Carrol saw them arrive at Oviedo.
[471] There is a long dispatch of Mendizabal to La Romana in the
Record Office, giving details of the storm of Villafranca, which
was all over in four hours.
Having accomplished this successful stroke La Romana was desirous
of pursuing his way to the Asturias, where he was determined to
make his power felt[472]. He took with him only one regiment (that
of La Princesa, one of his old corps from the Baltic), and handed
over the temporary command of the army to General Mahy, with orders
to hold on to the Vierzo as long as possible, but to retire on the
Asturias if Ney came up against him in force. The Marshal, however,
did not move from Lugo; when he heard of the fall of the garrison of
Villafranca, he was already so much entangled with the insurrection
that he could spare no troops for an expedition to the Vierzo. In
order to reopen the communication with Astorga he would have had to
call in his outlying brigades, and at the present moment he was more
concerned about the fate of Tuy and Vigo than about the operations of
La Romana. Accordingly, Mahy was left unmolested for the greater part
of a month in his cantonments along the banks of the Sil; it was a
welcome respite for the much-wandering army of Galicia.
[472] Captain Carrol had written to him a few days before to beg
him to hasten to Oviedo: ‘I strongly advise your Excellency’s
repairing to this city (Oviedo), and adopting such plans and
measures for the better government of the province and the active
operations of the army as your Excellency shall think meet.’
There were similar appeals from Spanish officers discontented
with the Junta.
Romana meanwhile betook himself to Oviedo with his escort, and on
arriving there on April 4 entered into a furious controversy with
the Junta. Finding them obstinate, and not disposed to carry out
his plans without discussion, he finally executed a petty _coup
d’état_[473]. It bears an absurd resemblance to Cromwell’s famous
dissolution of the Long Parliament. Coming into their council-room,
with Colonel Joseph O’Donnell and fifty grenadiers of the Princesa
regiment, he delivered an harangue to the members, accusing them of
all manner of maladministration and provincial selfishness. Then he
signed to his soldiers and bade them clear the room[474].
[473] It may be worth while to quote the opening clauses of
La Romana’s proclamation explaining his _coup d’état_; it is
dated the day after his ‘purge’ of the Junta: a copy exists in
the Record Office, forwarded to Castlereagh by Carrol:--‘Me es
forzoso manifestar con mucho sentimiento que la actual Junta
de Asturias, aunque de las mas favorecidas por la generosidad
britannica en toda classe de subsidios, es la que menos ha
coadyuvado a la grande y heroyca empresa de arrojar a los
enemigos de nuestro patrio suelo. Formada esta Junta por intriga,
y por la prepotencia de algunos sugetos y familias conexionadas,
se propuse arrogarse un poder absoluto e indefinido: serven los
individuos mutuamente en sus proyectos y despiques, desechan con
pretextos infundidos y aun calumniosos al que no subscribiese a
ellos, y contentan a los menesterosos con comisiones o encargos
de interes,’ &c.
[474] Carrol, who was an eye-witness of the scene, thought that
the Marquis ‘had re-formed the Junta in the most quiet, peaceable
and masterly manner.’ The last epithet seems the most appropriate
of the three. Carrol to Castlereagh, April 10, 1809 [in Record
Office].
La Romana then, on his own authority, nominated a new Junta; but
many of its members refused to act, doubting the legality of his
action, while the dispossessed delegates kept up a paper controversy,
and sent reams of objurgatory letters to the Government at Seville.
Ballasteros and his army, at the other side of the Principality,
seem to have paid little attention to La Romana, but the Marquis so
far got his way that he began to send much-needed stores, medicines,
munitions, and clothing to his troops in the Vierzo. He even
succeeded in procuring a few field-pieces for them[475], which were
dragged with difficulty over the passes viâ Cangas de Tineo.
[475] Letters of La Romana to Mahy in Appendix to Arteche, vol.
vi. p. 145.
Thus strengthened Mahy, much to his chief’s displeasure, advanced
from the Vierzo towards Lugo, with the intention of beating up the
French brigade there stationed. He took post at Navia de Suarna, just
outside the borders of the Asturias, and called to his standards all
the peasantry of the surrounding region. La Romana wrote him urgent
letters, directing him to avoid a battle and to await his own return.
‘He should remember that it was the policy of Fabius Maximus that
saved Rome, and curb his warlike zeal[476].’ It is satisfactory to
find that one Spanish general at least was free from that wild desire
for pitched battles that possessed most of his contemporaries.
[476] Ibid., p. 146.
Mahy, thus warned, halted in his march towards Lugo, and remained in
his cantonments in the valley of the Navia. His chief should have
returned to him, but lingered at Oviedo till April was over, busy
in the work of reorganization and in the forwarding of supplies.
Meanwhile the French hold on Southern Galicia had completely
disappeared: Vigo had fallen in March, Tuy had been evacuated.
Maucune’s column had cut its way back to Santiago with some
difficulty, bringing to Ney the news of Soult’s capture of Oporto,
but also the assurance that the whole valley of the Minho and the
western coast-land had passed into the hands of the insurgents.
What the Duke of Elchingen’s next move would have been, if he had not
received further intelligence from without, we cannot say. But in the
first week in May the long-lost communication with Madrid was at last
reopened, and he was ordered to take his part in a new and broad plan
of operations against La Romana’s army and the Asturias.
Ever since La Romana had stormed Villafranca, and all news from
Galicia had been completely cut off, King Joseph and his adviser
Jourdan had been in a state of great fear and perplexity as to the
condition of affairs in the north-west. Soult had long passed out of
their ken, and now Ney also was lost to sight. In default of accurate
information they received all manner of lugubrious rumours from
Leon and Astorga, and imagined that the Sixth Corps was in far more
desperate straits than was actually the case. Fearing the worst, they
resolved to find out, at all costs, what was going on in Galicia.
To do so it was necessary to fit out an expedition sufficiently
strong to brush aside the insurgents and communicate with Ney.
Troops, however, were hard to find. Lapisse had already marched
from Salamanca to join Victor. In Old Castile and Leon there were
but Kellermann’s dragoons and a few garrisons, none of which could
leave their posts. Marshal Bessières, to whom the general charge of
the northern provinces had been given by the Emperor, could show
conclusively that he was not able to equip a column of even 5,000 men
for service in Galicia.
The only quarter whence troops could be procured was Aragon, where
everything had remained quiet since the fall of Saragossa. The
Emperor had issued orders that of the two corps which had taken part
in the siege, the Third only should remain to hold down the conquered
kingdom: hence Mortier and the Fifth should have been disposable to
reinforce the troops in Old Castile. But, with the Austrian war upon
his hands, Napoleon was thinking of withdrawing Mortier and his
15,000 men from Spain. In a dispatch dated April 10, he announced
that the Marshal was to retire from Aragon to Logroño in Navarre,
from whence he might possibly be recalled to France if circumstances
demanded it[477]. At the same moment King Joseph was writing to
Mortier to summon him into Old Castile, and pointing out to him that
the safety of the whole of Northern Spain depended upon his presence.
Much perplexed by these contradictory orders, the Duke of Treviso
took a half-measure, and marched to Burgos, which was actually in Old
Castile, but lay only three marches from Logroño and upon the direct
route to France. A few days later the Emperor, moved by his brother’s
incessant appeals, and seeing that it was all-important to reopen
the communication between Ney and Soult, permitted Mortier to march
to Valladolid, where he was in a good position for holding down the
entire province of Old Castile. He also gave leave to the King to
employ for an expedition to Galicia the two regiments of the Third
Corps, which had escorted the prisoners of Saragossa to Bayonne, and
which were now on their homeward way to join their division in Aragon.
[477] Napoleon to Joseph, from Paris, April 10, 1809.
It was thus possible to get together enough troops to open the
way to Galicia. The charge of the expedition was handed over to
Kellermann, who was given his own dragoons, the two regiments from
Bayonne, a stray battalion of Leval’s Germans from Segovia, a Polish
battalion from Buitrago, and a provisional regiment organized from
belated details of the Second and Sixth Corps, which had been lying
in various garrisons of Castile and Leon[478]. He had altogether
some 7,000 or 8,000 men, whom he concentrated at Astorga on April
27. Marching on Villafranca he met no regular opposition, but was
harassed by the way by the peasantry, who had abandoned their
villages and retired into the hills. Mahy had moved off the main
road by making his advance to Navia de Suarna, and was not sighted
by Kellermann, nor did the Spaniard think fit to meddle with such a
powerful force as that which was now passing him.
[478] For details concerning the composition of this expedition
see Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 196.
On May 2 the column reached Lugo, where it fell in with Maurice
Mathieu’s division of the Sixth Corps, and obtained full information
as to Ney’s position. The Marshal was absent at Corunna, but sent his
chief of the staff to meet Kellermann and concert with him a common
plan of operations. It was settled that they should concentrate their
attention on La Romana and the Asturians, leaving southern Galicia
alone for the present, and taking no heed of Soult, of whom they had
received no news for a full month.
For the destruction of the Spanish armies of the north a concentric
movement was planned. Ney undertook to concentrate the main body
of his corps at Lugo, and to fall on the Asturians from the west,
crushing Mahy on the way. He stipulated, however, that he should
be allowed to return to Galicia as quickly as possible, lest the
insurgents should make havoc of his garrisons during his absence.
Kellermann was to retrace his steps to Astorga and Leon, and from
thence to march on the Asturias by the pass of Pajares, its great
southern outlet. At the same moment Bonnet at Santander was to be
requested to fall on from the east, and to attack Ballasteros and the
division that lay behind the Deba.
When it was reported to Mahy and La Romana that Kellermann had
turned back from Lugo, and was retreating upon Astorga, they failed
to grasp the meaning of his movement, and came to the conclusion
that his expedition had been sent out with no purpose save that
of communicating with Ney. Unconscious that a simultaneous attack
from all sides was being prepared against them, they failed to
concentrate. By leaving small ‘containing’ detachments at the
outlying posts, they could have massed 20,000 men against any one of
the French columns: but they failed to see their opportunity and were
caught in a state of complete dispersion. Ballasteros with 9,000 men
still lay opposite Bonnet; Worster at Castropol did not unite with
Mahy’s army at Navia de Suarna; and La Romana remained at Oviedo with
two regiments only.
Hence came hopeless disaster when the French attack was at last
let loose upon the Asturias. On May 13 the Duke of Elchingen drew
together at Lugo four of the eight infantry regiments which formed
the Sixth Corps, with two of his four cavalry regiments, and eight
mountain-guns carried by mules. This formed a compact force of 6,500
bayonets and 900 sabres[479]. He left behind him four battalions and
a cavalry regiment under Maucune at Santiago, the same force under
the cavalry brigadier Fournier at Lugo, two battalions at Corunna,
one at Betanzos, and one at Ferrol.
[479] The force that marched on the Asturias was composed of the
25th Léger, 27th and 59th of Maurice Mathieu’s division, the 39th
from Marchand’s, the 3rd Hussars, and 25th Dragoons.
Maucune’s detachment consisted of two battalions each of the 6th
Léger and the 76th, with the 15th Chasseurs and one battery.
Fournier’s detachment was composed of the 15th Dragoons, two
battalions of the 69th, and one of the 76th.
The obvious route by which the Marshal might have advanced on Oviedo
was the coast-road by Mondonedo and Castropol, which Worster was
guarding. But in order to save time and to fall upon the enemy on an
unexpected line, he took a shorter but more rugged mountain road by
Meyra and Ibias, which led him into the valley of the Navia. This
brought him straight upon Mahy’s army: but that general, when he learnt
of the strength that was directed against him, retreated in haste after
a skirmish at Pequin, and fled, not to the Asturias, but westward into
the upper valley of the Minho. [May 14.] This move was vexatious to
Ney, who would have preferred to drive him on to Oviedo, to share in
the general rout that was being prepared for the Asturians. The Marshal
refused to follow him, and pushed on to Cangas de Tineo in the valley
of the Narcea, capturing there a large convoy of food and ammunition
which was on its way from La Romana to Mahy. On May 17 he hurried on
to Salas, on the 18th he was at the bridge of Gallegos on the Nora
river, only ten miles from Oviedo. Here for the first time he met with
serious opposition: hitherto he had suffered from nothing but casual
‘sniping’ on the part of the peasantry. His march had been so rapid
that La Romana had only heard of his approach on the seventeenth[480],
and had not been able to call in any of his outlying detachments.
The Marquis was forced to attempt to defend the passage of the Nora
with nothing more than his small central reserve--the one Galician
regiment (La Princesa, only 600 bayonets) that he had brought with him
from Villafranca, and one Asturian battalion--not more than 1,500 men.
Naturally he was routed with great loss, though Ney allows that the
Princesa regiment made a creditable defence at the bridge[481]. The
Spanish troops therefore dispersed and fled eastward, while Romana rode
down to the seaport of Gijon and took ship on a Spanish sloop of war
along with the members of his Junta. The Marshal seized Oviedo on the
nineteenth: the place was pillaged in the most thorough fashion by his
troops. In his dispatch he makes the excuse that a few peasants had
attempted to defend some barricades in the suburbs, and that they, not
the soldiery, had begun the sack. _Credat Judaeus Apella!_ The ways
of the bands of Napoleon are too well known, and we shall not believe
that it was Spaniards who stole the cathedral plate, or tore the bones
of the early kings of Asturias from their resting-places in search of
treasure[482]. On May 20 Ney marched with one regiment down to Gijon,
where he found 250,000 lbs. of powder newly landed from England, and
a quantity of military stores. An English merchantman was captured
and another burnt[483]. A detached column occupied Aviles, the second
seaport of the Asturias.
