CHAPTER VI. CHRONOLOGY AND HISTORY.

Media . . . quam ante regnum Cyri superlovis et incrementa Persidos

legimus Asiae reginam totius.--Amm. Marc, xxiii. 6.

The origin of the Median nation is wrapt in a profound obscurity.

Following the traces which the Zendavesta offers, taking into

consideration its minute account of the earlier Arian migrations, its

entire omission of any mention of the Medes, and the undoubted fact that

it was nevertheless by the Medes and Persians that the document itself

was preserved and transmitted to us, we should be naturally led to

suppose that the race was one which in the earlier times of Arian

development was weak and insignificant, and that it first pushed itself

into notice after the ethnological portions of the Zendavesta were

composed, which is thought to have been about B.C. 1000. Quite in

accordance with this view is the further fact that in the native

Assyrian annals, so far as they have been, recovered, the Medes do not

make their appearance till the middle of the ninth century B.C., and

when they appear are weak and unimportant, only capable of opposing a

very slight resistance to the attacks of the Ninevite kings. The natural

conclusion from these data would appear to be that until about B.C. 850

the Median name was unknown in the world, and that previously, if Medes

existed at all, it was either as a sub-tribe of some other Arian race,

or at any rate as a tribe too petty and insignificant to obtain mention

either on the part of native or of foreign historians. Such early

insignificance and late development of what ultimately becomes the

dominant tribe of a race is no strange or unprecedented phenomenon to

the historical inquirer; on the contrary, it is among the facts with

which he is most familiar, and would admit of ample illustration, were

the point worth pursuing, alike from the history of the ancient and the

modern world.

But, against the conclusion to which we could not fail to be led by

the Arian and Assyrian records, which agree together so remarkably, two

startling notices in works of great authority but of a widely different

character have to be set. In the Toldoth Beni Noah, or “Book of the

Generation of the Sons of Noah,” which forms the tenth chapter of

Genesis, and which, if the work of Moses, was probably composed at

least as early as B.C. 1500, we find the Madai--a word elsewhere always

signifying “the Medes”--in the genealogy of the sons of Japhet. The word

is there conjoined with several other important ethnic titles, as Gomer,

Magog, Javan, Tubal, and Meshech; and there can be no reasonable doubt

that it is intended to designate the Median people. If so, the people

must have had already a separate and independent existence in the

fifteenth century B.C., and not only so, but they must have by that time

attained so much distinction as to be thought worthy of mention by

a writer who was only bent on affiliating the more important of the

nations known to him.

The other notice is furnished by Berosus. That remarkable historian,

in his account of the early dynasties of his native Chaldaea, declared

that, at a date anterior to B.C. 2000, the Medes had conquered Babylon

by a sudden inroad, had established a monarchy there, and had held

possession of the city and neighboring territory for a period of 224

years. Eight kings of their race had during that interval occupied the

Babylonian throne, It has been already observed that this narrative must

represent a fact. Berosus would not have gratuitously invented a foreign

conquest of his native land; nor would the earlier Babylonians, from

whom he derived his materials, have forged a tale which was so little

flattering to their national vanity. Some foreign conquest of Babylon

must have taken place about the period named; and it is certainly a most

important fact that Berosus should call the conquerors Medes. He may no

doubt have been mistaken about an event so ancient; he may have misread

his authorities, or he may have described as Medes a people of which he

really knew nothing except that they had issued from the tract which

in his own time bore the name of Media. But, while these axe mere

possibilities, hypotheses to which the mind resorts in order to escape

a difficulty, the hard fact remains that he has used the word; and this

fact, coupled with the mention of the Medes in the book of Genesis, does

certainly raise a presumption of no inconsiderable strength against,

the view which it would be natural to take if the Zendavesta and the

Assyrian annals were our solo authorities on the subject. It lends a

substantial basis to the theories of those who regard the Medes as one

of the principal primeval races; who believe that they were well known

to the Semitic inhabitants of the Mesopotamian valley as early as the

twenty-third century before Christ--long ere Abraham left Ur for Harran;

and that they actually formed the dominant power in Western Asia

for more than two centuries, prior to the establishment of the first

Chaldaean kingdom.

And if there are thus distinct historical grounds for the notion of an

early Median development, there are not wanting these obscurer but to

many minds more satisfactory proofs wherewith comparative philology

and ethnology are wont to illustrate and confirm the darker passages of

ancient history. Recent linguistic research has clearly traced among the

Arba Lisun, or, “Four Tongues” of ancient Chaldaea, which are so often

mentioned on the ancient monuments, an Arian formation, such as would

naturally have been left in the country, if it had been occupied for

some considerable period by a dominant Arian power. The early Chaldaean

ideographs have often several distinct values; and when this is the

case, one of the powers is almost always an Arian name of the object

represented. Words like nir, “man”, ar, “river,” (compare the names

Aras, Araxes, Endanus, Rha, Rhodanus, etc., the Slavonic rika, “river,”

etc.), san, “sun,” (compare German Sonne, Slavonic solnce, English

“sun,” Dutch zon, etc.), are seemingly Arian roots; and the very

term “Arian” (Ariya, “noble”) is perhaps contained in the name of a

primitive Chaldaean monarch, “Arioch, king of Ellasar.” There is

nothing perhaps in these scattered traces of Arian influence in in Lower

Mesopotamia at a remote era that points very particularly to the Medes;

but at any rate they harmonize with the historical account that has

reached us of early Arian power in these parts, and it is important that

they should not be ignored when we are engaged in considering the degree

of credence that is to be awarded to the account in question.

Again, there are traces of a vast expansion, apparently at a very early

date, of the Median race, such as seems to imply that they must have

been a great nation in Western Asia long previously to the time of the

Iranic movements in Bactria and the adjoining regions. In the Matieni

of Zagros and Cappadocia, in the Sauro-matae (or Northern Medes) of the

country between the Palus Maeotis and the Caspian, in the Maetae or

Maeotae of the tract about the mouth of the Don, and in the Maedi of

Thrace, we have seemingly remnants of a great migratory host which,

starting from the mountains that overhang Mesopotamia, spread itself

into the regions of the north and the north-west at a time which

does not admit of being definitely stated, but which is clearly

anti-historic. Whether these races generally retained any tradition of

their origin, we do not know; but a tribe which in the time of Herodotus

dwelt still further to the west than even the Maedi--to wit, the

Sigynnae, who occupied the tract between the Adriatic and the

Danube--had a very distinct belief in their Median descent, a belief

confirmed by the resemblance which their national dress bore to that of

the Medes. Herodotus, who relates these facts concerning them, appends

an expression of his astonishment at the circumstance that emigrants

from Media should have proceeded to such a distance from their original

home; how it had been brought about he could not conceive. “Still,” he

sagaciously remarks, “nothing is impossible in the long lapse of ages.”

A further argument in favor of the early development of Median power,

and the great importance of the nation in Western Asia at a period

anterior to the ninth century, is derivable from the ancient legends

of the Greeks, which seem to have designated the Medes under the two

eponyms of Medea and Andromeda. These legends indeed do not admit of

being dated with any accuracy; but as they are of a primitive type, and

probably older than Homer, we cannot well assign them to an age later

than b.c. 1000. Now they connect the Median name with the two countries

of Syria and Colchis, countries remote from each other, and neither of

them sufficiently near the true Median territory to be held from it,

unless at a time when the Medes were in possession of something like

an empire. And, even apart from any inferences to be drawn from the

localties which the Greek Myths connect with the Medes, the very fact

that the race was known to the Greeks at this early date--long before

the movements which brought them into contact with the Assyrians--would

seem to show that there was some remote period--prior to the Assyrian

domination--when the fame of the Medes was great in the part of Asia

known to the Hellenes, and that they did not first attract Hellenic

notice (as, but for the Myths, we might have imagined) by the conquests

of Cyaxarea. Thus, on the whole it would appear that we must acknowledge

two periods of Median prosperity, separated from each other by a lengthy

interval, one anterior to the rise of the Cushite empire in Lower

Babylonia, the other parallel with the decline and subsequently to the

fall of Assyria.

Of the first period it cannot be said that we possess any distinct

historical knowledge. The Median dynasty of Berosus at Babylon appears,

by recent discoveries, to have represented those Susianian monarchs who

bore sway there from B.C. 2286 to 2052. The early Median preponderance

in Western Asia, if it is a fact, must have been anterior to this, and

is an event which has only left traces in ethnological names and in

mythological speculations.

Our historical knowledge of the Medes as a nation commences in

the latter half of the ninth century before our era. Shalmaneser

II.--probably the “Shalman” of Hosea,--who reigned from B.C. 859 to B.C.

824--relates that in his twenty-fourth year (B.C. 885), after having

reduced to subjection the Zimri, who held the Zagros mountain range

immediately to the east of Assyria, and received tribute from the

Persians, he led an expedition into Media and Arazias, where he took and

destroyed a number of the towns, slaying the men, and carrying off the

spoil. He does not mention any pitched battle; and indeed it would seem

that he met with no serious resistance. The Medes whom he attacks

are evidently a weak and insignificant people, whom he holds in small

esteem, and regards as only deserving of a hurried mention. They seem

to occupy the tract now known as Ardelan--a varied region containing

several lofty ridges, with broad plains lying between them.

It is remarkable that the time of this first contact of Media with

Assyria--a contact taking place when Assyria was in her prime, and Media

was only just emerging from a long period of weakness and obscurity--is

almost exactly that which Ctesias selects as a day of the great

revolution whereby the Empire of the East passed from the hands of the

Shemites into those of the Arians. The long residence of Otesias among

the Persians, gave him a bias toward that people, which even extended to

their close kin, the Medes. Bent on glorifying these two Arian races,

he determined to throw back the commencement of their empire to a period

long anterior to the true date; and, feeling specially anxious to cover

up their early humiliation, he assigned their most glorious conquests

to the very century, and almost to the very time, when they were in fact

suffering reverses at the hands of the people over whom he represented

them as triumphant. There was a boldness in the notion of thus inverting

history which almost deserved, and to a considerable extent obtained,

success. The “long chronology” of Ctesias kept its ground until

recently, not indeed meeting with universal acceptance, but on the whole

predominating over the “short chronology” of Herodotus; and it may be

doubted whether anything less than the discovery that the native records

of Assyria entirely contradicted Ctesias would have sufficed to drive

from the field his figment of early Median dominion.

The second occasion upon which we hear of the Medes in the Assyrian

annals is in the reign of Shalmanoser’s son and successor, Shamas-Vul.

Here again, as on the former occasion, the Assyrians were the

aggressors. Shamas-Vul invaded Media and Arazias in his third year, and

committed ravages similar to those of his father, wasting the country

with fire and sword, but not (it would seem) reducing the Medes to

subjection, or even attempting to occupy their territory. Again the

attack is a mere raid, which produces no permanent impression.

