SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY AND PRESENT CONDITION OF TRIPOLI, WITH SOME
ACCOUNTS OF THE OTHER BARBARY STATES. NO. XI.--(Continued.)
The inertness of the French since their rupture with Algiers, had
induced Hussein to treat their threats with contempt, and he by no
means anticipated the extreme measures to which they were about to
resort. The certainty of their intentions to attack him, however,
effected no change in his resolve to maintain the position which he
had assumed; all offers of mediation or intercession were rejected,
and the approach of the storm only rendered him the more determined
to brave its violence. He was left to meet it alone. The mission of
Tahir Pasha was the only effort made by the Sultan in his behalf;
Great Britain had in vain offered its mediation to both Parties, and
did not appear disposed to interfere farther between them; the other
European Powers remained neutral. The Sovereigns of Tripoli and Tunis
were summoned to aid in defending the common cause of Islamism; but
the appeal was in both instances vain; Yusuf dreaded the vengeance of
the French, on account of the support which he had unwillingly
afforded to the accusations against their Consul, and was by no means
inclined to give them additional cause for enmity, or to involve
himself in expenses from which he could anticipate no immediate
benefit. The Bey of Tunis had long been devoted to the interests of
France; far from aiding the Dey, he had agreed to furnish his enemies
with provisions, and even if required to make a diversion in their
favor, by invading the Algerine Province of Constantina which lay
contiguous to his own dominions.
Hussein was thus reduced entirely to his own resources; an
examination of the means at his disposal will show that he was unable
to make any effectual resistance, and that without the interposition
of some occurrence beyond the control of man, "_the well defended
city_" must have fallen into the hands of the French.
The Algerine territory extends in length on the Mediterranean, about
six hundred miles; its breadth or the distance between that Sea and
the Desert no where exceeds one hundred miles, and is generally much
less. Shaler gives sixty as the average breadth, which would make the
superficial extent of the country about thirty-six thousand square
miles. A considerable portion of this territory consists of rugged
and almost inaccessible mountains, many of which are covered with
eternal snow; there are however vast tracts of the finest land, which
with proper attention would be rendered very productive, and even the
rude and careless mode of cultivation pursued by the inhabitants
enabled them frequently to export great quantities of wheat to
Europe. One of these tracts in the immediate vicinity of Algiers
called the plain of Metija is said to be of unparalleled fertility;
it is not less than a thousand square miles in extent, and is covered
with springs which by a judicious direction of their waters, might be
made the sources of health and plenty, instead of producing as they
now do only useless and insalubrious marshes.
The country was divided into three provinces, separated by lines
drawn from points on the coast southwardly to the Desert; each of
these divisions was governed by a Bey who though appointed from
Algiers, was almost absolute within his own territories. The Eastern
province bordering on Tunis was the largest and the most populous; it
took its name from its capital Constantina, the ancient Cirta, a
strong town situated about sixty miles from the Sea, and said to have
more inhabitants than Algiers. The principal ports of this district
are Bugia and Bona; upon its coast near Bona were the _African
Concessions_ which in part led to the difficulties with France.
Tittery the middle province is the smallest, its surface not being
more than sixty miles square; it however contains the capital, and is
more populous in proportion to its extent, than any other part of the
Regency. The Western province lying contiguous to Morocco has been
called Oran, Tlemsen and Mascara, accordingly as its Bey resided in
either of the principal cities which bear those names. In 1830 the
seat of government was Oran or more properly Warran, a seaport town
near the frontiers of Morocco which possesses a fine harbor and may
be rendered very strong; the other ports of this province Arzew,
Mostaganem and Shershell though nearly deserted, are well situated
both for commerce and defence. Indeed the western territories of
Algiers are considered the most delightful and the richest of
Northern Africa; in addition to their grain, fruits and mines, they
are also famous for the beauty and spirit of their horses which are
sent in great numbers to the East, as well as to Spain and the South
of France. The population appears likewise to be of a better
character than that of other parts of the Regency; there are fewer
Arabs or Kabyles, and a great portion of the inhabitants are the
descendants of that noble race of Moors, who were expelled from Spain
in the fifteenth and two succeeding centuries.
It is difficult to form any estimate of the number of inhabitants in
the Algerine territories. Shaler in 1824 considered it less than a
million; from the results of the latest inquiries made by the French
it amounted in 1830 to seven hundred and eighty thousand, who were
thus classed.
_Moors_, the industrious and most civilized class,
inhabiting the cities or engaged in agriculture, 400,000
_Kabyles_ or _Berbers_ who probably descend from the
aboriginals of the country; they are still a wild and
intractable race, living in the mountains and frequently
plundering or levying contributions on the industrious
part of the population, 200,000
_Arabs_ who live in tents, on the borders of the Desert
from the produce of their flocks and herds, or are
employed in transporting goods through the country, 120,000
{214} _Turkish Soldiers_, generally from the coasts and
islands of the Archipelago, 8,000
_Koul-ogleis_ or children of Turks by native women. 32,000
--------
780,000
Assuming this estimate as correct, it will be found by comparison
with the tables of population of other countries, that the Algerine
Dominions did not probably contain more than a hundred and twenty
thousand men capable of bearing arms; and when it is considered that
these are spread over an extensive territory, which is mountainous
and almost destitute of roads, it would be unreasonable to expect
that more than half that number could be collected at any one point,
even supposing the existence of universal patriotism and devotion to
the Government. Such feelings may have operated on the Moors, but
they could scarcely have produced much effect on the Kabyles and
Arabs, who according to the estimate form more than two-fifths of the
population; and although promises of high pay and the prospect of
plunder might induce many from each of those classes and from among
the wanderers of the Great Desert, to aid in the defence of the
country, yet little dependance could be placed upon these irregular
bands, when opposed to the disciplined troops of France.
