CHAPTER VII

PHILIP II AND THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS AGAINST SPANISH RULE

(1555-96)

The revolt of the Netherlands against Spain is not merely an event of

local Belgian history; it belongs to the political history of Europe.

It is an episode of those long and cruel wars of religion which,

beginning in Scotland after the constitution of the first Presbyterian

Covenant, set aflame the whole of Western Europe. Of course, the

occasion for the wars differed in each country, but the cause was the

same in every case and the question which was to be supreme in Europe,

Catholicism or Protestantism, actuated them all. In this tremendous

struggle all questions were finally reduced to one, and as social

influences aligned themselves on one side or the other, the tide turned

in favor of or against the church. Catholics and Protestants supported

their brethren in the faith on the other side of the frontiers. Each

side sought a decisive victory; divided influence or co-ordinate

recognition was acceptable to neither. Timid persons and politicians

seeking to remain neutral were carried away by the current or submerged

by it. Neutrality was impossible; everyone was forced to take part in

the struggle.

The kings of France, lacking principles and decision, found their

own forces divided and were unable to carry out a real international

policy. On the other hand, Elizabeth, Queen of England, resolutely

ranged herself on the side of international Protestantism, assisting

and often directing its attacks. Against her, Philip II of Spain,

considering himself as the absolute defender of Catholicism in Europe,

set his nationality and his faith. Lacking decision in political

matters, he showed no indecision in matters of faith. Against him arose

the league of Protestants throughout Europe. They realized that, if

he was defeated and his country crushed, the church would be defeated

throughout the world. The Protestants therefore concentrated their

attack on him in the Netherlands. The geographical position of the

latter made interference with England, France, and Germany especially

feasible; but they were at the same time the weakest spots in Philip’s

dominions. Revolt blazed within their borders--such revolt as might

result in bringing his power to an end. This Philip realized full well,

and determined to go to any limit in order to keep the Netherlands.

Nothing was left undone which would serve to suppress every attempt at

revolt. This object it was which dictated his unhappy policy in the

Netherlands, a policy that resulted in the loss of the northern part,

and ultimately in the founding of the separate state of the United

Provinces (Holland).

The true meaning of the wars of religion in the Netherlands cannot be

properly understood without taking these considerations into account.

It will also be useful to consider the characters of those prominently

involved in the tragedy, before narrating the details of the tragedy

itself.

Philip II, King of Spain and sovereign of the Netherlands, was

above all a Spaniard. Educated in Spain, he found himself unable to

understand the Belgians as his father had. He did not appreciate

their pride, their deep love of liberty, and their respect for the

privileges granted them. An autocratic king, he was haughty as only a

Spaniard can be. Deeply convinced of the superiority of Catholicism,

and possessing principles absolutely rigid in character, he was

incapable of compromise--in short, a real bigot. In political affairs

he endeavored to arrange every detail himself, and personally to read

piles of dispatches by the light of a candle in his dark room in the

Escurial. He labored day and night, constantly immersed in thought, and

was remarkably slow in reaching a decision. When, however, his mind

was finally made up, it was usually too late. Events had progressed

in the meantime and when his orders reached the theater of war they

could not be carried out, since the situation had entirely changed.

That slowness of decision brought him many disasters. Nevertheless, he

was an excellent father to his children, and there are extant letters

written by him to his daughters, in which it is difficult to recognize

the lonely thinker of the Escurial.

He paid a short visit to his subjects in the Netherlands at the

beginning of his reign (1557), but left no sympathetic impression

behind. His sister, Duchess Margareta of Parma, remained in the country

to govern the people during his absence. He was absent to the end.

His Flemish subjects never saw him again. From Madrid he directed the

affairs of the Belgians, and studied the dispatches which reached him

every week.

Margareta, offspring of the amour of Emperor Charles V with the

daughter of a Flemish upholsterer from Audenaerde, had been educated

for a time in Brussels and had then gone to Italy, where she

successively married Alessandro de’ Medici and Ottavio Farnese,

the latter being Duke of Parma and Piacenza. Although of masculine

character, loving sport and exercises, Margareta possessed the feminine

characteristics of vanity and shrewdness. She had acquired in Italy a

disposition to engage in _combinazione_, and succeeded in playing the

game often under very difficult circumstances. Philip of Spain left

her as an assistant in her political councils a man of real diplomacy,

Cardinal de Granvelle.

Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, Burgundian in origin, was a loyal

servant of his master. He was the man of the _raison d’état_. Philip

II never had a more faithful minister. Granvelle desired only the

welfare of the King and of the state he represented, and was heroic

enough to assume the responsibility for the drastic measures taken by

his sovereign. He was a man of real political genius, clear-sighted,

absolutely unselfish. The main object of his political plans was that

Spain should rule the seas, and it was he who urged Philip II to send

the famous Armada against England.

When Philip II began his reign in the Netherlands, the financial

situation of the government was distressing. Charles V had left heavy

debts created by his numerous wars. Public opinion was defiant,

influenced as it was by ill will for the unsympathetic King and by the

baseless fear that the scheme of erecting new dioceses would be the

precursor of the terrible Spanish Inquisition.

The scheme of erecting new dioceses had been conceived by the King

in 1559, in order to counteract more strongly the propaganda of

Protestantism. The existing mediaeval dioceses were too large to

enable the bishops to carry out their mission as guardians of the

faith. It was necessary, therefore, that the old dioceses be broken

up and divided into smaller ones, so that the bishops would have more

opportunity for action in smaller areas. The Pope consented, and

permitted the erection of thirteen new dioceses. From an ecclesiastical

point of view the country was now divided as follows: the archbishopric

of Malines, with the suffragan dioceses, Antwerp, Bois-le-Duc, Ghent,

Ypres, Bruges, Ruremonde; the archbishopric of Cambrai, with the

suffragans, Arras, Tournai, Namur, Saint-Omer; the archbishopric

of Utrecht, with the suffragans, Haerlem, Deventer, Leeuwarden,

Middelburg, Groninge. The scheme stirred up violent opposition among

the Belgian nobles, the abbots, some of the bishops, and even among the

common people. The nobles feared the loss of their political influence

through the admission of so many bishops into the States-General, where

they would occupy leading positions. Many of the abbots were resentful

because their monasteries would be compelled to contribute to the new

bishops a part of their income, in support of the new dioceses. Some

of the bishops were angered over the division of their former dioceses

and the reduction of their spiritual power. The people, influenced by

political agents and Protestant propagandists, were led to believe

that each new bishop would simply be a representative of the Spanish

Inquisition.

The movement of opposition would have been easily repressed by the

Belgian nobles had they really been faithful to the King. But, on

the whole, they were not. They had the same feelings as the French

aristocracy at this time. They were horrified at the idea of the

supremacy of the sovereign power. Although not possessing any definite

aim, they tried to dominate the Prince and the state by means of the

political power they themselves controlled. They were members of

the Council of State, governors of the different Belgian provinces,

captains in the national army, the famous _bandes d’ordonnance_, and

they exercised a tremendous influence on all classes. The political

difficulties encountered by the government were for them but favorable

opportunities of which to take advantage. The King himself afforded

them a chance. With characteristic disregard for the national

privileges, he established at Brussels a council called the _Consulta_,

an institution of true Spanish type. Composed of a few individuals,

it was dominated by the influence of Cardinal de Granvelle, and

undertook to decide the most important questions of national policy.

The _Consulta_ stirred up an opposition of formidable character,

guided by the most influential Belgian nobles, the Prince of Orange

and the counts of Egmont and Horn. Cardinal de Granvelle became the

victim of the most violent attacks. Margareta of Parma first sought

to defend him, but, little by little, influenced by the nobles, she

finally ranged herself on their side and herself requested the King to

recall the unsympathetic minister. Partly through weariness, partly

through political miscalculation, Philip II yielded. Granvelle left the

Netherlands.

This was a triumph for the opposition. Margareta, who had been moved

by jealousy of Granvelle and who had hoped to add materially to her

power after his departure, fell more and more under the control of the

nobles, who flattered her and took advantage of her feminine vanity. A

reign of anarchy and favoritism followed, the friends of the nobles

being furnished with offices and perquisites. The political opponents

of the King now tried to consolidate and to perpetuate their success.

They asked that all affairs be subject to the control of the Council

of State, the real national body of which they themselves were the

masters; that he should convoke the States-General, and that he should

temper the _placarts_ against the heretics and abolish the power of

the Inquisitors. The granting of the first of these demands would have

made the nobles all-powerful in political affairs. From the second

measure--the meeting of the States-General--they expected ratification

of their conduct and popular support of the opposition they had

inaugurated. In dealing with the question of the _placarts_, they

played a sort of religious policy calculated to bring them the support

of the Lutherans and the Calvinists.

