_Rome, June 3, 1870._—Valerga attacked the “Gallicans,” drawing a parallel
between the Pope and Christ, and between the Fallibilists and
Monothelites. As in Christ the human will co-existed with the divine, so
in the Pope may personal infallibility co-exist with moral sinfulness, and
to conclude from the former against the latter—to draw an argument from
scandals in papal history against the _privilegium inerrantiæ_—is
analogous to the error of the Monothelites, who denied the possibility of
a human will subject to sin co-existing with the divine will in the same
person. Never has the well-known spirit of the Roman _Curia_ shown itself
so openly and with such technical adroitness as in this carefully
elaborated and minute accusation against the Opposition. As Archbishop
Purcell of Cincinnati expressed it, it was “exemplum sophismatum artis ad
instar congestorum,” and great expectations might be formed of its
salutary effect on the French. Purcell answered shortly and pointedly that
the charge applied equally to the Council of Trent and the sixth, seventh,
and eighth Œcumenical Councils, and that he and his colleagues were
content to endure the patriarch’s anathema in such good company. Even
Bellarmine quotes a whole cloud of witnesses against infallibilism, and
neither he nor later writers had refuted them. It is a matter of
thankfulness to God that he has never suffered this opinion to gain
dogmatic authority. Purcell then cited clenching proofs of the public
erroneous teaching of Popes, and among them the history of the ordinations
and reordinations of Formosus and Sergius. The standpoint which he took as
a republican was interesting. He said that the Church was the freest
society in the world, and was loved as such by its American sons, for the
Americans abhorred every doctrine opposed to civil and spiritual freedom.
As kings existed for the good of the peoples, so Popes for the good of the
Church, and not _vice versâ_. Perhaps he was thinking of the words of the
absolutist Louis XIV., “La nation ne fait pas corps en France, elle réside
tout entière dans la personne du roi.” For “nation” put “Église,” and the
words describe precisely the papal system, as it is now intended to be
made exclusively dominant by means of the Council.
The most important speech in this sitting, and one of the most remarkable
theologically since the opening of the Council, was that of Conolly,
Archbishop of Halifax. Formerly an unhesitating adherent of personal
infallibility he had come here without having specially studied the
question, and under the full belief that the _Allgemeine Zeitung_ had
calumniated the Roman See in representing this dogma as the real object of
the Council. But when he found what was expected of him here, he
instituted a searching examination, and thoroughly sifted, as he said,
what the classical Roman theologians cite for their favourite doctrine. He
now frankly submitted to the Council the result of his studies,—that the
whole of Christian antiquity explains the stock passages of Scripture
alleged for papal infallibility in a different sense from the _Schema_,
and bears witness against the theory that the Pope alone, without the
Bishops or even in opposition to them (_etiam omnibus invitis et
contradicentibus_), is infallible. But what our Lord has not spoken, even
though it was certain metaphysically or physically, can never become the
basis of an article of faith, for faith comes by hearing, and hearing is
not by science, but by the words of Christ. It is the speciality of
Catholicism not to interpret passages of Scripture singly and by mere
critical exegesis, but in the light of tradition and in harmony with the
Fathers. To found a dogma on the rejection of the traditional
interpretation would be pure Protestantism. It is not therefore the words
of Scripture simply but the true sense, as revealed by God and attested by
the perpetual and unanimous consent of the Fathers, which all are pledged
by oath to follow, that must be called the real revelation of God. To cite
modern theologians, as Bellarmine does, is nothing to the purpose. I will
have nothing, he said, but the indubitable word of God made into a dogma.