It is in the reign of the son and successor of Shamas-Vul that the Medes

appear for the first time to have made their submission and accepted

the position of Assyrian tributaries. A people which was unable to offer

effectual resistance when the Assyrian levies invaded their country, and

which had no means of retaliating upon their foe or making him suffer

the evils that he inflicted, was naturally tempted to save itself from

molestation by the payment of an annual tribute, so purchasing quiet at

the expense of honor and independence. Towards the close of the ninth

century B.C. the Medes seem to have followed the example set them very

much earlier by their kindred and neighbors, the Persians, and to

have made arrangements for an annual payment which should exempt their

territory from ravage. It is doubtful whether the arrangement was made

by the whole people. The Median tribes at this time hung so loosely

together that a policy adopted by one portion of them might be entirely

repudiated by another. Most probably the tribute was paid by those

tribes only which boarded on Zagros, and not by those further to the

east or to the north, into whose territories the Assyrian arms has not

yet penetrated.

No further change in the condition of the Medes is known to have

occurred until about a hundred years later, when the Assyrians ceased

to be content with the semi-independent position which had been hitherto

allowed them, and determined on their more complete subjugation. The

great Sargon, the assailant of Egypt and conqueror of Babylon, towards

the middle of his reign, invaded Media with a large army, and having

rapidly overrun the country, seized several of the towns, and “annexed

them to Assyria,” while at the same time he also established in new

situations a number of fortified posts. The object was evidently to

incorporate Media into the empire; and the posts wore stations in which

a standing army was placed, to overawe the natives and prevent them from

offering an effectual resistance. With the same view deportation of the

people on a large scale seems to have been practised and the gaps

thus made in the population were filled up--wholly or in part--by the

settlement in the Median cities of Samaritan captives. On the country

thus re-organized and re-arranged a tribute of a new character was laid.

In lieu of the money payment hitherto exacted, the Medes were required

to furnish annually to the royal stud a number of horses. It is probable

that Media was already famous for the remarkable breed which is so

celebrated in later times; and that the horses now required of her by

the Assyrians were to be of the large and highly valued kind known as

“Nisaean.”

The date of this subjugation is about B.C. 710. And here, if we compare

the Greek accounts of Median history with those far more authentic ones

which have reached us through the Assyrian contemporary records, we are

struck by a repetition of the same device which came under our notice

more than a century earlier--the device of covering up the nation’s

disgraces at a particular period by assigning to that very date certain

great and striking successes. As Ctesias’s revolt of the Medes under

Arbaces and conquest of Nineveh synchronizes nearly with the first known

ravages of Assyria within the territories of the Medes, so Herodotus’s

revolt of the same people and commencement of their monarchy under

Deioces falls almost exactly at the date when they entirely lose their

independence. As there is no reason to suspect Herodotus either of

partiality toward the Medes or of any wilful departure from the truth,

we must regard him as imposed upon by his informants, who were probably

either Medes or Persians. These mendacious patriots found little

difficulty in palming their false tale upon the simple Halicarnassian,

thereby at once extending the antiquity of their empire and concealing

its shame behind a halo of fictitious glory.

After their subjugation by Sargon the Medes of Media Magna appear to

have remained the faithful subjects of Assyria for sixty or seventy

years. During this period we find no notices of the great mass of the

nation in the Assyrian records: only here and there indications occur

that Assyria is stretching out her arms towards the more distant and

outlying tribes, especially those of Azerbijan, and compelling them to

acknowledge her as mistress. Sennacherib boasts that early in his

reign, about B.C. 702, he received an embassy from the remoter parts of

Media--“parts of which the kings his fathers had not even heard”--which

brought him presents in sign of submission, and patiently accepted his

yoke. His son, Esar-haddon, relates that, about his tenth year (B.C.

671) he invaded Bikni or Bikan, a distant province of Media, “whereof

the kings his fathers had never heard the name;” and, attacking the

cities of the region one after another, forced them to acknowledge his

authority. The country was held by a number of independent chiefs, each

bearing sway in his own city and adjacent territory. These chiefs have

unmistakably Arian names, as Sitriparna or Sitraphernes, Eparna or

Orphernes, Zanasana or Zanasanes, and Eamatiya or Ramates. Esar-haddon

says that, having entered the country with his army, he seized two of

the chiefs and carried them off to Assyria, together with a vast spoil

and numerous other captives. Hereupon the remaining chiefs, alarmed

for their safety, made their submission, consenting to pay an annual

tribute, and admitting Assyrian officers into their territories, who

watched, if they did not even control, the government.

We are now approaching the time when Media seems to have been first

consolidated into a monarchy by the genius of an individual. Sober

history is forced to discard the shadowy forms of kings with which Greek

writers of more fancy than judgment have peopled the darkness that rests

upon the “origines” of the Medes. Arbaces, Maudaces, Sosarmus, Artycas,

Arbianes, Artseus, Deioces--Median monarchs, according to Ctesias or

Herodotus, during the space of time comprised within the years B.C. 875

and 655--have to be dismissed by the modern writer without a word,

since there is reason to believe that they are mere creatures of the

imagination, inventions of unscrupulous romancers, not men who once

walked the earth. The list of Median kings in Ctesias, so far as it

differs from the list in Herodotus, seems to be a pure forgery--an

extension of the period of the monarchy by the conscious use of a system

of duplication. Each king, or period, in Herodotus occurs in the list

of Ctesias twice--a transparent device, clumsily cloaked by the cheap

expedient of a liberal invention of names. Even the list of Herodotus

requires curtailment. His Deioces, whose whole history reads more like

romance than truth--the organizer of a powerful monarchy in Media just

at the time when Sargon was building his fortified posts in the

country and peopling with his Israelite captives the old “cities of the

Medes”--the prince who reigned for above half a century in perfect

peace with his neighbors, and who, although contemporary with Sargon,

Sennacherib, Esar-haddon, and As-shur-bani-pal--all kings more or less

connected with Media--is never heard of in any of their annals, must

be relegated to the historical limbo in which repose so many “shades of

mighty names;” and the Herodotean list of Median kings must at any

rate, be thus far reduced. Nothing is more evident than that during the

flourishing period of Assyria under the great Sargonidae above named

there was no grand Median kingdom upon the eastern flank of the empire.

Such a kingdom had certainly not been formed up to B.C. 671, when

Esar-haddon reduced the more distant Medes, finding them still under the

government of a number of petty chiefs. The earliest time at which we

can imagine the consolidation to have taken place consistently with what

we know of Assyria is about B.C. 760, or nearly half a century later

than the date given by Herodotus.

The cause of the sudden growth of Media in power about this period, and

of the consolidation which followed rapidly upon that growth, is to

be sought, apparently, in fresh migratory movements from the Arian

head-quarters, the countries east and south-east of the Caspian. The

Cyaxares who about the year B.C. 632 led an invading host of Medes

against Nineveh, was so well known to the Arian tribes of the north-east

that, when in the reign of Darius Hystaspis a Sagartian raised the

standard of revolt in that region he stated the ground of his claim to

the Sagartian throne to be descent from Cyaxares. This great chief,

it is probable, either alone, or in conjunction with his father (whom

Herodotus calls Phraortes), led a fresh emigration of Arians from the

Bacterian and Sagartian country to the regions directly east of the

Zagros mountain chain; and having thus vastly increased the strength of

the Arian race in that quarter, set himself to consolidate a mountain

kingdom capable of resisting the great monarchy of the plain. Accepted,

it would seem, as chief by the former Arian inhabitants of the tract, he

proceeded to reduce the scattered Scythic tribes which had hitherto held

possession of the high mountain region. The Zimri, Minni, Hupuska,

etc., who divided among them the country lying between Media Proper and

Assyria, were attacked and subdued without any great difficulty; and the

conqueror, finding himself thus at the head of a considerable kingdom,

and no longer in any danger of subjugation at the hands of Assyria,

began to contemplate the audacious enterprise of himself attacking

the Great Power which had been for so many hundred years the terror of

Western Asia. The supineness of Asshur-bani-pal, the Assyrian king,

who must at this time have been advanced in years, encouraged his

aspirations; and about B.C. 634, when that monarch had held the throne

for thirty-four years, suddenly, without warning, the Median troops

debouched from the passes of Zagros, and spread themselves over the rich

country at its base, Alarmed by the nearness and greatness of the peril,

the Assyrian king aroused himself, and putting himself at the head of

his troops, marched out to confront the invader. A great battle

was fought, probably somewhere in Adiabene, in which the Medes were

completely defeated: their whole army was cut to pieces; and the father

of Cyaxares was among the slain. Such was the result of the first Median

expedition against Nineveh. The assailants had miscalculated their

strength. In their own mountain country, and so long as they should

be called upon to act only on the defensive, they might be right

in regarding themselves as a match for the Assyrians; but when they

descended into the plain, and allowed their enemy the opportunity

of manoeuvering and of using his war chariots, their inferiority was

marked. Cyaxares, now, if not previously, actual king, withdrew awhile

from the war, and, convinced that all the valor of his Medes would be

unavailing without discipline, set himself to organize the army on a

new system, taking a pattern from the enemy, who had long possessed some

knowledge of tactics. Hitherto, it would seem, each Median chief had

brought into the field his band of followers, some mounted, some on

foot, foot and horse alike armed variously as their means allowed them,

some with bows and arrows, some with spears, some perhaps with slings or

darts; and the army had been composed of a number of such bodies, each

chief keeping his band close about him. Cyaxares broke up these bands,

and formed the soldiers who composed them into distinct corps, according

as they were horsemen or footmen, archers, slingers, or lancers. He

then, having completed his arrangements at his ease, without disturbance

(so far as appears) from the Assyrians, felt himself strong enough to

renew the war with a good prospect of success. Collecting as large

an army as he could, both from his Arian and his Scythic subjects, he

marched into Assyria, met the troops of Asshur-bani-pal in the field,

defeated them signally, and forced them to take refuge behind the strong

works which defended their capital. He even ventured to follow up the

flying foe and commence the siege of the capital itself; but at this

point he was suddenly checked in his career of victory, and forced to

assume a defensive attitude, by a danger of a novel kind, which recalled

him from Nineveh to his own country.

