CHAPTER XIII.

GEN. BUCKNER’S RETREAT--A CITIZEN’S ADVENTURE--GEN. BURNSIDE;

HIS WELCOME; HIS EXPEDITION--CUMBERLAND GAP; ITS SURRENDER--AN

ECCENTRIC FARMER--MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN EAST TENNESSEE--FIGHT AT

BLUE SPRINGS--AFFAIRS AT AND NEAR LOUDON--BURNSIDE AND THE PEOPLE.

“Now is the winter of our discontent

Made glorious summer by this sun of York;

And all the clouds that lowered upon our house,

In the deep bosom of the ocean buried.”

SHAKS.: _Richard III._

Gen. Buckner had been for some time at Knoxville in command of the

military department of Kentucky, Middle and East Tennessee, North

Alabama and Southwest Virginia. His personal presence was commanding

and adapted to fill the popular notion of a grand army officer. The

attention of citizens was attracted and their criticism challenged by

his imposing appearance, as he rode without escort upon a splendid

charger through the principal street. His reputation was that of a

true gentleman and a soldier of superior merit. The public esteem had

been drawn to him, by his conduct at the fall of Fort Donelson, in

comparison with that of his companion-generals, especially Floyd.

Late in August, to the surprise of civilians, he departed westward

with his troops, crossed the Tennessee River, twenty-nine miles

distant and burned the railway bridge behind him. Something important

had happened or was expected, but the people in their ignorance could

only wonder as to its nature. The retreat left them unprotected from

roving, lawless bands, which the war had spawned. One of these came

into the town at night and despoiled stables of horses. A citizen was

roused from sleep by their near prowling. Hastening to his stable,

he came upon thieves who quickly decamped. They had brought to the

spot a valuable horse just stolen by them from a near stall. They

left it behind in the hurry of flight, but took away the horse whose

owner had alarmed them. Without intending a deed of disinterested

benevolence by interfering with the rogues’ work, he had saved his

neighbor’s property, losing his own. The next day steps were taken

to form companies of armed townsmen for defence against marauders.

Before any thorough organization to that end was made, an unexpected

event occurred.

[Illustration: MAJ. GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE.]

It was the 2nd of September, 1863. A worthy Swiss immigrant of the

town at the beginning of the war espoused the side of “the South”

with all the fervor of his naturally ardent disposition. His friend,

“native and ... to the manner born,” was a decided Union man, and

because of his sentiments, met with various troubles during the

Confederate supremacy at the place, but the true-hearted Switzer was

steadfast in his friendship, at the risk of losing _caste_ with his

own party. In the afternoon of the day, he had concluded a visit

to the Unionist and was walking homeward, when to his astonishment

he saw three men on horseback and in blue uniforms, four hundred

yards distant, galloping towards him as if for life. “Halt!” they

shouted. But not heeding their call, he turned and ran to the room of

his friend, crying out as he entered it, “The Yankees are coming!”

Instantly the family assembled, and as quickly the soldiers in blue

were at the door. They were advance riders of the army under Maj.

Gen. Burnside, and being on the lookout for hostile soldiers in the

town, they had pursued the Switzer in the belief that he was one.

Through an upper window his friend looked out upon the troopers in

the yard, but they saw in the company gathered above, the man whom

they had followed, and immediately one of them, with face white from

excitement, raised his pistol and pointing it upward at the group

exclaimed, “There he is now! Stand out of the way, ladies!” The

native citizen stepped forward and said. “Don’t shoot! I am a Union

man.” The pistol was at once lowered, but the soldiers kept their

ground and must needs be talked with. The Switzer bravely said in

his imperfect English, that he would go down stairs and give himself

up, but his companion would go before, and opening the front door,

he assured the eager troopers that the man they supposed to be a

Confederate soldier, was only a citizen at the house as a visitor.

They were at once pacified, made apologies and rode away.