The opinions of 10,000 theologians do not suffice me. And no theologian
should be quoted who lived after the Isidorian forgeries. But no single
passage of Fathers or Councils can be quoted from that earlier time of
genuine tradition, which affirms the Pope’s dogmatic independence of the
rest of the Episcopate. If there be any such, let it be shown; but there
is none, and innumerable and conclusive testimonies can be cited on the
other side. Even at the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem St. James proved
the teaching of Peter by the Prophets, and appealed to it because it
agreed with theirs and not on account of his authority. Conolly was ready
for his part to believe that no Pope could wilfully and knowingly become
heretical,—_i.e._, persistently hold out against all the rest of the
Church; but that did not prove papal infallibility, and to define it would
be to bring the Vatican Council into contradiction with the three Councils
which condemned Honorius, to narrow the gates of heaven, repel the East,
and proclaim not peace but war. To those who said, “Pereant populi sed
promulgetur dogma,” Conolly replied that the loss of one soul was serious
enough to outweigh all the advantages looked for from the new dogma. He
declared, against Manning, that no one was justified in calling an opinion
“proximate heresy” which the Church had not condemned as such; for it was
a duty to follow and not to anticipate her sentence. A Pope had said that
no one should censure a doctrine before the Holy See had spoken, and the
Penitentiary had declared in 1831 that the Gallican Articles were not
under any censure. He had worked thirty-three years among Protestants, and
could testify that what Manning affirmed was the reverse of the truth.
Conolly is a man who is on the whole in tolerable harmony with Roman
views, but who is therefore all the more resolved to vote against
infallibility. While he forbids the Gallican doctrine being taught in his
diocese, he protests here against the Roman. There is evidently a process
going on in his mind, which in so cultivated a theologian can have but one
result. He ended by declaring that he would accept the definition if the
Council proclaimed it, for he was convinced that God was among them. But
that merely meant that he was convinced the dogma would never be
proclaimed. On the strength of that conviction he was almost the first
speaker who briefly but decisively maintained the doctrine to be
untenable.
Yesterday, Thursday, Vancsa, Bishop of Fogarasch, of the Greek Rite,
quoted the testimonies of Greek Fathers against infallibility, and his
speech was thought a remarkable one. Dreux-Brézé of Moulins followed him,
and again had the misfortune immediately to precede Strossmayer. He
contended that, as the Pope is supreme teacher, and the French call him
“Souverain Pontife,” and he is the highest judge, he must be infallible.
As Vicar of Christ, he is also king, for Christ said to Pilate, “Thou
rightly callest me king,” and the royal title was affixed to the cross.
But if Christ was infallible as king, so is the Pope. He supported all
this by texts of Scripture, and spoke against the Fathers who accused the
Pope of despotism or maintained that the new dogma would be the formal
introduction of the grossest despotism. Without the Pope, who is
“Episcopus universalis,” and can seldom exercise his office on account of
the number of the faithful and of his labours, the Bishops have no
jurisdiction, and cannot even absolve without powers derived from him.
“Let us therefore go on,” he concluded, “to unity and agreement, and give
Cæsar what belongs to Cæsar, and the Pope what belongs to the Pope.”
Strossmayer followed him, and declared that papal infallibility was
against the constitution of the Church, the rights of the Bishops and
Councils, and the immutable rule of faith. He explained the constitution
of the Church according to the holy Fathers and especially St. Cyprian
(_De Unitate Ecclesiæ_), who did not hold their jurisdiction to be limited
to their dioceses, since by virtue of their character they often had to
exercise authority in the concerns of the universal Church, and were
obliged to do so, as, _e.g._, in Councils. This sharing of authority and
rights between the Pope and the Episcopate was evident from the
controversy between Pope Stephen and Cyprian in the third century about
the rebaptism of heretics, in which the latter did not the least admit any
personal and absolute infallibility bestowed on the Pope by our Lord. And
St. Augustine defended him on the ground that the question had not yet
been decided by a General Council, which shows that the sole authority in
matters of faith and morals was in his opinion a General Council, united
with its head.
