CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSION.

The Price of Victory—The Special Strength of the Brigade—An

Example of True Race Integration—The Nation and the Individual.

There is no need to pursue the chronicle of the Brigade through the slow

months of demobilization, till in the following June the bulk of its

members embarked for home in a German liner handed over to Britain under

the terms of peace. When on that grey November morning the guns fell

silent, it had accomplished the task to which it had dedicated itself

in the summer of 1915. It had travelled a long road in the three years.

Brought suddenly, after its short campaign in Egypt, into the thick of

the fiercest struggle in the West, it had performed every duty allotted

to it with whole-hearted devotion and supreme competence. Never more

than a few thousand in numbers, and perpetually short of drafts, it had

won for its country of origin a name in the field as proud as that of

far larger and more populous territories. There is no soldier living who

would deny that in quality the South Africans ranked with the best troops

of any army. Twice by its own self-sacrifice the Brigade had been reduced

to a handful, and had lost all semblance of a unit, and on each occasion

its loss had been the salvation of the British cause. At Delville Wood,

at Marrières Wood, and at Messines it had proved to what heights of

resolution a defence may rise: in attack at Arras, at Third Ypres, and at

Le Cateau it had shown the world, in Napier’s famous words, “with what

majesty the British soldier fights.” The little contingent, one among

some hundred British brigades, occupied small space on the battle-map.

But scale must not be confused with kind; the men of Leonidas were not

the less Spartans because they were only three hundred.

In the long road to victory they had left many of their best by the

wayside. The casualties in France were close on 15,000, nearly 300

per cent. of the original strength. Of these some 5,000 were dead. As

evidence of the fury of the Western campaign, it may be noted that the

South African contingent in East Africa was nearly twice the size of the

forces in France from beginning to end, but its losses were not more

than a quarter of theirs. How many, especially of the younger officers,

whose names are recorded in the earlier actions, survived to advance on

Le Cateau? Yet the amazing thing is that in a Brigade which was so often

severely engaged, and in which the uttermost risks were cheerfully and

habitually taken, any came through the three years’ struggle. There are

men who fought from Agagia to Le Cateau and have now returned to the mine

and the farm to be living witnesses to their miraculous Odyssey.

Wherein lay the peculiar strength of the Brigade? It has been a war of

many marvels. We have seen pasty-faced youths from the slums of cities

toughen into redoubtable soldiers, and boys new from office-stool and

college classroom become on the instant leaders of men and Berserks

in battle. The Brigade had the initial advantage of drawing upon men

of a fine physique, and, in many cases, of practical experience in a

rough and self-reliant life. Its recruits, too, as I have already said,

showed a high average of education, and many who never left the ranks

were well qualified for commissions. They developed rapidly a perfect

_esprit de corps_, which, because they were so few and so far from home,

was more than the solidarity of a fighting unit, and became something

like the spirit of a race and a nation. I do not think a more perfect

brotherhood-in-arms could have been found on any front. Lastly, they were

commanded by officers who had their full confidence and affection. The

successive brigadiers, the battalion and battery commanders, and every

officer understood the meaning of “team-work,” and loved and respected

the troops they led.

There is one quality of the South Africans which deserves especial

mention—I mean their curious modesty. A less boastful body of men never

appeared in arms. They had a horror of any kind of advertisement. No war

correspondent attended them to chronicle their doings; no picturesque

articles in the press enlightened the public at home. That may have

been bad for the Allied cause; but assuredly it was what they wished

themselves. They had in a high degree the traditional British love of

understatement, and no old regular was ever a greater adept at pitching

things in a low key. To talk to them after a hard-fought action was

to hear a tale of quite ordinary and prosaic deeds, in which little

credit was sought for themselves but much given to others. They had

that gentle and inflexible pride which is too proud to make claims, and

leaves the bare fact to be its trumpeter. I believe that to be a quality

of South Africa. She is so ancient a land that she does not need to

brag and hustle like newer peoples, but comports herself with the quiet

good-breeding of long descent. She has been through so many furnaces that

she has won dignity and simplicity. These were most notably the traits of

her forces on the Western front. They feared very little on earth except

the reputation of heroes; and if in this book I have done violence to

that fine tradition, I can only make them my apology and plead the debt

of the historian to truth.

The story which I have endeavoured to tell is to be regarded in the first

place as the achievement of a people—that South African people in which

the union of two race-stocks is in process of consummation. The war

record of South Africa, from whatever angle it is regarded, is one to

be proud of. To the different fronts she contributed over 136,000 white

troops—nearly 10 per cent. of her total white population, and some 20 per

cent. of her male white population. But, great as was her work in other

battle-grounds, to my mind her chief glory is her achievement in France.

The campaigns in German East and South-West Africa might be regarded as

frontier wars, fought for the immediate defence of her borders and her

local interests. But to come into line in the main struggle far away in

Europe meant an understanding of the deeper issues of the Great War.

Her sons in France did not fight in the narrow sense for Britain; they

fought for that liberal civilization of which the British Commonwealth

is the humble guardian; they fought for that South African nation which

could not hope to live till Germany’s challenge to liberty was answered.

There were many in the Brigade who had still quick in their hearts an

affection for the northern islands from which they had sprung; but there

were many to whom Britain was only a faint memory, and many in whom her

name woke no enthusiasm. There were men of Dutch blood who had fought

stoutly against us in the old South African War, and now fought like

crusaders, not for our Empire, but for the greater faith by which alone

that Empire can be justified. All honour to those who were not beguiled

by the chatter of a shallow racialism, which, let it be remembered,

is the eternal foe of nationality; who, without the homely sentiment

and intimate loyalties which inspired the British-born, battled for an

austere faith and an honourable ideal of their country’s future.

Ever since eighteen years ago I had first the privilege to know South

Africa, I have cherished the belief that the Dutch stock there is one of

the finest in the world, and the most akin in fundamentals to our own;

and that the future must bring to the two races some such union in spirit

and in truth as links to-day the “auld enemies” of England and Scotland.

The War has enlarged that hope. Never during its three years was there

a spark of racial feeling in the ranks of the Brigade. No Dutchman ever

cavilled at the appointment of an Englishman; no Englishman or Scot but

gave his full confidence to a Dutch superior. All were South Africans and

citizens of no mean country. The Brigade was a microcosm of what South

Africa may yet become if the fates are kind. It was a living example of

true race integration.

The story may be regarded also as a record of plain human achievement,

of what heights are possible in the “difficult but not desperate” life

of man. To individuals, as to nations, comes at rare intervals the

supreme test of manhood. It is often an open choice: there are excellent

arguments why the smooth rather than the rough road should be taken. The

men of the Brigade enlisted voluntarily, under no conscription of law—not

even under the social coercion of universal recruiting; their pay was

the slender wage of the British regular; they abandoned, most of them,

good prospects in their different callings; there was no reward before

them save honour and a quiet conscience. They made, in another sense

than Dante’s Pope, the _gran rifiuto_, and preferred a rendezvous with

death to comfort and ease. And having chosen, they were wholly resolved

to endure to the end. Such a sacrifice is not made in vain, and against

it the gates of death cannot prevail. The survivors face life with a

new mastery over themselves and their fates, and the remembrance of the

fallen will be a glory and inspiration to the generations to come.

Man cannot live always on the heights. It would not be well if he did,

for the work of the world must be carried on among the flats beneath. But

it is good to know that the hills are there, and it is better to have

once sojourned among them.... In the bushveld under the scarp of the Berg

one may move for days in a parched and thorny land, where the dust hangs

in clouds over the road, and dank thickets fringe unwholesome rivers. But

to the west above the foothills rise green lines of upland, which by day

seem no more than the bare top of a mountain, but at sunset glow like

jewels in the heavens. Such a sight is welcome to the traveller, for it

tells him that somewhere, and not too distant, there is a land of cool

meadows and shining streams; and from that secret country descend the

waters which make fruitful the workaday plains.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.

THE HEAVY ARTILLERY.

An apology is due for the relegation of so distinguished a service as

the South African Heavy Artillery to an appendix, and for a sketch of a

most honourable record which must necessarily be short and inadequate.

To tell the story fully would involve the rewriting of the history of

the campaign in the West from a special angle; and the point of view of

a siege battery, which in action is stationary though not immobile, and

is on all occasions ancillary to the infantry work, is not the best from

which to follow the main movements of war. The story of a battery, too,

should include many technical matters which cannot properly find their

place in a general history. But it is greatly to be hoped that detailed

records will be published of the different South African artillery units,

such as has already been most admirably prepared for the 71st Battery.

Some of them were engaged in battles in which the Infantry Brigade had no

part, and when the artillery story is added, the South African records

cover almost the whole career of the British Army in France and Flanders.

In particular, the doings of the 73rd Battery at the southern gatepost

during the Battle of the Lys is a fitting accompaniment to the exploits

of the Infantry Brigade at Messines in the north.

We have already seen (Chapter I.) that the five batteries of the old

South African Heavy Artillery Brigade were armed, on arriving in England,

with 6-inch howitzers and affiliated to the Royal Garrison Artillery,

becoming the 73rd, 74th, 71st, 72nd, and 75th Siege Batteries, R.G.A.

In April 1916 a sixth battery, the 125th, was formed. Early in 1918 a

seventh battery, the 542nd, and an eighth, the 496th, were created, but

when they arrived in France they were broken up, and their guns and

_personnel_ distributed, the first between the 75th and the 125th,

and the second between the 72nd and 74th. A ninth battery, the 552nd,

armed with 8-inch guns, was formed in the autumn of 1918, but the War

ended before it could be brought into action. We have therefore to

deal with six siege batteries, which were engaged in France from the

summer of 1916 to the date of the armistice. At first the batteries were

independent units, being allotted to widely separated corps and heavy

artillery groups. It was not till the beginning of 1918 that they were

brought together, and two South African Brigades formed, the 44th and the

50th—the 44th including the 73rd (S.A.), 71st (S.A.), 125th (S.A.), and

20th Batteries; and the 50th, the 74th (S.A.), 72nd (S.A.), 75th (S.A.),

and 275th. It will be convenient to take the doings of each battery

separately up to January 1918, and thereafter to deal with the record of

the two brigades.

THE 73RD SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.

This Battery, after its period of training in England, landed at Havre

on May 1, 1916, under the command of Major Walter Brydon. On 9th May it

reached Bienvillers-au-Bois, in the Somme area, where it took up a battle

position under the command of the 19th Artillery Group. On 15th May it

fired its first round for sighting purposes. On 1st July, when the First

Battle of the Somme began, it covered the infantry advance on Gommecourt,

attaining the record of thirty-two rounds in eight minutes with each gun.

On 17th July it moved to the village of Berles-au-Bois, and was engaged

in smashing enemy trenches and counter-battery work in the neighbourhood

of Monchy-au-Bois and Ransart. On 25th August it moved back to Doullens,

and thence to Albert, where it took up position in the ruins of La

Boisselle. Here it supported the attack on Pozières, Courcelette, and

Thiepval; and Major Brydon was wounded while observing for the Battery

in the front trenches. In October it advanced its position to Pozières,

where it suffered considerably from enemy fire, and had its fill of

discomforts from the weather of that appalling winter. In February 1917

Major Brydon returned to duty; and on the 15th of that month two officers

of the Battery, Lieutenant Campion and Second-Lieutenant J. Currie,

advancing with the infantry to the capture of Boom ravine, rallied two

companies whose officers had all been killed, and captured two strong

machine-gun posts. Lieutenant Campion fell in this gallant exploit, and

Second-Lieutenant Currie received the D.S.O.

In March, in a heavy snowfall, the Battery left the Somme and went

north to the Arras area, where, in the Battle of Arras on 9th April,

it supported the attack of the Canadians on Vimy Ridge. By noon the

advance had progressed so far that the Battery was out of range, and

moved forward first to Écurie and then to Thélus. Thélus proved a hot

corner, and the Battery had many casualties, notably on 1st May, Major

Brydon being wounded for the second time. Soon after it was relieved and

retired to Houdain, its first spell out of the line since its arrival

in France. It returned to Thélus on 28th May, Captain P. A. M. Hands

being temporarily in command, and remained there till the last day of

June, when it was transferred to Flanders. Its new position was in the

Ypres salient, at the village of Zillebeke, close to Hill 60, where it

was much exposed to the enemy’s fire, and within 1,000 yards of his

front lines. Owing to this, working parties had to be sent up overnight,

going in single file for over three miles, past such places of proved

unhealthiness as “Hell Fire Corner” and “Shrapnel Corner.” The guns were

in position by the 17th July, and on the 25th Major Brydon came back

from hospital. The Battery was bombed night and day by enemy aircraft,

and had no means of making shell-proof cover, for the water was only two

feet below the surface of the ground. On 29th August it was relieved for

a short space, but it was not till 1st November that it finally left

Zillebeke and the Second Battle of Ypres. During the four months there

it had nine guns put out of action by hostile fire. On 7th October Major

Brydon was gassed, and went to hospital for the third time.

The Battery returned to its old ground at Thélus, which had now become

a quiet area, and on 11th November moved to Liévin, west of Lens.

Here it had comfortable quarters, and was busy preparing positions in

anticipation of an attack. It pulled out for Christmas to Béthune, and on

January 5, 1918, took up position at Loisne, where it received news of

its inclusion in the new 44th (S.A.) Brigade, R.G.A.

THE 71ST SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.

The 71st Battery arrived at Havre on April 16, 1916, under the command

of Major H. C. Harrison. It was destined for the impending operations

on the Somme, and its first position was at Mailly-Maillet in the VIII.

Corps area. On 2nd June, however, it was ordered north to Ypres, where

the Canadians at the moment were heavily engaged. On the 18th it returned

to Mailly-Maillet, where it participated in the opening days of the First

Battle of the Somme. On 5th July it moved to Bécordel, and supported the

attack on Mametz Wood, Ovillers, and Contalmaison, and the September

attack on Martinpuich and Flers. On 20th September it moved forward to

Bazentin, where till the close of the year it was engaged in battling

with the problem of the Somme mud. After a short period of rest it was

at Ovillers on January 2, 1917, and during February and March moved

slowly eastward, following the German retreat. In April it was engaged

against the Hindenburg line, and had a share in the fierce fighting

around Bullecourt. In July and August it had a position at Croisilles,

some 2,000 yards from the enemy front. One sector moved north on 31st

August to a position just outside the Menin gate at Ypres, and the rest

of the Battery followed on 15th September. There it took part in the

Third Battle of Ypres, supporting the attack of the South African Brigade

on 20th September, the first occasion when it was in action along with

its own infantry. Its position was badly exposed, and it suffered many

casualties from enemy shell fire and air-bombing, till it was relieved on

22nd October.

