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THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA
FIRST EDITION _December 1906_
_Reprinted_ _February 1907_
_Reprinted_ _March 1907_
_Reprinted_ _July 1908_
_Reprinted_ _October 1909_
_Reprinted_ _September 1910_
_Reprinted_ _January 1912_
THE BATTLE OF
TSU-SHIMA
BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN
FLEETS, FOUGHT ON 27TH MAY 1905
BY CAPTAIN VLADIMIR SEMENOFF
(ONE OF THE SURVIVORS)
TRANSLATED BY
CAPTAIN A. B. LINDSAY
2ND KING EDWARD’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
WITH A PREFACE BY
SIR GEORGE SYDENHAM CLARKE
G.C.M.G., F.R.S.
NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
1913
“Captain Semenoff’s little volume, which would well repay translation,
is a remarkably graphic and luminous account of Admiral Togo’s
great victory, compiled from notes taken by the author during the
engagement. His account is all the more interesting as he was also on
the _Cesarevitch_ when Admiral Vitoft made his unsuccessful attempt
to escape from Port Arthur on 10th August 1904.... Every word of this
little volume bears the impress of reality, and enables the reader to
form a vivid picture of the various phases of the battle. There is a
plan showing the positions of the contending fleets from 1.20 till 7
P.M.”
--_Times Literary Supplement_, 17th August 1906.
PREFACE
The paucity of war experience since the introduction of the
steam-driven armoured ship invests the battle of Tsu-shima with supreme
importance. Between Trafalgar and the 27th May 1905, there had been
only two fleet actions on a large scale--those of Lissa and of the
Yalu--and the first was fought before the wooden vessel had disappeared
and the rifled gun had become universal. The various minor engagements
which occurred during this long period were either destitute of
teaching, or failed to provide an adequate basis for conclusions
capable of serving as guides to a rational system of tactics or to a
scientific shipbuilding policy.
It has, therefore, followed, in this country especially, that the
evolution of the warship has been frequently capricious, indicating
the absence of any clear principles, and entailing an immense total
expenditure upon vessels unsuited to our national requirements, but
happily not forced to demonstrate their inutility.
In all wars, whether by sea or land, some few general lessons stand out
unmistakably; but the difficulty of arriving at a just estimate of the
relative significance of the causes which have led to victory or to
defeat is always extreme. Genius, which may be defined as an unerring
sense of proportion, is necessarily rare, and the person with an _idée
fixe_ in favour of some particular method or weapon will generally
discover, in every conflict, evidence in support of his faith. This
tendency will be most marked when national experience of war is
lacking, and we are, therefore, compelled to draw our inspirations from
fighting carried on by other peoples.
In the long series of wars which culminated in the Nelson era, broad
principles had been evolved and had been grasped by the leaders of
naval thought. More than ninety years have elapsed since the British
Navy was called upon to fight a great fleet action, and meanwhile
technical progress of all kinds, advancing by giant strides, has opened
out new possibilities tending to bewilder the imagination and to
invite mistakes and impolicy.
Even when, as now, valuable war experience is available, there is
always a risk of false deductions. Conditions differ so greatly that
generalisations based upon special episodes may be misleading and even
dangerous. Thus the American Navy and our own have unquestionably
suffered from shallow reasoning derived from the peculiar operations of
the Civil War. Similarly, the action off Lissa led to a cult of the ram
which has left a deep impress upon shipbuilding, while a few isolated
successes obtained by torpedoes, in exceptional circumstances, have
given rise to exaggerated claims on behalf of this weapon which can
only end in disappointment.
Instances could be multiplied, and the obvious moral is the vital
necessity for the most careful study by the clearest available brains
before translating any so-called lesson of war into national policy.
In a single year a navy of the magnitude of our own may be committed
to many millions of expenditure, the result of which will affect its
fighting efficiency for nearly a quarter of a century. The vital
need for caution and for profound study of all such experience as is
forthcoming is, therefore, evident.