Hussein's experience may probably have led him to some such
conclusions, but every act of his reign served to shew that they
would have been ineffectual towards inducing him to make concessions,
even were it not too late. After the rejection of the overture which
had been wrung from him by his friend Halil, nothing less than an
immense pecuniary sacrifice on his part would have contented the
French; and policy as well as pride forbade this sacrifice, for he
was well aware that a peace purchased on such terms would have cost
him his life. Moreover he was evidently a thorough fatalist; two
expeditions against Algiers had already failed completely, although
taking into consideration its defences at the several periods, the
chances of its fall were in both those cases greater than under the
existing circumstances. "God is great and good, and the Sea is
uncertain and dangerous," was his observation to the Captain of the
British frigate Rattlesnake; a storm such as occurs on that coast in
every month of the year, might in a few hours have dissipated the
forces of his enemies, or have thrown so large a number of them into
his hands as prisoners, that their restoration would have been deemed
an equivalent for peace.
On the 14th of May an incident took place which was calculated to
confirm the Dey in such expectations. During a violent gale from the
northeast, the Aventure and the Siléne two brigs which formed part of
the blockading squadron were on that night driven ashore near Cape
Bengut, about sixty miles east of Algiers. The officers and crews of
these vessels in number about two hundred persons, finding escape
impossible, and conceiving that any attempt at defence would only
insure their destruction, determined to march along the coast towards
Algiers, and to surrender themselves as prisoners of war to the first
party with which they might meet. They were soon observed and
surrounded by a troop of Kabyles whom they however induced to believe
that they were English, and that a large sum would be paid for their
safe delivery at Algiers. Under this persuasion the Barbarians were
conducting them towards the city, when their course was arrested by
the sudden rise of a river which it was necessary to cross; during
the delay thus occasioned, it was discovered that they were French,
and the greater part of them were immediately sacrificed to the fury
of the Kabyles. The heads of one hundred and nine of these
unfortunate persons were brought into Algiers on the 20th of May,
which having been purchased by the Dey at the regular price, were
exposed on the walls of the Casauba; they were however afterwards
surrendered for burial. The survivors, eighty-nine in number, were
confined in the dungeons of the castle; they were in other respects
treated by Hussein with as much lenity as the circumstances would
permit, and they received the kindest attentions from the Consuls of
Foreign Powers who remained in the place.
Hussein did not however trust entirely to Providence for the safety
of his capital; on the contrary he made every preparation in his
power for its defence. In the city and its environs every man was
enrolled, and the slightest expression indicative of fear or mistrust
as to the result of the contest, was punished by death. From the
Provinces, the Beys were ordered to bring to Algiers all whom they
could enlist or force into the service, and immense sums from the
public treasury were placed at their disposal for the purpose. By
these means he speedily assembled a very large force, the exact
amount of which it is impossible to ascertain; the French historians
state it to have been seventy-two thousand; other accounts perhaps
equally worthy of credit make it much less. The number of what may be
termed regular troops appears to have been precisely twenty-two
thousand, viz. five thousand Turks or Janissaries, seven thousand
Koul-ogleis, and ten thousand Moors; to these the French accounts add
ten thousand Kabyles, and forty thousand others, principally Arab
horsemen. Major Lee the Consul of the United States, who made very
particular observations and inquiries on the subject, and whose
statements appear to be entirely free from prejudice, does not
consider that the irregular forces exceeded thirty thousand. Whatever
may have been the fact with regard to the whole number of the
Algerine troops, it is certain that a large and important portion
were never brought into action in the open field, having been
necessarily retained to garrison the city and the fortifications in
its immediate vicinity.
When the preparations of the French had removed all doubts as to
their views with regard to Algiers, apprehensions were entertained by
the Governments of Christian nations for the safety of their Consuls
and citizens in the country, who, it was feared, might in a moment of
excitement be sacrificed to the fury of the inhabitants. Ships were
accordingly sent by several Powers for the purpose of bringing away
their respective agents and others who might be thus endangered; but
the commander of the blockading squadron having been strictly ordered
to allow no communication with Algiers prevented several of these
vessels from entering the harbor. An Austrian frigate and a Spanish
brig were thus ordered off, and the latter afterwards shewing some
disposition to enter was fired on. A Sardinian frigate was permitted
to send a boat on shore, to bring off the family of the Consul who
had protected {215} the interests of France during the difficulties
between the two countries, and several other vessels contrived to
enter and leave the port unnoticed. Commodore Biddle who commanded
the squadron of the United States in the Mediterranean, sent the
sloop of war Ontario to Algiers to bring off the American Consul
General and his family, in case they should be inclined to go. The
Ontario appeared at the entrance of the bay on the 4th of April,
accompanied by the frigate Constellation whose captain it is said was
ordered to engage any French ship which should attempt to oppose
their entrance. As no such attempt was made, it is needless to
inquire whether these instructions were really given, or to examine
whether they would have been in concordance with the received usages
of national intercourse. Major Henry Lee the American Consul General,
with his family and the Vice Consul, determined to remain; the ladies
of the Neapolitan and Spanish Consuls were however at his request
received on board the Ontario and carried to Mahon.
