A VICTORY AND AFTER
_28th June, 1915. Imbros._ The fateful day.
Left camp with Braithwaite, Dawnay and Ward. Embarked on the destroyer
_Colne_ (Commander Seymour) and sailed for Helles. The fire fight was
raging. From the bridge we got a fine view as our guns were being
focused on and about the north-west coast. The cliff line and half a
mile inland is shrouded in a pall of yellow dust which, as it twirls,
twists and eddies, blots out Achi Baba himself. Through this curtain
appear, dozens at a time, little balls of white,--the shrapnel searching
out the communication trenches and cutting the wire entanglements. At
other times spouts of green or black vapour rise, mix and lose
themselves in the yellow cloud. The noise is like the rumbling of an
express train--continuous; no break at all. The Turks sitting there in
their trenches--our men 100 yards away sitting in _their_ trenches! What
a wonderful change in the art,--no not the art, in the mechanism--of
war. Fifteen years ago armies would have stood aghast at our display of
explosive energy; to-day we know that our shortage is pitiable and that
we are very short of stuff; perilously short.--(Written in the cabin of
the _Colne_.)
Jimmy Watson met me on the pier. He is Commandant Advance Base. Deedes
also met me and the whole band of us made our way inland to my battle
dugout. This is probably our last onslaught before the new troops and
new supplies of shell come to hand in about a month from now. We have
just enough stuff to deal with one narrow strip by the coast. Had it not
been for some help from the French, we could not have entered upon this
engagement at all, but must have continued to sit still and be shot
at--rather an expensive way of fighting if John Bull could only be told
the truth. Now, although the area is limited the battle is a big one,
fairly entitled to be called a general action. As I said, the French are
helping Simpson-Baikie in his bombardment; the Fleet are helping us with
the fire of the _Scorpion_, _Talbot_ and _Wolverine_, and Birdwood has
been asked to try and help us from Anzac by making a push there to hold
the enemy and prevent him sending reinforcements south. On their side
the Turks are making a very feeble reply. Looks as if we had caught them
with their ammunition parks empty.
I went into the dugout indescribably slack; hardly energy to struggle
against the heat and the myriads of flies. I came out of it radiant. The
Turks are beat. Five lines of their best trenches carried (or, at least,
four regular lines plus a bit extra); the Boomerang Redoubt rushed, and
in two successive attacks we have advanced 1,000 yards. Our losses are
said to be moderate. The dreaded Boomerang collapsed and was stormed
with hardly a casualty. This was owing partly to the two trench mortars
lent us by the French and partly to the extraordinary fine shooting of
our own battery of 4.5 howitzers. The whole show went like
clockwork--like a Field Day. First the 87th Brigade took three lines of
trenches; then our guns lengthened their range and fuses and the 86th
Brigade, with the gallant Royal Fusiliers at their head, scrambled over
the trenches already taken by the 87th, and took the last two lines in
splendid style. We could have gone right on but we had nothing to go on
with. How I wish the whole world and his wife could have been here to
see our lines advancing under fire quite steadily with intervals and
dressing as on parade. A wonderful show!
As the 87th Brigade left the trenches at 11 a.m., the enemy opened a hot
shrapnel fire on them but although some men fell, none faltered as we
could see very well owing to the following device. The 29th attackers
had sewn on to their backs triangles cut out of kerosine tins. The idea
was to let these bright bits of metal flash in the sunlight and act as
helios. Thus our guns would be able to keep an eye on them. The
spectacle was extraordinary. From my post I could follow the movements
of every man. One moment after 11 a.m. the smoke pall lifted and moved
slowly on with a thousand sparkles of light in its wake: as if someone
had quite suddenly flung a big handful of diamonds on to the landscape.
At 11.30 the 86th Brigade likewise advanced; passed through the 87th and
took two more lines of trenches.
At mid-day I signalled, "Well done 29th Division and 156th Brigade. Am
watching your splendid attack with admiration. Stick to it and your
names will become famous in your homes."
At 1.50 I got a reply, "Thanks from all ranks 29th. We are here to
stay."
At 3.15 I ran across and warmly congratulated Hunter-Weston, staying
with him reading the messages until about 4 p.m. when I went on to see
Gouraud. Hunter-Weston, Gouraud and Braithwaite agree that:--_had we
only shell to repeat our bombardment of this morning, now, we could go
on another 1,000 yards before dark,--result, Achi Baba to-morrow, or, at
the latest, the day after; Achi Baba_ and fifty guns perhaps with, say,
10,000 prisoners.
At 5 p.m. Gouraud and I walked back to Hunter-Weston's G.H.Q. A load was
off our minds--we were wonderfully happy. At 5.30 a message from Birdie
to say the Queenslanders had thrust out towards Gaba Tepe and had
"drawn" the Turkish reserves who had been badly hammered by our guns.
With this crowning mercy in my pocket, walked down and boarded the
destroyer _Scourge_ (Lieutenant Tupper) and got back to camp before
seven. What a day! May our glorious Infantry gain everlasting
_Kudos_--and the Gunners, too, may the good use they made of their shell
ration create a legend.
The French official photographer has fixed a moment by snapping Gouraud
and myself overlooking the Hellespont from the old battlements.
[Illustration: GENERAL GOURAUD "Central News" photo.]
_Midnight._--When I lay down in my little tent two hours ago the canvas
seemed to make a sort of sounding board. No sooner did I try to sleep
than I heard the musketry rolling up and dying away; then rolling up
again in volume until I could stick it no longer and simply had to get
up and pick a path, through the brush and over sandhills, across to the
sea on the East coast of our island. There I could hear nothing. Was the
firing then an hallucination--a sort of sequel to the battle in my
brain? Not so; far away I could see faint corruscations of sparks; star
shells; coloured fire balls from pistols; searchlights playing up and
down the coast. Our fellows were being hard beset to hold on to what
they had won; there, where the horizon stood out with spectral
luminosity. What a contrast; the direct fear, joy, and excitement of the
fighting men out there in the searchlights and the dull anguish of
waiting here in the darkness; imagining horrors; praying the Almighty
our men may be vouchsafed valour to stick it through the night;
wondering, waiting until the wire brings its colourless message!
One thought I have which is in the end a sure sleep-getter--the
advancing death. Whether by hours or by years, by inches or by leagues,
by bullets or bacilli, we struggle-for-lifers will very soon struggle no
more. My last salaams are well-nigh due to my audience and to the stage.
That rare and curious being called I is more fragile than any porcelain
jar. How on earth it has preserved itself so long, heaven only knows.
One pellet of lead, it falls in a heap of dust; the Peninsula
disappears; the fighting men fall asleep; the world and its glories
become a blank--not even a dream--nothing!