Strossmayer took this opportunity of vindicating the French Church
admirably from the calumnies and attacks of the Patriarch of Jerusalem. He
complained indignantly of a Church which had come forth pure and
victorious from the bitterest persecution, and which boasted such great
martyrs and confessors, being slandered by the comparison of so-called
Gallicanism to Monothelitism, and of those great men being libelled who
during life had rendered such conspicuous services to the Church of God,
as well as their successors who had made wonderful and exceptional
sacrifices for the Church and the Holy See. Strossmayer blamed the
Patriarch’s vague and general statements about the constitution of the
Church, and advised him to bring arguments from positive tradition, which
were alone of any decisive force. He proceeded to insist on the power and
necessity of General Councils, especially in our days, and he proved the
necessity of their being frequently held from the conduct of the Apostles,
from the holy Fathers, and from the Councils of Constance and Trent. But
if once the personal infallibility of the Pope were defined, Councils
would become superfluous and useless, and the Bishops would be robbed of
their authority as witnesses and judges of faith. In the one way the
greatest injury would be done to the prosperity of the Church, and in the
other the rights of Bishops would be reduced to a mere assent, so that
they would hardly any longer be consultors and theologians; but this would
be clearly against the unchangeable constitution of the Church and the
usage of Councils, as for instance that of Chalcedon, where the Bishops
most unmistakeably exercised the office of judges as regarded the Letter
of Pope Leo. The Bishops could make no such concession without betraying
their authority, and casting a slur on their predecessors at the Council
of Trent, who are well known to have so emphatically vindicated their
freedom and rights, when the two words “proponentibus Legatis” were
inserted by the Legates against their will. And the speaker praised the
wisdom of the Council of Trent in resolving to abstain from deciding any
questions which might give occasion for discord or for prejudicing the
rights and freedom of the Bishops.
In the last part of his speech Strossmayer discussed the Catholic rule of
faith, which had been completely changed and violated by the comments of
the members of the Deputation of Faith on the _Schema_. The principle of
at least moral unanimity was, he said, a sacred one, corresponding to
precedent and pleasing to the faithful. There were whole volumes of the
holy Fathers extant on this principle, as of Irenæus, Tertullian,
Augustine and Vincent of Lerins, who in common with all others maintained
that there are three essential conditions for proving a divine tradition
and propounding an article of faith, antiquity, universality and
agreement. They all thought the tradition of the Roman Church a principal
river, whereby the whole earth was watered, but they regarded the
traditions of the other Churches also as tributaries by which the river
must be constantly fed, or it would in course of time be dried up. They
all ascribed the first authority to the witness of St. Peter’s successor,
but that authority was only manifested clearly to the Catholic world after
being reinforced by the consent of all the other Churches. This divine
rule would be completely overset by the personal infallibility of the
Pope, to the great injury of faith. If it is said that the definition is
earnestly desired by many, it must be replied that it is also desired by
the worst enemies of the Church, who openly say in writing and by word of
mouth that it is the best means for destroying the infallibility of the
Church. That fact alone would explain the alarm and anxiety of so many of
the most learned Fathers of the Council. Strossmayer dwelt in conclusion
on the danger that would result from the definition for the Southern
Sclaves and Catholic Croats, who lived side by side with eight million
persons out of the unity of the Church. Not only would the return of these
separated brethren be barred, but it might be feared that the Catholic
Croats would be driven out of the Church. He therefore always hoped, and
entreated the holy Father, that he would emulate the example of the
humility of St. Peter in his martyrdom, and of Christ who was exalted by
his Father because He had humbled Himself to the death of the Cross, and
magnanimously have the subject withdrawn.
The speech was listened to with great attention, and became the topic of
conversation in all circles at Rome, and even Bishops of the other party
paid a high tribute to it. As yet 24 Bishops have spoken against the dogma
and 35 for it,—most of the latter having no real dioceses.
Two interesting episodes have intervened. Last week the police refused the
Prince Bishop of Breslau his _visa_ for Naples, because he could show no
permission from the Presidents of the Council to go there. This implied
that the Fathers are civil as well as spiritual subjects of the Pope. The
Bishop, who was wearied out with the objectless proceedings in the Council
Hall, sent to Fessler, the Secretary of the Council, for the requisite
permission; Fessler replied that he could not give it, and referred him to
the President de Angelis, who tried to represent the whole affair as a
mistake. It had not been so ill meant, and at most only the departure of
the Orientals was intended to be prevented, he said, and he authorized
Fessler to instruct the police to give the permission. But that was the
most complete indorsing of what they had done, and proved that the Pope
meant to use his temporal power for managing the Council and controlling
the actions of the Fathers. On that account the departure of the Prince
Bishop had been hindered, and the whole affair involves the question of
ecclesiastical freedom and international right. Does a member of the
Council thereby lose or prejudice his rights as the subject of a foreign
state, or is the freedom of individual Bishops suspended while taking part
in it? So anxious is the Pope to give up nothing which may serve for
dominating the Council, that he restricts the Bishops in the most harmless
exercise of personal freedom, which at other times he would never have
thought of. I will not dwell on the insult in this procedure to the King
of Prussia, whose safe-conduct was no more respected than the Emperor
Sigismund’s at Constance, for a graver question is at stake,—that of
international right and freedom of the Council. Meanwhile they reckon on
Prussia taking no further notice of the affair, and the Prince Bishop has
given up his journey after these difficulties. France, too, has quietly
endured a series of insults, and so they hope not to have to abolish the
regulation or disavow the police.