The United States army had indeed arrived, and to look upon it, the

delighted Union man sought without delay the principal street. At the

end of two squares he found the way barred by a sentinel. In the halt

thus imposed upon all persons, he was entertained by the outspoken

displeasure of the company--chiefly ladies of the neighborhood--at

the incoming of the “Yankees.” One of them--a truly amiable, but

for the time deeply offended matron--gave free vent to her feelings

until the current of her thoughts was diverted at the suggestion of

a bystander, that the town might well be thankful for the protection

the United States army afforded it from robbers. Only a few nights

before they had stolen from her a valuable pony. This recollection

turned her resentment from “Lincoln and his hordes” to the source, as

she thought, of all present woes to the country. “If it had not been

for South Carolina,” she complained, “we should not have had all this

trouble!”

Gen. Burnside, on his arrival, established his headquarters in a

large mansion recently vacated by its owner, which stood near the

principal street and had a spacious front yard. From its covered

porch a large United States flag was lifted up, and in its drooping

folds the welcoming crowd wrapped themselves with beaming faces.

Expressions of joy from the people rung upon the air. They hailed the

General as their deliverer from a hated power and the oppression it

inflicted; and also as the representative of their beloved nation,

clothed with its authority and armed with its sword. Some of them

were so glad that they scarcely knew what to do with themselves. In

the overflow of their emotions they could have clasped him in their

arms, or, if opportunity had served, have drawn him in a carriage

with their own hands all over the town, that everybody, men, women

and children, might look upon him. Meanwhile he bore himself with

dignity and gentleness. Briefly he addressed them with words suited

to the occasion and full of friendly sympathy. Then, his attentive

hearers, elated with joy as with new wine, were eager for more

discourse. An adjournment was made to the court-house, and from its

front several citizens addressed the assembly in the open air.

The expedition of Gen. Burnside into East Tennessee had been

conceived in his mind at least six months before it was made. He

took command of the department of the Ohio, at Cincinnati, March

25, 1863. It included Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Kentucky

(excepting west of the Tennessee River), and “all of East Tennessee

that he might at any time occupy.” At that date Gen. Pegram, with a

formidable cavalry force, had marched from East Tennessee across the

Cumberland River, had driven the United States forces to the north

of Kentucky River, and had taken possession of Danville and its

vicinity. In a few days, by direction of Gen. Burnside, Gen. Gilmore

compelled Gen. Pegram to retreat; and afterwards at Somerset, with

the co-operation of Gen. Manson, commanding a part of Gen. Boyle’s

forces, completely defeated Pegram, and made the Cumberland River

again the dividing line. Central Kentucky was for the next month

free from hostile forces. Early in May, upon the organization of the

troops in that State into the Twenty-third army corps, under Gen. G.

L. Hartsuff, Gen. Burnside at once commenced to make preparations

for moving into East Tennessee. On June 3d he left Cincinnati to

take command in person of the troops which were organizing for that

movement, and which consisted of the two divisions of the Ninth army

corps under Gen. Wilcox and a portion of the Twenty-third corps

under Gen. Hartsuff. On arriving at Lexington, Ky., he received an

order to send the Ninth corps to Gen. Grant, and in consequence,

the expedition to East Tennessee had to be deferred. After Col.

Sanders returned to Kentucky from his raid, “preparations were still

continued” by the General, “in the hope of being able to spare

sufficient force to go into East Tennessee.” But they were disturbed

by the approach of the rebel General, John H. Morgan, with a large

cavalry force, about the 1st of July, on his memorable raid through

Kentucky and Indiana into Ohio, which resulted in his surrender near

Steubenville, and the capture altogether of 3,000 men--three-fourths

of the troops with which he had entered Kentucky. While the United

States soldiers were absent in pursuit of Morgan, a considerable

force of rebel cavalry under Col. John S. Scott, went from East

Tennessee, crossed the Kentucky River and approached the Ohio,

evidently with the view of assisting Morgan on his expected return.

They were soon driven out of Kentucky with heavy loss, by Col.

Sanders’ cavalry after it came back from the pursuit of Morgan.

Then preparations were again begun by Gen. Burnside for a movement

into East Tennessee. As the troops were worn and scattered by their

recent fatiguing services, it required much labor and time to perfect

the organization necessary for that purpose. He appointed Gen. J.

