Among the instances in which Diana ministers to death, there are many

where she clearly exercises a mitigating and favouring agency; and

this may probably be signified in nearly all. Even of the children of

Niobe[185] it may be meant, that they were thus gently removed, the

innocent causes of their mother’s pride; while she was reserved for

heavier punishment, and doomed to weep eternally in stone.

[185] Il. xxiv. 606. Laodamia is an exception: see Il. vi. 205.

In considering what may have been the early traditional source of these

remarkable attributes of the children of Latona, we should tread softly

and carefully, for we are on very sacred ground. But we seem to see in

them the traces of the form of One, who, as an all-conquering King, was

to be terrible and destructive to His enemies, but who was also, on

behalf of mankind, to take away the sting from Death, and to change its

iron band for a thread of silken slumber.

The share of Messianic tradition accorded in this particular province

to Minerva appears, as has already been observed, to consist in her

peculiar power within the realm of Aidoneus himself.

~_Independence of second causes._~

10. Lastly, we appear to find, that in the conduct of those operations

in which their power over Nature is exhibited, Minerva and Apollo are

not tied down, or at least are not tied down in the same degree with

the other deities generally, to the use of instruments or symbols.

We find that Neptune, when he has to inspire courage into the two

Ajaxes, strikes them, (Il. xiii. 59.) As an accompanying significant

act, of a nature tending by itself to produce the result, this greatly

weakens the force of the passage in proof of divine or extraordinary

power. In like manner, when the same divinity converts the ship of the

Phæacians into a rock, he drives it downward with his hand[186].

[186] Od. xiii. 164.

But Apollo performs no such outward act when he infuses courage into

Hector, or into Glaucus; or when he heals the wounds of the latter

chieftain[187].

[187] Il. xv. 262. xvi. 528-9.

So likewise, when Minerva alters the personal appearance of Telemachus,

Ulysses, Laertes, or Penelope, by improving it, she uses no sign or

ministrative act. Only when she effects an organic though partial

transformation in the case of Ulysses[188] does she strike him with

her wand: but then this total transformation is an exercise of power,

of which we have no other example among the Olympian deities. Again,

when Minerva finally endows the hero with heightened beauty of figure

and countenance, it is done without the use of any visible sign

whatever[189].

[188] Od. xiii. 429. xvi. 172, 455.

[189] Od. xxiii. 156-63.

This employment of instruments is, in fact, susceptible of two

significations. They may be, like the tokens of Jupiter, intended to

act upon the senses of men. But where they have not this meaning, there

is a decided tendency to convey the conception of the instrument as

being itself the power which the deity merely directs and applies. Thus

it is in the cestus of Venus and the wand of Mercury that the divine

energy resides[190], not less than it is in the herbs of Paieon and in

the fire of Vulcan. So that any exemption from the use of these symbols

is a sign of belonging to a high order of deity.

[190] Nägelsbach, i. 25.

~Superiority of their moral standard.~

We now approach the third and last division of this subject; namely,

those points of distinction which most essentially belong to the moral

tone and personal character of these two great divinities.

Their moral standard is conspicuously raised above that of the Olympian

family in general.

It partakes indeed, as we might expect, of taint. Each has begun to

give way; and each in the way adapted to their several relations with

man and woman’s nature respectively. Apollo’s character has just begun

to be touched by licentiousness: and the character of Minerva is not

above condescension to deceit.

She is nowhere, however, associated either directly or indirectly, in

word or act, with anything impure. The contest of beauty, in which

Paris was the judge, is mentioned by Homer[191]: but the notice, a very

succinct one, though not quite in keeping with her highest dignity,

does not imply any deviation from her elevated chastity. Neither of

Juno, nor of Thetis, can the same virtue be fully predicated: both of

them, though in different modes, are brought into immediate contact

with the subject of sensual passion.

[191] Il. xxiv. 27-30.

Pallas is, in truth, no less chaste than Diana: but her purity is

absorbed in the dazzling splendour of her august prerogatives, while it

is more observed in the Huntress-maid, because it is the most salient

and distinguished point in her character.

In the post-Homeric, but yet early, hymn to Venus, three beings alone

in the wide universe are declared to be exempt from her sway. One of

them is Hestie, who represents the impersonation of the marriage bond

and the family life, and whose exemption therefore testifies directly

to the nature of the dominion from which it frees her. The other two

privileged beings are Pallas and Diana[192].

