SPENCER AND ORGANIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
In the second half of the last century social thought passed under
biological influence. Society was discussed in terms of biological
analogies, that is, it was compared in its structure and functions
to organic life. Herbert Spencer was the leader among those writers
who attempted to analyze society in terms of biological figures of
speech. He also stressed the structural nature of society, and in
his _Principles of Sociology_ he went into great detail in giving a
historical description of social institutions.
The Greek writers, the Hebrews before them, the founder of Christianity
made references to the likenesses between human society and plant and
animal life. Mankind has often been compared to a tree or a plant with
its manifold, evolving branches and fruit.
Spencer’s famous organic analogies were preceded by the studies of
biologists, such as Lamarck and Darwin. Lamarck (1744–1829) argued that
by activity and use man could develop traits which would be transmitted
by inheritance. Although this theory has been undermined by Weismann,
it served as a basis for the further study of the biological laws of
human evolution.
The thought of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) upon the nature of evolution
was stimulated in part by Malthus’ doctrine of surplus population
and the consequent struggle for existence. He also based his ideas
on the Lamarckian theory of transmission of acquired characters. He
developed the concepts of the prodigality of nature and the struggle
for existence, which led to the resultant concept of natural selection
and survival of the fittest. The process of natural selection accounts
for the instincts, imitation, imagination, reason as well as for
self-consciousness, and the esthetic and religious impulses. In this
way man, according to the Darwinian formula, has ascended by stages
from the lower orders of life.
The fittest to survive, concluded Darwin, are those individuals who
are best fitted to meet the conditions of their environment. If the
environment be competitive, savage, brutal, then the fittest will be
the strongest physically and the most vicious. If the environment be
co-operative, then the fittest will be the individuals who co-operate
best. With the development of intelligence and sagacity in early human
society, individuals otherwise cruel learned to co-operate. A tribe
of co-operating individuals would be victorious in a conflict with a
tribe of non-co-operating members. Thus co-operation and a co-operating
environment themselves are the result of natural selection.
Unfortunately, Darwin’s concept of natural selection has been grossly
distorted. Upon this misapprehension, a doctrine of “social Darwinism”
has gained recognition. According to this false interpretation of
Darwinism, the tooth and fang struggle for existence among animals is
the normal procedure among human beings. The most brutal, cruel, and
shrewd men are “fitted” to survive in an environment of physical and
mental competition. Likewise, the nations which can marshal together
the most powerful armies and navies are the “fittest” to survive in a
world where each nation is accountable unto itself alone. Thus, it is
seen that human society is simply an extension of the animal society
and that the fundamental law of social progress is the law of force and
might, first physical, and then physical and psychical.
But this interpretation is false to Darwin’s own principles. While
Darwin did describe and lay great emphasis upon the tooth and fang
struggle for existence, he noted and stressed the fact that even
among animals, modifying influences were at work. He made clear that
co-operation exists among many species of animal life, and that this
co-operative tendency is an important survival factor. He also saw
that among the highest types of animals there were new and complex
expressions of co-operation, and that the higher mental activity
of these animal types seemed to be a correlate in some way of the
greater co-operative spirit. The application of this principle to human
progress implies that the co-operative spirit may ultimately become
the chief survival force, and that some day the “fittest” to survive
will be those individuals or groups of individuals who co-operate most
wisely. This theory will be developed further in the chapter upon
“Co-operation Theories in Sociology.” The chief contributors have been
Kropotkin and Novicow.
Darwin made another important contribution to social science in his
theory of sexual selection. This idea is a phase of natural selection.
Among the higher animals the females choose their mates. The males,
for example, with the singing voice and beautiful plumage, are the
most likely to be chosen. These males thus become the progenitors of
the next generation of the given species; the less attractive males
mate if at all with the inferior types of females. Thus signs of male
attractiveness come to possess survival value.[XVI-1]
Among human beings the principle of sexual selection operates, but in
a reversed sexual form. During the earlier centuries of human history
the custom developed whereby the males took the initiative in choosing
mates. As a result, the females resorted to all sorts of devices to
make themselves “attractive” and to get themselves “selected.”
The social theories of Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) have caused more
controversy than those of any other writer in the sociological field.
The fact that in these controversies the ideas of Spencer have usually
been worsted will not blind the fair-minded seeker after truth to the
important rôle which Spencer took in the field of social thought.