Before the departure of the American ships the British frigate
Rattlesnake arrived, bringing despatches to the Consul Mr. St. John,
who had been ordered by his Government to remain; on leaving the
harbor she was spoken by one of the blockading ships and her captain
was informed that he would not be permitted again to enter. This fact
having been communicated to the Consul, the Rattlesnake sailed for
Malta whence she soon returned bearing a letter from Admiral Malcolm
to the French Commander, in consequence of which she was allowed to
enter Algiers on condition however that her stay should be limited to
a week.
The Consuls who remained in Algiers found it necessary to adopt
measures for their own safety. The representative of Great Britain
having a large country house at a short distance from the city, out
of the probable line of operations, determined merely to retire to it
on the approach of the conflict: those of the United States, Denmark,
Spain and Naples agreed to establish themselves together at a villa
situated on a height overlooking the place, and capable of being
rendered sufficiently strong, to resist such attacks as might have
been expected. The Dey afforded them every facility in his power, for
the fortification and defence of their residence; they were allowed
to enlist some Janissaries, and the other Christians with some Jews
of the town having joined them, they mustered nearly two hundred men
who were tolerably well supplied with arms and ammunition. They
accordingly removed on the 26th of May to the _Castle_ as it was
termed, on which the flag of the United States was immediately
hoisted, Major Lee having by unanimous vote, been elected
Commander-in-Chief.
On the 3d of June a part of the fleet which conveyed the French army
of invasion was seen off the coast near Algiers. An immediate attack
was anticipated, and the Dey prepared to resist it, although not more
than half the troops which he expected had then arrived. The
fortifications on the bay were well provided and manned, so that the
place might be considered secure on that side; the batteries of the
Mole were directed by the younger Ibrahim the Minister of the Marine,
and the charge of the Emperor's Castle had been committed to the
Hasnagee or Treasurer in whom Hussein placed the utmost confidence.
The Dey remained secluded within the walls of the Casauba, from which
his messengers were seen constantly flying in every direction. As it
was anticipated that the landing would be attempted on the shore west
of Algiers, the Aga Ibrahim marched out with a part of his forces and
encamped on a plain near the sea, distant about ten miles in that
direction. A violent gale from the eastward however dispersed the
French ships, and nothing more was seen of them for some days; at
length information was brought from a certain source that the whole
fleet had retired to Palma.
On the 9th, Achmet Bey of Constantina who had been anxiously
expected, made his appearance with his troops principally Arabs and
Kabyles; the contingents of Oran and Tittery did not however arrive
until some days afterwards, and the whole force at that time under
Ibrahim's immediate command probably amounted to twenty thousand, of
whom at least one half were Arab horsemen.
On the morning of the 13th the sea near Algiers was again covered
with ships under the white flag of France. The sky was cloudless, a
fresh breeze from the northeast permitted the vessels to move at
pleasure along the coast, and as they passed majestically almost
within gun shot of the batteries, the Algerines felt that the day of
trial was come.
In order to understand the operations of the French against Algiers,
some knowledge of the surrounding country and of the relative
bearings and distances of important points, is necessary. It is
however difficult to convey such information without the aid of maps;
our geographical language is limited, and wants precision, and even
where it may be sufficient for the purpose, few readers are disposed
to study the details with the care requisite to comprehend them
fully.
In the account of Lord Exmouth's attack upon Algiers in 1816, the
city was described as standing on the western shore, and near the
entrance of a bay about fifteen miles in diameter; it must now be
considered as situated on the north-eastern side, and near the
extremity of a tongue of land, which projects from the African
continent northwardly into the Mediterranean. This tongue is about
twelve miles in its greatest breadth, where it joins the continent,
and ten in length from north to south; the surface of its northern
portion is irregular, and in some places rugged, traversed by ridges
and ravines, and rising in the centre into a lofty peak, called
Jibbel Boujereah; southward from this mountain the inequalities
gradually disappear, and the extensive plain of the Metijah succeeds.
The northernmost point or termination of the tongue is a bold
promontory called Ras Acconnatter, or Cape Caxine, which is four
miles west by north of Algiers; following the shore nine miles
south-west from this cape, we find a small peninsula, rather more
than a mile in length, and less than a mile in breadth, extending
westwardly into the sea. This peninsula is high and rocky at its
extremity, but low and sandy at the neck which unites it to the main
land; the sea around it affords safe anchorage for vessels, and its
shores as well as those in its vicinity, present a clear beach, free
from rocks or other impediments to approach. On its highest point
stood a small fort, called by the Spanish traders _Torreta Chica_, or
_the little tower_, on which were mounted or rather placed, four
light pieces of cannon {216} more curious from their antiquity than
useful. Against the tower was built a Marabout or chapel, containing
the tomb of Sidi Ferruch, a saint held in great veneration by the
Algerines, and from whom the peninsula takes its name. A battery of
stone with twelve embrasures had been also erected on the shore near
the end of the peninsula, in order to prevent hostile vessels from
anchoring, but on the approach of the expedition it was dismantled
and abandoned.