The battle of Tsu-shima is by far the greatest and the most important
naval event since Trafalgar, and the navy which is able to draw the
most accurate conclusions, technical as well as tactical, from its
experiences and to apply them in terms of policy and of training will
secure marked advantage in the future.
At the battle of the Yalu the Japanese and Chinese fleets were
numerically equal--twelve ships--but the former had only three vessels
(all under 3000 tons) carrying side armour, and eight were protected
cruisers.[1] The Chinese, on the other hand, had five vessels with side
armour, including two battleships, and six protected cruisers.[1] In
heavy armament the Chinese had a great superiority, the Japanese having
the advantage in quick-firing guns, as shown below:
------------------------------+------+-------
GUNS. |JAPAN.| CHINA.
------------------------------+------+-------
12-inch and over | 3 | 8
Over 8-inch and under 12-inch | 8 | 17
Intermediate | 27 | 15
Q.F. 6-inch and 4.7 inch | 67 | 2
------------------------------+------+-------
At Tsu-shima the classification of armoured ships engaged was as
follows:
--------------------------+--------+--------
CLASS. | JAPAN. | RUSSIA.
--------------------------+--------+--------
Battleships | 4 | 8
Coast-defence Armour-clad | ... | 3
Armoured Cruisers | 8 | 3
+--------+--------
TOTAL, | 12 | 14
--------------------------+--------+--------
The respective armaments were:
-------+-------+-------+------+------+---------------
| | | | | Q.F.
| | | | +------+--------
GUNS. | 12-IN.| 10-IN.| 9-IN.| 8-IN.| 6-IN.| 4.7 IN.
-------+-------+-------+------+------+------+--------
Japan | 16 | 1 | ... | 30 | 160 | ...
Russia | 26 | 15 | 4 | 8 | 102 | 30
-------+-------+-------+------+------+------+--------
In heavy guns (9-inch and over) the Russians had the large
preponderance of 28, the proportion being 45 to 17. In the smaller
types, 4.7-inch to 8-inch, on the other hand, the Japanese superiority
was 50, and in the 6-inch Q.F. type alone it was 58. A fair inference
seems to be that the Japanese secondary armaments played the most
important part in the first and practically decisive period of the
battle.
In both actions the Japanese had the highest average speed--about 2
knots at the battle of the Yalu and much more at Tsu-shima, where the
three Russian coast-defence ships, the older battleships, and the three
armoured cruisers were poor steamers. Excluding, on the Russian side,
the _Sissoy-Veliki_, _Navarin_, and _Nicolay I._, the difference of
average battleship speed was only 0.6 knots; but the condition of the
Russian vessels was such that they could not approach their theoretical
maximum.
These were the antecedent technical conditions of a great battle
which, in the startling decisiveness of its results, and in the fact
that the victors lost no ship, challenges comparison with that of the
Nile. The tangled chain of causation now requires to be unravelled
by the coolest heads at our disposal, excluding all previous bias,
and seeking only to apportion the true relative values of the various
factors involved with the single object of securing the sound direction
of future naval policy.
What part did superior speed play in carrying destruction to the
Russian fleet? What guns established the initial superiority of fire
and wrought the havoc, moral and material, which ensured victory? What
purpose did armour serve, and how did its distribution conform to the
needs of the battle? It is upon the answers to such questions as these
that our naval policy must depend.
Underlying the experience of the battle of Tsu-shima there are
undoubtedly principles of general application. It is for us to
ascertain those principles, and to apply them as a test to all ship
designs and tactical theories.
The merit of this little work is that it records the impressions of
a naval officer who apparently had no official duties to absorb his
attention. Captain Semenoff had also the advantage of being present on
board the _Cesarevitch_ at the action of the 10th August 1904, when
it was vital to the Japanese to take no great risks. He significantly
notes the difference of conditions. At Tsu-shima, Admiral Togo was
determined to force a decisive action. Moreover, the Japanese had,
meanwhile, improved their fuses. Thus, in the later action, “shells
seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly.... It seemed as if these were
mines, not shells.... They burst as soon as they touched anything....
No! It was different to the 10th August.”
