THE DUTCH RULE AND THE BELGIAN REVOLT OF 1830
After the fall of Napoleon, the powers were called upon to decide the
political status of Belgium. The Belgians were not consulted in the
matter, vitally important as it was, and their country was considered
merely as the spoil of the Allies. The main idea that actuated the
Congress of Vienna (1814-15) in rearranging the map of Europe was
to prevent a new menace from the side of France. This country was
not allowed to hold more territory than it possessed in 1789, before
the outbreak of the Revolution; at the same time the Allies who had
defeated Napoleon sought to erect a bulwark against any new extension
of France in the North. They could have granted independence to
Belgium, but as the country was weak it seemed that independence would
mean reabsorption by France. The final settlement of this important
question resulted, therefore, in the formation of the new Kingdom of
the Netherlands, whereby both Belgium and Holland, united under the
same sovereign, would, it was expected, present a sufficiently strong
barrier against France. The new kingdom was declared also to be neutral
territory. This is the first time that the conception of neutrality
was realized with regard to a buffer-state in Western Europe, located
between England, France, and Germany. But the conception of neutrality,
as applied to the Netherlands, is much older than the Congress of
Vienna; and it seems worth while to trace the different schemes
dealing with Belgian neutrality before the years 1814-15.[19]
The idea of establishing the neutrality of the Netherlands goes back in
history as far as the government of Maria of Hungary, at the time of
Emperor Charles V. The former proposed the neutrality of the Belgian
provinces on February 8, 1536, in order that they might escape being
made the battlefield of Europe during the impending international
conflicts. Charles V refused to consider the scheme, as he himself was
planning to raise the Netherlands into an independent kingdom, to be
governed by the son of Francis I, King of France. This plan, of course,
was never carried out.
In 1634 France and Holland concluded a special treaty against Spain,
by which the Netherlands should either become an independent kingdom
or be divided between the contracting powers. Cardinal Richelieu, the
French minister, preferred the idea of an independent Belgium, and went
so far as to propose that this kingdom should be permanently neutral.
In that way the cornerstone of Spanish power in Europe would have
been destroyed. Although neutral, Belgium would have had the right
to conclude offensive alliances, but would not enjoy the benefit of
having the integrity of its territory guaranteed. If that scheme had
been carried out, the Belgians would have had to revolt against Spanish
rule. But the Belgians, owing to the presence of strong Spanish armies
within their borders, did not revolt. The plan of Richelieu failed.
His scheme was, however, taken over by Cardinal Mazarin, minister of
Louis XIV. Mazarin had first suggested the annexation of Belgium by
France, but he met with strong opposition on the part of Holland and
England, both interested in keeping the French menace from extending
right to their own doors. Changing his mind, Mazarin, in 1658, reverted
to Richelieu’s plan concerning the creation of an independent and
neutral Belgium. This proposal met with the strong opposition of the
Dutch “Staatspensionnaris” De Witt, who expressed the fear that such a
state would ruin Dutch trade--an independent Belgium would necessarily
be given a free Scheldt. He also made it clear that Holland could not
forego her right to meddle in the affairs of the Catholic Netherlands,
and that the idea of a common protectorate over them would be welcome.
Mazarin seems not to have been sincere when proposing his plan. It may
be inferred that his main object was to quiet the fear of Holland that
the French and the English would use Belgium as a base during their
operations against Spain.
When the Treaty of the Barriers (1715) threatened to impose upon
Belgium the Dutch garrisons which were maintained for protection
against France, the latter presented (February 17) a memoir to Holland,
again proposing the status of permanent neutrality for Belgium.
The egotism and ill-will of the Dutch defeated this proposal. They
would never have consented to the opening of the Scheldt, which was
a necessary condition for an independent Belgium. Their policy on
this point is made clear by the declaration of the States-General of
the United Provinces, when Emperor Joseph II, in 1756, endeavored to
obtain the opening of the Scheldt and free shipping on the river.
The States-General declared that “the salvation or the loss of the
Republic and its inhabitants depended upon this point.”