The vast tracts, chiefly consisting of grassy plains, which lie north of

the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian, and the Jaxartes Syhun river,

were inhabited in ancient times by a race or races known to the Asiatics

as Saka, “Scythians.” These people appear to have been allied ethnically

with many of the more southern races, as with the Parthians, the

Iberians, the Alarodians, the tribes of the Zagros chain, the

Susianians, and others. It is just possible that they may have taken

an interest in the warfare of their southern brethren, and that, when

Cyaxares brought the tribes of Zagros under his yoke, the Scyths of the

north may have felt resentment, or compassion, If this view seem too

improbable, considering the distance, the physical obstacles, and the

little communication that there was between nations in those early

times, we must suppose that by a mere coincidence it happened that the

subjugation of the southern Scyths by Cyaxares was followed within a few

years by a great irruption of Scyths from the trans-Caucasian region. In

that case we shall have to regard the invasion as a mere example of that

ever-recurring law by which the poor and hardy races of Upper Asia or

Europe are from time to time directed upon the effete kingdoms of the

south, to shake, ravage, or overturn them, as the case may be, and

prevent them from stagnating into corruption.

The character of the Scythians, and the general nature of their ravages,

have been described in a former portion of this work. If they entered

Southern Asia, as seems probable, by the Daghestan route, they would

then have been able to pass on without much difficulty, through Georgia

into Azerbijan, and from Azerbijan into Media Magna, where the Medes had

now established their southern capital. Four roads lead from Azerbijan

to Hamadan or the Greater Ecbatana, one through Menjil and Kasvin, and

across the Caraghan Hills; a second through Miana, Zenjan, and the

province of Khamseh; a third by the valley of the Jaghetu, through

Chukli and Tikan-Teppeh; and a fourth through Sefer-Khaneh and Sennah.

We cannot say which of the four the invaders selected; but, as they were

passing southwards, they met the army of Cyaxares, which had quitted

Nineveh on the first news of their invasion, and had marched in hot

haste to meet and engage them. The two enemies were not ill-matched.

Both were hardy and warlike, both active and full of energy; with both

the cavalry was the chief arm, and the bow the weapon on which they

depended mainly for victory. The Medes were no doubt the better

disciplined; they had a greater variety of weapons and of soldiers; and

individually they were probably more powerful men than the Scythians;

but these last had the advantage of numbers, of reckless daring, and of

tactics that it was difficult to encounter. Moreover, the necessity of

their situation in the midst of an enemy’s country made it imperative on

them to succeed, while their adversaries might be defeated without any

very grievous consequences. The Scytho had not come into Asia to conquer

so much as to ravage; defeat at their hands involved damage rather than

destruction; and the Medes must have felt that, if they lost the battle,

they might still hope to maintain a stout defence behind the strong

walls of some of their towns. The result was such as might have been

expected under these circumstances. Madyes, the Scythian leader,

obtained the victory, Cyaxares was defeated, and compelled to make terms

with the invader. Retaining his royal name, and the actual government of

his country, he admitted the suzerainty of the Scyths, and agreed to pay

them an annual tribute. Whether Media suffered very seriously from their

ravages, we cannot say. Neither its wealth nor its fertility was such

as to tempt marauders to remain in it very long. The main complaint

made against the Scythian conquerors is that, not content with the

fixed tribute which they had agreed to receive, and which was paid them

regularly, they levied contributions at their pleasure on the various

states under their sway, which were oppressed by repeated exactions. The

injuries suffered from their marauding habits form only a subordinate

charge against them, as though it had not been practically felt to be

so great a grievance. We can well imagine that the bulk of the invaders

would prefer the warmer and richer lands of Assyria, Mesopotamia, and

Syria; and that, pouring into them, they would leave the colder and less

wealthy Media comparatively free from ravage.

The condition of Media and the adjacent countries under the Scythians

must have nearly resembled that of almost the same regions under

the Seljukian Turks during the early times of their domination. The

conquerors made no fixed settlements, but pitched their tents in any

portion of the territory that they chose. Their horses and cattle

were free to pasture on all lands equally. They were recognized as the

dominant race, were feared and shunned, but did not greatly interfere

with the bulk of their subjects. It was impossible that they should

occupy at any given time more than a comparatively few spots in the wide

tract which they had overrun and subjugated; and, consequently,

there was not much contact between them and the peoples whom they had

conquered. Such contact as there was must no doubt have been galling and

oppressive. The right of free pasture in the lands of others is always

irksome to those who have to endure it, and, even where it is exercised

with strict fairness, naturally leads to quarrels. The barbarous

Scythians are not likely to have cared very much about fairness. They

would press heavily upon the more fertile tracts, paying over-frequent

visits to such spots, and remaining in them till the region was

exhausted. The chiefs would not be able to restrain their followers

from acts of pillage; redress would be obtained with difficulty; and

sometimes even the chiefs themselves may have been sharers in the

injuries committed. The insolence, moreover, of a dominant race so

coarse and rude as the Scyths must have been very hard to bear; and we

can well understand that the various nations which had to endure the

yoke must have looked anxiously for an opportunity of shaking it off,

and recovering their independence.

Among these various nations, there was probably none that fretted and

winced under its subjection more than the Medes. Naturally brave and

high-spirited, with the love of independence inherent in mountaineers,

and with a well-grounded pride in their recent great successes, they

must have chafed daily and hourly at the ignominy of their position,

the postponement of their hopes, and the wrongs which they continually

suffered. At first it seemed necessary to endure. They had tried the

chances of a battle, and had been defeated in fair fight--what reason

was there to hope that, if they drew the sword again, they would be more

successful? Accordingly they remained quiet but, as time went on, and

the Scythians dispersed themselves continually over a wider and a

wider space, invading Assyria, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and again

Armenia and Cappadocia, everywhere plundering and marauding, conducting

sieges, fighting battles, losing men from the sword, from sickness, from

excesses, becoming weaker instead of stronger, as each year went by,

owing to the drain of constant wars--the Medes by degrees took heart.

Not trusting, however, entirely to the strength of their right arms, a

trust which had failed them once, they resolved to prepare the way for

an outbreak by a stratagem which they regarded as justifiable. Cyaxares

and his court invited a number of the Scythian chiefs to a grand

banquet, and, having induced them to drink till they were completely

drunk, set upon them when they were in this helpless condition, and

remorselessly slew them all.

This deed was the signal for a general revolt of the nation. The Medes

everywhere took arms, and, turning upon their conquerors, assailed them

with a fury the more terrible because it had been for years repressed.

A war followed, the duration and circumstances of which are unknown; for

the stories with which Ctesias enlivened this portion of his history can

scarcely be accepted as having any foundation in fact. According to him,

the Parthians made common cause with the Scythians on the occasion, and

the war lasted many years; numerous battles were fought with great loss

to both sides; and peace was finally concluded without either party

having gained the upper hand. The Scyths were commanded by a queen,

Zarina or Zarinsea, woman of rare beauty, and as brave as she was

fair; who won the hearts, when she could not resist the swords, of her

adversaries. A strangely romantic love-tale is told of this beauteous

Amazon. It is not at all clear what region Ctesias supposes her to

govern. It has a capital city, called Koxanace (a name entirely unknown

to any other historian or geographer), and it contains many other towns

of which Zarina was the foundress. Its chief architectural monument was

the tomb of Zarina, a triangular pyramid, six hundred feet high, and

more than a mile round the base, crowned by a colossal figure of the

queen made of solid gold. But--to leave these fables and return to

fact--we can only say with certainty that the result of the war was the

complete defeat of the Scythians, who not only lost their position of

pre-eminence in Media and the adjacent countries, but were driven across

the Caucasus into their own proper territory. Their expulsion was

so complete that they scarcely left a trace of their power or their

presence in the geography or ethnography of the country. One Palestine

city only, as already observed, and one Armenian province retained in

their names a lingering memory of the great inroad which but for them

would have passed away without making any more permanent mark on the

region than a hurricane or a snowstorm. How long the dominion of the

Scyths endured is a matter of great uncertainty. It was no doubt

the belief of Herodotus that from their defeat of Cyaxares to his

treacherous murder of their chiefs was a period of exactly twenty-eight

years. During the whole of this space he regarded them as the undisputed

lords of Asia. It was not till the twenty-eight years were over that

the Medes were able, according to him, to renew their attacks on the

Assyrians, and once more to besiege Nineveh. But this chronology is open

to great objections. There is strong reason for believing that Nineveh

fell about B.C. 625 or 624; but according to the numbers of Herodotus

the fall would, at the earliest, have taken place in B.C. 602. There is

great unlikelihood that the Scyths, if they had maintained their rule

for a generation, should not have attracted some distinct notice from

the Jewish writers. Again, if twenty-eight out of the forty years

assigned to Cyaxares are to be regarded as years of inaction, all his

great exploits, his two sieges of Nineveh, his capture of that capital,

his conquest of the countries north and west of Media as far as the

Halys, his six years’ war in Asia Minor beyond that river, and his joint

expedition with Nebuchadnezzar into Syria, will have to be crowded most

improbably into the space of twelve years, two or three preceding and

ten or nine following the Scythian domination. These and other reasons

lead to the conclusion, which has the support of Eusebius, that

the Scythian domination was of much shorter duration than Herodotus

imagined. It may have been twenty-eight years from the original attack

on Media to the final expulsion of the last of the invaders from

Asia--and this may have been what the informants of Herodotus really

intended--but it cannot have been very long after the first attack

before the Medes began to recover themselves, to shake off the fear

which had possessed them and clear their territories of the invaders. If

the invasion really took place in the reign of Cyaxares, and not in the

lifetime of his father, where Eusebius places it, we must suppose that

within eight years of its occurrence Cyaxares found himself sufficiently

strong, and his hands sufficiently free, to resume his old projects, and

for the second time to march an army into Assyria.

The weakness of Assyria was such as to offer strong temptations to an

invader. As the famous inroad of the Gauls into Italy in the year of

Rome 365 paved the way for the Roman conquests in the peninsula by

breaking the power of the Etruscans, the Umbrians, and various other

races, so the Scythic incursion may have, really benefited, rather than

injured, Media, by weakening the great power to whose empire she

aspired to succeed. The exhaustion of Assyria’s resources at the time is

remarkably illustrated by the poverty and meanness of the palace which

the last king, Saracus, built for himself at Calah. She lay, apparently,

at the mercy of the first bold assailant, her prestige lost, her army

dispirited or disorganized, her defences injured, her high spirit broken

and subdued.

Cyaxaros, ere proceeding to the attack, sent, it is probable, to make

an alliance with the Susianians and Chaldaeans. Susiana was the last

country which Assyria had conquered, and could remember the pleasures of

independence. Chaldaea, though it had been now for above half a century

an Assyrian fief, and had borne the yoke with scarcely a murmur during

that period, could never wholly forget its old glories, or the long

resistance which it had made before submitting to its northern neighbor.

