defined in these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke that
enveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed,
while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with an
inconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and then
but dimly and briefly. As a consequence, three line-of-battle ships and
a frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth
badly cut up; while the _Agamemnon_ lay opposed to one of the heaviest
sea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours came
off with comparatively little loss."
"Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have
had (and we have so few details about these works that we can draw no
sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received by
the vessels), it evidently was not for want of being _hit_ often enough
(smoke or no smoke), that the _Agamemnon_ escaped with so little injury.
She 'was struck by 240 shot and shells;' and it is only due to the
inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that she was
not destroyed."
"With respect to the damages received by Fort Constantine, Dahlgren
says:--"
"The distance of the _Agamemnon_ and _Sanspareil_ from Fort
Constantine (17th October, 1854), was assumed to be about 800 yards;
Lord Raglan states it to have been rather less. These two ships could
bring to bear about 87 guns, and the firing from them probably lasted
some four hours. There can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage,
for the Russian Commander-in-chief-admits it in his official report; but
not sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far short of
effecting a breach in it."
"At Bomarsund, the results were rather different:--Three 32-pounders of
42 cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's spar deck,
and placed in battery at 950 yards from the North Tower--the masonry of
good quality and 6-1/2 feet thick. In eight hours, the wall between two
embrasures was cut through from top to bottom, offering a practicable
breach, to effect which 487 shot and 45 shells were fired, being at the
rate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute; or,
from each gun, one in 2-3/4 minutes. The Tower surrendered."
"It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to
accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do,
the distances from the object being alike--particularly when it is
considered that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most of
them employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. The
guns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery,
which was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth
minutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot
and shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; a
number which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of
three guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in
fourteen places; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which is
abundant proof of the lack of accuracy. They must either have been
dispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether,
and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which was
attained by the battery. The constantly preferred complaint of motion in
the ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading
Sebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too
large to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. That
the fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them,
proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and the
calibres too low. It is said that the _Agamemnon_ was struck in the hull
by two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a
small portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if,
as already observed, the calibre had been heavier."
Here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which were
sufficient, had they been thrown from a land battery, according to the
result at Bomarsund, to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failed
not only to produce a single breach, but even "to impair the strength of
the masonry."
The reason of this is obvious. That degree of precision of fire by which
a breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a
floating structure, for the motion of the water, even in the calmest
days, is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at a
distance, as in this case, of seven and eight hundred yards.
With respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the _Agamemnon_,
it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power
of the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries
against ships of war. The Russians had some of them in their fleet, and
at Sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew up two Turkish frigates _in
fifteen minutes_. It does not appear that in the Crimean war they had
yet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for where
shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in every
instance of inferior calibre.
With respect to the naval attack upon Kinburn, which has been referred
to as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to
ships in reducing harbor defences, we have no official reports of the
Russians from which to derive accurate information of the strength of
the works attacked. Dahlgren, drawing his information from the official
accounts of the "English and French admirals," describes the works and
their location is follows:--
"The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly by
the projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of
Sand-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction
until it passes the promontory of Otchakov, where it terminates, and
from which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of the
estuary empty into the Black Sea."
"The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the
Point of Otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; but
the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war,
except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its
northern shore. Here, therefore, are placed the works designed to
command the entrance. They are three in number. Near the extreme point
of the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in and
overlaid with sand,--pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten."
"Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connected
with the spit battery by a covered way. This work, built of stone, and
riveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial of the
three; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating shot."
"Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is Fort
Kinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, and
to the waters of the estuary on the north. It is casemated in part,
though but few of these embrasures were armed,--its chief force being in
the pieces _en barbette, _and some nine or ten mortars. The masonry,
though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, and
so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the
interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space was
occupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and
plastered over."
"This fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. The English admiral
states, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars.
The calibres are not given officially, but stated in private letters to
be 18-pounders and 32-pounders."
"The above description will quite justify the further remark as to
these works:--"
"They were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable of
withstanding any serious operation by sea or land. The main fort was
particularly weak in design, and dilapidated; all of them were
indifferently armed and garrisoned."