D. Cox to take charge in his absence of the District of Ohio, Gen.

Wilcox of the District of Indiana, and Gen. Boyle of Kentucky, all

of whom he considered “officers of great skill and determination.”

On August 10th, he left his headquarters at Cincinnati to join the

column that was to march into East Tennessee. It consisted of the

Twenty-third army corps, commanded by Gen. Hartsuff, and on the 20th

was located as follows, viz.: White’s division at Columbia, Ky.;

Hascall’s division at Stamford; Carter’s division at Crab Orchard;

Graham’s cavalry at Glasgow; and Woolford’s cavalry at Somerset.

As ordered, Gen. Hartsuff moved his commands as follows: Hascall’s

division to Kingston, Tenn., by way of Somerset, Chitwood, Huntsville

and Montgomery; White’s division from Columbia to Montgomery, Tenn.,

by way of Creelsboro and Albany, Ky., and Jamestown, Tenn.; Graham’s

cavalry to join White by way of Burksville, Albany and Jamestown; and

Woolford’s cavalry brigade to guard the supply and ammunition trains

that were with Hascall’s division. Carter’s cavalry brigade, which

Gen. Burnside’s headquarters accompanied, was to move by way of Mt.

Vernon, London and Williamsburg, Ky., over the Jellico Mountains

to Chitwood, Huntsville, Montgomery and Kingston, Tenn., except

such portions as might be detached. These forces were directed to

meet at such times and places as not to interfere with each other’s

movements; and the whole work was performed with wonderful promptness

and accuracy, considering the great difficulties in the way, of

steep, rugged mountains, bad roads and short forage.

At Williamsburg, a cavalry force under Col. Byrd, of the 1st

Tennessee Regiment, was detached for the purpose of making a

demonstration on Knoxville, by way of Big Creek Gap, and at

Montgomery a cavalry force was detached with orders to pass through

Winter’s Gap and occupy Knoxville. The main body of the command moved

on the direct road to Kingston, which point the advance reached on

the 1st of September. Col. Foster arrived at Knoxville September 2nd,

captured several engines and cars, which he sent up the railroad

to Morristown, Greeneville and near Jonesboro, and took also large

quantities of supplies. Little resistance was met with by the Federal

troops, throughout their entire march from Kentucky--the enemy in all

cases retreating before them. Their main body, with Gen. Burnside

in person, moved forward from Kingston and reached Knoxville on the

3rd. In his opinion, “nothing could be better than the conduct of

the officers and men of the Twenty-third corps; from the time it

left Kentucky, their labors were most difficult, but were performed

with the greatest accuracy and efficiency.” The mountainous route

by which the army traveled was long and fatiguing, but it was the

only one possible. At the end of the journey the army was, he said,

“in the midst of friends;” it “found the people generally loyal and

disposed to do all in their power for its comfort and welfare.” At

the same time it was more than two hundred miles from the Ohio River,

and one hundred and fifty miles from the nearest point where the

mountains and ridges that traverse Southeastern Kentucky give place

to the fertile and garden-like “blue-grass region.” From beyond those

highlands, supplies for the army must be transported in wagons drawn

by mules, whose mongrel nature, hardy as it is, was so unequal to

the roughness and toil it had to bear in the work of transportation,

that the number of their dead bodies lying on sides of the road over

the mountains might be named Legion. It was currently estimated,

as aggregating from first to last, ten thousand. Although the army

occupied Knoxville and other important points in East Tennessee, it

had not exclusive possession of that region. The great body of the

population was friendly, but there were hostile troops in several

directions.

Before leaving Kentucky, Gen. Burnside had organized a division of

new troops under Col. De Courcy, to move down upon the north side of

Cumberland Gap, and if possible, occupy that position. On his own

arrival at Knoxville, he learned that the Gap was still occupied by

the enemy. He directed Gen. Shackelford to proceed to its south side,

and if within his power, capture the garrison. Gen. Shackelford on

arriving there, communicated with Col. De Courcy on the north side

by courier, and ascertained that the position was too strong to be

carried by the small force under his command. Gen. Burnside, upon

being informed of this fact, started at once for the Gap, with Col.