The overtures of the Median monarch seem to have been favorably

received; and it was agreed that an army from the south should march up

the Tigris and threaten Assyria from that quarter, while Cyaxares

led his Medes from the east, through the passes of Zagros against the

capital. Rumor soon conveyed the tidings of his enemies’ intentions to

the Assyrian monarch, who immediately made such a disposition of the

forces at his command as seemed best calculated to meet the double

danger which threatened him. Selecting from among his generals the

one in whom he placed most confidence--a man named Nabopolassar, most

probably an Assyrian--he put him at the head of a portion of his troops,

and sent him to Babylon to resist the enemy who was advancing from the

sea. The command of his main army he reserved for himself, intending to

undertake in person the defence of his territory against the Medes. This

plan of campaign was not badly conceived; but it was frustrated by an

unexpected calamity, Nabopolassar, seeing his sovereign’s danger, and

calculating astutely that he might gain more by an opportune defection

from a falling cause than he could look to receive as the reward of

fidelity, resolved to turn traitor and join the enemies of Assyria.

Accordingly he sent an embassy to Cyaxares, with proposals for a close

alliance to be cemented by a marriage. If the Median monarch would

give his daughter Amuhia (or Amyitis) to be the wife of his son

Nebuchadnezzar, the forces under his command should march against

Nineveh and assist Cyaxares to capture it. Such a proposition arriving

at such a time was not likely to meet with a refusal. Cyaxares gladly

came into the terms; the marriage took place; and Nabopolassar, who had

now practically assumed the sovereignty of Babylon, either led or sent a

Babylonian contingent to the aid of the Medes.

The siege of Nineveh by the combined Medes and Babylonians was narrated

by Ctesias at some length. He called the Assyrian king Sardanapalus,

the Median commander Arbaces, the Babylonian Belesis. Though he thus

disguised the real names, and threw back the event to a period a century

and a half earlier than its true date, there can be no doubt that he

intended to relate the last siege of the city, that which immediately

preceded its complete destruction. He told how the combined army,

consisting of Persians and Arabs as well as of Medes and Babylonians,

and amounting to four hundred thousand men, was twice defeated with

great loss by the Assyrian monarch, and compelled to take refuge in

the Zagros chain--how after losing a third battle it retreated to

Babylonia--how it was there joined by strong reinforcements from

Bactria, surprised the Assyrian camp by night, and drove the whole host

in confusion to Nineveh--how then, after two more victories, it advanced

and invested the city, which was well provisioned for a siege and

strongly fortified. The siege, Ctesias said, had lasted two full years,

and the third year had commenced--success seemed still far off--when

an unusually rainy season so swelled the waters of the Tigris that they

burst into the city, sweeping away more than two miles of the wall.

This vast breach it was impossible to repair; and the Assyrian monarch,

seeing that further resistance was vain, brought the struggle to an end

by burning himself, with his concubines and eunuchs and all his chief

wealth, in his palace.

Such, in outline, was the story of Ctesias. If we except the extent

of the breach which the river is declared to have made, it contains no

glaring improbabilities. On the contrary, it is a narrative that hangs

well together, and that suits both the relations of the parties and

the localities. Moreover, it is confirmed in one or two points by

authorities of the highest order. Still, as Ctesias is a writer who

delights in fiction, and as it seems very unlikely that he would find a

detailed account of the siege, such as he has given us, in the Persian

archives, from whence he professed to derive his history, no confidence

can be placed in those points of his narrative which have not any

further sanction. All that we know on the subject of the last siege

of Nineveh is that it was conducted by a combined army of Medes

and Babylonians, the former commanded by Cyaxares, the latter by

Nabopolassar or Nebuchadnezzar, and that it was terminated, when

all hope was lost, by the suicide of the Assyrian monarch. The

self-immolation of Saracus is related by Abydenus, who almost certainly

follows Berosus in this part of his history. We may therefore accept

it as a fact about which there ought to be no question. Actuated by

a feeling which has more than once caused a vanquished monarch to die

rather than fall into the power of his enemies, Saracus made a funeral

pyre of his ancestral palace, and lighted it with his own hand.

One further point in the narrative of Ctesias we may suspect to contain

a true representation. Ctesias declared the cause of the capture to

have been the destruction of the city wall by an unexpected rise of the

river. Now, the prophet Nahum, in his announcement of the fate coming on

Nineveh, has a very remarkable expression, which seems most naturally to

point to some destruction of a portion of the fortifications by means of

water. After relating the steps that would be taken for the defence of

the place, he turns to remark on their fruitlessness, and says: “The

gates of the rivers are opened, and the palace is dissolved; and Huzzab

is led away captive; she is led up, with her maidens, sighing as with

the voice of doves, smiting upon their breasts.” Now, we have already

seen that at the northwest angle of Nineveh there was a sluice or

floodgate, intended mainly to keep the water of the Khosrsu, which

ordinarily filled the city moat, from flowing off too rapidly into the

Tigris, but probably intended also to keep back the water of the Tigris,

when that stream rose above its common level. A sudden and great rise

of the Tigris would necessarily endanger this gate, and if it gave way

beneath the pressure, a vast torrent of water would rush up the moat

along and against the northern wall, which may have been undermined by

its force, and have fallen in. The stream would then pour into the city;

and it may perhaps have reached the palace platform, which being made

of sun-dried bricks, and probably not cased with stone inside the

city, would begin to be “dissolved.” Such seems the simplest and best

interpretation of this passage, which, though it is not historical, but

only prophetical, must be regarded as giving an importance that it would

not otherwise have possessed to the statement of Ctesias with regard to

the part played by the Tigris in the destruction of Nineveh.

The fall of the city was followed by a division of the spoil between the

two principal conquerors. While Cyaxares took to his own share the land

of the conquered people, Assyria Proper, and the countries dependent on

Assyria towards the north and north-west, Nabopolassar was allowed, not

merely Babylonia, Chaldaea, and Susiana, but the valley of the Euphrates

and the countries to which that valley conducted. Thus two considerable

empires arose at the same time cut of the ashes of Assyria--the

Babylonian towards the south and the south-west, stretching from

Luristan to the borders of Egypt, the Median towards the north, reaching

from the salt desert of Iran to Amanus and the Upper Euphrates.

These empires were established by mutual consent; they were connected

together, not merely by treaties, but by the ties of affinity which

united their rulers; and, instead of cherishing, as might have been

expected, a mutual suspicion and distrust, they seem to have really

entertained the most friendly feelings towards one another, and to have

been ready on all emergencies to lend each other important assistance.

For once in the history of the world two powerful monarchies were seen

to stand side by side, not only without collision, but without jealousy

or rancor. Babylonia and Media were content to share between them the

empire of Western Asia: the world was, they thought, wide enough for

both; and so, though they could not but have had in some respects

conflicting interests, they remained close friends and allies for more

than half a century.

To the Median monarch the conquest of Assyria did not bring a time

of repose. Wandering bands of Scythians were still, it is probable,

committing ravages in many parts of Western Asia. The subjects of

Assyria, set free by her downfall, were likely to use the occasion for

the assertion of their independence, if they were not immediately shown

that a power of at least equal strength had taken her place, and was

prepared to claim her inheritance. War begets war; and the successes of

Cyaxares up to the present point in his career did but whet his appetite

for power, and stimulate him to attempt further conquests. In brief but

pregnant words Herodotus informs us that Cyaxares “subdued to himself

all Asia above the Halys.” How much he may include in this expression,

it is impossible to determine; but, _prime facie_, it would seem at

least to imply that he engaged in a series of wars with the various

tribes and nations which intervened between Media and Assyria on the one

side and the river Halys on the other, and that he succeeded in bringing

them under his dominion. The most important countries in this direction

were Armenia and Cappadocia. Armenia, strong in its lofty mountains,

its deep gorges, and its numerous rapid rivers--the head-streams of

the Tigris, Euphrates, Kur, and Aras--had for centuries resisted with

unconquered spirit the perpetual efforts of the Assyrian kings to bring

it under their yoke, and had only at last consented under the latest

king but one to a mere nominal allegiance. Cappadocia had not even been

brought to this degree of dependence. It had lain beyond the furthest

limit whereto the Assyrian arms had ever reached, and had not as yet

come into collision with any of the great powers of Asia. Other minor

tribes in this region, neighbors of the Armenians and Cappadocians, but

more remote from Media, were the Ibenans, the Colchians, the Moschi, the

Tibareni, the Mares the Macrones, and the Mosynoeci. Herodotus appears

to have been of opinion that all these tribes, or at any rate all but

the Colchians, were at this time brought under by Cyaxares who thus

extended his dominions to the Caucasus and the Black Sea upon the north,

and upon the east to the Kizil Irmak or Halys.

It is possible that the reduction of these countries under the Median

yoke was not so much a conquest as a voluntary submission of the

inhabitants to the power which alone seemed strong enough to save them

from the hated domination of the Scyths. According to Strabo, Armenia

and Cappadocia were the regions where the Scythic ravages had been most

severely felt. Cappadocia had been devastated from the mountains down

to the coast; and in Armenia the most fertile portion of the whole

territory had been seized and occupied by the invaders, from whom it

thenceforth took the name of Sacassene, the Armenians and Cappadocians

may have found the yoke of the Scyths so intolerable as to have gladly

exchanged it for dependence on a comparatively civilized people. In

the neighboring territory of Asia Minor a similar cause had recently

exercised a unifying influence, the necessity of combining to resist

Cimmerian immigrants having tended to establish a hegemony of Lydia over

the various tribes which divided among them the tract west of the Halys.

It is evidently not improbable that the sufferings endured at the hands

of the Scyths may have disposed the nations east of the river to adopt

the same remedy and that, so soon as Media had proved her strength,

first by shaking herself free of the Scythic invaders and then

conquering Assyria. the tribes of these parts accepted her as at once

their mistress and their deliverer.

Another quite distinct cause may also have helped to bring about the

result above indicated. Parallel with the great Median migration from

the East under Cyaxares, or Phraortes (?), his father, an Arian influx

had taken place into the countries between the Caspian and the Halys.

In Armenia and Cappadocia during the flourishing period of Assyria,

Turanian tribes had been predominant. Between the middle and the end of

the seventh century these tribes appear to have yielded the supremacy to

Arians. In Armenia, the present language which is predominantly

Arian, ousted the former Turaman tongue which appears in the cuneiform

inscriptions of Van and the adjacent regions. In Cappadocia, the Moschi

and Tibareni had to yield their seats to a new race--the Katapatuka, who

were not only Arian but distinctly Medo-Persic, as is plain from their

proper names, and from the close connection of their royal house

with that of the kings of Persia. This spread of the Arians into the

countries lying between the Caspian and the Halys must have done much to

pave the way for Median supremacy over those regions. The weaker Arian

tribes of the north would have been proud of their southern brethren, to

whose arms the queen of Western Asia had been forced to yield, and

would have felt comparatively little repugnance in surrendering their

independence into the hands of a friendly and kindred people.

