TACTICS.
IV. Tactics.--We have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troops
into action, or of moving them in the presence of the enemy;--that is,
within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. This branch of
the military art has usually been divided into two parts: 1st. Grand
Tactics, or the tactics of battles; and 2d. Elementary Tactics, or
tactics of instruction.[9]
[Footnote 9: "It does not come within the view of this work to say any
thing of the merely mechanical part of the art; because it must be taken
for granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army knows at
least the alphabet of his trade. If he does not, (unless his enemy be as
ignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy await him. Without understanding
perfectly what are called _the evolutions_, how is it possible that a
general can give to his own army that order of battle which shall be
most provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may be
placed? How know which of these evolutions the enemy employs against
him? and, of course, how decide on a counter-movement which may be
necessary to secure victory or avoid defeat? The man who shall take the
command of an army without perfectly understanding this elementary
branch, is no less presumptuous than he who should pretend to teach
Greek without knowing even his letters. If we have such generals, let
them, for their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselves
immediately to school."]
A _battle_ is a general action between armies. If only a small portion
of the forces are engaged it is usually denominated a _combat_, an
_affair_, an _action_, a _skirmish_, &c., according to the character of
the conflict. The art of combining and conducting battles of all
descriptions has been designated by the name of Grand Tactics.
Battles may be arranged into three classes; 1st. _Defensive_ battles, or
those given in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of the
enemy. 2d. _Offensive_ battles, or those made by an army which attacks
the enemy in position. 3d. The _mixed_ or _unforeseen_ battles, given by
two armies meeting while on the march.
I. When an army awaits the attack, it takes its position and forms its
line of battle according to the nature of the ground and the supposed
character and strength of the enemy's forces. Such is usually the case
when an army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard dépôts of
provisions and military stores, or some important strategic point. The
general relations of positions with strategy and engineering have
already been considered; we will now discuss merely their relations to
battles.
The first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that its
debouches shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he has
approached to the desired point, than those which the enemy can have for
attacking our line of battle. 2d. The artillery should have its full
effect upon all the avenues of approach. 3d. We should have good ground
for manoeuvring our own troops unseen, if possible, by the enemy. 4th.
We should have a full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances to
the attack. 5th. We should have the flanks of our line well protected by
natural or artificial obstacles. 6th. We should have some means of
effecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction.
It is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the same
time; and sometimes the very means of satisfying one, may be in direct
violation of another. A river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a
flank of a line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, should
the defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. Again, the position
may be difficult of attack in front or on the wings, and at the same
time unfavorable for retreat. Such was Wellington's position at
Waterloo. The park of Hougomont, the hamlet of Haye Sainte, and the
marshy rivulet of Papelotte, were serious obstacles against the
attacking force; but the marshy forest of Soignies in rear, with but a
single road, cut off all hope of retreat.
II. According to the strategic relations of the contending forces in a
campaign, will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy, or to
seek him out and attack him wherever he may be found. We may sometimes
be obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose of
preventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off forces that may be
separated from the main body by a river, &c. As a general rule the
attacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive, but this
advantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions.
The main thing in an _offensive_ battle is to seize upon the decisive
point of the field. This point is determined by the configuration of the
ground, the position of the contending forces, the strategic object of
the battle; or, by a combination of these. For example, when one wing of
the enemy rests on a height that commands the remainder of his line,
this would seem the decisive point to be attacked, for its occupation
would secure the greatest advantages; but this point may be so very
difficult of access, or be so related to the strategic object as to
render its attack out of the question. Thus it was at the battle of
Bautzen: the left of the allies rested on the mountains of Bohemia,
which were difficult of attack, but favorable for defence; moreover,
their only line of retreat was on the right, which thus became the point
of attack for the French, although the topographical and tactical key of
the field was on the left.
III. It frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result from
the meeting of armies in motion, both parties acting on the offensive.
Indeed, an army that is occupying a defensive position may, on the
approach of the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. Battles
of this kind may partake of the mixed character of offensive and
defensive actions, or they may be of the nature of a surprise to both
armies. To this class belong the battles of Rosbach, Eylau, Lutzen,
Luzzara, Abensberg, &c.
Surprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times, for the
noise of musketry and the roar of artillery, belonging to the posts or
wings assailed, will prevent any general surprise of an army. Moreover,
the division into separate masses, or _corps d'armée,_ will necessarily
confine the surprise to a part, at most, of the forces employed.
Nevertheless, in the change given to military terms, a surprise may now
mean only an unexpected combination of manoeuvres for an attack, rather
than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. In this sense
Marengo, Lutzen, Eylau, &c. are numbered with surprises. Benningsen's
attack on Murat at Zarantin in 1812 was a true surprise, resulting from
the gross negligence and carelessness of the king of Naples.
An _order of battle_ is the particular disposition given to the troops
for a determined manoeuvre on the field of battle. A _line of battle_ is
the general name applied to troops drawn up in their usual order of
exercise, without any determined manoeuvre; it may apply to defensive
positions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object has
been decided on. Military writers lay down twelve orders of battle,
viz.: 1st. The simple parallel order; 2d. The parallel order with a
crotchet; 3d. The parallel order reinforced on one or both wings; 4th.
The parallel order reinforced on the centre; 5th. The simple oblique
order; 6th. The oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing; 7th. The
perpendicular order on one or both wings; 8th. The concave order; 9th.
The convex order; 10th. The order by echelon on one or both wings; 11th.
The order by echelon on the centre; 12th. The combined orders of attack
on the centre and one wing at the same time.
(Figure 14.)[10] The simple parallel order is the worst possible
disposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight with equal
chances, and the combat must continue till accident, superior numbers,
or mere physical strength decides the day; skill can have little or no
influence in such a contest.
[Footnote 10: In the plans, B is the army in position, and A the
attacking force arranged according to the different orders of battle. To
simplify the drawings, a single line represents the position of an army,
whereas, in practice, troops are usually drawn up in three lines. Each
figure represents a grand division of twelve battalions.]
(Figure 15.) The parallel order with a crotchet on the flank, is
sometimes used in a defensive position, and also in the offensive with
the crotchet thrown forward. Malplaquet, Nordlingen, Prague, and Kolin,
are examples of this order. Wellington, at Waterloo, formed the parallel
order with the retired crotchet on the right flank.
(Figure 16.) A line of battle parallel to the enemy's, if strongly
reinforced on one point, is according to correct principles, and may in
certain cases secure the victory; but it has many inconveniences. The
weak part of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstanding its
efforts to the contrary, become engaged, and run the risk of a defeat,
and thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the strong point.
Moreover, the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit by
its success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, without
endangering its connection with the rest of the line.
(Figure 17) represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre. The
same remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding.
These two orders were frequently used by the ancients: as at the battle
of Zama, for example; and sometimes by modern generals. Turenne employed
one of them at Ensheim.
(Figure 18) is the simple oblique order.
(Figure 19) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing reinforced.
This last is better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior,
for it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point of
the enemy's line, while the weak wing is not only out of reach of
immediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in
check by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorable
point as occasion may require.
The most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of
Leuctra and Mantinea, under the celebrated Epaminondas; Leuthen, under
Frederick; the Pyramids, Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon.
(Figure 20.) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning
of a battle, as was the army of Frederick at Rosbach, and the Russian
army at Kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. An
attack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force is
vastly superior. At Eylau, Napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one
wing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre.
(Figure 21.) The concave order may be used with advantage in certain
cases, and in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battle
of Cannæ, the English at Crecy and Agincourt, and the Austrians at
Essling, in 1809.
(Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to
attack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the
passage of a river. The Romans formed this order at the battle of
Cosilinum; the French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at
Essling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic in 1813,
and at Brienne in 1814.
(Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequently
employed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there
is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both
wings. At Dresden, Napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this
is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this
was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position of
his troops.
(Figure 24.) The echelon order on the centre alone may be employed with
success against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle,
for it would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line.
The echelon order possesses in general very great advantages. The
several corps composing the army may manoeuvre separately, and
consequently with greater ease. Each echelon covers the flank of that
which precedes it; and all may be combined towards a single object, and
extended with the necessary _ensemble_. At the battle of the Pyramids,
Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. Portions of his
forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles.
(Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the centre and one
extremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the
preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. Napoleon employed this
order at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo.
It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders
of battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively
followed throughout the whole battle. The question must be decided by
the general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may be
duly weighed. An order well suited to one position might be the worst
possible in another. Tactics is in this respect the very reverse of
strategy--the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable rules.
But whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, it should seek to
dislodge the enemy, either by piercing or turning his line. If it can
conceal its real intentions, and deceive him respecting the true point
of attack, success will be more certain and decisive. A turning
manoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time
with the main attack on the line. The operations of Davoust at Wagram,
and Richepanse at Hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. The
manoeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill,
may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the Austrians at
Rivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French under Jourdan at Stackach, and
under Marmont at Salamanca.
We will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the
line of battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering,
however, much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction.
We shall begin with _infantry_, as the most important arm on the
battle-field.
There are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: 1st, as
tirailleurs, or light troops; 2d, in deployed lines; 3d, in lines of
battalions, ployed on the central division of each battalion, or formed
in squares; 4th, in deep masses.
These different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems:
1st, the thin formation of two deployed lines; 2d, a line of battalions
in columns of attack on the centre, or in squares by battalions; 3d, a
combination of these two, or the first line deployed, and the second in
columns of attack; and 4th, the deep formation of heavy columns of
several battalions. The tirailleurs are merely accessories to the main
forces, and are employed to fill up intervals, to protect the march of
the columns, to annoy the enemy, and to manoeuvre on the flanks.
1st. Formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally that
of two deployed lines of troops, as shown in Fig. 26. But reason and
experience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order,
can only move very slowly; that in attempting rapid movements it breaks
and exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be easily
pierced through by troops of a deeper order. Hence it is that the light
formation is only proper when the infantry is to make use of its fire,
and to remain almost stationary.
2d. If the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack be
employed, the depth and mobility will depend upon the organization or
habitual formation of this arm.
In our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies,
each formed in three ranks. The two flank companies are designed for
tirailleurs. This would give a column of four divisions, and
consequently twelve files deep; and as only two of these files could
employ their fire, there would be much too large a portion of
non-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. In practice, however,
we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the flank companies be
detached, would give a column of attack eight files in depth, which is
not objectionable. If however, the flank companies should be present in
the battalion, the depth of the column would still be ten files.
In the French service, each battalion is composed of four divisions,
formed in either two or three ranks. The two-rank formation is the one
habitually employed. If all the companies be present, and the formation
in three ranks, the depth of column will be twelve files; if in two
ranks the depth will be eight, files. If the flank companies be
detached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine files, and
for two ranks six files. (Figs. 27 and 28.)
In the Russian service each, battalion has four divisions of three ranks
each. But the third rank is employed as tirailleurs, which gives a depth
of column of eight files. The employment of the third rank for
tirailleurs is deemed objectionable on account of the difficulty of
rallying them on the column. For this reason, the best authorities
prefer detaching an entire division of two companies.
The formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country,
and against an enemy who is superior in cavalry. Formerly very large
squares were employed, but they are now formed either by regiment or by
battalion. The former are deemed best for the defensive, and the latter
for offensive movements. The manner of arranging these is shown in
Figure 29.
3d. The mixed system, or the combination of the two preceding, has
sometimes been employed with success. Napoleon used this formation at
Tagliamento, and the Russians at Eylau. Each regiment was composed of
three battalions, the first being deployed in line, and the other two
formed in columns of attack by division in rear of the two extremities,
as shown in Fig. 30. It may in some cases be better to place the second
and third battalions in line with the first, and on the two extremities
of this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. The centre of
the line of each regiment would be less strong, however, than when the
two battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which is
deployed. This mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in
certain situations may be employed with great advantage.
4th. The deep order of heavy columns of several battalions is
objectionable as an habitual formation for battle, inasmuch as it
exposes large masses of men to the ravages of artillery, and diminishes
the mobility and impulsion of an attack without adding greatly to its
force. Macdonald led a column of this kind at the battle of Wagram with
complete success, although he experienced enormous losses. But Ney's
heavy columns of attack at Waterloo failed of success, and suffered
terribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries.
Whenever deep columns are employed, Jomini recommends that the
grand-division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on each
flank, (Fig. 31,) marching by files, in order to protect its flanks from
the enemy's attacks. Without this defence a column of twelve battalions
deep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be thrown into disorder
or broken, as was the column of Fontenoy, and the Macedonian phalanx by
Paulus Emillus. A grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns by
brigade, as is represented in Figure 32. These are less heavy than a
single column of grand-division by battalion, but are subject to nearly
the same objections.