"So much for the works. As to the character of the armament brought to
the assault, the same authority says:--"
"The allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, embracing
every description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, and all
propelled by steam. There were screw-liners, and like vessels of
inferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gunboats, floating-batteries,
mortar-vessels, etc., each armed in what was considered the most
approved manner. And this truly formidable naval force carried
_besides_ 'some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these
'dilapidated' works of Kinburn."
"Without going into the particulars, we simply give Dahlgren's account
of the affair:--"
"The French floating-batteries (_Devastation, Lave_, and _Tonnante_)
steamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six or seven
hundred yards off the S.E. bastion of Fort Kinburn, and at 9.20 opened
fire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of which six were English, by the
gunboats, five French and six English, and by the steamer _Odin_, 16."
"The heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve
50-pounders on the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of the
fort; and the vertical fire was so good that the French admiral
attributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender of the place. The
gunboats also made good ricochet practice, which was noticed to be
severe on the barbette batteries."
"The Russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, plied
their guns rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to the
floating-batteries, which were nearest."
"Exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the _Royal Albert _, 121,
_Algiers_, 91, _Agamemnon_, 90, and _Princess Royal_, 90, with the four
French liners in close order, taking position in line, ranging N.W. and
S.E., about one mile from the fort, in twenty-eight feet water."
"At the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under Rear-Admirals
Stewart and Pellion, dashed in through the passage to the basin, opening
fire on the spit and central batteries in passing, and anchoring well
inside of Fort Nicholaiev and Otchakov. The attack seaward was completed
by the _Acre_, 100, _Curaçoa_, 30, _Tribune_, 30, and _Sphynx_, 6,
opening on the central battery; while the _Hannibal_, 91, _Dauntless_,
24, and _Terrible_, 21, assailed that on the spit. To this storm of shot
and shells, the Russians could not reply long. In the spit battery, the
sand falling through between the logs, displaced by shot and shells,
choked the embrasures, and blocked up the guns. In the fort, the light
wooden buildings were in flames at an early hour; then the walls began
to crumble before the balls which came from every quarter, front, flank,
and rear; and as the guns were disabled successively, the return became
feeble, until few were in condition to be fired, the central redoubt
alone discharging single guns at long intervals. The Russian commander,
however, made no sign of surrender; but the admirals, seeing that his
fire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, hoisted the white
flag at 1.35 P.M., upon which the works were given up on honorable
terms."
"The garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men; their loss is
differently stated,--the French admiral says eighty wounded,--another,
forty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded."
"The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besides
two killed and two wounded in the _Arrow_, by the bursting of her two
68-pounder Lancaster guns."
"The superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of
ordnance was very decided; they must have had at least six hundred and
fifty pieces in play, chiefly 32-pounders, and 8-inch shell guns, with a
fair proportion of 68-pounders and mortars, besides the 50-pounders of
the French floating batteries. To which the Russians could only reply
with eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre than
32-pounders, while many were lower. The great disparity in offensive
power was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commanding
position, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same level
with the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength.
On the other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners to
approach nearer than one mile; and thus their fire was by no means so
intense as it would have been at shorter range."
"This was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an
opportunity of proving their endurance; which was the question of most
importance, as no one could doubt the effect of long 50-pounders, or
68-pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, and
able to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire."
"No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, for
though the English had employed long 68-pounders at Sebastopol, yet the
distance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards; and the
concentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from the
published statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six
50-pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close
order."
"They were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the _Devastation_),
it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout
iron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a half
inches,--still, there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by
shot and shell which entered the ports,--and the majority of damage to
the French personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three
floating-batteries."
Major Barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it "proves
nothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and
ill-constructed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contend
against such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * *
The Fort of Kinburn surrendered, _not because_ it was breached--not
because the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be
unable to protract the contest,--but simply because the guns and
gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and the
calibres (of the guns in Kinburn) were incapable of doing any great
damage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed."
The guns in the low _open_ batteries were exposed to a ricochet and
vertical fire, to which latter the French admiral attributed, in good
part, the surrender of the place. The buildings behind the batteries,
built of wood, "slightly constructed and plastered over," were set on
fire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns
almost impracticable. Nevertheless, out of a garrison of 1,400, only 157
were killed and wounded--a very small loss under all the circumstances.