Thus Cyaxares, in his triumphant progress to the north and the

north-west, made war, it is probable, chiefly upon the Scyths, or upon

them and the old Turanian inhabitants of the countries, while by

the Arians he was welcomed as a champion come to deliver them from

a grievous oppression. Ranging themselves under his standard, they

probably helped him to expel from Asia the barbarian hordes which had

now for many years tyrannized over them; and when the expulsion was

completed, gratitude or habit made them willing to continue in the

subject position which they had assumed in order to effect it. Cyaxares

within less than ten years from his capture of Nineveh had added to his

empire the fertile and valuable tracts of Armenia and Cappadocia--never

really subject to Assyria--and may perhaps have further mastered the

entire region between Armenia and the Caucasus and Euxine.

The advance of their western frontier to the river Halys, which was

involved in the absorption of Cappadocia into the Empire, brought the

Medes into contact with a new power--a power which, like Media, had been

recently increasing in greatness, and which was not likely to submit to

a foreign yoke without a struggle. The Lydian kingdom was one of great

antiquity in this part of Asia. According to traditions current among

its people, it had been established more than seven hundred years at the

time when Cyaxares pushed his conquests to its borders. Three dynasties

of native kings--Atyadse, Heraclidse, and Mermnadae--had successively

held the throne during that period. The Lydians could repeat the names

of at least thirty monarchs who had borne sway in Sardis, their capital

city, since its foundation. They had never been conquered. In the old

times, indeed, Lydus, the son of Atys, had changed the name of the

people inhabiting the country from Maeonians to Lydians--a change which

to the keen sense of an historical critic implies a conquest of one race

by another. But to the people themselves this tradition conveyed no such

meaning; or, if it did to any, their self-complacency was not disturbed

thereby, since they would hug the notion that they belonged not to the

conquered race but to the conquerors. If a Ramcsos or a Sesostris had

ever penetrated to their country, he had met with a brave resistance,

and had left monuments indicating his respect for their courage.

Neither Babylon nor Assyria had ever given a king to the Lydians--on the

contrary, the Lydian tradition was, that they had themselves sent forth

Belus and Ninus from their own country to found dynasties and cities in

Mesopotamia. In a still more remote age they had seen their colonists

embark upon the western waters, and start for the distant Hesperia,

where they had arrived in safety, and had founded the great Etruscan

nation. On another occasion they had carried their arms beyond the

limits of Asia Minor, and had marched southward to the very extremity

of: Syria, where their general, Ascalus, had founded a great city and

called it after his name.

Such were the Lydian traditions with respect to the more remote times.

Of their real history they seem to have known but little, and that

little did not extend further back than about two hundred years before

Cyaxares. Within this space it was certain that they had had a change

of dynasty, a change preceded by a long feud between their two greatest

houses, which were perhaps really two branches of the royal family. The

Heraclidae had grown jealous of the Mermnadae, and had treated them with

injustice; the Mormnadae had at first sought their safety in flight,

and afterwards, when they felt themselves strong enough, had returned,

murdered the Heraclide monarch, and placed their chief, Gyges, upon

the throne. With Gyges, who had commenced his reign about B.C. 700, the

prosperity of the Lydians had greatly increased, and they had begun to

assume an aggressive attitude towards their neighbors. Gyges’ revenue

was so great that his wealth became proverbial, and he could afford to

spread his fame by sending from his superfluity to the distant temple

of Delphi presents of such magnificence that they were the admiration

of later ages. The relations of his predecessors with the Greeks of

the Asiatic coast had been friendly, Gyges changed this policy, and,

desirous of enlarging his seaboard, made war upon the Greek maritime

towns, attacking Miletus and Smyrna without result, but succeeding in

capturing the Ionic city of Colophon. He also picked a quarrel with

the inland town of Magnesia, and after many invasions of its territory

compelled it to submission. According to some, he made himself master

of the whole territory of the Troad, and the Milesians had to obtain his

permission before they could establish their colony of Abydos upon the

Hellespont. At any rate he was a rich and puissant monarch in the

eyes of the Greeks of Asia and the islands, who were never tired of

celebrating his wealth, his wars, and his romantic history.

The shadow of calamity had, however, fallen upon Lydia towards the close

of Gyges’ long reign. About thirty years before the Scythians from

the Steppe country crossed the Caucasus and fell upon Media, the same

barrier was passed by another groat horde of nomads. The Cimmerians,

probably a Celtic people, who had dwelt hitherto in the Tauric

Chersonese and the country adjoining upon it, pressed on by Scythic

invaders from the East, had sought a vent in this direction. Passing

the great mountain barrier either by the route of Mozdok--the Pylas

Caucasiae--or by some still more difficult track towards the Euxine,

they had entered Asia Minor by way of Cappadocia and had spread terror

and devastation in every direction. Gyges, alarmed at their advance, had

placed himself under the protection of Assyria, and had then confidently

given them battle, defeated them, and captured several of their chiefs.

It is uncertain whether the Assyrians gave him any material aid, but

evident that he ascribed his success to his alliance with them. In his

gratitude he sent an embassy to Asshur-bani-pal, king of Assyria, and

courted his favor by presents and by sending him his Cimmerian captives.

Later in his reign, however, he changed his policy, and, breaking with

Assyria, gave aid to the Egyptian rebel, Psammetichus, and helped him

to establish his independence. The result followed which was to be

expected. Assyria withdrew her protection; and Lydia was left to fight

her own battles when the great crisis came. Carrying all before them,

the fierce hordes swarmed in full force into the more western districts

of Asia Minor; Paphlagonia, Phrygia, Bithynia, Lydia, and Ionia were

overrun; Gyges, venturing on an engagement, perished; the frightened

inhabitants generally shut themselves up in their walled towns, and

hoped that the tide of invasion might sweep by them quickly and roll

elsewhere; but the Cimmerians, impatient and undisciplined as they

might be, could sometimes bring themselves to endure the weary work of a

siege, and they saw in the Lydian capital a prize well worth an effort.

The hordes besieged Sardis, and took it, except the citadel, which was

commandingly placed and defied all their attempts. A terrible scene of

carnage must have followed. How Lydia withstood the blow, and rapidly

recovered from it, is hard to understand; but it seems certain that

within a generation she was so far restored to vigor as to venture

on resuming her attacks upon the Greeks of the coast, which had been

suspended during her period of prostration. Sadyattes, the son of

Ardys, and grandson of Gyges, following the example of his father and

grandfather, made war upon Miletus; and Alyattes, his son and successor,

pursued the same policy of aggression. Besides pressing Miletus, he

besieged and took Smyrna, and ravaged the territory of Clazomenae.

But the great work of Alyattes’ reign, and the one which seems to have

had the most important consequences for Lydia, was the war which he

undertook for the purpose of expelling the Cimmerians from Asia Minor.

The hordes had been greatly weakened by time, by their losses in war,

and, probably by their excesses; they had long ceased to be formidable;

but they were still strong enough to be an annoyance. Alyattes is said

to have “driven them out of Asia,” by which we can scarcely understand

less than that he expelled them from his own dominions and those of his

neighbors--or, in other words, from the countries which had been the

scenes of their chief ravages--Paphlagonia, Bithynia, Lydia, Phrygia,

and Cilicia. But, to do this, he must have entered into a league with

his neighbors, who must have consented to act under him for the purposes

of war, if they did not even admit the permanent hegemony of his

country. Alyattes’ success appears to have been complete, or nearly so;

he cleared Asia Minor of the Cimmerians; and having thus conferred a

benefit on all the nations of the region and exhibited before their

eyes his great military capacity, if he had not actually constructed an

empire, he had at any rate done much to pave the way for one.

Such was the political position in the regions west and south of the

Halys, when Cyaxares completed his absorption of Cappadocia, and looking

across the river that divided the Cappadocians from the Phrygians, saw

stretched before him a region of great fertile plains, which seemed to

invite an invader. A pretext for an attack was all that he wanted,

and this was soon forthcoming. A body of the nomad Scyths--probably

belonging to the great invasion, though Herodotus thought otherwise--had

taken service under Cyaxares, and for some time served him faithfully,

being employed chiefly as hunters. A cause of quarrel, however, arose

after a while; and the Scyths, disliking their position or distrusting

the intentions of their lords towards them, quitted the Median

territory, and, marching through a great part of Asia Minor, sought and

found a refuge with Alyattes, the Lydian king. Cyaxares, upon learning

their flight, sent an embassy to the court of Sardis to demand the

surrender of the fugitives; but the Lydian monarch met the demand with a

refusal, and, fully understanding the probable consequences, immediately

prepared for war.

Though Lydia, compared to Media, was but a small state, yet her

resources were by no means inconsiderable. In fertility she surpassed

almost every other country of Asia Minor, which is altogether one of

the richest regions in the world. At this time she was producing large

quantities of gold, which was found in great abundance in the Pactolus,

and probably in the other small streams that flowed down on all sides

from the Tmolus mountain-chain. Her people were at once warlike and

ingenious. They had invented the art of coining money, and showed

considerable taste in their devices. [PLATE VII., Fig. 1], They claimed

also to have been the inventors of a number of games, which were common

to them with the Greeks. According to Herodotus, they were the first

who made a livelihood by shop-keeping. They were skilful in the use of

musical instruments, and had their own peculiar musical mode or style,

which was in much favor among the Greeks, though condemned as effeminate

by some of the philosophers. At the same time the Lydians were not

wanting in courage or manliness. They fought chiefly on horseback, and

were excellent riders, carrying long spears, which they managed with

great skill. Nicolas of Damascus tells us that even under the Heraclido

kings, they could muster for service cavalry to the number of 30,000. In

peace they pursued with ardor the sports of the field, and found in the

chase of the wild boar a pastime which called forth and exercised every

manly quality. Thus Lydia, even by herself, was no contemptible enemy;

though it can hardly be supposed that, without help from others, she

would have proved a match for the Great Median Empire.

[Illustration: PLATE VII.]

