or can dwell in every sensible object, and often a
very great and mighty one in an insignificant thing.
This spirit he does not consider as bound fast and
unchangeably to the corporeal thing it dwells in, but it
has only its usual or principal abode in it.”[72]
Space permitting I might add evidence furnished by Sir Alfred Lyall,
who, in his valuable papers published in the _Fortnightly Review_
years ago on religion in India, has given the results of observations
made there. Writing to me from the North-West provinces under date
August 1, in reference to the controversy between Mr. Harrison and
myself, he incloses copies of a letter and accompanying memorandum
from the magistrate of Gorakhpur, in verification of the doctrine
that ghost-worship is the “chief source and origin” of religion. Not,
indeed, that I should hope by additional evidences to convince Mr.
Harrison. When I point to the high authority of Dr. Tylor as on the
side of the ghost-theory, Mr. Harrison says—“If Dr. Tylor has finally
adopted it, I am sorry.” And now I suppose that when I cite these
further high authorities on the same side, he will simply say
again “I am sorry,” and continue to believe as before.
In respect of the fetichism distinguishable as nature-worship,
Mr. Harrison relies much on the Chinese. He says:—
The case of China is decisive. There we have a religion
of vast antiquity and extent, perfectly clear and well
ascertained. It rests entirely on worship of Heaven,
and Earth, and objects of Nature, regarded as organized
beings, and not as the abode of human spirits.
Had I sought for a case of “a religion of vast antiquity and extent,
perfectly clear and well ascertained,” which illustrates origin from
the ghost-theory, I should have chosen that of China; where the
State-religion continues down to the present day to be an elaborate
ancestor-worship, where each man’s chief thought in life is to secure
the due making of sacrifices to his ghost after death, and where the
failure of a first wife to bear a son who shall make these sacrifices,
is held a legitimate reason for taking a second. But Mr. Harrison
would, I suppose, say that I had selected facts to fit my hypothesis.
I therefore give him, instead, the testimony of a bystander. Count
D’Alviella has published a _brochure_ concerning these questions on
which Mr. Harrison and I disagree.[73] In it he says on page 15:—
La thèse de M. Harrison, au contraire,—que l’homme
aurait commencé par l’adoration d’objets matériels
“franchement regardés comme tels,”—nous paraît
absolument contraire au raisonnement et à l’observation.
Il cite, à titre d’exemple, l’antique religion de la
Chine, “entièrement basée sur la vénération de la Terre,
du Ciel et des Ancêtres, considérés objectivement et
non comme la residence d’êtres immatériels.” [This
sentence is from Mr, Harrison’s first article, not
from his second.] C’est là jouer de malheur, car, sans
même insister sur ce que peuvent être des Ancêtres
“considérés objectivement,” il se trouve précisément que
la religion de l’ancien empire Chinois est le type le
plus parfait de l’animisme organise et qu’elle regarde
même les objets matériels, dont elle fait ses dieux,
comme la manifestation inséparable, l’enveloppe ou même
le corps d’esprits invisibles. [Here in a note Count
D’Alviella refers to authorities, notamment Tiele,
_Manuel de l’Histoire des Religions_, traduit par M.
Maurice Vernes, Liv. II, et dans la _Revue de l’Histoire
des Religions_, la _Religion de l’ancien empire Chinois_
par M. Julius Happel (t. IV. no. 6).]
Whether Mr. Harrison’s opinion is or is not changed by this array
of counter-opinion, he may at any rate be led somewhat to qualify
his original statement that “Nothing is more certain than that man
everywhere started with a simple lead worship of natural objects.”
I pass now to Mr. Harrison’s endeavor to rebut my assertion that he had
demolished a _simulacrum_ and not the reality.
I pointed out that he had inverted my meaning by representing as
negative that which I regarded as positive. What I have everywhere
referred to as the All-Being, he named the All-Nothingness. What answer
does he make when I show that my position is exactly the reverse of
that alleged? He says that while I am “dealing with transcendental
conceptions, intelligible only to certain trained metaphysicians,” he
is “dealing with religion as it affects the lives of men and women in
the world;” that “to ordinary men and women, an unknowable and
inconceivable Reality is practically an Unreality;” and that thus all
he meant to say was that the “Everlasting Yes” of the “evolutionist,”
“is in effect on the public a mere Everlasting No,” (p. 354). Now
compare these passages in his last article with the following passages
in his first article:—“One would like to know how much of the
Evolutionist’s day is consecrated to seeking the Unknowable in a devout
way, and what the religious exercises might be. How does the man of
science approach the All-Nothingness” (p. 502)? Thus we see that what
was at first represented as the unfitness of the creed considered as
offered to the select is now represented as its unfitness considered as
offered to the masses. What were originally the “Evolutionist” and the
“man of science” are now changed into “ordinary men and women” and “the
public;” and what was originally called the All-Nothingness has become
an “inconceivable Reality.” The statement which was to be justified is
not justified but something else is justified in its stead.
