SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The principal attacks which we have had to sustain, either as colonies
or states, from civilized foes, have come from Canada. As colonies we
were continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the French
possessions. In the war of the Revolution, it being one of national
emancipation, the military operations were more general throughout the
several states; but in the war of 1812 the attacks were confined to the
northern frontier and a few exposed points along the coast. In these two
contests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, being within
reach of the British naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction
of rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults.
Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with England.
An attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on Canada or a
servile insurrection in the southern states. The former project, in a
military point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but most
probably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting a diversion,
if nothing more. But for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injury
by the destruction of large amounts of public and private property, our
seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. This mode
of warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly attend a conflict
with any great maritime power. How can we best prepare in time of peace
to repel these attacks?
Immediately after the war of 1812 a joint commission of our most
distinguished military and naval officers was formed, to devise a system
of defensive works, to be erected in time of peace for the security of
the most important and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. It may
be well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions and
character of these works, mentioning only such as have been completed,
or are now in course of construction, and such as are intended to be
built as soon as Congress shall grant the requisite funds. There are
other works projected for some future period, but as they do not belong
to the class required for immediate, use, they will not be referred to.
MAINE.
Beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, we have, for
Eastport and Wiscasset, projected works estimated to carry about fifty
guns. Nothing has yet been done to these works.
Next Portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty guns, and Fort
Penobscot and batteries, carrying about one hundred and fifty guns.
These are only partly built.
NEW HAMPSHIRE.
Defences of Portsmouth and the vicinity, about two hundred guns. These
works are also only partly built.
MASSACHUSETTS.
Projected works east of Boston, carrying about sixty guns. These are not
yet commenced.
Works for defence of Boston Harbor carry about five hundred guns. These
are nearly three-quarters completed. Those of New Bedford harbor carry
fifty guns: not yet begun.
RHODE ISLAND.
Newport harbor,--works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed.
CONNECTICUT.
New London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut river. The first of
these nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun.
NEW YORK.
The works projected for the defence of New York harbor are estimated to
carry about one thousand guns. These works are not yet one-half
constructed.
PENNSYLVANIA.
The works projected for the defence of the Delaware Bay and Philadelphia
will carry about one hundred and fifty guns. They are not one-quarter
built.
MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.
Baltimore and Annapolis--these works will carry some two hundred and
fifty guns. The works for the Chesapeake Bay will carry about six
hundred guns; and those for the Potomac river about eighty guns. These
are more than one-half completed.
NORTH CAROLINA.
The works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one hundred and fifty
guns. They are essentially completed.
SOUTH CAROLINA.
The works for the defence of Charleston carry some two hundred guns.
They are one-half constructed.
GEORGIA.
The defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly
three-quarters finished.
FLORIDA.
The works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, Key West,
Tortugas, and Pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns.
Those at St. Augustine and Pensacola are essentially completed, but
those at Key West and Tortugas are barely begun.
ALABAMA.
The works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one hundred and
sixty guns. These are nearly constructed.
LOUISIANA.
The works for the defence of New Orleans will carry some two hundred and
fifty or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed.
The works north of the Chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per
gun; those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun. This
difference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which
the fortifications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in the
south for materials and workmanship.
* * * * *
Having pointed out the character and condition of our system of
sea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may be
relied on as a means of security against a maritime descent.
To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine the
three or four great maritime descents attempted by the English during
the wars of the French Revolution; a period at which the great naval
superiority of England over other nations, gave her the title of
_mistress of the seas_. Let us notice what have been the results of the
several attempts made by this power at maritime invasions, and the means
by which such attacks have been repelled.
In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against Quiberon, at an
expense of eight millions of dollars. This port of the French coast had
then a naval defence of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen
hundred guns. Lord Bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line,
five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hundred guns in
all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to take
shelter under the guns of the fortifications of L'Orient. The French
naval defence being destroyed, the British now entered Quiberon without
opposition. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British Naval History,
to be "the finest on the coast of France, or perhaps in the world, for
landing an army." Besides these natural advantages in favor of the
English, the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in open
insurrection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. A body of
ten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, arms, &c., furnished to
as many more royalist troops; but the combined forces failed in their
attack upon St. Barbe, and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, with
seven thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, penned
up, without defences, in the narrow peninsula. Reinforced by a new
debarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soon
defeated, and ultimately almost entirely destroyed.
In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent upon Holland with
fourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about eleven
hundred guns and a great number of transports, with an army of
thirty-six thousand men. The Dutch naval defences consisted of eight
ships of the line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gun
ships and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hundred
guns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, and
was soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. The defensive army was at
first only twelve thousand, but the Republicans afterwards increased it
to twenty-two thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. But
notwithstanding this immense naval and military superiority, and the
co-operation of the Orange party in assisting the landing of their
troops, the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place;
and after a loss of six thousand men, were compelled to capitulate.
"Such," says Alison, "was the disastrous issue of the greatest
expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbors during the
war."
In 1801, Nelson, with three ships of the line, two frigates, and
thirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of
Boulogne, but was repulsed with severe loss.
Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the
Scheldt, or as it is commonly called, the Walcheren expedition, in 1809.
This expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving
the expediency of maritime descents. The following is a brief narrative
of this expedition:--
Napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, and naval
arsenals at Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of a maritime force
in the Scheldt. But no sooner was the execution of this project begun,
than the English fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of
the Scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. Flushing, at the
mouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and Antwerp, some sixty or
seventy miles further up the river, was entirely defenceless; the
rampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its
garrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits.
Napoleon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in the Peninsula.
The British attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line,
twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun,
mortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two
gunboats, innumerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, and
an immense artillery train; making in all, says the English historian,
"an hundred thousand combatants." A landing was made upon the island of
Walcheren, and siege laid to Flushing, which place was not reduced till
eighteen days after the landing; the attack upon the water was made by
seven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels,
but produced no effect. The channel at the mouth of the river was too
broad to be defended by the works of Flushing, and the main portion of
the fleet passed out of reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt part
way up to Antwerp. But in the mean time, the fortifications of that
place had been repaired, and, after a fruitless operation of a whole
month in the river, the English were gradually forced to retreat to
Walcheren, and finally to evacuate their entire conquest.
The cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. It
was certainly very poorly managed. But we cannot help noticing the
superior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents.