If the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the men from
the ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who
invested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still
less; and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater
damage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force.
With respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, Commander
Dahlgren very judiciously remarks:--
"The use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in
attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their
asserted invulnerability. It may be that the performance at Kinburn
answered the expectation of the French emperor as regards offensive
power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the
heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which
concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of 32-pounder
shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in future
be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the
artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn.
Still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable
element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of
absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide
against its employment."
The works at Bomarsund were taken by means of _land-batteries_, which
breached the exposed walls of the towers and main works. An auxiliary
fire was opened upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced very
little effect. But after the work had been reduced, an experimental
firing was made by the _Edinburgh_, armed with the largest and most
powerful guns in the British navy.
In speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of
Bomarsund, and the experimental fire of the _Edinburgh_, Sir Howard
Douglas remarks:--
"This successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally,
but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships,
and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and
ought to attempt elsewhere."
"But the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the
fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack
was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover
shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant
this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like
the _Edinburgh_, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within 500
yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without
being fired at! The firing of the _Edinburgh_, at 1,060 yards, was
unsatisfactory. 390 shot and shells were fired, from the largest and
most powerful guns in the British navy (viz., from the Lancaster gun
of 95 cwt., with an elongated shell of 100 lbs.;--from 68-pounders of 95
cwt., and 32-pounders of 56 cwt., solid shot guns;--from 10-inch shell
guns of 84 cwt., with hollow shot of 84 lbs.;--from 8-inch shell guns of
65 and 60 cwt., with hollow shot of 56 lbs.), and did but little injury
to the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired.
A small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely
bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and
other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained--no
practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted,
taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40,000
lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1,060, and then at
480 yards."
Surely, this "naval attack," taken in connection with the true facts of
the capture of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of the British fleet in the
Pacific upon the Russian works of Petropauloski, is not calculated to
affect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist
maritime attacks.
Few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore
over guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of
resisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against
it by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area
of the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in
barbette. This conclusion they form from the results of the maritime
attack on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on Bomarsund.
Major Barnard, in his valuable work on "The Dangers and Defences of New
York," draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and
contends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed
stone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the
latter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that they
proved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with
guns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a
vertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at Bomarsund was
poorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced very
little effect upon it. It is also equally certain that Kinburn Was
taken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical
and ricochet fires.
With respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be
remarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentioned
therein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towards
completion, and that the acquisition of Texas and California, and the
settlement of Oregon and Washington Territory, by greatly extending our
line of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of
other points. It should also be noted that while the value and necessity
of these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of
the system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that
the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of
modern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render it
necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports
of New York and San Francisco--one the _key point_ of the Atlantic, and
the other of the Pacific coast. Perhaps the system adopted by our Boards
of Engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted _too
many_ points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our
great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast
defence. However this may have been _at the time the system was
adopted_, there can be no question that the relative strength of the
works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond
to _the present_ relative importance of the places to be defended, and
the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing
the means of maritime attack. On this subject we quote from the work of
Major Barnard:--
"While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed
a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive
system was planned, and our country has so increased in population,
wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any
impression by an invasion of our territory,--our great maritime places
like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater
proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack."
"The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of
New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at
the present day."
"The recent war of England and France against Russia may illustrate
my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of
these nations to wage war against the United States."
"No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was
made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results
would flow from such means. The war consisted exclusively in attacks
upon maritime places--great seaports--seats of commercial and naval
power. Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and
prosperity of a nation--by the large populations and immense amount
of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime
attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive
results may be produced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn,
Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in
succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first
named became, indeed, the true seats of war."
"Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources,
and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have
turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided _there_,
Cronstadt would have been the next field of combat,--for which, indeed,
the allies had made the most enormous preparations."