Thus is it, too, with the paragraph in which Mr. Harrison seeks to
disprove my assertion that he had exactly transposed the doctrines
of Dean Mansel and myself, respecting our consciousness of that
which transcends perception. He quotes his original words, which
were “there is a gulf which separates even his all-negative _deity_
from Mr. Spencer’s impersonal, unconscious, unthinkable Energy.” And
he then goes on to say “I was speaking of Mansel’s Theology, not of
his Ontology. I said “_deity_,” not the Absolute.” Very well; now
let us see what this implies. Mansel, as I was perfectly well aware,
supplements his ontological nihilism with a theological realism. That
which in his ontological argument he represents as a mere “negation
of conceivability,” he subsequently re-asserts on grounds of faith,
and clothes with the ordinarily-ascribed divine attributes. Which of
these did I suppose Mr. Harrison meant by “all-negative deity”? I was
compelled to conclude he meant that which in the ontological argument
was said to be a “negation of conceivability.” How could I suppose that
by “all-negative deity” Mr. Harrison meant the deity which Dean Mansel
as a matter of “duty” rehabilitates and worships in his official
capacity as priest. It was a considerable stretch of courage on the
part of Mr. Harrison to call the deity of the established church an
“all-negative deity.” Yet in seeking to escape from the charge of
misrepresenting me he inevitably does this by implication.
In his second article Mr. Harrison does not simply ascribe to me ideas
which are wholly unlike those my words express, but he ascribes to me
ideas I have intentionally excluded. When justifying my use of the
word “proceed,” as the most colorless word I could find to indicate
the relation between the knowable manifestations present to perception
and the Unknowable Reality which transcends perception, I incidentally
mentioned, as showing that I wished to avoid those theological
implications which Mr. Harrison said were suggested, that the words
originally written were “created and sustained;” and that though in the
sense in which I used them the meanings of these words did not exceed
my thought, I had erased them because “the ideas” associated with these
words might mislead. Yet Mr. Harrison speaks of these erased words as
though I had finally adopted them, and saddles me with the ordinary
connotations. If Mr. Harrison defends himself by quoting my words to
the effect that the Inscrutable Existence manifested through phenomena
“stands towards our general conception of things in substantially the
same relation as does the Creative Power asserted by Theology;” then I
point to all my arguments as clearly meaning that when the attributes
and the mode of operation ordinarily ascribed to “that which lies
beyond the sphere of sense” cease to be ascribed, “that which lies
beyond the sphere of sense” will bear the same relation as before to
that which lies within it, in so far that it will occupy the same
relative position in the totality of our consciousness: no assertion
being made concerning the mode of connexion of the one with the other.
Surely when I have deliberately avoided the word “create” to express
the connexion between noumenal cause and the phenomenal effect, because
it might suggest the ordinary idea of a creating power separate from
the created thing, Mr. Harrison was not justified in basing arguments
against me on the assumption that I had used it.
But the course in so many cases pursued by him of fathering upon
me ideas incongruous with those I have expressed, and making me
responsible for the resulting absurdities, is exhibited in the most
extreme degree, by the way in which he has built up for me a system
of beliefs and practices. In his first article occur such passages
as—“seeking the Unknowable in a devout way” (p. 502); can anyone “hope
anything of the Unknowable or find consolation therein?” (p. 503); and
to a grieving mother he represents me as replying to assuage her grief,
“Think on the Unknowable” (p. 503). Similarly in his second article
he writes “to tell them that they are to worship this Unknowable is
equivalent to telling them to worship nothing” (p. 357); “the worship
of the Unknowable is abhorrent to every instinct of genuine religion”
(p. 360); “praying to the Unknowable at home” (p. 376); and having
in these and kindred ways fashioned for me the observances of a
religion which he represents me as “proposing,” he calls it “one of
the most gigantic paradoxes in the history of thought” (p. 355). So
effectually has Mr. Harrison impressed everybody by these expressions
and assertions, that I read in a newspaper—“Mr. Spencer speaks of the
‘absurdities of the Comtean religion,’ but what about his own peculiar
cult?”