_29th June, 1915. Imbros._ Sunlight has scattered the spectres of the
night,--they have fled, leaving behind them only the matter-of-fact
residuum of heavy Turkish counter-attacks against our fresh-won ground.
The fighting took place along the coastline, and the stillness of the
night seems to have helped the sounds of musketry across the twelve
miles of sea. The attack was most determined: repulsed by bombs and with
the bayonet: at daylight the enemy came under a cross-fire of machine
guns and rifles and were shot to pieces.
Very early approved the revise of my long cable (for the Cabinet)
outlining my hopes and fears:--
"(No. M.F. 381). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With
reference to your telegram No. 5770, cipher. As the Cabinet are anxious
to consider my situation in all its bearings, it is necessary I should
open to you all my mind. In my No. M.F. 328 of 13th June, I gave you an
outline of my plan, based on the news that I was to be given new
divisions, and I told you what I should do with a possible fourth
division in my No. M.F. 364 of 23rd June. I am now asked whether I
consider a fifth division advisable and necessary.
"I have taken time to answer this question, as the addition of each new
division necessitates, in such a theatre of war as this, a
reconsideration of the whole strategical and tactical situation as well
as of the power of the Fleet to work up to the increased demands that
would be placed upon it. The scheme which might tempt me (Naval
considerations permitting) of landing the 4th and 5th Divisions together
with the three divisions and one or two divisions from Cape Helles and
Anzac on flank of shore of Gulf of Saros to march on Rodosto and
Constantinople I reject because the 4th and 5th Divisions cannot reach
me simultaneously with all their transport.
"But assuming that reinforcements can only reach me in echelon of
divisions I have decided that the best policy would be to adhere to my
original plan of endeavouring to turn the enemy's right at Anzac with
the first three divisions and to gain a position from Gaba Tepe to
Maidos. I should then use the 4th and 5th Divisions, in case of
non-success at first to reinforce this wing, and in case of success
possibly to effect a landing on the southern shore of the Dardanelles;
and since the enemy's forces south of the Straits would probably have
been reduced to a minimum in order to oppose my reinforced strength on
the Peninsula I should in the latter case count upon these two divisions
doing more than hold a bridge-head (see my M.F. 349 of 19th June), and
should expect them, reinforced from the northern wing if necessary, to
press forward to Chanak and thus to cut off this enemy's sole remaining
line of supply.[22] By these means I should hope to compel the
surrender of the whole Gallipoli Army. Meanwhile, with my force on the
Asiatic side I would be enabled to establish in Morto Bay a base safe
from the bad weather which must be expected later on.
"With regard to ammunition, the more we can get the more easy will our
task be, but I hope we may be able to achieve success at the end of July
with the amount available. As we are so far from home, however, we
cannot afford to run things too fine, and we shall always be obliged to
keep up a large reserve until the arrival of further supply. I should,
therefore, like as much as you can spare, particularly high explosive.
So far as this question affects sending a 4th and 5th Division I would
not refuse them on the score of ammunition alone, because with the
Artillery of three new divisions complete I think we shall have as many
guns as the terrain will allow us to use in the operations towards
Maidos, and also sufficient to compete with any Artillery which the
enemy could bring against the detachment operating on the Asiatic shore.
"To summarize--I think I have reasonable prospects of eventual success
with three divisions, with four the risks of miscalculation would be
minimized, and with five, even if the fifth division had little or no
gun ammunition, I think it would be a much simpler matter to clear the
Asiatic shore subsequently of big guns, etc., Kilid Bahr would be
captured at an earlier date and success would be generally assured."
Next, I boiled down yesterday's battle into telegraphic dispatch form:
"(No. M.F. 383). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for
War. In continuation of my Nos. M.F. 379 and 382. Plan of operations
yesterday was to throw forward left of my line south-east of Krithia,
pivoting on point about one mile from the sea, and after advancing
extreme left for about half a mile, to establish new line facing east on
ground thus gained. This plan entailed the capture in succession of two
lines of the Turkish trenches east of the Saghir Dere and five lines of
trenches west of it. Australian Corps was ordered to co-operate by
making vigorous demonstration. The action opened at 9 a.m. with
bombardment by heavy artillery of the trenches to be captured.
"Assistance rendered by French in this bombardment was most valuable. At
10.20 our field artillery opened fire to cut wire in front of Turkish
trenches and this was effectively done. Great effect on enemy's trench
near sea and in keeping down his artillery fire from that quarter was
produced by very accurate fire of H.M.S. _Talbot_, _Scorpion_, and
_Wolverine_. At 10.45 a small Turkish advanced work in the Saghir Dere,
known as the Boomerang Redoubt, was assaulted. This little fort was
very strongly sited, protected by extra strong wire entanglements and
has long been a source of trouble. After special bombardment by trench
mortars and while bombardment of surrounding trenches was at its height
part of Border Regiment, at the exact moment prescribed, leapt from
their trenches like a pack of hounds pouring out of cover, raced across
and took the work most brilliantly.
"Artillery bombardment increased in intensity till 11 a.m. when range
was lengthened and infantry advanced. Infantry attack was carried out
with great dash along whole line. West of Saghir Dere 87th Brigade
captured three lines of trenches with little opposition. Trenches full
of dead Turks, many buried by bombardment, and 100 prisoners were taken
in them. East of Ravine two battalions Royal Scots made fine attack,
capturing the two lines of trenches assigned as their objective, but
remainder of 156th Brigade on their right met severe opposition and were
unable to get forward. At 11.30, 86th Brigade led by 2nd Bn. Royal
Fusiliers started second phase of attack West of Ravine. They advanced
with great steadiness and resolution through trenches already captured
and on across the open, and taking two more lines of trenches reached
objective allotted to them, Lancashire Fusiliers inclining half right
and forming line to connect with our new position East of Ravine.
"The northernmost objective I had set out to reach had now been
attained, but the Gurkhas pressing on under the cliffs captured an
important knoll still further forward, actually due west of Krithia.
This they fortified and held during the night, making our total gain on
the left precisely 1,000 yards. During afternoon 88th Brigade attacked
trenches, small portion of which remained uncaptured on right, but enemy
held on stubbornly, supported by machine guns and artillery, and attacks
did not succeed. During night enemy counter-attacked furthest trenches
gained but was repulsed with heavy loss. Party of Turks who penetrated
from flank between two lines of captured trenches, subjected to
machine-gun fire at daybreak, suffered very heavily and survivors
surrendered.
"Except for small portion of trench already mentioned which is still
held by enemy, all, and more than we hoped for, from operations has been
gained. On extreme left, line has been pushed forward to specially
strong point well beyond limit of advance originally contemplated. Our
casualties about 2,000, the greater proportion of which are slight cases
of which 250 at Anzac, in the useful demonstration made simultaneously
there. All engaged did well, but certainly the chief factor in the
success was the splendid attack carried out by XXIXth Division, whose
conduct in this as on previous occasions was beyond praise."