"Is it not _certain_ that in future all war of maritime powers against
the United States, will take a similar course? All territorial invasion
being out of the question, it is against our _great_ seaports and
strategic points of coast defence--such as New York, New Orleans, and
San Francisco--pre-eminently New York,--that an enemy will concentrate
his efforts. Against these he will prepare such immense armaments,
--against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack,
which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall _insure_
success."
"The mere defense of the city against _ordinary fleets_, is no longer
the question; but _through the defensive works to be here erected, the
nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the
resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science
and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can
bring against them_; in short, in fortifying New York, _we are really
preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous
contests is to be decided_."
A few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground
that casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and
floating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area,
will accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longer
land fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege.
It cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can,
as a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more
exposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners
to be picked off by sharpshooters. Moreover, they give but a very
limited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor.
On the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works,
when properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectually
resist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries. The
results of recent wars, and of the West Point experiments by General
Totten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this.
Against such proofs the mere _ad captandum_ assertion of their
incapacity can have but little weight--certainly not enough to justify
the abandonment of a system approved by the best military authorities
of this country and Europe, and sanctioned by long experience.
Major Barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to
resist the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety of
abandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of Coast Defences,
uses the following forcible language:--"When we bear in mind that the
hostile 'floating batteries,' of whatever description, will themselves
be exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown from
shore batteries,--that when they choose to come to 'close quarters,' to
attempt to breach, _their_ 'embrasures' present openings through which
deluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon the
gunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason has
taught us, with regard to the casemate,--we need not be under
apprehension that our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubt
that they will, as they did in Russia, answer the important purposes for
which they were designed."
"It only remains to show the _necessity_ of such works. It, in general,
costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build
a masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount
it. All authorities agree that an open barbette battery (Grivel's very
forcible admission has been quoted), on a low site, and to which vessels
can approach within 300 or 400 yards, is utterly inadmissible. It may
safely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnish
the efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of
this character; and indeed it very often happens that there are _no
others_."
"When such sites _are_ found, it rarely happens that they afford room
for sufficient number of guns in open batteries. Hence the necessity of
putting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the casemated
structure. Such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, raking
fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes,
offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and afford
to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as _can_ be given
to men thus engaged."
"On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no
danger in giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real and
intense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression
of the great city and port of New York, it is not admissible to set
aside the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds who
have devoted themselves to such subjects. A means of defence, sanctioned
by its being confided in to protect the great ports of Europe--which
_has_ protected the great ports of Russia against the most formidable
naval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our
confidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to be
adhered to in place of all new 'systems,' until time and trial shall
have _necessitated_ (not merely justified) the change."
"If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has
been judged necessary for the defence of important ports,--to
experience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of
actual trial,--we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now
required to defend New York. We shall find at _Sebastopol_--a narrow
harbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval dépôt of
Russia on the Black Sea--an array of 700 guns, about 500 of which were
placed in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of great
size), and the remainder in open batteries. These defensive works
fulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on
the 17th of October, 1854, without sensible damage."
"The facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets--the enormous
preparations required--the great risks encountered in landing a
besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protection
against the _former_ species of attack, costly works are necessary, and
against the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, afford
protection), naturally caused the Russians to make these water defences
their _first_ object. Yet, though almost unprotected on the land side,
Sebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; and
illustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and
effectual _land defence_ may be improvised, where the _sea defence_ is
provided for, as thoroughly as it was at that place."
"Let Cronstadt be another example. Great as was the importance of its
defence to Russia, it was not greater,--it was by no means _as great_,
as that of New York to our own country. This port, and military and
naval dépôt, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of 600 guns,
500 of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works; the
remainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the main channel.
This number is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in New
York harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence as
was found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long line of
approach, compared with the latter."
"_These works fulfilled their object._ They protected the great port and
dépôt of Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. For two
successive years did the mighty armaments of France and England
threaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated
castles' which presented itself, and declined the contest."
"Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dépôt of France. After the
almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing
the shores of her great rival, England, and an equally profuse
expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval dépôt, we
may suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which the
science of man could devise, would be employed here to make this great
seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack
possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant.