Incidentally the author notes the “portmanteaus” (Japanese 12-inch
shell) “curving awkwardly head over heels through the air and falling
anyhow on the water.” This shows that some of the Japanese 12-inch
guns--numbering only sixteen--were so much worn as to be unable to give
adequate rotation to their projectiles, which consequently could only
have hit the Russian ships by accident.
The _Suvoroff_, where Captain Semenoff’s experiences were gained,
was a ship of 13,500 tons, with a continuous armour belt 12 feet
broad, tapering in length at the water-line from 8 inches to 6 inches,
and vertically from 6 inches to 4 inches above. Her heavy armament
consisted of four 12-inch guns in 10-inch turrets, standing upon
10-inch barbettes built up from the armoured deck. The secondary
armament of twelve 6-inch guns was mounted in 6-inch turrets standing
upon 6-inch barbettes, all built up from the upper deck. Below the
6-inch barbettes were armoured ammunition hoists carried down to the
belt level. A main armoured deck (3 to 2 inches) at the water-line
level extended all over the ship.
Such was the _Suvoroff_, which was driven out of the line in less than
forty minutes, and after being reduced to the hopeless state described
by Captain Semenoff, was gratuitously torpedoed by the Japanese. Being
the flag-ship of the Commander-in-Chief she was doubtless singled out
as a target; but, of her three sister-ships, the _Alexander III._ was
sunk by gun fire about five hours after the beginning of the action;
the _Borodino_ also sank in five hours, apparently as the result of the
explosion of a magazine; and the _Orel_ surrendered on the 28th with
main turrets not seriously injured and thick armour not penetrated.
The general impression conveyed by Captain Semenoff, and confirmed
from other sources, is that the Russian ships were overwhelmed by the
volume of the Japanese fire, and that frequency of hitting rather
than weight of shells should be the main object. If this conclusion
is correct, the principle which guided the British Navy in the days
of Nelson--to close to effective range and then deliver the most
rapid fire possible--has been strikingly reaffirmed. Effective ranges
have increased; but this principle remains unchanged and is probably
unchangeable.
The trouble which arose from the outbreak of fire on board the
_Suvoroff_ and from the wreckage of the bridges and spar-deck, the
men killed in the conning tower, the penetration of the armoured deck
near the bow, the down-draught of smoke, the estimate of range (“a
little more than 20 cables”) at a critical moment--all these points,
which present themselves in the narrative, claim attention and careful
comparison with other accounts.
Captain Semenoff’s impressions of the manœuvring of the fleets
may well be somewhat vague; but it is worth collating with other
observations. Lastly, the graphic touches of the author show with
painful distinctness the terrible strain imposed upon human endurance.
Few who read his account of the heroic signalmen “standing silently
and outwardly calm,” unwilling to go below the armoured deck, wishing
only for orders, and feeling “themselves indispensable to the fight,”
will be inclined to accept the recent theory that partly-trained and
half-disciplined men are fit to find a place on board ship in modern
naval war.
Upon a correct understanding of the lessons of Tsu-shima the
expenditure of millions of public money and the efficiency of the Navy
in the near future must mainly depend. If this simple narrative can,
in however small a degree, help us to attain such an understanding, its
publication will be abundantly justified.
G. S. CLARKE.
LONDON, _10th November 1906_.
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
The following account of the battle of Tsu-shima, fought on 27th May
1905, is a translation of the narrative of Captain Vladimir Semenoff, a
Russian naval officer who was on board the flag-ship (_Knyaz Suvoroff_)
during the engagement. It is of more than usual interest, as the writer
had previously served in the _Cesarevitch_ at Port Arthur, and had
taken part in the disastrous sally from that port on 10th August 1904.
At the great battle of which he now relates his experiences, he
was present in an unofficial capacity, which gave him unlimited
opportunity for observation. Moreover, the fact of his being able to
make a series of notes at the time (till too seriously wounded) puts an
additional stamp of reality on to his already most graphic account.