But such help as she needed was not wanting to her. The rapid strides

with which Media had advanced towards the west had no doubt alarmed the

numerous princes of Asia Minor, who must have felt that they had a power

to deal with as full of schemes of conquest as Assyria, and more capable

of carrying her designs into execution. It has been already observed

that the long course of Assyrian aggressions developed gradually among

the Asiatic tribes a tendency to unite in leagues for purposes of

resistance. The circumstances of the time called now imperatively

for such a league to be formed, unless the princes of Asia Minor were

content to have their several territories absorbed one after another

into the growing Median Empire. These princes appear to have seen their

danger. Cyaxares may perhaps have, declared war specially against the

Lydians, and have crossed the Halys professedly in order to chastise

them; but he could only reach Lydia through the territories of other

nations, which he was evidently intending to conquer on his way; and

it was thus apparent that he was activated, not by anger against a

particular power, but by a general design of extending his dominions in

this direction. A league seems therefore to have been determined on. We

have not indeed any positive evidence of its existence till the close of

the war; but the probabilities are wholly in favor of its having taken

effect from the first. Prudence would have dictated such a course; and

it seems almost implied in the fact that a successful resistance was

made to the Median attack from the very commencement. We may conclude

therefore that the princes of Asia Minor, having either met in conclave

or communicated by embassies, resolved to make common cause, if the

Medes crossed the Halys; and that, having already acted under Lydia in

the expulsion of the Cimmerians from their territories, they naturally

placed her at their head when they coalesced for the second time.

Cyaxares on his part, was not content to bring against the confederates

merely the power of Media. He requested and obtained a contingent from

the Babylonian monarch, Nabopolassar, and may not improbably have had

the assistance of other allies also. With a vast army drawn from various

parts of inner Asia, he invaded the territory of the Western Powers,

and began his attempt at subjugation. We have no detailed account of

the war; but we learn from the general expressions of Herodotus that the

Median monarch met with a most stubborn resistance; numerous engagements

were fought with varied results; sometimes the Medes succeeded in

defeating their adversaries in pitched battles; but sometimes, and

apparently as often, the Lydians and their allies gained decided

victories over the Medes. It is noted that one of the engagements took

place by night, a rare occurrence in ancient (as in modern) times. The

war had continued six years, and the Medes had evidently made no serious

impression, when a remarkable circumstance brought it suddenly to

a termination. The two armies had once more met and were engaged in

conflict, when, in the midst of the struggle, an ominous darkness fell

upon the combatants and filled them with superstitious awe. The sun

was eclipsed, either totally or at any rate considerably, so that the

attention of the two armies was attracted to it; and, discontinuing the

fight, they stood to gaze at the phenomenon. In most parts of the

East such an occurrence is even now seen with dread--the ignorant mass

believe that the orb of day is actually being devoured or destroyed,

and that the end of all things is at hand--even the chiefs, who may have

some notion that the phenomenon is a recurrent one, do not understand

its cause, and participate in the alarm of their followers. On the

present occasion it is said that, amid the general fear, a desire for

reconciliation seized both armies. Of this spontaneous movement two

chiefs, the foremost of the allies on either side, took advantage.

Syennesis, king of Cilicia, the first known monarch of his name, on

the part of Lydia, and a prince whom Herodotus calls “Labynetus of

Babylon”--probably either Nabopolassar or Nebuchadnezzar--on the part

of Media, came forward to propose an immediate armistice; and, when the

proposal was accepted on either side, proceeded to the more difficult

task of arranging terms of peace between the contending parties. Since

nothing is said of the Scythians, who had been put forward as the

ostensible grounds of quarrel, we may presume that Alyattes retained

them. It is further clear that both he and his allies preserved

undiminished both their territories and their independence. The

territorial basis of the treaty was thus what in modern diplomatic

language is called the status quo; matters, in other words, returned to

the position in which they had stood before the war broke out. The only

difference was that Cyaxares gained a friend and an ally where he had

previously had a jealous enemy; since it was agreed that the two kings

of Media and Lydia should swear a friendship, and that, to cement the

alliance, Alyattes should give his daughter Aryenis in marriage to

Astyages, the son of Cyaxares. The marriage thus arranged took place

soon afterwards, while the oath of friendship was sworn at once.

According to the barbarous usages of the time and place, the two

monarchs, having met and repeated the words of the formula, punctured

their own arms, and then sealed their contract by each sucking from the

wound a portion of the other’s blood.

By this peace the three great monarchies of the time--the Median, the

Lydian, and the Babylonian--were placed on terms, not only of amity,

but of intimacy and (if the word may be used) of blood relationship. The

Crown Princes of the three kingdoms had become brothers. From the shores

of the Aegean to those of the Persian Gulf, Western Asia was now ruled

by interconnected dynasties, bound by treaties to respect each other’s

rights, and perhaps to lend each other aid in important conjunctures,

and animated, it would seem, by a real spirit of mutual friendliness and

attachment. After more than five centuries of almost constant war and

ravage, after fifty years of fearful strife and convulsion, during

which the old monarchy of Assyria had gone down and a new Empire--the

Median--had risen up in its place, this part of Asia entered upon a

period of repose which stands out in strong contrast with the long term

of struggle. From the date of the peace between Alyattes and Cyaxares

(probably B.C. 610), for nearly half a century, the three kingdoms

of Media, Lydia, and Babylonia remained fast friends, pursuing their

separate courses without quarrel or collision, and thus giving to the

nations within their borders a rest and a refreshment which they must

have greatly needed and desired.

In one quarter only was this rest for a short time disturbed. During the

troublous period the neighboring country of Egypt, which had recovered

its freedom, and witnessed a revival of its ancient prosperity, under

the Psamatik family, began once more to aspire to the possession of

those provinces which, being divided off from the rest of the Asiatic

continent by the impassable Syrian desert, seems politically to belong

to Africa almost more than to Asia. Psamatik I., the Psammetichus of

Herodotus, had commenced an aggressive war in this quarter, probably

about the time that Assyria was suffering from the Median and then

from the Scythian inroads. He had besieged for several years the strong

Philistine town of Ashdod, which commands the coast-route from Egypt

to Palestine, and was at this time a most important city. Despite a

resistance which would have wearied out any less pertinacious assailant,

he had persevered in his attempt, and had finally succeeded in taking

the place. He had thus obtained a firm footing in Syria; and his

successor was, able, starting from this vantage-ground, to overrun

and conquer the whole territory. About the year B.C. 608, Neco, son of

Psamatik I., having recently ascended the throne, invaded Palestine with

a large army, met and defeated Josiah, king of Judah, near Megiddo in

the great plain of Esdraelon, and, pressing forward through Syria to the

Euphrates, attacked and took Carchemish, the strong city which guarded

the ordinary passage of the river. Idumea, Palestine, Phoenicia, and

Syria submitted to him, and for three years he remained in undisturbed

possession of his conquest. Then, however, the Babylonians, who had

received these provinces at the division of the Assyrian Empire, began

to bestir themselves. Nebuchadnezzar marched to Carchemish, defeated the

army of Neco, recovered all the territory to the border of Egypt, and

even ravaged a portion of that country. It is probable that in this

expedition he was assisted by the Medes. At any rate, seven or eight

years afterwards, when the intrigues of Egypt had again created

disturbances in this quarter, and Jehoiakim, the Jewish king, broke

into open insurrection, the Median monarch sent a contingent, which

accompanied Nebuchadnezzar into Judaea, and assisted him to establish

his power firmly in South-Western Asia.

This is the last act that we can ascribe to the great Median king. He

can scarcely have been much less than seventy years old at this time;

and his life was prolonged at the utmost three years longer. According

to Herodotus, he died B.C. 593, after a reign of exactly forty years,

leaving his crown to his son Astyages, whose marriage with a Lydian

princess was above related.

We have no sufficient materials from which to draw out a complete

character of Cyaxares. He appears to have possessed great ambition,

considerable military ability, and a rare tenacity of purpose, which

gained him his chief successes. At the same time he was not wanting in

good sense, and could bring himself to withdraw from an enterprise, when

he had misjudged the fitting time for it, or greatly miscalculated its

difficulties. He was faithful to his friends, but thought treachery

allowable towards his enemies. He knew how to conquer, but not how to

organize, an empire; and, if we except his establishment of Magism,

as the religion of the state, we may say that he did nothing to

give permanency to the monarchy which he founded. He was a conqueror

altogether after the Asiatic model, able to wield the sword, but not to

guide the pen, to subdue his contemporaries to his will by his

personal ascendency over them, but not to influence posterity by the

establishment of a kingdom, or of institutions, on deep and stable

foundations. The Empire, which owed to him its foundation, was the most

shortlived of all the great Oriental monarchies, having begun and

ended within the narrow space of three score and ten years--the natural

lifetime of an individual.

Astyages, who succeeded to the Median throne about B.C. 593, had neither

his father’s enterprise nor his ability. Born to an empire, and bred

up in all the luxury of an Oriental Court, he seems to have been quite

content with the lot which fortune appeared to have assigned him, and to

have coveted no grander position. Tradition says that he was remarkably

handsome, cautious, and of an easy and generous temper. Although

the anecdotes related of his mode of life at Ecbatana by Herodotus,

Xenophon, and Nicolas of Damascus, seem to be for the most part

apocryphal, and at any rate come to us upon authority too weak to

entitle them to a place in history, we may perhaps gather from the

concurrent, descriptions of these three writers something of the general

character of the Court over which he presided. Its leading features do

not seem to have differed greatly from those of the Court of Assyria.

The monarch lived secluded, and could only be seen by those who asked

and obtained an audience. He was surrounded by guards and eunuchs, the

latter of whom held most of the offices near the royal person. The Court

was magnificent in its apparel, in its banquets, and in the number and

organization of its attendants. The courtiers wore long flowing robes

of many different colors, amongst which red and purple predominated,

and adorned their necks with chains or collars of gold, and their wrists

with bracelets of the same precious metal. Even the horses on which

they rode had sometimes golden bits to their bridles. One officer of the

Court was especially called “the King’s Eye;” another had the privilege

of introducing strangers to him; a third was his cupbearer; a fourth his

messenger. Guards torch-bearers, serving-men, ushers, and sweepers, were

among the orders into which the lower sort of attendants were divided;

while among the courtiers of the highest rank was a privileged class

known as “the King’s table-companions”. The chief pastime in which

the Court indulged was hunting. Generally this took place in a park or

“paradise” near the capital; but sometimes the King and Court went out

on a grand hunt into the open country, where lions, leopards, bears,

wild boars, wild asses, antelopes, stags, and wild sheep abounded,

and, when the beasts had been driven by beaters into a confined space,

despatched them with arrows and javelins.

Prominent at the Court, according to Herodotus, was the priestly caste

of the Magi. Held in the highest honor by both King and people, they

were in constant attendance, ready to expound omens or dreams, and

to give their advice on all matters of state policy. The religious

ceremonial was, as a matter of course, under their charge; and it is

probable that high state offices were often conferred upon them. Of all

classes of the people they were the only one that could feel they had

a real influence over the monarch, and might claim to share in his

sovereignty.