Much worn out, it now moved to Liévin, in the Lens area, where for a

little it had a quieter life. On 8th November it handed over its guns

to the 73rd (S.A.) Siege Battery, and with the guns of the latter went

south to Bapaume. Its new position was in the outskirts of Gouzeaucourt,

where, on 20th November, it shared in the Battle of Cambrai. The German

counter-attack of the 30th came very near its position, and during those

stormy days the Battery, under the command of Major P. N. G. Fitzpatrick,

did brilliant work under great difficulties. Unhappily, on 14th December,

at Beaumetz, Major Fitzpatrick was killed by a chance shell. On the 18th

the guns were withdrawn to Beaumetz, and by the end of the month the

Battery was on the front between Béthune and Lens, one section going

to La Bourse, and the other to Beuvry. Here it became part of the 44th

(S.A.) Brigade.

THE 125TH SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.

The 125th Battery was first organized on April 4, 1916, under the command

of Major R. P. G. Begbie. It arrived at Havre on 21st July, and reached

the Third Army area on 26th July, during the fourth week of the First

Battle of the Somme. Its position was at Sailly-au-Bois, on the extreme

left of the battle-ground, where its principal targets were the German

batteries at Puisieux, Bucquoy, and Grandcourt. On 19th October it moved

to the eastern edge of Englebelmer Wood, where it was attached to Sir

Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army. Here it “prepared” and participated in the

attack on Beaumont-Hamel on 13th November. It was a difficult task, for

its gun positions were remote from the road, and every 100 lb. shell had

to be carried some 400 yards through a swamp, until eventually a line of

rails was laid. On January 20, 1917, the Battery moved to a new position

on the Auchonvillers road, half a mile north of Mailly-Maillet, where for

the next few weeks it was engaged by enemy batteries and a German heavy

calibre naval gun, and suffered many losses. On 22nd February it moved

into Beaumont-Hamel, where it had better quarters.

On 22nd March, over impossible roads, the Battery moved north to Arras,

where its first position was beside the Faubourg d’Amiens. On the

second day of the battle of Arras it moved east to St. Sauveur, and on

16th April it went forward a mile east of Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines, on

the Arras-Cambrai road. Here it was much exposed, and three days later

it moved back to the wood of Tilloy. For the next month its guns were

constantly in action by day and night. On 11th May it pulled out for a

much needed rest, during which time it received reinforcements which

brought it up to strength. On 18th June it moved to Roclincourt, in the

Oppy section, where the first leave to England was granted. On 21st July

it took up position at Vermelles-lès-Béthune, in the Lens area. Here

it came under the First Army, and from the 15th to the 23rd August was

heavily engaged in supporting the attack of the Canadians on Hill 70,

east of Loos. On the evening of the latter day it moved forward into the

ruins of Loos, and rendered brilliant service in the action of the 24th.

Its cables were constantly cut by shell fire, and on 5th September it had

28 casualties from a deluge of German gas shells. The _personnel_ of

the Battery was withdrawn to rest between the 9th and 21st of September,

but from the latter date till 8th October it resumed its work in that

section. When the four guns were brought back to Béthune, it was found

that not one was fit for further action.

The Battery was now attached to the Belgian Army as one of the thirteen

siege batteries constituting the XIV. Corps Heavy Artillery. Its position

was in the swampy country in the neighbourhood of Steenvoorde and

Oostkerke. On 3rd December it moved to the La Bassée area, and rejoined

the First Army, taking up position at Annequin. On January 9, 1918, there

came a short space of rest near Lillers. Major Begbie handed over the

command to Major J. G. Stewart, and the Battery became part of the 44th

(S.A.) Brigade.

THE 44TH (SOUTH AFRICAN) HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

On January 29, 1918, Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Blew, D.S.O., of the South

African Defence Force, took command of the Brigade, with headquarters

at Beuvry Château. The four batteries were in position east and south

of Béthune. During February and March this was a quiet sector, but the

batteries were busy preparing reserve positions in depth in view of

a possible German attack. From the first day of April the guns were

actively engaged in counter-battery work.

The German assault came on 9th April, and one of its main objectives

was the right pillar of the British front at Givenchy, held by the 55th

Division. All the battery positions of the Brigade, except that of the

125th, had been located by the enemy, who from the early morning drenched

them with high explosives and gas shells. For a time all communications

with Brigade Headquarters were cut. The falling back of the division on

their left allowed the enemy to advance almost up to their gun positions.

The 73rd Battery was in the most hazardous case, and owing to the

shelling it was impossible to bring up motor transport to evacuate its

guns. Major Brydon, who had returned the month before from hospital to

the command of the Battery, was ordered to blow up his guns, but instead

he served out rifles and a couple of machine guns to his men, and bade

them stand to. At one time he had to send the breech-blocks to the rear

for safety, but the attack was stayed before it reached the guns, and the

breech-blocks were brought back. Though wounded and gassed, he refused to

leave his Battery. Finally he was compelled to retire. The men dragged

the guns for nearly a mile under cover of darkness, and by 2 a.m. on

the morning of the 10th a new position had been found, and the Battery

was again in action. The casualties of the Brigade that day were 13 men

killed, and 6 officers and 29 men wounded.

The stand on the 9th checked the enemy for a time, and all batteries

were able to take up less exposed positions. They suffered, however,

from a continuous bombardment, and on the 12th the heroic commander of

the 73rd was killed by a shell. He had left the doctor’s hands when a

severe burst of German fire began, and had hurried forward to see to his

guns. No officer in the British Army had a finer record for gallantry

and devotion to duty. His Battery was known everywhere on the front as

“Brydon’s Battery,” and he was beloved by his men, for his only thought

was for them. During the 9th, though wounded himself, he helped to dress

the other wounded, and when the men at the guns began to show signs of

exhaustion, he himself dealt out rum to them. Finally he went through a

downpour of shells to find a doctor and more dressings. It was one of the

many ironies of the war that he never received the Victoria Cross, for

he won it a dozen times. Let his epitaph be the words of a gunner in his

Battery, who had served with him only a few weeks, and who on the 9th had

his arms and legs shot away. Major Brydon stopped and asked if he could

do anything for him. The dying man raised himself on his stumps. “By God,

Brydon,” he cried, “you are a man. I’m only good for the parson now, but

I’m proud to die under you.”

The 18th of April saw another severe bombardment, when five officers

of the 73rd Battery were gassed—Captain P. A. M. Hands, the second in

command, and Second-Lieutenants Maasdorp and Brown dying of the effects.

This meant a loss to the Brigade, since the 9th, of five officers dead.

The expenditure of ammunition during that period had been enormous: the

71st Battery, for example, fired 11,000 rounds. The Brigade remained on

the same front till the 27th June, when it was brought out to rest. On

the 27th July Lieutenant-Colonel Blew relinquished his command, being

succeeded temporarily by Major E. H. Tamplin, who, on 17th August,

handed over to Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Bennett, formerly commanding the

74th Battery.

On returning to the line on 2nd August, the Brigade took up positions

farther south in the neighbourhood of Hulluch. On the 22nd its

Headquarters were heavily shelled, and one member of the staff was

killed. During August and September the batteries supported the steady

pressure maintained along this sector in anticipation of the German

retirement, all moving to forward positions. On the 2nd October the

enemy fell back three miles to the line of the Haute-Deule Canal, and

the advance of the Fifth Army began. As soon as roads were repaired, the

guns moved up to Douvrin, Hulluch, and Wingles, and on the 12th October

assisted in the capture of Vendin by the 15th Division. Owing to the

difficulty of bridging the many canals, siege batteries could only follow

very slowly, and the Germans were on the line of the Scheldt before they

came again into action. The enemy kept up a heavy bombardment during the

first week of November, and on the night of the 6th the Brigade suffered

its last casualties in the war. The bridging of the Scheldt was in rapid

progress, and the batteries were preparing to advance across the river,

when on the 11th hostilities ceased.

THE 74TH SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.

The 74th Battery landed at Havre on April 30, 1916, under the command

of Major Pickburn. It proceeded to Authuille, and on 4th May took

up position at Bienvillers-au-Bois. On the first day of the First

Battle of the Somme its four guns fired 1,733 rounds, supporting the

unsuccessful attack of the infantry at Gommecourt. It then took over

the position of the 73rd Battery, and later on, 27th August, moved to

the Martinsart-Aveluy road for the operations against Thiepval. On 7th

October it was in the orchard at Colincamp, a place without cover and

a favourite target for the enemy. There it spent some desperate weeks.

On 7th November the battery-commander, Major Pickburn, was killed. On

the 20th November the enemy kept up a severe bombardment all day, and

four gunners lost their lives. It was the same on the 29th, when an

armour-piercing shell penetrated to a cellar protected by seven feet

of earth and bricks, and killed the three occupants. The position was

really untenable for a heavy battery, but it was held till early in

December, when a move was made to Auchonvillers. It presently moved to

Gouy-en-Artois, and then to Arras and the Faubourg d’Amiens. In the early

weeks of the year it was at Rivière, opposite Ficheux, and then again in

a suburb of Arras.

In the battle of Arras the Battery supported the advance of the South

African Infantry Brigade, and on the 12th its right section was in the

old German line at Point de Jour, supporting the fighting in the Oppy,

Gavrelle, and Rœux area. At that time they were the farthest forward

siege guns on the British front. There the Battery continued till the

battle died away. Major Tamplin was gassed and returned to England, Major

Murray-MacGregor taking over the command. By 5th July the whole Battery

had moved to the Ypres neighbourhood, where it took up ground on the

canal bank near “Shrapnel Corner.” There, during the first stages of

Third Ypres, it suffered the usual fate of combatants in the Salient.

Major Murray-MacGregor was succeeded in the command by Major G. M.

Bennett. Presently it moved to a position on the Verbranden-Molen road,

and a little later to Hooge. This was its station during the remainder

of the battle. It had many casualties from shell, fire, and gas, and the

reliefs coming by the Menin road had to face an incessant enemy barrage.

The total men available on each shift were only seventeen for all four

guns, and had not three of the guns been knocked out the task would have

been impossible. When at last the Battery was withdrawn, it was reduced

to 1 gun and 70 men.

On 21st December the Battery, now brought up to strength, went back to

the line as part of the 50th (S.A.) Brigade, R.G.A.

THE 72ND SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.

The 72nd Battery landed in France on April 21, 1916, under the command

of Major C. W. Alston. Its first position was at Mailly-Maillet, where

with a very short allowance of ammunition it entered upon its field

experience. It was sent to Ypres on 3rd June along with the 71st to

assist the Canadians, where it had some hard fighting, Major Alston being

severely wounded, and Captain A. G. Mullins taking over the command.

Returning to Mailly, it took part in the opening days of the First

Somme, and then moved first to Englebelmer, and then to Authuille. This

last was an excellent position, with a steep bank in front of the guns

and the Ancre in the rear. The Battery remained there for eight months,

until the retirement of the enemy enabled it to advance to Thiepval and

Grandcourt.

On March 22, 1917, it moved to the Arras neighbourhood, taking up ground

near Berthonval Wood, a few miles east of Mont St. Eloi. From this

position the Battery shared in the battle for Vimy, after the fall of

which it moved forward to Souchez, under the northern end of the ridge.

On 30th April it retired to Houdain for its first spell of rest since

it arrived in France. On 12th May it was at Thélus, and four days later

it was transferred to the 1st Canadian Heavy Artillery Group, and took

up position at Zouave valley, near Givenchy, in the Vimy area. There it

remained for three months, supporting the Canadian attack at Lens.

On 25th October the Battery went north with the Canadian Corps to Ypres,

where it relieved the 73rd (S.A.) Siege Battery in a peculiarly unhealthy

spot between Zillebeke and Observatory Ridge. There, during the first

twenty-four hours, it had twelve casualties. On 17th October the command

was taken over by Captain C. P. Ward. On January 11, 1918, after a period

of rest, the Battery took up position behind the Damm Strasse, near

Wytschaete. It was now brigaded with the 50th (S.A.) Brigade.

THE 75TH SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.

The 75th Battery reached France on April 24, 1916, under the command of

Major W. H. L. Tripp. It took up its position on the outskirts of the

town of Albert, near the hospital, being attached to the III. Corps. It

participated in the “preparation” for the First Battle of the Somme,

and on 1st July fired 1,312 rounds before noon. On 14th July it moved

to Bécourt Wood, and on the 29th to a position north of Fricourt Wood.

Here it supported the attack of 15th September. On the 21st of that

month it moved to the wood of Bazentin-le-Grand, where it was in touch

with the South African Infantry Brigade during its fight at the Butte de

Warlencourt. On January 29, 1917, it moved back to Albert, and early

in February went south of the Somme into the old French area. There it

advanced as the Germans fell back, crossing the Somme at Péronne on

25th March, and occupying ground successively at Templeux-la-Fosse and

Longavesnes. On 6th April, at St. Emilie, it fired its first shot against

the Hindenburg Line, and remained in that area till the end of June, when

it moved north to Flanders.

[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. H. L. TRIPP, D.S.O., M.C.,

Commanding 75th Siege Battery, S.A.H.A., August 1915-January 1918, then

50th (S.A.) Brigade, R.G.A.]

By 13th July all four guns were in position on the

Vlamertinghe-Elverdinghe road, where, owing to the flat country, the

Battery had great difficulty in finding suitable O.P.’s. On the night

of 30th July it moved forward to the bank of the Ypres Canal, where it

supported the opening of the Third Battle of Ypres. Later it advanced

to the Pilckem ridge, where in a much exposed position it supported

the attack on Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele. It was exceptionally

fortunate, for in all the period from 31st July to 20th December it had

only one officer casualty. In the middle of December it went south to the

Zillebeke lake, and on January 11, 1918, it moved to the Damm Strasse,

near Wytschaete. It was now part of the 50th Brigade.

THE 50TH (SOUTH AFRICAN) HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

This Brigade was formed during January 1918, under the command of

Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. L. Tripp, D.S.O., M.C., formerly of the 75th

Battery. On 28th January it was attached to the Australian Corps,

occupying positions between Zillebeke and Wytschaete. On 26th February

it went into General Headquarters Reserve, being encamped near Bailleul.

On 6th March the 496th (S.A.) Siege Battery arrived, and was split up

between the 72nd and 74th Batteries, making these six-gun batteries.

On 10th March the Brigade was ordered to prepare positions behind the

Portuguese divisions, but the orders were cancelled. On 13th March it

was attached to Sir H. Plumer’s Second Army. On the 24th, after the

great German attack had been launched at St. Quentin, it began to move

southwards, and on the 28th was at Neuville St. Vaast during the German

assault on Arras. On the 30th it was attached to the Canadian Corps.