When the Revolution of the Belgians against Austrian rule broke out
in 1789, the Elector Frederick-William of Prussia tried in vain to
obtain from the other powers, England and Holland, the recognition
of the Belgian Republic. He proposed that they should recognize the
independence of Belgium and compel the Belgians “to establish a firm,
strong constitution, in conformity with the interests of the Allies...;
to create, subject to the advice of the Allies, a respectable military
state that would inspire confidence; to avoid alliances with powers,
enemies of the Allies, and also trade with them.”
As Prussia was ready to make war on Austria, her hereditary enemy,
Emperor Leopold II declared that he would, in case of war, cede
the “Austrian Netherlands” to France. This England could not have
permitted, and therefore that country withdrew support from Prussia,
causing the Elector Frederick-William to abandon his plan concerning
Belgium.
The French conquest of Belgium entirely changed the policy of the
European powers with regard to the Belgian problem. England now
saw the French menace facing her own shores, and, according to her
traditional policy, began to take measures to avoid the danger. On
November 13, 1813, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the English ambassador
in Vienna: “I must particularly recommend you to pay attention to
Antwerp.... Leaving Antwerp in the hands of France means, or almost
means, imposing on us the necessity of a continuous state of war.” It
was now England that was specially interested in the future status
of Belgium, and it is from that country that emanated the idea,
forcibly expressed, of establishing a strong bulwark against France
by the creation of the neutral kingdom of the Netherlands. The idea,
supported by Prussia, which, as we have seen, had advocated it some
years before, was, however, this time expressed by Lord Castlereagh;
and the aggrandizement of Holland by its union with Belgium was
strongly supported by the Duke of Wellington. Accordingly, on July 31,
1814, the Belgian provinces were formally handed over to the Prince
of Orange, whom the Dutch had made their sovereign the year before.
The arrangement was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna, and made to
include Liège and Luxemburg.
The union of Belgium and Holland was the work of diplomacy: the
Belgians had not even been consulted. It was an essentially bad
combination. Had the “complete and intimate fusion,” of which the
diplomats spoke, been possible between both countries, the projectors
would have accomplished an admirable work, offering the surest
guaranties for the maintenance of European peace and the durability of
their own fabric. But unfortunately the conception was utopian.
Independently of the fact that the Allies disdained to consult the
feelings of the Belgian people, they appeared to have lost sight of
the moral history of the Netherlands, and to have forgotten those
deep-rooted hatreds, jealousies, and dissensions, both religious
and political, that had divided the two peoples since the time
of their separation in the sixteenth century. Count Charles Van
Hoogendorp, a prominent member of the Dutch chamber, in a pamphlet
entitled _Séparation de la Hollande et de la Belgique_, October,
1830 (Amsterdam), himself acknowledged the lack of sympathy between
these peoples: “The difference of national character had engendered
grievances, and these grievances had excited universal discontent, and
national animosity. The division between the two countries existed
_de facto_. Instead of a fusion, all the means employed to amalgamate
the two people had only served to disunite them still further. This
discontent was not the birth of a day; it dates from the first union of
the two states.”
After peace had been restored in 1815, when Napoleon had suffered
defeat at Waterloo, difficulties began at once. In March, 1814, Holland
had adopted a constitution. Inspired by the old laws of the United
Provinces, it was in the main strongly Protestant. Eleven Dutch, eleven
Belgians, and two delegates representing Luxemburg were appointed to
transform this constitution into one that could be applied to the new
kingdom of the Netherlands. The commission proposed the introduction
of equality and toleration for all creeds throughout the kingdom, and
the creation of a two-chambered Parliament in which Holland and Belgium
were to have an equal number of representatives, although the Belgians
had 50 per cent more population. No national capital was specified,
but the King was to be invested both at Amsterdam and at some city in
Belgium. On these principles a fundamental constitution was drafted
and submitted contemporaneously to the Dutch States-General and to
the notables of the different Belgian provinces. The Dutch passed it
unanimously; the Belgians rejected it by a vote of 1,603 to 527. This
rejection was partly due to the unwillingness of the Belgian notables
to legalize religious equality. The Dutch King, William I, decided to
meet the difficulty in a simple manner. He announced that all who had
abstained from voting should be counted as voting for the act, and
that the 126 hostile votes still remaining as a majority against the
act after counting in its favor those refraining from voting should
not count, as the principle of religious liberty had been imposed by
the Congress of Vienna and had to be observed. This method, which the
Belgians called “Dutch arithmetic,” gave to the act 933 votes in its
favor as against 670 hostile votes, and it was declared passed.