Lastly, I wrote out a special Force Order thanking the incomparable
29th.
Winter brought me over a letter just received from Wallace. He is
quarrelling with Elliot. For that I don't blame him. At the end of his
letter Wallace says, "I feel that the organization of the Lines of
Communication and making it work is such a task that I sometimes doubt
myself whether I am equal to it." Wallace is a good fellow and a
sensible man placed, by British methods, out of his element and out of
his depth. Have told Winter to tell him I sympathize and will help him
and support him all I know; that if it turns out his strong points lie
in another direction than administering a huge business machine, I will
try and find a handsome way out for him.
Had been writing, writing, writing since cockcrow so when I heard a
trawler was going over with two of the General Staff at mid-day, I could
not resist the chance of another visit to the scene of yesterday's
victorious advance. Went to see Hunter-Weston but he was up at the front
where I had no time to follow him. His Chief of Staff says all goes
well, but they have just had cables from my own Headquarters to tell
them that heavy columns of Turks are massing behind Achi Baba for a
fresh counter-attack. Thought, therefore, the wisest thing was to get
back quickly. Reached camp again about 7 p.m., and found more news in
office than I got on the spot. Last night's firing on the Peninsula
meant close and desperate fighting. Several heavy columns of Turks
attacked with bomb and bayonet, and in places some of their braves broke
through into our new trenches where the defence had not yet been put on
a stable footing. When daylight came we got them enfiladed by machine
guns and every single mother's son of them was either killed or
captured. So we still hold every yard we had gained.
The attack by a part of the Lowland Division seems to have been
mishandled. A Brigade made the assault East of the Ravine; the men
advanced gallantly but there was lack of effective preparation. Two
battalions of the Royal Scots carried a couple of the enemy's trenches
in fine style and stuck to them, but the rest of the Brigade lost a
number of good men to no useful purpose in their push against H.12. One
thing is clear. If the bombardment was ineffective, from whatever cause,
then the men should not have been allowed to break cover.[23]
_30th June, 1915. Imbros._ Writing in camp.
More good news. It never rains but it pours. The French have made a fine
push and got the Quadrilateral by 8 a.m. with but little loss. The Turks
seemed discouraged, they say, and did not offer their usual firm
resistance.
At 10.30 a.m. wired Gouraud:--"Warm congratulations on this morning's
work which will compensate for the loss of your 2,000 quarts of wine.
Your Government should now replace it with vintage claret. Please send
me quickly a sketch of the ground you have gained."
Gouraud now replies:--"Best thanks for congratulations. Sketch being
made. If our Government is pleased to send a finer brand of wine to
replace what was wasted by the guns of Asia, we Frenchmen will drink it
to the very good health of our British comrades in arms."
How lucky I signalled de Robeck 8 p.m. yesterday to let us keep the
_Wolverine_ and _Scorpion_ "in case of a night attack!" Sure enough
there was another onslaught made against our northernmost post. Two
Turkish Regiments were discovered in mass creeping along the top of the
cliffs by the searchlights of the _Scorpion_. They were so punished by
her guns that they were completely broken up and the Infantry at
daylight had not much to do except pick up the fragments. 300 Turks lay
dead upon the ground. Also, hiding in furze, have gleaned 180 prisoners
belonging to the 13th, 16th and 33rd Regiments. A Circassian prisoner
carried in a wounded Royal Scot on his back under a heavy fire.
Three wires from Helles; the first early this morning; the last just to
hand (11 p.m.) saying that the lack of hand grenades is endangering all
our gains. The Turks are much better armed in this respect. De Lisle
says that where we have hand grenades we can advance still further;
where we have not, we lose ground. At mid-day, we wired our reply saying
we had no more hand grenades we feared but that we would do our best to
scrape up a few; also that several trench mortars had just arrived from
home and that they would be sent over forthwith.
Have returned some interesting minutes on the Dardanelles, sent me from
home, with this remark:--"Looking back I see now clearly that the one
fallacy which crept into your plans was non-recognition of the pride and
military _moral_ of the Turk. There was never any question of the Turk
being demoralized or even flustered by ships sailing past him or by
troops landing in his rear. _At last, I believe_, this _moral_ is
beginning to crack up a little (not much) but nothing less than
murderous losses would have done it. In their diaries their officers
speak of this Peninsula as the Slaughterhouse."
Brigadier-General de Lothbinière and Major Ruthven lunched and young
Brodrick and I dined together on board the _Triad_ with the hospitable
Vice-Admiral. We were all very cheery at the happy turn of our fortunes;
outwardly, that is to say, for there was a skeleton at the feast who
kept tap, tap, tapping on the mahogany with his bony knuckles; tap, tap,
tap; the gunfire at Helles was insistent, warning us that the Turks had
not yet "taken their licking." But when I get back, although there is
nothing in from Hunter-Weston there is an officer from Anzac who has
just given me the complete story of Birdwood's demonstration on the
28th. The tide of war is indeed racing full flood in our favour.
When we were working out our scheme for the attack of the 29th Division
and 156th Brigade the day before yesterday, as well as Gouraud's attack
of yesterday, we had reckoned that the Turkish High Command would get to
realize by about 11 a.m. on the 28th that an uncommon stiff fight had
been set afoot to the sou'-west of Krithia. L. von S. would then, it
might be surmised, draw upon his reserves at Maidos and upon his forces
opposite Anzac: they would get their orders about mid-day: they would be
starting about 1 p.m.: they would reach Krithia about dusk: they would
use their "pull" in the matter of hand grenades to counter-attack by
moonlight. So we asked Birdie to make one of his most engaging gestures
just to delay these reinforcements a little bit; and now it turns out
that the Australians and New Zealanders in their handsome, antipodean
style went some 50 per cent. better than their bargain:--
(1) At 1 p.m. on the 28th the Queensland giants darted out of their
caves and went for the low ridge covering Gaba Tepe, that tenderest spot
of the Turks. They got on to the foot of it and, by their dashing
onslaught, drew the fire of all the enemy guns; but, what was still
better, heavy Turkish columns, on the march, evidently, from Maidos to
the help of Krithia, turned back northwards and closed in for the
defence of Gaba Tepe. As they drew near they came under fire of our
destroyers and of the Anzac guns and were badly knocked about and broken
up. So both Krithia and the French Quadrilateral have had to do without
the help of these reinforcements from the reserves of Liman von Sanders.
One of the neatest of strokes and the credit of it lies with the
Queenslanders who were not content to flourish their fists in the
enemy's face but ran out and attacked him at close quarters.