During April the batteries were in position at Roclincourt, to the

north-east of Arras, and settled down to the familiar type of trench

warfare. Since the whole military situation was uncertain at the

moment, much time had to be spent on the preparation of reserve battery

positions. Five series were selected, varying from three to fifteen miles

behind those in use. On 1st May the Brigade was ordered north, the 72nd

and 74th Batteries joining the I. Corps near Mazingarbe, and the others

going to the XIII. Corps, in the vicinity of Hinges. By the 3rd these

orders were changed, and the whole Brigade was sent to Arras to the XVII.

Corps. There it remained till the end of August, engaged in normal trench

warfare. On 7th August Captain E. G. Ridley, M.C., was promoted major in

command of the 74th Battery, to replace Major Bennett, who had gone to

command the 44th Brigade.

On 26th August the Brigade supported the advance of the Canadian Corps

and the 51st Division, which resulted in the capture of Monchy. The

batteries now began to move forward along the Arras-Cambrai road, where

they were engaged in cutting the wire of the Drocourt-Quéant switch. On

1st September the medical officer of the Brigade, Captain G. R. Cowie,

was seriously wounded, and died two days later. On the 2nd the Canadians

carried the Drocourt-Quéant switch, all the guns in the Brigade assisting

in the preliminary bombardment and the subsequent barrage. Next day the

Brigade passed under the XXII. Corps, which held the line of the Sensée,

in order to protect the flank of the Canadian thrust towards Cambrai.

No serious operations took place for more than three weeks; but on the

27th came the great advance of the Canadian and XVII. Corps towards and

beyond Cambrai, and it became clear that a general enemy retirement was

a matter of days. On 3rd October Major Ridley left for England to form a

new 8-inch S.A. battery, and his place in command of the 74th was taken

by Major C. J. Forder. On the 11th the Brigade came under the Canadian

Corps.

On the 12th the batteries advanced, first to Tortequesne, and then to

Estrées and Noyelle. On the 19th they were at Lewarde. On the 20th a

section of the 74th Battery moved to Wallers to support the Canadian

attack. This was the last engagement of the Brigade in the War, for on

the 24th it was placed in army reserve, and remained there till the

armistice on 11th November.

APPENDIX II.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIGNAL COMPANY (R.E.)

INCEPTION AND ORGANIZATION—AUGUST-OCTOBER 1915.

At the beginning of the war the service of communications in the Imperial

Army was organized as the Signals Branch of the Corps of Royal Engineers.

This provided and maintained all communications, comprising Telegraphs,

Telephones, Visual Signalling, and Despatch Riders (Horse, Motor-Cycle,

and Cycle). A Signal Service Company, suitably equipped and organized for

its multifarious duties, was provided in war establishments as a part

of the headquarters of each of the higher formations—Division, Corps,

and Army. The development of scientific trench warfare on the Western

Front vastly increased both the importance and the complexity of the

communications of the contending armies; and when, towards the close of

the campaign in German South-West Africa, the composition of the Union

Oversea Contingent was decided, the offer of a Divisional Signal Company

was willingly accepted by the Imperial authorities.

The raising of this Company was entrusted to Major N. Harrison,

Engineer-in-Chief of the Union Post Office, who had acted as Director

of Signals to the Union Forces during the Rebellion and the German

South-West African Campaign. For the acceptance of his recruits Major

Harrison set such a high standard of specialized knowledge, character,

intelligence, and military experience, that the assembling of the two

hundred and thirty men of the original Company occupied the whole of

August and September 1915. Eventually a magnificent body of picked

men were assembled in Potchefstroom Camp fully representative of all

South Africa, from the Zambesi to Cape Town. In view of the technical

nature of the new unit’s duties, it was natural that a high proportion

of the recruits should come from the Transvaal, and particularly the

Witwatersrand. The relative figures were—

Recruited in Transvaal 53.7 per cent.

(Of these, 64 per cent. from Johannesburg.)

Cape 25 ”

Natal 12.7 ”

Orange Free State 6.6 ”

Rhodesia, etc. 2 ”

The standard of physique was very high, and fully correspondent to the

maturity shown by an average age of 28.4 years. The backbone of the

Company consisted of skilled telegraphists and linemen from the Union

Post Office, the majority of whom had served in German South-West Africa,

and in previous wars. The drivers, whose excellent horsemanship impressed

every one at the training centre in England, were recruited mainly from

the farming population, and included many young Dutchmen.

By the beginning of October all the officers, who had been selected from

officials of the engineering branch of the post office and electrical

engineers of the Witwatersrand, had joined, and on the 17th October the

unit, in company with the S.A.M.C. and details of the South African

Brigade and S.A.H.A., sailed for England on the _Kenilworth Castle_, with

a strength of six officers—Major N. Harrison commanding—Lieutenants J.

A. Dingwall, R. H. Covernton, J. Jack, F. H. Michell, F. M. Ross—and 229

other ranks. The Company arrived at Bordon Camp, Hants, on 4th November.

REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE COMPANY IN ENGLAND—NOVEMBER 1915-APRIL

1916.

Owing to the demands of the German East African Campaign, in which the

Union Government was now engaged, there was no prospect of infantry units

for the Western Front beyond the one brigade already in England. As the

South African Brigade would, therefore, constitute only one-third of the

infantry of some Imperial division, the Company could not serve with the

Infantry Brigade in the capacity of a divisional signal company, as

originally contemplated. On the other hand, new army corps were in course

of formation, and corps signal companies had to be raised and trained

for them. A corps signal company requires a high proportion of skilled

technicians in the ranks, and as, owing to the commanding officer’s care

in selecting his recruits, the company possessed such a proportion, the

War Office decided that it should be reorganized in order to form a Corps

Signal Company, and proceed to the Signal Service Training Centre in

Bedford for the necessary specialized training. The Company accordingly

entrained for Hitchin on the 23rd November, and during the next few days

was reorganized.

A Corps Signal Company exists primarily to provide communication between

the headquarters of an army corps and the infantry divisions with their

associated divisional field artilleries which constitute a corps. For

this purpose it staffs and equips a Corps Headquarters Signal Office,

including telephone exchange, telegraph and despatch rider offices;

constructs such telegraph and telephone lines to divisions as may be

necessary or possible; provides operators at the divisional ends of the

lines, and runs and maintains local telephone lines to the different

sections of the corps staff, and to the different units of the corps

troops. The corps troops—which are those units directly commanded by

corps headquarters—though negligible at the beginning of the war,

increased enormously with the development of the Heavy Artillery, the

Flying Corps, and the rest of the complicated technique of modern

position warfare, until finally their communications dwarfed all others.

In addition, the Corps Signal Company acts as a repair workshop, and

issue store for the signal material and apparatus required by all units

and formations within the corps; assists with and correlates their signal

arrangements, and provides electric lighting for corps headquarters.

To provide for the night and day working and the manning of an advanced

headquarters, the Headquarter Section was organized in three reliefs,

each under a sergeant superintendent. To increase the number of lines

which can be simultaneously run out during a general move, both Air

Line and Cable Sections were divided into two detachments, each under

a sergeant or corporal. Each air line detachment carried material for

five miles of poled line on its lorries, and, after training, became

capable of erecting this line at the rate of a mile an hour. Each cable

detachment carried nine miles of cable, and learned to lay this out at

the gallop when necessary, or at a normal rate of three miles an hour

along roads where precautions for the preservation of the line had to be

taken.

On January 17, 1916, all sections were concentrated in order to continue

their training as a company, and billeted in the small villages of

Clifton, Shefford, and Broome, a few miles from Haynes Park. The

following months were spent in continuous unit training, interspersed

with periods of combined training, known as “Signal Schemes.” In these

“schemes” numbers of signal units awaiting their turn for oversea were

organized as armies—imaginary in all except their communications—and

flung a moving network of lines across the Eastern Counties. It was an

extremely valuable and realistic training for mobile warfare. The drawing

of the Company’s mobilization equipment and the completion of the motor

transport, with the A.S.C. _personnel_ to operate it, followed the news

of Verdun, and the day of embarkation for France was eagerly awaited. The

men grew restive at the idea that the Infantry Brigade had already been

in action in Egypt while they were still training in England.

Towards the end of March Major Harrison went to France in order to

acquire the atmosphere of the trenches. During his absence the great

blizzard of 1916 destroyed much of the post office and railway telegraph

systems in the Midlands. All experienced men in the Company were turned

out to assist in repairs, and the order to move to Southampton for

France arrived when 51 Air Line and portions of all cable sections were

scattered on this work up to a radius of forty miles from headquarters.

Nevertheless the Company was assembled in a few hours, and was ready to

move off at noon next day, with its mass of stores packed complete in

all respects. The headquarters and 51 Air Line moving by road in their

lorries, and the cable sections by train from Hitchin, reassembled at

Southampton on the 10th April, and, sailing in the S.S. _Investigator_

with one of the S.A.H.A. batteries, landed at Havre on the 21st.

IN FRANCE: THE FRICOURT SECTOR—APRIL 1916.

After a day at Havre the move was continued—motor transport sections

by road and cable sections by train—to Vignacourt. At this village in

the Somme Valley, between Abbeville and Amiens, the headquarters of the

newly constituted XV. Corps was concentrating under Lieutenant-General

Horne, and Major Harrison, on the 23rd April, was appointed Assistant

Director of Army Signals—_i.e._ Staff Officer for Signals to the Corps

Commander. The Company now became the XV. Corps Signal Company, and

served continuously with that Corps throughout the remainder of the war.

A few days later the Corps moved into line between the III. and XIII.

Corps, becoming a part of the Fourth Army under General Sir H. Rawlinson,

and took over the sector fronting Fricourt and Mametz, between Bécourt

and Carnoy. On the 30th April the Company took over from the XIII. Corps

Signal Company at Heilly, a village on the Ancre, near Corbie. B.F. and

B.G. sections were sent to join the headquarters of the two divisions

in line—the 7th and 21st respectively—and B.F. section proceeded to

Ville-sur-Ancre, where Brigadier-General Napier, commanding the Corps

Heavy Artillery, had his headquarters, and took charge of the Heavy

Artillery’s communications on the 27th April.

The experience of previous battles had shown that, next to an adequate

artillery, the primary technical condition for a successful offensive

was good and reliable communication between the assaulting infantry,

the directing staffs, and the supporting artillery. Overground wires,

no matter how multiplied, failed immediately under the counter-barrage.

Visual signalling, slow at the best, was generally ineffective because

of the smoke and dust of the barrage, the exposure of the _personnel_,

and the unsuitability of the terrain, so faith was now pinned on cables

laid in deep trenches for thousands of yards in rear of the front line,

carrier pigeons, and runners. As soon as the area could be thoroughly

surveyed, a programme of work was drawn up covering:—

(_a_) Reconstruction of and additions to the inadequate open

wire routes in the back area, from Corps headquarters up

to behind Méaulte, Morlancourt, and the Bois des Tailles,

sufficient to cope with the number of units and formations

to be thrown in for the battle, and suitably designed and

located for rapid extension along the probable roads of

the anticipated advance.

(_b_) A complete network of cable trenches extending from the

heads of the open wire routes to the front line, providing

telephone communication down to company and battery command

posts and artillery observation posts.

In the early part of 1916 the deficiencies of technical equipment, in

the supply of materials and of labour, were still great. The Signal

Sections were then equipped for mobile warfare only, and found themselves

carrying out heavy semi-permanent work with scarcely any of the usual

tools and appliances. The work of the Ministry of Munitions had not yet

produced its full fruits in supply, and though the Deputy-Director of

Army Signals—Colonel R. G. Earle—did everything possible to meet the

Company’s requirements, signal material—particularly cable—was scanty,

and deliveries of a hand-to-mouth order. The Labour Corps was then a

thing of the future, and, therefore, the whole of the massive works

required for the offensive—roads, railways, dumps, dug-outs, etc.—had

to be performed by the infantry in their turns out of the line. In such

circumstances there was never enough labour to go round, and it required

all the commanding officer’s tact and persuasiveness to secure the

minimum of digging labour required for the cable trenches; all other

unskilled work had to be thrown on the skilled sappers of the Company,

and to free the outdoor men for construction, the telegraphists, after a

long day at their instruments, had often to spend half the night loading

and off-loading in the forward area masses of cable, poles, and line

material.

Labour for the Heavy Artillery cable trenches was not secured till June,

when two battalions from each division were placed under the direction

of Lieutenant Ross for this work. Digging the trenches and laying cable

were then pressed forward continuously night and day. Much of the work

was only possible at night, as the ground was under direct observation,

and the few skilled sappers available, after working most of the night

with infantry digging parties, had to be turned out again at dawn, day

after day, to take charge of scratch cable-laying parties made up from

the signallers of batteries. The Heavy Artillery allotment for the XV.

Corps in the coming battle was twenty-three batteries, organized in five

groups, and an independent railway battery. The tactical conditions

made the communication problem one of peculiar difficulty, because they

enforced the siting of the batteries in two main clusters—one in the

valley of the Ancre and the other in Happy Valley—both on the extreme

flanks of the Corps’ frontage. Further, owing to the enemy’s tenure of

the Fricourt salient, many batteries, to carry out their work, had to

establish communication with observation posts sited on the opposite

flank of the Corps area to the position of the batteries, and the most

favourable O.P. positions lay far outside the Corps boundaries. The fact

that many of the batteries only took position and settled on their O.P.’s

in the last few days was an additional complication.

When these difficulties had been more or less successfully disposed of

and laying commenced, a minor but vital detail in the material threatened

disaster. The cable coming forward proved to be mainly single D 5—_i.e._

the standard army cable as supplied for overground use in mobile

warfare, when few lines are laid and there is no objection to the earth

constituting the return circuit. The results already known to have been

obtained by the enemy in picking up our messages through earth by means

of sensitive listening telephone apparatus, had already caused the issue

of stringent orders that all lines within 1,600 yards—later increased to

3,000 yards—of the front line must be metallic circuits—_i.e._ each line

had to consist of a pair of insulated wires. Also, owing to inductive

effects when a number of pairs of wires are laid closely parallel to each

other, as in a trench, a conversation over one pair will be heard in the

other circuits unless each pair is twisted. The use of the single cable,

therefore, not only doubled the work of laying (as each line necessitated

two separate wires), but the untwisted pairs so formed would render the

lines noisy and possibly entirely unworkable. Utilizing the frame of a

cable wagon trail, and one of its wheels as a foundation, a machine was

rapidly improvised by the section on which the drums of single cable were

mounted as received, spun into twisted cable, and simultaneously reeled

off on other drums for the laying parties. This apparatus was kept going

and running at high pressure by the section wheeler, Sapper Page, with

a few Artillery Headquarters’ grooms and batmen as his only available

assistants.