[192] Hymn. ad Ven. 8, 16.

The character of Apollo in this respect is by some degrees less

elevated: for he is an enjoying spectator of the scene described by

the certainly licentious lay of Demodocus in the Eighth Odyssey, from

which the goddesses in a body absent themselves. In the legend, too,

of the Ninth Iliad we find that Apollo carried off the daughter of

Marpessa, afterwards named by her parents Alcyone: but this passage, we

shall see, is susceptible of an interpretation, which gives it another

construction, and one certainly far more agreeable to the general

character of this divinity. The epithet enjoyed by the Homeric Diana,

expressive of purity, is accorded by Æschylus[193] (whose accuracy and

truthfulness often recall those of Homer) to Apollo;

[193] Æsch. Suppl. 222.

ἁγνόν τ’ Ἀπόλλω φυγάδ’ ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ θεόν.

And here the question arises, how did it happen that, while the element

of purity was strictly preserved in the tradition of the Wisdom, it was

lost in the twin tradition of the Seed of the woman?

The Wisdom naturally, when impersonated, assumed the feminine form.

Now the character of woman seems to be in itself better fenced against

impurity than that of man. Her comparatively dependent condition,

and the more direct operation of her failure in this respect on the

marriage tie through the disorganization of the family, have had a

further influence in giving an additional stringency to the ideas of

mankind with respect to her observance of this virtue; a stringency

not the less real, because it exemplifies the partial administration

of a law essentially just, nor because it has become rather less

conspicuous since the Gospel laid down with rigour, upon higher

grounds, one law for all. Thus it remained possible to conceive a

woman chaste, after the conditions of that idea had been almost lost

in connection with the standard of excellence in the other sex: and

this virtue, banished from the earth in general, still found here and

there, even down to the fœtid corruption of the time of Martial[194], a

last refuge in individual cases of untainted womanhood. This course of

thought and feeling is exemplified in the Minerva of the Olympian Court.

[194] Epigr. x. 63.

Yet the idea was not simply extinguished in the twin tradition, of

which Apollo is the chief representative. Submerged in him, a home is

found for it in the appropriate form of Diana as his sister. The power

and majesty of this form of the Messianic tradition fall chiefly to his

share: she retains what was then, to the shame of our race, thought

its less precious ingredient, freedom from sensual taint. Apollo would

have been its natural vehicle: but in him, for the reason that he was

a man, it was perhaps to the Greek mind inconceivable: a new vehicle

was either framed, or adapted, in order to carry it: the idea of the

great Deliverer that should be born was thus disintegrated, like other

traditions, and like other historical characters, which men could not

so readily embrace in their integrity.

As this is the first point in the discussion at which we have

encountered an actual instance of this disintegration, it may be well

to explain the meaning I attach to the term.

~_Disintegration of traditions._~

It seems indubitable, that moral combinations, which are intelligible

as well as credible to one age, may become incredible to another.

Just as there are individual men at every epoch, who cannot believe in

generosity and elevation of character, because they have in themselves

no mirror which can reflect such qualities; so a generation ruled

by more debased ideas cannot comprehend what another, influenced by

less impure tendencies, could readily embrace. On the same principle,

the Gospel gives not to the sagacious, but to the ‘pure in heart,’

the greatest triumph of mental vision, namely, that ‘they shall see

God[195].’

[195] St. Matt. v. 8.

Accordingly, when it happens that a tradition becomes unintelligible

to the mind of a given people, it is lost. It may be lost by the

disappearance even of its outward form and shell. Or it may be lost by

the alteration of its meaning while its words are retained. Or the work

of destruction may take another turn: it may be lost by being torn into

pieces; the effect being that one old tradition disappears, and more

than one partial substitute for it is created.

The highest fraud and the highest force appear to have been, according

to original tradition, joined in the Evil One: they were separated in

the Grecian forms of[196] that tradition. The Apollo of Homer was still

one, with a great diversity of gifts; but mythological solecisms were

already apparent in his character, like cracks in a stately building.

This, too, was settled by disintegration; and in the later mythology

there were many Apollos: other causes probably concurring to extend the

multiplying process.

[196] Inf. Sect. iii.

The same operation took effect upon the traditions of human character.