All offensive operations on the field of battle require _mobility,
solidity_, and _impulsion_; while, on the other hand, all defensive
operations should combine _solidity_ with _the greatest possible amount
of fire_.
Troops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms, whatever
may be their formation. If in very large masses, they move slower and
are more exposed; but the moral effect of these large moveable columns
is such, that they frequently carry positions without ever employing
their fire. The French columns usually succeeded against the Austrian
and Prussian infantry, but the English infantry could not so easily be
driven from their ground; hey also employed their fire to greater
advantage, as was shown at Talavera, Busaco, Fuente de Honore, Albuera
and Waterloo. The smaller columns and the mixed formation were always
most successful against such troops.
From these remarks we must conclude--1st. That the very thin as well as
the very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances,
and can seldom be employed with safety.
2d. That the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best for
carrying a position; the column should, however, be diminished in depth
as much as possible, in order both to increase its own fire and to
diminish its exposure to the fire of the enemy; moreover, it should be
well covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry.
3d. That the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the second
in columns of battalion by division is the best for defence.
4th. That either of the last two may be employed in the offensive or
defensive, according to the nature of the ground, the character of the
general, and the character and position of the troops. Squares are
always good against cavalry.
Troops should be habituated to all these formations, and accustomed to
pass rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night. None,
however, but disciplined troops can do this: hence the great superiority
of regulars on the field of battle, where skilful manoeuvres frequently
effect more than the most undaunted courage.
The arm next in importance on the battle-field is _cavalry_. The
principal merit of this arm consists in its _velocity_ and _mobility_.
Cavalry has little solidity, and cannot of itself defend any position
against infantry; but in connection with the other arms, it is
indispensable for beginning a battle, for completing a victory, and for
reaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe.
There are four different modes of forming cavalry, the same as for
infantry: 1st in deployed lines; 2d, a line of regiments in column of
attack on the centre; 3d, the mixed formation; and 4th, the deep
formation of several columns.
1st. The thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry, on
account of its liability to be penetrated by cavalry. The same objection
does not hold so forcibly with respect to this latter arm; but full
lines are deemed less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or
in echelon. In either case the distance between the lines should be
sufficient to prevent the second line from coming in contact with the
first, in case the latter receives a slight check. This distance need
not be so great in lines deployed checker-wise, as when they are full,
or in echelon.
2d. The second system of formation, that is, a line of columns of attack
on the central division for infantry, is by battalion, but for cavalry,
by regiment. If the regiment is composed of eight squadrons, the column
will contain four lines, two squadrons forming a division; but if
composed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only three
lines, and consequently will be six files in depth. In either case the
distance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron, when the
troops are drawn up in battle array; but when charging, the divisions
may close to a less distance.
3d. In forming a grand division of two brigades, by the third or mixed
system, two regiments may be deployed in the first line, and three
formed in columns of attack in rear of the flanks and centre, as is
shown in Fig. 33, the sixth being held in reserve. This formation is
deemed a good one.
4th. The fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is entirely unsuited
for the charge, and this formation can only be employed for troops drawn
up in reserve.
The flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed, and
squadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left,
and a little in rear of the main body, in order to protect the flanks
from the attacks of the enemy's horse. Irregular cavalry is usually
employed for this purpose.
In the formation of a grand division in line of battle, care should be
taken not to give too great an extent to the command of the generals of
brigade. If the formation be in two lines, neither brigade should form
an entire line, but each should form a wing of the division, two
regiments of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. This
rule is an important one, and should never be neglected.
It may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation of cavalry on the
battle-field, that the first line after the charge, even if most
successful, may require reforming in rear of the second line, and that
this last should be prepared to act in the front line after the first
onset. The success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge of
the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already engaged.
It is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cavalry on the
battle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, that great bodies
deployed in full lines are principally objected to. They cannot be
handled with the facility and rapidity of columns of regiments by
divisions. The attack of Nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on the
Prussian cavalry, deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry, in 1814, is a
good proof of this.