Philip II rejected their demands. Astonished by this resistance,

which they did not expect after the capitulation of the King on the

question of Granvelle, some of the Belgian nobles, and especially the

Prince of Orange, succeeded in embroiling the Protestant sectarians

in the struggle. The Calvinists, more warlike than the Lutherans,

were more than ready to join the movement, owing to their hatred of

the Catholic King of Spain. But, once begun, the movement became an

irresistible one. Stirred up by their preachers and assisted by the

worst elements of the populace, the Calvinists invaded the churches,

smashed the statues of the saints, carried away the treasures, attacked

the convents, and killed monks and priests (1566). The Belgian nobles,

surprised by the revolt they had so imprudently initiated, were unable

to stop it; rather they were submerged by the current. From this time

onward the political anti-Spanish movement became a part of the general

movement of the wars of religion. Many Catholics foresaw what would

happen and deserted the cause, separating themselves from a revolt that

was being directed as much against the church as against Spanish rule.

From the revolt of 1566 and the outrages of the sectarians resulted the

later policy of Philip II toward the Netherlands. Hitherto he had but

followed the traditional policy of his father, Emperor Charles. He had

showed respect for political institutions; he had avoided any cause

of rupture. He had tried, of course unwillingly and unskilfully, to

satisfy public opinion. His patience brought him nothing but a serious

check. He had recalled, in 1561, the Spanish garrisons which had been

quartered in Belgium during the war with France; he had sacrificed his

loyal minister Granvelle and had capitulated to the nobles. But the

more he showed himself to be conciliatory the more audacious became the

opposition. This was at first purely political and aimed only at the

reconstruction of the Burgundian state as against the Spanish state;

later, it had dared to claim liberty of conscience, an unheard-of thing

at this period; finally, it had favored the Calvinistic agitation and

had caused the desecration of convents and churches.

When the news of this outrage reached the King, he angrily exclaimed:

“By the soul of my father, for these crimes they shall pay a heavy

price.” In the eyes of Philip II, official protector of Catholicism,

both the royal and the divine majesty had been insulted, and the claim

for autonomy had but aggravated the triumph of heresy. His rebellious

subjects were to be chastised. He would impose political absolutism

upon them as well as the religious control that prevailed in Spain.

The iron rule he intended to introduce would preserve for the church

and for himself those countries which were the cornerstones of his

world-power.

From now on we may speak of the “Spanish rule.” The traditionally lax

policy of Emperor Charles was gone. The tyranny of Spain was destined

to crush the Belgians. That task was intrusted to the Duke of Alva, who

came to Belgium as governor in 1567. Don Luis Alvarez de Toledo, Duke

of Alva and Marquess of Soria, was a cold and implacable warrior. The

greatness of his king was for him the greatness of Spain. He hated the

Belgians, who had dared to ask for liberty of conscience, as much as he

hated the heretics. He accomplished his terrible mission unwaveringly

and remorselessly; his method of government was terror. Accustomed to

fight the Moslem Moors of Spain, he knew only two weapons with which

to crush the heretics--the sword and the stake. He wrote in one of his

letters: “It is infinitely better to keep, by means of war, for God and

for the King, an impoverished and even ruined country, than to keep it,

without war, undamaged, for the devil and his partisans, the heretics.”

Such was the terrible warrior to whom Philip II intrusted a double

task: to chastise the rebels and heretics and to subject the nation

to the rule of Madrid. Alva arrived in Belgium with a large number

of the best Spanish troops. Contrary to all customs in the free

Netherlands, they were billeted in the cities. A fortress was ordered

built at Antwerp. The counts of Egmont and Horn and the burgomaster

of Antwerp were treacherously arrested and imprisoned. But the real

leader of the opposition, the Prince of Orange, could not be taken.