Homer, with the finest powers of light and shade, has represented Helen

as erring, and as penitent. The moral sense of later, less simple,

and more deeply corrupted, times became impervious to a balanced

conception of this kind. Accordingly, the one Helen was torn into two,

and supplied material both for the guilty Helen, or εἴδωλον of Helen,

at Troy, and for the innocent Helen detained in Egypt. In like manner,

it became a question, probably first when Athens had grown great, how

Minos could on the one hand be great and wise, and could on the other

have made war and imposed tribute upon Attica. Hence the fable of two

Minoses[197]: so that those who venerated the ancient traditions of

Crete might still be allowed to cherish their pious sentiment, while,

upon the other hand, the Athenian dramatists might exercise a fertile

imagination in inventing circumstances of horror for the biography of

the piratical enemy of their country.

[197] Höck’s Creta, vol. ii.

It was, I conceive, an early example of this disintegration, which

divided between Apollo and Diana different members of a primitive

Messianic tradition. And, when we again combine the two personalities

of the brother and the sister in one, the tradition resumes its

completeness and roundness.

It is likely that the same mental process, which thus deposited the

element of chastity in the person of the comparatively feeble Diana,

also conferred on her the figure of the Huntress-Queen. For thus she

lived in seclusion from the ways and haunts of man: and it was only by

seclusion that she could be kept in maiden innocence.

But although the logical turn of the Greek mind soon came to place

Apollo in morally disadvantageous contrast, under this particular head,

both with his sister and with Pallas, he may be favourably compared

with the other Homeric gods. There is something in the tradition that

he was unshorn (ἀκερσεκόμης), which is evidently intended to connect

him with the innocence of youth. And in Homer, unless it be by the

legend of the Ninth Iliad, he is unharmed by connection with any of

those relations which assign to Jupiter, Neptune, Mars, and Mercury,

human children as the fruit of their indulgence.

~_Legend of Marpessa._~

The reasons which lead me to suppose that the legend of Marpessa is not

of a sensual character are these. The words used are[198];

[198] Il. ix. 564.

ὅτε μιν ἑκάεργος ἀνήρπασε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

Now none of the numerous intrigues of the mythical deities with women

include violence: they always appear, so far as the language used

gives them a specific character, to have been voluntarily accepted

connections[199]. It was not likely that the case of Apollo should have

been the exception. Again, they are always mentioned as having led

to the birth of children: but there is no such mention in this case,

and Apollo has no human progeny. Lastly, the word used does not mean

_ravished_, but _seized and carried up_. It nearly corresponds with the

expression in the case of Ganymede[200],

[199] Il. ii. 513; xvi. 184, and other cases.

[200] Il. xx. 234.

τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείψαντο θεοὶ Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν,

and it may have been either a case of translation, or one in which the

maid was conceived to have been taken for the service of the deity,

perhaps at the neighbouring shrine of Delphi.

After the part which the lay of Demodocus assigns to him, the most,

perhaps the only, discreditable transaction assigned to Apollo in

the poems is the manner in which he disarms and partially disables

Patroclus. Nothing can be more wretched than his operations on this

occasion. The god comes up to the hero enveloped in cloud; strikes him

from behind on the back; and knocks off his armour. I can conceive

but one explanation for this singular passage, which appears alike

unsatisfactory from a poetical and from a mythological point of view.

That explanation I think is to be sought in intense nationality.

The main purpose of the poem required the sacrifice of a principal

Greek hero: but no genuine Greek hero could be killed by fair means,

therefore it was necessary to dispose of him by such as were foul. It

is perhaps also worth remark that the audacity of Patroclus in pushing

on to the city may perhaps have rendered him punishable (Il. xvi.

698-711).

It is remarkable, however, that the character of each of the two great

traditive deities had begun to give way to corruption, and each in

the point at which, according to the respective sex, its yielding

might have been anticipated. As unchastity is more readily pardoned,

according to social usage, in the man, so is deceit in the woman. And

in this point the standard had already fallen for Minerva.

Of this we have one most clear indication, in her being commissioned

to undertake the charge of inciting Pandarus to a very black act of

treachery, the breach of the Pact. So far from being unwilling in this

matter, she was even eager[201];

[201] Il. iv. 73.

ὣς εἰπὼν ὤτρυνε πάρος μεμαυῖαν Ἀθήνην.

Besides judgment and industrial skill, she gave κέρδεα to

Penelope[202]: and she describes herself[203] as excelling among the

gods in craft as well as counsel;

[202] Od. ii. 117.

[203] Od. xiii. 299.

μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν.

With the exception of this initial tendency to degenerate on the side

of craft, we may say with truth that the highest moral tone, both of

speech and action, is reserved for Minerva in particular throughout

the poems, whether in the Olympian Court, or in her intercourse with

men. Alike in the Iliad and the Odyssey, her counsel, which prevails,

undoubtedly also deserves to prevail. She is in both the champion of

the righteous cause. And when she states for the second time the case

of Ulysses before the assembled gods, it is not now as before his

liberality in sacrifice that she pleads, but, as a last resort, she

makes bold to urge the bad moral effect which will result, if they

discourage virtue by permitting the ruin of this excellent man[204].

[204] Od. v. 7.

~_Their place in Providential Government._~

2. It is in conformity with the expectations, which the superior

morality of Apollo and Minerva tends to raise, that we find them

occupying a position such as is accorded to no other deity in the

Providential government both of the human mind and will, and likewise

of the course of events external to it.

The origin of this position may, as I conceive, be found in the

traditions which they inherit, and according to which they would

naturally be exhibited as the administrators of the government of the

world, on behalf, if I may so speak, of the Godhead.

But there were, among the inborn tendencies of polytheism, two at

least which powerfully tended to give to these divinities a position

not only associated with that of Jupiter, but on the one hand more

palpable and practical, and on the other of higher moral elevation.

These were the tendencies which, among the incidents of his supremacy,

on the one hand, blessed him with personal repose, and, on the other,

endowed him with unbounded appetite. The first, by making Apollo and

Minerva, as his organs, the practical governors of the world, tended

to increase their importance at the expense of his, and the second

gave them a moral title as it were to gain ground upon him. In the

time of Homer this process was considerably advanced; so that while

they seem to share with Jupiter the office of general direction, which

they hold subject to his control, it falls to one of them, to Minerva

especially, to conduct the highest of all the divine processes in the

administration of moral discipline, and in the exercise of influence

over the human soul.

In the war before Troy, what is done by Juno or by Neptune is commonly

done in the way of unauthorized, or even of forbidden, interference.

In this, Minerva shares: for she has a less perfect conformity of

will with that of Jupiter than Apollo, though she has a more profound

moral resemblance of character to the ideal, from which the Homeric

Jupiter was a depravation. Of the action before Troy, however, as a

whole, thus much remains true: that, when the will of Jupiter is to be

wrought out in favour of the Greeks, it is done entirely by Minerva,

and when in favour of the Trojans it is done entirely by Apollo. Each

therefore appears as the proper minister of Jupiter, when willing, for

conducting the government of mankind. One of them is always willing:

and though the other is not equally acquiescent, still it is the view

of the case taken by her, in common with other gods more weighty than

numerous, to which Jupiter ultimately gives way. Thus we may discern,

graven as it were upon the relation between themselves and Jupiter,

the mark which shows that it was originally derived from the office

of Him, ‘by whom God made the worlds[205].’ Scarcely ever do we find

Homer deviate from the general rule which exhibits them as the ordinary

Providence of the world for governing the detail of life. There is, I

think, but one part of the Iliad which exhibits to us any considerable

assumption of this function by Jupiter himself. It is during the latter

part of the day which was to be closed by a sunset fatal to Hector,

that, besides sending forth Apollo with the blinding Ægis, he himself

descends to such acts of minute interference as breaking the bowstring

of Teucer[206].

[205] Heb. i. 2.

[206] Il. xv. 463.

~_It is frequently ascribed to them._~

Regarded from without, these two deities appear to us as frequently

receiving from men the ascriptions of Divine Providence.

The idea of Divine Providence is frequently expressed by Homer under

the names θεὸς, θεοὶ, ἀθάνατοι, δαίμων. It is also often conveyed by

the name Jupiter alone, or by such an expression as ‘Jupiter and the

other immortal gods,’ in which he appears at their head. In one place

of the Odyssey, though only one, the day being the festival of Apollo,

this very extraordinary distinction is assigned to him: and the τις of

the Suitors thus places him at the head of the Olympian company[207];

[207] Od. xxi. 364.

εἴ κεν Ἀπόλλων

ἡμῖν ἱλήκῃσι καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι.

Sometimes mortal men look to one of these deities for success in

their enterprises, even without naming Jupiter: sometimes that name

is conjoined with one of theirs. Apollo himself, appearing to Hector

in the form of Asius his uncle, exhorts that chieftain to attack

Patroclus, ‘in the hope that Apollo may give him success[208].’