Cavalry may be brought to a charge--1st, in columns; 2d, in line; and
3d, in route, or at random, _(à la déban-dade.)_ These may also be
varied by charging either at a trot or a gallop. All these modes have
been employed with success. In a regular charge in line the lance offers
great advantages; in the melee the sabre is the best weapon; hence some
military writers have proposed arming the front rank with lances, and
the second with sabres, The pistol and the carabine are useless in the
charge, but may sometimes be employed with advantage against convoys,
outposts, and light cavalry; to fire the carabine with any effect, the
troop must be at a halt. In all charges in line, especially against
cavalry, the fast trot is deemed preferable to the gallop, on account of
the difficulty of keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased.
Lances are utterly useless in a melée, and in employing troops armed in
this way, it is of the greatest importance to keep them in order and in
line. In charging with the sabre against artillery the gallop may
sometimes be employed, for velocity here may be more important than
force.
We will now consider the formation and use of _artillery_ on the field
of battle. It may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that the fire
of artillery should be directed on that part of the enemy's line which
we design to pierce; for this fire will not only weaken this point, but
will also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry when the principal
efforts are directed towards the intended point.
In the defence, the artillery is usually distributed throughout the
whole line, on ground favorable for its fire; but the reserve should be
so placed that it can easily be brought to bear on the point where the
enemy will be most likely to direct his principal attack.
Artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly inclined in front,
and using the point-blank or ricochet fire, is the most effective; very
high points are unfavorable If possible, the concentric fire should be
employed against the enemy's columns of attack. The position of the
English artillery on the field of Waterloo, and the use of the
concentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the disposition
of this arm to be found in modern military history.
The proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy's
infantry and cavalry, consequently only a small part of it should be
employed to respond to the fire of the enemy's batteries; not more than
one third at most can be spared for this object.
If possible, batteries should be established so as to take the enemy's
line in flank, either by an oblique or enfilading fire. A direct fire
against columns of attack, with a few light pieces thrown out to take it
in flank at the same time, will always be advantageous. A direct and
flank fire was employed with success by Kleist against the column of Ney
at the battle of Bautzen; the French marshal was forced to change his
direction.
Batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, and constantly
sustained by infantry or cavalry. If attacked by cavalry, the artillery
should keep up its fire as long as possible, first with ball, and then
with grape when the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. The same
rule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire of solid
shot at a great distance is much less effective than against mounted
troops.
The _engineer troops_ are employed on the field of battle principally by
detachments, acting as auxiliaries to the other arms. Each regiment of
infantry should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act as
pioneers, for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance.
These sappers are of the utmost importance, for without them an entire
column might be checked and thrown into confusion by impediments which a
few sappers with their axes would remove in a very short time.
Detachments of engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry
and artillery for the same purpose as above. In establishing the
batteries of artillery, in opening roads for their manoeuvres, and in
arranging material obstacles for their defence, the axes, picks, and
shovels of the sappers are of infinite value. Fieldworks, bridges, and
bridge-defences, frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of
a battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the action, they
will be discussed in another place. In the attack and defence of these
field-works, the engineer troops play a distinguished part. The
consideration of this part of the subject, though perhaps properly
belonging to the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another
occasion.
We will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field of
battle.
Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and
brigades, was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines. The
cavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery distributed
along the entire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, two
of cavalry and two of infantry: in moving by a flank, they formed only
two very long columns; the cavalry, however, sometimes formed a third
and separate column in flank movements, but this disposition was rarely
made.
The French Revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composed
of the four arms combined; each division moved separately and
independently of the other. In the wars of the Empire, Napoleon united
two or more of these divisions into a _corps d'armée,_ which formed a
wing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. In addition to these
divisions and _corps d'armée,_ he had large reserves of cavalry and
artillery, which were employed as distinct and separate arms.
If the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by _corps d'armée,_ each
corps should have its own reserve, independent of the general reserve of
the army. Again, if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisions
only, each division should then have _its_ separate reserve.
