TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_, and small caps
are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
[Illustration: _General Joseph Palafox_
_From the Portrait by Goya in the Prado Gallery._
_Walker & Cockerell Ph. Sc._]
A HISTORY OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR
BY
CHARLES OMAN, M.A.
FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE
AND DEPUTY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY (CHICHELE)
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA
DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID
VOL. II
JAN.-SEPT. 1809
FROM THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA TO THE
END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN
WITH MAPS, PLANS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1903
HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH
NEW YORK
PREFACE
The second volume of this work has swelled to an even greater bulk
than its predecessor. Its size must be attributed to two main
causes: the first is the fact that a much greater number of original
sources, both printed and unprinted, are available for the campaigns
of 1809 than for those of 1808. The second is that the war in its
second year had lost the character of comparative unity which it
had possessed in its first. Napoleon, on quitting Spain in January,
left behind him as a legacy to his brother a comprehensive plan for
the conquest of the whole Peninsula. But that plan was, from the
first, impracticable: and when it had miscarried, the fighting in
every region of the theatre of war became local and isolated. Neither
the harassed and distracted French King at Madrid, nor the impotent
Spanish Junta at Seville, knew how to combine and co-ordinate the
operations of their various armies into a single logical scheme. Ere
long, six or seven campaigns were taking place simultaneously in
different corners of the Peninsula, each of which was practically
independent of the others. Every French and Spanish general fought
for his own hand, with little care for what his colleagues were
doing: their only unanimity was that all alike kept urging on their
central governments the plea that their own particular section of the
war was more critical and important than any other. If we look at
the month of May, 1809, we find that the following six disconnected
series of operations were all in progress at once, and that each
has to be treated as a separate unit, rather than as a part of one
great general scheme of strategy--(1) Soult’s campaign against
Wellesley in Northern Portugal, (2) Ney’s invasion of the Asturias,
(3) Victor’s and Cuesta’s movements in Estremadura, (4) Sebastiani’s
demonstrations against Venegas in La Mancha, (5) Suchet’s contest
with Blake in Aragon, (6) St. Cyr’s attempt to subdue Catalonia.
When a war has broken up into so many fractions, it becomes not only
hard to follow but very lengthy to narrate. Fortunately for the
historian and the student, a certain amount of unity is restored in
July, mainly owing to the fact that the master-mind of Wellesley has
been brought to bear upon the situation. When the British general
attempted to combine with the Spanish armies of Estremadura and La
Mancha for a common march upon Madrid, the whole of the hostile
forces in the Peninsula [with the exception of those in Aragon and
Catalonia] were once more drawn into a single scheme of operations.
Hence the Talavera campaign is the central fact in the annals of
the Peninsular War for the year 1809. I trust that it will not be
considered that I have devoted a disproportionate amount of space to
the setting forth and discussion of the various problems which it
involved.
The details of the battle of Talavera itself have engaged my special
attention. I thought it worth while to go very carefully over the
battle-field, which fortunately remains much as it was in 1809. A
walk around it explained many difficulties, but suggested certain
others, which I have done my best to solve.
In several other chapters of this volume I discovered that a
personal inspection of localities produced most valuable results.
At Oporto, for example, I found Wellesley’s passage of the Douro
assuming a new aspect when studied on the spot. Not one of the
historians who have dealt with it has taken the trouble to mention
that the crossing was effected at a point where the Douro runs
between lofty and precipitous cliffs, towering nearly 200 feet above
the water’s edge! Yet this simple fact explains how it came to pass
that the passage was effected at all--the French, on the plateau
above the river, could not see what was going on at the bottom of the
deeply sunk gorge, which lies in a ‘dead angle’ to any observer who
has not come forward to the very edge of the cliff. I have inserted a
photograph of the spot, which will explain the situation at a glance.
From Napier’s narrative and plan I am driven to conclude that he had
either never seen the ground, or had forgotten its aspect after the
lapse of years.