It should be remembered that the Russian Baltic fleet--Russia’s final
and supreme appeal to the God of Battles--left Cronstadt for the Far
East on 11th September 1904, and during all the long months till the
following May was slowly making its way, _viâ_ the Cape of Good Hope,
to Japanese waters. The difficulties encountered during that prolonged
voyage were enormous. The nerves of officers and men, who constantly
apprehended attempts to destroy the fleet, were in a continual state
of tension: news of the outside world and especially of events in
the Far East was practically unobtainable: and yet officers and men,
despite the additional disadvantage of having to take their ships into
action after these many months at sea, fearlessly entered into an
engagement which they knew meant death, and fought their ships with a
self-devotion and courage which has earned for them the admiration of
the world.
Admiral Togo--flying his flag on the _Mikasa_--awaited the enemy in
Japanese waters. His fleet, which, since the fall of Port Arthur on 2nd
January 1905, had been relieved of its blockading duties, had spent the
intervening months in repairing damage and bringing itself up to the
highest state of preparation in expectation of the coming of the Baltic
fleet.
To a nation like ourselves, whose first line of defence is the Navy,
I venture to think that these pages will give food for thought, as,
besides enabling the reader to see the paralysing and awful effect of
high explosives thrown on board a modern battleship in action, they
supply us with a picture of what a losing engagement means to those who
lose.
When first I took up the original volume I read it merely with a
view to extracting information _re_ fire effect, gun power, weather
conditions, formations, and other factors complementary to the result
of the battle. But the narrative appeared so realistic that the thought
occurred to me to place the following translation before the public.
The speed maintained by the opposing fleets during the battle is
shown in the diagram attached. Dates have been expressed according
to the English calendar (which is thirteen days in advance of the
Russian)--otherwise the writer’s own words and colloquial style have,
as far as possible, been faithfully adhered to, to the detriment of
literary style in translating.
It may be mentioned that this narrative comes as a supplement to the
very interesting account by Politovsky of the voyage of the Baltic
fleet to the Far East--recently translated by Major Godfrey and
published by John Murray under the title “From Libau to Tsu-shima.”
Politovsky went down in the _Suvoroff_, and his story ends with the
arrival of the fleet at Shanghai on 23rd May, the date on which he
posted his last letter to Russia. The following narrative commences on
25th May, as the fleet swung out of Shanghai to meet its destiny.
A. B. L.
_7th November 1906._
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
Weather on leaving Shanghai--“Order of march”--Instructions
for taking order of battle--Accident to _Senyavin’s_
engines--Manœuvres on 26th May--Spoilt by 3rd
squadron--Unpreparedness of Russian fleet--A forlorn
hope--Comparison between Russian and Japanese ships--
Feeling on Board the _Suvoroff_--Togo’s whereabouts--
A discussion--Will he be misled?--Will the Russian
fleet slip past?--Which course to follow?--Three
possibilities 1–24
CHAPTER II
Not yet discovered--Intercepting Japanese wireless
messages--Night of 26th May--Doings in the _Suvoroff_--
The engine-room--The ward-room--Reflections and
ruminations--Commander V. V. Ignatzius--His
opinion--A desperate adventure--Dawn on 27th May--The
_Sinano Maru_ runs into the hospital ships--The fleet
discovered--Recall of the scouts--Four Japanese ships
reported--_Idzumi_ sighted 6.45 A.M.--And later the 3rd
Japanese squadron--Russian fleet takes order of battle--
11.20 A.M., opens fire--A mistake--Ship’s companies
have dinner--The alarm--Japanese light cruisers--
Russians manœuvre--Orders misunderstood--Result--