The means there employed are (so far as regards mere _harbor_ defence)
precisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined
with open batteries where the locations are favorable); and the
application of means is the same as we have found so successful in
Russia,--the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of New
York."
Captain McClelland, in his official report to the War Department, on the
siege of Sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:--
"The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water,
although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own
most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they
were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and
the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness
of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that
well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for
the strongest fleet."
"It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and
imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced
persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:"
"1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and
proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least
possible delay."
"2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the
forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European
war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and
directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be
acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose,
and by long habit."
"In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol
would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not
appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared
to sustain a siege."
"This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark
upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped
around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be
made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications
must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists.
To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough
to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can
bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men
could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers;
but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined
veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its
own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they
cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow
campaign."
"Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large
enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it
should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the
frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned
officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase;
and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction
of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia
and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective
basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all
possible means taken to spread sound military information among them.
In the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to
provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of
instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular
artillery for instructors."
On this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of
sea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from Major Barnard's
pamphlet:--
"One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which
has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even _attacked_
with impunity, I conceive to be the want of _skill_ and _care_ in the
use of the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious
throwing away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been,
however, by no means a _peculiarity_ of coast defences. The same system
of random firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms
in land and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred
apparently to even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why,
for one man wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so
many thousands of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air."
"But this question is _now_ asked, both in the use of the soldier's
rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of
artillery of all kinds."
"It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the
soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform
certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same
idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval
science, and is a _necessary_ result of the recent great
improvements in the construction of arms. In short, the truth has at
last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing,
though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at Balaklava, 'bien
magnifique, _n'est pas la guerre_.'"
"It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle
to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical
effect. The _volunteers_ of our cities will constitute _mainly_, in
time of war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast
guns. In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties.
But it is most desirable that we should have at _all times_ a body of
gunners, practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to
give to our _citizens_, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the
defences provided for their security, but it would disseminate military
knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the
different defensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be
desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a
sufficient garrison of _artillery_ troops to aid in the instruction
of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army _this_ cannot
be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail
an artillery officer or two for the purpose."
NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.--OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.
The author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him
to change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior
strategic importance of the line of Lake Champlain, both as a line of
military operations, and as a line of defence. The mutual commercial
interests of the United States and the Canadas render a war between the
two countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an event
is by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us to
prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency.
NOTE TO CHAPTERS IX., X., XI. AND XII.--ARMY ORGANIZATION.
Since these chapters were written, several important changes have been
made in our army organization. The rank of Lieutenant-General (at
least, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps,
infantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineer
troops organized. But this company is mainly employed at West Point for
instruction of the cadets in the several branches of military
engineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the
system of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, of
troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our
permanent fortifications, and for the general duties of field
engineering, still remains to be supplied. Of all the arms of military
organization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; it
cannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared.
In speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of
the different European powers which he was sent to examine and report
upon, Captain McClelland says:--
"Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of
service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and
shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any
future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own
batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the
construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the
germ of an artillery school of practice; I would then suggest, for the
consideration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery
to construct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege
batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and
the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to
secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the
works of attack. This change," he says, "will require to be introduced
into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in
relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and
magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working
parties, etc."
With regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is sufficient to
remark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally
as great and equally as objectionable. The defect in our present army
organization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which,
from the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belong
to it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently
transfer a part of these duties to another arm. As well might it be
said, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in
proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should
be permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery
tactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals.
There are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown
to properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an
army organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the
appropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency
for either service. Suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and
shamefully small" in proportion to our pay department, shall our
paymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the use
of the scalpel and amputating instruments! This is, perhaps, an extreme
case, but it serves to illustrate the principle.
The defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which has so often
been pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any
transfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the
appropriate duties of one corps to another. Indeed, such a measure would
only tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary into
a lasting evil. It can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in
no other way. The executive action suggested would be deprecated by all.
Moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, that
there can be little doubt that Congress will soon perceive the
importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy.
NOTE TO CHAPTER XIII.--PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.