It became more and more clear that William I was not “the right man in
the right place”: he was too Protestant, too Dutch, too autocratic for
the Belgians. The latter soon complained of new grievances, among which
the following were the most important: the imposition of the Dutch
language upon all functionaries, whether civil or military, without
granting time to learn it to those who could not speak it; the extreme
partiality shown in the distribution of all offices and emoluments;
and a financial system that bore heavily and unjustly on Belgium. The
Belgians were made to contribute to the payment of debts incurred by
Holland long prior to the union, and to pay for the defense of the
Dutch colonies, which yielded them no returns at all. The Haute Cour,
or supreme court of justice, and all other great public institutions
were established in Holland. The religious grievances were also
numerous: the government was ill disposed toward the Catholics, and it
was supposed that it desired to “Protestantize” the people. Since 1815,
the Belgian bishops, under the leadership of Monsignor de Broglie,
bishop of Ghent, had dissuaded their flocks from taking the oath to a
constitution that introduced liberty of worship. Moreover, in 1825,
William I, imitating the plan formerly developed by Joseph II, had
established a Philosophic College at Louvain where all priests would
receive their education; and, claiming the monopoly for the state in
educational matters, had suppressed the episcopal and other national
colleges and free schools. Sundry oppressive taxes, repugnant to the
habits and usages of the people, were imposed. The freedom of the press
was destroyed, and journalists were continually prosecuted before
the tribunals. The King even pressed into service ignominious French
pamphleteers, expelled from their own country, who daily insulted the
Belgians.
This was too much for the descendants of those who had fought the
tyrannies of Spain, Austria, and France. Public opinion became excited,
and in 1828 a union was concluded between the Catholics, partisans of
tradition, and the Liberals, who had adopted the ideas of the French
Revolution. Threatened in their common interests and privileges,
Catholics and Liberals worked together to obtain redress of their
grievances and to defend their liberties.
Like Joseph II, the Dutch King refused to hear their complaints, and
continued to offend the Belgian people. In 1830 an event of great
importance fanned the revolt into flame.[20] In July the people of
Paris overthrew the French legitimist monarchy and the government of
Charles X. Just as the Brabant Revolution of 1789 was inspired in the
first instance by events in Paris and by the fall of the Bastile, so
the “July days” gave the final impulse to the Belgians in August. On
the evening of August 25, the Brussels Opera House gave a performance
of Auber’s _La Muette de Portici_. When the hero of the piece sang the
famous air appealing for revolt and liberty, the effect on the emotions
of his hearers was such as to cause them to rush into the streets and
then and there inaugurate a revolt against the Dutch. They sacked the
house of Van Maenen, the unpopular minister of William I, and that of
Libri, the editor of the official governmental newspaper, and attacked
the homes of many against whom hatred had long been growing. A guard
of citizens was raised to maintain order and a Committee of Regency
was established in the Hôtel de Ville. The French tricolor, which
had first been hoisted--and this proves the interference of French
clubs at the beginning of the Revolution--was replaced by the old
Brabant tricolor (black, yellow, red), which is now the Belgian flag.