Eastwardly from Sidi Ferruch the land rises almost imperceptibly for
three miles, presenting a sandy plain partially covered with aloes,
cactus, and evergreen shrubs, at the termination of which is an
irregular plateau called Staweli, where the shepherds of the country
were in the habit of encamping. Farther on a valley called
Backshé-dere separated this plateau from the south-western side of
Jibbel Boujereah, along which a road originally formed by the Romans
conducted to the walls of the Emperor's castle, within a mile of
Algiers. The whole distance by this way from Sidi Ferruch to the city
is twelve miles, over a country "gently undulating and perfectly
practicable for artillery or any species of carriage," which is also
abundantly supplied with fresh water from numerous springs.
These and other circumstances had induced Shaler[1] in 1825 to
recommend Sidi Ferruch as the most advantageous point for the
disembarkation of a force destined to act against Algiers; and
although the intentions of the Commander in Chief of the French
expedition were kept profoundly secret, yet it was generally
supposed, even before his departure from Toulon, that he would
attempt a landing there.
[Footnote 1: _Sketches of Algiers, political, historical, and civil,
&c. by William Shaler, American Consul General at Algiers. Boston:
1826._
Our country has produced few works displaying greater originality and
soundness of views than this; its subject has caused it to be
overlooked in the United States, but in France when circumstances
gave value to all information relative to Algiers, its merits were
soon recognized, and it was translated by order of the Government for
the benefit of the officers engaged in the expedition. His remarks on
the power, resources, and policy of the Algerine Government, or
rather upon its weakness, its want of means, and the absurdity of its
system, were calculated to dispel many of the illusions with regard
to it which the mutual jealousy of the great European nations had so
long contributed to maintain; and it is impossible to examine his
observations as to the proper disposition of a force destined to act
against the city, in conjunction with the statement of the plans
pursued by the French, without conceiving that in all probability
those plans were the result of his suggestions. At page 51 he says:
"The several expeditions against Algiers, in which land forces have
been employed, have landed in the bay eastward of the city; this is
evidently an error, and discovers unpardonable ignorance of the coast
and topography of the country, for all the means of defence are
concentrated there. But it is obvious that any force whatever might
be landed in the fine bay of Sidi Ferruch without opposition; thence
by a single march they might arrive upon the heights commanding the
Emperor's castle, the walls of which, as nothing could prevent an
approach to them, might be scaled or breached by a mine in a short
time. This position being mastered, batteries might be established on
a height commanding the Casauba, which is indicated by the ruins of
two wind-mills, and of a fort called the Star, which the jealous
fears of this Government caused to be destroyed for the reason here
alleged, that it commanded the citadel and consequently the city. The
fleet which had landed the troops would by this time appear in the
bay, to distract the attention of the besieged, when Algiers must
either surrender at discretion or be taken by storm."
Many other passages might be quoted in illustration of Mr. Shaler's
sagacity; so many of his speculations respecting the future destinies
of Barbary have been already confirmed, that we are warranted in
entertaining hopes of the fulfilment of his prediction, that it will
again be inhabited by a civilized and industrious race.]
The French ships after their dispersion by the storms of the first
days of June retreated to Palma where they remained until the 10th.
On that day the first and second divisions of the fleet again sailed
for the African coast; the third division composed almost entirely of
merchant vessels, containing the battering artillery, provisions and
materials which would not be needed until the disembarkation had been
effected, was to have sailed on the 12th, but it was detained until
the 18th by adverse winds.
As the distance between Palma and Algiers is only two hundred miles,
and the wind was favorable at an early hour on the 13th of June, the
first divisions of the armament, with all the troops on board, were
collected in front of the city, and every eye was fixed on the
Admiral's ship, in anxious expectation of the signal which was to
indicate the scene of the first operations. The Algerines, although
they expected that their enemies would land at some point westward
from the city, yet did not choose to subject themselves to the hazard
of a surprise, by leaving the place undefended; the batteries which
lined the bay were therefore all manned, and the greater part of the
moveable forces were disposed in their vicinity, so as to resist any
sudden attack. At eight o'clock, the signal was given by the French
Admiral, and his ships were soon under full sail towards the west;
they rounded Cape Caxine, and then changing their course to the
southward, no doubt was left respecting the intention of the
commander to attempt a landing at Sidi Ferruch.
As the fleet drew near the spot which had been selected for the
disembarkation of the troops, preparations were made for immediate
action in case it should be necessary. The heavy armed ships advanced
in front, slowly and in order of battle, ready to pour a destructive
fire upon any forces or works of their opponents as soon as
discovered within its reach. At ten o'clock, they were opposite the
extremity of the peninsula, and it became evident that no precautions
had been taken by the Algerines, which were likely to prove effectual
in preventing the descent. No fortifications had been erected on Sidi
Ferruch, in addition to the shore battery near the point, and the
turret on the hill, both of which were deserted; indeed nothing less
than the strongest works and the most scientific defence could have
rendered it tenable, when surrounded by such a fleet. On the main
land, a division of the Algerine army, supposed to consist of twelve
thousand men, were encamped near a spring of water about two miles
from the neck of the peninsula; between them and the sea were erected
two batteries,[2] armed with nine pieces of cannon {217} and two
howitzers, which had been removed from the fort on Sidi Ferruch. Arab
horsemen enveloped in their white cloaks were seen collected in
groups on the beach, or galloping among the bushes on the plain
between it and the encampment. Nothing however betokened any
disposition on the part of the Africans, to meet the invaders at the
water's edge.