Gilbert’s brigade, and after a march of 60 miles in 53 hours, reached

it on September 9th. Dispositions were made to assault the place,

but before the next morning, he demanded of Col. Frazer, who was in

command of the garrison, that he should surrender. The demand was

complied with, and nearly 2,500 men were delivered over to the United

States, together with all the material and armament of the fort.

Shackelford’s and Gilbert’s brigades returned to Knoxville, and Col.

De Courcy’s division (then under command of Col. Lemert) was left as

a garrison at the Gap.

As the Commander-in-chief was drawing nigh to that place on the

9th, with Gilbert’s brigade, he was given an illustration, somewhat

extravagant in its manner, of the joy inspired among the loyal people

of East Tennessee by his coming, and of the respectful affection they

had for him personally.

An eccentric farmer, son of a learned judge at Knoxville, resided in

the autumn of 1863, near the Gap. Amusing stories are yet current

of his unaffected oddities. He was a man of much simplicity of

character, of high, impulsive temper, of great frankness, a warm and

steadfast friend, a strong hater, quick to speak his mind, and in his

earlier mature years, a ready fighter. It is related of him, that

having once quarreled with a neighbor who bore the not uncommon name

of John Smith, he contracted sometime afterwards a bodily illness

that brought him nigh to death’s door. Some of his friends advised,

in view of the probability that his end was at hand, that he should

be reconciled with his enemy. To this he consented, and accordingly

John Smith was sent for, and without delay, arrived. The two

adversaries “made friends”--shook hands and parted in strong doubt

of another meeting between them on earth. But the sick man reflected

that he might get well, and in his great candor, he called out from

the bed to his former enemy, who was about leaving the room: “I say.

Smith! you understand. This is all very well if I die; but if I get

well, it goes for nothing!”

He was a Union man during the war, from the crown of his head to

the soles of his feet. Nothing else could have been expected of one

who was accustomed to espouse a cause with his whole soul, who had

always been an intense Whig in politics, and whose love of country

was both unalloyed and fervent. Hearing that the Commander-in-chief

of the United States army was drawing near Cumberland Gap, he went

forth to meet him, and falling down upon his knees in the highway,

he expressed aloud to the General, by words and gestures, his

thankfulness, love and joy. It was with some astonishment, mingled

with gratification, that Gen. Burnside witnessed this exhibition

of patriotic feeling, to which he made a kindly response. And

afterwards, whenever others told of the incident, his amused memory

would light up his face with a broad smile, which was instantly

restrained, as if by a feeling of respect for the honest enthusiasm

that had expressed itself so oddly at the Gap. He seemed to think

that the occurrence had its serious as well as its funny side.

Before leaving Cumberland Gap, he received the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS 21ST ARMY CORPS,

CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 10, 1863, 2 A. M.

MAJ. GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE,

Commanding Department of Ohio--Tennessee River:

SIR--I am directed by the General commanding the Department of

the Cumberland to inform you that I am in full possession of this

place, having entered it yesterday at 12 M. without resistance.

The enemy has retreated in the direction of Rome, Ga., the last

of his force, cavalry, having left a few hours before my arrival.

At daylight I made a rapid pursuit with my corps, and hope that

he will be intercepted by the center and right, the latter of

which was at Rome. The General commanding department requests

that you will move down your cavalry and occupy the country

recently covered by Col. Minty, who will report particulars to

you, and who has been ordered to cross the river.

(Signed) T. L. CRITTENDEN,

For Maj. Gen. Commanding.

This information relieved Gen. Burnside from all apprehension

concerning Gen. Rosecrans. It also fixed his determination to occupy

all the important points above Knoxville, and if possible, reach the

Salt Works near Abingdon, Va. Sufficient forces were left at Kingston

and Loudon. Col. Byrd, who was stationed at Kingston, was ordered to

occupy Athens, and if possible, Cleveland, thus communicating with

the cavalry of Gen. Rosecrans, as requested in the above dispatch,

and as directed in another soon afterwards received from Gen. Halleck

at Washington, as follows:

Hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains, the line of the

Holston River, or some point (if there be one) to prevent access

from Virginia; and connect with Gen. Rosecrans, at least with

your cavalry.