By such strenuous efforts the programme was completed, and when the

preparatory bombardment opened, 500 miles of cable had been laid and

joined up in over twenty miles of cable trench, and every battery had

excellent and reliable communication forward to its observation posts

and back to its group commander. Two dug-outs had been constructed on

each flank, into which all O.P. lines were led and terminated on special

switchboards, designed and made up at the Company Headquarters.

Through these O.P. exchanges any battery could be connected to any

O.P. for control of fire, which proved most valuable in the changing

circumstances of the fighting. At that date the establishment of neither

groups nor batteries included switchboards for metallic circuit lines.

The necessary number—over thirty—were improvised in a few days at the

Company workshops out of electric light fittings purchased in Amiens.

Meanwhile the other sections working at similar high pressure had

completed the main communications from Corps Headquarters to the Battle

Headquarters of the divisions, the 7th in dug-outs near Groveton, and

the 21st in dug-outs on the edge of the plateau above Méaulte, and

B.F. section had established and staffed a Corps Advanced Exchange

at Morlancourt. The Carrier Pigeon Service had been organized and

arrangements made for the systematic distribution of pigeons to the

assaulting brigades from the main lofts in Heilly, Albert, and Méaulte,

and the most rapid circulation from the pigeon lofts to all staffs

concerned of information contained in messages brought by the birds

returning from the front line.

A wireless detachment was supplied from Fourth Army Signals, and the

_personnel_ completed by skilled operators selected from the Company. The

Headquarters Station was fixed on the high ground near the Bray-Albert

road on the cable trench between the two O.P. exchanges, and provided

with direct communication to Corps through the underground system, and

mobile stations were attached to the Signals of the attacking divisions.

The Corps Staff Observation Posts in Péronne Avenue trench and the Grand

Stand above Bonte Redoubt were connected by direct lines to the General

Staff at Headquarters in Heilly, about ten miles off, and the special

linemen provided to look after these lines kept them through without

interruption during the attack.

THE SOMME BATTLE—JULY-NOVEMBER 1916.

In the early morning of the 1st July, after a continuous bombardment from

the 25th June, the XV. Corps attacked with the 7th Division on the right,

the 21st on the left, and the 17th in support. Hopes of a decisive

victory ran high, and all signal arrangements for a rapid advance were

in readiness, including the lines necessary to divert communications

to Vivier Mill, outside Méaulte, which was to be the first bound of

the Corps Headquarters, while the cable sections stood by with wagons

packed during the morning. In spite of the gallantry of the infantry

assault—which several of the Company were privileged to witness from the

advanced trenches—by the evening it was clear that no great depth would

be attained.

[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL N. HARRISON, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding

South African Signal Company (R.E.).]

The village of Fricourt was still holding out, and had repulsed a frontal

attack with heavy loss, while the converging attacks of the 7th and 21st

Divisions on the flanks of the salient, which were to have pinched it

out, had carried Mametz, but just failed to link up behind Fricourt. The

III. Corps on our left had taken La Boisselle and entered Ovillers, but

had been driven out again; Montauban had fallen to the XIII. Corps on the

right, but heavy fighting continued. Fricourt was bombarded all night by

heavy howitzers, and deluged with a new gas shell by a brigade of French

75’s, which, together with an additional brigade of heavies, had been

attached to the Corps Heavy Artillery shortly before the battle. When

the infantry advanced next morning the village was found evacuated, and

a party from B.E. section were able to make a preliminary reconnaissance

for pushing forward the artillery routes. Our tenure of the high ground

between Mametz and Montauban was now sufficiently secured, and the

roads Méaulte-Fricourt and Carnoy-Mametz repaired to such an extent as

to permit the advance of the heavy batteries to positions about our

old front line. The artillery moves having thus begun, B.E. section

thenceforward found itself taxed to the limit to keep pace with them.

There were now seven groups to keep in touch, including the two attached

French groups.

It was evident from the map that while the fighting for Mametz Wood

continued, the new centre of observation would be about Pommiers

Redoubt—the highest point of the Mametz-Montauban ridge—and after a hasty

reconnaissance which located our advanced line down the forward slope

about Caterpillar Wood, it was decided to lay a few pairs of armoured

cable up the old German trenches from the new battery positions about

Carnoy and Fricourt. The only armoured cable to be obtained was a portion

of that already laid in the trench between the two O.P. exchanges. A

few signallers having been collected from the batteries, this heavy

armoured cable was recovered from the trench, conveyed forward by wagon,

and again laid out up to Pommiers Redoubt. In doing this work the effect

of the appalling road and traffic conditions which clogged all effort

throughout the Somme was first clearly appreciated. The XV. Corps was

unfortunately placed, in that no main road ran forward through its front.

From beginning to end of the battle, the only traffic artery was the

narrow country by-road from Méaulte to Fricourt, and thence by Mametz to

Montauban.

Such transport conditions bore more hardly on signals than any other

service. With activities spread over the whole area, a very limited

_personnel_ and transport, and ever-changing conditions, which

often stultified by nightfall all the laborious effort of the day,

the difficulty of getting parties to a given spot at a given time,

co-ordinating the supply of materials and labour, controlling the working

parties and switching them to meet emergencies as they arose, was a

splendid schooling in patience, temper, and too often in resignation to

fate. This remained the paramount factor in the Company’s experience

throughout the Somme. As an example, a cable wagon of B.E. section took

its place in a melancholy queue at 7 a.m., and arrived at its working

point near Montauban at 2 p.m., to lay a short line required urgently at

noon, and involving about half an hour’s work. The party returned via

Carnoy in accordance with the traffic circuit, and encountering similar

conditions, reached headquarters near Méaulte at 10 p.m., with horses

and men exhausted. Under the same difficulties, 51 Air Line Section was

engaged in following up the advance with a light open wire route up to

Fricourt, and B.G. and B.F. Sections were worked with the 21st Division

Signals and the Corps Observers respectively.

The commencement of active operations brought the work of the operators

and the despatch riders at headquarters and with the heavy artillery to

a point of extreme pressure, which was maintained with little variation

throughout the following months. Up to two thousand telegrams, and a

larger number still of D.R.L.S. packets, were received or despatched

daily. The telephone exchanges at Corps and Heavy Artillery Headquarters,

with over sixty and thirty connections respectively, worked hard day and

night, handling urgent priority calls; but so keen and expert were the

operators that a service was maintained equal, if not superior, to the

highest civilian standard. The destruction of lines by hostile shelling

and traffic was met by the skilful use of alternative routes and by the

quickness and energy of the maintenance linemen. However, the incessant

strain to which the operators were subjected soon began to affect their

nerves, and before the Company was withdrawn men resting off duty could

be heard answering imaginary calls in their sleep.

On the 10th July B.G. Section, under the command of Lieutenant Covernton,

did a notably fine performance in laying and maintaining lines through

the intense barrages surrounding Mametz Wood. One of the first Valve

Amplifying Listening Sets supplied to the British forces for use in

intercepting enemy messages, by picking up weak leakage or induced

currents through earth or along parallel conductors, had been issued to

the Company for trial. As a large number of enemy cables ran through

Mametz Wood, and some extended to enemy territory behind it, favourable

results seemed probable. Lieutenant Collins took up the set, and tracing

the cables into No Man’s Land, tapped in there. Though, owing to the

excellent discipline of the enemy in obeying the limitations prescribed

for use of wire communication in the front line, no tactical messages

were obtained, this officer afterwards obtained recognition of his

courageous and enterprising efforts.

On the 14th July another general assault secured the line along the ridge

between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval. Accordingly, heavy batteries

were moved up as far as Caterpillar Wood in the valley in front of

Montauban, and on the 15th a party of B.E. section reconnoitred for lines

to Bazentin-le-Petit, in which village it was proposed to establish

H.A. Headquarters. The German reaction had, however, already begun, and

the party found the conditions in the village highly unsuited for a

headquarters, so much so that a warm infantry combat was proceeding in

the outskirts. High Wood had to be evacuated as too advanced to hold, and

the memorable struggle of the South African Infantry Brigade for Delville

Wood had begun. Nevertheless, over a mile of ground had been gained,

and the corresponding extension of communications necessarily taxed all

sections to their limit. The advanced headquarters of divisions moved up

to the famous dug-outs in the chalk under the ruins of Fricourt Château,

in which, thirty feet underground, with the amenities of electric light,

panelled walls, and artificial ventilation, the German Staff had dwelt

during the bombardment of the village. A twenty-four wire heavy route

was rapidly constructed by the 4th Army Signals from Méaulte to this

point, and thence to Mametz, in readiness for the advance, and the wire

light route built by the Company was extended by the Air Line Section

past Fricourt, up Death Valley, to Mametz Wood. The next deep advance

was not, however, to occur till two months later, as the corps front was

now becoming a salient, and it was necessary to clear the flanks and

broaden the base of the attack. Therefore, while the Anzac Corps and

III. Corps on the left, and the XIII. Corps succeeded by the XIV. Corps

on the right, hammered away round Pozières and Ginchy respectively, the

XV. Corps was engaged in continuous auxiliary attacks, and its heavy

artillery co-operated largely with the operations of the flanking corps.

This situation did not bring any relaxation to the Signal Company. The

German artillery, whose work behind the front line had been feeble

immediately after the 1st July, had now been heavily reinforced, and the

salient position of the Corps inevitably drew much enfilade fire. One

of the effects was the continuous destruction of lines back to points

thousands of yards from the front. In moving up after the 14th July,

all units had finally passed beyond the buried cables laid down for the

battle. Forward lines were now entirely overground, and if not blown up

by direct hits, were cut by the smallest splinters.

As the month of July wore on the demand for additional forward

communication and the strength of the hostile fire increased. It was

obvious that no satisfactory communication could be secured beyond

Fricourt except by burying, and Major Harrison finally succeeded in

securing a small labour party from the Corps Cyclist Battalion for this

purpose. It was decided to commence by burying sixteen pairs of armoured

cable from the head of the open route at Mametz to Pommiers Redoubt

dug-outs, where there were now Brigade Headquarters and Divisional Report

Centres. The work was entrusted to B.G. Section and proved difficult, not

only because of the maze of old trenches, barbed wire, and shell-holes

through which the cable trench had to go, but also because of the

frequent shelling of Mametz and along the ridge. On the 28th Lieutenant

Covernton, while superintending this work, was badly wounded. Lieutenant

Baker took over B.G. Section, completed the trench, and subsequently

extended the cables to Caterpillar Trench. At the same time, 51 Air

Line Section diverted the open wire route between Fricourt and Mametz,

by constructing a substantial pole route skirting both villages, which

carried eight pairs of twisted D 5 cables hung in slotted boards. This

cable route was not only much less frequently shelled down—a daily

occurrence with the open route—but could be quickly repaired, as the

cable when cut could be rejointed and worked, even if lying on the ground.

This method of substantial poled cable routes could and would have

been used to a greater extent but for the deficiency of material.

The consumption of cable by units in line was appalling. Artillery

Observation Post Lines, laid overground, were badly cut about by shell

fire, and had to be renewed every few days, and sometimes daily. In the

case of the heavy batteries, these lines were often of great length, and

ran to more than one O.P. For instance, the 34th Siege Battery, sited

to the left of Fricourt, had about this period lines out to O.P.’s at

Longueval and at the windmill in front of Bazentin-le-Grand, a total line

length of over eleven miles.

During the comparative lull towards the end of July the shelling of the

Fricourt area became so pronounced that, pending the next general attack,

the headquarters of the divisions in line were moved back to Bellevue

Farm—between Méaulte and Albert—and the opportunity was at once taken to

transfer the Corps Exchange in Fricourt into the dug-outs so vacated.

The Armstrong hut had luckily escaped so far, but several shells had

pitched within a few yards of it, and the operators deserved great credit

for the way they stuck to their duties without the slightest protection

through the periodical shellings. A new route was built by 51 Air Line

from Bellevue Farm to link up this new position with the main forward

route at Vivier Mill, and was calculated on a scale sufficient to meet

requirements in the event of the headquarters of the Corps moving to

Bellevue Farm when the advance resumed.

Throughout the war, but particularly in this earlier period, the

difficulties of Signals did not arise exclusively from the terrain and

from enemy action, but to a great extent from careless and thoughtless

conduct on the part of the other arms. Much damage to lines was done

by cross-country traffic at night, largely unavoidable but much also

avoidable, if a better understanding of the importance of communication

had existed in the non-technical units. When an infantryman found

himself in reserve a few thousand yards behind the front line, and

lacking a piece of cord to fix up his bivouac, cut a few yards out of

a cable which had been strung across the ground in his vicinity, he

did not realize that the line so put out of action might well be the

observation line of a heavy battery, that the damage he had done in a few

seconds might take an over-worked lineman hours to locate and repair,

and that meanwhile the battery would be blinded and his comrades in the

front line deprived of its instant and effective support. A typical

instance occurred on the night of the 3rd July. The group of French 75’s

attached to Corps Heavy Artillery had moved suddenly late in the evening

to support operations at Mametz Wood next morning. Communication was

established through one of the buried trenches by 10 p.m., but an hour

later this and other lines in the trench went full earth. At 3 a.m.,

after tracing the cable inch by inch through a dark night, and tapping in

at intervals as he progressed, the exhausted lineman found that a company

in support had decided that the cable trench would make a good temporary

cook-house, and, of course, had burnt all the twelve pairs of wires in

the trench. To the infinite relief of the H.A. Signal Officer, this

proved to be the only damage done, and the wires were set going again

before dawn and in time for the operations.

Long before the Somme Battle, the exigencies of trench warfare had

altered the original organization of army corps. The corps had ceased to

be a unit composed of specific divisions, and divisions were no longer

affiliated permanently to one corps, but moved at frequent intervals

from quiet sectors to active ones to take part in an offensive, and

after a short period of heavy losses and extreme exertion would be

again withdrawn to another quiet sector or a training area for rest,

recruitment, and refit. Therefore, on a front like the Somme, a

continuous stream of divisions passed through the corps, each taking its

share of the fighting and being in turn relieved. As the Corps Signal

Company, like the brook, “went on for ever,” it had to fit each fresh

division into the frame of the existing communications as they chanced

to stand at the moment, and assist the divisional signals to pick up and

utilize the available lines. The organization had, also, to be elastic

enough to meet the requirements of administering anything from two to

seven divisions simultaneously. During the Somme, nineteen different

divisions passed through the XV. Corps, and as many of them went

through the furnace more than once, there were altogether fifty-three

divisional changes. What work this involved to the Corps Signal Company

in the transferring of lines, the directing of traffic, the continuous

alteration of records, and the supply of material can be readily imagined.