Now the whole of this is a fabric framed out of Mr. Harrison’s
imaginations. I have nowhere “proposed” any object of religion.” I have
nowhere suggested that anyone should “worship this Unknowable.” No line
of mine gives ground for inquiring how the Unknowable is to be sought
“in a devout way,” or for asking what are “the religious exercises;”
nor have I suggested that anyone may find “consolation therein.”
Observe the facts. At the close of my article “Religion; a Retrospect
and Prospect,” I pointed out to “those who think that science is
dissipating religious beliefs and sentiments” that whatever of mystery
is taken from the old interpretation is added to the new;” increase
rather than diminution being the result. I said that in perpetually
extending our knowledge of the Universe, concrete science “enlarges
the sphere for religious sentiment;” and that progressing knowledge
is “accompanied by an increasing capacity for wonder.” And in my
second article, in further explanation, I have represented my thesis
to be “that whatever components of this [the religious] sentiment
disappear, there must ever survive those which are appropriate to the
consciousness of a Mystery that cannot be fathomed and a Power that
is omnipresent.” This is the sole thing for which I am responsible.
I have advocated nothing; I have proposed no worship; I have said
nothing about “devotion,” or “prayer,” or “religious exercises,” or
“hope,” or “consolation.” I have simply affirmed the permanence of
certain components in the consciousness which “is concerned with that
which lies beyond the sphere of sense.” If Mr. Harrison says that this
surviving sentiment is inadequate for what he thinks the purposes of
religion, I simply reply—I have said nothing about its adequacy or
inadequacy. The assertion that the emotions of awe and wonder form
but a fragment of religion, leaves me altogether unconcerned: I have
said nothing to the contrary. If Mr. Harrison sees well to describe
the emotions of awe and wonder as “some rags of religious sentiment
surviving” (p. 358), it is not incumbent on me to disprove the fitness
of his expression. I am responsible for nothing whatever beyond the
statement that these emotions will survive. If he shows this conclusion
to be erroneous, then indeed he touches me. This, however, he does not
attempt. Recognizing though he does that this is all I have asserted,
and even exclaiming “is that all!” (p. 358) he nevertheless continues
to father upon me a number of ideas quoted above, which I have neither
expressed nor implied, and asks readers to observe how grotesque is the
fabric formed of them.
* * * * *
I enter now on that portion of Mr. Harrison’s last article to which
is specially applicable its title “Agnostic Metaphysics.” In this
he recalls sundry of the insuperable difficulties set forth by Dean
Mansel, in his _Bampton Lectures_, as arising when we attempt to
frame any conception of that which lies beyond the realm of sense.
Accepting, as I did, Hamilton’s general arguments, which Mansel applied
to theological conceptions, I contended in _First Principles_ that
their arguments are valid, only on condition that that which transcends
the relative is regarded not as negative, but as positive; and that
the relative itself becomes unthinkable as such in the absence of a
postulated non-relative. Criticisms on my reasoning allied to those
made by Mr. Harrison, have been made before, and have before been
answered by me. To an able metaphysician, the Rev. James Martineau, I
made a reply which I may be excused here for reproducing, as I cannot
improve upon it:—
Always implying terms in relation, thought implies that
both terms shall be more or less defined; and as fast
as one of them becomes indefinite, the relation also
becomes indefinite, and thought becomes indistinct. Take
the case of magnitudes. I think of an inch; I think
of a foot; and having tolerably-definite ideas of the
two, I have a tolerably-definite idea of the relation
between them. I substitute for the foot a mile; and
being able to represent a mile much less definitely, I
cannot so definitely think of the relation between an
inch and a mile—cannot distinguish it in thought from
the relation between an inch and two miles, as clearly
as I can distinguish in thought the relation between an
inch and one foot from the relation between an inch and
two feet. And now if I endeavor to think of the relation
between an inch and the 240,000 miles from here to the
Moon, or the relation between an inch and the 92,000,000
miles from here to the Sun, I find that while these
distances, practically inconceivable, have become little
more than numbers to which I frame no answering ideas,
so, too, has the relation between an inch and either of
them become practically inconceivable. Now this partial
failure in the process of forming thought relations,
which happens even with finite magnitudes when one of
them is immense, passes into complete failure when
one of them cannot be brought within any limits. The
relation itself becomes unrepresentable at the same
time that one of its terms becomes unrepresentable.