A search in the Madrid _Deposito de la Guerra_ produced a few
important documents for the Talavera campaign, and was made most
pleasant by the extreme courtesy of the officers in charge. It
is curious to find that our London Record Office contains a good
many Spanish dispatches which do not survive at Madrid. This
results from the laudable zeal with which Mr. Frere, when acting
as British minister at Seville, sent home copies of every Spanish
document, printed or unprinted, on which he could lay his hands.
Once or twice he thus preserved invaluable ‘morning states’ of the
Peninsular armies, which it would otherwise have been impossible to
recover. Among our other representatives in Spain Captain Carroll
was the only one who possessed to a similar degree this admirable
habit of collecting original documents and statistics. His copious
‘enclosures’ to Lord Castlereagh are of the greatest use for the
comprehension of the war in the Asturias and Galicia.
Neither Napier nor any other historian of the Peninsular War has gone
into the question of Beresford’s reorganization of the Portuguese
army. Comparing English and Portuguese documents, I have succeeded
in working it out, and trust that Chapter III of Section XIII, and
Appendix No. V, may suffice to demonstrate Beresford’s very real
services to the allied cause.
It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge much kind help that I have
received from correspondents on both sides of the sea, who have
come to my aid in determining points of difficulty. Of those in
England I must make particular notice of Colonel F. A. Whinyates,
R.A., a specialist in all matters connected with the British
artillery. I owe to him my Appendix No. XI, which he was good enough
to draw up, as well as the loan of several unpublished diaries of
officers of his own arm, from which I have extracted some useful
and interesting facts. I must also express my obligation to Mr.
E. Mayne, for information relating to Sir Robert Wilson’s Loyal
Lusitanian Legion, of which his relative, Colonel W. Mayne, was in
1809 the second-in-command. The excerpts which he was kind enough to
collect for me have proved of great service, and could not have been
procured from any other quarter. Nor must I omit to thank two other
correspondents, Colonel Willoughby Verner and the Rev. Alexander
Craufurd, for their notes concerning the celebrated ‘Light Division,’
in which the one is interested as the historian of the old 95th, and
the other as the grandson of Robert Craufurd, of famous memory.
Of helpers from beyond the Channel I must make special mention of
Commandant Balagny, the author of _Napoléon en Espagne_, who has
supplied me with a great number of official documents from Paris,
and in especial with a quantity of statistics, many of them hitherto
unpublished, which serve to fix the strength and the losses of
various French corps in 1809. I also owe to him my Appendix VI (iii),
a most interesting _résumé_ of the material in the French archives
relating to the strange ‘Oporto conspiracy’ of Captain Argenton
and his confederates. This obscure chapter of the history of the
Peninsular War is, I think, brought out in its true proportions
by the juxtaposition of the English and French documents. It is
clear that Soult’s conduct was far more sinister than Napier will
allow, and also that the plot to depose the Marshal was the work
of a handful of military intriguers, not of the great body of
highly-placed conspirators in whose existence the mendacious Argenton
has induced some historians to believe.
At Madrid General Arteche placed at my disposal, with the most
bountiful liberality, his immense stores of knowledge, which I had
learnt to appreciate long before, as a conscientious student of his
_Guerra de la Independencia_. He pointed out to me many new sources,
which had escaped my notice, and was good enough to throw light on
many problems which had been vexing me. For his genial kindness I
cannot too strongly express my obligation.
Of the officers at the Madrid _Deposito de la Guerra_, whose courtesy
I have mentioned above, I must give special thanks to Captain Emilio
Figueras, from whom (just as these pages are going to press) I have
received some additional figures relating to the Army of Estremadura
in 1809.
Finally, as in my first volume, I must make special acknowledgement
of the assistance of two helpers in Oxford--the indefatigable
compiler of the Index, and Mr. C. E. Doble, whose corrections and
suggestions have been as valuable in 1903 as in 1902.
C. OMAN.
ALL SOULS COLLEGE,
_June 20, 1903_.
CONTENTS
SECTION IX
AFTER CORUNNA (JAN.-FEB. 1809)
CHAPTER PAGE
I. The Consequences of Moore’s Diversion: Rally of the
Spanish Armies: Battle of Ucles 1
II. Napoleon’s departure from Spain: his plans for the
Termination of the War: the Counter-Plans of the
Junta: Canning and Cadiz 15