[Footnote 2: Any fortification defended by artillery, and even the
spot occupied by artillery, is called a _battery_. These temporary
defences are formed by throwing up earth to the height of three or
four feet, so as to form a wall or _parapet_ for the protection of
the cannon and men; where this cannot be done, logs, barrels or sacks
filled with earth, &c. are employed. At New Orleans the American
lines of batteries were principally formed of bales of cotton.
In order to protect an army from sudden attacks, _entrenchments_ are
made on the side on which they are apprehended; they consist of
ditches, the earth from which is thrown up within.
In besieging a fortress, the object is to erect batteries on
particular points as near as possible to the place, and to render the
communications to and between them safe. For these purposes, a ditch
is commenced at a distance from the fortress, and is carried on in a
slanting direction towards it, the laborers being protected by the
earth thrown up on the side next the place. When these _approaches_
have been carried as near as requisite, another ditch called _a
parallel_ is dug in front or even around the fortress, batteries
being constructed on its line where necessary. Sometimes another
parallel is made within the outer one. Along these ditches the
cannon, ammunition, troops, &c. are conveyed in comparative safety to
the different batteries.]
Nevertheless Bourmont displayed here his determination to leave
nothing to chance, the success of which could be assured by caution
in the previous arrangements. The largest ships with the first and
second divisions of troops on board, passed around the extremity of
the peninsula, and anchored opposite its southwestern side on which
it had been resolved that the first descent should be made; a steamer
and some brigs entered the bay east of Sidi Ferruch, and took
positions so as to command the shore and the neck of the peninsula,
over which they could pour a raking fire, in case an attack should be
made by the Algerine forces at the moment of disembarkation. Some
rounds of grape shot from the steamer dispersed the Arabs who were
collected on the shore of the bay; the fire was returned from the
batteries; but it had no other effect than to wound a sailor on board
the Breslau, and it ceased after a few broadsides from the brigs.
By sunset the vessels were all anchored at their appointed positions,
and preparations were instantly commenced for the disembarkation. The
broad flat bottomed boats destined to carry the troops to the shore
were hoisted out; each was numbered, and to each was assigned a
particular part of the force, so arranged that the men might on
landing, instantly assume their relative positions in the order of
battle.
All things being ready, at three o'clock on the morning of the 14th
of June, the first brigade of the first division under General
Berthezéne, consisting of six thousand men, with eight pieces of
artillery were on their way to the shore, in boats towed by three
steamers. They were soon perceived by the Algerines, who commenced a
fire on them from their batteries; it however produced little or no
effect, and was soon silenced by the heavier shot from the steamers
and brigs in the eastern bay. At four the whole brigade was safely
landed, and drawn up on the south side of the peninsula near the
shore battery, which was instantly seized. In a few minutes more, the
white flag of France floated over the _Torreta Chica_; a guard was
however placed at the door of the Marabout, in order to show from the
commencement, that the religion of the inhabitants would be respected
by the invaders.
By six o'clock the whole of the first and second divisions were
landed together with all the field artillery, and the
Commander-in-chief of the expedition was established in his head
quarters near the Marabout, from which he could overlook the scene of
operations. General Valazé had already traced a line of works across
the neck of the peninsula, and the men were laboring at the
entrenchments; they were however occasionally annoyed by shots from
the batteries, and it was determined immediately to commence the
offensive. General Poret de Morvan accordingly advanced from the
peninsula at the head of the first brigade, and having without
difficulty turned the left of the batteries, their defenders were
driven from them at the point of the bayonet; they were then pursued
towards the encampment, which was also after a short struggle
abandoned, the whole African force retreating in disorder towards the
city.
This success cost the French about sixty men in killed and wounded;
two or three of their soldiers had been taken prisoners, but they
were found headless and horribly mutilated near the field of battle.
The loss of the Algerines is unknown, as those who fell were
according to the custom of the Arab warfare carried off. Nine pieces
of artillery and two small howitzers by which the batteries were
defended, being merely fixed on frames without wheels, remained in
the hands of the invaders.
While the first brigade was thus employed, the disembarkation of the
troops was prosecuted with increased activity, and as no farther
interruption was offered, the whole army and a considerable portion
of the artillery, ammunition and provisions were conveyed on shore
before night. It was not however the intention of the commanding
general immediately to advance upon Algiers; his object was to take
the city, and he was not disposed to lose the advantage of the
extraordinary preparations, which had been made in order to insure
its accomplishment. The third division of the fleet containing the
horses and heavy artillery had not arrived; unprotected by cavalry
his men would have been on their march exposed at each moment to the
sudden and impetuous attacks of the Arabs, and it would have been
needless to present himself before the fortresses which surround the
city, while unprovided with the means of reducing them. He therefore
determined to await the arrival of the vessels from Palma, and in the
mean time to devote all his efforts to the fortification of the
peninsula, so that it might serve as the depository of his _materiel_
during the advance of the army, and as a place of retreat in case of
unforeseen disaster. The first and second divisions under Berthezéne
and Loverdo were accordingly stationed on the heights in front of the
neck of the peninsula, from which the Algerines had been expelled in
the morning; in this position they were secured by temporary
batteries and by _chevaux de frise_ of a peculiar construction,
capable of being easily transported and speedily arranged for use.
The third division under the Duke D'Escars remained as a corps of
reserve at Sidi Ferruch, where the engineers, the general staff and
the greater part of the non-combatants of the expedition were also
established. Some difficulties were at first experienced from the
limited supply of water, but they were soon removed as it was found
in abundance at the depth of a few feet below the surface.