Japanese main force sighted--The eve of battle--
Rozhdestvensky enters the conning tower 25–50
CHAPTER III
Movements of Japanese fleet--A dangerous manœuvre--Russians
open fire--Enemy replies--“Portmanteaus”--Accurate
shooting--Author wounded--Comparison with 10th August--
Japanese fuses--Havoc and destruction--Gun power--
A new explosive--In the conning tower--The enemy
untouched--Russian ships on fire--Fighting the flames--
A shell in the dressing station--Casualties and damage
everywhere--Again in the conning tower 51–80
CHAPTER IV
The enemy’s superior speed--His attempt to cross the Russian
T--_Suvoroff’s_ Captain wounded--A funnel shot away--
Steering gear disabled--She leaves the line--Terrific
shell fire--Japanese reports--Fore-bridge in flames--
Demchinsky wounded--Spirit of the men--Fire in the
dressing station--Attempts to extinguish it--Scene on
the upper deck--Author again wounded--The hospital--
Death and destruction in the conning tower--Necessity
of abandoning it--Transfer to lower fighting position--
Admiral wounded--Carried into a turret 81–110
CHAPTER V
The _Alexander_ leads the fleet--Attempt to pass astern of
Japanese column--Enemy turns 16 points--Destruction
in the _Alexander_--The _Borodino_ on fire--Defeat
inevitable--3.25 P.M., the _Suvoroff_ heels over--
Forward turret destroyed--Attacked by torpedo-boats--
Work of one projectile--Rumoured damage to enemy--
Effect on men’s spirits--Death of Commander Ignatzius--
Torpedo-boats approach--Only two serviceable guns--A
tour of inspection--Effect of Japanese gun fire--Their
explosive--Kursel the Courlandian--Destruction of
officers’ quarters--Author again wounded 111–135
CHAPTER VI
4 P.M., fleets lose each other--5 P.M., Russian fleet
steams northwards--Passes the _Suvoroff_--The
_Borodino_ leads--The _Alexander_ heeling over--
Torpedo-boats ahead!--The _Buiny_--Admiral to be
transferred--Attempts to collect the Staff--Death
of all hands below--No boats available--Difficulty
of the undertaking--Rozhdestvensky put aboard--The
_Buiny_ steams off--Description of the flag-ship--The
Admiral’s condition--Nebogatoff in command--Sinking
of the _Alexander_--Overtaking the fleet--Sinking of
the _Oslyabya_--Also of the _Borodino_--End of the
_Suvoroff_ 136–162
COMPOSITION OF THE OPPOSING FLEETS 163
DIAGRAM OF MOVEMENTS _At end._
TO THE EVERLASTING MEMORY
OF THE HEROES WHO
PERISHED!
THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA
In memory of the _Suvoroff_!
CHAPTER I
A fresh breeze mournfully droned through the wire rigging and angrily
dispersed the ragged, low-lying clouds. The troubled waters of the
Yellow Sea splashed against the side of the battleship, while a
thin, cold, blinding rain fell, and the raw air penetrated to one’s
very bones. But a group of officers still stood on the after-bridge,
watching the silhouettes of the transports slowly disappearing in the
rain haze.
On their masts and yard-arms signals were being flown, the last
messages and final requests of those who had been our fellow-travellers
on the long tedious voyage.
Why is it that at sea a friendly greeting of this kind, expressed
merely by a combination of flags, touches one’s heart so deeply, and
speaks to it even more than salutes, cheers, or music? Why is it that
until the signal has been actually hauled down every one looks at it,
silently and intently, as if real words, instead of motley-coloured
pieces of cloth, were fluttering in the breeze, and becoming wet with
rain? Why is it that on the signal being hauled down every one turns
away, quietly moving off to his duty, as if the last quiet handshake
had been given, and “good-bye” had been said for ever?
“Well!--how about the weather?” said some one--to break the silence.
“Grand,” answered another with a smile. “If we get this all the way
to Vladivostok, then thank the Lord! why, a general battle will be
impossible.”
Once more a signal was made to the fleet, and, having cast off the
majority[2] of our transports at Shanghai, we take up our fresh and
_last_ “order of march.”