[480] Carrol gives an excellent account of the French invasion
in a long dispatch written from Vigo on June 3. He says that the
Marquis only heard of Ney’s approach by the peasants flying from
Cangas de Tineo on the morning of May 17. He himself was sent
out to verify the incredible information, and came on the French
as they were crossing the Navia, only thirty miles from Oviedo.
He rode back in haste, and met one Asturian battalion coming up,
and afterwards the regiment of La Princesa. Romana had no other
troops, and only a few hundred half-armed peasantry joined in the
defence of the bridge of Gallegos.
[481] ‘Ce dernier pont de Gallegos fut assez bien défendu par le
régiment de la Princesse, mais néanmoins il fut enlevé, ainsi
qu’une pièce de douze.’ Ney to King Joseph, Oviedo, May 21.
[482] ‘Les magasins et les plus riches maisons de la ville furent
pillés par les paysans et la populace. Ces malheureux, ivres
d’eau-de-vie, entreprirent de défendre la ville et firent feu
dans toutes les rues.’ Ney to King Joseph, Oviedo, May 21.
[483] They were called the Pique and the Plutus. Carrol was
nearly captured while burning the latter, and escaped in an open
boat.
On the following day, May 21, a detachment sent inland from Oviedo
up the valley of the Lena, with orders to search for the column
coming from the south, got into touch with that force. Kellermann
had duly reached Leon, where he found orders directing him to send
back to Aragon the two regiments of the Third Corps which had been
lent him[484], and to take instead a division of Mortier’s corps,
which was now disposable for service in the north. Accordingly he
picked up Girard’s (late Suchet’s) division, and leaving one of its
brigades at Leon, marched with the other and the remainder of his
original force, to storm the defiles of Pajares. He had with him
between 6,000 and 7,000 troops, a force with which he easily routed
the Asturian brigade of 3,000 men under Colonel Quixano, which had
been set to guard the pass. At the end of two days of irregular
fighting, Kellermann descended into the valley of the Lena and met
Ney’s outposts on May 21. The routed enemy dispersed among the hills.
[484] The 116th and 117th of Morlot’s division.
It remains to speak of the third French column which started to
invade the Asturias, that of Bonnet. This general marched from
Santander on May 17 with 5,000 men, intending to attack Ballasteros,
and force his way to Oviedo by the coast-road that passes by San
Vincente de la Barquera and Villaviciosa. But he found no one to
fight, for Ballasteros had been summoned by La Romana to defend
Oviedo, and had started off by the inland road viâ Cangas de Oñis and
Infiesto. The two armies therefore were marching parallel to each
other, with rough mountains between them. On reaching Infiesto on
May 21, Ballasteros heard of the fall of Oviedo and of the forcing
of the pass of Pajares: seeing that it would be useless to run into
the lion’s mouth by proceeding any further, he fell back into the
mountains, and took refuge in the upland valley of Covadonga, the
site of King Pelayo’s famous victory over the Moors in the year 718.
Here he remained undiscovered, and was gradually joined by the wrecks
of the force which Ney had routed at Oviedo, including O’Donnell and
the Princesa regiment. Bonnet passed him without discovering his
whereabouts, advanced as far as Infiesto and Villaviciosa, and got
into touch with Kellermann.
Thus the three French columns had all won their way into the heart
of the Asturias, but though they had seized its capital and its
seaports, they had failed to catch its army, and only half their task
had been performed. Of all the Asturian troops only the two small
forces at Oviedo and Pajares had been met and routed. Worster had not
been molested, Mahy had doubled back into Galicia, Ballasteros had
gone up into the mountains. If the invasion was to have any definite
results, it was necessary to hunt down all these three divisions.
But there was no time to do so: Ney was anxious about his Galician
garrisons; Bonnet remembered that he had left Santander in charge of
a weak detachment of no more than 1,200 men. Both refused to remain
in the Asturias, or to engage in a long stern chase after the elusive
Spaniards, among the peaks of the Peñas de Europa and the Sierras
Albas. They decided that Kellermann with his 7,000 men must finish
the business. Accordingly they departed each to his own province--and
it was high time, for their worst expectations had been fulfilled.
Mahy in the west and Ballasteros in the east had each played the
correct game, and had fallen upon the small garrisons left exposed in
their rear. Moreover, the insurgents of Southern Galicia had crossed
the Ulla and marched on Santiago. If Ney had remained ten days longer
in the Asturias, it is probable that he would have returned to find
the half of the Sixth Corps which he had left in Galicia absolutely
exterminated.
The Marshal, however, was just in time to prevent this disaster.
Handing over the charge of the principality to Kellermann, he marched
off on May 22 by the coast-road which leads to Galicia by the route
of Navia, Castropol, and Ribadeo. He hoped to deal with Worster by
the way, having learnt that the Swiss general had advanced from
Castropol by La Romana’s orders, and was moving cautiously in the
direction of Oviedo. But Worster was fortunate enough to escape: he
went up into the mountains when he heard that Ney was near, and had
the satisfaction of learning that the Marshal had passed him by. The
rivers being in flood, and the bridges broken, the French had a slow
and tiresome march to Ribadeo, which they only reached on May 26.
Next day the Duke of Elchingen was at Castropol, where he received
the news that Lugo had been in the gravest peril, and had only been
relieved by the unexpected appearance of Soult and the Second Corps
from the direction of Orense.
The sequence of events during the Marshal’s absence had been
as follows. When Mahy found that he had escaped pursuit, he had
immediately made up his mind to strike at the French garrisons. He
tried to persuade Worster to join him, or to attack Ferrol, but could
not induce him to quit the Asturias. So with his own 6,000 men Mahy
marched on Lugo, beat General Fournier (who came out to meet him)
in a skirmish outside the walls, and drove him into the town. Lugo
had no fortification save a mediaeval wall, and the Spaniards were
in great hopes of storming it, as they had stormed Villafranca. But
when they had lain two days before the place, they were surprised to
hear that a large French force was marching against them; it was not
Ney returning from the Asturias, but the dilapidated corps of Soult
retreating from Orense. Wisely refusing to face an army of 19,000
men, Mahy raised the siege and retired to Villalba in the folds of
the Sierra de Loba. On May 22 Soult entered Lugo, where he was at
last able to give his men nine days’ rest, and could begin to cast
about him for means to refit them with the proper equipment of an
army, for, as we have seen, they were in a condition of absolute
destitution and wholly unable to take the field.
At Castropol Ney heard at one and the same moment that Lugo had
been in danger and that it had been relieved. But he also received
news of even greater importance from another quarter. Maucune and
the detachment which he had left at Santiago had been defeated in
the open field by the insurgents of Southern Galicia, and had been
compelled to fall back on Corunna. This was now the point of danger,
wherefore the Marshal neither moved to join Soult at Lugo, nor set
himself to hunt Mahy in the mountains, but marched straight for
Corunna to succour Maucune.
The force which had defeated that general consisted in the main of
the insurgents who had beleaguered Tuy and Vigo in March and April.
They were now under Morillo and Garcia del Barrio, who were beginning
to reduce them to some sort of discipline, and were organizing them
into battalions and companies. But the core of the ‘Division of the
Minho,’ as this force was now called, was composed of the small body
of regulars which La Romana had left at Puebla de Senabria, under
Martin La Carrera. That officer, after giving his feeble detachment
some weeks of rest, had marched via Monterey and Orense to join the
insurrectionary army. He brought with him nine guns and 2,000 men. On
May 22 Carrera and Morillo crossed the Ulla and advanced on Santiago
with 10,000 men, of whom only 7,000 possessed firearms. Maucune
came forth to meet them in the Campo de Estrella[485], outside the
city, with his four battalions and a regiment of chasseurs, thinking
to gain an easy success when the enemy offered him battle in the
open. But he was outnumbered by three to one, and as the Galicians
showed much spirit and stood steadily to their guns, he was repulsed
with loss. Carrera then attacked in his turn, drove the French into
Santiago, chased them through the town, and pursued them for a
league beyond it. Maucune was wounded, and lost 600 men--a fifth of
his whole force--and two guns. He fell back in disorder on Corunna.
He had the audacity to write to Ney that he had retired after an
indecisive combat: but the Marshal, reading between the lines of his
dispatch, hastened to Corunna with all the troops which had returned
from the Asturias, and did not consider the situation secure till he
learnt that Carrera had not advanced from Santiago.
[485] The plain from which Santiago gets its name of Santiago de
Compostella.
Leaving his main body opposite the ‘Division of the Minho,’ the Duke
of Elchingen now betook himself to Lugo, to concert a joint plan of
operation with Soult [May 30]. The results of their somewhat stormy
conference must be told in another chapter.
Meanwhile the situation behind them was rapidly changing. On May 24
La Romana, who had landed at Ribadeo, rejoined Mahy and his army
at Villalba. The Marquis, on surveying the situation, came to the
conclusion that it was too dangerous to remain in the northern angle
of Galicia, between the French army at Lugo and the sea. He resolved
to return to the southern region of the province, and to get into
touch with Carrera and the troops on the Minho. He therefore bade
his army prepare for another forced march across the mountains. They
murmured but obeyed, and, cautiously slipping past Soult’s corps by
a flank movement, crossed the high-road to Villafranca and reached
Monforte de Lemos. From thence they safely descended to Orense,
where La Romana established his head quarters [June 6]. Thus the
Spaniards were once more in line, and prepared to defend the whole of
Southern Galicia.
We have still to deal with the state of affairs in the Asturias.
After Ney’s departure on May 22, Kellermann lay at Oviedo and Bonnet
at Infiesto. But a few days later the latter general received the
disquieting news that Ballasteros, whose movements had hitherto
escaped him, was on the move towards the east, and might be intending
either to make a raid into the plains of Castile, or to descend on
Santander and its weak garrison.
Ballasteros, as a matter of fact, had resolved to stir up trouble in
Bonnet’s rear, with the object of drawing him off from the Asturias.
Leaving his refuge at Covadonga on May 24 he marched by mule-tracks,
unmarked on any map, to Potes in the upper valley of the Deba. There
he remained a few days, and finding that he was unpursued, and that
his exact situation was unknown to the French, resolved to make a
dash for Santander. Starting on June 6 and keeping to the mountains,
he successfully achieved his end, and arrived at his goal before the
garrison of that place had any knowledge of his approach. On the
morning of June 10 he stormed the city, driving out General Noirot,
who escaped with 1,000 men, but capturing 200 of the garrison and 400
sick in hospital, as well as the whole of the stores and munitions of
Bonnet’s regiments. Among his other prizes was the sum of £10,000 in
cash, in the military chest of the division. Some of the French tried
to escape by sea, in three corvettes and two luggers which lay in the
harbour, but the British frigates _Amelia_ and _Statira_, which lay
off the coast, captured them all. This was a splendid stroke, and if
Ballasteros had been prudent he might have got away unharmed with
all his plunder. But he lingered in Santander, though he knew that
Bonnet must be in pursuit of him, and resolved to defend the town.
The French general had started to protect his base and his dépôts,
the moment that he ascertained the real direction of Ballasteros’
march. On the night of June 10 he met the fugitive garrison and
learnt that Santander had fallen. Late on the ensuing day he reached
its suburbs, and sent in two battalions to make a dash at the place.
They were beaten off; but next morning Bonnet attacked with his
whole force, the Asturians were defeated, and Ballasteros’ raid
ended in a disaster. He himself escaped by sea, but 3,000 of his men
were captured, and the rest dispersed. The French recovered their
sick and prisoners, and such of their stores as the Spaniards had
not consumed[486]. The wrecks of Ballasteros’ division drifted back
over the hills to their native principality, save one detachment,
the regulars of La Romana’s old regiment of La Princesa. This small
body of 300 men turned south, and by an astounding march across
Old Castile and Aragon reached Molina on the borders of Valencia,
where they joined the army of Blake. They had gone 250 miles through
territory of which the French were supposed to be in military
possession, but threaded their way between the garrisons in perfect
safety, because the peasantry never betrayed their position to the
enemy.
[486] All this may be studied in two dispatches of Bonnet to King
Joseph, dated Santander, June 12 and June 20.
Disastrous as was its end, Ballasteros’ expedition had yet served its
purpose. Not only had it thrown the whole of the French garrisons in
Biscay and Guipuzcoa into confusion, but even the Governor of Bayonne
had been frightened and had sent alarming dispatches to the Emperor.
This was comparatively unimportant, but it was a very different
matter that Bonnet had been forced to evacuate the Asturias, all of
whose eastern region was now free from the invaders.
More was to follow: Kellermann still lay at Oviedo, worried but
not seriously incommoded by Worster and the Asturians of the west.