Although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a
permanent fortification, as established by the great masters of this
branch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast
improvements which have, within the last few years, been made in
projectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works of
this character. These changes consist mainly in an increased thickness
of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the
arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from an
enemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege guns, and of
heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by
steam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of
harbors. In the Russian war, Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant
bombardment which left her fortifications intact. These modifications in
the arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in
order to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements
made in the means of attack. They can very easily be introduced without
changing the form or general character of the works, and they are really
so very essential that, without them, a fort constructed 25 or 30 years
ago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art,
will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege
batteries or well organized maritime attacks.
Some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by
the increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert
that masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the
increased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned
front, with lines more extended.
With respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is
very natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that
this improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a
defensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probably
lead to a different conclusion. Such at least is the opinion of the
ablest military engineers of Europe. The lines of the bastioned front
now generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the
arms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampart
gun" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points.
But this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is better
supplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. The latter
weapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent
work.
With respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it
has long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the
fire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. The neglect of
this rule caused the fall of Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, from
the results of that siege, the inference that the present mode of
fortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of
military engineering. The facts do not justify their conclusions.
With respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat,
the case is very different. They are usually casemates of masonry, not
masked by earthen works. Whether the increased efficiency of projectiles
thrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode
of protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a
question well worthy of discussion. This subject has already been
alluded to in the Note on Sea-coast Defences, and it is there shown that
no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change
in our present system.
NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV.--FIELD ENGINEERING.
As Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in
that country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering
which is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works,
particularly sapping and mining. The only operation resembling a siege
was the investment and bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy of
remark that if General Scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he
must have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches and
batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life.
Nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the
attack and defence of positions. Nevertheless, no one can read the
history of the war without appreciating the important influence which
Fort Brown had upon General Taylor's defence of the left bank of the Rio
Grande. Again if we compare our loss in other Mexican battles with that
which the Americans sustained in their attacks upon Monterey,
Churubusco, Molino del Key, and Chapultepec,--places partially secured
by field works--we shall be still more convinced of the value of
temporary fortifications for the defence of military positions, although
it was manifest that the Mexicans neither knew how to construct nor how
to defend them.
Nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges,
for, with the exception of the Rio Grande, our armies had no important
rivers to cross. We must not, however, omit to note the important fact
that General Taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories of
Palo Alto and Resacade La Palma to pursue and destroy the army of
Arista, _because_ he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow
them across the Rio Grande. It should also be remarked that even a very
small bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossing
other streams and ravines during the operations of this war. One of our
cavalry officers writes:--
"On our march from Matamaras to Victoria and Tampico, in 1846
and 1847, we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there
being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks;
a few ways of the Birago trestles would have saved us many days and
a vast amount of labor. In the operations in the valley of Mexico, our
movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches
and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more
free and rapid by the use of the Birago trestles, that our successes
could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity
than they were."
With regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of Lee
and others connected with the operations of General Scott, proved the
value and importance of this particular branch of field engineering.
But field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service,
received its greatest development and most brilliant application in the
Crimean war, particularly in the siege of Sebastopol, and the measures
resorted to by General Todtleben to defend that place against the attack
of superior forces.
A brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the
reader:--
When the allies reached Balaklava, Sebastopol was defended on the south
side only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, and
from eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with two
stories of loop-holes, and five guns in barbette. These works would have
afforded some protection against a _coup-de-main_ by infantry and
cavalry, but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to a
combined attack of these arms with artillery.
The Russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this
position by occupying the most important points in his line of defence
with detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, and
generally closed at the gorge. These works were afterwards connected by
re-entering lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the
ravines and to flank the advanced works. The old wall was strengthened
with earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at a
considerable distance in front.
The most important points of the main line of defence were: 1st. The
Flag-staff Bastion. 2d. The Central Bastion. 3d. The Malakoff. 4th. The
Redan. 5th. The little Redan. The command of the first was about fifteen
feet, its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. A
portion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. The
construction of the Central Bastion was similar to that of the
Flag-staff, but weaker in profile. The relief of the other works was
still less. The command of the Malakoff was about fourteen feet, its
ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. The thickness of parapet
in these works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofs
were covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth.
The loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart
and parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. Many of the
embrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanks
filled with earth. The same material was sometimes used for traverses.
Rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces from
rifle balls and small grape. Great attention was given to the
construction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. These
were sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (where
there was one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground,
and occasionally excavated in the solid rock. Some had fireplaces and
chimneys, and were well ventilated. Interior slopes were revetted with
gabions, crowned by fascines and sand bags. Gabions were also employed
to repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. Abattis, military
pits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive machines
were employed in front of different parts of the defences. Mines were
resorted to in front of the Flag-staff Bastion to retard the French
approaches. They were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to
fifteen feet deep. The Russian counter-approaches generally consisted of
fleches, united by a simple trench.
Captain McClelland, one of our officers sent to the Crimea, from whose
valuable Report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds the
following remarks upon these works of defence:--
"From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences
of Sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for
the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the
works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The
plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications
of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new
principle of engineering was developed. It is true, that there were
several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of
iron tanks, etc., but the whole merit consisted in the admirable
adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and
circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted that the plans
of the various works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no
impropriety in believing that if Todtleben were called upon to do
the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close
flanking arrangements."
"These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the
reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors and their results will
be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument
of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the
first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration of the
talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the
inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful
artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger places
than Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and
well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. There can be
no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebastopol
called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has
ever yet occurred."
We will now pass to the works of attack. When the allies decided that
the works of Sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and
assault, but must be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to be
considered was to secure the forces covering the siege works from
lateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army. The field works
planned for this purpose were not of any great strength, and many of
them "were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent
danger had demonstrated their necessity." The French line of defence
consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry
parapet. The English seemed to attach but little importance to field
works for the defence of their position; the terrible slaughter at
Inkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect.
In describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege.
Captain McClelland says:--
"In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little or
nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the
direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very
rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded
excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation
of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet
in the solid rock! The execution of many of the saps and batteries was
worthy of a school of practice. In the parallels, bombproofs were
provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc.
They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap-roller was
often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of
the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was
nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller
was placed in position--some thirty guns would be brought to bear
upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. It may justly be
said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice
their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage
evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent
approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and
is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their
corps of engineers."
"With regard to the English, the case was different; it seemed as
if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and
perfected with so much care at Chatham. Whenever the ground was
difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a
shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front,
appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. They
were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not
unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and
entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as
they ought to have been before giving the assault. In too many
cases the expression '_tâtonnement_ of the French would seem
to convey the best idea of their operations. Their batteries, however,
were very well constructed. The magazines, platforms, etc., were
usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although
unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. They
employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but
generally the flying-sap were employed."
It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the French
approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the
counterscarp of the Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reached
within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan.
This description of the operations of the English at the siege of
Sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges
in the Spanish Peninsula. It certainly is very strange that a great
nation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience,
have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer
officers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and
difficult duties of that arm. What excuse can ever be offered for
substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a
siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and
is always so necessary an element of a good military organization!
While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immense
importance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude from
the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large
development are better suited for the defence of a large city than
permanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will
necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men
and military stores. We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on this
point, and also make a short extract from the recently published Journal
of the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel.
Captain McClelland says:--
"This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy,
which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the
siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen)
fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that
it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary
works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a
longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as
field works never were before, and were defended as field works never
had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed
permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary
works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against
assault, while the former always do. In addition, permanent works
have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully
and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an assault
impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed
only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the
edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that
point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the
same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not
harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an
assault."
"Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers
never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been
a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the
siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered
way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage
of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the
moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and
fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced
coming into play."
"Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was
under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September,
would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the
siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even
be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the
allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the
southside."
General Neil remarks:--
"Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign
officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not
of incontestable utility in fortified places."
"Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications
of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament
such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a
large army which always preserved its free communications with the
interior of Russia."
"If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps;
if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been
compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the
heads of our columns would have met an army, Sebastopol would have
been an impregnable fortress."
"When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol
with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of
September, 1855, the day of the last assault, we had only executed,
after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the
crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that
period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most
murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since
the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the
sequel has proved."