A heavy force under the Confederate General Jones, was then holding

points in the upper part of East Tennessee Valley, which, by the

above order, Gen. Burnside was to occupy. Col. Foster’s brigade

had been doing excellent service in keeping that force in check.

Gen. Hartsuff was directed to send at once all his infantry (except

Gilbert’s brigade), and also Woolford’s cavalry up the valley. Col.

Carter’s cavalry brigade was already well advanced in that direction.

On the 16th, at night, Gen. Burnside received another dispatch from

Gen. Halleck, sent on the 13th. It read:

It is important that all the available forces at your command be

pushed forward into East Tennessee; all your scattered forces

should be concentrated there; move down your infantry as rapidly

as possible towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans.

Early on the morning of the 17th, Burnside sent orders by telegraph

for the Ninth corps and all other available troops then in Kentucky,

to join him at once. He also gave instructions for all the troops

then in upper East Tennessee and not in presence of the enemy, to

retrace their steps down the valley towards Rosecrans. The same

day he received another telegram from Halleck, dated the 14th, as

follows:

There are several reasons why you should reinforce Rosecrans with

all possible dispatch. It is believed the enemy will concentrate

to give him battle; you must be there to help him.

Burnside then repeated his order concerning the troops up the valley.

Having already started to take command of them in person, and

efficiently to promote the purpose of their movement, he proceeded

beyond Jonesboro to near the Watauga River. When arrived at the

extreme advance of his command, he saw no way of extricating it from

its situation, except by attacking the enemy’s position at Watauga

bridge. A cavalry brigade under Col. Foster was sent around on the

morning of the 23rd, to threaten the enemy’s rear, who on that night

burnt the bridge and evacuated the position. Immediately Burnside set

in motion all the United States troops, except a small portion of

cavalry, on the way to aid and relieve Rosecrans. The following day

he returned to Knoxville.

His movements were watched from Richmond. On the day when he received

Halleck’s telegram of the 14th, a close observer at that city wrote:

“It is said the enemy is evacuating East Tennessee, concentrating, I

suspect, for battle with Bragg.”[32]

It may easily be seen that it was impossible that the obedience

promptly given by Burnside to Halleck’s order, could avail in helping

Rosecrans, as intended. The United States troops, which were in

the upper country of East Tennessee, according to instructions

before given to Burnside, were from 150 to 200 miles distant from

Chicamauga, where Rosecrans was to do battle, and they could not

travel so far in the very short time before that battle began,

even if they were moved towards the spot as rapidly as possible.

Afterwards, when Rosecrans had established himself in Chattanooga,

many dispatches passed between Halleck and Burnside, in reference

to the latter’s going to strengthen and assist Rosecrans, and

some misunderstandings occurred in regard to the purport of those

dispatches. Gen. Burnside, in his report to the War Department, gives

the underlying reason. He says: “I was averse to doing what would

in any way weaken our hold in East Tennessee, and he (Halleck) was

anxious lest Rosecrans should not be able to hold Chattanooga. He

(Rosecrans) was not disturbed at Chattanooga, and we held our ground

in East Tennessee, so that what occurred in no way affected the

result.”

By the 30th of September, the whole of the Ninth army corps

arrived, numbering about 6,000 men. Previous to that date, Gen.

White’s division had been sent to Loudon, Col. Woolford’s cavalry

had reinforced Col. Byrd, and they were instructed to connect with

Rosecrans’ cavalry; Gen. Carter held Bull’s Gap, which was then the

most advanced position of the United States troops up the valley,

and Col. Haskell was in support at Morristown. Many of the men were

suffering from want of clothing, for there was great difficulty

in getting sufficient supplies across the mountains, and the

temperature of the air was frosty. On October 5th, Gen. Wilcox

arrived at Cumberland Gap with four new regiments of Indiana troops.

He was ordered to Morristown, and thence to Bull’s Gap, and to him

Col. Haskin’s brigade was directed to report from Morristown. Gen.

Burnside had determined to push his advance farther up the valley,

and with this purpose he sent the Ninth corps, under Brig. Gen., R.