Rome cannot admit the principle of international right in this case,
without giving up one of her own principles, the Inquisition, according to
whose laws foreigners can be arrested, imprisoned, and put to the
question. No secular tribunal limits its power, and every Bishop therefore
could in theory be brought before it. By papal law the Pope might at any
moment have Cardinal Schwarzenberg arrested, and if the right has become
inapplicable, that is due to the influence of foreign states and the
modern spirit, whose restraints on the full exercise of Church authority
it is the office of the Council to remove, as the Syllabus, Bull of
Censures, _Schema de Ecclesiâ_, etc., prove. According to Roman canon law,
freedom at the Council is inconceivable.
In a former letter I gave an inaccurate account of the Prince Bishop’s
conduct towards the priest Jentsch, at Liegnitz, being misled by
statements in the Roman newspapers.(105) The text of the explanation
accepted by the Bishop shows that no principle was conceded or denied, and
he said himself that he agreed in substance with Jentsch.
The arrival of Father Hötzl in Rome seemed for a time likely to produce
still more serious conflicts, for his affair looked as if it would oblige
the minority to give expression to their view of Döllinger’s teaching on
the necessity of general consent for the œcumenicity of a Council. Those
who had undertaken the instruction of Hötzl cared less for converting him
than for using the opportunity to provoke dissension among the minority.
He was told that an explanation, not a retractation, was all that was
demanded of him, and when the explanation he offered was found
unsatisfactory another was proposed to him on May 31. The crucial passage
in it was read and examined by leading bishops of the minority, whose
names were calculated to inspire complete confidence. Hötzl had some cause
to think he had saved honour and conscience, and responsibility to man and
God, when he sought the judgment of liberal German Bishops and resolved to
abide by it. But though they disliked the passage, they thought it
difficult to know how to save a man who had come to Rome in such childish
confidence, and did not feel justified under the circumstances in urging
him to go to extremities and sacrifice himself to their interests. It was
not their place to drive him to a breach with his Order or a loss of
personal liberty, at a time when they had not themselves publicly,
solemnly and decisively repudiated the doctrine imposed on him. Still less
did they want to compromise themselves or break up their harmony before
the time. And their hesitation may have led Father Hötzl into his mistake;
he was acting in concert with the minority when he signed.
I give only a brief preliminary notice of the most important points in
to-day’s sitting. After Dinkel, who spoke very well, and Domenec, Bishop
of Pittsburg, who was much interrupted, Maret made a longer speech, which
he delivered in a very loud voice, as deaf persons are apt to do. In the
course of it he declared that it would be called a vicious circle for the
less to give power to the greater, as would be done if the Council, which
was said to possess a lower authority, were to confer on the Pope—a higher
authority—the prerogative of infallibility. Thereupon Bilio struck in very
excitedly, crying out “Concilium nihil dat Papæ nec dare potest, sed
solummodo recognoscit, suffragia dat, et Sanctus Pater quod in Spiritu
Sancto ipsi placet decidit.”
In yesterday’s sitting a _postulatum_ for the close of the general debate
was prepared, which is said to have received 150 signatures. After Maret’s
speech it was at once produced and the close voted. Little more than 60
prelates have spoken, and above 40 were waiting their turn, amongst whom
were Haynald and other considerable persons. The continuation of the
debate had been reckoned upon and much was hoped from it; but now that the
example has once been set of using the well-known clause in the order of
business in the interests of one party, the step may be repeated in every
succeeding debate. The Opposition will be driven into greater firmness by
this occurrence, which they had foreshadowed in the half-threatening
formula at the end of their great Protest. The question is now forced upon
them, whether they were in earnest in what they then said.