More clear-sighted than his friends, he had fled to Holland before

the coming vengeance. In defiance of all national privileges, Alva

established an extraordinary tribunal, which the people soon called the

“Council of Blood”; that court of justice, established and conducted

in a thoroughly revolutionary manner, condemned scores of people

who were more or less guilty of revolt against the King. About two

thousand victims were sentenced to death and executed. Only political

crimes were taken into account, and the condemnation was followed by

the confiscation of property--a remarkably remunerative operation for

the Spanish treasure chest. Terror fell upon the Belgians. All who

had engaged in the slightest degree in the revolt of 1566 fled to

foreign countries; Lutherans and Calvinists, panic-stricken, left the

Netherlands in large numbers.

Meanwhile the Prince of Orange had sought for help among the German

Protestant princes; he gathered an army and invaded Belgium. He had

expected a general revolt of the people against Alva at the first news

of his campaign. But the soldiers of his army, merely hirelings, and

many of them fanatical Protestants, pillaged churches and convents on

their way; they disgusted the naturally religious populace of Belgium,

and the campaign of William the Silent proved a complete failure. The

prince was compelled to seek refuge in France, where he hoped to get

help from Coligny and the French Huguenots.

[Illustration: ANTWERP The oldest part of the city, the Scheldt, and

the Town Hall]

By way of reply to this misadventure of William the Silent came

the execution of the counts of Egmont and Horn. The “Council of

Blood” charged them with high treason and ordered them to be put to

death, on the Place du Sablon, in the heart of Brussels. Their death

stupefied the people and disheartened the nationalists. Both counts

fell victims to the hatred of the terrible duke, for they were guilty

only of weakness and imprudence--they never really were traitors to

their sovereign. The Belgians always regarded them as martyrs for

their country. Alva now proceeded to introduce into the Netherlands

the features of the Spanish régime, while his condemnations continued.

For the first time since 1561 the new bishops were able to occupy

their bishoprics, the Catholic faith was everywhere re-established,

the University of Louvain was visited in order to determine whether

it was sufficiently orthodox, the Council of State was no more called

together or given over to Spaniards. In order to secure supplies and

money for his administration and to crush the country economically,

Alva introduced unheard-of taxes, called the _centième, vingtième, et

dixième denier_. This meant a permanent impost, which the Belgians

had always stoutly resisted. A revolt broke out all over the country.

What the appeals of William the Silent did not effect, the attack upon

the people’s privileges and wealth did. The Prince of Orange cleverly

took advantage of it, and, needing the help of the heretics to fight

the enemy, gave the direction of the movement into the hands of the

Calvinists. Meanwhile a storm of recrimination and complaints, among

which the protests of the bishops and of the University of Louvain were

not the weakest, reached Philip II. The King understood that he had

gone to work the wrong way, and that the policy of terrorism had not

brought him any real success. He changed his mind and recalled Alva.

The terrible duke left Belgium pursued by the maledictions of the whole

people.

His successor, Don Luis de Requesens, was a better man. The change in

the King’s attitude was immediately revealed by the measures taken

by the new governor. Requesens abolished the “Council of Blood,”

proclaimed a general amnesty, and opened negotiations at Breda with

the rebellious provinces. These negotiations failed, however, and

the struggle continued on both sides with alternating successes and

reverses. Requesens died suddenly in 1575, at a moment when the

government was facing an appalling financial crisis. The Council of

State immediately took over the regency, till the King should send a

new governor.

The Prince of Orange, however, had decided that there should be no

peace and that the revolutionary movement should be agitated as much

as possible. He had completely gained the confidence of Holland and

Zeeland, where he was the real master, and he planned to extend his

control over the rest of the Seventeen Provinces. Deeply compromised

as he was, any agreement with the King would mean disaster and the end

of his plans, which aimed at the separation of the Belgian provinces

from the Spanish monarchy. Owing to personal circumstances he had

first endeavored to resist Philip II by legal means. During his

exile and under the government of Alva he had gone farther and had

planned a general revolt, and now that the milder attitude of the King

threatened to win back some sympathy in Belgium, especially among the

Catholics, he foresaw that only the most daring policy would save the

revolutionary movement. Agents were therefore sent to the southern

provinces to stir up the people against any attempt at conciliation.

As a result of their intrigues, the members of the Council of State

were arrested by a furious mob and imprisoned. By the time they were

liberated they had fallen completely under the influence of the

revolutionary leaders. The States-General were called together by the

friendly members of the Council of State, and for nine years exercised

the chief power in Belgium. It was during their government, which

proved on the whole to be Catholic and loyalist, that the Spanish

soldiers, deprived of their pay, arose and sacked the city of Antwerp,

killing nearly seven thousand people. This event is known as the

“Spanish Fury.”