B. Potter, in that direction, together with all the cavalry under

Gen. Shackelford, except Byrd’s and Woolford’s brigades. A junction

of all these forces was made at Bull’s Gap, where Gen. Burnside

arrived in person on the 9th, and on the following morning an

advance movement was ordered. At Blue Springs, between Bull’s Gap

and Greeneville, the enemy was found in heavy force and in a strong

position between the wagon road and the railway to Greeneville. The

United States cavalry occupied him in skirmishing until late in the

afternoon. Col. Foster was sent, with instructions to establish

his brigade in the rear of the enemy, on the line over which the

latter would be obliged to cross in retreating, and at a point near

Rheatown. An attack from the front was delayed until sufficient time

had passed, probably for those instructions to be fulfilled. After

5 P. M., Gen. Ferrero’s division of Gen. Potter’s command, moved

forward in the most dashing manner, driving the enemy from his first

line, and compelled him to retreat that night. Gen. Burnside pursued

early in the morning, driving his foes again beyond the Watauga

River, where he directed the United States cavalry to hold them.

Col. Foster’s brigade met with serious difficulties upon its special

errand, chiefly in rough roads, and did not reach its intended point

of establishment in the rear ground and check the enemy in his

retreat by night on the 9th, but it joined the pursuing forces next

morning.[33] The cavalry was left in the advance, supported by Col.

Raskin’s brigade of infantry at Jonesboro, Gen. Wilcox was left at

Greeneville, and the Ninth corps returned to Knoxville.

Nothing of importance occurred in the region of this fight until the

1st of November, when the outposts at Kingsport and Blountville were

driven in, and in consequence the road from Kingsport to Rogersville

was left unguarded. A heavy force of the enemy under Gen. S. Jones

moved down that road, surprised a brigade of United States cavalry

under Col. K. Garrard at Rogersville, and completely routed it. Col.

Garrard, with his shattered forces, retreated to Morristown, and as

the strength of the force which attacked him was unknown to Gen.

Burnside, he prudently directed Gen. Wilcox to fall back to Bull’s

Gap and hold that position. From that time until the 17th of the

month, operations were confined to cavalry fighting, skirmishing and

foraging.

West of Knoxville, on the south side of the Tennessee River, below

Loudon, the enemy were very active during the early part of October.

On the 19th of that month, Gen. Burnside had directions to report

to Gen. Grant, commanding Division of Mississippi, concerning the

situation and operations of his forces. This he did, and at the

same time sent a flag of truce through Col. Woolford’s lines,

whose headquarters were at Philadelphia, Tenn. The enemy’s cavalry

took advantage of the flag, made an attack upon Col. Woolford, and

captured from 300 to 400 of his men and some mountain howitzers. On

the 28th, the forces at Loudon were moved to the north side of the

Tennessee River, and the pontoon bridge was taken up and transported

to Knoxville. There it was thrown across the Tennessee, and proved of

immense service during the siege. The indications at that date were

that Bragg was sending a considerable force against Burnside. The

latter reinforced Kingston with Col. Mott’s brigade of infantry, left

Gen. White and his command at Loudon, and posted Gen. Potter with the

Ninth corps at Lenoir’s, about five miles east of Loudon. All the

available cavalry force at Knoxville was thrown on the south side

of the Tennessee River, with instructions to guard it down to the

junction of Little Tennessee and Tennessee rivers opposite Lenoir’s.

And in order to enable the United States forces to communicate with

each other, Gen. Potter was instructed to build a pontoon bridge

over the Tennessee just above the mouth of the Little Tennessee.

That was done with great expedition, under superintendence of Col.

O. E. Babcock. Some correspondence was carried on between Generals

Grant, Halleck and Burnside as to the proper points to be occupied in

East Tennessee, and a visit to Burnside’s headquarters followed from

Col. Wilson, of Grant’s staff, by order of his chief, accompanied by

Hon. Chas. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War. Burnside gave them

his reasons in full for desiring to hold Knoxville in preference

to Kingston. They concurred with him in that conclusion. They all

agreed it would be proper to recommend that both places be held, if

possible, but certainly Knoxville. At that date it was definitely

known that Longstreet was moving against Burnside.