(2) Now comes the sequel! Birdie has just sent in word of the best
business done at Anzac since May 19th!! The success of his demonstration
towards Gaba Tepe had given the Turks a bad attack of the jumps,
followed by a thirst for vengeance. Yesterday, they got _very_ nervy
during a dust storm and for two hours the whole of their Army kept up
high pressure fire from every rifle and machine gun they could bring to
bear. They simply poured out bullets by the million into the blinding
dust. Things then gradually quieted down till 1.30 this morning when a
very serious assault--very serious for the enemy--was suddenly launched
against the Anzac left, the brunt of it falling on Russell's New Zealand
Mounted Rifles and Chauvel's Australian Light Horse; a bad choice too!
Our victory complete; bloodless for us. Their defeat complete; very
bloody. Nine fresh enemy battalions smashed to bits: fighting went on
until dawn: five hundred Turks laid out and counted: no more detail but
that is good enough to go to sleep upon.
_1st July, 1915. Imbros._ Good news from Helles continues. In the early
hours of last night an attack was made on the Gurkhas in J trenches.
When they ran out of bombs the Turks bombed them out. Headed by Bruce
their Colonel, whom they adore, they retook the trench and, for the
first time, got into the enemy with their _kukris_ and sliced off a
number of their heads. At dawn half a battalion of Turks tried to make
the attack along the top of the cliff and were entirely wiped out.
Against this I must set down cruel bad news about Gouraud. An accursed
misadventure. He has been severely wounded by a shell. Directly I heard
I got the Navy to run me over. He was already in the Hospital ship; I
saw him there. A pure toss up whether he pulls round or not; luckily he
has a frame of iron. I was allowed to speak to him for half a minute and
he is full of pluck. The shell, an 8-incher from Asia, landed only some
half a dozen yards away from him as he was visiting his wounded and sick
down by "V" Beach. By some miracle none of the metal fragments touched
him, but the sheer force of the explosion shot him up into the air and
over a wall said to be seven feet high. His thigh, ankle and arm are all
badly smashed, simply by the fall. We could more easily spare a Brigade.
His loss is irreparable. By personal magnetism he has raised the ardour
of his troops to the highest power. Have cabled to Lord K. expressing my
profound sorrow and assuring him that "the grave loss suffered by the
French, and indirectly by my whole force," is really most serious, as I
know, I say, "the French War Minister cannot send us another General
Gouraud."
_2nd July, 1915. Imbros._ Worked all day in camp. Birdie, with Onslow,
his A.D.C--_such_ a nice boy--came over from Anzac in the morning and
stayed with me the day, during which we worked together at our plan. At
night we all went over together to H.M.S. _Triad_ to dine with the
Vice-Admiral.
Birdwood is quite confident that with a fresh Division and a decent
supply of shell he can get hold of the heights of Sari Bair, whereby he
will enfilade the whole network of Turkish trenches, now hedging him
round. The only thing he bargains for is that G.H.Q. so work the whole
affair from orders down to movements, that the enemy get no inkling of
our intentions. The Turks so far suspect nothing, and Koja Chemen Tepe
and Chunuk Bair, with all the intervening ridge, are still unentrenched
and open to capture by a _coup-de-main_. Even if the naval objections to
Bulair could be overcome, Sari Bair remains the better move of the two.
With the high ridges of Sari Bair in our hands we could put a stop to
the Turkish sea transport from Chanak which we could neither see nor
touch from Bulair. The tugs with their strings of lighters could not run
by day, and as soon as we could get searchlights fixed up, they would
find it very awkward to show themselves in the Straits by night. As to
the enemy land communications, as soon as we can haul up our big guns we
should command, and be able to search, all the ground between the Aegean
and the Dardanelles. Now is the moment. Birdwood says that he and his
men have exactly the same feeling that we have down at Helles--the
feeling, namely, that now at last, we have got a right moral pull over
the Turks. All we want is enough material to turn that faith into a mile
or two of mountains.
Making full use of their advantage in hand grenades, the Turks again won
their trench back from the Gurkhas last night; a trench which was the
key to a whole system of earthworks. Bruce had been wounded and they had
no officers left to lead them, so de Lisle had to call once more on the
29th Division and the bold Inniskilling Fusiliers retook that trench at
a cost of all their officers save two.
There are some feats of arms best left to speak for themselves and this
is one of them.
Wrote Lord K. as follows:--
"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
"MEDTN. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
"_2nd July, 1915._
"Dictated.
"MY DEAR LORD KITCHENER,
"There seems to be a lull in this tooth-and-nail struggle which has kept
me on tenterhooks during the past four days and nights. But we have on
our maps little blue arrows showing the movements of at least a Division
of troops in various little columns from above Kereves Dere, from Soghon
Dere river, from Kilid Bahr and even from within gun-shot of Achi Baba,
all converging on a point a mile or two north-west of Krithia. So it
looks as if they were going to have one more desperate go at the Gurkha
knoll due west of Krithia, and at the line of trench we call J.13
immediately behind it which was also held by the Gurkhas.
"Last night they bombed the Gurkhas out of the eastern half of J.13 and
the Inniskilling Fusiliers had to take it again at the point of the
bayonet just as day broke.
"You can have small idea of what the troops are going through. The same
old battalions being called on again and again to do the forlorn hope
sort of business. However, each day that passes, these captured
positions get better dug in, and make the Turks' counter-attack more
costly.
"The cause of the attack made the night before last on Anzac has been
made quite clear to us by a highly intelligent Armenian prisoner we have
taken. The strictest orders had been issued by His Excellency
Commanding-in-Chief on the Peninsula that no further attacks against our
works were to be made unless, of course, we took any ground from them
when we must be vigorously countered. But it was explained to the men
that the losses in attack had proved too heavy, whereas, if they had
patience and waited a week or ten days in their trenches, then at last
we would come out and try to attack them when they would kill us in
great quantities. However, Enver Pasha appeared in person amongst the
troops at Anzac, and ordered three regiments to attack whilst the whole
of the rest of the line supported them by demonstrations and by fire. It
was objected this was against the command of their local chief. He
brushed this objection aside, and told them never to look him in the
face again if they failed to drive the Australians into the sea. So off
they went and they certainly did not drive the Australians into the sea
(although they got into their support trenches at one time) and
certainly most of them never looked Enver in the face again, or anyone
else for that matter.
"The old battle tactics have clean vanished. I have only quite lately
realized the new conditions. Whether your entrenchments are on the top
of a hill or at the bottom of a valley matters precious little: whether
you are outflanked matters precious little--you may hold one half of a
straight trench and the enemy may hold the other half, and this
situation may endure for weeks. The only thing is by cunning or
surprise, or skill, or tremendous expenditure of high explosives, or
great expenditure of good troops, to win some small tactical position
which the enemy may be bound, perhaps for military or perhaps for
political reasons, to attack. Then you can begin to kill them pretty
fast."