They did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive
army could be raised. The works of Flushing were never intended to close
up the Scheldt, and of course could not intercept the passage of
shipping; but they were not reduced by the English naval force, as has
sometimes been alleged. Col. Mitchel, of the English service, says that
the fleet "kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, that the
French officers who had been present at Austerlitz and Jena declared
that the cannonade in these battles had been a mere _jeu d'enfans_ in
comparison. Yet what was the effect produced on the defences of the
place by this fire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone? The
writer can answer the question with some accuracy, for he went along the
entire sea-line the very day after the capitulation, and found no part
of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and
only one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell,
and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line of
battle ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries."[16]
[Footnote 16: The batteries constructed in the siege of this place were
armed with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars.]
But it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coast
are almost always unsuccessful, nevertheless a direct naval attack upon
a single fortified position will be attended with more favorable
results; and that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed
to bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. In other words,
that in a direct contest between ships and forts the former will have at
least an equal chance of success.
Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to be
properly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be
used with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commander
capable and brave. The ship is of the very best character, and in
perfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commander
skilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea--all as could be
desired.[17] The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than
requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists
of the slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended with
extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair
test of their relative strength.
[Footnote 17: These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but
for the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be
wholly attained.]
What result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending
forces? The ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose
her point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable;
but she herself is everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are much
concentrated, and consequently much exposed. But in the fort the guns
and men are more distributed, a fort with an interior area of several
acres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun
ship. All parts of the vessel are liable to injury; while the fort
offers but a small mark,--the opening of the embrasures, a small part of
the carriage, and now and then a head or arm raised above the
parapet,--the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than _twenty to
one_. In the vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the
balls go at random; in the fort the guns are fired from an immoveable
platform, and the balls reach their object with unerring aim. There is
always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's guns, though
accurately pointed at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely
away from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be otherwise
noticed; whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they are
pointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of
a few inches the spot in which the shot is received. In the fort the men
and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vessel
they are behind frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive
with the shot. The fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily be
set on fire by incendiary projectiles. The ship has many points exposed
that may be called vital points. By losing her rudder, or portions of
her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to
use her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable to
sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire: these damages are in
addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by
shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers;
while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned
above--namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be
struck.
The opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fully
accord with these deductions of theory. Some few individuals mistaking,
or misstating, the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern
improvements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress
in the art of land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able
to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant and superficial
persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a
naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case,
have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in
military science. This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has
received credit merely from its novelty. Let us examine the several
trials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts within
the last fifty years, and see what have been the results.
In 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Cagliari, whose
fortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely to
deserve the name of defences. Nevertheless, the French fleet, after a
bombardment of three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to
retire.
In 1794 two British ships, "the Fortitude of seventy-four, and the Juno
frigate of thirty-two guns," attacked a small town in the bay of
Martello, Corsica, which was armed with one gun in barbette, and a
garrison of thirty men. After a bombardment of two and a half hours,
these ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss of
life. The little tower had received no injury, and its garrison were
unharmed. Here were _one hundred and six guns_ afloat against _one_ on
shore; and yet the latter was successful.
In 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of Santa Crux,
in Teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns. But
notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he
was repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the
garrison received little or no damage. A single ball from the land
battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk her
with near a hundred seamen and marines!
In 1798, a French flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, manned with
near seven thousand men, attacked a little English redoubt on the island
of Marcou, which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders, two
six-pounders, four four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned
with two hundred and fifty men. Notwithstanding this great disparity of
numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs and
gunboats, captured another, and forced the remainder to retreat with
great loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded.
In 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thousand men, attacked
the poorly-constructed works of Porto Ferrairo, whose defensive force
was a motley garrison of fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, and
English. Here the attacking force was _four_ times as great as that of
the garrison; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several
bombardments and a siege of five months.
In July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, with an English fleet
of six ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all five
hundred and two guns, attacked the Spanish and French defences of
Algesiras. Supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to be
equal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair estimate for the
attacking force, considering the circumstances of the case,) we have a
French land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an English floating
force of one hundred and ninety-six guns. Notwithstanding this
inequality of nearly _seventeen_ to _one_, the little battery compelled
the superior naval force to retreat with great loss.
Shortly after this, the French and Spanish fleets attacked the same
English squadron with a force of nearly _three_ to _one_, but met with a
most signal defeat; whereas with a land-battery of only _one_ to
_seventeen_, the same party had been victorious. What proof can be more
decisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those afloat!
In 1803 the English garrison of Diamond Rock, near Port Royal Bay, with
only one hundred men and some fifteen guns, repelled a French squadron
of two seventy-four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land
attack of two hundred troops. There was not a single man killed or
wounded in the redoubt, while the French lost fifty men! The place was
afterwards reduced by famine.
In 1806 a French battery on Cape Licosa, of only two guns and a garrison
of twenty-five men, resisted the attacks of a British eighty-gun ship
and two frigates. The carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the
second shot, so that, in fact, only _one_ of them was available during
the action. Here was _a single piece of ordnance_ and a garrison of
_twenty-five men,_ opposed to a naval force of _over one hundred and
fifty guns_ and about _thirteen hundred men._ And what effects were
produced by this strange combat? The attacking force lost _thirty-seven_
men killed and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, while the
fort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed! What could not be effected
by force was afterwards obtained by negotiation.
In 1808 a French land-battery of only _three_ guns, near Fort Trinidad,
drove off an English seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel.
In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and
whose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an
English squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a
land force of one thousand troops. The whole attempt was a perfect
failure.
"In 1814, when the English advanced against Antwerp," says Colonel
Mitchell, an English historian, "Fort Frederick, a small work of only
two guns, was established in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distance
below Lillo. The armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a
half inch howitzer. From this post the French determined to dislodge the
English, and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored
near the Flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the British
battery. By her position she was secured from the fire of the
eighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of the howitzer only. As soon as
every thing was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and
smoke were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so many of the
moderns seem to think, the result of this strange contest would not have
been long doubtful, for the thunder of the French artillery actually
made the earth to shake again; but though the earth shook, the single
British howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced; and though the
artillery-men could not, perfectly exposed as they were, stand to their
gun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no
sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to
their post, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This
extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till near
twelve at noon, when the French ship, having had forty-one men killed
and wounded, her commander being in the list of the latter, and having
besides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, returned to
Antwerp without effecting any thing whatever. The howitzer was not
dismounted, the fort was not injured,--there being in fact nothing to
injure,--and the British had only one man killed and two wounded."