Nevertheless, in this case it is to be observed that
the almost-blank form of relation preserves a certain
qualitative character. It is still distinguishable as
belonging to the consciousness of extensions, not to the
consciousnesses of forces or durations; and in so far
remains a vaguely-identifiable relation. But now suppose
we ask what happens when one term of the relation
has not simply magnitude having no known limits,
and duration of which neither beginning nor end is
cognizable, but is also an existence not to be defined?
In other words, what must happen if one term of the
relation is not only quantitatively but also
qualitatively unrepresentable? Clearly in this case
the relation does not simply cease to be thinkable
except as a relation of a certain class, but it lapses
completely. When one of the terms becomes wholly
unknowable, the law of thought can no longer be
conformed to; both because one term cannot be present,
and because relation itself cannot be framed.... In
brief then, to Mr. Martineau’s objection I reply, that
the insoluble difficulties he indicates arise here,
as elsewhere, when thought is applied to that which
transcends the sphere of thought; and that just as when
we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations to the
Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to symbolize it
out of such materials as the phenomenal manifestations
give us; so we have simultaneously to symbolize the
connexion between this Ultimate Reality and its
manifestations, as somehow allied to the connexions
among the phenomenal manifestations themselves. The
truth Mr. Martineau’s criticism adumbrates, is that
the law of thought fails where the elements of thought
fail; and this is a conclusion quite conformable to
the general view I defend. Still holding the validity
of my argument against Hamilton and Mansel, that in
pursuance of their own principle the Relative is not at
all thinkable _as such_, unless in contradiction to some
existence posited, however vaguely, as the other term
of a relation, conceived however indefinitely; it is
consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which
thought inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not
only does the product of thought become a dim symbol
of a product, but the process of thought becomes a dim
symbol of a process; and hence any predicament inferable
from the law of thought cannot be asserted.[74]
Thus then criticisms like this of Mr. Martineau, often recurring in
one shape or other, and now again made by Mr. Harrison, do not show
the invalidity of my argument, but once more show the imbecility of
human intelligence when brought to bear on the ultimate question.
Phenomenon without noumenon is unthinkable; and yet noumenon cannot
be thought of in the true sense of thinking. We are at once obliged
to be conscious of a reality behind appearance, and yet can neither
bring this consciousness of reality into any shape, nor can bring into
any shape, its connexion with appearance. The forms of our thought,
moulded on experiences of phenomena, as well as the connotations of
our words formed to express the relations of phenomena, involve us in
contradictions when we try to think of that which is beyond phenomena;
and yet the existence of that which is beyond phenomena is a necessary
datum alike of our thoughts and our words. We have no choice but to
accept a formless consciousness of the inscrutable.
* * * * *
I cannot treat with fulness the many remaining issues. To Mr.
Harrison’s statement that it was uncandid in me to implicate him with
the absurdities of the Comtean belief and ritual, notwithstanding his
public utterances, I reply that whereas ten years ago I was led to
think he gave but a qualified adhesion to Comte’s religious doctrine,
such public utterances of his as I have read of late years, fervid
in their eloquence, persuaded me that he had become a much warmer
adherent. On his summary mode of dealing with my criticism of the
Comtean creed some comment is called for. He remarks that there are
“good reasons for declining to discuss with Mr. Spencer the writings
of Comte;” and names, as the first, “that he knows [I know] nothing
whatever about them” (p. 365). Now as Mr. Harrison is fully aware
that thirty years ago I reviewed the English version of those parts
of the Positive Philosophy which treat of Mathematics, Astronomy and
Physics; and as he has referred to the pamphlet in which, ten years
later, I quoted a number of passages from the original to signalize my
grounds of dissent from Comte’s system; I am somewhat surprised by this
statement, and by the still more emphatic statement that to me “the
writings of Comte are, if not the Absolute Unknowable, at any rate the
Absolute Unknown” (p. 365). Doubtless these assertions are effective;
but like many effective assertions they do not sufficiently recognize
the facts. The remaining statements in this division of Mr. Harrison’s
argument, I pass over: not because answers equally adequate with those
I have thus far given do not exist, but because I cannot give them
without entering upon personal questions which I prefer to avoid.