The excellence of the work of the B.E. Section with the Heavy Artillery

was recognized in a communication addressed to Major Harrison, in which

the Corps commander stated that he much appreciated the work done by

Lieutenant Ross and his party, and considered that the work of this

section was typical of the whole South African Signal Company. When

General Horne himself left the Corps at a later date, to take command of

the First Army, he had evidently seen no reason to alter his opinion of

the Company, for in taking leave of the A.D.A.S. he congratulated him on

commanding a unit second to none in France.

The operations continued to be hampered by rain at each of the critical

phases, but by the beginning of September the flanking corps had made

the necessary progress and everything was in readiness for the great

attack of 15th September. The vital importance of secure communication

being fully appreciated by the Staff, the necessary labour was made

available for a considerable buried scheme. A buried water-pipe laid

by the enemy between Longueval and Montauban had been located, and

considerable effort was expended by B.F. section in investigating the

possibility of using this pipe for running cable through. It was finally

decided that its exploitation would not be justified in view of the small

depth of the bury, and the extensive damage already done by shell fire.

The first section of the new bury consisted of a six-foot-deep cable

trench, extending from Pommiers Redoubt _via_ the famous Cosy Corner,

where the Carnoy and Mametz roads join outside Montauban, and thence

to York Trench on the left of Longueval. This trench had nine framed

test points let into the walls every four hundred and forty yards, and

contained forty-five pairs of cable. The accumulation of the necessary

quantities of cable suitable for the work presented great difficulty,

and the trench probably set up a record for the number of different

varieties it contained—from nineteen pair V.I.R., as thick and heavy as

a hawser and supplied on drums weighing over half a ton each, to one

pair G.P. Twin about as stout as a double boot-lace. The actual digging

was done by a battalion of the 7th Division, the work being under the

charge of Lieutenant Collins, assisted by Lieutenant Baker, with B.G.

section and most of the sappers of B.E. and W.W. sections. The mud of the

Somme will go down to history: and as the line of the trenches included

some excellent samples of it, the distribution along the trench of the

heavy cable drums and the pipes for crossing under tracks presented

great difficulties. The jointing, terminating, and testing of the wires

had to be completed against time, and with a limited number of expert

men, as the maintenance of the widespread network for which the Company

was responsible had absorbed many of the best men out of all sections.

The lines were, however, ready in time for the divisions who had moved

Headquarters up again to Fricourt and Pommiers Redoubt, with Advanced

Headquarters at York Trench, and also for the Heavy Artillery, most of

whose batteries took positions along the Mametz-Montauban ridge and in

folds of the forward slope towards Caterpillar Wood and Longueval. To

cope with the steady forward drift of the Corps units, and to provide

another advance maintenance point, a new Corps Forward Exchange was

established in a dug-out at Pommiers, and after the attack B.E. section

staffed this exchange and maintained the area.

The attack on 15th September proved highly successful and not too

costly in life, a depth of over a mile being made good, including the

villages of Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers. Communications held

well throughout the day, and the good liaison between infantry and

artillery so secured played an important part in the result. The recently

introduced Power Buzzers for transmitting high-power buzzer signals

through earth to be picked up by Valve Amplifying Receivers at distances

up to three thousand yards, were used with fair success in the advance.

These sets were controlled by the Wireless Section, but the forward

stations were manned by signallers of the attacking battalions. The

comparative inexperience and lack of special training of these signallers

prevented the best being got out of the instruments, but the limited

establishment of the Signal Service prevented any other procedure.

The advance rendered a further extension of the cable trench urgent, but

for the moment suitable cable for a permanent bury was not available.

Another section of trench, however, was dug immediately in order that

units might have the benefit of its protection in running temporary

field cables forward. This section extended from York Trench through

the corner of Delville Wood to Switch Trench, and the digging proved a

gruesome task, as Delville Wood and neighbourhood was a huge graveyard.

In the sides of the trench were visible more than one pitiful reminder

that our heroic comrades of the Infantry Brigade had fought and died

there. To prevent confusion and facilitate maintenance, the left-hand

side of the new trench was assigned to divisions and the right to the

Heavy Artillery, the Headquarters Signals of which prepared and erected

along the trench fixtures for cables in the shape of angle iron high-wire

entanglement pickets, each having a piece of two-inch by two-inch wood

screwed to it with a dozen diagonal slots cut in it for the cable.

The cutting and slotting of so many pieces—upwards of one thousand

five hundred—was a task beyond hand methods, but was accomplished in

three days by obtaining a power-band saw from a factory in Albert,

and connecting it up with the water wheel at Vivier Mill by a belt

extemporized from the driving bands of the cable wagon winding gears.

During this period occurred a noteworthy performance in rapid repair of

cable routes. The main cable trench about midnight received a direct hit

from a large shell, severing all communication; but fortunately a party

of B.E. section was returning down the trench from forward work, and

came on the shell crater soon afterwards. Though already worn out with a

long day’s work and struggling through the mud, they at once started to

dig up the cable ends, sending a man to summon assistance by tapping in

at the next test point in the trench, and succeeded in getting all the

forty-five pairs of wires rejointed and working again in _three hours_.

Liaison lines had grown formidably in numbers. Direct lines were now

demanded not only between Heavy Artillery Headquarters and the Artillery

Headquarters of all divisions in line, but between the divisional

artilleries and the majority of the Heavy Artillery Groups. There had

been a great development of the service of Observation in the shape

of artillery aeroplanes, kite balloons, of which there were now three

sections attached to the Corps and Observation Groups of the R.E. Survey

battalion. Whenever possible lines were now required from these units,

not only to the artillery groups, but to the batteries specially assigned

for counter-battery work. To co-ordinate and render fully effective this

work of the systematic location and destruction or neutralization of

hostile batteries, a special staff, commanded by a colonel, had been

added to the H.A. Headquarters, and this staff, in its turn, required

additional direct lines and communication facilities to enable it to

function promptly and effectively.

The evil luck that, except in the initial push, caused every successful

attack to be followed by broken weather, still held good and hampered

all preparations for the assault on the next entrenched line; but by

herculean efforts the necessary organization for another general attack

on the 25th September was completed. Road conditions up to a certain

point forward were now beginning to improve under the triple influences

of the introduction of Décauville tramways for the conveying of the heavy

ammunition in the forward area, the extension of broad-gauge ammunition

railheads to Fricourt and Caterpillar Wood, and the removal of water

lorries from the roads by the completion of a vast system of pipe lines

extending back to the Ancre and the Somme through which the river water

was pumped after treatment in chlorinating plants.

On the 25th the intermediate German line, including Morval, Lesbœufs,

and Gueudecourt, succumbed, and the Corps front again advanced over a

mile. On the 26th the victory was completed by the Fifth Army’s capture

of Thiepval, and once again the roseate prospect of a great victory and

of reaching Bapaume before winter cheered the tired troops, and kept

the Signal Company’s hands full with preparations for forward moves of

all headquarters. The weather, however, intervened on the side of the

Germans, and breaking decisively on the 26th, remained miserably cold and

wet thenceforward, and largely stultified the heroic efforts repeatedly

made throughout October.

During this period, the heavy batteries of some of the H.A. Group

Headquarters moved up to and in front of Longueval, necessitating the

running of many new cable lines. Permanent cable was laid in the second

section of the main cable trench up to Longueval, and a third section of

trench was dug forwards to the sugar works at Factory Corner in front of

Flers. An experimental trench was started near Longueval, with a trench

excavator loaned by the French, which was, in effect, a small land dredge

mounted on a motor lorry chassis and driven by its engine. This machine

could excavate a cable trench eighteen inches wide and up to seven feet

deep in ordinary soil with ease, but it was immobile on the terrain of

the Somme, and could not be manœuvred except with the assistance of an

artillery caterpillar tractor. Consequent on this trial improved machines

were ordered from America for next year’s campaign, but the Corps Signal

Company did not have the opportunity of using them.

At the end of October the Anzac Corps, under General Birdwood, relieved

the XV. Corps commanded by Sir John Ducane since the departure of General

Horne. As there was then no other Corps Signal Company in France formed

from Colonial troops, it appeared possible that the Company would be

retained in line with the Anzacs. It is no disparagement of the spirit of

the men to state that every one heaved a sigh of relief when it became

known that “K” Corps Signal Company was to take over. In truth, nearly

all were bone-weary and temporarily played out, and every section badly

needed a spell out of the line to reorganize and refit. There had been

no leave granted in the line, and those with ties in England eagerly

anticipated its reopening.

In view of the extensive system to be taken over, the relief by “K” Corps

Signal Company was conducted gradually, and B.E., the last section to

leave the line, did not reach the new headquarters at Long until the

middle of November. Long proved to be a tiny old-world village on the

left bank of the Somme a few miles upstream from Abbeville. A liberal

allotment of leave permits was soon issued, and a batch of men were

sent off daily, while the less fortunate ones overhauled, cleaned, and

repaired equipment, improved billets and horse standings, and carried out

the signal work still required. For Signal Companies in the field there

is no such thing as “complete rest,” even in the rest area.

On Major Harrison’s promotion, Captain Dingwall now assumed the executive

control of the Company, but scarcely had the sections completed their

refit, when orders were suddenly received for the Corps to take over a

portion of the French front in the Péronne sector, with the 4th, 8th,

33rd, and 40th Divisions then in rest.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN ON THE SOMME—16TH DECEMBER-17TH MARCH.

The move into line commenced on the 3rd December, and was completed on

the 6th. The cable sections, so depleted by the large numbers on leave

that they were unable to fill the saddles of the mounted men, moved with

the Divisional Signal Companies, and were directed—B.E. and B.G. on Bray,

and B.F. on Maricourt.

Headquarters and the air line section joined the Corps Headquarters at

Etinehem, a village on the right bank of the Somme, a mile or so west

of Bray. In their weakened condition all sections had a most strenuous

time taking over communications as released by the French, testing the

routes out, reorganizing the lines and connecting up units as they

arrived. The Corps front extended from the XIV. Corps boundary on the

north at Combles, previously the extreme right of the British line, to

near Bouchavesnes, and ran in front of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, where the

most desperate French attacks in the autumn had, like our own in the

north, been stifled in the mud. The terrain as a whole was of similar

nature and condition to that in the Longueval sector, but the roads were

better, Décauville tramways existed, and best of all, from a signal

point of view, a very fair network of deep cable trenches had been dug

in the forward area. Though the cable used in these “buries”—mainly one

pair lead covered with impregnated paper insulation—proved unreliable

in insulation, and much trouble was caused and many circuits lost

thereby, yet the “buries” proved very useful, and, supplemented by

the construction system of several new open routes in rear, enabled

a communication system to be rapidly completed, sufficient for the

needs of the defensive winter campaign. Corps forward exchanges were

established with the Heavy Artillery Headquarters in excellent French

dug-outs at Bois Louage in front of Maurepas, as at Maricourt, in charge

of B.F. section, and with B.G. section at Bray, where the horse lines

of all cable sections were shortly concentrated. The sappers of B.E.

section remained with H.A. Headquarters under Lieutenant Collins, who

replaced Captain Ross as H.A. Signal Officer, while the latter did duty

at Headquarters during the successive sick leaves of Lieutenant-Colonel

Harrison and Captain Dingwall.

Etinehem proved a most miserable headquarters. The village was much

overcrowded, and the billets so wretched that some of them did not even

afford an adequate shelter from the weather of the most severe winter

known in France for over twenty years. The only redeeming feature of the

place was that its situation on the river enabled the many tons of heavy

signal stores now in the Company’s possession to be brought up the Somme

from Long by barge, so releasing the lorries for urgent construction

work. The pressure of duty on the limited numbers of men available,

as well as the shortage of material, fuel, and of daylight, made it

difficult for some time to improve conditions. Authority for additional

blankets and for the issue of waterproof clothing to the linemen was

obtained, but the poor conditions, the severity of the weather, and the

lowered vitality, due to the lack of a sufficient recuperative period

after the summer campaign, resulted in a heavy and increasing sick list,

reaching forty daily, and the evacuation of considerable numbers to

hospital with pulmonary complaints. This state of affairs, coupled with

difficulties experienced in obtaining reinforcements, kept the Company

much below normal strength for several months.

During December it was understood that the French contemplated launching

an attack against Mont St. Quentin and Péronne, and to this end they

retained a frontage on both banks of the Somme. However, early in January

1917 the project was abandoned, and orders were received for the XV.

Corps to extend its front to the right, taking over to the river by

Cléry, and simultaneously handing over a divisional frontage on the left

to the XIV. Corps. The divisional sectors were taken over successively,

and the move completed by the 22nd January without interference by the

enemy, the Headquarters of divisions in line being established at P.C.

Chapeau and P.C. Jean, ex-French divisional command posts judiciously and

inconspicuously sited under the high bank running parallel to the Somme

bank. H.A. Headquarters with B.E. section moved also to P.C. Chapeau, and

the Corps Forward Exchange at Maricourt was transferred with B.F. section

to Suzanne. This change of frontage was a nasty jar to the Company,

as nearly all the new routes, on which the sections had toiled early

and late to complete the communication scheme for the winter, were now

outside the Corps area, and the same work had to be started afresh in the

bitter frosts of January. The weather, that had been vilely cold and wet

from the beginning of December, now turned to snow and hard frost. The

latter penetrated the ground to such an extent that by the end of the

month all digging became impossible, and work on a buried cable trench

between Ouvrages and Oursel, to provide forward communications for the

33rd Division, had to be suspended. The ex-French bury forward of P.C.

Jean proved very faulty, and a section of twelve pair open-wire heavy

route was put in hand early in February, running forward to Monac, partly

to supplement the bury and partly to carry forward the head of the main

route in anticipation of the advance next spring. The ground was found

to be frozen as hard as concrete to a foot from the surface, and after

ineffectual struggles with picks and crowbars, excavations for the pole

holes were finally blasted with gun-cotton. As the forward end of this

route came under direct observation, the last few hundred yards were run

in cables hung on short stakes, each cable from a small bobbin insulator

nailed to the side of the stake. This method was copied from the French,

who had used it extensively in the area, and proved very satisfactory in

this instance.

In the meantime, aeroplane night-bombing and the shelling of back

areas by long range guns, initiated in the latter stages of the Somme

Battle, had developed to an unpleasant extent. Rarely did a day pass

without some main route suffering from one or other of these agencies,

and the consequent necessity for diverting the limited working parties

from urgent construction to still more urgent repairs. The railheads

of Maricourt and Bray were favourite targets, and again and again the

unfortunate sappers were turned out of their blankets to stumble along a

route in the pitch black night, and then struggle for hours with numbed

fingers to evolve order out of a chaos of tangled wire and broken poles.

