Buffon, in a page published in every “Cours de Littérature,” sings

a hosanna to cultivated Nature, and appears unable to find words

strong enough to express his horror of Nature in its savage state,

“brute” Nature as he calls it. At the present day, our impression is

precisely the reverse of this. We seek on almost inaccessible summits,

in the region of eternal snow, and in the very heart of hitherto

unexplored continents, a spot where man has not yet penetrated, and

where we may behold Nature in her inviolate virginity. We are stifled

by civilization, wearied out with books, newspapers, reviews, and

periodicals, letters to write and to read; railway travelling, the

post, the telegraph, and the telephone, devour time and completely

mince up one’s life; any solitude for fruitful reflection is quite out

of the question. Shall I find it, at least, among the fir-trees of

the Carpathians, or beneath the shade of the old oaks of the Balkans?

Industry is spoiling and soiling our planet. Chemical produce poisons

the water, the dross from different works and factories covers the

country, quarries split up the picturesque slopes of valleys, black

coal smoke dulls the verdant foliage and the azure of the sky, the

drainage of large cities turns our rivers into sewers, whence emerge

the germs of typhus. The useful destroys the beautiful; and this

is so general as at times to bring tears to the eyes. Have not the

Italians on the lovely Isle of Sta. Heléna, near to the public gardens

in Venice, erected works for the building of engines, and replaced

the ruins of a fourth-century church by chimneys, whose opaque smoke,

produced by the detestable bituminous coal of the Saar, would soon

leave a sooty trace on the pink marble of the Doge’s palace and on

the mosaics of St. Mark, just as we see them on St. Paul’s Cathedral

in London, so ugly covered with sticky streaks. It is true that the

produce of this industrial activity becomes condensed in revenue,

which enriches many families, and adds considerably to the list of the

bourgeois population inhabiting the capital. Here, on the banks of the

Rhine, these revenues are represented by villas and castles, whose

pseudo-Greek or Gothic architecture peeps out from among masses of

exotic trees and plants in the most sought-after positions, near to

Bonn, Godesberg, St. Goar or Bingen. Look! there is an immense feudal

castle, beside which Stolzenfels, the Empress Augusta’s favorite

residence, would be a mere shooting box. This immense assemblage

of turrets, galleries, roofs, and terraces must have cost at least

£80,000. Has it sprung from coal or from Bessemer steel? It is

situated just below the noble ruin of Drachenfels. Will not the dragon

watching over the Niebelungen treasure in Nifelheim’s den, avenge this

impertinent challenge of modern plutocracy?

All that I see on my way up the Rhine leads me to reflect on the

special characteristics of Prussian administration. The works which

have so marvellously “domesticated” the river as to make it a type of

what Pascal calls “un chemin qui marche,” have taken between thirty and

forty years, and have been carried out continuously, systematically and

scientifically. In her public works, as in her military preparations,

Prussia has succeeded in uniting two qualities which are only too often

lacking—a spirit of consistency, and the love of progress. The desire

to be as near as possible to perfection is apparent in the most minute

details. Not unfrequently consistency, and a too close following of

traditions, leads to routine which rejects innovations. Great strength

is attained, and the chances of success are considerably increased if,

while one aim is kept always in view, the best means to attain it are

selected and applied without delay.

I have remarked, when speaking of parliamentary administration, that a

lack of consistency was one reason of the feebleness of democracies.

This should be guarded against as soon as it becomes apparent, or

inferiority will ensue. A few trifling facts will show that the

Prussians are as great lovers of useful novelties and of practical

improvement as the Americans. On the Rhine, at the ferries the old

ferry-boats have been replaced by little steamers, which are constantly

crossing the river from one side to the other. At the railway stations,

I notice that the trucks for luggage are made of steel, and are lighter

and stronger than any I have seen elsewhere. The system for warming

the railway compartments is also more perfected. Heated pipes run

under the seats of the carriages, and the passengers can regulate the

temperature by turning a needle on a disc from _Kalt_ (cold) to _Warm_

or _vice-versâ_. At the summit of the tower of the Town Hall of Berlin

the different flagstaffs for the flags hoisted on the fête days are

ranged in order. Outside the highest gallery iron rings have been

fitted all round in which to fix the staffs, each of which has a number

corresponding to the same number on the ring it is to fit into. In this

manner both rapidity and regularity are insured. Order and foresight

are safe means to an end.