On the 15th, it was perceived that the Algerines had established
their camp about three miles in front of the advanced positions of
the French, at a place designated by the guides of the expedition as
Sidi Khalef; between {218} the two armies lay an uninhabited tract,
crossed by small ravines, and overgrown with bushes, under cover of
which the Africans were enabled to approach the outposts of the
invaders, and thus to annoy them by desultory attacks. Each Arab
horseman brought behind him a foot soldier, armed with a long gun, in
the use of which those troops had been rendered very dexterous by
constant exercise; when they came near to the French lines, the sharp
shooter jumped from the horse and stationed himself behind some bush,
where he quietly awaited the opportunity of exercising his skill upon
the first unfortunate sentinel or straggler who should appear within
reach of his shot. In this manner a number of the French were
wounded, often mortally by their unseen foes; those who left the
lines in search of water or from other motives were frequently found
by their companions, without their heads and shockingly mangled. As
the Arabs were well acquainted with the paths, pursuit would have
been vain as well as dangerous, and the only effectual means of
checking their audacity was by a liberal employment of the artillery.
The labors of the French were interrupted on the morning of the 16th,
by a most violent gale of wind from the northwest, accompanied by
heavy rain. The waves soon rose to an alarming height, threatening at
every moment to overwhelm the vessels, which lay wedged together in
the bays; several of them were also struck by lightning, and had one
been set on fire nothing could have prevented the destruction of the
whole fleet. Fortunately at about eleven o'clock, the wind shifted to
the east and became more moderate; the waves rapidly subsided, and it
was found that only trifling injuries had been sustained by the
shipping. Admiral Duperré however did not neglect the warning, and he
immediately issued orders that each transport vessel should sail for
France as soon as she had delivered her cargo; the greater part of
the ships of war, were at the same time commanded to put to sea, and
to cruise at a safe distance from the coast, leaving only such as
were required to protect the peninsula.
On the 17th and 18th, some of the vessels arrived from Palma bringing
a few horses and pieces of heavy artillery, but not enough to warrant
an advance of the army. On the 18th, four Arab Scheicks appeared at
the outposts, and having been conducted to the commander of the
expedition, they informed him that the Algerines had received large
reinforcements, and were about to attack him on the succeeding day.
Bourmont however paid no attention to their declarations, and gave no
orders in consequence of them, although it was evident from the
increase in the number of their tents that a considerable addition
had been made to the force of his enemies.
On the day after the French had effected their landing, all the
Algerine troops except those which were necessary to guard the city
and the fortifications in its vicinity, were collected under the
Aga's immediate command, at his camp of Sidi Khalef; on the morning
of the 18th, the contingent of Oran also arrived, accompanied by a
number of Arabs who had joined them on the way. Thus strengthened,
and encouraged by the inactivity of the French, which he attributed
probably to want of resolution, Ibrahim determined to make a
desperate attack upon their lines, calculating that if he could
succeed in throwing them into confusion, it would afterwards be easy
to destroy them in detail. For this purpose he divided his army into
two columns, which are supposed to have consisted of about twenty
thousand men each; the right column under Achmet Bey of Constantina
was destined to attack Loverdo's division, which occupied the left or
northern side of the French position; the other column was to be led
by Ibrahim in person, with Abderrahman Bey of Tittery as his
lieutenant, against the right division of the invaders, under
Berthezéne.
At day break on the morning of the 19th, the Algerines appeared
before the lines of the French, who were however found drawn up, and
ready to receive them; the attack was commenced by the Arab cavalry
and Moorish regular troops intermingled, who rushed forward rending
the air with their cries, and endeavored to throw down the _chevaux
de frise_. The French reserved their fire, until the assailants were
near, and then opening their batteries poured forth a shower of grape
shot, which made great havoc in the ranks of the Algerines. Nothing
daunted however, the Moors and Arabs continued to pull up, and break
down the _chevaux de frise_, until they had gained entrances within
the lines; the action was then continued hand to hand, the keen sabre
of the African opposed to the rigid bayonet of the European. In this
situation there was less inequality between the parties engaged, and
the issue of the combat became doubtful. Berthezéne's division
however repulsed its assailants, and kept them at bay; that of
Loverdo was wavering when Bourmont appeared on the ground, followed
by a part of the reserved corps. He soon restored order in the ranks,
and having formed Loverdo's division together with the reserve into a
close column, he ordered them to advance against their opponents.
Achmet's forces were immediately driven into a ravine where the
artillery of the French having been brought to bear upon them, they
were after a few ineffectual attempts to regain the height, thrown
into disorder. Ibrahim's men seeing this also lost their courage, and
the route of the Africans became general. The French had on the field
only seventeen horses which were attached to the artillery; as the
Algerines could not therefore be pursued very closely they were
enabled to form again in front of their camp at Sidi Khalef; but they
were likewise driven from this position, and followed for some
distance beyond it, where the ground being less favorable for
cavalry, great numbers of their men fell into the power of the
invaders. Bourmont had issued orders to spare the prisoners, but his
troops irritated at the barbarities which had been so frequently
committed on their companions, disregarded the injunction and put to
death nearly every Algerine whom they could reach. A few Arabs who
were made prisoners, on being asked respecting the forces and
intentions of their General, haughtily bade the French to kill and
not to question them. The number of French slain in this engagement
according to the official reports, amounted to fifty-seven, and of
wounded to four hundred and sixty-three; but little reliance can be
placed on the exactness of Bourmont's published accounts, and there
is good reason for supposing that his loss was much more serious. The
destruction of life among the Algerines was very great; they also
left their camp of four hundred tents, together {219} with a large
supply of ammunition, sheep and camels, in the hands of their
enemies.