Ahead, in wedge formation, was the scout division consisting of three
ships--the _Svietlana_, _Almaz_, and _Ural_; next came the fleet in two
columns. The starboard column consisted of the 1st and 2nd armoured
squadrons, _i.e._ eight ships--the _Suvoroff_, _Alexander_, _Borodino_,
_Orel_,[3] _Sissoy_, _Navarin_, _Nakhimoff_. On the port side were the
3rd armoured and cruiser squadrons, _i.e._ eight ships--the _Nicolay_,
_Senyavin_, _Apraxin_, _Ushakoff_, and the cruisers, _Oleg_, _Aurora_,
_Donskoy_, and _Monomakh_. On either beam, and parallel with the
leading ships, were the _Zemtchug_ and _Izumrud_, each accompanied by
two torpedo-boats, acting as scouts for the port and starboard columns.
In rear of, and between, the wakes of these columns steamed a line
of transports which we _were obliged_ to take to Vladivostok[4]--the
_Anadir_, _Irtish_, _Korea_, _Kamchatka_--and with them the repair and
steam-tugs, _Svir_ and _Russ_, ready to render assistance in case of
need. With the cruiser squadron were five torpedo-boats, whose duty
it was to co-operate with the former in protecting the transports
during the battle. Astern of all came the hospital ships, _Orel_ and
_Kostroma_.
This disposition of the fleet would make it possible, if the enemy
appeared unexpectedly, for the various squadrons to take order of
battle quickly and without any complicated manœuvres (_i.e._ without
attracting attention). The scout division was to turn from whichever
side the enemy appeared and to join the cruisers, which were to convoy
the transports out of action, and protect them from the enemy’s
cruisers. The 1st and 2nd armoured squadrons were to increase speed,
and, having inclined to port _together_,[5] were to take station in
front of the 3rd armoured squadron and proceed on their former course.
The result would be that the three squadrons would then be in single
column line ahead, and the centre of our fleet would consist of twelve
armoured ships. The _Zemtchug_ and _Izumrud_ were to manœuvre according
to circumstances and, taking advantage of their speed, together with
the torpedo-boats assigned to them, were to take station ahead, astern,
or abeam of the armoured ships. They were to be on the further side of
the fleet from the enemy, out of the range of his shells; their duty
being to prevent the enemy’s torpedo-boats from getting round the fleet.
Above was the plan of battle, worked out beforehand and known to every
officer in the fleet. The various details as to formations dependent on
the direction in which the enemy appeared, the instructions for fire
control, the manner in which assistance was to be rendered to injured
ships, the transfer of the Admiral’s flag from one ship to another,
the handing over of the command, etc., etc., were laid down in special
orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, but these details would
scarcely be of interest to readers unacquainted with naval matters.
The day (25th May) passed quietly. Towards evening it was reported
that an accident had happened to the _Senyavin’s_ engines, and all
that night we steamed slowly. In the ward-room of the _Suvoroff_ the
officers grumbled and swore at the “old tubs,”[6] as they nicknamed
Nebogatoff’s ships, but, although natural, it was hardly fair, for we
ourselves were little better. The prolonged voyage had been a long
mournful indictment of our boilers and machinery, while our martyrs of
engineers had literally had to “get oil out of flints,” and to effect
repairs although with no material at hand with which to make them.
That night, the first cold one after six months in the tropics, we
slept splendidly, but, of course, by watches, _i.e._ half the night one
half of the officers and crew were at the guns, and the other half the
remainder.
On 26th May the clouds began to break and the sun shone fitfully, but
although a fairly fresh south-westerly breeze had sprung up, a thick
mist still lay upon the water.
Being anxious to avail himself of every moment of daylight while
passing the Japanese coast, where we would most probably be attacked
by torpedoes, the Admiral arranged for the fleet to be in the centre of
its passage through the straits of Tsu-shima at noon on the 27th May.
According to our calculations this would give us about four hours to
spare, which we employed in practising manœuvres for the last time.
Once again, and for the _last_ time, we were forcibly reminded of the
old truism that a “fleet” is created by long years of practice at
sea in time of peace (cruising, not remaining in port), and, that a
collection of ships of various types hastily collected, which have only
learned to sail together on the way to the scene of operations, is no
fleet, but a chance concourse of vessels.