I intended going to see at Stuttgart a former member of the Austrian

Cabinet, Albert Schüffle, who now devotes all his time to the study of

social questions, and has published some very well-known works—among

others, “Capitalismus und Socialismus,” and “Bau und Leben des Socialen

Körpers” (“Construction and Life of the Social Body”), books which

place him at the extreme left of Professorial Socialism. Unfortunately,

he is at the baths in the Black Forest. But I stop at Würzburg to

meet Ludwig Noiré, a philosopher and philologist, who has deigned

to study political economy. The sight of the socialistic pass to

which democratic tendencies are leading modern society, induces many

philosophers to turn their attention to social questions. This is

the case in France with Jules Simon, Paul Janet, Taine, Renouvier;

in England with Herbert Spencer, William Graham, and even with that

æstheticist of pre-Raphaelite art, Ruskin.

I hold that political economy should go hand in hand with philosophy,

religion, and especially with morality; but as I cannot myself rise

to these elevated spheres of thought, I am only too happy when a

philosopher throws me out a bit of cord by which I may pull myself a

little higher, above our workaday world. Ludwig Noiré has written a

book, which is exactly what I needed in this respect, and which I hope

to be able to speak of at greater length a little later. It is entitled

“Das Werkzeug” (“The Tool”). It shows the truth of Franklin’s saying:

_Man is a tool-making creature_. Noiré says that the origin of tools

dates from the origin of Reason and Language. At the commencement,

as far back as one can conceive, man was forced to act on matter to

obtain food. This action on Nature for the purpose of satisfying wants

is labor. As men were living together in families and in tribes, labor

was carried on in common. A person making a muscular effort very

naturally pronounces certain sounds in connection with the effort he

is making. These sounds, repeated and heard by the entire group, were

after a time understood to signify the action of which they were the

spontaneous accompaniment. Thus was language born from natural activity

in view of supplying imperious needs, and the verb representing the

action preceded all their words. The effort to procure the necessary

and useful develops the reasoning powers, and tools soon became

necessary. Wherever traces of prehistoric men are found, there is also

to be found the flint implement. Thus reason, language, labor, and

implements, all manifestations of an intelligence capable of progress,

appeared almost simultaneously.

Noiré has developed this theory fully in another book, entitled,

“Ursprung der Sprache” (“Origin of Speech”). When it was published, Max

Müller stated in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, that, although he

considered this system too exclusive, yet it was far superior to either

the onomatopœia or the interjection theory, and that it was certainly

the best and the most probable one brought forward at present. I can

but bow before this appreciation.

Noiré is a fanatical Kantian, and an enthusiastic admirer of

Schopenhauer. He has succeeded in forming a committee for the purpose

of erecting a statue in honor of the modern Heraclites. The committee,

he says, _must_ be international, for if as a writer Schopenhauer be

German, as a philosopher he belongs to the entire world, and he asked

me to join it. “I am exceedingly flattered by the proposal,” said I;

“but I offer two objections.” In the first place, a humble economist has

not the right to place his name side by side with such as are already

on the list. Secondly, being an incurable disciple of Platonism, I fear

that Schopenhauer did not remain in the Cartesian line of spiritualism.

I feel persuaded that two notions, which, it appears, are at the

present day very old-fashioned—I speak of a belief in God and in the

soul’s immortality—should form the basis of all social science. He who

believes in nothing but matter cannot rise to a notion of what ‘ought

to be’—_i. e._, to an ideal of right and justice. This ideal can only

be conceived as a divine order of things imposing itself morally on

mankind. The ‘Revue Philosophique’ of October, 1882, says, ‘Positive

Science, as understood at the present day, considers not what _should_

be, but only what _is_. It searches merely the formula of facts.

All idea of obligation, or of imperative prohibition, is completely

foreign to its code. Such a creed is a death-stroke to all notion of

duty. I believe that faith in a future life is indispensable for the

accomplishment of good works. Materialism weakens the moral sense, and

naturally leads to general decay.’