Spencer early developed the habit of causal thinking, that is, he
believed in causes, and hence searched everywhere for causes. Because
of the acrimonious discussions which took place between his father
and mother, and because of his own independent nature, he repudiated
the orthodox religious explanations of the universe. He was trained
for the profession of civil engineering. His studies in mathematics
and mechanics accentuated his precise and somewhat materialistic
interpretation of the universe. His social theories are an outgrowth in
part of his emphasis upon the laws of co-existence and sequences in the
physical world.
In order to understand Spencer’s social laws it is necessary first to
consider his general law of evolution. He traced everything in the
world back through causal chains to two fundamental factors, namely,
matter and motion--two aspects of force. As a result of the operation
of some First Cause, an integration of matter began to take place,
accompanied by a concomitant dissipation of motion. As a result, matter
passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite,
coherent heterogeneity. During this process the unexpended motion
undergoes a similar change.[XVI-2]
The best explanation of this law of evolution can be found in its
application to societary phenomena. Suppose that a modern city
neighborhood undertakes to organize itself. It possesses physical
resources and mental abilities. The “neighbors” are all more or less
untrained in community organization activities. In this sense they are
homogeneous. At first they are unable to work together; in fact they
do not know what to do; thus, they form “an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity.” But with experience in community organization activities,
the individuals of the neighborhood learn to work together. Each finds
the type of work which he can do best. All work toward a definite
goal. Thus, a definite, coherent heterogeneity arises. Further, the
unexpended energies of the people are influenced and transformed by the
pattern ideas which experience in community organization measures has
taught.[XVI-3]
This application of Spencer’s law of evolution to human progress
has weak as well as strong points. There is not always an original
homogeneity. Upon close examination this homogeneity disappears
before a variegated conglomeration of heterogeneous experiences and
potentialities of all the individuals who are concerned. It is not
necessary to point out additional errors. Spencer deserves credit,
however, for developing the concept of social evolution as a phase of
natural evolution and for stressing the idea of natural causation in
societary matters.
Spencer began his _Principles of Sociology_ with a very elaborate
description of primitive man--the original societary unit corresponding
to the biological cell. The physical, emotional, and intellectual
life of primitive man is given prominence. An analysis is made of the
behavior of man, the original social unit, when he is exposed to the
various environing conditions--inorganic, organic, and super-organic.
The emphasis upon “man” as the primary unit neglects the importance
of the “group” in the social evolutionary process. Moreover, Spencer
underrated the intellectual nature of primitive man; he denied to early
man the qualities involving excursiveness of thought, imagination, and
original ideas.[XVI-4]
Spencer’s discussion of primitive ideas shows widespread reading of
volumes of source materials. The “inductions” are often influenced
by preconceived notions of human life, despite Spencer’s sincere
desire and effort to be scientific. While the horde, the family, and
other groups are described, the influences which are the result of
the interaction of individual minds and the interactions between the
individual and his group are scarcely recognized.
In regard to the state, Spencer carried forward the theories which have
already been noted, namely, of individual rights. He repudiated the
state which is the product of the military organization of society.
Such a régime is primordial and uncivilized. It is an organization of
homogeneous units in which the units, or the individuals, are slaves to
the organization.
Spencer believed in a new industrial development whereby individuals
would become differentiated and developed, and whereby individuals
would be shifted from an autocratic maximum to a democratic maximum. To
Spencer, man is vastly superior to the state. In the coming industrial
order Spencer foresaw an era in which the main business of society will
be to defend the rights of individuals. Spencer forecasted an epoch
of industrial states which have abolished war. In such a day the only
conflicts that will take place between states will be natural. These
will be only the competitions that arise naturally between states that
are engaged in building up the best individuals, that is, those persons
who develop their individuality most freely and harmoniously.
The rise of industrial states with a minimum emphasis upon government
and a maximum emphasis upon individuality will produce a world order
in which national barriers will slowly melt away and a planetary
unity will develop. Spencer’s industrialism, however, has fundamental
weaknesses. It implies that social organization is more important than
social process. It neglects to provide for inherent psychical changes.
It assumes that an industrial society, _per se_, will be peaceful. It
underestimates the importance of socializing motives.