But a few days after Bonnet’s departure he received a request from
Mortier (backed by orders from King Joseph), that the division of
the 5th Corps which had been lent him should instantly return to
Castile. This was one of the results of Wellesley’s campaign on
the Douro, for Mortier, hearing of Soult’s expulsion from Northern
Portugal, imagined that the British army, being now free for further
action, would debouch by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo and fall upon
Salamanca. He needed the aid of his second division, which Kellermann
was forced to send back. But it would have been not only useless
but extremely dangerous to linger at Oviedo with the small remnant
of the expeditionary force, when Girard’s regiments had been
withdrawn. Therefore Kellermann wisely resolved to evacuate the whole
principality, and returned to Leon by the pass of Pajares in the
third week of June.
Thus ended in complete failure the great concentric attack on the
Asturias. The causes of the fiasco were two. (1) The French generals
chose as their objective, not the enemy’s armies, but his capital
and base of operations. Both Ney and Bonnet while marching on Oviedo
left what (adapting a naval phrase) we may call an ‘army-in-being’
behind them, and in each case that army fell upon the detachments
left in the rear, and pressed them so hard that the invading forces
could not stay in the Asturias, but were forced to turn back to
protect their communications. (2) In Spain conquest was useless
unless a garrison could be left behind to hold down the territory
that was overrun. But neither Ney, Kellermann, nor Bonnet had any
troops to devote to such a purpose: they invaded the Asturias with
regiments borrowed from other regions, from which they could not long
be spared. As later experience in 1811 and 1812 showed, it required
some 8,000 men merely to maintain a hold upon Oviedo and the central
parts of the principality. The invaders had no such force at their
disposition--the troops from the 6th Corps were wanted in Galicia,
those of the 5th Corps in Castile, those of Bonnet in the Montaña. If
it were impossible to garrison the Asturias, the invasion dwindled
down into a raid, and a raid which left untouched the larger part
of the enemy’s field army was useless. It would have been better
policy to hunt Mahy, Worster, and Ballasteros rather than to secure
for a bare three weeks military possession of Oviedo and Gijon. If
Soult had not dropped from the clouds, as it were, to save Lugo:
if Ballasteros had been a little more prudent at Santander, the
Asturian expedition would have ended not merely in a failure, but in
an ignominious defeat. It should never have been undertaken while
the Galician insurrection was still raging, and while no troops were
available for the permanent garrisoning of the principality.
Searching a little deeper, may we not say that the ultimate cause
of the fiasco was Napoleon’s misconception of the character of the
Spanish war? It was he who ordered the invasion of the Asturias, and
he issued his orders under the hypothesis that it could be not only
conquered but retained. But with the numbers then at the disposal of
his generals this was impossible, because the insurrection absorbed
so many of their troops, that no more could be detached without
risking the loss of all that had been already gained. By grasping at
the Asturias Napoleon nearly lost Galicia. Only Soult’s appearance
prevented that province from falling completely into the hands of
Mahy and La Carrera: and that appearance was as involuntary as it was
unexpected. If the Duke of Dalmatia had been able to carry out his
original design he would have retreated from Oporto to Zamora and not
to Orense. If Beresford had not foiled him at Amarante, he would have
been resting on the Douro when Fournier was in such desperate straits
at Lugo. In that case Ney might have returned from Oviedo to find
that his detachments had been destroyed, and that Galicia was lost.
It was not the Emperor’s fault that this disaster failed to occur.
SECTION XV: CHAPTER II
THE FRENCH ABANDON GALICIA
When, upon May 30, 1809, Ney arrived at Lugo, and met Soult in
conference, it seemed that, now or never, the time had come when a
serious endeavour might be made to subdue the Galician insurgents.
The whole force of the 2nd and 6th Corps was concentrated in the
narrow triangle between Ferrol, Corunna, and Lugo. The two marshals
had still 33,000 men fit for service, after deducting the sick. If
they set aside competent garrisons for the three towns that we have
just named, they could still show some 25,000 men available for field
operations, and with such a force Ney was of the opinion that the
insurrection might be beaten down. It was true that the 2nd Corps
was in a deplorable condition as regards equipment, but on the other
hand Corunna and Ferrol were still full of the stores of arms and
ammunition that had been captured when they surrendered. Clothing, no
doubt, was lamentably deficient, and Ney could only supply hundreds
where Soult asked for thousands of boots and _capotes_; but he
refitted his colleague’s troops with muskets and ammunition, and
furnished him with eight mountain-guns--field-pieces the Duke of
Dalmatia would not take, though a certain number were offered him;
for after his experience of the way that his artillery had delayed
him in February and March he refused to accept them. Horses and
mules were unattainable--nearly half Soult’s cavalry was dismounted,
and he had lost most of his sumpter-beasts between Guimaraens and
Montalegre. Nevertheless, the corps, after a week’s rest at Lugo,
was once more capable of service. Its weakly men had been left in
hospital at Oporto, or had fallen by the way in the dreadful defiles
of Ruivaens and Salamonde. All that remained were war-hardened
veterans, and Soult, out of his 19,000 men, had no more than 800
sick and wounded. He resolved to disembarrass himself of another
hindrance, his dismounted cavalry, and in each regiment made the 3rd
and 4th squadrons hand over their chargers to the 1st and 2nd. The
1,100 troopers thus left without mounts were armed with muskets, and
formed into a column, to which were added the _cadres_ of certain
infantry battalions belonging to the regiments which had suffered
most. In these the 3rd, or the 3rd and 4th, battalions turned over
their effective rank and file to the others, while the officers and
non-commissioned officers were to be sent home to their dépôts to
organize new units. The whole body was placed under General Quesnel,
who was directed to cut his way to Astorga by the great high-road:
it was hoped that he would come safely through, now that La Romana
had withdrawn his army to Southern Galicia. The expedient was a
hazardous one; but the column was fortunate: it was forced to fight
with a large assembly of peasants at Doncos, half-way between Lugo
and Villafranca, but reached its goal with no great loss, though for
every mile of the march it was being ‘sniped’ and harassed by the
guerrillas.
Soult’s available force, after he had sent his sick into the
hospitals of Lugo, and had dismissed Quesnel’s detachment, was about
16,500 or 17,000 sabres and bayonets. Ney had about 15,000 men left.
The two marshals were bound, both by the Emperor’s orders and by the
mere necessities of the situation, to co-operate with each other. But
there was a fundamental divergence between their aims and intentions.
Ney had been given charge of Galicia, and he regarded it as his duty
to conquer and hold down the province. He refused to look beyond his
orders, or to take into consideration the progress of operations
in other parts of the Peninsula. Soult, on the other hand, always
loved to play his own game, and had no desire to stay in Galicia in
order to lighten his colleague’s task. He was disgusted with the
land, its mountains, and its insurgents, and was eager to find some
excuse for quitting it. He had no difficulty in discovering many
excellent reasons for retiring into the plains of Leon. The first
was the dilapidated state of his troops: in spite of the resources
which Ney had lent, the 2nd Corps still lacked clothing, pay, and
transport. Soult had written to King Joseph on May 30 to ask that all
these necessaries might be sent forward to Zamora, where he intended
to pick them up. A still more plausible plea might be found in the
general state of affairs in Northern Spain. The Emperor’s main object
was the expulsion of the British army from the Peninsula. But if the
2nd Corps joined the 6th in a long, and probably fruitless, hunt
after the evasive La Romana, Wellesley would be left free to march
whithersoever he might please. He might base himself on Almeida and
Ciudad Rodrigo, and make a sudden inroad into Leon and Old Castile,
where the small corps of Mortier would certainly prove inadequate to
hold him back. Or he might go off to the south, and fall upon Victor
in Estremadura, a move which might very probably lead to the loss of
Madrid. Soult therefore was of opinion that his duty was to drop down
into Leon, and there join with Mortier in making such a demonstration
against Portugal as would compel the British army to stand upon the
defensive, and to abandon any idea of invading Spain either by the
valley of the Douro or that of the Tagus. ‘He could not keep his eye
off Portugal,’ as Jourdan and King Joseph, no less than Ney, kept
complaining[487]. There cannot be the least doubt that Soult was
quite right in turning his main attention in this direction. It was
the English army that was the most dangerous enemy; and it was the
flanking position of Portugal that rendered the French movements
toward the south of Spain hazardous or impracticable.
[487] The phrase occurs in a dispatch of Jourdan’s written in
August.
Nevertheless all the Duke of Dalmatia’s arguments seemed to his
colleague mere excuses destined to cover a selfish determination
to abandon the 6th Corps, and to shirk the duty of co-operating in
the conquest of Galicia. He insisted that Soult must aid him in
crushing La Romana before taking any other task in hand. And he had
a strong moral claim for pressing his request, because it was from
the resources which he had furnished that the 2nd Corps had been
re-equipped and rendered capable of renewed service in the field.
The marshals wrangled, and their followers copied them, for a fierce
feud, leading to a copious exchange of recrimination and many duels,
sprang up during the few days that the staffs of the two corps lay
together at Lugo[488]. At last Soult yielded, or feigned to yield,
to Ney’s instances: he promised to lend his aid for the suppression
of the Galician insurrection under certain conditions. A plan for
combined action was accordingly drawn up.
[488] There is clear evidence of this quarrel in the diaries and
memoirs of the officers of both corps. ‘Nous fûmes d’abord bien
reçus à Lugo’--writes Soult’s aide-de-camp St. Chamans--‘mais le
Maréchal Ney étant arrivé, les choses changèrent de face, et on
eût dit que nous n’étions plus un corps français: tout nous était
refusé: même nos malades mouraient en foule dans les hôpitaux,
faute d’aliments: car tout était réservé, par les ordres de Ney,
pour son corps d’armée, et on peut bien dire qu’on nous traita
de Turc en Maure’ (p. 150). Des Odoards is equally precise:
‘Une fâcheuse mésintelligence a éclaté entre les troupes de Ney
et les nôtres: les duels sont survenus, et peu s’en est fallu
qu’oubliant que nous sommes, les uns et les autres, enfants de
la France, il n’y ait eu engagement général. Le non-succès de
notre entreprise, l’état de délabrement de notre tenue, out servi
de texte aux mauvaises plaisanteries, aux propos outrageants,
dont des scènes sanguinaires ont été la suite. Les soldats seuls
ont d’abord pris part à ces rixes, puis elles ont gagné les
officiers, et s’il faut croire certain bruits, les maréchaux ont
eu eux-mêmes une entrevue fort orageuse’ (p. 240). According to
the common report this ‘stormy interview’ actually ended in Ney’s
drawing his sword upon Soult, and being only prevented by General
Maurice Mathieu from assailing him. This tale was told to Captain
Boothby (see his _Memoirs_, ii. p. 31) by a French officer who
said that he had been an eye-witness of the scene.
According to this scheme Ney was to advance from Corunna to Santiago
with the 6th Corps, and was to drive the main body of the insurgents
southward in the direction of Vigo and Tuy, following the line of
the great coast-road. Soult meanwhile was to operate in the inland,
against the enemy’s exposed flank. He was to march from Lugo down
the valley of the upper Minho, pushing before him all that stood in
his way, with the object of thrusting the enemy on to Orense, and
then towards the sea. If all went right, La Romana’s army as well as
the insurgents of the coast, would finally be enclosed between the
two marshals and the Atlantic cliffs, and, as it was hoped, would
be exterminated or forced to surrender. The obviously weak point of
the plan was that it did not allow sufficiently for the power which
the enemy possessed of escaping, by dispersion, or by taking to the
mountains. Even if the details of the two movements had been carried
out with perfect accuracy, it is probable that the Galicians would
have crept out of some gap, or slipped away between the converging
corps, or saved themselves by a headlong retreat into Portugal.
The Marshals might have captured Vigo and Orense: it is extremely
unlikely that they could have done more, especially as they had to
deal with a general like La Romana, who had made up his mind that his
duty was to avoid pitched battles, and to preserve his army at all
costs. If Cuesta or Blake had been in command the scheme would have
been much more feasible; but La Romana was the only Spanish commander
then in the field who had resolved never to fight if he could help it.
On June 1 Ney and Soult parted, starting the one upon the road to
Corunna, the other upon that which makes for Orense by the valley of
the upper Minho. It would seem that neither of them had any great
confidence in the success of the plan adopted, and that each was
possessed by the strongest doubts as to the loyalty with which his
colleague would support him. Soult was on the watch for any good
excuse for throwing up the scheme and retiring to Zamora. Ney was
determined not to risk himself and his corps overmuch, lest he should
find himself left in the lurch by Soult at the critical moment[489].
[489] ‘Il se sépara de Ney, avec lequel il eût l’air d’arrêter,
pour la conservation de la Galice, un plan de campagne auquel
tous les deux étaient, je crois, résolus d’avance de ne pas
se conformer, car ils voulaient le moins possible se trouver
ensemble.’ St. Chamans (p. 151). This represents the view of
Soult’s staff.