The other chief towns followed and confined their Dutch garrisons
within the citadels and forts. Meanwhile a deputation was sent to the
King, to petition for the administrative separation of Belgium and
Holland, retaining, however, their personal union. William I, unaware
of the gravity of the situation, paid scarcely any attention to the
delegates. He sent a Dutch army nearly 10,000 strong, with many guns,
under Prince Frederick, his younger son, to attack Brussels, where
the revolutionists held the lower town. The troops fought their way
to the very heart of the upper town, but were stopped at the Place
Royale by the stubborn resistance of the Belgian volunteers. These
were merely Brussels citizens, reinforced by 300 volunteers from
Liège under Charles Rogier, 200 from Louvain, with Jenneval, author
of the “Brabançonne,”[21] and others from various Walloon towns. For
three days there was terrible street fighting, and on the night of
September 26-27 Prince Frederick, with at least 1,500 killed and many
wounded, admitted his defeat and left Brussels. Meanwhile a provisional
government had been established, composed of Baron d’Hoogvorst, the
commander of the volunteers; Charles Rogier, who afterward became the
Belgian prime minister; Count Felix de Merode; Van de Weyer, afterward
Belgian minister in London; Gendebien, the leader of the French party
among the revolutionists, Joly, and De Potter. On October 4, 1830,
this provisional government declared Belgium an independent state,
and announced its intention of preparing a constitution which was to
be approved and adopted by a national congress. A special commission
decided, on October 12, in favor of a constitutional monarchy. The
final decree of the congress establishing this constitution as law was
voted on February 7, 1831.
The basis of the new Belgian constitution consisted of the charters and
privileges of the different Belgian provinces and cities, which dated
from the Middle Ages, and especially the “Joyeuse Entrée” of Brabant,
of which mention has already been made. Other liberties, required by
the spirit of modern times, were added: equality of all the Belgians
before the law; freedom of worship, of the press, of association,
of educational teaching, and the right to vote was accorded to all
Belgians who paid a certain amount in taxes.
Some time after the provisional government had declared Belgium an
independent state a conference of the powers was held, on November 4,
1830, in London, to consider the new situation created by the Belgian
revolt: Van der Weyer was sent to represent the Belgian interests. On
December 20, a motion made by the British delegate, Lord Palmerston,
was adopted, which declared Belgium an “independent power.” The victory
of the revolutionists was thus confirmed. At the same time, the plan of
a small but active party among them, who had attempted the reannexation
of the country to France, was defeated.
Another important question was now to be settled--the choice of
a monarch for the new kingdom. The Belgian congress excluded the
candidacy of the Prince of Orange, who was favored by England and
Prussia, since the accession of this prince would mean practically
reannexation by Holland. Under the influence of the French
sympathizers, led by Gendebien, of the provisional government, and
by its president, Surlet de Chokier, the Belgian congress decided to
offer the crown to the Duke of Nemours, younger son of the French King,
Louis-Philippe. This scheme could not be acceded to by England, since
Belgium would then have been under the direct influence of France. The
English ministry, on February 4, unanimously resolved to declare war
on France if Louis-Philippe accepted the offer. So the French King was
compelled to decline it on behalf of his son. Finally, on June 4, 1831,
the Belgian congress elected Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha,
widower of the Princess Charlotte of England. Leopold had fought
gallantly in the army of the Allies against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814,
and had just refused the crown of Greece. He was solemnly inaugurated
at Brussels on June 21 as King of the Belgians. He was considered
an English prince, and for the moment France resented his election;
but Leopold quieted the jealousy of Louis-Philippe by marrying the
daughter of the French King, Louise of Orléans.
Another question to be settled was the delimitation of the boundaries
of the new kingdom. On January 20 and 27, the Conference of London had
issued two protocols, proposing that Belgium be made a perpetually
neutral state; that Holland take all the territory that belonged to the
Dutch republic in 1790, and that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg become
an appanage of the house of Orange; that Belgium should be charged
with 16/31 of the national debt of the former United Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
These protocols, favorable to Holland, were immediately accepted by
the Dutch King, but unequivocally rejected by the Belgians. The second
article of the London protocols robbed them of Dutch Flanders--the
north of the ancient county--of the towns of Maestricht and Venloo and
the strip of Limburg surrounding them, and also of the Grand Duchy,
a part of the old Belgian province of Luxemburg. The loss of this
territory seemed the more unjust as the inhabitants of those regions
had participated in the Belgian revolt and did not desire annexation by
Holland.