In the changes from a military to an industrial organization
of society, the six main sets of social institutions undergo
deep-seated changes. Spencer describes at length these six
institutional structures, namely, the domestic, ceremonial, political,
ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial. Two, the political and
industrial, have been mentioned on the preceding page. Spencer’s
treatment of the other four is accurate to a degree but at fundamental
points is unreliable--judged by current conceptions and data.
Perhaps Spencer is best known for his treatment of the organic analogy.
He set up the hypothesis that society is like a biological organism and
then proceeded to defend his thesis against all objections with great
logical force. But logic was his sociological downfall, for it overcame
his scientific insight.
Spencer found four main ways in which society resembles an
organism.[XVI-5] (1) In both cases growth is attended by augmentation
of mass. (2) In each instance growth is accomplished by increasing
complexity of structure. (3) In the organism and in society there is an
interdependence of parts. (4) The life of society, like the life of an
organism, is far longer than the life of any of the units or parts.
But there are ways in which society and an organism are unlike.[XVI-6]
These were analyzed by Spencer and determined to be merely superficial
differences. There are four of these main differences. (1) Unlike
organisms, societies have no specific extensive form, such as a
physical body with limbs or a face. (2) The elements of society do not
form a continuous whole as in the case of an animal. The living units
composing society are free, and not in contact, being more or less
dispersed. (3) The parts of society are not stationary and fixed in
their positions relative to the whole. (4) In an organism consciousness
is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate, while in society
consciousness is diffused. The alleged superficiality in this
difference between society and an organism was difficult for Spencer to
maintain.
In discussing the organic analogy further, Spencer compared the
alimentary system of an organism to the productive industries, or the
sustaining system in the body politic.[XVI-7] Furthermore, there is a
strong parallelism between the circulatory system of an organism and
the distributing system in society with its transportation lines; but
more particularly, its commercial classes and media of exchange. Then,
in both cases there has developed regulating systems. In an organism
there is a dominant center and subordinate centers, the senses, and
a neural apparatus. A similar structure appears in society in the
form of an adjustive apparatus, or government, for the purpose of
adjudicating the differences between the producers and the consumers.
These parallelisms throw only a small measure of light upon the nature
of society. They appear ridiculous when carried to an extreme, for
example, to the extreme to which Spencer himself went when he compared
the King’s Council to the medulla oblongata, the House of Lords to the
cerebellum, and the House of Commons to the cerebrum.
Spencer uses his analogies very extensively and vigorously, and later
refers to them as merely a scaffolding for building a structure of
deductions. This conclusion contains contradictory elements. When the
scaffolding is removed, society is left standing as a more or less
intangible affair. If a society is like an organism, it experiences a
natural cycle of birth, maturity, old age, and death. But according to
the telic concept of progress that was advanced by Lester F. Ward and
developed by later writers, the death of society does not come with
organic inevitableness, but depends on the vision, plans, courage, and
activities of that society’s members. A society need never die.
For many years it has been popular to criticise Spencer. Nearly all
the criticisms are justified. Moreover, they have been so numerous
that little of worth seems to be left in Spencer’s writings. However,
Spencer’s contributions to social thought are not negligible for
several reasons. (1) He emphasized the laws of evolution and natural
causation. (2) He described social evolution as a phase of natural
evolution. (3) He pointed out the likenesses between biological
organisms and human society. (4) He made the rôle of social structures,
or institutions, to stand out distinctly. (5) He stressed the
importance of individuality. (6) He undermined the idea that the State
is a master machine to which all the individual citizens must submit
automatically.
In the United States, Spencer possessed an able and loyal friend
in John Fiske (1842–1901). Fiske built his social thought upon
the evolutionarily formulae of Darwin and Spencer. In his _Cosmic
Philosophy_, or philosophy of the universe, Fiske contended that
the evolution of man produced fundamental changes in the nature of
cosmic evolution. With the development of man there appears a new
force in the universe, the human spirit, or soul. The advent of this
psychical entity has produced a subordination of the purely bodily,
physical, material forces and established a control by spiritual
forces. Moreover, in human evolution there has been a slowly increasing
subordination of the selfish phases of spiritual life to the
altruistic. With the apparent cessation in important bodily changes
there have come unheralded and unanticipated psychical inventions,
which have released man from the passive adaptation to environment
which animals manifest, and given to him an increasingly positive
control over the processes of adaptation. Humanity as the highest
product of the evolutionary processes has the power to change the
whole course of cosmic development. Fiske distinctly emphasized the
psychical forces in evolution and the part which they are playing
in making mankind purposeful and in organizing groups on social
principles. Humanity is not a mere incident in evolution; it is the
supreme factor.[XVI-9] The main purpose of man is not the perpetuation
of the species, but the development of increasingly higher and more
social purposes.