It is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of the
French Revolution; the whole history of these wars is one continued
proof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier
defence. The sea-coast of France is almost within stone's throw[18] of
the principal British naval depots; here were large towns and harbors,
filled with the rich commerce of the world, offering the dazzling
attraction of rich booty. The French navy was at this time utterly
incompetent to their defence; while England supported a maritime force
at an annual expense of near _ninety millions of dollars._ Her largest
fleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not
unfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping. "At this period,"
says one of her naval historians, "the naval force of Britain, so
multiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimate
knowledge of their (the French) harbors, their bays and creeks; her
officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to be met
with in every situation." On the other hand, these harbors and towns
were frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of
distant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortifications
and militia. And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed
during the entire contest. They were frequently attacked, and in some
instances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent
lodgment; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the
expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was made
on either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies. This certainly
was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the
British navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost
total annihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly proven.
Why then did these places, escape? We know of no other reason, than that
_they were fortified_; and that the French knew how to defend their
fortifications. The British maritime expeditions to Quiberon, Holland,
Boulogne, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c., sufficiently
prove the ill-success, and the waste of life and treasure with which
they must always be attended. But when her naval power was applied to
the destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land
forces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in
Portugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory of their
achievements.
[Footnote 18: Only eighteen and a half miles across the Channel at the
narrowest place.]
Let us now examine the several British naval attacks on our own forts,
in the wars of the Revolution and of 1812.
In 1776 Sir Peter Parker, with a British fleet of nine vessels, carrying
about two hundred and seventy[19] guns, attacked Fort Moultrie, in
Charleston harbor, which was then armed with only twenty-six guns, and
garrisoned by only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few
militia. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, and lost,
in killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, while their whole two
hundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the
fort. Of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, Cooper
in his Naval History, says:--"It goes fully to prove the important
military position that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are
properly armed, constructed, and garrisoned. General Moultrie says only
thirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the
want of powder alone prevented the Americans from destroying the
men-of-war."
[Footnote 19: These vessels _rated_ two hundred and fifty-four guns, but
the number actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and
seventy.]
In 1814 a British fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety-two guns,
attacked Fort Boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land
commanding the passage from the Gulf into the bay of Mobile. This
redoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants,
officers included; and its armament was but twenty small pieces of
cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most of them
poorly mounted "in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunners
uncovered from the knee upward," while the enemy's land force, acting in
concert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a battery
of two guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, Indians, and negroes.
His ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. This immense
disparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the British military
and naval commanders the slightest apprehension "that four British
ships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a land force somewhat exceeding
seven hundred combatants, could fail in reducing a small work mounting
only twenty short carronades, and defended by a little more than a
hundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, or
casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells." Nevertheless,
the enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirely
destroyed, and 85 men were killed and wounded on board the other; while
our loss was only eight or nine. Here a naval force of _five_ to _one_
was repelled by the land-battery.
Again, in 1814, a barbette battery of one four-pounder and two
eighteen-pounder guns at Stonington, repelled a British fleet of one
hundred and thirty-four guns. During the engagement the Americans
exhausted their ammunition, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only
one of them was afterwards used. Two of the enemy's ships, carrying one
hundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the whole time of attack,
and during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyond
reach of the land-battery. They were entirely too far off for the
four-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two eighteen-pounders
to have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of
the fleet, _one_ eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than
equivalent to _sixty-seven_ guns afloat, for the ships were so much
injured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The British loss
was twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. Ours was only two killed
and six wounded.[20]
[Footnote 20: Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six
wounded, but makes no mention of any killed.]
The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, consisted of forty
sail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of
over six thousand combatants. The troops were landed at North Point,
while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach
of Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five
hours. During this attack, the enemy threw "fifteen hundred shells, four
hundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but without
making any impression on either the strength of the work or the
garrison," and the British were compelled to retire with much loss.
In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off the mouths of the
Mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high
as Fort St. Philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of only
twenty guns in all. A heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with
but few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making no
impression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to their
former position at the mouth of the river.
There is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where the enemy's
vessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been
alluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a
proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks.
Even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception
be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? We
allude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by the British
fleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful
and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the
archives of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient
work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a
small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been
completed. The portion constructed was never, until very recently,
properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack
could not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whatever
was made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one
hundred and seventy-three guns, under orders "to ascend the river as
high as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a
bombardment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell,
which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter
deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer was
immediately dismissed for his cowardice. An English naval officer, who
was one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison,
says: "We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. The
position was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men,
and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind
and many other chances were in their favor," &c. The fleet ascended the
river to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries were
preparing at White House and Indian Head to cut off its retreat, it
retired, in much haste, but not without injury.
Some have also pretended to find in modern European history a few
examples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned
to ships and forts. Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated
examples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have
repelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the four
or five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) a
somewhat doubtful victory over forts. But a careful and critical
examination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these are
no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over
guns afloat.
The only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any
note, that ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack on
Copenhagen in 1801; the passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attack
on Algiers, in 1816; the attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, in 1838; and the
attack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840.
Let us examine these examples a little in detail:--
_Copenhagen_.--The British fleet sent to attack Copenhagen, in 1801,
consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battle
ships, four frigates, &c. They sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of
March, passed the Sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the
Danish line on the 2d of April.
The Sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about two and a
half miles wide, (vide Fig. 34.) The batteries of Cronenberg and
Elsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; but
the Swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only six
guns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the damage his
squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel,
defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships,
preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt; but after a few
of his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to
the Sound.
He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, a
declaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. It must be
remembered that at this time England was at peace with both Denmark and
Sweden, and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the admiral
inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath to
involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as England,
by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. The
Danish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his
post, whose object and destination were unknown to him. He fired upon
them, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and
not as an act of hostility against the English. The Swedes, on the
contrary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to lie near
by for several days without firing upon them. Seeing this friendly
disposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed out
of the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and
shells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the
fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man.
The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been
impossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had it
been possible, Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for
fear that Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich
duties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. There may have
been some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for their
conduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with England. Napoleon
says that, even at that season, a few days would have been sufficient
for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that Sweden had much more
time than was requisite. And with a hundred guns on each side of the
channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have
sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack Copenhagen.
On this passage, we remark:--
1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the Sound
amounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over
seventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more
than _sixteen_ to _one_, the British admiral preferred the dangerous
passage of the Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries.