_3rd July, 1915. Imbros._ Very hot; very limp with the prevalent disease
but greatly cheered up by the news of yesterday evening's battle at
Helles. The Turks must have got hold of a lot of fresh shell for, at
5.30 p.m., they began as heavy a bombardment as any yet seen at Helles,
concentrating on our extreme left. We could only send a feeble reply. At
6 o'clock the enemy advanced in swarms, but before they had covered more
than 100 yards they were driven back again into the Ravine some 800
yards to our front. H.M.S. _Scorpion_ and our machine guns played the
chief hand. At 7 p.m. the Turkish guns began again, blazing away as if
shells were a drug in the market, whilst, under cover of this very
intense fire, another two of their battalions had the nerve to emerge
from the Ravine to the north-east of our forward trenches and to move in
regular lines--shoulder to shoulder--right across the open. Hardly had
they shown themselves when the 10th Battery R.F.A. sprayed them
beautifully with shrapnel. The Gurkha supports were rushed up, and as
there was no room for them in the fire trenches they crept into shell
craters and any sort of hole they could find from which to rake the
Turks as they made their advance. The enemy's officers greatly
distinguished themselves, waving their swords and running well out into
the open to get the men forward. The men also had screwed up their
courage to the sticking point and made a big push for it, but, in the
end, they could not face our fire, and fell back helter-skelter to their
mullah. Along the spot where they had stood wavering awhile before they
broke and ran, there are still two clearly marked lines of corpses.
Wrote a letter to Sclater saying I cannot understand his request for
fuller information about the drafts needed to make my units up to
strength. We have regularly cabled strengths; the figures are correct
and it is the A.G. himself who has ordered us to furnish the optimistic
"ration" strengths instead of the customary "fighting" strengths. The
ration strength are for the Q.M.G., but unless the A.G. wishes to go on
living in a fool's paradise, why should he be afraid of knowing the
numbers we cannot put into the line of battle!
Have also written Cowans protesting once more that we should have
business brains to run the most intricate business proposition at
present on tap in the world--our communications. During the past month
the confusion at Mudros, our advanced base, becomes daily worse
confounded. Things meant for Anzac go to Helles, and _vice versa_: or,
not infrequently, stores, supplies or luxuries arrive and are sent off
on a little tour to Alexandria and Malta before delivery. The system
would be perfect for the mellowing of port or madeira, but when it is
applied to plum and apple jam or, when 18 pr. shell are sent to
howitzers, the system needs overhauling. I know the job is out of the
way difficult. There is work here for Lesseps, Goethals and Morgan
rolled into one:--work that may change the face of the world far, far
more than the Suez or Panama Canals and, to do it, they have put in a
good fighting soldier, quite out of his setting, and merely because they
did not know what to do with him in Egypt! In case Cowans shares K.'s
suspicions about my sneaking desire for Ellison, I say, "I assure you;
most solemnly I assure you, that the personal equation does not, even in
the vaguest fashion, enter into my thoughts. Put the greatest enemy I
possess in the world, and the person I most dislike, into that post, and
I would thank God for his appointment, on my knees, provided he was a
competent business man."
Again:--
"I am in despair myself over it. Perhaps that is putting it rather
strong as I try never to despair, but seriously I worry just as much
over things behind me as I do over the enemy in front of me. What I want
is a really big man there, and I don't care one D. who he is. A man I
mean who, if he saw the real necessity, would wire for a great English
contractor and 300 navvies without bothering or referring the matter to
anyone."
A cable to say that the editing of my despatch is ended, and that the
public will be let into its dreadful secrets in a day or two. But, I am
informed there are passages in it whose "secret nature will be
scrupulously observed." What passages? I cannot remember any secrets in
my despatch.
Have been defending myself desperately against the War Office who want
to send out a Naval Doctor to take full charge and responsibility for
the wounded (including destination) the moment they quit dry land. But
we must have a complete scheme of evacuation _by land and sea_, not two
badly jointed schemes. So I have asked, who is to be "Boss"? Who is to
see to it that the two halves fit together? The answer is that the War
Office are confident "there will be no friction" (bless them!); they
say, "nothing could be simpler than this arrangement and no difficulty
is anticipated. Neither is boss and the boundary between the different
spheres of activity of the two officers might be laid down as the
high-water mark." (Bless them again!). Have replied:--
"I have struggled with your high-water mark silently for weeks and know
something about it. Had I bothered you with all my troubles you would, I
respectfully submit, realize that your proposal is not simple but
extraordinarily complicated, even pre-supposing seraphic dispositions on
either side. If you determine finally that these two officers are to be
independent, I foresee that you will greatly widen the scope of dual
control which is now only applicable to my great friend the Admiral and
myself.
"Either Babtie must order up the ships when and where he wants them, or
Porter must order the wounded down when he is ready for them. This is
my considered opinion."[24]
Have also sent an earnest message to K.--just the old, old story--saying
that what I want _first_ is drafts, and only _second_ fresh divisions.
My old Chief has been his kind self again:--so very considerate has he
been in his recent messages that I feel it almost brutal to press him or
to seem to wish to take advantage of his goodness. But we are dealing
with lives of men and I _must_ try and make myself clear:--
"I am anxious with regard to the question of reinforcements for units.
During the period 28th to 30th June, the Brigades of the XXIXth and
Lowland Divisions dropped in strengths approximately as follows:--86th
from 71 officers, 2,807 others to 36 and 1,994; 87th from 65 and 2,724
to 48 and 2,075; 88th from 63 and 2,139 to 46 and 1,765; 156th from 102
and 2,839 to 30 and 1,399. All Officers who have arrived from England to
date are included in the above figures. Maxwell has agreed to let me
have 80 young Officers from Egypt. Of the other ranks I have no
appreciable reinforcements to put in. This is the situation after an
operation carried out by the XXIXth and two brigades of LIInd Divisions,
which was not only successful but even more successful than we
anticipated; wherein the initial losses on 28th June were comparatively
small, namely 2,000, but as the result of numerous counter-attacks day
and night, have since swelled to some 3,500.
"The drafts promised in your No. 5793, A.G.2a, would, provided there
were no more casualties, bring the units of the XXIXth Division to
approximately 75 per cent. of establishment, but would leave none
available as further reinforcements.