The results of this action were highly important to the French, and
indeed it rendered their success certain. The Arabs began to
disappear, and the Turkish and Moorish soldiers retreated to the
city, from which it was not easy to bring them again to the field;
symptoms of insurrection among the populace also manifested
themselves. In this situation, it has been considered possible that
had Bourmont advanced immediately upon Algiers, the Dey would have
found it necessary to capitulate; there was however no reason to
believe that the disaffection would extend to the garrisons of the
fortresses, and the city could not have been reduced while they held
out.
On the 23d the vessels from Palma began to come in; the horses were
immediately landed, and two small corps of cavalry were added to the
troops encamped at Sidi Khalef. The fortifications of the peninsula
were also by this time completed, a line of works fifteen hundred
yards in length, having been drawn across the neck, and armed with
twenty-four pieces of cannon; by this means the whole of the land
forces were rendered disposable, as two thousand men principally
taken from the _equipage de ligne_[3] of the fleet, were considered
sufficient for the security of the place. The provisions, &c. were
all landed, and placed within the lines, in temporary buildings which
had been brought in detached pieces from France; comfortable
hospitals were likewise established there, together with bakeries,
butcheries, and even a printing office, from which the _Estafette d'
Alger_, a semi-official newspaper, was regularly issued. The
communications between Sidi Ferruch and the camp, were facilitated by
the construction of a military road, defended by redoubts and
blockhouses placed at short intervals on the way.
[Footnote 3: A certain number of young men are annually chosen by lot
in France, for the supply of the army and navy, in which they are
required to serve eight years. Those intended for the navy, are sent
to the dockyards, where they are drilled as soldiers, and instructed
in marine exercises for some time before they are sent to sea. The
crew of each public vessel must contain a certain proportion of those
soldier sailors, who are termed the _equipage de ligne_.]
The Algerines encouraged by the delay of the French, rallied and made
another attack upon them at Sidi Khalef early on the morning of the
24th. On this occasion but few Arabs and Kabyles appeared, and the
action was sustained on the side of the Algerines, almost entirely by
the Turks, the Moorish regulars, and the militia of the city, who had
been at length induced to leave its walls. The assailants were spread
out on a very extended line, which was immediately broken by the
advance of the first division of the French army, with a part of the
second in close column. A few discharges of artillery increased the
confusion; the Algerines soon began to fly, and were pursued to the
foot of the last range of hills which separated them from the city.
On the summit of one of these heights, were the ruins of the Star
Fort, which had been some years before destroyed, "because it
commanded the Casauba, and consequently the city;" it was however
used as a powder magazine, and the Africans on their retreat, fearing
lest it should fall into the hands of the French, blew it up. The
loss of men in this affair was trifling on each side. The only French
officer dangerously wounded was Captain Amédée de Bourmont, the
second of four sons of the General who accompanied him on the
expedition; he received a ball in the head, while leading his company
of Grenadiers to drive a body of Turks from a garden in which they
had established themselves, and died on the 7th of July.
While this combat was going on, the remainder of the vessels from
Palma, nearly three hundred in number, entered the bay of Sidi
Ferruch. Their arrival determined Bourmont not to retire to his camp
at Sidi Khalef, but to establish his first and second divisions five
miles in advance of that spot, in the valley of Backshé-dere, so that
the road might be completed, and the heavy artillery be brought as
soon as landed to the immediate vicinity of the position on which it
was to be employed. The third division was distributed between the
main body and Sidi Ferruch, in order to protect the communications.
This advantage was however dearly purchased; for during the four days
passed in this situation, the French suffered greatly from the
Algerine sharp-shooters, posted above them on the heights, and from
two batteries which had been established on a point commanding the
camp. In this way Bourmont acknowledges that seven hundred of his men
were rendered unfit for duty within that period; he does not say how
many were killed.
The necessary arrangements having been completed, and several
battering pieces brought up to the rear of the French camp, Bourmont
put his forces in motion before day on the 29th of June. Two brigades
of d'Escar's division which had hitherto been little employed, were
ordered to advance to the left and turn the positions of the
Algerines on that side; on the right the same duty was to be
performed by a part of Berthezéne's division, while Loverdo was to
attack the enemy in the centre. They proceeded in silence, and having
gained the summits of the first eminences unperceived, directed a
terrible fire of artillery upon the Algerines, who having only small
arms to oppose to it were soon thrown into confusion and put to
flight. The Moors and Turks took refuge in the city and the
surrounding fortifications, while the Arabs and Kabyles escaped along
the seashore on the southeast, towards the interior of the country.
The French had now only to choose their positions from investing
Algiers, which with all its defences lay before them. Besides the
Casauba and batteries of the city, they had to encounter four
fortresses. On the southeastern side near the sea, half a mile from
the walls was Fort Babazon, westward of which, and one mile southward
from the Casauba, was the Emperor's castle, presenting the most
formidable impediment to the approach of the invaders. This castle
was a mass of irregular brick buildings, disposed nearly in a square,
the circumference of which was about five hundred yards. From the
unevenness of the ground on which it was built, its walls were in
some places sixty feet high, in others not more than twenty; they
were six feet in thickness, and flanked by towers at the angles, but
unprotected by a ditch or any outworks, except a few batteries which
had been hastily thrown up on the side next the enemy. In the centre
rose a large round tower of great height and strength, forming the
keep or citadel, under which were the vaults containing the powder.