2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of England, he
persuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet
to pass near that shore, out of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore.
3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that if
the Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the
Danish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it
incapable of any serious attempt on Copenhagen.
We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and
defence of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to the
attack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal
extending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow
approach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35) On the most advanced part
of this shoal are the Crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eight
guns.[21] The entrance into the Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthorn,
is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which
is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on the
left of the Crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel
four ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all
three hundred and fifty-eight guns. To secure the port and city from
bombardment from the King's Channel, (that between the Middle Ground and
town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the
shoal, and manned principally by volunteers. This line consisted of old
hulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six
hundred and twenty-eight guns--a force strong enough to prevent the
approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was
intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of
war; but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by
the difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were certainly very
great; and Nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry him
in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship." Had the Danes
supposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, the
line of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the
right supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack. "In that
case," says Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson would have failed in
his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between
the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As it was, the line was too
extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive
assistance from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a
reserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced
to the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted of eight ships of
the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred
guns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is
not given.) One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into
action, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson says, "although not in
the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great
service." This force was concentrated upon _a part_ of the Danish line
of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by
three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the
reach of succor, and without a chance of escape. The result was what
might have been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of this
outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones,
which cut and run under protection of the fortifications. The left of
the line, being supported by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken. A
division of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for
the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but
"it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was
obliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off."
[Footnote 21: Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the
English writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently to
increase the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still
greater.]
The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to
the city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest.
They are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the
British ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force.
Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance
far enough to be within their range.
The Crown-battery was _behind_ the Danish line, and mainly masked by it.
A part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this
line, and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates, which it did
most effectually. But we now come to a new feature in this battle. As
the Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the English,
the range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and its power was felt. Nelson
saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last
convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, "made up
his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement." To retreat,
however, from his present position, was exceedingly difficult and
dangerous. He therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice,
and dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent:
"Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting;
but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must
be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken,
without the power to save the brave Danes who have defended them."
This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased, when
three of the English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was,
struck upon the bank. "They were in the jaws of destruction, and would
never have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. They
therefore owed their safety to this armistice." A convention was soon
signed, by which every thing was left _in statu quo_, and the fleet of
Admiral Parker allowed to proceed into the Baltic. Edward Baines, the
able English historian of the wars of the French Revolution, in speaking
of Nelson's request for an armistice, says: "This letter, which
exhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a moment
when Lord Nelson perceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state
of the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise;
that _the principal batteries_ of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth
of the harbor, _were yet untouched;_ that two of his own division had
grounded, and others were likely to share the same fate." Campbell says
these batteries and ships "_were still unconquered._ Two of his
[Nelson's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire;
others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate,
while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes
under the fire of the batteries."
With respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of the
times says they were of no service while the action lasted. "They began
to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it
was at the same time the parley appeared." The Danish commander,
speaking of the general contest between the two lines, says: "The
Crown-battery did not come at all into action." An English writer says
distinctly: "The works (fortifications) of Copenhagen were absolutely
untouched at the close of the action." Colonel Mitchel, the English
historian, says: "Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town or
fortifications of Copenhagen; he destroyed a line of block-ships,
prames, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the
town; and the Crown Prince, seeing his capital exposed, was willing to
finish by armistice a war, the object of which was neither very popular
nor well understood. What the result of the action between Copenhagen
and the British fleet might ultimately have been, is therefore
altogether uncertain. THE BOMBARDMENT OF COPENHAGEN BY NELSON, as it is
generally styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the
day, a mere combination of words, without the slightest meaning."
The British lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men;
and the loss of the Danes, according to their own account, which is
confirmed by the French, was but very little higher. The English,
however, say it amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred; but let the
loss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floating
defences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of
the guns ashore and guns afloat.
The facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incontestably--
1st. That of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sent
by the English to the attack upon Copenhagen, two ships carrying one
hundred and forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked; seven ships of
the line, and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand
guns, were actually brought into the action; while the remainder were
held as a reserve to act upon the first favorable opportunity.
2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of
hulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only six hundred and twenty-eight
guns of all descriptions; that the fixed batteries supporting this line
did not carry over eighty or ninety guns at most; and that both these
land and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by
_volunteers_.
3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so
completely masked, or so far distant, as to be useless during the
contest between the fleet and floating force.
4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available
by the position of the floating defences, repelled, with little or no
loss to themselves, and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior
force of frigates which attacked them.
5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly
destroyed, while the fixed batteries were uninjured.
6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack island were not
attacked, and had no part in the contest.
7th. That, as soon as the Crown-batteries were unmasked and began to
act, Nelson prepared to retreat, but, on account of the difficulty of
doing so, he opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy of
the most barbarous ages, that, _unless the batteries ceased their fire
upon his ships, he would burn all the floating defences with the Danish
prisoners in his possession;_ and that this armistice was concluded just
in time to save his own ships from destruction.
8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen cannot be regarded as
a contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts:
that, so far as the guns on shore were engaged, they showed a vast
superiority over those afloat--a superiority known and confessed by the
English themselves.
_Constantinople_.--The channel of the Dardanelles is about twelve
leagues long, three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters
of a mile at its narrowest point. Its principal defences are the outer
and inner castles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and
Abydos. Constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entrance
into the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this
sea. The defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but
few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. In
Constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defence
were made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks had
not determined whether to side with the English or the French, and even
then the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading
them to resist the demands of Duckforth.
The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two
sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen
guns, (besides those in the bomb-ships.) Admiral Duckforth sailed
through the Dardanelles on the 19th of February, 1807, with little or no
opposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the soldiers of the
scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none
were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for
defence. But while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora for the
result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon
Constantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and
the Turks actively employed, under French engineers and artillery
officers, in repairing the defences of the Straits. Campbell, in his
Naval History, says:--"Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived the
critical situation in which he was placed. He might, indeed, succeed,
should the weather become favorable, in bombarding Constantinople; _but
unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing
the Turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not
compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. With
this damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the Dardanelles, now
rendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them_."