This, of course, gave the anti-Spanish party an excellent chance.

Under the pressure of William the Silent, the States-General met at

Ghent in 1575, and out of their deliberations was born the famous

“Pacification of Ghent.” This act was the work of the Prince of Orange,

and was intended to reconcile Catholics and Protestants and to settle

their religious differences, in order that they might be united in

the political struggle against Spain. This attempt at establishing

a “peace of religion” was unfortunately premature and provisional.

The hostilities between Catholics and Protestants were suspended and

religious tolerance was proclaimed; but in Holland and Zeeland, the

political sphere of influence of the Prince of Orange, the Catholic

worship was provisionally forbidden. The States-General would, it

was promised, later on reconsider the whole problem and settle the

religious differences definitely. This agreement was, of course,

unfavorable to the Catholics, but union was temporarily restored.

Meanwhile Don Juan, the new Spanish governor, had been appointed by

Philip II and had arrived in Belgium. Don Juan was the son of Charles

V, and the celebrated victor over the Turks in the naval battle of

Lepanto (1571). He had no sympathy for the Belgians and did not like

the task which was intrusted to him. He attempted, of course, though

against his convictions, to negotiate with the rebels, but failed. As

we have seen, the Prince of Orange had determined that there should

be no peace until his plans had been carried out. By surprising and

occupying the fortress of Namur, contrary to the conventions but in

order to obtain a stronghold for his protection, Don Juan played, as a

matter of fact, into the hands of his enemies. Under the influence of

William the Silent the States-General declared the governor a traitor

to the country, and called upon Archduke Mathias, brother of Emperor

Rodolphe, to be their new governor. Mathias became practically an

instrument in the hands of the Prince of Orange, who was appointed as

his lieutenant-general.

Now followed a period of anarchy and misrule. Germany, England, and

France sent into Belgium a host of sectarians and adventurers; these

aided the Calvinists in taking Brussels, Antwerp, and Ghent. Ghent

became the center of a Calvinistic republic, where the leaders ruled

by terror and began a rigorous persecution of the Catholics. It was

now quite clear that the Protestants had gained the upper hand in the

struggle and that the national revolt had turned into a war against

Catholicism. In the midst of these troubles, Don Juan of Austria died

at Bouges, near Namur (1578).

At this very moment, events of great importance took place. The Prince

of Orange, contrary to the provisions of the Pacification of Ghent,

had again endeavored to introduce a new “peace of religion,” which

had for its object the introduction of Protestantism into the Belgian

provinces other than Holland and Zeeland. The Protestant ministers

rejected his proposal. What they wanted was not co-ordinate recognition

of Catholicism and Protestantism, but the complete supremacy of their

own religion. Seeing that his attempts brought about only discontent

of both parties, Catholics and Protestants, William the Silent finally

declared himself openly as a Calvinist (1578). His rupture with the

Catholics was now complete.

This induced the southern provinces, where Catholicism was still in

control, to withdraw their support and to reconcile themselves with

the Spanish King. The sole motive of this decision was a religious

one. There could be no talk of hostility between the Walloons of the

south and the Flemings of the north. This was not a question of racial

or linguistic difference. The people of Artois, Hainaut, and French

Flanders were disgusted at the excesses committed by the Calvinists

of Ghent and the position taken by William the Silent in religious

matters. The Catholic spirit of Belgium, imposed on the country ever

since the Middle Ages, weighed more strongly in their minds than their

national hostility to the Spanish rule. Moreover, two other provinces

which joined them--Namur and Luxemburg--had never taken part in the

revolt. As we have seen, the province of Brabant, more independent

than any other, and, since the fourteenth century, determined in its

opposition to foreign interference, had taken the real leadership in

the struggle against Spain.