Sometime before. Gen. Shackelford had been ordered to report from

upper East Tennessee at Knoxville, to take command there of all the

United States cavalry, and on the approach of Longstreet, Haskin’s

brigade was ordered to that place. This left Gen. Wilcox, with his

new division, with some newly recruited North Carolinians, and also

Foster’s division of cavalry, composed of Graham’s and Garrard’s

brigades, in the country above Knoxville. The whole command in that

region, though it consisted of good men, was in bad condition, for

want of almost everything that was needful. Burnside, when he learned

certainly that Longstreet was advancing towards him, directed Wilcox

to arrange for the march of his command to Cumberland Gap, in the

event telegraphic communication between him and Gen. Burnside’s

headquarters should be broken. On that night, November 16, it was

cut off, at the same time that the siege of Knoxville was about to

begin.

The United States Army under Gen. Rosecrans had been saved on the

20th of September by the firmness of Gen. Thomas. It was then shut

up in Chattanooga by Gen. Bragg, who reported to Richmond that he

expected its “speedy evacuation” of that place, “for want of food and

forage.” Whether Bragg thought that, as he said, he held his enemy

at his mercy, and therefore could weaken his own force for a distant

purpose, or whether, as Gen. Grant thought probable, the movement

of troops to that end was ordered by Jefferson Davis, in default of

his endeavor to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg and

Longstreet, a heavy force, including cavalry, was detached from

Bragg’s army and sent under Longstreet to capture Burnside.[34]

The United States General who was the intended victim of that

undertaking was not blind to the possibility that his military

occupation of East Tennessee would shortly be brought to an end by

a hostile force from the southwest. The bare thought of such an

event deeply grieved him, not only as a disaster to the Federal

Government, but also as a great calamity to the Union people of East

Tennessee. A short time before Longstreet’s march upon Knoxville

began, Burnside in private conversation with a citizen-friend, spoke

with strong feeling of the possibility that he would not be able

to continue to those people his protection. Had they known that not

without reason he thought such a contingency existed, they would

have been as deeply pained as he was, at the idea of his departure.

He had been among them only about ten weeks, but in that brief time

he had won their hearts. He had made good use of his opportunities

to establish the military supremacy of the United States, to extend

its area in East Tennessee and to hold it in possession against

enemies. He had also, without putting aside the dignity becoming his

official position, manifested the kindly sympathy he sincerely felt

for the Union people who had suffered for more than two years under

Confederate rule, he had permitted a healthy freedom of approach

to his presence, had listened when at leisure to their griefs and

wrongs, had now and then, as his public duties permitted, partaken

of their hospitalities, and in a word, had in various ways showed

that he was their friend. Everywhere he was looked upon with respect

and affection. Even among citizens, at heart hostile to the flag he

defended, were some who admired and liked him. They could not well be

otherwise than content with him, for he visited them with no needless

severities and his judgments were reasonable. His native magnanimity

of soul would have lifted him above seeking revenge for his private

wrongs suffered from the conflict, but he had no such wrongs. The

bitterness and animosities which he found the war had produced among

neighbors in East Tennessee, met with no favorable response from his

own heart. He could not fully understand them, and spoke of their

existence with mingled surprise and regret.

In the same connection he related that in his recent march from

Kentucky, he pitched his tent at the base of the mountain on the

Tennessee side. By and by, a number of the mountaineer Unionists

gathered not far off, and soon, a few of them stepped out from the

company and approached the General as a committee. They said to him,

“General, we want you to give us authority to go down here into

the valley, and carry off the hogs and cattle we find there.” This

request the General refused in few words. “But,” they said, “that is

the way they have treated us. And we will not make any mistakes. We

will carry off only the cattle and hogs of the rebels.” The General

replied, “That is not my way of carrying on war;” and the petitioners

withdrew very much disappointed.