Under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the
3d of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of the
channel, with a favorable and strong current. "This escape, however,"
says Baines, "was only from destruction, but by no means from serious
loss and injury. * * * * In what instance in the whole course of our
naval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in
this extraordinary enterprise?" In detailing the extent of this damage,
we will take the ships in the order they descended. The first had her
wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the loss
of only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the poop
and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, carried away the wheel,
and did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. Two shot
struck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss
in killed and wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed,
with a loss of sixteen. The fifth had a large shot, six feet eight
inches in circumference, enter her lower deck; loss fifty-five. The
sixth, not injured. The seventh, a good deal damaged, with a loss of
seventeen. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much injured that,
"had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack,
she must have gone down:" her loss was eight. The tenth lost twelve. The
eleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight--making a total loss in
repassing the Dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in the
whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundred
and fifty men who perished in the burning of the Ajax.
Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a
favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned
forts of the Dardanelles. Duckforth himself says, that "had he remained
before Constantinople much longer--till the forts had been completely
put in order--no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidable
sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence." Scarcely had
the fleet cleared the Straits, before it (the fleet) was reinforced with
eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength,
the English did not venture to renew the contest. They had effected a
most fortunate escape. General Jomini says that if the defence had been
conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition
would have cost the English their whole squadron.
Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were
uninjured. The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in
all probability not even striking their objects--"the rapid change of
position, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the
certainty of aim." The state of the batteries when the fleet first
passed, is thus described in James's Naval History: "Some of them were
dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned." And
Alison says: "They had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles
of Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the
dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their
ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as
remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the
rapidity and precision of an English broadside."
Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did
not hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected
to accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is
forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve _Turkish line-of-battle
-ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their
sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within
the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or
nothing against the invaders._ It is scarcely ever mentioned, being
regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number
of its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardly
have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which
were as ancient as the reign of Amurath!
_Algiers._--The following narrative of the attack on Algiers, in 1816,
is drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and other
official and authentic English papers.
The attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of
the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five
bomb-vessels and several rocket-boats, carrying in all about one
thousand guns. The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given,
but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount to over nine
hundred. The harbor and defences of Algiers had been previously surveyed
by Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction; and the
number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information
given in this survey--just so many ships, and no more, being taken, as
could be employed to advantage against the city, without being
needlessly exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected and
exercised with reference to this particular attack.
From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appears
that the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity,
counting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was
only two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions,
including mortars. But not near all of these could act upon the fleet as
it lay. Other English accounts state the number of guns actually opposed
to the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty.
Some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all
the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (Fig. 36.) Supposing
only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the
forces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 5 to
2. This is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that
several of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, brought
both broadsides to bear; moreover, at no one time could _all_ the guns
of the water fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. The
Algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, including several
vessels of war, but no use was made of them in defence, and nearly all
were burnt. The attacking ships commanded some of the batteries, and
almost immediately dismounted their guns. The walls of the casemated
works were so thin as to be very soon battered down. Most of the
Algerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after
the first fire. They had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they
loaded their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they could
not possibly have used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. The
ships approached the forts, and many of them anchored in their intended
position, without a shot being fired from the batteries. The action
commenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely cease till
half-past eleven. The ships then took advantage of the land breeze, and,
by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come to
anchor beyond reach of the land-batteries. Negotiations were again
opened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves and yielded to the
terms of the treaty.
During the contest, the fleet "fired nearly one hundred and eighteen
tons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, (weighing more than five
hundred tons of iron,) besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen and
ten-inch shells, (thrown by the bomb-vessels,) and the shells and
rockets from the flotilla." The vessels were considerably crippled, and
their loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred and
eighty-three. The land batteries were much injured, and a large part of
their guns dismounted. Their loss is not known; the English confess they
could obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great.
This seems more than probable; for, besides those actually employed in
the defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness
the contest. So great was this curiosity, that, when the action
commenced, the parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the
manoeuvres of the ships. To avoid so unnecessary and indiscriminate a
slaughter, Lord Exmouth (showing a humanity that does him great credit)
motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place
of safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of the
buildings within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction of
their fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the
harbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did
more than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an
honorable conclusion to the treaty. We know very well that these
batteries, though much injured, _were not silenced_ when Lord Exmouth
took advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach. The
ships retired--1st, because they had become much injured, and their
ammunition nearly exhausted; 2d, in order to escape from a position so
hazardous in case of a storm; and 3d, to get beyond the reach of the
Algerine batteries. Lord Exmouth himself gives these as his reasons for
the retreat, and says, "the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow."
And Vice-admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the battle, gives the
same opinion: "_in this retreat_" says he, "which, from want of wind and
the damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, _the ships had still
to suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's
batteries_; at last, the land breeze springing up," &c. An English
officer, who took part in this affair, says: "It was well for us that
the land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and God knows
what would have been our fate, had we remained all night."
The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. Had the Arabs
set themselves zealously at work, during the night, to prepare for a new
contest, by remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins
of those batteries which had fallen,--in other words, had the works now
been placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the English, the
contest would have been far from ended. But (to use the words of the
Board of Defence) Lord Exmouth relied on the effects produced on the
people by his dreadful cannonade; and the result proves that he was
right. His anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that
there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave
to be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to keep
in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this
power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries?
The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of
injury done on the one side or the other--particularly as there was on
one side a city to suffer as well as the batteries--as the relative
efficiency of the parties when the battle closed. All political
agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had
the fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next
morning? These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture;
but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts
whether, had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he
had it in his power to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he
had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. On the
whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent
as an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument to
shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned,
and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard.
We cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, when we reflect upon
all the circumstances of the case. The high character, skill, and
bravery of the attacking force; their immense superiority in number of
guns, with no surplus human life to be exposed; the antiquated and
ill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of the Algerine
artillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation; the
severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy's
ships,--an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the French
or Dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships of
the same foe,--from these facts, we must think that those who are so
ready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of
land-batteries as a means of defence against shipping, know but little
of the nature of the contest.
An English historian of some note, in speaking of this attack,
says:--"It is but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be
accomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed,
and governed. Algiers is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, sloping
down towards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark to the
fire of hostile ships. But where is the capital exactly so situated that
we are ever likely to attack? And as to the destruction of a few
second-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species
of warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss sustained
before Algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted
by mere Algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be
expected from a contest maintained against batteries manned with
soldiers instructed by officers of skill and science, not only in
working the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessary for
keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of
formidable efficiency."
_San Juan d'Ulloa._--The following facts, relative to the attack on San
Juan d'Ulloa by the French, in 1838, are drawn principally from the
report of a French engineer officer who was one of the expedition.
