THIRTY-SEVENTH LETTER.

_Rome, April 15, 1870._—The _Constitutio Dogmatica de Ecclesiâ Christi_

will receive its definitive form in the Congregation of Easter Tuesday,

but the substance is already fixed. It received many significant

alterations in the course of discussion, and the ready reception accorded

to it as a whole is due to the many detailed amendments which have been

conceded. These changes are so important that the spokesman of the

Commission, Pie of Poitiers, said in his closing speech it was really the

work of the whole Council, so that the Fathers might truly say, “_Visum

est Spiritui Sancto et nobis_.” After the insertion of the word “Romana”

before “Catholica Ecclesia,” the three first chapters were accepted in

their amended form. The fourth, on faith and knowledge, was debated only

cursorily and by a few speakers on April 8. But this chapter contains a

passage of the greatest practical importance. At the end occur these

words: “Since it is not enough to avoid heretical pravity, unless those

errors which more or less nearly approach it are shunned, we admonish all

of the duty of observing the constitution and decrees where such evil

opinions not expressly named here have been proscribed and prohibited by

this Holy See.”(78) The Bishops with good reason saw in this passage a

confirmation of the judgments and increase of the authority of the Roman

Congregations, _i.e._, of the tribunals through which the Pope exercises

his power. It seemed to them desirable to give due expression to their

objections, and accordingly a request was made to the President to appoint

a further day for this subject. But as nobody had inscribed his name to

speak, the request was refused and the whole debate was closed on that

day, Friday, April 8. But to avoid the danger of opposition at the last

moment and secure the decrees being unanimous, a certain concession was

made by announcing that the closing paragraph should not be voted on till

the whole _Schema de Fide_, four chapters of which only were as yet ready,

should be completed. Thus a great point was gained,—a decree on matters of

faith was carried by moral unanimity and not by surprise, but after a

serious though compressed debate, which helped to win for the views of the

minority a very perceptible influence on the form of the decree.

But on the following day, April 9, a notice was communicated that, as the

closing paragraph of the _Schema_—beginning with the words “Itaque supremi

pastoralis,” etc.(79)—had not been treated with sufficient particularity

at the last general sitting, it must be again brought forward for

deliberation before the whole fourth chapter came to be voted upon. The

Fathers were thereby admonished that they might produce their amendments

on the fourth chapter at the next sitting. This Congregation was held on

April 12, when the final paragraph was put to the vote, and this roused

them from the dream of unanimity. It was observed in the debate that if

the voting on the paragraph were put off till the whole _Schema de Fide_

was completed, this would be putting it off to the Greek Calends. But if

the fixing of this _Schema_ was undertaken directly after Easter, the more

important subject of the _Schema de Ecclesiâ_ must give place to it, and

so it might easily happen that infallibility would not come on at all this

spring. To withdraw the closing paragraph would be not only not to

maintain but to lose that favourite form of authoritative papal utterance

through the medium of the Roman Congregations, which especially required

to be upheld. Pie of Poitiers insisted on the fact that the paragraph had

been published in the _Allgemeine Zeitung_, and could not therefore

without peril be withdrawn even for the moment only.

The Opposition were partly disposed themselves to treat the passage as

unimportant. There were some who thought that in principle it was right

for the Roman decisions to be respected and a certain authority attached

to them, for this was necessary for the government of the Church; and the

very wording of the passage distinguished these decisions from matters

defined under anathema. So the minority resolved not to make any

collective resistance to it, and many well-known members of the Opposition

accepted it without contradiction. Notwithstanding this, when the whole

fourth chapter came to be voted on on Tuesday, April 12, the desired

unanimity was not attained; 83 Bishops gave a conditional _Placet_ only.

They handed in the grounds of their vote in writing, which seem to have

been of various kinds, for even the Bishops of Moulins and Saluzzo, who

are notorious infallibilists, were among them. Some, especially English

Bishops, may well have demurred to the designation “_Romana_ Catholica”

before “Ecclesiâ;” others may have thought it necessary to guard their

rights as against majorities; but far the greater number wanted to

repudiate the concluding passage. The vote was understood here in this

latter sense, and no stone was left unturned to induce the Opposition to

yield on that point. The step they have taken makes the deeper impression,

because it is known that they have not put forth their full strength.