“Yes,” replied Noiré, “this is just the problem. How, side by side

with the dire necessities of Nature, or with Divine omnipotence, can

there be place for human personality and liberty? Nobody, neither

Christian nor Naturalist, has yet been able satisfactorily to answer

this. Hence has sprung, on the one hand, the predestination of the

Calvinists and Luther’s _De servo arbitrio_, and, on the other,

determinism and materialism. Kant is the first mortal who fearlessly

studied this problem and studied it satisfactorily. He plunged into

the abyss, like the diver of Schiller, and returned, having vanquished

the monsters he found there, and holding in his hand the golden cup

from which henceforward Humanity may drink the Divine beverage of

Truth. As nothing can be of greater interest to us than the solution of

this problem, so our gratitude, be it ever so considerable, can never

possibly equal the service rendered by this really prodigious effort

of the human mind. Kant has provided us with the only arm which can

combat materialism. It is full time we should make use of it, for this

detestable doctrine is everywhere undermining the foundations of human

society. I venerate the memory of Schopenhauer, because he has inspired

the truths revealed by Kant with more real life and penetrating vigor.

Schopenhauer is not well known in either France or England. Some of

his works have been translated, but no one has really understood him

thoroughly, because to understand a philosopher it is necessary not

only to admire but to be passionately attached to him. ‘The folly of

the Cross’ is an admirable expression.

“Schopenhauer maintains that the will is the great source of all; it

means both personality and liberty. We are here at once planted at

the antipodes of naturalistic determinism. Free intelligence creates

matter. _Spiritus in nobis qui viget, ille facit._ God is the great

ideal. He does not make us move, but moves Himself in us. The more we

appropriate to ourselves this Ideal, the freer we become; we are the

reasonable and conscious authors of our actions, and liberty consists

in this. Schopenhauer’s moral law is precisely that of Christianity—a

law of abnegation, of resignation and asceticism. What Christians call

Charity, he designates as ‘Pity.’ He exhorts his followers to struggle

against self-will; not to let their eyes dwell on the passing delusions

of the outside world, but to seek their soul’s peace by sacrificing all

pursuits and interests which should fix their attentions solely on the

changing scenes of this life. Are not these also the Gospel principles?

Must they be rejected because Buddha also preached them? ‘The sovereign

proof of the truth of my doctrines,’ says Schopenhauer, ‘is the number

of Christian persons who have abandoned all their earthly treasure,

position and riches, and have embraced voluntary poverty, devoting

themselves wholly to the service of the poor and the sick and needy,

undaunted in their work of charity by the most frightful wounds, the

most revolting complaints. Their happiness consists in self-abnegation,

in their indifference to the pleasures of this life, in their living

faith, in the immortality of their being, and in a future of endless

bliss.’

“The chief aim of Kant’s metaphysics,” proceeds Noiré, “is to fix

a limit to the circle that can be embraced by man’s reason. ‘We

resemble,’ he says, ‘fish in a pond, who can see, just to the edge of

the water, the banks that imprison them, but are perfectly ignorant of

all that is beyond.’ Schopenhauer goes farther than Kant. ‘True,’ he

says, ‘we can only see the world from outside, and as a phenomenon,

but there is one little loophole left open to us by which we can get

a peep at substantial realities, and this loophole is each individual

“Myself,” revealed to us as “Will,” which gives us the key to the

“Transcendent.” You say, dear colleague, that you are incurably

Platonic; are you not then aware Schopenhauer constantly refers to

the ‘divine’ Plato, and to the incomparable, the prodigious, _der

erstaunliche_ Kant. His great merit is to have defended idealism

against all the wild beasts which Dante met with in the dark forest,

_nella selva oscura’_ into which he had strayed—materialism and

sensualism, and their worthy offspring selfishness and bestiality.