The French fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one hundred and
eighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb-ketches with four
large mortars. The whole number of guns, of whatever description, found
in the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven; a large portion of these,
however, were for land defence. (Fig. 37.)
When the French vessels were towed into the position selected for the
attack, "it was lucky for us," says the French officer in his report,
"that the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly
two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire." "We were
exposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders,
seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eighteen-pounder
carronades--_in all nineteen pieces only_." If these be converted into
equivalent twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of the
balls, the whole nineteen guns will be _less than twelve twenty-four
pounders_. This estimate is much too great, for it allows three
eight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and each of the
eighteen-pounder carronades to be three quarters the power of a long
twenty-four-pounder; whereas, at the distance at which the parties were
engaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. Two of the powder
magazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up during the
engagement, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of
the castle were dismounted; thus reducing the land force to _an
equivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders_. The other sixteen guns were
still effective when abandoned by the Mexicans. The cannonade and
bombardment continued about six hours, eight thousand two hundred and
fifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the French. The
principal injury received by the work was from the explosion of the
powder magazine. But very few guns were dismounted by the fire of the
French ships, and only three of these on the water front. The details of
the condition of the ships and fort are given in the report of the
French officer,[22] but it is unnecessary to repeat them here.
[Footnote 22: Vide also House Doc. No. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, first
session]
In general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned report, that the
number of guns actually brought into action by the floating force,
(counting only one broadside of the ship,) amounted to _ninety-four
guns, besides four heavy sea-mortars_; that the whole number so employed
in the fort was only _nineteen, including the smallest calibres_; that
these guns were generally so small and inefficient, that their balls
would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates; the
principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion
of powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured; that
the castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured by
the French fire; that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the
ordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few of
their guns had been dismounted; that notwithstanding all the
circumstances in favor of the French, their killed and wounded, in
proportion to the guns acting against them, was upwards of _four times_
as great as the loss of the English at the battle of Trafalgar!
_St. Jean d'Acre_.--The narratives of the day contained most exaggerated
accounts of the English attack on St. Jean d'Acre; now, however, the
principal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated. For
the amount of the fleet we quote from the British official papers, and
for that of the fort, from the pamphlet of Lieutenant-colonel
Matuszewiez. These statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives,
more recently published, of several English and French eye-witnesses.
The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their
plans, and much decayed. Their entire armament amounted to only two
hundred guns, some of which were merely field-pieces. The water fronts
were armed with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the
smaller calibre included. (Fig. 38.) When approached by the British
fleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, says Commodore Napier,
"were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack."
The British fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, carrying six
hundred and forty-six guns; six frigates, carrying two hundred and
thirty-six guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or three
other vessels, whose force is not given. "Only a few guns," says Napier,
"defended the approach from the northward," and most of the ships came
in from that direction. The western front was armed with about forty
cannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying
about five hundred guns. Their fire was tremendous during the
engagement, but _no breach was made_ in the walls. The south front was
armed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces. This front
was attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred
guns. The eastern front was armed only with light artillery; against
this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying about two
hundred and forty guns. The guns of the works were so poorly mounted,
that but few could be used at all; and these, on account of the
construction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored
close by the walls. "Only five of their guns," says Napier, "placed in a
flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were
pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only." The stone was
of so poor a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that
the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance,
but they were nowhere seriously injured. In the words of Napier, "_they
were not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secure
under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering
much loss_." The accidental explosion of a magazine within the fort,
containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of sixty
thousand square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the
fortifications, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and wounded
a thousand men of the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the French
account, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The prisoners and
malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison at
the same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on the
land side. The uselessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort,
the attacks of the English, all combined to force the retreat of the
garrison, "in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders."
We will close this account with the following extract of a speech of the
Duke of Wellington, in the House of Lords, Feb. 4, 1841: "He had had,"
he said, "a little experience in services of this nature; and he thought
it his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they must
not always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant
their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully
with stone walls. He had no recollection, in all his experience, except
the recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by
ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of San Juan
d'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This was, he thought, the
single instance that he recollected, though he believed that something
of the sort had occurred at the siege of Havana, in 1763. The present
achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times. This was
his opinion, and he gave the highest credit to those who had performed
such a service. It was, altogether, a most skilful proceeding. He was
greatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board the
fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it was
because the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary
distance. The guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a
greater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over the
ships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means,
they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which they would
otherwise have experienced. Not less than five hundred pieces of
ordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with which
the fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the
blowing up of the large magazine--all aided in achieving this great
victory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say thus much,
because he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds
as this could be effected every day. He would repeat that this was a
singular instance, in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill
was manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar
circumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. It must not
therefore be expected, as a matter of course, that all such attempts
must necessarily succeed."
Having completed our examination of the ability of land batteries to
cope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us consider, for a few
moments, the objection which is sometimes made to the use of
fortifications for the defence of the sea-coast, viz.: _that our
maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured
by a home squadron_.
We have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means
of defence for another. The efficiency of the bayonet can in no way
enable us to dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops
in the passage of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, render
cavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. To the
navy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the high
seas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of our
harbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns.
Let us take a case in point. For the defence of New York city, it is
deemed highly important that the East River should be closed to the
approach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the
city, so that an army landed there would have to cross the Westchester
creek, the Bronx, Harlem river, and the defiles of Harlem
heights--obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. Throg's
Neck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there not
only command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep it
for a great distance above and below. No other position, even _in_ the
channel itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we had only naval
means of defence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to place
the floating defences themselves on this point. Leaving entirely out of
consideration the question of relative _power, position_ alone would
give the superior efficiency to the fort. But there are other
considerations no less important than that of position. Fort Schuyler
can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which
will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city.
On the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen;
they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent land
operations. Moreover, forts, situated as this is, can be so planned as
to bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of guns
than can be presented by any hostile squadron against the corresponding
portion of the fort. This result can be obtained with little difficulty
in narrow channels, as is done in most of the other works for the
defence of New York, the works for Boston, Newport, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, &c., and an approximation
to it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries,
like the Chesapeake.
But we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets
to our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force
exclusively. Let us leave out of consideration the security of all our
other harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance
of having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast, in the
absence of his fleet. We take the single case of the attack being made
on New York harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there. Now, if
this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may
be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us--for an
attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best
materials. But here the consequences of victory are very unequal: the
enemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our
squadron and the objects it is intended to defend. If we suppose our own
naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor
would in all respects be complete, provided this force never left the
harbor. But, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must
be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively
upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's
fleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping
him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the
loss of our harbor.