It must be allowed that the final paragraph contained no actual doctrine

which made the resistance of the Episcopate an absolute duty and required

unanimous consent, but still it is obvious that the Council thereby

sanctioned and strengthened what it ought to have reformed and limited,

and therefore the carelessness manifested by a portion of the Opposition

admits of no favourable explanation. For the chief cause of the weakness

and corruption of the Church is to be found in those Roman

Congregations,—in the principles of some and the defects of others. The

Bishops who accept the paragraph give their approval, _e.g._, to the

Inquisition and the Index, and thereby prejudice not a little their moral

influence and dignity. The vote of last Tuesday does not accordingly

appear to me any proof of the firm organization or imposing power of the

minority; it only shows what they might accomplish if they chose, but that

they do not choose to do as much as they can. But the event will show

whether the _Curia_ holds to its policy of securing unanimity by prudent

and well-timed concessions. The minority will be urged and entreated first

to withdraw their objections. If that fails, the Court must either give up

the hope of unanimity or accept a very sensible humiliation. For if the

text remains unaltered, those who have now given a conditional _Placet_

can give no simple _Placet_ next time.(80) Rome will certainly exhaust all

her arts to avert the scandal of an open opposition in a Solemn Session.

I said in a former letter that the Opposition had taken up a position

which no enemy from without could dislodge them from, but this did not

imply at all that all internal dangers are overcome. These by no means

consist in the decomposing influences of hope and fear which the _Curia_

makes such use of, or the prospect of a Cardinal’s Hat, or again in party

divisions at home, which might have disturbed and divided the French,

Austrian and North American Bishops. The latter danger might have made

itself felt at the commencement of the Council, but constant intercourse

and community of experiences during this winter have put an end to it. The

real disease which has weakened the minority in the past and threatens it

in the future lies deeper—the great internal differences of Catholicism,

which are now being brought to a decisive issue, do not coincide with the

antagonism of the rival parties in the Council, but divide the minority

itself. The main question, exclusive of the immediate controversy and

partly independent of it, which divides Catholics into two sections so

sharply that no sympathy or confidence can bridge over the gulf, remains

unsolved within the minority and constantly endangers their coherence. The

common designation of Liberal Catholics tends rather to obscure than to

express the principle of this division. By Liberal Catholics may be

understood those who desiderate freedom not only _for_ but _in_ the

Church, and would subject all arbitrary power of Church as well as State

in matters of religion to law and tradition; but that is the end they aim

at, not their fundamental principle. Such requirements concern the

constitution rather than the doctrine of the Church, law rather than

theology. They are important, but they do not contain the crucial point of

the present contest in the Church. The root of the matter lies not simply

in the relation to be maintained towards the chief authority in the

Church, but in the right relation to science; it is not merely freedom but

truth that is at stake. It is mainly as an institution for the salvation

of men and dispenser of the means of grace that the Church has to deal

with the labouring, suffering and ignorant millions of mankind. And in

order to guard them from the assaults of popular Protestantism, a popular

Catholicism and fabulous representation of the Church has been gradually

built up, which surrounds her past history with an ideal halo, and

conceals by sophistries and virtual lies whatever is difficult or

inconvenient or evil, whatever, in short, is “offensive to pious ears.”

But such a transfigured Catholicism is a mere shadow Catholicism, not the

Church but a phantom of the Church. Its upholders are compelled at every

step to employ various weapons, to ward off any triumph of their enemies

and avoid disturbing the faithful in a religious sentiment artificially

compounded of error and truth combined. The more the notion of the supreme

glory, and even infallibility, of the Pope was developed, the greater

solidarity with the past became requisite, that the history of the Popes

might not be suffered to bear witness too strongly against such views. To

quote a significant phrase in constant use here during this winter, “the

dogma must conquer history.”(81) A contest has arisen, not of dogma but of

a theological opinion against history, that is against truth; the end

sanctifies the means. It was held allowable in order to save the Church

and for the interest of souls to commit what would in any other case have

been acknowledged to be sin. Not only was history falsified, but the rules

of Christian morality were no longer held applicable where the credit of

the hierarchy was at stake. The very sense of truth and error, right and

wrong,—in a word the conscience—was thrown into confusion. Thus, _e.g._,

when Pius V. demanded that the Huguenot prisoners should be put to death,

he did right, for he was Pope and a Saint to boot. Since Charles Borromeo

approved the murdering of Protestants by private persons, it is better to

approve it than to call his canonization in question. Or one moral

aberration is got rid of by another. Many of the leading Catholic writers

of this century deny that Gregory XIII. approved the massacre of St.