An army, whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions,
usually forms, on the field of battle, a centre, two wings, and a
reserve. Each corps or division acts by itself, with its infantry,
cavalry, artillery, and engineer troops. The reserve of cavalry may be
formed in rear of the centre or one of the wings. In small forces of
fifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with advantage on the
wings, in the manner of the ancients. If the reserve of this arm be
large enough to form three separate bodies, it may _itself_ very
properly be formed into a centre and wings. If it be formed into two
columns only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between the
centre and the wings of the main force. The reserve of artillery is
employed either to reinforce the centre or a wing, and in the defensive
is frequently distributed throughout the whole line of battle. In
offensive operations, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as
possible on the intended point of attack. The mounted artillery either
acts in concert with the cavalry, of is used to reinforce that arm; the
light-foot acts with the infantry, and the batteries of heavy calibre
are distributed along the line, or concentrated on some important point
where their fire may be most effectual. They reach the enemy's forces at
a distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. They may also be
employed to draw the fire of his artillery; but their movements are too
slow and difficult for a reserve.
The order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in a
battle, depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidental
circumstances, and cannot be determined by any fixed rules. The
following, however, is most frequently employed, and in ordinary cases
may be deemed good.
The attack is first opened by a cannonade; light troops are sent forward
to annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to pick off his artillerists. The
main body then advances in two lines: the first displays itself in line
as it arrives nearly within the range of grape-shot; the second line
remains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, at a
distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the reach of the enemy's
musketry, but near enough to support the first line, or to cover it, if
driven back. The artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on
some weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes into the
opening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. The cavalry charges at
the opportune moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates
an opening in his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops,
forces them into retreat, and completes the victory. During this time
the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, so as to prevent
fresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point.
The following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:--1st.
_General battles_ are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one
of the following circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedly
superior to the enemy; when he is on the point of receiving
reinforcements, which will materially effect your relative strength;
when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of supplies or
reinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of your
operations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battle
will be greater than the disadvantage of losing it.
2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you ought
to regard as indispensable preliminaries,--a thorough knowledge of the
ground on which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the most
perfect order in your fire-arms; hospital dépôts regularly established,
with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient for the accommodation
of the wounded; points of rendezvous established and known to the
commanders of corps; and an entire possession of the passes in your own
rear.
3d. The battle being fought and _won_, the victory must be followed up
with as much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained,--a
maxim very difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobedience
which pervades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which an
able general will never dispense. No one knew better the use of this
maxim than Napoleon, and no one was a more strict and habitual observer
of it.
4th. The battle being fought and _lost_, it is your first duty to do
away the _moral_ effect of defeat,--the want of that self-respect and
self-confidence, which are its immediate followers, and which, so long
as they last, are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. It is
scarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this object,--to reinspire
a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory,--we must not
turn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him our
front also;--we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt
such measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered,
we are neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess enough
both of strength and spirit to punish his faults, should he commit any.
Do you operate in a covered or mountainous country?--avail yourself of
its ridges and woods; for by doing so you will best evade the pressure
of his cavalry. Have you defiles or villages to pass?--seize the heads
of these, defend them obstinately, and make a show of fighting another
battle. In a word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorable
incident of the ground, escape your notice or your use. It is by these
means that your enemy is checked, and your troops inspirited; and it was
by these that Frederick balanced his surprise at Hohenkirchen, and the
defeat of his plans before Olmutz. The movement of our own Washington,
after losing the battle of Brandywine, was of this character. He hastily
recrossed the Schuylkill with the professed intention of seeking the
enemy and renewing the combat, which was _apparently_ prevented only by
a heavy and incessant fall of rain. A rumor was now raised that the
enemy, while refusing his left wing, was rapidly advancing upon his
right, to intercept our passage of the river, and thus gain possession
of Philadelphia. This report justified a retreat, which drew from the
General repeated assurances, that in quitting his present position and
giving to his march a retrograde direction, it was not his object to
avoid, but to follow and to fight the enemy. This movement, though no
battle ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well of the
people as of the army.[11]
[Footnote 11: There are innumerable works in almost every language on
elementary tactics; very few persons, however, care to read any thing
further than the manuals used in our own service. Our system of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from the
French; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured,
for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the French manuals for
the varied duties of this arm.
On Grand Tactics, or Tactics of Battles, the military and historical
writings of General Jomini abound in most valuable instructions.
Napoleon's memoirs, and the writings of Rocquancourt, Hoyer, Decker,
Okouneff, Roguiat, Jocquinot-de-Presle, Guibert, Duhesme, Gassendi,
Warnery, Baron Bohan, Lindneau, Maiseroy, Miller, and Ternay, are
considered as being among the best authorities.]