General Burnside was buoyant with hope that the Union of the States

would not only be preserved, but be stronger and better from the

triumphant conclusion of the war in its behalf. He once expressed

an opinion, which did not show great sagacity as a worldly-wise

politician. It was the reflection, at the moment, of his own

generous, magnanimous spirit, rather than a deliberate conclusion

of his judgment from careful weighing of future possibilities. In

conversation with a few friends concerning the ruinous losses by

citizens generally of personal property, he ventured the prediction

that “when the war is over, everybody will be paid.”

Business at headquarters was necessarily alive and active. Gen.

Samuel P. Carter was Provost Marshal General. His office was a place

of many affairs, and was visited by various applicants and their

friends. There were citizens from near at hand and from a distance,

who wanted to take the oath of allegiance to the United States,

some of whom had been before of doubtful loyalty, and who desired,

when they had passed through that process of political purgation,

to carry home with them an official certificate of their title to

the protection by the United States Government, of their persons and

property. There were men from town and country who wanted to “go

North” on business, or to get away from the strife, its turmoils,

uncertainties and troubles, or to leave for Europe. There were men

under arrest to be dealt with, or recusant citizens to be allowed

the freedom of the town on parole or to be held as hostages, and

others still who invited by their belligerent and dangerous speech

a compulsory trip for themselves to Camp Chase or preferably into

the Confederate lines. Then there were men of known loyalty, who

had complaints to make, or claims to be adjusted, or this, that

or something else done or prevented or remedied. Citizens who had

influence with the military authorities, were kept busy in the

service of their Confederate friends and neighbors. To some of such

workers it was a labor of love, but probably not to all. Instances

occurred, if rumor were true, of ten dollars each being charged for

introducing people to General Carter. There were also orders to

issue, official reports to receive, and troops to be sent here and

there. Sometimes Union citizens, overflowing with patriotic zeal, had

news to tell at headquarters, which they thought to be important.

If now and then their zeal outstripped their discretion, it was

little wonder that the information they carried should be lacking

in accuracy. No doubt such instances of unintentional but hurtful

mistakes were rare, for military life and discipline forbade their

repetition even by civilians. One case was visited with a reprimand

to the offender that was justly severe upon him and amusing to others.

Late one night a strong partisan interrupted the serenity at

headquarters with the exciting statement that the Confederates had

marched upon Maryville, in Blount County, 17 miles distant, where

were only a few United States soldiers. Quickly a sufficient body

of cavalry were summoned from their beds into their saddles and

dispatched to repel the invading force. The alarm proved to be false;

no Confederate troops were found in or near Maryville. The next day.

General Burnside, on meeting his deceived and deceiving informant,

said to him, “Mr. ----, you bring me a great deal of news. Now, I

don’t want you to bring me any more, for _the average is bad_!”

It has been said that all religion springs from a sense of

dependence upon the Supreme Being. We may doubt the truth of the

postulate, but certainly all true religion includes that sense,

and it had its proper place in the mind of Gen. Burnside. While

his personal and social conduct in East Tennessee was upright and

blameless, he was not forgetful of Him who “doeth according to His

will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth,”

and to thoughts of whom, the responsibilities of his position, its

difficulties and dangers tended to move him more actively. He once

said to a friend during that period, that he “loved sometimes to

retire to his own room, there to lift up his mind and heart to God,

and to give himself to quiet meditation.” The impression made by his

conversations, his reverent participation in the worship of God and

hearing of the gospel, was that without much knowledge of religious

doctrine, he accepted in faith the truth of Christianity.

Immediately after his first arrival at Knoxville, Burnside sent to a

certain Christian minister, who because of his Union sentiments had

been excluded for precisely two years from his pastoral charge, a

written invitation to fill the unoccupied pulpit of his own church

on the next Sunday. The request was complied with--the day being

the 6th of September. By one of those curious coincidences which

have been noticed to occur at different times in similar religious

services, when the portion of the Psalms for that morning came to be

responsively read, the minister unexpectedly to himself and to the

surprised attention of some in the congregation who knew all the

facts of the case, began, as prescribed, with the words:

“I will magnify thee, O Lord; for thou hast set me up, and not made

my foes to triumph over me.”

The loyal mountaineers of Tennessee · 第 13 / 20 章