Presently, Patroclus, dying, attributes Hector’s victory to Jupiter and

Apollo, his own death to Apollo and Μοῖρα[209]; Apollo, says Xanthus

the immortal horse, slew Patroclus, and gave glory to Hector[210]. This

cannot well apply to the direct agency of the god in the matter, as he

only disarmed the Greek hero. Again, when Patroclus is slain, Minerva

takes no part in the proceedings. When Hector is about to be vanquished

Apollo retires, and Minerva straightway appears upon the field[211]. In

the Doloneia, Ulysses and Diomed succeed, because Jupiter and Minerva

befriend them[212]. Minerva rejoices, when she finds her name invoked

first of all the gods[213]: and she instructs Laertes to call upon

Jupiter with herself, assuming for her own name the first place;

[208] Il. xvi. 715.

[209] Ibid. 845.

[210] Il. xix. 413.

[211] Il. xxii. 209-14.

[212] Il. x. 552-3. Comp. xi. 736.

[213] Cf. Il. x. 462.

εὐξάμενος κούρῃ Γλαυκώπιδι καὶ Διὶ πατρί[214].

[214] Od. xxiv. 518.

Agamemnon feels that he is certain to take Troy, if only Jupiter and

Minerva will it[215]. Ulysses expects to slay the Suitors ‘by the

favour of Jupiter and Minerva[216].’ But in fact, the whole scheme of

divine retribution, of which that hero is the organ, was planned by

Minerva and not by Jupiter, as is twice declared to us from his own

lips[217]. I must not, however, omit to notice one passage of peculiar

grandeur, in which Jupiter and Minerva are combined, as joint arbiters

of great events. In the Sixteenth Odyssey, Telemachus exhorts his

father, amid their gloomy and doubtful prospects, to bethink him of

obtaining some ally. He nobly replies as follows: ‘I will tell you, and

do you answer me and say, whether Athene with Zeus her father will not

suffice for us, or whether I shall study to find some other defender.’

The rejoinder of Telemachus is in the same exalted strain. ‘Yes, these

are good, though they be afar off, sitting on high; for they prevail

over all others, whether they be men, or whether they be immortal

gods[218].’

[215] Il. viii. 287.

[216] Od. xx. 42.

[217] Od. v. 23. xxiv. 479.

[218] Od. xvi. 256-61, 262-5.

~_Especially in the highest sense to Minerva._~

It should be observed, that they are not the lower and more external

forms of providential action which devolve on Minerva, with a

reservation of the higher parts to Jupiter. On the contrary, in what

we may call external and wholesale Providence, Jupiter is supreme;

and in the conflict between Ulysses and the Ithacan rebels, as well

as in various passages of the Iliad relating to external action,

Jupiter interposes to check her eager spirit. In the last Odyssey she

asks his designs. He recommends a pacification. She thereupon exhorts

and assists old Laertes to begin the battle. At length a thunderbolt

descends from Jupiter, and it falls at Minerva’s feet. She then

interposes to make peace[219].

[219] Od. xxiv. 472-86, 515-41.

Thus it is in battle and matters of the strong hand: but the higher and

deeper forms of providential action appear to be unheeded by Jupiter,

and to fall to the lot of these two deities, more particularly of

Minerva.

In the Odyssey, one of the Suitors, Amphinomus, better minded than

the rest, anticipates evil at an early juncture, and is disposed to

take the advice given him by Ulysses, that he should quit the palace,

and return home. But he did not even now, says the Poet, escape

doom: for Minerva fettered him, that he should fall beneath the hand

of Telemachus[220]. And further, she works inwardly on the minds of

the Suitors, ‘not suffering them,’ such is the remarkable phrase, ‘to

abstain from their biting insolence:’ so that pain might yet more

deeply pierce the soul of Ulysses[221]:

[220] Od. xviii. 151-7.

[221] Od. xviii. 346.

μνηστῆρας δ’ οὐ πάμπαν ἀγήνορας εἴα Ἀθήνη

λώβης ἴσχεσθαι θυμαλγέος, ὄφρ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον

δύη ἄχος κραδίην Λαερτιάδην Ὀδυσῆα.

Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age, Vol. 2 of 3 Olympus; or, the Religion of the Homeric Age · 第 8 / 38 段