Taking up order of battle was moderately performed, but it was spoilt
by the 3rd squadron, and who can blame its admiral or captains? When
near Madagascar, and during our wanderings off the coast of Annam, our
ships to a certain extent had been able to learn their work, and to get
to know one another. They had, in fact, been able to “rehearse.” But as
the 3rd squadron, which joined the fleet barely a fortnight ago,[7] had
only arrived in time to finish the voyage with us and take part in the
battle, there was no time for it to receive instruction.
Admiral Togo, on the other hand, had commanded his squadron
continuously for eight years without hauling down his flag. Five of
the vice-admirals and seven of the rear-admirals taking part in the
Tsu-shima battle, in command of squadrons, ships, or as junior flag
officers, were his old comrades and pupils, having been educated under
his command. As for us, we could only regret our unpreparedness, and in
the coming fight there was nothing for us to do but to make the most of
what we had.
Rozhdestvensky thought (and facts later fully justified the opinion)
that in the decisive battle Togo would be at the head of his twelve
best armoured ships. Against them our Admiral was also to lead twelve
similar ships (which he handled magnificently), and in the duel between
them it was thought the centre of gravity of the fight would certainly
lie. The difference between our main force and that of the Japanese
was very material. The oldest of Togo’s twelve ships--the _Fuji_, was
two years younger than the _Sissoy_, which, among our twelve best, came
sixth in seniority! Their speed was one-and-a-half times as great as
ours, but their chief superiority lay in their new shells, of which we
had no inkling.
What with manœuvres, etc., the 26th May passed almost imperceptibly.
I do not know the feeling on board the other ships, but in the
_Suvoroff_ we were cheerful and eager for the fray. Anxious, of course,
we were, but not so over-anxious as to worry. The officers went their
rounds, and looked after their men more than usual; explained details,
talked, and found fault with those immediately under them more than
was their wont. Some, the thought suddenly occurring to them, put their
keepsakes and the letters which they had just written into the treasure
chest for safety.
“He evidently means to leave us!” said Lieutenant Vladimirsky, the
senior gunnery officer, pointing to a sailor who was busy rummaging in
a bag.
“What! made your preparations for going already?”
“I?” said he in amazement; and with a grin--“Yes--I am quite ready!”
“Look here!” said Lieutenant Bogdanoff, the senior torpedo officer, who
was a veteran of the former war and had been wounded at the capture of
the Taku forts--“To-morrow--or rather to-night--you’ll please go to
the office and get your accounts made up!”
This humour had no effect.
“And haven’t _you_ a presentiment? _You’ve_ been under fire before,”
asked a young sub-lieutenant, coming up, with his hand in his pocket,
in which was evidently a letter destined for the treasure chest.
Bogdanoff got annoyed. “What do you mean by a presentiment? I’m not
your fortune-teller! I tell you what! If Japanese guns begin talking to
us to-morrow you will feel something soon enough,--but you won’t feel
anything before then!”[8]
Some more officers approached. Times without number we had hotly
discussed the question,--would we meet the whole of the Japanese fleet
at Tsu-shima, or only part of it?
Optimists asserted that Togo would be misled, and would patrol to the
North to look out for us, as the _Terek_ and _Kuban_ had on the 22nd
gone round the eastern shores of Japan endeavouring to attract as much
attention there as possible.[9]
Pessimists declared that Togo was as well able as we were to understand
the conditions, and would know that a single coaling was not sufficient
to enable us to steam all round Japan; we should have to coal again.
And where? We were no longer in the tropics; the weather here was
anything but reliable, which meant we could not count upon coaling
at sea. Take shelter in some bay?--but there were telegraph stations,
and, of course, intelligence posts, everywhere. Togo would learn of
it in good time, so what would he gain by hastening northward? Even
if we succeeded in coaling at sea and slipped unnoticed into one of
the Straits, we couldn’t conceal our movements there, thanks to their
narrowness. And then--submarine and floating mines, sown along our
course, and attacks by torpedo-boats, which would be easy even in broad
daylight!