Following the ideas of Maine, Tylor, McLennan, and Lubbock, Fiske
concluded that social evolution originated when families, “temporarily
organized among all the higher gregarious mammals, became in the case
of the highest mammal permanently organized.”[XVI-10] Gregariousness
developed into definite family relationships and responsibilities.
Social evolution produced an increased complexity and specialty in
intelligence, which in turn required a lengthening of the period
“during which the nervous connections involved in ordinary adjustments
are becoming organized.” Such a transformation requires time, and hence
the need for a period of infancy which is not common to the lower
animals. Accompanying this period of infancy, there is the development
of strong affection of relatively short duration among higher animals.
Among mankind parental love takes on the characteristics not only
of intensity and unselfishness but of duration and forgiveness. In
this phase of evolution there is a correlative development of three
factors, namely, the prolongation of infancy, the rise of parental
affection, and increasing intelligence. The gradual prolongation of the
period of infancy is partly a consequence of increasing intelligence,
and in turn the prolongation of infancy affords the circumstances for
the establishment of permanent relationships, of reciprocal behavior,
of sociality.
Fiske was one of the first social philosophers to point out the
significance of foresight as a phase of evolutionary development.
Perhaps the chief way in which civilized man is distinguished from the
barbarian is in his ability “to adapt his conduct to future events,
whether contingent or certain to occur.” Civilized man has the power to
forego present enjoyment in order to safeguard himself against future
disaster.[XVI-12] This quality is the essence of prudence and is due
in large part to civilized man’s superior power of self-restraint,
one of the chief elements in moral progress. It is equally important
as “an indispensable prerequisite to the accumulation of wealth in
any community.” It is the basic factor in civilized man’s elaborate
scientific provisions and in his numerous far-reaching philosophic and
religious systems.
Paul von Lilienfeld (1829–1903) made the organic analogy a definite
part of his theory of society. He compared the individual to the
cells in an organism; the governmental and industrial organizations,
to the neural system; and the cultural products of society, to the
intercellular parts of an organism.[XVI-13]
Lilienfeld compared the stages of growth of the individual to the
stages of racial development, namely, savage, barbarian, and civilized.
This analogy was made use of by Fiske. Although somewhat true in a very
general sense, this recapitulation theory cannot be carried into minute
details.
The concept of social capitalization was originated by Lilienfeld. By
it he meant the ability of society to store up useful ideas and methods
and transmit them from generation to generation. In this way each
generation becomes the inheritor of all the human experiences that have
gone before.
Lilienfeld was one of the first sociological writers to develop the
definite concept of social pathology.[XVI-14] His treatment of this
theme, however, was exceedingly weak. He distinguished between a
normal and diseased organism and then, by analogy, between a normal
and diseased society. Social pathology, according to Lilienfeld, deals
with three sets of diseases, namely, of industry, of justice, and of
politics. Lilienfeld carried the organic analogy to a ridiculous and
puerile extreme when he compared the diseases of industry to insanity;
of justice, to delirium; of politics, to paralysis. He also elaborated
a system of social therapeutics to correspond to the diseases.
In Albert Schaeffle (1831–1903), the organic analogy found another
disciple, but a more worthy one than either Spencer or Lilienfeld. In
the thought of Schaeffle, society is not primarily a large organism but
a gigantic mind. Schaeffle presented a functional analogy rather than a
biological analogy. Whereas Spencer was especially interested in social
structures, Schaeffle set his attention upon social functions.
In his functional analogies Schaeffle compared the reason with the
legislature in society; the will, with the executive officers; and
the esthetic judgment, with the judiciary. Schaeffle’s psychology is
inaccurate and on the whole unscientific; his analogies add little
to an understanding of society. Nevertheless, his thought on these
subjects represents an advance over the ideas of Spencer.
In the _Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers_, Schaeffle undertook
to develop a complete sociological system. His teachings follow
the principle that “function leads structure and structure limits
function.” Activities produce developments in bodily structure, and
also cause the formation of new social institutions. Bodily structures
and social institutions alike limit activities and usefulness. These
propositions are a reversal of the emphasis which Spencer maintained.