Meanwhile the Spaniards had been straining every nerve to reorganize
the army of Galicia, employing the short time of respite that
they had gained in drafting back into the old corps the numerous
stragglers who began to return to their colours as the summer drew
on, and in raising new battalions of volunteers. La Romana lay in
person at Orense with the main body of the original army, which
had now risen to a force of about 7,000 properly equipped men, and
nearly 3,000 unarmed recruits: he had still only four guns[490]. The
‘Division of the Minho’ was no longer under Carrera and Morillo: they
had been superseded by the arrival of the Conde de Noroña to whom
the Central Junta had given over the command. This officer found
himself at the head of about 10,000 men, of whom only about 2,500
were regulars, the rest were peasantry new to the career of arms, but
so much exhilarated by their late successes at Vigo and the Campo
de Estrella, that it was hard to hold them back from taking the
offensive[491]. Fortunately Noroña was gifted not only with tact but
with caution: he knew how to keep the horde together without allowing
them to get out of hand, and utterly refused to risk them in the open
field[492].
[490] La Romana (June 1, in the Record Office) gives present at
Orense 9,633 men--of whom 7,094 were old soldiers, including 381
cavalry and 379 artillery.
[491] Carrol to Castlereagh, from Vigo, June 11.
[492] For some notes concerning Noroña’s character see Arteche,
vi. 188.
On June 5 Ney arrived before Santiago with the main body of the
6th Corps--eighteen battalions, three cavalry regiments and two
batteries: he had again left Corunna, Ferrol, and Lugo in the charge
of very small garrisons, and was by no means without misgivings as
to their fate during his absence. But he thought that his first duty
was to concentrate a field force sufficiently large to face and beat
the whole army of Galicia, in case La Romana should join Noroña for a
combined attack on the 6th Corps.
On the news of the Marshal’s approach the Spanish general drew back
all his forces behind the estuary known as the Octavem (or Oitaben),
a broad tidal stretch of water where several small mountain torrents
meet at the head of a long bay. Noroña might have disputed the lines
of the Ulla and the Vedra, but neither of these rivers affords such
a good defensive position as the Oitaben. Here the hills of the
interior come down much nearer to the sea than they do at the mouths
of the Ulla and the Vedra, so that there is a much shorter line to
defend, between low-water mark and the foot of the inaccessible
Sierra de Suido. There was no road inland by which the position could
be turned, so that the Galicians had only to guard the six miles of
river-bank between the sea and the mountain. There were two bridges
to be watched: the more important was that of Sampayo, where the
main _chaussée_ to Vigo passes the Oitaben just where it narrows
down and ceases to be tidal. The second was that of Caldelas, four
miles further inland, where a side-road to the village of Sotomayor
crosses the Verdugo, the most northern of the three torrents which
unite to form the Oitaben. Noroña had broken down four arches of
the great Sampayo bridge. That of Caldelas he had not destroyed,
but had barricaded: he had drawn a double line of trenches on the
hillside that dominates it, and placed there a battery containing
some of his small provision of artillery--he had but nine field-guns
and two mortars taken from the walls of Vigo. Morillo was given
charge of this part of the position, Noroña took post himself at
Sampayo. He had neglected no minor precaution that was possible--some
gunboats, one of which was manned by English sailors drawn from the
two frigates in the bay, patrolled the tidal part of the Oitaben, and
flanked the broken bridge. Winter, the senior naval officer present,
put his marines on shore: along with sixty stragglers from Moore’s
army, who had been liberated by the peasants from French captivity,
they garrisoned Vigo, which lies a few miles beyond the Oitaben.
On June 7 Ney reached the front of the position and ascertained
that the bridge of Sampayo was broken. His artillery exchanged some
objectless salvos with that of Noroña, while his cavalry rode inland
to look for possible points of passage. They could find none save
the fortified bridge of Caldelas, and a very difficult ford just
above it, commanded, like the bridge, by the Spanish trenches on the
hillside. The Marshal was also informed that at the Sampayo itself
there was another ford, passable only at low tide for three hours at
a time.
These reports were by no means encouraging: the Spanish position was
almost impregnable, and there was no way of turning it. Indeed the
only road by which the enemy could be taken in flank or rear was
that from Orense to Vigo, along the Minho. This Ney could not reach:
but supposing that Soult had carried out the plan of operations to
which he had assented on June 1, it was just possible that he might
appear, sooner or later, on that line, and so dislodge the enemy.
However it was equally possible that he might be still far distant,
and so Ney resolved to make an attempt to force the passage of
the Oitaben. On the morning of June 8 therefore, after a long but
fruitless cannonade, one body of infantry endeavoured to pass at the
ford opposite the village of Sampayo[493], while another, with some
cavalry, attempted to cross the other ford at Caldelas, and to storm
its bridge. At both places the Galicians stood their ground, and the
heads of the column were exposed to such a furious fire that they
suffered heavily and failed to reach the further bank. The Marshal
therefore drew them back, and refused to persist in an attack which
would only have had a chance of success if the enemy had misbehaved
and given way to panic. The French lost several hundred men[494], the
Galicians, safe in their trenches, suffered far less.
[493] Carrol, writing from Vigo two days later, says that the
French infantry ‘seemed determined _at any risk_ to cross the
water at low tide,’ that they came on very boldly, but could not
face the fire, and finally gave back.
[494] Carrol, in the letter just quoted, says that thirty-nine
dead bodies were left before the bridge-head of Caldelas, which
the French could not carry off because of the hot fire that
played upon the spot. He estimates the French total loss at 300,
while that of Noroña was only 111.
That evening Ney received news which convinced him that Soult had
left him in the lurch, and had no intention of prosecuting his march
on Orense, to turn the enemy’s flank. It was reported that the 2nd
Corps, after making only two days’ march from Lugo, had stopped short
at Monforte de Lemos, and showed no signs of moving forward. Indeed
the Duke of Dalmatia had put the regiments into cantonments and was
evidently about to make a lengthy halt.
Since the Duke of Elchingen was now convinced that the enemy could
not be dislodged from behind the Oitaben without his colleague’s aid,
and since that colleague showed no signs of appearing within any
reasonable time, the game was up. On the morning of the ninth Ney
gave orders for his troops to draw off, and to retire by the road
to Santiago and Corunna. He made no secret of his belief that Soult
had deliberately betrayed him, and had never intended to keep his
promise[495]. Without the aid of the 2nd Corps he had no hopes of
being able to suppress the Galician insurrection. But till he should
learn precisely what his colleague was doing, he could not make up
his mind to abandon the province. He therefore sent off on June 10 an
aide-de-camp with a large escort, by the circuitous route via Lugo.
This officer bore a dispatch, which explained the situation, reported
the check at Sampayo, and demanded that the 2nd Corps should not
move any further away, but should return to lend aid to the 6th in
its time of need. It was more than ten days before an answer was
received. But on the twenty-first Soult’s reply came to hand: he
had been found marching, not towards Orense, but eastward, in the
direction of the frontiers of Leon. He refused to turn back, alleging
that this was not in the bond signed at Lugo, and that his troops
were in such a state of exhaustion that he was forced to lead them
into the plains, to rest them and refit them. Such a reply seemed to
justify Ney’s worst suspicions; abandoned by his colleague, and with
the care of the whole of Galicia thrown upon his hands, he refused
to risk the safety of the 6th Corps in the unequal struggle. He
evacuated Corunna and Ferrol on the twenty-second and concentrated
his whole force at Lugo. There he picked up the sick and wounded of
Soult’s corps as well as his own, and in six forced marches retired
along the high-road by Villafranca to Astorga, which place he reached
on June 30. Every day he had been worried and molested by the local
guerrillas, but neither Noroña nor La Romana had dared to meddle
with him. In his anger at the constant attacks of the insurgents, he
sacked every place that he passed, from Villafranca and Ponferrada
down to the smallest hamlets. Twenty-seven Galician towns and
villages are said to have been burned by the 6th Corps during its
retreat. Such conduct was unworthy of a soldier of Ney’s calibre: it
can only be explained by the fact that he was almost beside himself
with wrath at being foiled by Soult’s breach of his plighted word,
and vented his fury on the only victims that he could reach.
[495] ‘I have been assured,’ says Napier (ii. 127), ‘by an
officer of Ney’s personal staff [Col. D’Esménard] that he rashly
concluded that personal feelings had swayed Soult to betray the
6th Corps. In this error he returned in wrath to Corunna.’ But
was his conclusion rash, or wrong?
We must now turn back to trace the steps of the 2nd Corps in its
devious march from Lugo to the plains of Leon. Soult had sent out
Loison with one division by the road down the left bank of the Minho
on June 1. He himself followed with the rest of the army on the next
day. On the third the Marshal reached the little town of Monforte de
Lemos, between the Minho and the Sil, which he found deserted by its
inhabitants. In obedience to La Romana’s orders they had all gone up
into the mountains.
If Soult had been honestly desirous of carrying out his compact with
Ney, his next step would have been to make a rapid march on Orense.
He must have been able to calculate that his colleague would now be
in touch with Noroña’s forces somewhere to the south of Corunna,
and it was his duty to co-operate by descending the Minho in the
enemy’s rear. The mere fact that he remained for the unconscionable
space of eight days at Monforte, is a sufficient proof that he never
intended to carry out his part of the compact. During this time [June
3-11], while Ney was fighting out to an unsuccessful end his campaign
against Noroña, Soult was absolutely quiescent, at a place only
thirty miles from his starting-point at Lugo. He was unmolested save
by small bands of local guerrillas, who fled to the hills whenever
they were faced. His official chronicler Le Noble pleads that there
were no fords to be found either over the Minho or over the Sil[496].
But in eight days, unopposed by any serious enemy, the engineers of
the 2nd Corps could certainly have built bridges if the Marshal had
ordered them to do so. Meanwhile the troops rested, and rejoiced in
the abundant supplies of food and wine which they gathered in from
the neighbourhood, for Monforte lies in the centre of a fertile
upland and its neighbourhood had never before suffered from the ills
of war[497].
[496] Le Noble, p. 280.
[497] Fantin des Odoards, p. 242.
On the eleventh Soult at last moved on. But it was not in the
direction of Orense. He had no news of Ney, and professed to be
concerned that the 6th Corps had not yet been heard of on the
Orense road. Finally he announced that he was compelled to believe
that the Duke of Elchingen had not executed his part of the joint
campaign[498], and that there was no longer any reason that the 2nd
Corps should carry out its share of the plan. Accordingly he marched,
not toward Ney, but in the opposite direction, up the valley of the
Sil, with his face set towards the east. He pretended that he hoped
to catch and disperse the corps of La Romana, to whom he attributed
a design of marching on Puebla de Senabria--the same movement that
the Marquis had executed once before in the first days of March. But
as a matter of fact La Romana was at Orense, and far from having
any intention of retreating eastward, if he were attacked by the 2nd
Corps, he was looking on Portugal as his line of retreat[499].
[498] ‘Le Maréchal crut, _ou feignit de croire_, que Ney avait
changé d’idée,’ says his aide-de-camp St. Chamans, p. 151.
[499] La Romana writes to Carrol from Orense, on June 9, to
say that he had been intending to march by cross-roads to fall
on Ney’s flank, and so aid the division of Noroña. But Soult’s
appearance at Monforte with 12,000 men [an under-estimate]
compels him to remain behind to observe that marshal [Record
Office].
On the thirteenth Soult reached Montefurado, where the Sil is bridged
by masses of rocks which have fallen into its bed: the river forces
its way beneath them by a tunnel sixty feet broad, which is supposed
to have been cut by the Romans. Crossing on this natural bridge,
he turned southward to follow the valley of the Bibey, which leads
to Puebla de Senabria and the plains of Leon. He met no resistance
save from the local insurgents, headed by the Abbot of Casoyo and
a partisan called El Salamanquino, who received little or no aid
from the regular army. Indeed the only Spanish troops in this remote
corner of Galicia were 200 men under an officer called Echevarria,
a dépôt left behind at Puebla de Senabria by La Carrera, when he
had marched to Vigo in May. This handful of men joined the local
guerrillas, and the appearance of their uniforms among the enemy’s
ranks served Soult as an excuse for stating that he was contending
with the army of La Romana. Any reader of his dispatches would
conclude that during the last days of June he was opposed by a
considerable body of that force. As a matter of fact he was never
anywhere near the Galician army, which lay first at Orense, then at
Celanova, finally at Monterey on the Portuguese frontier, always
moving to the right, parallel with the Marshal’s advance, so as to
avoid being outflanked on its southern wing. It was with the peasants
of the valley of the Bibey alone that Soult had to do. Thrusting
them to right and left, and cruelly ravaging the country-side on
both banks of the river, he reached Viana on June 16. From thence
Franceschi sent a flying expedition over the hills to La Gudina, on
the road from Monterey to Puebla de Senabria. It brought back news
that La Romana had come down to Monterey when the 2nd Corps moved to
Viana, but that he was evidently not marching eastward. It had met
and routed a party of Spanish cavalry sent out from Monterey[500];
the prisoners taken from them said that the Marquis was returning to
Orense now that he had seen the 2nd Corps committing itself to an
advance up the valley of the Bibey, and passing away in the direction
of the plains of Leon.
[500] Carrol was with this party. He had come out from Vigo to
join La Romana, was at La Gudina on June 16, and retreated to
Monterey when Franceschi attacked that point. The Marquis turned
back when he saw Franceschi move off eastward, and retired to his
old head quarters at Orense. If Soult had pushed westward, the
Spaniards had the choice between the road to Chaves and that back
to Orense, and were in no danger.