The long reign of Astyages seems to have been almost undisturbed, until

just before its close, by wars or rebellions. Eusebius indeed relates

that he, and not Cyaxares, carried on the great Lydian contest; and

Moses of Chorene declares that he was engaged in a long struggle with

Tigranes, an Armenian king. But little credit can be attached to these

statements, the former of which contradicts Herodotus, while the latter

is wholly unsupported by any other writer. The character which Cyaxares

bore among the Greeks was evidently that of an unwarlike king. If he had

really carried his arms into the heart of Asia Minor, and threatened the

whole of that extensive region with subjugation, we can scarcely suppose

that he would have been considered so peaceful a ruler. Neither is

it easy to imagine that in that case no classical writer--not even

Ctesias--would have taxed Herodotus with an error that must have been

so flagrant. With respect to the war with Tigranes, it is just possible

that it may have a basis of truth; there may have been a revolt of

Armenia from Astyages under a certain Tigranes, followed by an attempt

at subjugation. But the slender authority of Moses is insufficient to

establish the truth of his story, which is internally improbable and

quite incompatible with the narrative of Herodotus.

There are some grounds for believing that in one direction Astyages

succeeded in slightly extending the limits of his empire. But he owed

his success to prudent management, and not to courage or military skill.

On the north-eastern frontier, occupying the low country now known as

Talish and Ghilan, was a powerful tribe called Cadusians, probably of

Arian origin, which had hitherto maintained its independence. This would

not be surprising, if we could accept the statement of Diodorus that

they were able to bring into the field 200,000 men. But this account,

which probably came from Ctesias, and is wholly without corroboration

from other writers, has the air of a gross exaggeration; and we may

conclude from the general tenor of ancient history that the Cadusians

were more indebted to the strength of their country, than to either

their numbers or their prowess, for the freedom and independence which

they were still enjoying. It seems that they were at this time under the

government of a certain king, or chief, named Aphernes, or Onaphernes.

This ruler was, it appears, doubtful of his position, and, thinking it

could not be long maintained, made overtures of surrender to Astyages,

which were gladly entertained by that monarch. A secret treaty was

concluded to the satisfaction of both parties; and the Cadusians, it

would seem, passed under the Medes by this arrangement, without any

hostile struggle, though armed resistance on the part of the people, who

were ignorant of the intentions of their chieftain, was for some time

apprehended.

The domestic relations of Astyages seem to have been unhappy. His

“marriage de convenance” with the Lydian princess Aryenis, if not wholly

unfruitful, at any rate brought him no son; and, as he grew to old

age, the absence of such support to the throne must have been felt very

sensibly, and have caused great uneasiness. The want of an heir perhaps

led him to contract those other marriages of which we hear in the

Armenian History of Moses--one with a certain Anusia, of whom nothing

more is known; and another with an Armenian princess, the loveliest of

her sex, Tigrania, sister of the Armenian king, Tigranes. The blessing

of male offspring was still, however, denied him; and it is even

doubtful whether he was really the father of any daughter or daughters.

Herodotus, and Xenophon, indeed give him a daughter Mandane, whom they

make the mother of Cyrus; and Ctesias, who denied in the most positive

terms the truth of this statement, gave him a daughter, Amytis, whom he

made the wife, first of Spitaces the Mede, and afterwards of Cyrus the

Persian. But these stories, which seem intended to gratify the vanity of

the Persians by tracing the descent of their kings to the great Median

conqueror, while at the same time they flattered the Medes by showing

them that the issue of their old monarchs was still seated on the Arian

throne, are entitled to little more credit than the narrative of the

Shahnameh, which declares that Iskander (Alexander) was the son of Darab

(Darius) and of a daughter of Failakus (Philip of Macedon). When an

oriental crown passes from one dynasty to another, however foreign and

unconnected, the natives are wont to invent a relationship between the

two houses, which both parties are commonly quite ready to accept; as

it suits the rising house to be provided with a royal ancestry, and it

pleases the fallen one and its partisans to see in the occupants of the

throne a branch of the ancient stock--a continuation of the legitimate

family. Tales therefore of the above-mentioned kind are, historically

speaking, valueless; and it must remain uncertain whether the second

Median monarch had any child at all, either male or female.

Old age was now creeping upon the sonless king. If he was sixteen

or seventeen years old at the time of his contract of marriage with

Aryenis, he must have been nearly seventy in B.C. 558, when the revolt

occurred which terminated both his reign and his kingdom. It appears

that the Persian branch of the Arian race, which had made itself a home

in the country lying south and south-east of Media, between the 32nd

parallel and the Persian gulf, had acknowledged some subjection to

the Median kings during the time of their greatness. Dwelling in their

rugged mountains and high upland plains, they had however maintained the

simplicity of their primitive manners, and had mixed but little with

the Medes, being governed by their own native princes of the Achasmenian

house, the descendants, real or supposed, of a certain Achajmenes. These

princes were connected by marriage with the Cappadocian kings; and their

house was regarded as one of the noblest in Western Asia. What the exact

terms were upon which they stood with the Median monarch is uncertain.

Herodotus regards Persia as absorbed into Media at this time, and the

Achsemenidse as merely a good Persian family. Nicolas of Damascus makes

Persia a Median satrapy, of which Atradates, the father of Cyrus, is

satrap, Xenophon, on the contrary, not only gives the Achajmenidae their

royal rank, but seems to consider Persia as completely independent of

Media; Moses of Chorene takes the same view, regarding Cyrus as a great

and powerful sovereign during the reign of Astyages. The native records

lean towards the view of Xenophon and Moses. Darius declares that eight

of his race had been kings before himself, and makes no difference

between his own royalty and theirs. Cyrus calls himself in one

inscription “the son of Cambyses, the powerful king.” It is certain

therefore that Persia continued to be ruled by her own native monarchs

during the whole of the Median period, and that Cyrus led the attack

upon Astyages as hereditary Persian king. The Persian records seem

rather to imply actual independence of Media; but as national vanity

would prompt to dissimulation in such a case, we may perhaps accord so

much weight to the statement of Herodotus, and to the general tradition

on the subject, as to believe that there was some kind of acknowledgment

of Median supremacy on the part of the Persian kings anterior to Cyrus,

though the acknowledgment may have been not much more than a formality

and have imposed no onerous obligations. The residence of Cyrus at the

Median Court, which is asserted in almost every narrative of his life

before he became king, inexplicable if Persia was independent, becomes

thoroughly intelligible on the supposition that she was a great Median

feudatory. In such cases the residence of the Crown Prince at the

capital of the suzerain is constantly desired, or even required by the

superior Power, which sees in the presence of the son and heir the best

security against disaffection or rebellion on the part of the father.

It appears that Cyrus, while at the Median Court, observing the

unwarlike temper of the existing generation of the Medes, who had not

seen any actual service, and despising the personal character of the

monarch, who led a luxurious life, chiefly at Ecbatana, amid eunuchs,

concubines, and dancing-girls, resolved on raising the standard of

rebellion, and seeking at any rate to free his own country. It may be

suspected that the Persian prince was not actuated solely by political

motives. To earnest Zoroastrians, such as the Achgemenians are shown

to have been by their inscriptions, the yoke of a Power which had so

greatly corrupted, if it had not wholly laid aside, the worship of

Ormazd, must have been extremely distasteful; and Cyrus may have wished

by his rebellion as much to vindicate the honor of his religion--as to

obtain a loftier position for his nation. If the Magi occupied really

the position at the Median Court which Herodotus assigns to them--if

they “were held in high honor by the king, and shared in his

sovereignty”--if the priest-ridden monarch was perpetually dreaming and

perpetually referring his dreams to the Magian seers for exposition, and

then guiding his actions by the advice they tendered him, the religious

zeal of the young Zoroastrian may very naturally have been aroused, and

the contest into which he plunged may have been, in his eyes, not so

much a national struggle as a crusade against the infidels. It will be

found hereafter that religious fervor animated the Persians in most

of those wars by which they spread their dominion. We may suspect,

therefore, though it must be admitted we cannot prove, that a religious

motive was among those which led them to make their first efforts after

independence.

According to the account of the struggle which is most circumstantial,

and on the whole most probable, the first difficulty which the would-be

rebel had to meet and vanquish was that of quitting the Court. Alleging

that his father was in weak health, and required his care, he requested

leave of absence for a short time; but his petition was refused on the

flattering ground that the Great King was too much attached to him to

lose sight of him even for a day. A second application, however, made

through a favorite eunuch after a certain interval of time, was more

successful; Cyrus received permission to absent himself from Court for

the next five months; whereupon, with a few attendants, he left Ecbatana

by night, and took the road leading to his native country.

The next evening Astyages, enjoying himself as usual over his

wine, surrounded by a crowd of his concubines, singing-girls, and

dancing-girls, called on one of them for a song. The girl took her lyre

and sang as follows: “The lion had the wild boar in his power, but let

him depart to his own lair; in his lair he will wax in strength, and

will cause the lion a world of toil; till at length, although the

weaker, he will overcome the stronger.” The words of the song greatly

disquieted the king, who had been already made aware that a Chaldaean

prophecy designated Cyrus as future king of the Persians. Repenting of

the indulgence which he had granted him, Astyages forthwith summoned an

officer into his presence, and ordered him to take a body of horsemen,

pursue the Persian prince, and bring him back, either alive or dead.

The officer obeyed, overtook Cyrus, and announced his errand; upon which

Cyrus expressed his perfect willingness to return, but proposed, that,

as it was late, they should defer their start till the next day. The

Medes consenting, Cyrus feasted them, and succeeded in making them

all drunk; then mounting his horse, he rode off at full speed with his

attendants, and reached a Persian outpost, where he had arranged with

his father that he should find a body of Persian troops. When the Medes

had slept off their drunkenness, and found their prisoner gone, they

pursued, and again overtaking Cyrus, who was now at the head of an armed

force, engaged him. They were, however, defeated with great loss, and

forced to retreat, while Cyrus, having beaten them off, made good his

escape into Persia.

When Astyages heard what had happened, he was greatly vexed; and,

smiting his thigh, he exclaimed, “Ah! fool, thou knewest well that it

boots not to heap favors on the vile; yet didst thou suffer thyself to

be gulled by smooth words; and so thou hast brought upon thyself this

mischief. But even now he shall not get off scot-free.” And instantly

he sent for his generals, and commanded them to collect his host, and

proceed to reduce Persia to obedience. Three thousand chariots, two

hundred thousand horse, and a million footmen (!) were soon brought

together; and with these Astyages in person invaded the revolted

province, and engaged the army which Cyrus and his father Cambyses

had collected for defence. This consisted of a hundred chariots, fifty

thousand horsemen, and three hundred thousand light-armed foot, who were

drawn up in in front of a fortified town near the frontier. The first

day’s battle was long and bloody, terminating without any decisive

advantage to either side; but on the second day Astyages, making skilful

use of his superior numbers, gained a great victory. Having detached one

hundred thousand men with orders to make a circuit and get into the

rear of the town, he renewed the attack; and when the Persians were all

intent on the battle in their front, the troops detached fell on the

city and took it, almost before its defenders were aware. Cambyses, who

commanded in the town, was mortally wounded and fell into the enemy’s

hands. The army in the field, finding itself between two fires, broke

and fled towards the interior, bent on defending Pasargadse, the

capital. Meanwhile Astyages, having given Cambyses honorable burial,

pressed on in pursuit.