They are fundamentally correct.
Although Schaeffle referred frequently to the “social body,” he did not
give the concept a specific meaning. He introduced the term “social
process,” but did not analyze its nature. He repudiated the idea that
the individual is the social unit; he considered the group to be the
all-important unit in society. Natural selection in social evolution
manifests itself in conflicts between the ideals of different groups.
René Worms, it may be added, has assumed the existence of a social
consciousness apart from the consciousness of individuals, and argued
that the chief difference between biological organisms and social
organizations is one of degree.
Schaeffle considered that government justifies itself in protecting
the weaker members of society, and in maintaining the highest welfare
of all. He pointed out the social responsibility which rests upon the
best educated and most fortunate members of society. Schaeffle wisely
emphasized the development of purposeful activity on the part of both
the individual and society.
The ideas of John Stuart Mackenzie differ from those of Spencer,
Lilienfeld, and Schaeffle. Mackenzie does not use the figure of an
organic analogy; he speaks in terms of homologies. According to
Mackenzie, society is not like an organism; it is organic.
The organic nature of society is three-fold. (1) There is an intrinsic
relation between the parts of society and the whole. The individual
reflects the culture of the group in which he has been trained. (2) The
development of a group is by virtue of intrinsic processes. A group
builds on ideas derived from both the past and from other groups, but
it does not genuinely grow unless it takes these ideas and makes them
over into a part of its own nature. (3) Society develops towards ends
which are discoverable in society itself. By analysis of the ideals and
motive forces of a group, it is possible to determine in what direction
the group is moving.
Mackenzie argues for the inner principle of things and particularly
of society. He believes, however, that knowledge concerning this
inner principle and the essential unity of mankind cannot be reduced
to a science, but will constitute the basis of a social philosophy.
Social philosophy does not supply facts, but seeks to interpret the
significance of the special aspects of human life with reference to the
social unity of mankind.[XVI-15]
The family and the state are the two forms of association in which
the most intimate bonds of union are nurtured. Language, if it can
be called a social institution, is perhaps the most fundamental
institution of all, because it produces that community of spirit
whereby intimacy in social intercourse can take place and whereby the
realization of a common good can be achieved.[XVI-16]
According to Mackenzie, there are three main lines of social progress,
and hence three main types of social control to be encouraged.[XVI-17]
(1) The control of natural forces by human agencies. (2) The control of
individuals by the communal spirit. (3) Self control.
The road of social advance is beset with obstacles. The chief are
these: (1) The dominance of vegetative needs. These economic factors
are so universal and insistent that they are likely at any time to
override all other human needs. (2) The insistence of animal impulses,
chiefly love and strife. While love promotes unity, it generally
produced a limited unity. Moreover, one mode of unity is apt to
conflict with other types of unity, and thus lead to intense strife.
(3) The mastery of mechanism. Life is easily crushed under the weight
of organization; thought, by scholastic pedantry; industry, by economic
systems; nationality, by soulless bureaucracy. (4) Anarchism. The
remedy for over-organization is not anarchy, for life and society are
composed of numbers of conflicting tendencies, which must be controlled
by the power of thought. But the exercise of merely individual thought
will not suffice. Individual thought is likely to be egocentric, to
evade the problems of group life, or to solve them selfishly. (5)
Conservatism. An established and successful civilization is in danger
of relying too much on its past. It often carries within itself the
canker of decay, and frequently lacks any clear vision of higher
development.
Mackenzie is committed to internationalism. It is no longer fitting
for anyone to think of his own country as an exclusive object of
devotion. “The earth is our country, and all its inhabitants are our
fellow-citizens; and it is only the recognition of this that entitles
us to look for any lasting security.”
Mackenzie advances beyond the organic analogists when he describes
the ways in which society is organic. As a social philosopher he has
contributed important pattern-ideas. He has escaped from the foibles of
the organic analogy and at the same time indicated the values that lie
beneath that concept.
This chapter deals with a significant period in the history of social
thought. The biology of the time was very faulty and the sociological
applications of biological knowledge were consequently of little merit.
The early years of the present century were characterized by noteworthy
improvements in biological thinking. The facts about the laws of
heredity and variation increased in number; a science of heredity was
established. The first decade of the present century also marks the
rise of the science of eugenics. In a later chapter the contributions
of recent scientific biology, and particularly of eugenics, to social
thought will be presented.