It was while halting at Larouco, during this march, that Soult
received the dispatch which Ney had written to him from Santiago on
June 10. His reply, as we have already seen, was a peremptory refusal
to turn back to the aid of the 6th Corps. He asserted that he had
fulfilled his part of the bargain made at Lugo (which he assuredly
had not), and refused to undertake any further offensive operations
with troops in a state of utter destitution and fatigue. He declared
to his staff, and wrote to King Joseph, that he believed that Ney had
deliberately mismanaged his expedition against Vigo, and had suffered
himself to be checked, in order to have an excuse for detaining
the 2nd Corps in Galicia[501]. Why, he asked, had not the Duke of
Elchingen sent a turning column against Orense, instead of making a
frontal attack against the line of the Oitaben? The plain answer to
this query--viz. that Ney with a field-force of only 10,000 men, and
having three weak garrisons behind him, could not afford either to
divide his army or to go too far from Corunna and Lugo--he naturally
did not give.
[501] ‘Il (Ney) m’engageait à rester en Galice, et me
représentait qu’il pourrait résulter pour lui de fâcheuses
conséquences si j’en sortais. Cette proposition m’étonna: il me
parut que M. le Maréchal Ney se conduisait à m’obliger à rester
en Galice: car certainement rien ne l’empêchait de manœuvrer sur
Orense, tandis que moi-même j’agissais contre La Romana.... Je
me crus encore plus obligé qu’auparavant de suivre mon premier
projet.’ Soult to Joseph, June 25.
Accordingly, on June 23, Soult abandoned the valley of the Bibey,
and crossed the watershed of the Sierra Segundera in two columns,
one descending on to La Gudina, the other on to Lobian. On the
twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth the whole army was united at Puebla
de Senabria. The town was taken without a shot being fired; and the
French found there several cannon which La Carrera had not carried
off when he marched to Vigo, and which Echevarria had spiked but
neglected to destroy. The corps rested for five days in Puebla
de Senabria, where it obtained abundance of food and comfortable
lodging. But Franceschi and his light-horse, now reduced to not
more than 700 sabres, were pushed on at once to Zamora, to bear
news to King Joseph of the approach of the 2nd Corps, and to beg
that the stores, money, artillery, and clothing, which Soult had
demanded in his letter from Lugo, might be forwarded to him as soon
as possible[502]. Although the authorities at Madrid had heard
nothing of the doings of the Marshal since June 1, they had already
prepared much of the material required, and sent it to Salamanca.
From thence it was now transferred to Zamora and Benavente, where it
was handed over to the war-worn 2nd Corps. Other stores were procured
from Valladolid and even from Bayonne. But the artillery, the most
important of all the necessaries, was long in coming.
[502] On reaching Zamora, Franceschi handed over the charge of
his division to General Pierre Soult, the Marshal’s brother, and
rode on towards Madrid with no escort but two aides-de-camp. They
were captured near Toro by the celebrated guerrilla chief El
Capuchino (Fray Juan Delica), who sent the important dispatches
which they were bearing to Seville: Frere instantly forwarded a
copy to Wellesley (July 9), who thus got invaluable information
as to Soult’s situation and future intentions. In the Record
Office there is a letter requesting that the news of Franceschi’s
captivity may be sent to his wife in Paris, which was duly done.
The unfortunate general was imprisoned first at Granada and then
at Cartagena: in both places, it is said, he was treated with
unjustifiable rigour, and kept in close confinement within four
walls--it was the same usage that Napoleon meted out to Palafox.
He died of a fever in 1811, after two years’ captivity.
Soult’s main body had broken up from Puebla de Senabria on June 29:
from thence Mermet’s, Delaborde’s, and Lorges’ troops marched to
Benavente, and those of Merle and Heudelet to Zamora. In these places
they enjoyed a few days of rest and began to refit themselves. But
it was not long before they were called upon to take part in another
great campaign, and once more to face their old enemies the English.
The first care of the Duke of Dalmatia, after he had emerged from the
Galician Sierras, had been to write long justificatory dispatches to
the Emperor and King Joseph. They are most interesting documents,
and explain with perfect clearness his reasons for abandoning Ney
and returning to the valley of the Douro. His main thesis is that
it was his duty to keep the English in check, since they were the
one really dangerous enemy in the Peninsula. Since it was notorious
that Wellesley had quitted Northern Portugal, it was practically
certain that he must be intending to march southward, to fall upon
Victor, and strike a blow at Madrid. It was necessary, therefore,
that the 2nd Corps should follow him, and be ready to aid in the
defence of the capital. The safety of Madrid was far more important
than the subjection of Galicia, and the Marshal had no hesitation
in sacrificing the lesser object in order to secure the greater.
Ney, he thought, would be strong enough to make head against Noroña
and La Romana united: but he could not hope to hold down the whole
of Galicia, and he would have either to be reinforced, or to be
permitted to evacuate the province.
As to the conquest of Galicia, it would take many men and many
months. At present it would be impossible to find the forces
necessary for its complete subjection. This could only be done by
fortifying not merely Corunna, Ferrol, and Lugo, but also Tuy,
Monterey, Viana, and Puebla de Senabria. Each of these places should
be given a garrison of 5,000 or 6,000 men, and furnished with stores
calculated to last for four months. In addition there would have to
be blockhouses built along the high-road from Lugo to Villafranca,
and on several other lines. Columns operating from each of the seven
great garrisons should be continually moving about, keeping open the
communication between stronghold and stronghold, and chastising the
insurgents.
Thus Soult calculated that the subjection of Galicia would require
from 35,000 to 42,000 men, continually on the move, and never liable
to be called upon for any service outside the province. It was
absurd, therefore, for him to suggest in a later paragraph that Ney
might be left to hold his own. What was the use of setting 15,000
men to work on a task that would strain the energies of 35,000? And
where was King Joseph to find the additional 20,000 men, if the 2nd
Corps were withdrawn into Leon to watch the British army? No such
force could be drawn from any other part of Spain, and it would be
useless to ask for reinforcements from France while the Austrian War
was calling every available man to the Danube. Soult’s view, clearly,
was that Galicia would have to be abandoned for the present, though
he did not choose to say so. Till the English had been destroyed, or
driven into the sea, King Joseph would never be able to find 35,000
men to lock up in the remote and mountainous north-western corner of
the Peninsula[503].
[503] There is so much valuable information in these dispatches
of Soult, dated June 25, from Puebla de Senabria, that I have
printed the most important paragraphs as an Appendix--omitting
the lengthy narrative of the operations on the Sil and the
Bibey in which the Marshal vainly flattered himself that he
had dispersed the armies of La Romana and ‘Chavarria’ (i.e.
Echevarria).
There is not the slightest doubt that Soult’s views were perfectly
correct. Looking at the war in the Peninsula as a whole, it was a
strategical blunder to endeavour to hold Galicia before Portugal had
been conquered. And while the force of the French armies in Spain
remained at its present figure, it was impossible to spare two whole
army corps for this secondary theatre of operations. The attempt
to subdue the province had only been made because Moore had drawn
after him to Corunna the armies of Soult and Ney: and, since they
were on the spot, the temptation to use them there was too great to
be withstood. This is but one more instance of the way in which the
famous march to Sahagun had disarranged all the Emperor’s original
plans for the conquest of the Peninsula.
It has often been debated whether it would be truer to say that
Galicia was delivered by Wellesley’s operations or by the valour
and obstinacy of its own inhabitants. After giving all due credit
to the gallant peasantry who checked Ney and harassed Soult, to the
prudence of the untiring La Romana, and to Noroña’s cautious courage,
it is yet necessary to decide that the real cause of the evacuation
of the province by the invaders was the presence of the victorious
British army in Portugal. The two Marshals might have maintained
themselves there for an indefinite time, if they could have shut
their eyes to what was going on elsewhere. But Soult was quite
right in believing that it would be mad to persist in the attempt to
subdue Galicia, while Wellesley was in the field, and nothing lay
between him and Madrid but the 22,000 men of the 1st Corps. If he
and Ney had lingered on in the north, engaged in fruitless hunting
after La Romana, while July and August wore on, Madrid would have
fallen into the hands of Wellesley and Cuesta, and King Joseph would
once more have been forced to go upon his travels, to Burgos or
elsewhere. The Talavera campaign only failed of success because the
2nd and the 6th Corps were withdrawn from the Galician hills just
in time to concentrate at Salamanca and fall upon the rear of the
victors. If they had been wandering around Monterey or Mondonedo at
the end of July, instead of being cantoned in the plains of Leon, the
capital of Spain would undoubtedly have been recovered by Wellesley
and Cuesta--though whether those ill-assorted colleagues could have
held it for long is another question. Into such possibilities it is
useless to make inquiry.
N.B.--My best authority for this campaign is the set of dispatches
by Carrol in the Record Office. He was at Vigo from June 3 to June
14; with La Romana from June 16 to July 11. Thus he was on the spot
for the fight on the Oitaben, and also for the operations against
Soult. Napier’s narrative is more than usually faulty in dealing
with the end of the Galician campaign. He writes as a partisan of
Soult, and his whole tale is drawn from the Marshal’s dispatches and
from the book of the panegyrist, Le Noble. His whole picture of the
desperate condition of La Romana is untrue: the Marquis had always
open to him a safe retreat into Portugal, and his army was never
engaged with Soult at all. Carrol’s dispatches make this quite clear.
The map (facing p. 125 of vol. ii.) is so hopelessly inaccurate both
as to distances, and as to the relative positions of places to each
other, that I can only compare it to those ingenious diagrams which
a railway produces, in order to show that it possesses the shortest
route from London to Edinburgh, or from Brussels to Berlin.
SECTION XV: CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS IN ARAGON: ALCAÑIZ AND BELCHITE
(MARCH-JUNE 1809)
When, upon February 20, the plague-stricken remnant of the
much-enduring garrison of Saragossa laid down their arms at the feet
of Lannes, it seemed probable that the whole of North-Eastern Spain
must fall a helpless prey to the invader. The time had come when the
3rd and the 5th Corps, freed from the long strain of the siege, were
once more available for field-operations. For the last two months
almost every dispatch that the Emperor or King Joseph wrote, had
been filled with plans and projects that began with the words ‘When
Saragossa shall have fallen.’ If only Palafox and his desperate
bands were removed, it would be easy to trample down Aragon, to take
Catalonia in the rear, and finally to march to the gates of Valencia,
and end the struggle on the eastern coast.
Now at last the 30,000 men of Mortier and Junot could be turned to
other tasks, and there seemed to be every reason to expect that
they would suffice to carry out the Emperor’s designs. There was no
army which could be opposed to them, for, only a few days after the
capitulation of Saragossa, Reding had risked and lost the battle of
Valls, and the wrecks of his host had taken refuge within the walls
of Tarragona.
The only surviving Spanish force which was under arms in the valley
of the Ebro consisted of the single division, not more than 4,000
strong, under the Marquis of Lazan. After his vain attempt to come
to the rescue of Saragossa in the early days of February, Lazan had
drawn back to Fraga and Monzon, forced to look on from afar at the
last stage of his brother’s desperate resistance. In the rest of the
kingdom of Aragon there were but two or three scattered battalions
of new levies[504], and some guerrilla bands under Perena and other
chiefs.
[504] See sect. xi. chap. i. pp. 101-2.
The mistaken policy which had led Joseph Palafox to shut up in
Saragossa not only his own army but also the succours which he had
procured from Valencia and Murcia, now bore its fruit. There was no
force left which could take the field against the victorious army
of Lannes. It seemed therefore that the war in Aragon must come to
a speedy end: the French had but to advance and the whole kingdom
must fall into their hands. The national cause, however, was not
quite so desperate as might have been supposed. Here, as in other
regions of Spain, it was ere long to be discovered that it was one
thing to destroy a Spanish army, and another to hold down a Spanish
province. A French corps that was irresistible when concentrated on
the field of battle, became vulnerable when forced to divide itself
into the number of small garrisons that were needed for the permanent
retention of the territory that it had won. Though the capital of
Aragon and its chief towns were to remain in the hands of the enemy
for the next five years, yet there were always rugged corners of the
land where the struggle was kept up and the invader baffled and held
in check.
Yet immediately after the fall of Saragossa it seemed for a space
that Aragon might settle down beneath the invader’s heel. Lannes,
whose health was still bad, returned to France, but Mortier and
Junot, who now once more resumed that joint responsibility that they
had shared in December, went forth conquering and to conquer. They
so divided their efforts that the 5th Corps operated for the most
part to the north, and the 3rd Corps to the south of the Ebro, though
occasionally their lines of operations crossed each other.
The kingdom of Aragon consists of three well-marked divisions. On
each side of the Ebro there is a wide and fertile plain, generally
some thirty miles broad. But to the north and the south of this rich
valley lie range on range of rugged hills. Those on the north are
the lower spurs of the Pyrenees: those to the south form part of the
great central ganglion of the Sierras of Central Spain, which lies
just where Aragon, Valencia, and New Castile meet.
