CHAPTER XIII.

A SPECIAL LOOK AT SPACE AND TIME.

Through scientific idealism, fully examined, Kant proved that matter is a

manufacture of sense. We have not followed the order of his work, but have

gone straight to the heart of it. His own beginning was the dissection of

space and time. Still, he implied therein, if only in one remark, all that

has here been stated.

"If I take [says Kant] from our representation of a body, all that the

understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force,

divisibility, and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability,

hardness, color, there is still something left us from this empirical

intuition, namely _extension and shape_. These belong to pure intuition,

which exists _a priori_ in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and

without any real object of the senses or any sensation."

Students of Kant have known, in a general way, that he attributed

"extension" to "bodies," as derived by them from _a priori_ mind. _Space_

is so derived; hence all things _in_ space, which is the "form," the

"condition" of their existence, must partake of its nature, which is pure

extension, pure "given quantity," as he designates it. But why does the

_shape_ of a material body belong to "pure intuition," and _come from

mind_? Simply because the shape (let it be of a stone) is merely the

_objected_ "_synthesis of apprehension_," in which the properties of the

stone, as impressions of sense, are _unified_, but in accordance with

their special variety. The shape is their "figurative synthesis," their

"_synthesis speciosa_." Now, in the meaning of Kant, and in the nature of

the case, space is _made_ in precisely the same _manner_ as a stone; only

the stone is full of diverse properties--special effects on sense, got

from some impinging background of matter--some "noumenon"--while space has

no properties at all, except additions and divisions of _itself_--spaces.

In other words, the stone is a _special_ relation between mental synthesis

and sensuous susceptibility, the latter being in particular impact with

some noumenal non-ego, and being definitely _filled_ from it. Space, on

the other hand, is a _general_ relation between the same mental synthesis

and the same sensuous susceptibility, the latter holding _no contents_

from any noumenon, yet being recipient to _all_ possibility of noumenal

impact. Hence, space is just "the synthesis of apprehension" itself, set

in self-reflex, objected, phenomenated. The stone, in its unity, its form,

its "shape," is this objected synthesis of apprehension, _filled_ with

certain sensuous effects. The synthesis of apprehension, again, as the

condition of any special "shape" into which it may be stuffed, is of

course _a priori_ to _the_ stuffed shape; so space is _a priori_ to the

stone in space. Once again, space is the outward representation, the very

double to the eye, of the synthesis of apprehension; for space is just the

_visible synthesis of the apprehended_--the transparent base of

co-existence for all external things.

It must be remembered that the synthesis of apprehension, as the "mind" of

"sense," is itself a _double_, containing the pure conjunctive unity of

"unconscious understanding" as an active factor, and susceptibility to

impact as a passive factor. In the conjoined relation of these two factors

every material phenomenon gets to exist; so there must be _some_ relation

of space to _every_ external object, and to _all_ external objects--which

is to say at once that space is _infinite_, both in extent and

divisibility, so far as it can apply to objects _at all_.

And here, too, is the reason that the contained character, the constituent

quality, of space--meaning what Kant termed the "form of the

intuition"--is essentially plural. This constituent quality of space is a

_re_-presentation of mind, as at once active and passive, receptive and

reflexive--as fundamental _a priori_ self-separateness. But _space

itself_, as a _whole_, is the _synthesis_ of this self-separateness. It is

self-unity of self-separateness, _materialized_. Space, made of spaces, is

a thing identical in form and contents. Kant said:

"Space _re_-presented as an _object_ (as geometry really requires it to

be) contains more than the mere _form of the intuition_; namely, a

combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility

into a representation that can be intuited; so the _form of the

intuition_ gives us merely the manifold, but the _formal intuition_ gives

unity of re-presentation. In the 'AEsthetic,' [the first division of _The

Critique of Pure Reason_], I regarded this unity as belonging entirely to

sensibility, for the purpose of indicating that it antecedes all

conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to

sense, through which, however, all our conceptions of space and time are

possible.... By means of this unity alone (the understanding determining

the sensibility) space and time are given as intuitions."

It is easy enough to follow out the genesis of time, in the same way as

the genesis of space. The constituent quality of space and time is the

same in both, and is subject in both to the same act of synthesis, in

order that the essential plurality of "the form of intuition" may be

created into the unity of "the formal intuition" itself--the single thing,

space or time. But time is the "form" of "_in_-ternal sense," as Kant put

it, while space is the "form" of "_ex_-ternal sense"--sense being to Kant

not its physical organs (which are matter), but mental _susceptibility_ as

distinguished from mental _synthesis_. Every phenomenon in space is made

of active subjective-synthesis, passive subjective-susceptibility, and

noumenal impact. Space and time themselves are made of the synthesis and

the susceptibility alone. But pure synthesis, which means just pure

identity of awareness, can _have_ no "susceptibility," cannot be

_occupied_, without _change of state_; and any change of state in a pure

general awareness forms succession of states, or, as Kant said,

"_generates time_." But conjunction, again, of synthesis and

susceptibility must be the relating of separates, with reference to the

objective as well as the subjective factor. As objective effect this

relation is pure co-existence of separates in time, through outness from

each other--space. All objects, impressions, "effects of sense," must take

the order of time; but "objects of internal sense" (feelings, or

emotions), having no direct filling from noumena, are not objects in

space. Thus, while space is pure synthesis of apprehension _ex_-ternally

objected, time is the same pure synthesis of apprehension _in_-ternally

objected.

The Church of St. Bunco · 第 13 / 20 章