"In view of the operations on a larger scale, with increased forces, I
feel I should draw your attention to the risk introduced by the theatre
of operations being so far from England. I have no reserves in base
depots now, while the operations we are engaged in are such that heavy
casualties are to be expected. The want of drafts ready on the spot to
fill up units which have suffered heavily might prevent me pressing to
full advantage as the result of a local success. At a critical moment I
might find myself compelled to suspend operations until the arrival of
drafts from England. This might involve a month and in the meantime the
enemy would have time to consolidate his position. The difficulty of the
drafts question is fully realized, but I think you should know exactly
how I am placed and that I should reflect and make clear the essential
difference between the Dardanelles and France in so far as the necessity
of mobilizing first reinforcements for each unit is concerned. Our real
need is a system which will enable me to maintain drafts for the
deficiencies in depots on my lines of communications with Egypt."
If K. did not want brief spurts sandwiched between long waits, all he
had to do was to tell his A.G. to see to it that the XXIXth Division was
kept up to strength. A word and a frown would have done it. But he has
not said the word, or scowled, and the troops have by extraordinary
efforts and self-sacrifice carried through the work of strong battalions
with weak ones--but only to some extent. That is the whole story.
_4th July, 1915. Imbros._ Church Parade this morning. Made a close
inspection of the Surrey Yeomanry under Major Bonsor. Even with as free
a hand as the Lord Almighty, it would be hard to invent a better type of
fighting man than the British Yeomanry; only, they have never been
properly appreciated by the martinets who have ruled our roost, and
chances have never been given to them to make the most of themselves as
soldiers.
The Escort was made up of men of the 29th Division under Lieutenant
Burrell of the South Wales Borderers--that famous battalion which
stormed so brilliantly de Tott's battery at the first landing,--also of
a detachment of Australians under Lieutenant Edwards and a squad of New
Zealanders under Lieutenant Sheppard, fine men all of them, but very
different (despite the superficial resemblance imparted by their slouch
hats) when thus seen shoulder to shoulder on parade. The Australians
have the pull in height and width of chest; the New Zealanders are
thicker all through, chests, waists, thighs.
After Church Parade, boarded H.M.S. _Basilisk_ (Lieutenant Fallowfield)
and steamed to Helles. The Turks, inconsiderate as usual, were shelling
Lancashire Landing as we got ashore. Every living soul had gone to
ground. Strolled up the deserted road with an air of careless
indifference, hopped casually over a huge splosh of fresh blood, and
crossed to Hunter-Weston's Headquarters. Had I only been my simple self,
I would have out-stripped the hare for swiftness, as it was, I, as
C.-in-C, had to play up to the dugouts. As Hunter-Weston and I were
starting lunch, an orderly rushed in to say that a ship in harbour had
been torpedoed. So we rushed out with our glasses and watched. She was a
French transport, the _Carthage_, and she took exactly four minutes to
sink. The destroyers and picket boats were round her as smart as flies
settle on a lump of sugar, and there was no loss of life. Sad to see the
old ship go down. I knew her well at Malta and Jean once came across in
her from Tunis. She used to roll like the devil and was always said,
with what justice I do not know, to be the sister ship to the _Waratah_
which foundered so mysteriously somewhere off the Natal coast with a
very good chap, a M.F.H., Percy Brown, on board. At 2.30 General
Bailloud, now commanding the French, came over to see me. When he had
finished his business which he handles in so original a manner as to
make it a recreation, I went off with Hunter-Weston and Staffs to see
General Egerton of the Lowland Division. Egerton introduced me to
Colonel Mudge, A.A.G., Major Maclean, D.A.A.G. (an old friend), Captain
Tollemashe, G.S.O.3, and to his A.D.C., Lieutenant Laverton. We then
went on and saw the 156th Brigade. Passed the time of day to a lot of
the Officers and men. Among those whose names I remember were Colonel
Pallin, acting Brigadier; Captain Girdwood, Brigade Major; Captain Law,
Staff Captain; Colonel Peebles, 7th Royal Scots; Captain Sinclair, 4th
Royal Scots; Lieutenant McClay, 8th Scottish Rifles. The last Officer
was one of the very few--I am not sure they did not say the only one--of
his Battalion who went into the assault and returned untouched.
The whole Brigade had attacked H. 12 on the 28th ult. and lost a number
of good men. The rank and file seemed very nice lads but--there was no
mistaking it--they have been given a bad shake and many of them were
down on their luck. As we came to each Battalion Headquarters we were
told, "These are the remnants of the----," whatever the unit was. Three
times was this remark repeated but the fourth time I had to express my
firm opinion that in no case was the use of the word "remnant," as
applied to a fighting unit "in being," an expression which authority
should employ in the presence of the men.
Re-embarked in H.M.S. _Basilisk_ and got back to Imbros fairly late.
A set of Turkish Divisional orders sent by the Turkish General to the
Commander of their right zone at Helles has been taken from a wounded
Turkish officer. They bear out our views of the blow that the 29th
Division have struck at the enemy's _moral_ by their brilliant attack on
the 28th inst.
"There is nothing that causes us more sorrow, increases the courage of
the enemy and encourages him to attack more freely, causing us great
losses, than the losing of these trenches. Henceforth, commanders who
surrender these trenches from whatever side the attack may come before
the last man is killed will be punished in the same way as if they had
run away. Especially will the commanders of units told off to guard a
certain front be punished if, instead of thinking about their work
supporting their units and giving information to the higher command,
they only take action after a regrettable incident has taken place.
"I hope that this will not occur again. I give notice that if it does, I
shall carry out the punishment. I do not desire to see a blot made on
the courage of our men by those who escape from the trenches to avoid
the rifle and machine gun fire of the enemy. Henceforth, I shall hold
responsible all Officers who do not shoot with their revolvers all the
privates who try to escape from the trenches on any pretext. Commander
of the 11th Division, Colonel Rifaat."
In sending on this order to his battalions, the Colonel of the 127th
Regiment adds:--
"To Commander of the 1st Battalion. The contents will be communicated to
the Officers and I promise to carry out the orders till the last drop of
our blood has been shed."
Then followed the signatures of the company commanders of the Battalion.
There is a savage ring about these orders but they are, I am sure, more
bracing to the recipients than laments and condolences over their
losses.
_5th July, 1915. Imbros._ Spent a long, hot day hanging at the end of
the wire. Heavy firing on the Peninsula last night under cover of which
the Turks at dawn made, or tried to make, a grand, concerted attack. Not
a soul in England, outside the Ordnance, realizes, I believe, that
barring the guns of the 29th Division and the few guns of the Anzacs,
our field artillery consists of the old 15-prs., relics of South Africa,
and of 5-inch hows., some of them Omdurman veterans. Quite a number of
these guns are already unserviceable and, in the 42nd Division, to keep
one and a half batteries fully gunned, we have had to use up every piece
in the Brigade. The surplus personnel are thus wasted. To take on new
Skoda or Krupp guns with these short-range veterans is rough on the
gunners. Still, but for the Territorial Force we should have nothing at
all, and but for those guns to-day some of the enemy might have got
home.