Bartholomew,(82) or that heretics have ever been put to death at Rome.

This spirit, which falsifies history and corrupts morals, is the crying

sin of modern Catholicism, and it reaches high enough. Of the three men

who are commonly held in France to stand at the head of the Catholic

movement, one wrote a panegyric on Pius V., another under the name of

_Religion et Liberté_ attacked absolutism in France while defending the

double absolutism in Rome, and a third vindicated the Syllabus—all three

thus manifesting the influence of this deplorable spirit.

On the other hand the genuine Catholic, who wishes also to be a good

Christian, cannot separate love for his Church from the love of goodness

and truth. He shrinks from lies in history as much as from present

adulation, and is divided by a deep moral gulf from those who deliberately

seek to defend the Church by sin and religious truth by historical

falsehood. This contrast is most conspicuously exhibited in the question

of infallibility, as one example may suffice to prove. The principles of

the Inquisition have been most solemnly proclaimed and sanctioned by the

Popes. Whoever maintains papal infallibility must deny certain radical

principles of Christian morality, and not merely excuse but accept as true

the opposite views of the Popes. Thus the Roman element excludes the

Catholic and Christian. Such differences obviously cut deep into men’s

ethical character, and divide them far more decisively than any striving

for common practical ends or community of interest and feeling can unite

them on the ground of prudence. In presence of so profound an internal

division the question of the opportuneness of the definition of

infallibility assumes a very subordinate place, and the mere inopportunist

is immeasurably removed from the decided opponent of the dogma. Between

Bishops who consider Popes fallible and those whose conscience is easy

enough to swallow certain doctrines of former Popes on faith and morals,

and who do not see any deadly peril for souls in giving a higher sanction

to these dogmas—between anti-infallibilists and mere inopportunists—the

difference is far deeper than the union. The inopportunists stand nearer

to the infallibilists than to those who oppose the dogma on principle.

They are divided from the one party on a mere question of prudence, from

the other on a question of faith and morality; with the one they are

united by an internal bond, with the other by an external bond, only which

circumstances may dissolve.

This is the true explanation of the halting policy so often observed in

the Opposition. The honest opponents of infallibility wished to secure the

support of those who do not properly speaking share their sentiments. But

they should never for a moment have forgotten that they have to attack

what Gratry has rightly described as an “école de mensonge.” And the

greatest honesty and outspokenness is necessary for defending the honour

and truth of Catholicism against that school. Instead of that they exhibit

themselves in a false light and obscure the situation.

Meanwhile Pius IX. by his letters to Guéranger and Cabrière has completely

and publicly identified himself with that school, at the very moment when

Gratry was so unmistakeably exposing its spirit, and he has made this

still clearer by the distinctions bestowed on Margotti and Veuillot at the

very moment when Newman characterized them as the leaders of “an

aggressive and insolent faction.” He said plainly to the French Bishop

Ramadie of Perpignan that “only Protestants and infidels denied his

infallibility.” His official organ describes the Opposition as allies of

the Freemasons, and he himself calls all who oppose his infallibility bad

Catholics. It is true that the Opposition has gradually been brought to

make very decided declarations of opinion, and has itself expressed doubts

about the future recognition of the Council. But that has complicated its

attitude still further. The other party may ask, “Why these doubts about

Œcumenicity? The Bishops of various countries are assembled in great

numbers; the Governments offer no hindrances, and the Council has united

itself with the Pope in the greatest freedom in the capital city of the

Church. Why then doubt the good results and œcumenical character of the

Council and the validity and future recognition of its decrees?” And the

Opposition can only answer, “For the sole and single reason that the Pope

destroys all freedom of action by his regulations, that he has already

overthrown the ancient constitution of the Church and exercises a power

over the Council incompatible with the rights of the Bishops and the

freedom of the Church.”

The French note is to be presented to-day to Antonelli and next week to

the Pope, instead of to the Council. It is doubted whether Pius will

communicate it to them.(83)

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