This hostile aeroplane activity caused a rapid increase of anti-aircraft

units. Batteries and searchlights were now dotted over the area, and

the installation and maintenance of a separate and complete system of

communication for the Anti-Aircraft Defence of the Corps area was now

added to the Company’s duties, and the H.A. Signal Officer found himself

occupied with communications for the Survey Groups and the installation

of lines to their O.P.’s, and to the Microphone positions of the Sound

Ranging Section now added to the H.A. Counter Battery organization.

Though the duties of the H.A. Signal Officer were somewhat reduced by the

appointment, in January, of a R.E. Signal Officer to each H.A. Group,

the commencement by the enemy of systematic counter battery work, in

imitation of the British methods initiated in the previous year, made

it more than ever difficult to keep the forward lines in continuous

operation. A scheme for the forward extension of the buried system, till

recently used by the French, was prepared under the greatest transport

difficulties, the drums having to be man-handled about half a mile

across country by night, and a portion of the material was got up to

Marrières Wood, next year the scene of the South African Brigade’s fine

stand in the March retreat. But the deep crust of frozen ground prevented

digging, and the important local attack of the 8th Division on the 4th

March on Fritz Trench above Bouchavesnes had to be carried through

without the assistance of the new buried communication, and as most of

the above-ground cables were cut, the first news of the assaulting troops

was brought by pigeon to the Corps Loft at Etinehem. The attack was fully

successful, and the effective use made by the artillery of the excellent

observation secured by it, no doubt expedited the general retirement of

the enemy in this sector.

A few days later symptoms of this retreat became obvious in the shape of

villages burning and large transport movements in the enemy back area.

The general withdrawal began on the 15th March, the enemy falling back

on the Corps front across the Canal du Nord. As the Fourth Army was not

destined to play a part in the spring offensive, it had been heavily

depleted both to swell the concentration northwards in preparation for

the coming Arras battle, and to take over additional ground from the

French, the sector on the XV. Corps right south of the Somme having

been occupied by the III. Corps during February. Apart, therefore, from

the tremendous transport difficulties due to continuous wet weather

succeeding the frost, and the methodical destruction of bridges, roads,

and railways, there was not sufficient strength to press the enemy

closely, but the advance was conducted methodically, touch with the enemy

rearguards on the Corps front being maintained by the Wiltshire Yeomanry

and the Corps Cyclist Battalion until a Cavalry Division could come up.

The Signal Company’s share in the work was first to maintain direct touch

between the Corps Staff and the advanced troops, for which purpose D.R.’s

were attached to the cavalry, but by a special effort of B.E. section

direct telephone communication was soon secured and maintained. Secondly,

the main communication network had to be extended forward at the same

rate as the advance, and, as a counter-attack was very possible, the

full organization for position warfare accompanied the Corps. The Signal

difficulties were doubled on the 25th March, by the sudden withdrawal

from line of the XIV. Corps on the right and the consequent extension of

the already wide Corps frontage which then stretched from Péronne to Le

Transloy.

The Imperial Signal Sections attached for assistance at intervals during

the winter had been withdrawn, and, worst of all, the needs of the

fighting fronts northwards entirely shut off for a time the supply of

line construction material. Consequently, before a single pole or wire

could be erected, it had to be released from service in rear, salvaged,

and transported forward by the company’s lorries over extremely bad and

congested roads. Much heavy material had again to be relayed forward

over tracks impassable to lorries by teams from the cable sections, and

finally carried on the sappers’ shoulders over shell-shattered ground

impassable even for wagons. Under such handicaps, and in the teeth of

continuous blizzards of snow, sleet, and rain, which continued till

the end of April, over forty miles of poled route, including much of

a heavy permanent nature carrying twenty-four wires, was erected, and

two successive moves of the Headquarters of Corps and all subordinate

formations accomplished without any loss of communication. The skill,

endurance, and ready zeal of the A.S.C. Motor Transport drivers attached

to the Company played a great part in the results achieved. They had

never failed to meet the severe calls made upon them from time to time

during the Somme fighting, but now both the distances and the masses of

material to be moved were greater, and the road conditions but little, if

any, better.

Early in April the advance reached its limit, and was definitely held

up in front of La Vacquerie and Havrincourt—outlying strong points of

the Hindenburg Line. On the 17th, Corps Headquarters was established

in hutments and tents near Haute-Allaines, after a short interval at

P.C. Chapeau. Then the weather at last broke, and with a genial spring

sun overhead, a rapidly drying country underfoot, and good news coming

through from the Arras front, life under canvas, even in this devastated

zone, became pleasant.

Little relaxation of effort was possible however. The Germans on their

retreat had accomplished as thorough work in the demolition of signal

communications as in their wanton spoliation of civilian property. As

every house and every fruit tree was destroyed, so was every pole sawn

through when not bodily removed. Scarcely a yard of usable line—cables or

open wire—existed in the new area, and the whole of the immense network

of communications for stationary warfare had to be reconstituted under

continuing supply and transport difficulties, while the hasty work done

in the advance had to be overhauled and made permanent.

Scarcely was this task well under way when orders were received to

prepare signal plans for an offensive and commence the necessary works

as early as possible. The position in regard to materials was alleviated

in May by the organization of a temporary Corps Signal Salvage Unit,

composed of B.F. section, a platoon of a Labour Company, and the

necessary horse and motor Transport under Lieutenant Jack. This made it

possible to push forward work on two heavy open-wire routes, running

from Corps Headquarters, through Nurlu and Fins, and through Sève Wood,

Liéramont, and Heudicourt respectively, with the necessary spur and

lateral routes. To economize cable, which remained very short in supply,

the subsidiary routes were run as far as possible in light iron wire

(60 lb. to the mile), on air line or light hop poles, and considerable

use was made of a light type of French cable with all copper conductors

salvaged in the back area. This use of low resistance conductors, and

the maintaining of good line conditions, made clear speech possible

between O.P.’s and H.A. Headquarters, and on special occasions Corps

Headquarters, a point of great value in securing rapid and effective

counter-battery work. Up to this time all the British field cables,

except D 5—too heavy and too scarce for ordinary forward use—had steel

conductors, and were, therefore, of high resistance, and good speech

could only be obtained on short lines. Plans were also elaborated for a

buried cable scheme covering the area between the front line and heads of

open wire behind Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu respectively. The permanent

routes had progressed beyond Fins and Heudicourt, when, towards the end

of May, orders arrived for the XV. Corps to hand over to the III. Corps

and proceed to Villers-Bretonneux. The cable sections of the Company

joined various divisions, and, at the end of May, accompanied them out of

the area to unknown destinations.

The remainder of the Company reached Villers-Bretonneux on the 3rd June,

and settled down very comfortably in this pleasant little town, destined

to be the storm centre of the fighting for Amiens next spring. A small

allotment of leave was obtained, making it possible to send away some

of the men who had now been fifteen months continuously in the field.

The usual refitting proceeded, and opportunity was taken to complete the

reorganization necessitated by certain changes in signal establishments

that had recently taken effect, and by the increasing numbers of valuable

and experienced N.C.O.’s and men who left to take up Imperial commissions

in the various branches of the service. The numbers so lost to the

Company constituted a striking testimony to the high quality of its

_personnel_, and aggregated over eighty before hostilities ceased.

The great and continuing growth in the demands on the Signal Service,

particularly in connection with the Heavy Artillery, had for long unduly

taxed the available _personnel_, and increase in establishments was

overdue. To the Corps Signal Company was, therefore, now added a Heavy

Artillery Headquarters Signal Section, with a strength of one officer

and thirty-seven other ranks. The _personnel_ for this section was

obtained from drafts built up on a nucleus of experienced men, mainly

from R.E. section. At the same time, a signal sub-section of one officer

and twenty-seven other ranks was formed for each H.A. Group, but as H.A.

Groups were frequently moved from Corps to Corps, these sub-sections

were organized from Imperial R.E. _personnel_. The Company Headquarters

Section was also strengthened by the withdrawal of four telegraphists

from each cable section, the vacancies being filled with additional

pioneers. The Signal Section forming part of the Headquarters of S.A.

Infantry Brigade was now affiliated to the Company, and thenceforward

drew its reinforcements therefrom. This Section was originally formed by

Lieutenant F. W. S. Burton of the Union Post Office and the 3rd Regiment

from signallers selected from the infantry battalions. As, however, the

Brigade only chanced to serve for two short periods in the same formation

as the Signal Company, the story of this Signal Section is that of the

Brigade and need not be separately recounted.

The signal instruction for infantry and artillery units, commenced at

Long, and so abruptly suspended by the move into line, had during the

spring become a permanent feature of the Company’s activities. Classes in

Carrier Pigeon work had been immediately resumed at Etinehem, and were

thenceforward carried on till the end of the war under Lieutenant Egleton

and Corporal Jorgenson, with the most valuable results. In the middle

of March the Corps Signal School was reconstituted at Chipilly, with a

separate establishment, and Lieutenant Johnson was seconded as Commandant

with a staff of four Sergeant-Instructors from the Company. The School

then constituted continued to function till after the Armistice, moving

with the Corps from point to point, and many hundreds of officers and men

passed through the six weeks’ courses held at it with a most marked and

beneficial effect to the efficiency of Signal work among the fighting

troops. Lieutenant Johnson’s vacancy was filled by the promotion of

C.Q.M.S. C. H. Ison, whose untiring energy had done much to help the

Company through its difficulties in the past year.

The interlude at Villers was abruptly cut short by orders to move on

the 10th June for a secret destination. As there were no cable sections

to accompany, all _personnel_ travelled in lorries, and the move was

accomplished in two days. The secret was extremely well kept, however,

and not until the convoy actually entered Dunkirk on the 11th was

it realized that the Corps was to take over the Nieuport Sector—the

important bit of line running from the sea along the Yser, which had

been held by the French since the momentous days of the first battle of

Ypres. Corps Headquarters were established on the 11th in the Casino of

Malo-les-Bains, a suburb of Dunkirk, and arrangements for the relief of

the 36th French Corps at once put in hand.

THE BELGIAN COAST AND THE BATTLE OF THE DUNES—NOVEMBER 1917.

Though this sector had been for a long period a quiet one, the German

artillery concentration opposite it was already great, especially in

heavy long range guns, partly because the arc of many of their coast

defence batteries covered more or less of the land front, and for the

most part were already behind concrete emplacements. Normal trenches in

this terrain were impossible, and both sides stood behind breastworks

that in the dunes were merely gabions filled with sand; but here, as

on the Ypres front, the liberal use of concrete by the enemy had given

his front-line troops, as well as his batteries and command posts, the

protection of many “pill-boxes” and concrete shelters of various forms.

For a long period the French had held the sector comparatively lightly;

consequently the whole of the titanic task of mounting a trench warfare

offensive fell on the incoming corps. On such terrain the preparations

presented extreme and unique difficulties, and those of Signals were

enhanced by the fact that not only did the nature of the ground forbid

deep cable buries, but very few shallow ones existed; while the existing

communications—naturally inadequate—were almost entirely open wire to

within four thousand yards of the front line, and sited along roads

certain to be heavily shelled.

British divisions began to arrive in the area on the 15th, bringing the

absent cable sections of the Company with them, and between the 20th

and 23rd the French divisions in line were relieved by the 1st and 32nd

Divisions. Thereafter the Corps Heavy Artillery commenced to move in, the

H.A. Signal Section and B.E. Section proceeding to the late French Heavy

Artillery Headquarters, D.C.A.L. to a small copse about two miles south

of Nieuport, and B.G. Section to Coxyde to prepare for the establishment

of a forward exchange.

After a rapid survey of the area, a communication scheme to meet the

needs of Corps, Divisions, and the Heavy Artillery on a hitherto

unprecedented scale was prepared. Meanwhile the various sections toiled

at the familiar task of connecting up the units that were streaming into

the area daily, and preparing the new Corps Headquarters at Bray-Dunes

Plage—a small watering-place south of La Panne. The H.A. Section had,

even with the assistance of B.E. Section, a particularly strenuous task

in coping with the concentration of eleven groups of “heavies,” and found

it necessary to endeavour to bring into use at once the incomplete French

buries. By an evil stroke of luck, the material ordered for this purpose

was delayed over a fortnight by the truck containing it being railed to

Péronne instead of Dunkirk, owing to the extreme secrecy that enshrouded

the movements of the Corps.

The movement of Corps Headquarters to Bray-Dunes was effected on the 29th

June, having been somewhat expedited by one of the periodical shellings

of Dunkirk by a German long range gun. On the morning of the 27th a

twelve-inch shell dropped on the Corps Offices in the Casino at Malo,

and inflicted a number of casualties—luckily for the Company, it just

missed the Signal Office. A few days later the Heavy Artillery Quarters

moved back to the village of Oost Dunkirk, about six thousand yards from

the line, and occupied the Villa Rosarie. During the first week in July

a considerable increase in hostile shelling was noted, but not to an

alarming extent, though a direct hit on the H.A. sections’ store rooms

put a few telephones _hors de combat_; and no immediate operations were

anticipated.

The enemy, however, had decided to nip our attack in the bud by taking

the initiative himself, and had only delayed to complete a crushing

artillery concentration. Thus about 9.30 a.m. on the 10th July, when

many batteries were not yet in position and many others not yet ready

for action, an intense bombardment dropped over the whole Corps area up

to nine thousand yards behind the front line. With the most admirable

accuracy and thoroughness, every village and battery position was

searched, and every road of approach swept by heavy shell fire. Forward

communications failed almost at once, the bridges across the Yser below

Nieuport were destroyed, the breastwork trenches melted away before the

storm of high explosive, and when the infantry assault was delivered

about 7 p.m. few survivors of the Brigade of the 1st Division that

held the trenches across the Yser in front of Nieuport Bain, remained

to resist, and the German front line was established on the Yser bank

in this sector. On the other flank, at Lombartzyde, the 32nd Division

managed by desperate fighting to retain most of the ground in front of

Nieuport, but the main German object was achieved; the approaches to the

bridgehead were now limited to the single entry of Nieuport, and the

bridgehead itself was so reduced in area as to make a serious attack in

force a very desperate venture.

This day was naturally a most trying one for the Signal _personnel_.