A sort of professional gossip turned up to-day from G.H.Q. France. We do
not seem to be so popular as we deserve to be in _la belle France!_ But
what I would plead were I only able to get at Joffre and French is that
we are "such a little one." Were we all to be set down in the West
to-morrow with our shattered, torn formations, they'd put us back into
reserve for a month's rest and training. As for the guns, they'd scrap
the lot. _They_ don't want ancient 15-prs. and 5-inch hows. out there.
They picture us feasting upon their munitions, but half of what we use
they would not touch with a barge pole and, of the good stuff, one
Division in France will fire away in one day what would serve to take
the Peninsula.
Braithwaite has a letter from the D.M.I. telling him that 5,000 Russians
sailed from Vladivostock on the 1st inst. to join us here. One Regiment
of four Battalions plus one Sotnia of Cossacks. A reinforcement of 5,000
stout soldiers tumbling out of the skies! Russians placed here are worth
twice their number elsewhere, not only because we need rifles so badly,
but because of the moral effect their presence should have in the
Balkans.
This little vodka pick-me-up has come in the nick of time to hearten me
against the tenor of the news of to-day which is splendid indeed in one
sense; ominous in another. The Turks are being heavily reinforced. All
the enemy troops who made the big attack last night were fresh arrivals
from Adrianople. I do not grumble at the attack (on the contrary we like
it), but at the reason they had for making it, which is that two fresh
Divisions, newly arrived, asked leave to show their muscle by driving us
into the sea. Full details are only just in. The biggest bombardment
took place at Anzac. A Turkish battleship joined in from the Hellespont,
dropping about twenty 11.2-inch shells into our lines. At Helles, all
night, the Turks blazed away from their trenches. At 4 a.m. they opened
fire on our trenches and beaches with every gun they could bring to
bear from Asia or Achi Baba. Their Asiatic Batteries alone fired 1,900
rounds, of which 700 fell on Lancashire Landing. At least 5,000 shell
were loosed off on to Helles. A lot of the stuff was 6-inch and over.
The bombardment was very wild and seemed almost unaimed. Soon after 4
a.m. very heavy columns of Turks tried to emerge from the Ravine against
the left of the 29th Division. "It wanted to be the hell of a great
attack," as one of the witnesses, a moderate spoken young gentleman,
states. When the Commanders saw what was impending they sent messages to
Simpson-Baikie begging him to send some 4.5 H.E. shell into the Ravine
which was beginning to overflow. He was adamant. He had only a few
rounds of H.E. and he would not spend them, feeling sure his 18 prs.
with their shrapnel were masters of the field. At 6 a.m. out came the
Turks, not in lines, but just like a swarm of bees. Our fellows never
saw the like and began to wonder whenever they were going to stop, and
what on earth _could_ stop them! Thousands of Turks in a bunch, so the
boys say, swarmed out of their trenches and the Gully Ravine. Well, they
were stopped _dead_. There they lie, _still_. The guns ate the life out
of them.
It was our central group of artillery who did it. As that big oblong
crowd of Turks showed their left flank to Baikie's nine batteries they
were swept in enfilade by shrapnel. The fall of the shell was corrected
by the two young R.A. subalterns at the front, neither of whom would
observe in the usual way through his periscope. They looked over the
parapet because that method was more sure and quick, and the stress of
the battle was great. There is a rumour that both were shot through the
head: I pray it may be but a rumour. Out of all these Turks some thirty
only reached our parapets. The sudden destruction which befell them was
due in the main to the devotion of these two young heroes. At 7.30 a.m.
the Turks tried to storm again. Some of them got in amongst the Royal
Naval Division, who brought up their own supports and killed 300,
driving out the rest. Ninety dead Turks are laid out on their parapet.
Another, later, enemy effort against the right of the 29th Division was
clean wiped out. 150 Turks are dead there. But it is on the far
crestline they lie thick.
Every one of these attacking Turks were _fresh_--from Adrianople! Full
of fight as compared with their thrice beaten brethren. If the Turks are
given time to swap troops in the middle of fighting, we can't really
tell how we stand. Still; they are not now as fresh as they were. They
have lost a terrible lot of men since the 28th. The big Ravine and all
the small nullahs are chock-a-block with corpses. Their casualties in
these past few days are put at very high figures by both Birdie and H.W.
and it is probable that 5,000 are actually lying dead on the ground. I
have on my table a statement made by de Lisle; endorsed by Hunter-Weston
and dated 4th instant, saying that 1,200 Turkish dead can be counted
corpse by corpse from the left front. The actual numbers de Lisle
estimates as between 2,000 and 3,000. Now we have to-day's losses to
throw in. The Turks are burning their candle fast at the Anzac as well
as the Helles end. Ten days of this and they are finished.[25]
Naturally, my mind dwells happily just now upon our incoming New Army
formations. Yet every now and then I feel compelled to look back to
regret the lack of systematic flow of drafts and munitions which have
turned our fine victory of the 28th into a pyrrhic instead of a fruitful
affair. When Pyrrhus gained his battle over the Romans and exclaimed,
"One more such victory and I am done in," or words to that effect, he
had no organized system of depots behind him from which the bloody gaps
in his ranks could be filled. A couple of thousand years have now passed
and we are still as unscientific as Pyrrhus. A splendid expeditionary
force sails away; invades an Empire, storms the outworks and in doing so
knocks itself to bits. Then a second expeditionary force is sent, but
that would have been unnecessary had any sort of arrangement been
thought out for promptly replacing first wastages in men and in shell.
_6th July, 1915._ From early morning till 5 p.m. stuck as persistently
to my desk as the flies stuck persistently to me. After tea went riding
with Maitland. Then with Pollen to dine on board H.M.S. _Triad_. The two
Territorial Divisions are coming. What with them and the Rooskies we
ought to get a move on this time. Discoursed small craft with the
Admiral. The French hate the overseas fire--small blame to them--and
Bailloud agrees with his predecessor Gouraud in thinking that one man
hit in the back from Asia affects the _moral_ of his comrades as badly
as half a dozen bowled over by the enemy facing them. The Admiral's idea
of landing from Tenedos would help us here, but it is admitted on all
hands now that the Turks have pushed on with their Asiatic defences, and
it is too much to ask of either the New Army or of the Territorials that
they should start off with a terrible landing.