Nothing can be more false or dangerous than physics without

metaphysics, and yet this truth proclaimed at the present day by

great men merely provokes a laugh. The notion of duty is based on

metaphysics. Nothing in Nature teaches it, and physics are silent on

the subject. Nature is pitiless; brute force triumphs there. The better

armed destroys and devours his less favored brother. Where then is

right and justice? Materialists adopt as their motto the words which

Frenchmen falsely accuse our Chancellor of having uttered, ‘Might is

Right.’ Schopenhauer’s ‘Pity,’ Christian ‘Charity,’ the philosopher’s

and jurist’s ‘Justice,’ are diametrically opposed to instinct and

the voice of Nature, which urge us to sacrifice everything to the

satisfaction of animal appetites. Read the eloquent conclusion of the

book of Lange, ‘Geschichte des Materialismus.’ If materialism be not

vanquished while it is yet time, all the law courts, prisons, bayonets

and grape-shot in the world will not suffice to prevent the downfall of

the social edifice. This pernicious doctrine must be banished from the

brains of learned men, where it now reigns supreme. It has started from

thence, and has gradually obtained a hold on the public mind. It is the

duty of true philosophy to save the world.”

“But,” I replied, “Schopenhauer’s philosophy will never be comprehended

but by a small minority; for myself, I humbly confess I have never read

but fragments translated.”

“It is a pity you have never perused the original,” answered Noiré,

“the style is exceedingly clear and simple. He is one of our best

writers. He has exposed the most abstruse problems in the best possible

terms. No one has more thoroughly justified the truth of what our Jean

Paul said of Plato, Bacon and Leibnitz, the most learned reflection

need not exclude a brilliant setting to show it off in relief, any

more than a learned brain excludes a fine forehead and a fine face.

Unfortunately, M. de Hartmann, who popularized Schopenhauer, has too

frequently rendered his ideas unintelligible by his Hegelian Jargon.

Schopenhauer could not endure Hegelianism. Like an Iconoclast, he

smashed to shivers its idols with a heavy club. He approved of violent

expressions, and indulged in very strong terms. So, for instance, he

liked what he calls _die göttliche Grobheit_, ‘divine coarseness.’

At the same time, he praises elegance and good manners, and even,

strange to say, has translated a little manual on ‘The Way to Behave

in Society,’ ‘El Oraculo Manual,’ published in 1658, by the Jesuit,

Baltasar Gracian. ‘There was a time,’ he writes, ‘when Germany’s three

great sophists, Fichte, Schelling, and especially Hegel, that seller

of senselessness, _der freche unsinnige Schmierer_, that impertinent

scribbler, imagined they would appear learned by becoming obscure. This

shameless humbug succeeded in winning the adulations of the multitude.

He reigned at the Universities, where his style was imitated.

Hegelianism became a religion, and a most intolerant one. Whosoever was

not Hegelian was suspected even by the Prussian State. All these good

gentlemen were in quest of the Absolute, and pretended that they had

found it, and brought it home in their carpet-bags.’

“Kant maintainedthat human reason can only grasp the relative. ‘Error,’

cry in chorus Hegel, Schelling, Jacobi and Schleiermacher, and _tutti

quanti_. ‘The Absolute! Why, I know it intimately; it has no secrets

from me,’ and the different universities became the scenes of

revolutions of the Absolute which stirred all Germany. If it were

proposed to attempt to recall these illustrious maniacs to their

right reason, the question was asked, ‘Do you adequately comprehend

the Absolute?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then hold your tongue; you are a bad Christian

and a dangerous subject. Beware of the stronghold.’ The unfortunate

Beneke was so startled by this treatment that he went mad and drowned

himself. Finally these great authorities quarrelled between themselves.

They informed each other that they knew nothing of the Absolute. A

quarrel on this subject was very often deadly. These battles resemble

the discussion at Toledo between the Rabbi and the Monk in Heine’s

‘Romancero.’ After they had both lengthily discussed and quarrelled,

the king said to the queen: ‘Which of the two do you think is

right?’ ‘I think,’ replied the queen, ‘that they both smell equally

unpleasantly.’

“This nebulous system of the Hegelian Absolute-seekers, reminding

one of _Nephclokokkygia_, ‘the town in the clouds,’ in Aristophanes’

‘Birds,’ has become a proverb with our French neighbors, who

very rightly are fond of clearness. When anything seems to them

unintelligible, they dub it as German metaphysics. Cousin did his best

to clarify all this indigestible stuff, and serve it up in a palatable

form. But in so doing he lost, not his Latin, but his German and his

French. I am sure you never understood that ‘pure Being’ was identical

with ‘no Being.’ Do you recollect Grimm’s story, ‘The Emperor’s Robe?’