Nearly all wire communication was lost in the first two hours, and all

formations from Corps downwards had to fall back on despatch riders and

runners. Very fine work was done by the Company’s despatch runners on

the shell-swept roads, while the sections strove to patch up and keep

going the vital command lines. Thanks to cool and quick repair work by

the sappers, and to the use of a short piece of cable trench completed

on the previous day, touch was kept with most of the Heavy Artillery

Groups continually throughout the day. The observation lines could not,

however, be kept going, and thus the batteries not put out of action

were blinded, and could not effectively support the infantry across the

river. Oost Dunkirk village suffered heavily, and after nightfall the

H.A. Staff were forced to move into the sand dunes half a mile to the

flank, when temporary cables were run back to the signal office at the

Villa Rosarie, which enjoyed protection in a sandbagged shelter behind

the house. As this shelter was the only place in the village enjoying any

degree of protection, it became during that day and night a temporary

aid post for wounded and a refuge for the few remaining villagers. Amid

these conditions, and deafened by the crashing explosions of the shells

among the houses, the telephonists managed to carry on with wonderful

efficiency for twenty-four consecutive hours. Conditions at Coxyde Signal

Office with B.G. section were very similar.

Much to the general surprise, the attack was not resumed on the following

day, and while every nerve was strained to get the existing lines

restored, work on the new communications began and was pressed forward

night and day. The buried scheme originally planned provided for four

forward trenches, one along the sea coast, one through the dunes, one

partly French and already dug through the polder area, and one consisting

of cable laid in the bed of the Nieuport Canal—all to be connected by a

lateral trench running through H.A. Headquarters, which was to become the

chief maintenance and test point. Lieutenant Collins with B.E. section

and a rapidly increasing number of Imperial sections, loaned from Army

Signals, was entrusted with this work, assisted by Lieutenant Dobson. In

view of the experiences of the 10th, two additional trenches were added

to the plan, one from a main open route junction point behind Coxyde,

forward along the fringe of the dunes to H.A. Headquarters, and the other

along the sea-beach above highwater mark from Corps Headquarters at

Bray-Dunes to the same point.

This latter trench, which contained twenty-five pair dry core cable,

was completed by Lieutenant Hill with skilled cable jointers from 51

Air Line. Labour was made freely available by the Corps Staff, and as

material now came forward rapidly, up to two thousand men a day were

employed on these works. The forward portion of the scheme presented

great difficulty, as the area was now so sown with batteries that it was

almost impossible to trace the trenches so as to avoid battery positions

and the shelling which they attracted. The greater part of the work could

only be done by night because of enemy observation; and, further, time

did not admit of the usual detailed preparation for the working parties.

Nevertheless, all works were completed for the attack; and taking into

account the continuous heavy shelling, with light casualties.

The experiment made on the Somme of using a kite balloon to maintain

communication with the front line, was now repeated; and as a separate

balloon was now placed at the disposal of Second-Lieutenant Wilson and a

visual signalling party, the result was satisfactory.

Though all other preparations were well advanced, including the seclusion

of the 1st Division in a “hush” camp on the coast, where they were

specially rehearsed in landing operations from the sea, the attack was

postponed from date to date, until it finally became evident by the

transfer of a large proportion of the heavy batteries to the Ypres front,

that the slow progress made there owing to weather and “pill-boxes” was

likely to postpone the Nieuport offensive indefinitely.

During the interval, the rival artilleries waged a furious and continuous

duel. The forward buried system, unavoidably shallow from the nature

of the ground, was continuously broken by shell fire. During September

the cable trenches were blown up by direct hits on the average nearly

twice a day. The repairs were most difficult and laborious owing both

to the persistent shelling and the rise of the water level everywhere

after the wet weather of August. Even with the sappers of three cable

sections—B.F., B.E., and A.U. Imperial Cable Section,—and two area Signal

Detachments from the Fourth Army, it became impossible to keep going

satisfactorily the network of forty miles of trenches containing 1,200

miles of cable; and finally the assistance of the Corps Cyclist Battalion

was obtained to dig diversion trenches in the worst shell areas, and a

new trench in the Belgian area in substitution of the cable laid in the

Nieuport Canal, the insulation of which began to fail soon after laying.

During this period the sappers stationed at the forward test points had

a most trying experience. Owing to the frequent breakdowns, they were

perpetually working on the cable trenches by day and by night, employed

in testing and substituting lines. The frequent use of gas shell made

it necessary that at their isolated points they should secure the gas

blankets of their dug-out entrances at night, and this inevitably

produced an atmosphere little inferior to the gas itself. Two concreted

test points in the “polder” area, taken over from the French, were

conspicuous after shelling had destroyed all arboreal cover. The Germans

apparently decided that these were gun positions, and favoured them with

special attention, managing finally to secure three direct hits—two

innocuous, however unnerving to the inmates; but the third on P.C. 6

burst square on the roof, and though only slightly bending the steel

rails embedded in the concrete, killed a sapper of B.F. section inside.

One small dug-out on the canal bank, P.C. 18, disappeared altogether

after an eleven-inch howitzer bombardment of a neighbouring battery, but

fortunately there was no occupant at the time.

Corps Headquarters moved to La Panne at the beginning of September;

but the location had evidently been given away by a spy, as it was

heavily shelled by a long range gun a fortnight later, and consequently

retransferred to Bray-Dunes. Though as the autumn drew on activity in

the sector died down, all ranks had reason to welcome the relief of the

Corps by the XXXVI. French Corps that commenced on the 19th November. On

the 20th the Headquarters of the Company, under Captain Dingwall, who had

been acting as A.W. Signals since September during Lieutenant-Colonel

Harrison’s absence on sick leave, moved to Hinges near Béthune, and

commenced to take over from the XI. Corps—then under orders for Italy—a

sector between Béthune and Armentières.

THE LYS AREA.

After some readjustments of frontage in December, the XV. Corps settled

down to hold the sector in front of the Lys, from Houplines to Laventie,

with the Portuguese Corps on the right and the Anzac Corps on the left.

In January 1918 Corps Headquarters were shifted from Hinges to La

Motte-aux-Bois in front of the Forest of Nieppe, and Heavy Artillery,

with the H.A. and B.E. sections, to Estaires, where 51 Air Line was

already established. A further reorganization of the Company now took

place. As cable sections rarely, if ever, performed the mobile work

for which their horse transport was provided, the decision was reached

to disband one cable section in each Corps, to reduce the strength of

the Corps air line section to forty-two all ranks with one heavy and

two light lorries, and with the surplus _personnel_ so accruing form

an additional air line for each Corps. B.G. section was, accordingly,

converted into the nucleus of the new 91 Air Line Section, to which

Lieutenant Dobson was appointed. At the same time, “Q” Wireless Section

became an integral portion of the Signal Company, and was taken over by

Lieutenant McArthur, with 2nd Lieutenant FitzGeorge as second officer,

the Imperial _personnel_ being rapidly replaced by South Africans. A

second officer was also authorized for the Heavy Artillery Section,

and Lieutenant M. Cohen, who had been attached to a brigade of the 8th

Division since his arrival from England in November 1917, was appointed.

The communications here were such as would serve on a thinly held and

lightly shelled front. Buries were few and becoming inefficient with age;

the light open-wire routes which formed the bulk of the communication

were run close up to the front line. The defection of Russia made it

certain that the Allies would be thrown on the defensive in the spring;

and as the Lys covered Hazebrouck and the direct route to Calais, it was

probable that the sector would become a main front of attack. Ample and

secure communications were, therefore, a first necessity, and a complete

scheme was prepared on a scale of magnitude and thoroughness which

surpassed any previous performance. All trenches were to be seven feet

deep and carry no less than thirty pairs of wires.

Work could not be commenced before the 25th January, owing to the whole

Lys Valley, which is very low lying, becoming water-logged by heavy rain.

At first the labour available was very limited, owing to the urgent

demands for defence works in the battle zone, and for the construction

and wiring of a new emergency line of five trenches on the north bank of

the river. Early in February the labour position improved, and frequently

over one thousand five hundred men were employed simultaneously. The

sappers had a strenuous time, and, but for the assistance of a party

from the Corps Cyclists, who by long association with Signals had become

relatively skilled, could not have kept up the pace. By unremitting

effort the Corps Section of the trenches was completed by the beginning

of March, and a portion of the work originally assigned to divisions

taken over.

While the other sections were so engaged, B.F. was employed on another

section of the scheme in and around Armentières itself. In this town a

considerable underground sewer system existed, and though not comparable

with the underways of Arras, yet these sewers proved extremely valuable

as affording ready-made covered ways for cable. B.F. accordingly spent

two months in laying securely many miles of cable. The new 91 Air Line

Section meanwhile pushed on the necessary additions to the open-wire

routes forward from Corps Headquarters. Hostile artillery activity

began to increase considerably in March, and about the middle of the

month became so marked that from this and other symptoms an immediate

attack was expected. This cut off the supply of labour, but the sappers

were busier than ever in bringing the cables already laid into use by

temporary joints, without waiting for the construction of the test

dug-outs.

This alarm proved for the time false, the offensive commencing instead

on the Third and Fifth Army fronts on the 21st March. The immediate

effect was the withdrawal of all the divisions in the Corps, and their

replacement with exhausted divisions from the south—the 34th and 40th—who

naturally could provide no labour. The greatest anxiety was now felt lest

the communication should not be finished in time, and work was rushed day

and night. With the assistance of the Corps Cyclists temporary sandbagged

test points were erected where the concrete work was still lacking, and

when the storm finally broke on the 9th April practically all cable laid

had been joined up and was working, and three-quarters of the original

scheme had been completed.

The attack began at 4.30 a.m. with an intense bombardment extending back

to and beyond the river, followed by an infantry assault about 7 a.m.,

which immediately broke through the Portuguese on the Corps right. There

were no reserves available to man effectively the new line dug on the

northern bank, and during the afternoon the enemy crossed at Bac St.

Maur, and by 7 p.m. had forced our firing line back behind the signal

test point at Croix de Bac. Communications had held well so far; the 34th

Division was still maintaining its ground on the left round Armentières,

and there was hope of an immediate restoration of the situation by

counter-attack. The lineman at this point—Corporal Shepherd of the H.A.

section—was, therefore, instructed not to destroy the lines, but to

leave them all through, and fall back on the next test point. He did so,

but omitted to put through one of the lines. On ascertaining this when

he reached H.A. headquarters, he voluntarily returned and managed to

re-enter the dug-out, which was now in No Man’s Land, and put the line

through. Though this dug-out passed into the enemy’s hands during the

night, and after a temporary reversal of fortune again next morning,

direct communication from Corps headquarters to troops in Armentières

was maintained over the cables passing through it till afternoon on the

following day, when the evacuation of the town began.

By next morning the Germans had forced the river to Estaires. This town

had been intensely shelled all day, and B.E. Section billet was blown up

early in the morning. Nevertheless, the Corps Exchange was kept going

till a late hour that night by Lieutenant Hill with 51 Air Line and a

party of operators from the Headquarters section.

During the following days, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the Corps was

steadily driven back by the heavy thrust made by the enemy for

Hazebrouck. The 29th and 31st Divisions and the 4th Guards Brigade were

successively thrown in, but their desperate fighting only succeeded

in slowing the German advance, until the entry into line of the 1st

Australian Division on the night of the 12th, when the enemy was finally

brought to a stop on the edge of the Nieppe Forest. Thereafter the storm

centre shifted gradually to the northward round Kemmel and Messines,

while on the Corps front the battle died down to local combats.

The effort to keep up communications during these days tested every

one to the limit. Units were changing location like figures in a

kaleidoscope, and nearly the whole of the existing system of lines had

passed into the enemy’s hands. However, by the most strenuous efforts,

touch was maintained throughout the retreat, and the good work done was

recognized by the Corps commander; for in a letter addressed to Colonel

Harrison, he conveyed his appreciation of the work carried out by all

ranks of the Company during the recent operations. He added that he

realized that, owing to the untiring energy and devotion to duty shown

by all ranks, a very high standard of communication was maintained, and

thanked all for the efforts made and the results achieved. The general

commanding the Heavy Artillery also made reference in a special order of

the day to the particularly good work done by the H.A. Signal Section,

under Lieutenant Collins, in the following words:—

“That the Heavy Artillery was able to cover the whole Corps

front with its fire during each day, and to withdraw to

fresh positions each night, testifies also to the excellence

of the staff work—especially in connection with telephonic

communication.”

On the 11th Corps Headquarters fell back to Wardrecques, between St.

Omer and Hazebrouck, leaving an advanced Signal Office at La Motte until

the evening of the 12th. During the next few days it became evident that

the front was established again—at any rate temporarily—and the work of

restoring the normal network of communication at once commenced, at first

with great shortage of material, as all forward signal dumps had been

captured.

Captain Dingwall, whose health had suffered under the continuous strain

in France, now left the Company to join L Signal Battalion, and was

replaced by Captain Ross, who was relieved of the Heavy Artillery Section

by Lieutenant Collins. Lieutenant Hill took up duty at headquarters, and

Lieutenant McArthur left the Wireless Section for 51 Air Line.

At this time also Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Ducane was summoned to

replace Sir Henry Rawlinson on the Versailles Council, and the XV. Corps

was henceforward commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir B. de Lisle. The

departure of General Ducane was much regretted by the Company, as he

had always taken a close interest in communications, and showed keen

appreciation of the work done, as is shown by the following extract from

a letter written by him to Colonel Harrison after the termination of

hostilities:—

“In the many bright spots of the XV. Corps, I have always

maintained, and always will maintain, that the Signal Service

was far away the best Signal Service of any other organization

in France. Not only was there a very thorough grasp of the

work, but always—what was so pleasant to find—there was a

desire to go out of your way to help. It is with the greatest

pleasure that I write to say how much I always appreciate

having the South African Signal Company in the XV. Corps. They

were not only highly efficient in all departments of this

work, but I can honestly say they were the most energetic,

hard-working, well-disciplined, and courteous body of men that

I have come across in my experience of the Army.

“I always felt in dealing with you that nothing was ever too

much trouble for you or your men, and that no matter how

exacting the demands made upon you—and they were often very

heavy indeed—no effort would be spared to carry them through

successfully. Never were we let down during the most trying

times—on the Somme, on the coast, or on the Lys. During the

enemy’s attack on the Lys in April 1918, the truly remarkable

way in which all our communications held out for three days,

till we were compelled to abandon La Motte, greatly facilitated

the exercise of the command of the Corps during those difficult

days, and was an eloquent testimony of the thoroughness and

skill with which the work of preparation had been carried out.”

The final holding up of the Germans at Kemmel on the 28th April made it

possible to commence effective work on the defences at Hazebrouck, and

during the next few months successive lines of trenches and belts of wire

came into existence, and seamed the country as far back as St. Omer.

The Company’s share in these preparations was work on a buried cable

scheme which started early in May, and gradually developed as labour and

material were obtainable, until, when the advance began, a network of

trenches extended across the whole Corps area for 13,000 yards in depth

and 7,000 in breadth, embodying thirty miles of seven-foot deep trench

and nearly 1,200 miles of pair cable. This work, though never tested by

another offensive, was of great value during the prolonged artillery

duel which followed the Battle of the Lys. The open-wire routes were

continuously shelled or bombed down, for in this sector, as on the coast,

aeroplane bombing was a nightly event.