The valley of the Ebro gave the French little trouble: it was not a
region that could easily offer resistance, for it was destitute of
all natural defences. Moreover, the flower of its manhood had been
enrolled in the battalions which had perished at Saragossa, and few
were left in the country-side who were capable of bearing arms--still
fewer who possessed them. The plain of Central Aragon lay exhausted
at the victor’s feet. It was otherwise with the mountains of the
north and the south, which contain some of the most difficult ground
in the whole of Spain. There the rough and sturdy hill-folk found
every opportunity for resistance, and when once they had learnt by
experience the limitations of the invader’s power, were able to keep
up a petty warfare without an end. Partisans like Villacampa in the
southern hills, and Mina in the Pyrenean valleys along the edge of
Navarre, succeeded in maintaining themselves against every expedition
that was sent against them. Always hunted, often brought to bay, they
yet were never crushed or destroyed.
But in March 1809 the Aragonese had not yet recognized their own
opportunities: the disaster of Saragossa had struck such a deep blow
that apathy and despair seemed to have spread over the greater part
of the kingdom. When Mortier and Junot, after giving their corps
a short rest, began to spread movable columns abroad, there was
at first no resistance. The inaccessible fortress of Jaca in the
foot-hills of the Pyrenees surrendered at the first summons; its
garrison was only 500 strong, yet it should have made some sort of
defence against a force consisting of no more than a single regiment
of Mortier’s corps, without artillery. [March 21[505].] The fall
of this place was important, as it commands the only pass in the
Central Pyrenees which is anything better than mule-track. Though
barely practicable for artillery or light vehicles, it was useful for
communication between Saragossa and France, and gave the French army
of Aragon a line of communication of its own, independent of the long
and circuitous route by Tudela and Pampeluna.
[505] Toreno gives some curious details about the surrender
of Jaca, which he says was largely due to the intrigues of a
friar named José de Consolation, who preached resignation and
submission to God’s will in such moving terms that the greater
part of the garrison deserted! He was afterwards found to have
been an agent of the French. The Central Junta sent the Governor
Campos, the Corregidor Arcón, and the officers commanding the
artillery and engineers before a court-martial, which condemned
them all to death. Only the engineer was caught (he had openly
joined the French) and shot. [Arteche, vi. p. 10.]
Other columns of Mortier’s corps marched against Monzon and Fraga,
the chief towns in the valley of the Cinca. On their approach the
Marquis of Lazan retired down the Ebro to Tortosa, and both towns
were occupied without offering resistance. Another column marched
against Mequinenza, the fortress at the junction of the Ebro and
Segre: here, however, they met with opposition; the place was only
protected by antiquated sixteenth-century fortifications, but it
twice refused to surrender, though on the second occasion Mortier
himself appeared before its walls with a whole brigade. The Marshal
did not besiege it, deferring this task till he should have got all
of Eastern Aragon well in hand. At this same time he made an attempt
to open communications with St. Cyr in Catalonia, sending a regiment
of cavalry under Colonel Briche to strike across the mountains
beyond the Segre in search of the 7th Corps. Briche executed half
his mission, for by great good fortune combined with very rapid
movement, he slipped between Lerida and Mequinenza, got down into
the coast-plain and met Chabot’s division of St. Cyr’s army at
Montblanch. When, however, he tried to return to Aragon, in order to
convey to the Duke of Treviso the information as to the distribution
of the 7th Corps, he was beset by the _somatenes_, who were now on
the alert. So vigorously was he assailed that he was forced to turn
back and seek refuge with Chabot. Thus Mortier gained none of the
news that he sought, and very naturally came to the conclusion that
his flying column had been captured or cut to pieces.
Meanwhile Junot and the 3rd Corps were operating south of the Ebro.
The Duke of Abrantes sent one of his three divisions (that of
Grandjean) against Caspe, Alcañiz, and the valleys of the Guadalope
and Martin, while another (that of Musnier) moved out against the
highlands of the south, and the mountain-towns of Daroca and Molina.
Most of the battalions of his third division, that of Morlot, were
still engaged in guarding on their way to France the prisoners of
Saragossa.
Of the two expeditions which Junot sent out, that which entered the
mountains effected little. It lost several small detachments, cut off
by the local insurgents, and though it ultimately penetrated as far
as Molina, it was unable to hold the place. The whole population had
fled, and after remaining there only six days, the French were forced
to return to the plains by want of food. [March 22--April 10.] The
Aragonese at once came back to their former position.
Grandjean, who had moved against Alcañiz, had at first more
favourable fortune. He overran with great ease all the low-lying
country south of the Ebro, and met with so little opposition that he
resolved to push his advance even beyond the borders of Valencia.
Accordingly he ascended the valley of the Bercantes, and appeared
before Morella, the frontier town of that kingdom, on March 18.
The place was strong, but there was only a very small garrison in
charge of it[506], which retired after a slight skirmish, abandoning
the fortress and a large store of food and equipment. If Grandjean
could have held Morella, he would have secured for the French army
a splendid base for further operations. But he had left many men
behind him at Caspe and Alcañiz, and had but a few battalions in
hand. He had gone too far forward to be safe, and when the Junta of
Valencia sent against him the whole of the forces that they could
collect--some 5,000 men under General Roca--he was compelled to
evacuate Morella and to fall back on Alcañiz. [March 25.]
[506] Only the single regiment, America, whose cadre, sent back
by Infantado from Cuenca, was being filled up with recruits from
the Morella district. [Junot to King Joseph, from Saragossa,
March 25.]
Mortier and Junot were concerting a joint movement for the completion
of the conquest of Eastern Aragon, and an advance against Tortosa,
when orders from Paris suddenly changed the whole face of affairs.
The Emperor saw that war with Austria was inevitable and imminent:
disquieted as to the strength of the new enemy, he resolved to draw
troops from Spain to reinforce the army of the Danube. The only
corps which seemed to him available was that of Mortier, and on
April 5 he ordered that the Duke of Treviso should concentrate his
troops and draw back to Tudela and Logroño. It might still prove to
be unnecessary to remove the 5th Corps from the Peninsula; but at
Logroño it would be within four marches of France if the Emperor
discovered that he had need of its services in the north. On the same
day Napoleon removed Junot from his command, probably on account of
the numerous complaints as to his conduct sent in by King Joseph.
To replace him General Suchet, the commander of one of Mortier’s
divisions, was directed to take charge of the 3rd Corps[507].
[507] See Joseph’s letter of April 6, and the Emperor’s orders,
from Paris, of April 5 and April 10.
Ten days later the imperial mandate reached Saragossa, and on
receiving it Mortier massed his troops and marched away to Tudela.
We have already seen[508] that his corps was never withdrawn from
Spain, but merely moved from Aragon to Old Castile. But its departure
completely changed the balance of fortune on the Lower Ebro. The
number of French troops in that direction was suddenly reduced by one
half, and the 3rd Corps had to spread itself out to the north, in
order to take over all the positions evacuated by Mortier. It was far
too weak for the duty committed to its charge, and at this moment it
had not even received back the brigade sent to guard the Saragossa
prisoners, which (it will be remembered) had been called off and lent
to Kellermann[509]. There were hardly 15,000 troops left in the whole
kingdom of Aragon, and these were dispersed in small bodies, with
the design of holding down as much ground as possible. The single
division of Grandjean had to cover the whole line from Barbastro to
Alcañiz--places seventy miles apart--with less than 5,000 bayonets.
The second division, Musnier’s, with its head quarters at Saragossa,
had to watch the mountains of Upper Aragon. Of the 3rd division, that
of Morlot, the few battalions that were available were garrisoning
Jaca and Tudela, on the borders of Navarre. No sooner had Mortier’s
corps departed, than a series of small reverses occurred, the
inevitable results of the attempt to hold down large districts with
an inadequate force. Junot, who was still retained in command till
his successor should arrive, seemed to lack the courage to draw in
his exposed detachments: probably his heart was no longer in the
business, since he was under sentence of recall. Yet he had six weeks
of work before him, for by some mischance the dispatch nominating
Suchet to take his place reached Saragossa after that general had
marched off at the head of his old division of Mortier’s corps.
Cross-communication being tardy and difficult, it failed to catch
him up till he had reached Valladolid. Returning from thence with a
slow-moving escort of infantry, Suchet did not succeed in joining
his corps till May 19. He found it in a desperate situation, for the
last four weeks had seen an almost unbroken series of petty reverses,
and it looked as if the whole of Aragon was about to slip out of the
hands of the French. It was fortunate for the 3rd Corps that its new
commander, though hitherto he had never been placed in a position
of independent responsibility, proved to be a man of courage and
resource--perhaps indeed the most capable of all the French generals
who took part in the Peninsular War. A timid or unskilful leader
might have lost Aragon, and imperilled the hold of King Joseph on
Madrid. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the entire French
position in Spain would have been gravely compromised if during the
last weeks of May the 3rd Corps had been under the charge of a less
skilful and self-reliant commander.
[508] See p. 378.
[509] See p. 378.
In the month that elapsed before Suchet’s arrival the consequences
of the withdrawal of the 5th Corps from the Lower Ebro were making
themselves felt. The Aragonese were not slow to discover the decrease
in the numbers of the invaders, and to note the long distances that
now intervened between post and post. The partisans who had retired
into Catalonia, or had taken refuge in the mountains of the south
and the north, began to descend into the plains and to fall upon the
outlying French detachments. On May 6 Colonel Perena came out of
Lerida, and beset the detachment of Grandjean’s division which held
the town and fortress of Monzon, with a horde of peasants and some
Catalan _miqueletes_. The governor, Solnicki, thereupon fell back
to Barbastro, the head quarters of Habert’s brigade. That general
considered that he was in duty bound to retake Monzon, and marched
against it with six battalions and a regiment of cuirassiers. He
tried to cross the Cinca, not opposite the town, but much lower
down the stream, at the ferry of Pomar. [May 16.] But just as his
vanguard[510] had established itself on the other bank, a sudden
storm caused such a rising of the waters that its communication
with the main body was completely cut off. Thereupon Habert marched
northward, and tried to force a passage at Monzon, so as to secure
a line of retreat for his lost detachment. The bridge of that town
however had been barricaded, and the castle garrisoned: Habert was
held at bay, and the 1,000 men who had crossed at the ferry of Pomar
were all cut off and forced to surrender. After marching for three
days among the insurgents, and vainly endeavouring to force their
way through the horde, they had to lay down their arms when their
cartridges had all been exhausted. [May 19.] Only the cuirassiers
escaped, by swimming the river when the flood had begun to abate, and
found their way back to Barbastro.
[510] It consisted of eight _compagnies d’élite_, viz. the
_voltigeur_ companies of the 14th Line, and the 2nd of the
Vistula, and the grenadier and voltigeur companies of the 116th
of the Line, with half a squadron of the 13th Cuirassiers. [Von
Brandt, p. 62.]
In consequence of this disaster the French lost their grip on the
valley of the Cinca, for the insurgents, under Perena and the Catalan
chief Baget, moved forward into the Sierra de Alcubierre and raised
the whole country-side in their aid. Habert, fearing to be cut off
from Saragossa, thereupon retired to Villafranca on the Ebro, and
abandoned all North-Eastern Aragon[511].
[511] This little campaign can be studied in detail in Von
Brandt, pp. 60-8. He was serving as lieutenant in the 2nd of
the Vistula, and gives many details which are not to be found
in Suchet or Arteche. Toreno would seem (ii. 10) to be wrong in
saying that Habert tried to storm Monzon, and got over the river
there, but was beaten back by Baget. Von Brandt says that there
was nothing but a hot fire across the water, and that the attack
could not be pushed home.
Meanwhile the other brigade of Grandjean’s division, which still
lay at Alcañiz, south of the Ebro, was also driven in by the
Spaniards. Its commander Laval was attacked by a large force coming
from Tortosa, and was forced to draw back to San Per and Hijar
[May 18-19]. At the news of his retreat all the hill-country of
Southern Aragon took arms, and the bands from Molina and the other
mountain-cities extended their raids down the valley of the Huerta
and almost to the gates of Saragossa.
The Spanish force which had seized Alcañiz was no mere body of
armed peasants, but a small regular army. General Blake had just
been given the post of commander-in-chief of all the forces of
the _Coronilla_--the old kingdom of Aragon and its dependencies,
Valencia and Catalonia. Burning to atone for his defeats at Zornoza
and Espinosa by some brilliant feat of arms, he was doing his best
to collect a new ‘Army of the Right.’ From Catalonia he could draw
little or nothing: the troops which had fought under Reding at Valls
were still cooped up in Tarragona, and unfit for field-service. But
Blake had concentrated at Tortosa the division of the Marquis of
Lazan--the sole surviving fraction of the old Army of Aragon--and the
troops which he could draw from Valencia. These last consisted at
this moment of no more than the reorganized division of Roca from the
old ‘Army of the Centre.’ Its depleted _cadres_ had been sent back
by Infantado from Cuenca, and the Junta had shot into them a mass of
recruits, who in a few weeks had raised the strength of the division
from 1,500 to 5,000 bayonets. Other regiments were being raised in
Valencia, but in the early weeks of May they were not yet ready
for the field, though by June they gave Blake a reinforcement of
nearly 12,000 men[512]. Murcia could provide in May only one single
battalion for Blake’s assistance: all its field army had perished at
Saragossa. The total force of the new ‘Army of the Right’ when it
advanced against Alcañiz was less than 10,000 men--the Valencians in
its ranks outnumbered the Aragonese by four to three.