The negotiations between the powers and the Belgians would never have
reached a settlement but for King Leopold. The Belgian King persuaded
the Conference of London to supersede its protocols by a declaration
in eighteen articles, leaving the matter in dispute to be directly
negotiated between Leopold and William of Holland, with the good
offices of the great powers. The Dutch King refused to recognize the
eighteen articles and, on August 2, twelve days after the accession
to the throne of Leopold, invaded Belgium. King Leopold displayed
military skill and courage, but the Belgians had no strong army and
their ill-trained troops were badly defeated at Louvain and at Hasselt.
Impending disaster was prevented by the sudden arrival of a French
army, sent by Louis-Philippe, to whom the Belgian King had appealed
for help. The French repulsed the Dutch. This intervention of France
seriously alarmed the other powers, and especially England. Fearing
that French influence might regain a foothold in the new kingdom,
they precipitately drafted another protocol, called the Twenty-four
Articles, in place of the former eighteen, and took from Belgium
the whole of the area in dispute, except the district of Arlon, in
Luxemburg. Again the Belgians refused to be stripped; but the threat
of invasion by a German army finally compelled them to accede. On
November 15, 1831, Belgium, France, and England signed the Treaty of
the Twenty-four Articles, to which Russia, Prussia, and Austria soon
afterward assented.
This time Holland was unwilling to yield, and the Dutch refused to
evacuate the territory they occupied, especially the citadel of
Antwerp. A French army, under Gérard, marched for the second time into
Belgium, besieged the Antwerp stronghold, and forced the Dutch to
capitulate (1832). King William continued to refuse to subscribe to
any agreement until 1838. Then, suddenly, he gave his adherence to the
Twenty-four Articles. The Conference of London met again and, on April
18, 1839, the final Treaty of London was signed. The Belgians were
given a large reduction in what was agreed should be their contribution
to the debt of the Netherlands, but were forced to surrender the
territories agreed upon by the treaty of 1831. They did it very
reluctantly, but had no other choice.
This Treaty of London is the famous “scrap of paper” of which the
German chancellor spoke so disdainfully on August 14, 1914. It
settled the external relations of Belgium in Europe. By that treaty,
Belgium was declared to be an independent kingdom and was to remain
“a perpetually neutral state,” under the guaranty of the five great
powers. The neutrality of Belgium had been imposed upon the new kingdom
at the instance chiefly of England, who desired above all to maintain
it as a bulwark against France. As King Leopold I himself writes to
Queen Victoria on February 15, 1852, “this neutrality was in the real
interest of this country, but our good congress here did _not_ wish it:
it was _imposé_ upon them.”
Owing to the fact that so much has been said about the neutrality of
Belgium since the beginning of the European war, it seems worth while
to explain briefly what ought to be understood by the words “permanent
neutrality,” used by the Conference of London.[22]
Article VII of the Treaty of London declares: “Belgium, within the
limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent
and _perpetually neutral_ state. It shall be bound to observe such
neutrality toward all other states.” A distinction must be made between
the neutrality imposed by this article on Belgium and the occasional
neutrality of a state, which during a war between other powers wishes
to avoid the conflict and, in a perfectly voluntary manner, proclaims
that decision to the world. In the recent European war, the United
States of America observed such an “occasional” neutrality.
Permanent neutrality is quite another thing. History shows that there
are certain countries, certain geographical zones, which, by virtue of
their situation, are in some way predestined to become periodically
the theater of struggles between nations. The subjection of such a
country to the exclusive influence of one great power has always
marked a breakdown of the European balance of power. The idea of
placing these zones by means of a treaty in the position of countries
outside the possible zone of international conflicts corresponds to
a general plan of establishing a régime of peace on the basis of
reciprocal and voluntary restriction of action. From this point of
view, neutralization is essentially a factor for peace. It follows that
the state which is perpetually neutral has not only its own individual
meaning and independent mission, but is an important “wheel” in the
general policy. This is the case with Belgium, as it was established by
the great powers after the revolt of 1830, and that is the true meaning
of the statement that it was to be “perpetually neutral.”