It was impossible to pass unnoticed through these Straits even in a fog
or in bad weather; how then could a fleet accompanied by transports
hope to escape observation? Even if the Almighty did bring us through
all this, what was beyond?--the meeting with the Japanese fleet which
from Tsu-shima could always come out across our course while our fleet
would have already been harassed in the Straits by torpedo-boats as
well as every conceivable type of mine.
“Gentlemen--Gentlemen! let me speak!” exclaimed the first lieutenant
and senior navigating officer, Zotoff, who was always fond of
discussions and liked making his voice heard. “It is quite clear that
the best course for us is up the eastern side of the gulf of Korea. My
chief reason for saying so is because here it is wide and deep, while
there is room for us to manœuvre, and it can be navigated without
danger in any weather. In fact, the worse the weather the better for
us. All this has been talked over till nothing more remains to be said,
and considered till nothing is left to consider; even disciples of
Voltaire themselves would admit this. Presumably Togo is no greater
fool than we, and knows this. I assume that he also knows how to use a
pair of compasses and is acquainted with the four rules of arithmetic!
This being so he can easily calculate that, if we steam round Japan,
deciding in the face of our knowledge to brave the mines before meeting
him, it would still be possible for him to intercept us on the road
to Vladivostok, if, at the same time as we come out of the ocean into
the Straits, he starts from ... Attention, gentlemen! ... from the
northernmost point of Tsu-shima. There is no doubt that arrangements
have been made to organise a defence of the Straits by mines. The naval
ports of Aomori and Mororan are on either side. If any one doesn’t
know it he ought to be ashamed of himself. Togo may tell off some of
his smaller mining vessels to go there, but he, with his main force
(I would even go so far as to say with the whole of his fleet)--where
will he be? No, I will put another question: Where ought he to be?
Why! nowhere else but off the northern point of Tsu-shima. He can gain
nothing by loitering about at sea, so he will be lying in some bay.”
“In Mazampo, for instance?” asked Sub-Lieutenant Ball, the junior
navigating officer.
“Mazampo--if you like--but let me finish. It is childish to hope that
the Japanese main fleet will be out of the way. I think we have
reached the culminating point of our adventures. To-morrow the decision
must be made: either vertically”--and, putting his hand above his head,
he energetically waved it downwards in front of him--“or”--quietly
moving his arm out to the right, and dropping it slowly downwards in a
circular direction--“a longer route, but to the west all the same.”
“How? Why? Why to the west?” broke in the bystanders.
“Because though the end may not come at once,” shouted Zotoff, “the
result will be the same! It’s absurd to think of steaming victoriously
into Vladivostok, or of getting command of the sea! The only possible
chance is a dash through! and having dashed through, after two, three,
or at the most four sallies, we shall have burnt all our supplies of
coal, and have shed our blossoms before we have bloomed! We shall have
to prepare for a siege, take our guns on shore, teach the crew to use
bayonets----”
“A bas! A bas! Conspuez le prophête!” interrupted some. “Hear! Hear!
strongly[10] said!” shouted others. “What about Austria’s Parliament!”
“Let him finish,” growled Bogdanoff in his bass voice.
“Having postponed a discussion of questions of the distant future--a
discussion which makes those who take part in it so excited,” continued
Zotoff, availing himself of a quiet moment, “I will venture to say a
few words concerning what is immediately at hand. I foresee three
possibilities. Firstly:--If we have already been discovered, or are
discovered in the course of the day, we shall certainly be subjected
at night to a series of torpedo attacks, and in the morning shall have
to fight the Japanese fleet, which will be unpleasant. Secondly:--If
we are not discovered till to-morrow we shall be able to commence the
fight at full strength, without casualties, which will be better.
Lastly, and thirdly:--If the mist thickens and dirty weather comes on,
thanks to the width of the Straits, we may either slip through, or
be discovered too late, when there will be only the open sea between
us and Vladivostok.--This would be excellent. On these three chances
those who wish may start the totalisator! For myself, preparing for
the worst, and foreseeing a broken night, I suggest that we all take
advantage of every spare hour to sleep.”
His words had the desired effect.