[512] It is necessary to enter a protest against Napier’s
statement (vol. ii. p. 252), that Valencia did not do its fair
share in defending the general cause of Spain--that ‘from
the very commencement of the insurrection its policy was
characterized by a singular indifference to the calamities that
overwhelmed the other parts of the country.’ The contribution of
Valencia to the national armies raised in 1808-9, compares well
with that of the other provinces. These troops, too, were not
used for local defence, but employed in other parts of Spain.
Argüelles’ answer to Napier on this point seems conclusive: (see
the Appendix-volume of his _Observaciones_, &c.). The troops sent
out by Valencia were:--
Men.
(1) To join the division of Llamas in the ‘Army of the
Centre’ [Roca’s later division], thirteen battalions,
about 6,000
(2) To join the division of O’Neille in Aragon, one
regiment 800
(3) To join the division of St. March in Aragon, nine
battalions 6,000
(4) Joined Palafox at Saragossa between the date of Tudela
and the commencement of the siege, one battalion 500
(5) Sent to Catalonia in December, two battalions 800
(6) Raised to recruit Roca’s division in January 4,000
(7) Raised to join Blake between April and June 1809 11,881
------
Total 29,981
These figures are exclusive of cavalry and artillery, and in some
cases are under-estimated, as no morning-states of the troops
survive for the earlier months of the campaign of 1808, and
these totals are taken from returns made late in the year, when
the regiments had begun to run low in numbers. For the enormous
monetary contribution made by Valencia in 1808-9, see the tables
in Argüelles.
When Suchet therefore arrived at Saragossa on May 19, and took over
the command of the 3rd Corps from the hands of Junot, the prospect
seemed a gloomy one for the French. Their outlying detachments had
been forced back to the neighbourhood of Saragossa: the central
reserve (Musnier’s two brigades) was small: the third division
(with the exception of one regiment) was still absent--one of its
brigades was with Kellermann in Leon[513], and some detachments were
scattered among the garrisons of Navarre. After the sick and the
absent had been deducted, Suchet found that he had not much more
than 10,000 men under arms, though the nominal force of the 3rd
Corps was still about 20,000 sabres and bayonets. Nor was it only
in numbers that the Army of Aragon was weak: its _morale_ also left
much to be desired. The newly-formed regiments which composed more
than half of the infantry[514] were in a deplorable condition, a
natural consequence of the haste with which they had been organized
and sent into the field. Having been originally composed of companies
drawn from many quarters, they still showed a mixture of uniforms of
different cut and colour, which gave them a motley appearance and,
according to their commander, degraded them in their own eyes and
lowered their self-respect[515]. They had not yet fully recovered
from the physical and moral strain of the siege of Saragossa. Their
pay was in arrear, the military chest empty, the food procured from
day to day by marauding. There was much grumbling among the officers,
who complained that the promotions and rewards due for the capture
of Saragossa had almost all been reserved for the 5th Corps. The
guerrilla warfare of the last few weeks had disgusted the rank and
file, who thought that Junot had been mismanaging them, and knew
absolutely nothing of the successor who had just replaced him. The
whole corps, says Suchet, was dejected and discontented[516].
[513] See p. 378.
[514] The 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, and 121st of the line were
all formed from the ‘Provisional Regiments’ of 1808.
[515] Suchet’s _Mémoires_. i. p. 11.
[516] ‘Le 3me corps avait beaucoup souffert au siège de
Saragosse. L’infanterie était considérablement affaiblie: les
régiments de nouvelle formation surtout se trouvaient dans un
état déplorable, par les vices inséparables d’une organisation
récente et précipitée.... Des habits blancs bleus et de formes
différentes, restes choquants de divers changements dans
l’habillement, occasionnaient dans les rangs une bigarrure
qui achevait d’enlever à des soldats déjà faibles et abattus
toute idée de considération militaire. L’apparence de la misère
les dégradait à leurs propres yeux ... Dans un état voisin du
découragement, cette armée était loin de compenser par sa force
morale le danger de sa faiblesse numérique.’ Suchet, p. 16.
Von Brandt speaks to much the same effect, and says that some
of the troops gave a bad impression, and that he saw battalions
which looked as if they would not stand firm against a sudden and
fierce attack, such as that which Mina and his guerrillas used to
deliver [p. 61].
Nevertheless there was no time to rest or reorganize these sullen
battalions: the Spaniards were pressing in so close that it was
necessary to attack them at all costs: the only other alternative
would have been to abandon Saragossa. Such a step, though perhaps
theoretically justifiable under the circumstances, would have ruined
Suchet’s military career, and was far from his thoughts. Only two
days after he had assumed the command of the corps, he marched out
with Musnier’s division to join Laval’s troops at Hijar. [May 21.] He
had sent orders to Habert to cross the Ebro and follow him as fast
as he was able: but that general, who was still on the march from
Barbastro to Villafranca, did not receive the dispatch in time, and
failed to join his chief before the oncoming battle[517].
[517] From a casual reading of Suchet, i. 17-21, it might be
thought that the general had been joined by Habert before the
battle. But he certainly was not, as the Memoirs of Von Brandt,
who was with Habert, show that this brigade was at Villafranca,
forty miles from Alcañiz, on the twenty-third, and only started
(too late) to join its chief on the twenty-fourth. The mention
of the 2nd of the Vistula on p. 21 of Suchet is a misprint for
the 3rd of the Vistula of Musnier’s division. Half the 13th
Cuirassiers was also absent with Habert.
On May 23, however, Suchet, with Musnier’s and Laval’s men, presented
himself in front of Blake’s position at Alcañiz. He had fourteen
battalions and five squadrons with him--a force in all of about
8,000 men, with eighteen guns[518]. He found the Spaniards ready
and willing to fight. They were drawn up on a line of hills to the
east of Alcañiz, covering that town and its bridge. Their position
was good from a tactical point of view, but extremely dangerous when
considered strategically: for Blake had been tempted by the strong
ground into fighting with the river Guadalope at his back, and had
no way of crossing it save by the single bridge of Alcañiz and a
bad ford. It was an exact reproduction of the deplorable order of
battle that the Russians had adopted at Friedland in 1807, though not
destined to lead to any such disaster. The northern and highest of
the three hills occupied by the Spaniards, that called the Cerro de
los Pueyos, was held by the Aragonese troops. On the central height,
called the hill of Las Horcas, was placed the whole of the Spanish
artillery--nineteen guns--guarded by three Valencian battalions: this
part of the line was immediately in front of the bridge of Alcañiz,
the sole line of retreat. The southern and lowest hill, that of La
Perdiguera, was held by Roca and the rest of the Valencians, and
flanked by the small body of cavalry--only 400 sabres--which Blake
possessed[519]. The whole army, not quite 9,000 strong, outnumbered
the enemy by less than 800 bayonets, though in French narratives it
is often stated at 12,000 or 15,000 men[520].
[518] According to Suchet’s own figures from his May 15 return,
the forces engaged must have been:--
Musnier’s Division:
114th Line (three batts.) 1,627
115th Line (three batts.) 1,732
1st of the Vistula (two batts.) 1,039
121st Line (one batt. only) 400
Detachment of the 64th and 40th of
the Line [General’s escort] 450
-------
5,248
Laval’s Brigade:
14th Line (two batts.) 1,080
3rd of the Vistula (two batts.) 964
Cavalry, 4th Hussars 326
Half 13th Cuirassiers 200
Artillery 320
-------
2,890
Total 8,138
[519] The Spanish line-of-battle was as follows:--
Left wing, General Areizaga:
Daroca, Volunteers of Aragon, Tiradores de Doyle,
Reserve of Aragon, 1st Tiradores de Murcia, Company
of Tiradores de Cartagena--five and one-sixth batts. 2,669
Centre, Marquis of Lazan:
Volunteers of Valencia, Ferdinando VII, 3rd batt. of
America, detachment of Traxler’s Swiss--three and a
half batts. 1,605
Right wing, General Roca:
3rd batt. of Savoia, 2nd batt. of America, 1st of
Valencia (three batts.), 2nd Cazadores of Valencia,
1st Volunteers of Saragossa--seven batts. 3,742
Cavalry (detachments of Santiago, Olivenza, and Husares
Españoles) 445
Artillery 245
[520] Napier, for example, following French sources, gives Blake
12,000 men.
Suchet seems to have found some difficulty at first in making out
the Spanish position--the hills hid from him the bridge and town of
Alcañiz, whose position in rear of Blake’s centre was the dominant
military fact of the situation. At any rate, he spent the whole
morning in tentative movements, and only delivered his main stroke
in the afternoon. He began by sending Laval’s brigade against the
dominating hill on the right flank of the Spanish position. Two
assaults were made upon the Cerro de los Pueyos, which Suchet in his
autobiography calls feints, but which Blake considered so serious
that he sent off to this flank two battalions from his left wing and
the whole of his cavalry. Whether intended as mere demonstrations or
as a real attack, these movements had no success, and were repelled
by General Areizaga, the commander of the Aragonese, without much
difficulty. The Spanish cavalry, however, was badly mauled by
Suchet’s hussars when it tried to deliver a flank charge upon the
enemy at the moment that he retired.
When all the fighting on the northern extremity of the line had
died down, Suchet launched his main attack against Blake’s centre,
hoping (as he says) to break the line, seize the bridge of Alcañiz,
which lay just behind the hill of Las Horcas, and thus to capture
the greater part of the Spanish wings, which would have no line of
retreat. The attack was delivered by two of Musnier’s regiments[521]
formed in columns of battalions, and acting in a single mass--a
force of over 2,600 men. A column of this strength often succeeded
in bursting through a Spanish line during the Peninsular War. But on
this day Suchet was unlucky, or his troops did not display the usual
_élan_ of French infantry. They advanced steadily enough across the
flat ground, and began to climb the hill, in spite of the rapid and
accurate fire of the artillery which crowned its summit. But when
the fire of musketry from the Spanish left began to beat upon their
flank, and the guns opened with grape, the attacking columns came to
a standstill at the line of a ditch cut in the slope. Their officers
made every effort to carry them forward for the few hundred yards
that separated them from the Spanish guns, but the mass wavered,
surged helplessly for a few minutes under the heavy fire, and then
dispersed and fled in disorder. Suchet rallied them behind the five
intact battalions which he still possessed, but refused to renew
the attack, and drew off ere night. He himself had been wounded in
the foot at the close of the action, and his troops had suffered
heavily--their loss must have been at least 700 or 800 men[522].
Blake, who had lost no more than 300, did not attempt to pursue,
fearing to expose his troops in the plain to the assaults of the
French cavalry.
[521] Three battalions of the 114th of the Line, and two of the
1st of the Vistula.
[522] Suchet gives a very poor account of Alcañiz in his
_Mémoires_. In spite of his many merits, he did not take a
beating well, and slurs over this action, just as in 1812 he
slurs over his defeat at Castalla. He does not even give an
estimate of his killed and wounded, and has the assurance to say
that he left the enemy only ‘l’opinion de la victoire’ (i. 20).
Blake clearly makes too much of the French attack on his right in
his dispatch.
The morale of the 3rd Corps had been so much shaken by its
unsuccessful début under its new commander, that a panic broke out
after dark among Laval’s troops, who fled in all directions, on
a false alarm that the Spanish cavalry had attacked and captured
the rearguard. Next morning the army poured into San Per and Hijar
in complete disorder, and some hours had to be spent in restoring
discipline. Suchet discovered the man who had started the cry of
_sauve qui peut_, and had him shot before the day was over[523].
[523] Suchet, _Mémoires_, p. 20.
The French had expected to be pursued, and many critics have blamed
Blake for not making the most of his victory and following the
defeated enemy at full speed. The Spanish general, however, had good
reasons for his quiescence: he saw that Suchet’s force was almost
as large as his own; he could not match the French in cavalry;
and having noted the orderly fashion in which they had left the
battle-field, he could not have guessed that during the night they
would disband in panic. Moreover--and this was the most important
point--he was expecting to receive in a few days reinforcements
from Valencia which would more than double his numbers. Till they
had come up he would not move, but contented himself with sending
the news of Alcañiz all over Aragon and stimulating the activity of
the insurgents. As he had hoped, the results of his victory were
important--the French had to evacuate every outlying post that they
possessed, and the whole of the open country passed into the hands of
the patriots. Perena and the insurgents of the north bank of the Ebro
pressed close in to Saragossa: other bands threatened the high-road
to Tudela: thousands of recruits flocked into Blake’s camp, but he
was unfortunately unable to arm or utilize them.
Within a few days, however, he began to receive the promised
reinforcements from Valencia--a number of fresh regiments from the
rear, and drafts for the corps that were already with him[524]. He
also used his authority as supreme commander in Catalonia to draw
some reinforcements from that principality--three battalions of
Reding’s Granadan troops and one of _miqueletes_: no more could
be spared from in front of the active St. Cyr. Within three weeks
after his victory of Alcañiz he had collected an army of 25,000 men,
and considered himself strong enough to commence the march upon
Saragossa. It was in his power to advance directly upon the city by
the high-road along the Ebro, and to challenge Suchet to a battle
outside its southern gates. He did not, however, make this move, but
with a caution that he did not often display, kept to the mountains
and marched by a side-road to Belchite [June 12]. Here he received
news of Napoleon’s check at Essling, which had happened on the
twenty-second of the preceding month; it was announced as a complete
and crushing defeat of the Emperor, and encouraged the Spaniards in
no small degree.