These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single
harbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the
Delaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New
Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and
therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy
will direct his assaults. If he come to one of these in the absence of
our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole
force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both
fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged as
to meet these enterprises?
"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack
out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can
indicate the spot? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to
be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the
advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in
front of it, shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely less
than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to
ours? Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; or
shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern
cities, or give them up also? We must unquestionably do one of two
things--either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our
cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances
of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question."
"On the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising
in front of it--or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an
enemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get
no glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps
on the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience."
The naval power of Spain under Philip II. was almost unlimited. With the
treasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a
fleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another
country, was no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force
was of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency for this
purpose was well tested in 1596. England and Holland attacked Cadiz with
a combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships, which entered the Bay
of Cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by the
Spanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to England, passed along
a great portion of the Spanish coast without ever meeting with the
slightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish floating defences.
In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-two
thousand men, sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meeting
with any opposition from the superior British fleet which had been sent
out, under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. The landing of
the troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon the
coast of France to seek shelter.
In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many
smaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soon
afterwards returned to France, and the others proceeded to the gulf of
St. Lawrence. An English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some
frigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passed
each other in a thick fog, and all the French vessels except two reached
Quebec in safety.
In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a British
force under Commodore Bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity,
escaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent
upon Carrickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, without
meeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships of the line
were then stationed upon the coasts of England and France, and several
of these were actually in pursuit.
In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into
Ireland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to
intercept the French fleet in its passage. The Channel fleet, of near
thirty sail of the line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead;
Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward;
Vice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with thirteen sail of the
line; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the
harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triple
floating bulwark, as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast, a
second in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores--the French
fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five
thousand men, reached Bantry Bay in safety! This fleet was eight days on
the passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of the
vessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had it not been for
disasters by storms, for only _one_ of their whole number was
intercepted by the vast naval force which England had assembled for that
express object. "The result of this expedition," says Alison, "was
pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries.
To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a
maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small
number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and
the unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the
best concerted enterprises. To the English, as showing that _the empire
of the seas does not always afford security against invasion;_ that, in
the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen
days at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her
sailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved
them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. While
these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion,
they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening
confidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that _the only base
upon which certain reliance can be placed_, even by an insular power,
_is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects_."
Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks.
In the following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops,
passed the British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping
in the port of Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast
of Wales. Again, in 1798, the immense British naval force failed to
prevent the landing of General Humbert's army in the bay of Killala;
and, in the latter part of the same year, a French squadron of nine
vessels and three thousand men escaped Sir J.B. Warren's squadron, and
safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further illustration, we quote
from the report of the Board of National Defence in 1839.
The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the line
and twenty smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making in
all, three hundred sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port
and sailed to Malta. "It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly
that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria.
The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage;
so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding them
there, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his
adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the
French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there,
achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the
narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the
actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson,
notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear
nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability
of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic."
"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in
the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West
Indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe;
his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay
of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at
Trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to
the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given,
were willing to try the issue of a battle--these are instances, of the
many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of
encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and
how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most
exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse
chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who
seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and
without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When
out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had
taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by
tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again
put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz."
"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to
belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country,
this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of
chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as
to the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and
without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. The navy is
required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance,
and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes
are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the
purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of
storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact
spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of
fogs and darkness."
"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are
satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it
submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the
war, having no hope or reserve beyond."
"The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a
more glorious sphere--that of the _offensive_. In our last war, instead
of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of
the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number--instead of
leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and
our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over
the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas,
everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's
navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's
property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered,
and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered
vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal--they rendered
benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they
acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any
that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.
Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the
navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it
has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and
advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In
order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active
and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same
time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit,
we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."
A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy
of their support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regard
this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can
seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No
matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be
substituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where this
might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let us
endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city,
the Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in
this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the _outer_ harbor of
New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or
that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot
reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel
them. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a
shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous
preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its
possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important.
Strong fortifications on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might
probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the
entrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force
stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of
forts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less
certain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well
consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the
proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect
the same object, and to be kept continually _at home_ for that special
purpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our
commerce, its character and efficiency as a _harbor_ defence would be
lost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force--fixed within the
limits of the defence of this particular place--and our estimates must
be made accordingly.
The average durability of ships of war in the British navy, has been
variously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten
to twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his
"Brief Inquiry," published in 1812, estimates the average durability at
about eight years. His calculations seem based upon authentic
information. A distinguished English writer has more recently arrived at
the same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the Board of
Admiralty during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. The
data in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for
_building_ and _repairing_ having been so expended as to render it
impossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. But, in the returns
now before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the
_timbers_ used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this
(the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate
comparisons.
According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber, for hulls,
masts, and yards, in _building_ an English 74 gun ship, is £61,382. Let
us now compare this cost of timber for _building_, with that of the same
item for _repairs_, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and
1820. The list would have been still further enlarged, but the returns
for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect:
============================================================
Name of Ship. |No. of| When | Repaired from | Cost.
|Guns. |built.| |
------------------------------------------------------------
Vengeance,...........| 74 | -- | 1800 to 1807 | £84,720
Ildefonso,...........| 74 | -- | 1807 to 1808 | 85,195
Scipio,..............| 74 | -- | 1807 to 1809 | 60,785
Tremendous,..........| 74 | -- | 1807 to 1810 | 135,397
Elephant,............| 74 | -- | 1808 to 1811 | 67,007
Spencer,.............| 74 | 1800 | 1809 to 1813 | 124,186
Romulus,.............| 74 | -- | 1810 to 1812 | 73,141
Albion,..............| 74 | 1802 | 1810 to 1813 | 102,295
Donegal,.............| 74 | -- | 1812 to 1815 | 101,367
Implacable,..........| 74 | -- | 1813 to 1815 | 59,865
Illustrious,.........| 74 | 1803 | 1813 to 1816 | 74,184
Northumberland,......| 74 | -- | 1814 to 1815 | 59,795
Kent,................| 74 | -- | 1814 to 1818 | 88,357
Sultan,..............| 74 | 1807 | 1816 to 1818 | 61,518
Sterling Castle,.....| 74 | -- | 1816 to 1818 | 65,280
------------------------------------------------------------
This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships,
during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of _timber alone_
used in their repair, an average of about $400,000 each. More timber
than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid
for out of the funds appropriated "for such as may be ordered in course
of the year to be repaired." But the amount specifically appropriated
for timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen
years, equal the entire _first cost_ of the same items. If we add to
this amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to
the operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of
other materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the
ships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the
whole sum _expended_ under these heads to equal the first cost, even
within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timber
used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between 1800 and 1820, was
£18,727,551; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," £17,449,780;
making an annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and
$4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels
_built_ were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so
decayed as to be broken up.