The series of successful minor operations carried out by the Corps in

July and August, including the capture of Méteren, and the devastating

effect of our superior and incessantly active artillery, no doubt

quickened the German decision to evacuate the Lys salient. This

evacuation commenced at the end of August, and thenceforward all ranks

were occupied in the rapid restoration of communications through the

devastated area, now as broad as the old Somme battlefield. An attempt

was made to utilize the old buries laid down by the XV. and other Corps

before the retreat; but these were too effectively destroyed by the

enemy to admit of rapid restoration.

After the successful attack of the Belgian and Second British Armies at

the end of September, in which the XV. Corps co-operated on the right

flank, headquarters were moved to St. Jans-Cappel on the 4th October, and

on the 21st, to Mouvaux, near Tourcoing, following the rapid retreat of

the enemy to the Scheldt. On this occasion a fast piece of work was done

by 91 Air Line and B.E. Cable Section, two lines being completed across

the Lys to the new headquarters—a distance of nearly twenty miles—in one

day.

The Signal portion of the preparations for forcing the passage of the

Scheldt filled the period up to the 10th November; but as the enemy

retired during the night, and the Armistice was proclaimed the following

day, they proved unnecessary.

The Corps was not selected to accompany the advance to the Rhine, and

so it fell to the lot of B.E. Section on the 12th to lay the last and

farthest forward cable in France, from the Scheldt, crossing at Pecq to

an observation point on the eastern side.

APPENDIX III.

THE MEDICAL SERVICES.

When the South African Expeditionary Force was organized on the

termination of the campaign in German South-West Africa, Colonel P. G.

Stock was appointed S.M.O., and in addition to the South African Medical

Corps _personnel_ who volunteered for regimental duties, arranged for

the mobilization of one Field Ambulance and one General Hospital. The

former, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Usmar, S.A.M.C.,

assembled at Potchefstroom with the 1st South African Infantry Brigade;

while the General Hospital was formed at Wynberg, the _personnel_

being largely composed of volunteers from the staffs of No. 1 General

Hospital, Wynberg, and No. 2 General Hospital, Maitland, and included

representatives from each of the four provinces of the Union. It

subsequently provided the _personnel_ for the Depot in England, and the

South African Military Hospital at Richmond, which was afterwards built

and organized.

No hospital equipment was available in South Africa, but the official

Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid, of which Sir Thomas Smartt was

chairman, met the difficulty by voting £15,000 to purchase it on arrival

in England, and a further £1,500 to augment the equipment taken by the

Field Ambulance.

Both units accompanied the Infantry Brigade to England, the General

Hospital embarking on H.M.T. _Balmoral Castle_ at Cape Town on 25th

September, and the Field Ambulance on H.M.T. _Kenilworth Castle_ on

October 10, 1915. On arrival there, they proceeded to the R.A.M.C. Depot

at Twezeldown, near Aldershot. At the depot the training of the Field

Ambulance proceeded under its own officers, and, with the rest of the

Brigade, it was present at Bordon when her Majesty the Queen reviewed the

troops on December 2, 1915. On 29th December the unit proceeded by route

march to Farnham, there entraining for Devonport, where it embarked on

H.M.T. _Corsican_ for Egypt, Alexandria being reached on January 13, 1916.

In the meantime, the _personnel_ of No. 1 General Hospital—which had been

particularly fortunate in securing the services of some of the leading

surgeons and physicians and most experienced nurses in South Africa—was

temporarily detailed to strengthen the staffs of various Imperial

hospitals in England. On 20th December, however, the unit was reassembled

at Bournemouth, where it took over and staffed the Mont Dore Military

Hospital, which, under an Imperial officer as commandant, had just been

equipped for 520 patients.

In February 1916 the control of the “Grata Quies” Auxiliary Hospital was

transferred to the Mont Dore, which became a “Central Hospital,” and on

April 1, 1916, seventeen additional auxiliary hospitals, situated in the

districts of Poole, Wimbourne, Swanage, Sherbourne, and Yeovil, were

affiliated, increasing the number of beds controlled to over 1,200.

The first patients from overseas were admitted on 8th January, the

majority being medical cases, and although a number of severe cases of

“trench feet” from Gallipoli were taken in, few wounded were received up

to the time the unit left on July 3, 1916, when it proceeded to Aldershot

preparatory to joining the British Expeditionary Force in France.

When the decision to send South African troops to England became known,

a number of prominent South Africans in London formed a committee under

the chairmanship of Lord Gladstone—until recently the Governor-General—to

start a fund for the establishment of a hospital and for the general

comfort of the troops. On the arrival of the contingent in England

this movement received renewed attention, a proposal then being under

consideration to erect huts to accommodate some three hundred patients,

as a South African wing to the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley. On

further investigation, however, it was found that the site, although in

many respects an ideal one in the summer, would not have been suitable

for South African troops during the winter, and further search had to

be made. Many places and buildings were inspected, and finally a site

in Richmond Park, for which his Majesty the King was graciously pleased

to grant the necessary permission, was selected, and no more beautiful,

convenient, and healthy spot could possibly have been obtained.

[Illustration: COLONEL P. G. STOCK, C.B., C.B.E., D.D.M.S., South African

Forces.]

Much of the success of this hospital was due to the time and care

spent over the plans, and Mr. Allison, the chief architect of the

Office of Works, was always ready to adopt any recommendations made by

Lieutenant-Colonel Stock and the expert sub-committee of officers of No.

1 General Hospital who were dealing with the project. The desire was to

provide 500 beds, but for financial reasons it was decided to start with

300, on the basis of plans which provided for future necessary extensions.

The construction was begun early in March, and on June 16, 1916, the

hospital was formally opened by its patroness, H.R.H. Princess Christian,

being then taken over fully equipped as a gift from South Africans by the

D.D.M.S., London District, on behalf of the Army Council.

On the opening of the hospital, the S.A.M.C. Depot in England was

transferred to Richmond, and a redistribution of the _personnel_ of No.

1 General Hospital carried out, which enabled a South African Staff to

be placed in charge of Richmond without interfering with the efficiency

of the former unit. Major Thornton, the adjutant and registrar of No. 1

South African General Hospital, succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Stock in

command at Richmond, and Captain Basil Brooke was appointed adjutant and

registrar of No. 1 General Hospital. Before, however, proceeding further

with the history of the South African Hospital at Richmond, it will be

convenient to follow the fortunes of the units which left England.

On January 13, 1916, No. 1 South African Field Ambulance arrived at

Alexandria on H.M.T. _Corsican_, and marched the following day to

Mex Camp, where the rest of the Brigade was encamped. Its history is

included in that of the South African Infantry Brigade, with which it was

associated from this date until the cessation of hostilities.

On the arrival of No. 1 South African General Hospital at Aldershot,

the final touches were given to the unit, and about 400 shipping tons

of stores and equipment drawn, which, by a special arrangement with the

Army Council, had been paid for out of the £15,000 voted by Sir Thomas

Smartt’s Committee in Cape Town.

On 12th July the unit entrained for Southampton, there to embark on

H.M.T. _Huntcraft_. The ship berthed at Havre about 10.30 a.m. on the

13th, and as she was urgently required elsewhere, the unloading at once

commenced; and on the following day the unit—together with its stores and

equipment—left for Abbeville, which was reached on 15th July.

Here it was found that the hospital would be established next to No. 2

Stationary Hospital, an Imperial unit which had been there for some time.

The necessity for not interfering with the ripening harvest considerably

curtailed the choice of a site, the ground allotted being a ploughed

field on the slope of the hills overlooking the valley of the Somme.

Abbeville itself lay about a mile away in the valley, but the railway

station and “triage” were on the far side of the town and must have been

nearly three miles from the hospital.

Some hospital marquees had already been erected, but the layout of the

hospital was greatly handicapped by the cramped area of ground then

available. As the corn was reaped more ground became vacant, and, later

on, by frequent striking and repitching of tents, the hospital gradually

took a more symmetrical and workable shape.

When the unit arrived in France the First Battle of the Somme had begun,

and hospital accommodation was urgently required for the large number

of casualties. So, in the absence of any kind of building, a store tent

was converted into an operating tent; an improvised sterilizing shelter

erected; and within forty-eight hours of arrival patients were admitted

and every available surgeon hard at work.

In those early days the wide surgical experience and considered judgment

of Lieutenant-Colonel Ritchie Thomson proved invaluable. He had accepted

the post of chief surgeon when the hospital was mobilized in South

Africa, and many a sorely wounded man owes his life and limb to his skill

and judgment.

The initial difficulties were many: buildings and engineering services

were almost impossible to obtain, and it was not until the end of

November that the operating block—the first building to be erected—was

completed. All, however, were willing workers, and it was not long before

additional tentage was pitched and Major Merritt had organized the

kitchens, stores, and a hundred and one odd things appertaining to the

Quartermaster’s Department, all of which mean so much to the efficiency

and comfort of any hospital.

Until early in August the hospital was without its own nursing

Sisters—these services being performed by members of the Q.A.I.M.N.S.,

the Canadian Military Nursing Service, and English V.A.D.’s, who did all

that hard work and devotion to duty could do to make up for the shortage

in number. On 5th August, however, Matron Creagh and twenty-one members

of the S.A.M.N.S. arrived from England, and the greatest difficulties in

this respect were over. The nurses’ camp had to be pitched in the wooded

ground of a château some little distance off; but when the storm clouds

rolled up the valley, and the winter rains set in, they had perforce to

be billeted in the town until the huts which were contemplated for them

were completed.

Situated as it was at the advanced base in a convenient position for

their reception, the hospital, during the autumn of 1916, received a

large number of wounded direct from the Somme battlefield. Amongst the

earliest admissions in July 1916 were South Africans wounded at Delville

Wood, and towards the end of July General Lukin was one of the first

officer patients.

The most severely wounded journeyed by specially-fitted hospital barges,

which, from the casualty clearing stations around Corbie, floated down

the Somme to Abbeville, where the patients were disembarked and taken by

motor ambulances to the hospital. The use of barges was restricted to

those cases who were unable to stand the strain of a journey by train.

Usually they travelled in pairs, but on more than one occasion during

the autumn of 1916 patients from six barges were admitted during the

twenty-four hours. Towards the end of 1916 the barges ceased running, as

the winter rains had rendered the passage down the Somme too dangerous,

and they were not again employed, as the advance in the spring of 1917

carried the fighting away from the river.

Fortunately, during the first few weeks after the arrival of the unit in

France, the weather was fine, but even then difficulties were experienced

in regard to the main road leading to the hospital. For part of the way

this was formed by “sleepers,” but as the supply of them gave out beech

planking had to be substituted. This quickly “warped,” and becoming

displaced with the constant traffic, was always a source of trouble, as

the underlying chalk during the dry weather quickly powdered to a fine

dust, and later, when the rains set in, turned into a particularly greasy

form of mud.

As soon as materials and labour became available, the “sleeper track”

was continued, and a large “triage” constructed on which the ambulance

wagons could turn; but it was not until many months later that it

became possible to build a macadamized road connecting the hospital with

the Route d’Amiens. The old entrance was then utilized as an exit for

empty wagons, and the original signboard of the hospital, on which Major

Merritt had painted the Springbok badge, was removed to the new entrance.

Progress was gradually made in the erection of temporary buildings, and

by the end of 1916 there was accommodation in huts for 120 patients. It

was obvious, however, that for that winter at least the majority of beds

would be under canvas, and a particularly successful form of sliding

door with windows at the top was designed; and with the funds available

a local contractor was engaged, who quickly fitted them at each end of

the tented wards. At the same time the Royal Engineers undertook the

installation of stoves and wood flooring, and with doors closed and

the sides of the tents fastened down the tented wards were really most

comfortable. “Duck” boarding also gradually became more plentiful.

During the period July 23, 1916, to December 31, 1916, the total

admissions were 6,436, of whom 3,032 were “battle casualties” and 3,404

“sick.” During the same period 5,719 were “discharged hospital.” Of these

673 were returned to duty; 548 transferred to convalescent depôts; 3,306

evacuated to the United Kingdom; and 1,192 transferred to hospitals at

other bases in France. Five hundred and eighty-eight major operations

were performed; and there were in all, for the same period, 236 deaths,

or—calculated on the number of admissions—a percentage of 3.68. This

comparatively high mortality is explained by the fact that practically

every case admitted to this hospital was seriously wounded—the barges,

from which the large majority of cases were received, only carrying

those cases which were unfit to travel by other means of transport. The

mortality was further increased owing to the fact that this hospital

was the nearest General Hospital to the Somme front, and many moribund

patients were taken off ambulance trains on account of their being too

ill to travel to more distant bases. By the end of the year, in addition

to the operation block, hutted accommodation for 120 patients was

erected, and in the early part of 1917 hutted quarters for the nursing

staff and rooms for officers’, sergeants’, and men’s messes were added,

as well as buildings for part of the quartermaster’s stores.

Early in the year instructions were received from General Headquarters

that the hospital was to be enlarged from 520 beds to a normal capacity

of 1,120 beds, with a “crisis expansion” to 1,500 beds. The hospital

remained on this basis, and during the latter part of 1917, and not

infrequently during 1916, as many as 1,600 to 1,700 patients were

accommodated at one time.

The total admissions for the year 1917 were 19,109, of which 7,613 were

battle casualties and 11,496 were sick. During the same period there were

18,277 discharges. Of this number 2,638 were returned to duty, 4,253

were transferred to convalescent depôts, 8,749 were evacuated to the

United Kingdom, and 2,637 were transferred to hospitals at other bases in

France. One thousand two hundred and ten major operations were performed

during the year 1917. For the same period, including eleven cases brought

in for burial, there were 181 deaths in the hospital. Of these 128

were due to wounds—a percentage of 1.68; and 53 were due to sickness—a

percentage of .46. The death rate from all causes for this year worked

out at .94 per cent.

Promises of hutted accommodation, both for patients and personnel, were

current for at least twelve months. Nothing, however, happened in this

direction, except that an administration block and a new kitchen for the

hospital were built; and in October 1917, with keen remembrances of the

previous winter, it was decided to erect such huts as was possible with

labour supplied by the staff of the hospital. A start was made, with the

idea of housing the men of the company who were over forty years of age,

and a hut was built, using discarded telegraph poles as the principals,

covered with corrugated iron and lined with wood—the lining being bought

from funds provided by the South African Hospital and Comforts Fund at a

cost of, approximately, £120.