[524] The drafts were so large that the troops of Lazan’s
division, which had numbered 3,979 in May, were 5,679 in June,
those of Roca rose similarly from 3,449 to 5,525. The Valencian
Junta claimed to have sent in all 11,881 men to reinforce Blake,
and the returns bear them out. They also gave him 2,000,000
reals in cash--about £22,000--raised by a special contribution
in fifteen days. Their report says that they had sent on every
armed man in the province, and that the city was only guarded by
peasants armed with pikes. (Argüelles.)
From Belchite Blake, still keeping to the mountains, pursued his
march eastward to Villanueva in the valley of the Huerba. This move
revealed his design; he was about to place himself in a position from
which he could threaten Suchet’s lines of communication with Tudela
and Logroño, and so compel him either to abandon Saragossa without
fighting, or to come out and attack the Spanish army among the hills.
Blake, in short, was trying to manœuvre his enemy out of Saragossa,
or to induce him to fight another offensive action such as that of
Alcañiz had been. After the experience of May 25 he thought that he
could trust his army to hold its ground, though he was not willing
to risk an advance in the open, across the level plain in front of
Saragossa.
Suchet meanwhile had concentrated his whole available force in
that city and its immediate neighbourhood; he had drawn in every
man save a single column of two battalions, which was lying at La
Muela under General Fabre, with orders to keep back the insurgents
of the southern mountains from making a dash at Alagon and cutting
the high-road to Tudela. He had been writing letters to Madrid,
couched in the most urgent terms, to beg for reinforcements. But
just at this moment the Asturian expedition had drawn away to the
north all the troops in Old Castile. King Joseph could do no more
than promise that the two regiments from the 3rd Corps which had
been lent to Kellermann should be summoned back, and directed to
make forced marches on Saragossa. He could spare nothing save these
six battalions, believing it impossible to deplete the garrison of
Madrid, or to draw from Valladolid the single division of Mortier’s
corps, which was at this moment the only solid force remaining in the
valley of the Douro.
Suchet was inclined to believe that he might be attacked before this
small reinforcement of 3,000 men could arrive, and feared that, with
little more than 10,000 sabres and bayonets, he would risk defeat
if he attacked Blake in the mountains. The conduct of his troops in
and after the battle of Alcañiz had not tended to make him hopeful
of the result of another action of the same kind. Nevertheless, when
Blake came down into the valley of the Huerba, and began to threaten
his communications, he resolved that he must fight once again; the
alternative course, the evacuation of Saragossa and a retreat up the
Ebro, would have been too humiliating. Suchet devoted the three weeks
of respite which the slow advance of the enemy allowed him to the
reorganization of his corps. He made strenuous exertions to clothe
it, and to provide it with its arrears of pay. He inspected every
regiment in person, sought out and remedied grievances, displaced
a number of unsatisfactory officers, and promoted many deserving
individuals. He claims that the improvement in the morale of the
troops during the three weeks when they lay encamped at Saragossa was
enormous[525], and his statements may be verified in the narrative of
one of his subordinates, who remarks that neither Moncey nor Junot
had ever shown that keen personal interest in the corps which Suchet
always displayed, and that the troops considered their new chief both
more genial and more business-like than any general they had hitherto
seen, and so resolved to do their best for him[526].
[525] Suchet, _Mémoires_, p. 23.
[526] Von Brandt, _Aus meinem Leben_, i. 67.
Forced to fight, but not by any means confident of victory, the
French commander discharged on to Tudela and Pampeluna his sick,
his heavy baggage, and his parks, before marching out to meet Blake
upon June 14. The enemy, though still clinging to the skirts of the
hills, had now moved so close to Saragossa that it was clear that he
must be attacked at once, though Suchet would have preferred to wait
a few days longer, till he should have rallied the brigade from Old
Castile. These two regiments, under Colonel Robert, had now passed
Tudela, and were expected to arrive on the fifteenth or sixteenth.
But Blake had now descended the valley of the Huerba, and had pushed
his outposts to within ten or twelve miles of Saragossa. He had
reorganized his army into three divisions, one of which (mainly
composed of Aragonese troops) was placed under General Areizaga,
while Roca and the Marquis of Lazan headed the two others, in which
the Valencian levies predominated. Of the total of 25,000 men which
the muster-rolls showed, 20,000 were in line: the rest were detached
or in hospital. There were about 1,000 untrustworthy cavalry and
twenty-five guns.
In his final advance down the Huerba, Blake moved in two columns.
Areizaga’s division kept to the right bank and halted at Botorrita,
some sixteen miles from Saragossa. The Commander-in-chief, with the
other two divisions, marched on the left bank, and pushing further
forward than his lieutenant, reached the village of Maria, twelve
miles from the south-western front of the city. A distance of six
or seven miles separated the two corps. Thus Blake had taken the
strategical offensive, but was endeavouring to retain the tactical
defensive, by placing himself in a position where the enemy must
attack him. But he seems to have made a grave mistake in keeping his
columns so far apart, on different roads and with a river between
them. It should have been his object to make sure that every man was
on the field when the critical moment should arrive.
Already on the morning of the fourteenth the two armies came into
contact. Musnier’s division met the Spanish vanguard, thrust it back
some way, but then came upon Blake and the main body, and had to give
ground. Suchet, on the same evening, established his head quarters at
the Abbey of Santa Fé, and there dictated his orders for the battle
of the following day. Having ascertained that Areizaga’s division was
the weaker of the two Spanish columns, he left opposite it, on the
Monte Torrero, a mile and a half outside Saragossa, only a single
brigade--five battalions--under General Laval, who had now become
the commander of the 1st Division, for Grandjean had been sent back
to France. Protected by the line of the canal of Aragon, these 2,000
men[527] were to do their best to beat off any attack which Areizaga
might make against the city, while the main bodies of both armies
were engaged elsewhere. The charge of Saragossa itself was given
over to Colonel Haxo, who had but a single battalion of infantry[528]
and the sapper-companies of the army.
[527] 44th of the Line, 1,069 bayonets, and 3rd of the Vistula,
964 bayonets, according to Suchet’s figures.
[528] Apparently a battalion of the 121st of the Line, the rest
of which regiment was still in Navarre.
Having set aside these 3,000 men to guard his flank and rear, Suchet
could only bring forward Musnier’s division, and the remaining
brigade of Laval’s division (that of Habert), with two other
battalions, for the main attack. But he retained with himself the
whole of his cavalry and all his artillery, save one single battery
left with the troops on Monte Torrero. This gave him fourteen
battalions--about 7,500 infantry--800 horse, and twelve guns--less
than 9,000 men in all--to commence the battle. But he was encouraged
to risk an attack by the news that the brigade from Tudela was now
close at hand, and could reach the field by noon with 3,000 bayonets
more. It would seem that Suchet (though he does not say so in his
_Mémoires_) held back during the morning hours, in order to allow
this heavy reserve time to reach the fighting-ground.
Blake was in order of battle along the line of a rolling hill
separated from the French lines by less than a mile. Behind his
front were two other similar spurs of the Sierra de la Muela, each
separated from the other by a steep ravine. On his right flank was
the river Huerba, with level fields half a mile broad between the
water’s edge and the commencement of the rising ground. The village
of Maria lay to his right rear, some way up the stream. The Spaniards
were drawn out in two lines, Roca’s division on the northernmost
ridge, Lazan’s in its rear on the second, while the cavalry filled
the space between the hills and the river. Two battalions and half a
battery were in reserve, in front of Maria. The rest of the artillery
was placed in the intervals of the first line.
The French occupied a minor line of heights facing Blake’s front:
Habert’s brigade held the left, near the river, having the two
cavalry regiments of Wathier in support. Musnier’s division formed
the centre and right: a squadron of Polish lancers was placed far
out upon its flank. The only reserve consisted of the two stray
battalions which did not belong either to Musnier or Habert--one of
the 5th Léger, another of the 64th of the Line[529].
[529] The battalion of the 5th Léger belonged to Morlot’s
division, the rest of which was dispersed in Navarre or absent:
that of the 64th was one which Suchet had brought from Valladolid
as his personal escort, and which properly belonged to the 5th
Corps.
Blake’s army was slow in taking up its ground, while Suchet did not
wish to move till the brigade from Tudela had got within supporting
distance. Hence in the morning hours there was no serious collision.
But at last the Spaniards took the initiative, and pushed a cautious
advance against Suchet’s left, apparently with the object of worrying
him into assuming the offensive rather than of delivering a serious
attack. But the cloud of skirmishers sent against Habert’s front grew
so thick and pushed so far forward, that at last the whole brigade
was seriously engaged, and the artillery was obliged to open upon the
swarm of Spanish _tirailleurs_. They fell back when the shells began
to drop among them, and sought refuge by retiring nearer to their
main body[530].
[530] Suchet says the morning was occupied in mere ‘tiraillement’
of the Spanish skirmishers and the 2nd of the Vistula. This is
not borne out by the narrative of Von Brandt, of that corps.
He says that the enemy came on ‘sehr lebhaft,’ that both
battalions of his regiment were deeply engaged, that a regiment
of Spanish dragoons in yellow [he calls it Numancia, but it was
really Olivenza] charged into the skirmishing-line and nearly
broke it. The 2nd of the Vistula used up all its cartridges,
and lost ground. ‘Die Kavalleriezüge wurden jedoch jedesmal
zurückgewiesen, aber nichtsdestoweniger verloren wir allmählich
Terrain.’ The Spaniards were only driven off by a battery being
drawn forward into the fighting-line. Then the fight stood still,
but the regiment had suffered very heavily, and was finally drawn
back and put into the reserve. (_Aus meinem Leben_, pp. 71-2.)
About midday the bickering died down on the French left, but shortly
after the fire broke out with redoubled energy in another direction.
Disappointed that he could not induce Suchet to attack him, Blake
had at last resolved to take the offensive himself, and columns
were seen descending from his extreme left wing, evidently with the
intention of turning the French right. Having thus made up his mind
to strike, the Spanish general should have sent prompt orders to his
detached division under Areizaga, to bid it cross the Huerba with
all possible speed, and hasten to join the main body before the
engagement had grown hot. It could certainly have arrived in two
hours, since it was but six or seven miles away. But Blake made no
attempt to call in this body of 6,000 men (the best troops in his
army) or to utilize it in any way. He only employed the two divisions
that were under his hand on the hillsides above Maria.
The attack on the French right, made between one and two o’clock,
precipitated matters. When Suchet saw the Spanish battalions
beginning to descend from the ridge, he ordered his Polish lancers
to charge them in flank, and attacked them in front with part of the
114th regiment and some _voltigeur_ companies. The enemy was thrown
back, and retired to rejoin his main body. Then, before they were
fully rearranged in line of battle, the French general bade the whole
of Musnier’s division advance, and storm the Spanish position. He was
emboldened to press matters to an issue by the joyful news that the
long-expected brigade from Tudela had passed Saragossa, and would be
on the field in a couple of hours.
The eight battalions of the 114th, 115th, and the 1st of the Vistula
crossed the valley and fell upon the Spanish line between two and
three o’clock in the afternoon. Roca’s men met them with resolution,
and the fighting was for some time indecisive. Along part of the
front the French gained ground, but at other points they were beaten
back, and to repair a severe check suffered by the 115th, Suchet had
to engage half his reserve, the battalion of the 64th, and to draw
into the fight the 2nd of the Vistula from Habert’s brigade upon
the left. This movement restored the line, but nothing appreciable
had been gained, when a violent hailstorm from the north suddenly
swept down upon both armies, and hid them for half an hour from each
other’s sight.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF ALCAÑIZ
MAY 23RD 1809]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MARIA
JUNE 15TH 1809]
Before it was over, Suchet learnt that Robert and his brigade had
arrived at the Abbey of Santa Fé, on his right rear. He therefore
resolved to throw into the battle the wing of his army which he had
hitherto held back,--Habert’s battalions and the cavalry. When the
storm had passed over, they advanced against the Spanish right, in
the low ground near the river. The three battalions[531] of infantry
led the way, but when their fire had begun to take effect, Suchet
bade his hussars and cuirassiers charge through the intervals of
the front line. The troops here opposed to them consisted of 600
cavalry under General O’Donoju--the whole of the horsemen that Blake
possessed, for the rest of his squadrons were with Areizaga, far away
from the field.
[531] The 2nd of the Vistula having been distracted to the
centre, Habert had only the two battalions of the 14th of the
Line, and one of the 5th Léger from the reserve.
The charge of Wathier’s two regiments proved decisive: the Spanish
horse did not wait to cross sabres, but broke and fled from the
field, exposing the flank of the battalions which lay next them in
the line. The cuirassiers and hussars rolled up these unfortunate
troops, and hunted them along the high-road as far as the outskirts
of Maria; here they came upon and rode down the two battalions which
Blake had left there as a last reserve, and captured the half-battery
that accompanied them.