A tailor condemned to death promised, in order to obtain his pardon, to

make the Emperor the finest robe ever seen. He stitched, and stitched,

and stitched ceaselessly, and finally announced that the robe was

ready, but that it was invisible to all, save to wise people. All the

servants, officers, and chamberlains of the court came to examine

this work of art with the ministers and high dignitaries, and one

and all pronounced it magnificent. On the coronation day the Emperor

is supposed to put on the costume, and rides through the town in

procession. The streets and windows are crowded; no one will admit that

he has less wisdom than his neighbor, and all repeat; ‘How magnificent!

Was ever anything seen so lovely?’ At last a little child calls out,

‘But the Emperor is naked,’ and it was then admitted that the robe had

never existed, and the tailor was hanged.

“Schopenhauer is the child revealing the misery, or rather the

non-existence of Hegelianism, and his writings were consequently

unappreciated for upwards of thirty years. The first edition of his

most important work found its way to the grocer’s shop and thence

to the rubbish heap. It is our duty to-day to make amends for such

injustice, and to render him the honor which is his due; his pessimism

need not stay you. ‘The world,’ he says, ‘is full of evil, and all

suffer here below. Man’s will is by nature perverse.’ Is not this

doctrine the very essence of Christianity? _Ingemui tomnis creatura._

He maintains that our natural will is selfish and bad, but that, by an

effort over itself, it may become purified and rise above its natural

state to a state of grace, of holiness, of which the Church speaks,

δευτἑρος πλὁυς. This is the deliverance, the Redemption, for which

pious souls long, and it is to be attained by an indifference to and

condemnation of the world and of self. _Spernere mundum, spernere se,

spernere se sperni._”[54]

Before leaving Würzburg I visit the Palace, formerly the residence

of the Prince-Bishops, and also several churches. The Palace, _die

Residenz_, is immense, and seems the more so when one reflects that it

was destined to ornament the chief town of a small bishopric. Built

between the years 1720 and 1744, after the plan of the palace of

Versailles, it is very nearly as large. There is not such another

staircase to be found anywhere. This, and the hall which precedes it,

occupy the entire width of the building and a third of its length, and

the effect is really of imperial magnificence. The trains of crowds

of cassocked prelates and fine ladies could sweep here with ease.

The cut stone balustrades are ornamented with statues. There is a

suite of 350 reception-rooms—all for show, none for use. A certain

number of these were decorated at the time of the French Empire. How

mean the paintings on the ceilings, the pseudo-classic walls, and the

mahogany furniture with brass ornaments, appear when compared to the

apartments completed at the beginning of the eighteenth century, where

the “chicorée” ornamentation exhibits all its seductions. I have never

seen, all over Europe, anything in this style so perfect or better

preserved. The curtains are in material of the period, and the chairs,

sofas, and arm-chairs are covered to match. Each room is of a dominant

color. There is a green one with metallic shades, like the wings of a

Brazilian beetle. The _broché_ silk on the furniture is to correspond.

The effect is magical. In another, splendid Gobelin tapestry, after

Lebrun, represents the triumph and the clemency of Alexander. Another,

again, is all mirrors, even to the door-panels, but groups of flowers

in oil-painting on the glass temper the excessive brilliancy. The

stoves are really marvels of inventive genius and good taste, all

in white and gold Saxony china. The blacksmith’s art never produced

anything finer than the immense wrought-iron gates which enclose the

pleasure-grounds, with their terraces, lawns, grass-plots, fountains,

and rustic retreats. This princely residence, which has been almost

invariably vacant since the suppression of episcopal sovereignty, has

remained perfectly intact. It has been deteriorated neither by popular

insurrections nor by changes in taste. What finished models of the

style of the Regency architects and furniture makers could find here to

copy from!

The contemplation of all these grandeurs suggests two questions to

my mind. Where did these Sovereigns of tiny States find the money to

furnish themselves with splendors and luxuries which Louis XIV. might

have envied? My colleague, George Schanz, Professor of Political

Economy at the University of Würzburg, informs me that these bishops

had scarcely any troops to maintain. “Make,” he says, “builders,

joiners, upholsterers, and carpenters of all our soldiers all over the

land at the present day, and Germany might soon be covered with such

palaces.”

Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, Science, and Art, January 1885 · 第 17 / 26 段