But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the
sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in
building and repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815.
===============================================================
| | For the wear|Ext. Expenses| For entire |
| Year | and tear of |for building,| sea-service. |
| | Ships. |repairing,&c.| |
|---------------------------------------------------|
| 1800 | £4,350,000 | £772,140 | £13,619,079 |
| 1801 | 5,850,000 | 933,900 | 16,577,037 |
| 1802 | 3,684,000 | 773,500 | 11,833,571 |
| 1803 | 3,120,000 | 901,140 | 10,211,378 |
| 1804 | 3,900,000 | 948,520 | 12,350,606 |
| 1805 | 4,680,000 | 1,553,690 | 15,035,630 |
| 1806 | 4,680,000 | 1,980,830 | 18,864,341 |
| 1807 | 5,070,000 | 2,134,903 | 17,400,337 |
| 1808 | 5,070,000 | 2,351,188 | 18,087,544 |
| 1809 | 3,295,500 | 2,296,030 | 19,578,467 |
| 1810 | 3,295,500 | 1,841,107 | 18,975,120 |
| 1811 | 3,675,750 | 2,046,200 | 19,822,000 |
| 1812 | 3,675,750 | 1,696,621 | 19,305,759 |
| 1813 | 3,549,000 | 2,822,031 | 20,096,709 |
| 1814 | 3,268,000 | 2,086,274 | 19,312,070 |
| 1815 | 2,386,500 | 2,116,710 | 19,032,700 |
---------------------------------------------------------------
It appears from this table that the appropriations for the service,
during the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a
little less than _ninety millions_ of dollars per annum; and for the
wear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary expenses in building and
repairing ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near
_thirty millions_.
Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to
form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and
repairs of our men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report
of the Secretary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th
Congress,) will afford data for an approximate calculation:--
======================================================================
Name of No. Total Cost When Cost of Repaired
Ship. of of building, completed. Repairs, between.
Guns. exclusive of exclusive
armament, of
stores, ordnance,
&c. &c. &c. &c.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Delaware, 74 $543,368 00 1820 $354,132 56 1827 and 1838
N. Carolina, 74 431,852 00 1825 317,628 92 1824 and 1836
Constitution, 44 302,718 84 1797 266,878 34 1833 and 1839
United States 44 299,336 56 1797 571,972 77 1821 and 1841
Brandywine, 44 [23]299,218 12 1825 [23]377,665 95 1826 and 1838
Potomac, 44 [23]231,013 02 1822 [23] 82,597 03 1829 and 1835
Concord, 20 115,325 80 1828 72,796 22 1832 and 1840
Falmouth, 20 94,093 27 1827 130,015 43 1828 and 1837
John Adams, 20 110,670 69 1829 119,641 93 1834 and 1837
Boston, 20 91,973 19 1825 189,264 37 1826 and 1840
St. Louis, 20 102,461 95 1828 135,458 75 1834 and 1839
Vincennes, 20 111,512 79 1826 178,094 81 1830 and 1838
Vandalia, 20 90,977 88 1828 59,181 34 1832 and 1834
Lexington, 20? 114,622 35 1826 83,386 52 1827 and 1837
Warren, 20? 99,410 01 1826 152,596 03 1830 and 1838
Fairfield, 20 100,490 35 1826 65,918 26 1831 and 1837
Natches,[24] 20? 106,232 19 1827 129,969 80 1829 and 1836
Boxer, 10 30,697 88 1831 28,780 48 1834 and 1840
Enterprise, 10 27,938 63 1831 20,716 59 1834 and 1840
Grampus, 10 23,627 42 1821 96,086 36 1825 and 1840
Dolphin, 10 38,522 62 1836 15,013 35 1839 and 1840
Shark, 10 23,627 42 1821 93,395 84 1824 and 1839
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Footnote 23: Returns incomplete.]
[Footnote 24: Broken up in 1840.]
It appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of
the line is about $6,600 per gun; of frigates, $6,500 per gun; of
smaller vessels of war, a little less than $5,000 per gun: making an
average cost of vessels of war to be _more than six thousand dollars per
gun._ And the expense of repairs for these vessels is _more than seven
per cent. per annum_ on their first cost.
We have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. The
Fulton, four guns, built in 1838-'39, cost three hundred and
thirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and
seventy-seven cents; the Mississippi and Missouri, ten guns each, built
in 1841, cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece; making an
average cost for war-steamers of _over sixty thousand dollars per gun._
The cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for
vessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience to
determine the exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by competent
judges, that when kept, the expense of repairs will at least equal
twelve per cent. of the first cost. The expense of keeping them in
commission is enormously great. "Their engines," says the Secretary of
the Navy, in his annual report in 1842, "consume so much fuel as to add
enormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they should return
to port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders it
impossible to send them on any distant service. They cannot be relied on
as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of
peace. I have therefore determined to take them out of commission, and
substitute for them other and less expensive vessels."
The average cost of permanent fortifications is but _little more than
three thousand dollars per gun_. And it must be obvious, from the nature
of the materials of which they are constructed, that the expense of
their support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some years
past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has been
under the head of "repairs;" but much of this sum is for alterations and
enlargements of temporary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the
war of 1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual repairs of decayed
or injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from the
nature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials and
poor workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. But if we include
the risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn from
past experience, that _one-third of one per cent. per annum_, of the
first cost, will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have been
constructed since the last war.
But it is unnecessary to further discuss this question We repeat what
has already been said, no matter what may be the relative cost of ships
and forts, the one, as a general thing, cannot be substituted for the
other. Each has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in
its own way, to the national defence; and any undue increase of one, at
the expense of the other, will be attended by a corresponding diminution
of national power.[25]
[Footnote 25: For further information concerning our system of sea-coast
defences, the reader is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixth
Congress, second session; Senate Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, second
session; and to the annual reports of the Chief Engineer.]