"The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a
position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in
surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification."
"Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the
besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to
throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our
artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute,
behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been
inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army."
"The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place
from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence;
for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges
of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault,
which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of
the siege."
"Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated
night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able
to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having
to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges
of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the
besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly
invaded by the greater part of the Russian army."
"Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that
which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from
insult by good masonry scarps.'" (Note to page 443.)
And again, page 423, the same authority remarks:
"Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the
concentric fires of our batteries; for, _not being protected by masonry
scarps_, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in
order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced'"
NOTE TO CHAPTER XV.--MILITARY EDUCATION, &C.
With regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps,
be sufficient to remark that the Mexican war incontestably proved the
value of the West Point Military Academy; for the superior efficiency of
properly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civil
life without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon to
practice, fully satisfied the country of the importance of that
institution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be
convinced.
The recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a
retired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes of
introducing this very necessary measure into our military service;
although it is very certain that without this we can never have our
system of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis,
which shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit, while it
prevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism.
The Mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the
system of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped that
the more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to the
necessity of a change; for if military office continue to be conferred
for partisan services, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the
efficiency of our army.
EXPLANATION OF PLATES
Figs. 1, 2, 3.--Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies
A and B.
Fig. 4.--Line of operations directed against the extremity of the
enemy's line of defence, as was done by Napoleon in the Marengo
campaign.
Fig. 5.--Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the Rhine,
and the army of reserve.
Fig. 6 shows the plan adopted by Napoleon in the campaign of 1800, to
preserve his communications.
Fig. 7 illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806.
Fig. 8.--Interior and central line of operations.
Fig. 9 represents a camp of a grand division of an army. The distance
from the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from
350 to 400 feet; thence to the line of posts, from 150 to 200 feet;
thence to the line of sentinels, from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases,
the line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensed
with. The distance between battalions will be from 50 to 100 feet; and
the same between squadrons and batteries.
Fig. 10.--Details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. The width
of company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and will
be so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of
the battalion, when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from
50 to 100 feet. The distance between the tents of each row will be 2 or
3 feet; the distance between the tents of one company and those of
another, from 4 to 6 feet.
Fig. 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company encamping
alone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. The
horses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at a
distance from them of about 12 feet. The forage is placed between the
tents. A squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about 180
feet. The fires, or company kitchens, should be 50 or 60 feet in rear of
the non-commissioned officers' tents.
Fig 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies
of foot engineers.
[The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the "Instruction of
U.S. Field Artillery, horse and foot," may be employed where a single
battery encamps by itself, or where only the skeleton of companies is
maintained; but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full
battery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with other troops.
The plan we have given is that which is employed in most European
services.]
Fig. 13.--In this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires
are so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the
sparks from the kitchens.
Fig. 14.--Simple parallel order of battle.
15.--Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank.
16.--Parallel order, reinforced on a wing.
17.--Parallel order, reinforced on the centre.
18.--Simple oblique order.
19.--Oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing.
20.--Perpendicular order.
21.--Concave order.
22.--Convex order.
23.--Order by echelon on a wing.
24.--Order by echelon on the centre.
25.--Combined order of attack.
26.--Formation of infantry by two deployed lines.
27, 28.--- Arrangements corresponding to depth of column.
29.--Formation by squares.
30.--Mixed formation of three battalions.
31.--Deep formation of heavy columns.
32.--Formation in columns by brigade.
33.--Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system.
34.--Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, in 1807.
35.--Attack on Copenhagen.
36.--Attack on Algiers.
37.--Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa.
38.--Attack on St. Jean d'Acre.
39.--Plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification.
40.--Section of do. do.
41.--Tenaillons.
Fig. 42.--Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet.
43.--A horn-work.
44.--A crown-work.
45.--A redan.
46.--A lunette.
47.--A mitre or priest-cap.
48.--A bastioned fort.
49.--Vertical section of a field intrenchment.
50.--Simple sap.
51.--Flying sap.
52.--Full sap.
53.--Crater of a military mine.
54.--Plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work.
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