Between the neutralized state and the creators of its neutrality there
thus exist reciprocal obligations. The contracting powers between them
undertake engagements whereby they guarantee to the neutralized state
the privileged condition of enjoying permanent peace; while on the
other side, the neutralized state accepts the obligations which protect
the European balance of power. In that way, each of the contracting
powers is bound not to attack the neutral state; not to invite it
to abandon its peaceful attitude; to defend it against any power,
co-contracting or not, which would compel it to abandon its neutrality.
The inviolability of the neutralized territory is agreed upon by this
means, for violation would mean for such a state a breach of its own
neutrality. On the other hand, the neutralized state must itself defend
its neutrality, and adopt all the measures needed for such defense. For
this reason, international law holds that a neutralized state which
commits an act of defense is not to be considered as being in state of
war with the power which violates its neutrality.[23] Moreover, the
neutral state must prevent troops or convoys of a belligerent power
from passing through its territory.[24] Finally, such a state ought to
remain a truly independent state, for if it places or allows itself to
be placed in a position of dependence upon another power it destroys
the European balance of power, the origin of its international status.
Some authorities on international law[25] maintain that in case of
violation of the neutral territory by a belligerent, the contracting
powers have not only the right, but the duty, to interfere _ex
officio_, and to protect the neutral state by military power, even
without the consent of the latter. On this point, however, opinion is
divided.
Does the neutral possess the right to conclude alliances with a foreign
power? This question is a little more difficult to determine exactly,
but it may be settled in the following manner. Every alliance has
in view the possibility of an armed conflict. It follows logically
from this that the right of the neutral state to contract alliances
corresponds very closely to its right of making war. If it is
necessary to forbid such a state every alliance which would tend to
draw it into an armed conflict with third parties, it ought to be
granted without hesitation the right of concluding any understanding
which should have for its sole object the protection of the nation
against foreign aggression. And a defensive agreement tending to
facilitate for the neutral state the carrying out of the part it
is compelled to play in the maintenance of the European balance of
power--the very basis of its neutrality--is certainly permissible, and,
under certain circumstances, may even seem necessary; for example, when
the neutral state seems too weak to resist by its own force a possibly
powerful invasion. But it is obvious that the neutral state may never
conclude either an offensive or a defensive alliance which would impose
upon it the obligation of possible co-operation in the defense of a
foreign territory. That is the true meaning of the permanent neutrality
imposed on Belgium by the Treaty of London, and it will become clearer
when we look at the subsequent facts of history.
In 1870, on the eve of the Franco-German War, Bismarck, with the
object of alienating from France the sympathy of the neutral nations,
and especially that of England, published a draft treaty, three or
four years old, and in the handwriting of Napoleon III’s ambassador,
whereby France was to annex Belgium. This publication aroused public
opinion in England, and, giving expression to English feeling, Disraeli
told Parliament that “the treaties on which are based the independence
and neutrality of Belgium” had been concluded _in the general interest
of Europe_ and also with a very clear idea of their importance for
England. He added: “It is a fundamental principle of the policy of
this country, that the country situated along the coasts of Dunkirk
to the North Sea islands should be possessed by free and prosperous
states practising the arts of peace, in order that these countries
should not belong to a great military power.” In conformity with these
declarations the English government proposed to France and to Prussia
to observe the guaranty by way of co-operation between the English
forces and the forces of one of the belligerents against the other in
case of the violation by the latter of the neutrality of Belgium. This
arrangement was accepted on both sides, and laid down in the formal
treaties dated August 9 and 11, 1870. Those special treaties were to be
in force “during the war and for one year thereafter,” and the final
paragraph expressly stated that, after this period, the regulations of
the Treaty of London (1839) should be regarded as in force.[26] This
treaty it was that was thought to protect Belgium when the country’s
neutrality was violated by Germany on August 3, 1914.