On its ramparts were mounted {220} one hundred and twenty large
cannon, besides mortars and howitzers, and it was defended by fifteen
hundred Turks well acquainted with the use of artillery, under the
command of the Hasnagee or Treasurer who had promised to die rather
than surrender. As it overlooked the Casauba and the whole city, it
was clear that an enemy in possession of this spot and provided with
artillery, could soon reduce the place to dust; but it was itself
commanded in a like manner, by several heights within the distance of
a thousand yards, which were in the hands of the French. The next
fortress was the Sittit Akoleit or _Fort of twenty-four hours_, half
a mile north of the city; and lastly a work called the English fort
was erected on the seashore near Point Pescada, a headland about
one-third of the way between Algiers and Cape Caxine. The object of
the French was to reduce the Emperor's castle as soon as possible,
and in the mean time to confine the Algerines within their walls as
well as to prevent them from receiving succors. For the latter
purposes, it was necessary to extend their lines much more than would
have been compatible with safety, in presence of a foe well
acquainted with military science; trusting however to the ignorance
and fears of his enemies, Bourmont did not hesitate to spread out his
forces, even at the risk of having one of his wings cut off by a
sudden sortie. Loverdo in consequence established his division on a
height within five hundred yards of the Emperor's castle; Berthezéne
changed his position from the right to the centre, occupying the
sides of mount Boujereah the heights immediately west of the city;
while d'Escars on the extreme left, overlooked the Sittit Akoleit,
and the English fort. These positions were all taken before two
o'clock in the day.
On the right of Berthezéne's corps, was the country house in which
the foreign consuls were assembled under the flag of the United
States. As its situation gave it importance, General Achard who
commanded the second brigade determined to occupy it, and even to
erect a battery in front of it. Major Lee the _Commander in Chief_ of
the consular garrison, formally protested against his doing either,
maintaining that the flag which waved over the spot rendered it
neutral ground. The French General did not seem much inclined to
yield to this reasoning; but when it was also alleged that the
erection of the battery would draw the fire of the Algerine forts
upon the house, in which a number of females were collected, as well
as the representatives of several nations friendly to France, he
agreed to dispense with the execution of that part of his order, but
his soldiers were quartered on the premises, and his officers
received at the table of the consuls. The latter were, as might have
been expected, polished and gallant men; the soldiers were very
unruly, and by no means merited the praises which have been bestowed
on their moderation and good conduct, in the despatches of their
commander and the accounts of the historians.
The night of the 29th passed without any attack on the lines of the
French. Before morning the engineers under Valazé had opened a trench
within five hundred yards of the Emperor's castle, and various
country houses situated in the vicinity of that fortress, were armed
with heavy pieces and converted into batteries. As soon as this was
perceived from the castle, a fire was opened upon the laborers; but
they were already too well protected by the works which had been
thrown up, and few of the balls took effect. A sortie was next made
by the garrison, and for a moment they succeeded in occupying the
house of the Swedish Consul, in which a French corps had been
stationed; they were however immediately driven out, and forced to
retire to their own walls.
In order to divert the attention of the Algerines during the progress
of the works, false attacks were made on their marine defences by the
ships of the French squadron. On the 1st of July Admiral Rosamel,
with a portion of the naval force, passed across the entrance of the
bay, and opened a fire on the batteries, which after some time was
returned. Not the slightest damage appears to have been received by
either party, the French keeping, as the Admiral says, "à grande
portée de canon," that is to say, _nearly_ out of the reach of the
fire of the batteries; one bomb is stated to have fallen in the
vicinity of Rosamel's ship. The effect of this movement not answering
the expectations of the French, as it did not induce the Algerines to
suspend their fires on the investing force, it was determined that a
more formidable display should be made. Accordingly on the 3d,
Admiral Duperré made his appearance before the place, with seven sail
of the line, fifteen frigates, six bomb vessels, and two steamers.
The frigate Belloné which led the way, approached the batteries and
fired on them, as she passed with much gallantry; the other ships
kept farther off, and as they came opposite the Mole, retired beyond
the reach of the guns, where they continued for some hours, during
which each party poured tons of shot harmless into the sea. As the
Admiral states in his despatch, "none of his ships suffered any
apparent damage, or notable less of men," except from the usual
"bursting of a gun on board the Provence, by which ten were killed
and fifteen wounded."
The high character for courage and skill which Admiral Duperré has
acquired by his long and distinguished services, precludes the
possibility of imagining that there could have been any want of
either of those qualities on his part in this affair. Indeed he would
have been most blameable had he exposed his ships and men to the fire
of the fortresses which extend in front of Algiers, at a period when
the success of the expedition was certain. The "moral effect" of
which the Admiral speaks in his despatch, might have been produced to
an equal or greater extent, by the mere display of the forces in the
bay; the only physical result of the cannonade, was the abandonment
of some batteries, on Point Pescada, which were in consequence
occupied by d'Escar's forces. The whole attack if it may be so
termed, was probably only intended to repress any feelings of
jealousy which may have arisen in the minds of the naval officers and
men, by thus affording them at least an ostensible right to share
with the army the glory of reducing Algiers.