The country had now become rugged and difficult. Between Pasargadse and

the place where the two days’ battle was fought lay a barrier of lofty

hills, only penetrated by a single narrow pass. On either side were two

smooth surfaces of rock, while the mountain towered above, lofty and

precipitous. The pass was guarded by ten thousand Persians. Recognizing

the impossibility of forcing it, Astyages again detached a body of

troops, who marched along the foot of the range till they found a place

where it could be ascended, when they climbed it and seized the heights

directly over the defile. The Persians upon this had to evacuate their

strong position, and to retire to a lower range of hills very near to

Pasargadge. Here again there was a two days’ fight. On the first day

all the efforts of the Medes to ascend the range (which, though low,

was steep, and covered with thickets of wild olive) were fruitless. Their

enemy met them, not merely with the ordinary weapons, but with great

masses of stone, which they hurled down with crushing force upon their

ascending columns. On the second day, however, the resistance was weaker

or less effective Astyages had placed at the foot of the range, below

his attacking columns, a body of troops with orders to kill all who

refused to ascend, or who, having ascended, attempted to quit the

heights and return to the valley. Thus compelled to advance, his men

fought with desperation, and drove the Persians before them up the

slopes of the hill to its very summit, where the women and children

had been placed for the sake of security. There, however, the tide of

success turned. The taunts and upbraidings of their mothers and wives

restored the courage of the Persians; and, turning upon their foe, they

made a sudden furious charge. The Medes, astonished and overborne, were

driven headlong down the hill, and fell into such confusion that the

Persians slew sixty thousand of them. Still Astyages did not desist from

his attack. The authority whom we have been following here to a great

extent fails us, and we have only a few scattered notices from which to

reconstruct the closing scenes of the war. It would seem from these

that Astyages still maintained the offensive, and that there was a

fifth battle in the immediate neighborhood of Pasargadse, wherein he was

completely defeated by Cyrus, who routed the Median army, and pressing

upon them in their flight, took their camp. All the insignia of Median

royalty fell into his hands; and, amid the acclamations of his army,

he assumed them, and was saluted by his soldiers “King of Media and

Persia.” Meanwhile Astyages had sought for safety in flight; the greater

part of his army had dispersed, and he was left with only a few friends,

who still adhered to his fortunes. Could he have reached Ecbatana, he

might have greatly prolonged the struggle; but his enemy pressed him

close; and, being compelled to an engagement, he not only suffered a

complete defeat, but was made prisoner by his fortunate adversary.

By this capture the Median monarchy was brought abruptly to an end.

Astyages had no son to take his place and continue the struggle. Even

had it been otherwise, the capture of the monarch would probably have

involved his people’s submission. In the East the king is so identified

with his kingdom that the possession of the royal person is regarded as

conveying to the possessor all regal rights. Cyrus, apparently, had no

need even to besiege Ecbatana; the whole Median state, together with its

dependencies, at once submitted to him, on learning what had happened.

This ready submission was no doubt partly owing to the general

recognition of a close connection between Media and Persia, which made

the transfer of empire from the one to the other but slightly galling

to the subjected power, and a matter of complete indifference to the

dependent countries. Except in so far as religion was concerned,

the change from one Iranic race to the other would make scarcely a

perceptible difference to the subjects of either kingdom. The law of

the state would still be “the law of the Medes and Persians.” Official

employments would be open to the people of both countries. Even the fame

and glory of empire would attain, in the minds of men, almost as much

to the one nation as the other. If Media descended from her preeminent

rank, it was to occupy a station only a little below the highest, and

one which left her a very distinct superiority over all the subject

races.

If it be asked how Media, in her hour of peril, came to receive no

assistance from the great Powers with which she had made such close

alliances--Babylonia and Lydia--the answer would seem to be that Lydia

was too remote from the scene of strife to lend her effective aid, while

circumstances had occurred in Babylonia to detach that state from her

and render it unfriendly. The great king, Nebuchadnezzar, had he been

on the throne, would undoubtedly have come to the assistance of his

brother-in-law, when the fortune of war changed, and it became evident

that his crown was in danger. But Nebuchadnezzar had died in B.V. 561,

three years before the Persian revolt broke out. His son, Evil-Merodach,

who would probably have maintained his father’s alliances, had survived

him but two years: he had been murdered in B.C. 559 by a brother-in-law,

Nergalsharezer or Neriglissar, who ascended the throne in that year and

reigned till B.C. 555. This prince was consequently on the throne at

the time of Astyages’ need. As he had supplanted the house of

Nebuchadnezzar, he would naturally be on bad terms with that monarch’s

Median connections; and we may suppose that he saw with pleasure the

fall of a power to which pretenders from the Nebuchadnezzar family would

have looked for support and countenance.

In conclusion, a few words may be said on the general character of the

Median Empire, and the causes of its early extinction.

The Median Empire was in extent and fertility of territory-equal if not

superior to the Assyrian. It stretched from Rhages and the Carmanian

desert on the east to the river Halys upon the west, a distance of

above twenty degrees, or about 1,300 miles. From north to south it

was comparatively narrow, being confined between the Black Sea, the

Caucasus, and the Caspian, on the one side, and the Euphrates and

Persian Gulf on the other. Its greatest width, which was towards the

east, was about nine, and its least, which was towards the west, was

about four degrees. Its area was probably not much short of 500,000

square miles. Thus it was as large as Great Britain, France, Spain, and

Portugal put together.

In fertility its various parts were very unequal. Portions of both

Medias, of Persia, of Armenia, Iberia, and Cappadocia, were rich and

productive; but in all these countries there was a large quantity of

barren mountain, and in Media Magna and Persia there were tracts of

desert. If we estimate the resources of Media from the data furnished by

Herodotus in his account of the Persian revenue, and compare them with

those of the Assyrian Empire, as indicated by the same document, we

shall find reason to conclude, that except during the few years when

Egypt was a province of Assyria, the resources of the Third exceeded

those of the Second Monarchy.

The weakness of the Empire arose chiefly from its want of organization.

Nicolas of Damascus, indeed, in the long passage from which our account

of the struggle between Cyrus and Astyages has been taken, represents

the Median Empire as divided, like the Persian, into a number of

satrapies but there is no real ground for believing that any such

organization was practised in Median times, or to doubt that Darius

Hystaspis was the originator of the satrapial system. The Median Empire,

like the Assyrian, was a congeries of kingdoms, each ruled by its own

native prince, as is evident from the case of Persia, where Cambyses was

not satrap, but monarch. Such organization as was attempted appears to

have been clumsy in the extreme. The Medes (we are told) only claimed

direct suzerainty over the nations immediately upon their borders;

remoter tribes they placed under these, and looked to them to collect

and remit the tribute of the outlying countries. It is doubtful if they

called on the subject nations for any contingents of troops. We never

hear of their doing so. Probably, like the Assyrians, they made their

conquests with armies composed entirely of native soldiers, or of

those combined with such forces as were sent to their aid by princes in

alliance with them.

The weakness arising from this lack of organization was increased by a

corruption of manners, which caused the Medes speedily to decline in

energy and warlike spirit. The conquest of a great and luxurious empire

by a hardy and simple race is followed, almost of necessity, by a

deterioration in the character of the conquerors, who lose the warlike

virtues, and too often do not replace them by the less splendid virtues

of peace. This tendency, which is fixed in the nature of things, admits

of being checked for a while, or rapidly developed, according to the

policy and character of the monarchs who happen to occupy the throne.

If the original conqueror is succeeded, by two or three ambitious and

energetic princes, who engage in important wars and labor to extend

their dominions at the expense of their neighbors, it will be some time

before the degeneracy becomes marked. If, on the other hand, a prince of

a quiet temper, self-indulgent, and studious of ease, come to the throne

within a short time of the original conquests, the deterioration will

be very rapid. In the present instance it happened that the immediate

successor of the first conqueror was of a peaceful disposition,

unambitious, and luxurious in his habits. During a reign which lasted

at least thirty-five years he abstained almost wholly from military

enterprises; and thus an entire generation of Medes grew up without

seeing actual service, which alone makes the soldier. At the same

time there was a general softening of manners. The luxury of the Court

corrupted the nobles, who from hardy mountain chieftains, simple if not

even savage in their dress and mode of life, became polite courtiers,

magnificent in their apparel, choice in their diet, and averse to all

unnecessary exertion. The example of the upper classes would tell on the

lower, though not perhaps to any very large extent. The ordinary Mede,

no doubt, lost something of his old daring and savagery; from disuse

he became inexpert in the management of arms; and he was thus no longer

greatly to be dreaded as a soldier. But he was really not very much less

brave, nor less capable of bearing hardships, than before; and it only

required a few years of training to enable him to recover himself and to

be once more as good a soldier as any in Asia.

But in the affairs of nations, as in those of men, negligence often

proves fatal before it can be repaired. Cyrus saw his opportunity,

pressed his advantage, and established the supremacy of his nation,

before the unhappy effects of Astyages’ peace policy could be removed.

He knew that his own Persians possessed the military spirit in its

fullest vigor; he felt that he himself had all the qualities of a

successful loader; he may have had faith in his cause, which, he would

view as the cause of Ormazd against Ahriman, of pure Religion against a

corrupt and debasing nature-worship. His revolt was sudden, unexpected,

and well-timed. He waited till Astyages was advanced in years, and so

disqualified for command; till the veterans of Cyaxares were almost all

in their graves; and till the Babylonian throne was occupied by a king

who was not likely to afford Astyages any aid. Ho may not at first have

aspired to do more than establish the independence of his own country.

But when the opportunity of effecting a transfer of empire offered

itself, he seized it promptly; rapidly repeating his blows, and allowing

his enemy no time to recover and renew the struggle. The substitution

of Persia for Media as the ruling power in Western Asia was due less to

general causes than to the personal character of two men. Had Astyages

been a prince of ordinary vigor, the military training of the Medes

would have been kept up; and in that case they might easily have hold

their own against all comers. Had their training been kept up, or had

Cyrus possessed no more than ordinary ambition and ability, either

he would not have thought of revolting, or he would have revolted

unsuccessfully. The fall of the Median Empire was due immediately to

the genius of the Persian Prince; but its ruin was prepared, and its

destruction was really caused, by the shortsightedness of the Median

monarch.