The movement in the south in favor of a reconciliation with Philip II

was an essentially popular movement. The nobles of Artois and Hainaut

still wavered in their sympathies.[14] The clever policy of the new

governor, Alexander Farnese, who succeeded Don Juan of Austria after

the death of the latter (1578), overcame their last hesitation.[15]

Alexander Farnese was the son of Margareta of Parma, who had formerly

governed the Netherlands. He was of a sympathetic nature, loyal,

honest, but firm. He was one of the greatest warriors of his age, but

at the same time, being an Italian prince, he distinguished himself as

a very shrewd diplomat. At last Philip II had found the right man to

govern the Netherlands. Alexander Farnese, highly approved by Cardinal

de Granvelle--who at this time resided in Madrid--inaugurated a policy

of mildness and conciliation that produced the happiest results. He

induced the nobles of the southern provinces, and especially the

Count of Lalaing, to abandon their scruples and to return to the

service of the King. Both clever diplomacy and gifts and promises of

large sums of money played a part in these achievements. From these

negotiations resulted the Treaty of Arras (1579), concluded between

the representatives of Artois, Hainaut, Luxemburg, Namur, and French

Flanders and the new governor, as a consequence of which the southern

provinces returned to the allegiance of Philip II. A concession made

by Farnese was that the foreign troops, which had for so many years

pillaged and ruined the country, should leave Belgium.

The Treaty of Arras resulted in the reconquest, without bloodshed, of

the southern part of Belgium; it provoked a rupture between Catholics

and Protestants, the separation of the Walloons and the Flemings,

and crushed the plans of the Prince of Orange. Henceforth it would

be no longer possible to unite the whole of Belgium against Spanish

rule. William the Silent replied to the Treaty of Arras by the

so-called Union of Utrecht (1579), whereby the northern provinces of

the Netherlands united themselves in the common struggle and decided

to carry on the revolt to ultimate victory. Slowly, but surely, the

secession of Belgium from Holland was in progress.

The Prince of Orange, infuriated by the blow inflicted on his policy,

now proclaimed the forfeiture by Philip II of the sovereignty of the

Netherlands and offered the crown to the Duke of Anjou, brother of the

French King Henry III (1584). He himself received the title of governor

of Holland and Zeeland and remained the real leader of the union.

Philip II replied by declaring the Prince an outlaw and putting a price

on his head. Such an appeal to murder was common in the sixteenth

century and was even supported by the teaching of many theorists;

today it seems cruel and opposed to every principle of civilization.

A man fanatical enough to fulfil the desire of the Spanish King was

soon found. Balthazar Gérard treacherously assassinated the Prince of

Orange at Delft, in 1584. So died the leader of the revolt of the

Netherlands against Spain. He did not succeed in uniting the whole of

Belgium against Philip II, but he initiated the United Provinces of

Holland. The Dutch are right, therefore, in calling him the “Father of

the Fatherland.”

Meanwhile, supported by the Catholic provinces, Alexander Farnese had

successively reconquered all the Belgian cities and won an imperishable

fame by the siege and conquest of Antwerp. Only Ostend resisted and

could not be taken. It seemed now to be the turn of the north, and

already the United Provinces were threatened with invasion, when the

unwise policy of Philip II suddenly stopped the advance. The lonely

autocrat of the Escurial had planned the invasion of England and the

conquest of the throne of France, where Henry IV, a Protestant but the

legitimate heir, was at war with the Catholic League. To these plans

he sacrificed all the resources of Spain from 1587 to 1592 and forced

Farnese to suspend his campaign in Flanders, to assist in the transport

of troops for the invasion of England, and to aid with his army the

League in France. Both enterprises failed utterly, the invasion of

England by the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the conquest of the French

throne by the final rally of the country to the support of Henry IV.

The obstinacy of Philip II caused the loss of the northern part of the

Netherlands, which Farnese would probably have conquered. Alexander

Farnese died in 1592 and at his death the Spanish King lost the best

governor he had ever had in Belgium. The last years of the sixteenth

century were unhappy years for the country. The long and bloody

struggle had utterly ruined the land. The population had been reduced

by at least 50 per cent; churches and civic buildings had been burned

or severely damaged; trade and industry were in large part gone;

Antwerp had lost its commerce, and thousands of people engaged in

trade had fled to England, Germany, or Holland. Artistic and literary

activity had come to a complete standstill; and the scientific center

of Belgium, the University of Louvain, barely escaped complete ruin.

But Belgium remained Catholic and subject to the Spanish branch of the

Hapsburgs, while the United Provinces (of Holland), overwhelmingly

Protestant, had in fact become an independent country. Henceforth

Belgium and Holland went each its own way, and their history no longer

records common interests, at least until the period of the United

Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814).

A short history of Belgium · 第 7 / 14 章