_7th July, 1915._ No escape from the steadily rising flood of letters
and files,--none from the swarms of filthy flies. General Bailloud and
Colonel Piépape (Chief of Staff) came across with Major Bertier in a
French torpedo boat to see me. They stayed about an hour. Bailloud's
main object was to get me to put off the attack planned by General
Gouraud for to-morrow. Gouraud has worked out everything, and I greatly
hoped in the then state of the Turks the French would have done a very
good advance on our right. The arrival of these fresh Turkish Divisions
from Adrianople does make a difference. Still, I am sorry the attack is
not to come off. Girodon is a heavy loss to Bailloud. Piépape has never
been a General Staff Officer before; by training, bent of mind and
experience he is an administrator. He is very much depressed by the loss
of the 2,000 quarts of wine by the Asiatic shell. Since Gouraud and
Girodon have left them the French seem to be less confident. When
Bailloud entered our Mess he said, in the presence of four or five young
Officers, "If the Asiatic side of the Straits is not held by us within
fifteen days our whole force is _voué à la destruction_." He meant it as
a jest, but when those who prophesy destruction are _gros bonnets_; big
wigs; it needs no miracle to make them come off--I don't mean the wigs
but the prophecies. Fortunately, Bailloud soon made a cheerier class of
joke and wound up by inviting me to dine with him in an extra chic
restaurant at Constantinople.
Have told K. plainly that the employment of an ordinary executive
soldier as Boss of so gigantic a business as Mudros is suicidal--no
less. Heaven knows K. himself had his work cut out when he ran the
communications during his advance upon Khartoum. Heaven knows I myself
had a hard enough job when I became responsible for feeding our troops
at Chitral, two hundred miles into the heart of the Himalayas from the
base at Nowshera. Breaking bulk at every stage--it was heart-breaking.
First the railway, then the bullock cart, the camel, the mules--till, at
the Larram Pass we got down to the donkey. But here we have to break
bulk from big ships to small craft; to send our stuff not to one but to
several landings, to run the show with a mixed staff of Naval and
Military Officers. No, give me deserts or precipices,--anything fixed
and solid is better than this capricious, ever-changing sea. The problem
is a real puzzler, demanding experience, energy, good temper as well as
the power of entering into the point of view of sailors as well as
soldiers, and of being (mentally) in at least three places at once:--
"_From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. (No. M.F. 424)._
"Private. I am becoming seriously apprehensive about my Lines of
Communication and am forced to let you know the state of affairs.
"Much of the time of General Headquarters has been taken up during the
last few days considering matters relating to Mudros and Lines of
Communication generally. The Inspector-General of Communications must be
a man of energy and ideas. The new Divisions will find the Mudros
littoral on arrival better prepared for their reception than it was a
month ago. The present man is probably excellent in his own line, but he
himself in writing doubts his own ability to cope with one of the most
complicated situations imaginable. Please do not think for a moment that
I am still hankering after Ellison, I only want a man of that type,
someone, for instance, like Maxwell or Sir Edward Ward. Unless I can
feel confident in the Commandant of my Lines of Communication I shall
always be looking behind me. Wallace could remain as Deputy
Inspector-General of Communications. Something, however, must be done
meanwhile, and I am sending Brigadier-General Hon. H.A. Lawrence, a man
of tried business capacity and great character, to Mudros to-day as
dry-nurse."
I have followed up this cable in my letter to Lord K. of date, where I
say, "I have just seen Bertie Lawrence who I am sending to reinforce
Wallace. He is bitterly disappointed at losing his Brigade, but there is
no help for it. He is a business man of great competence, and I think he
ought to be able to do much to get things on to a ship-shape footing.
General Douglas is very sorry too and says that Lawrence was one of the
best Brigadiers imaginable."
The last sentence has been written, I confess, with a spice of malice.
When, about a month ago, I had hurriedly to lay my hands on a Commander
for the 127th Brigade, I bethought me of Bertie Lawrence, then G.S.O. to
the Yeomanry in Egypt. The thrust of a Lancer and the circumspection of
a Banker do not usually harbour in the same skull, but I believed I knew
of one exception. So I put Lawrence in. By return King's Messenger came
a rap over the knuckles. To promote a dugout to be a Brigadier of
Infantry was risky, but to put in a Cavalry dugout as a Brigadier of
Infantry was outrageous! Still, I stuck to Lorenzo, and lo and behold!
Douglas, the Commander of the East Lancs. Division, is fighting tooth
and nail for his paragon Brigadier![26]
Since 19th March we have been asking for bombs--any kind of bombs--and
we have not even got answers. Now they offer us some speciality bombs
for which France, they say, has no use.
I have replied:--
"I shall be most grateful for as many bombs of this and any other kind
as you can spare. Anything made of iron and containing high explosive
and detonator will be welcome. I should be greatly relieved if a large
supply could be sent overland via Marseilles, as the bomb question is
growing increasingly urgent. The Turks have an unlimited supply of
bombs, and our deficiencies place our troops at a disadvantage both
physically and morally and increase our difficulties in holding captured
trenches.
"Could you arrange for a weekly consignment of 10,000 to be sent to us
regularly?"
De Lisle came over to dine and stay the night.
_8th July, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Tenedos._ Started off in H.M.S. _Triad_
with Freddie Maitland, Aspinall and our host, the Admiral.
Had a lovely sail to Tenedos where Colonel Nuillion (acting Governor)
and Commander Samson, now Commandant of the Flying Camp, came on board.
After lunch, rowed ashore. There was some surf on and I jumped short,
landing (if such an expression may pass) in the sea. Wet feet rather
refreshing than otherwise on so hot a day. Tenedos is lovely. Each of
these islands has its own type of coasts, vegetation and colouring: like
rubies and diamonds they are connected yet hardly akin. Climbed Tenedos
Hill, our ascent ending in a desperate race for the crest. My long legs
and light body enabled me to win despite the weight of age. Very hot,
though, and the weight of age has got even less now.
From the top we had an hour's close prospecting of the opposite coasts,
where the Turks have done too much digging to make landing anything but
a very bloody business. Half a mile to the South looks healthier, but
they are sure to have a lot of machine guns there now. The landing would
be worse than on the 25th April. Anyway, _I am not going to do it_.
On the ground we now have a fair showing of aeroplanes, but mostly of
the wingless sort. At this precise moment only two are really fit. K.
has stuck to his word and is not going to help us here, and I can't
grumble as certainly I was forewarned. Had he only followed Neville
Usborne's £10,000,000 suggestion, we might now be bombing the Turks'
landing places and store depots, as well as spotting every day for our
gunners. But these naval airmen, bold fellows, always on for an
adventurous attack, are hardly in their element when carrying out the
technical gunnery part of our work.
Re-embarked, and during our sail back saw a trawler firing at a
submarine, whilst other trawlers and picket boats were skurrying up from
all points of the compass. Nets were run out in a jiffy, but I fear the
big fish had already given them the slip. Cast anchor about 7 o'clock.
Colonel Dick and Mr. Graives dined.
_9th July, 1915._ Spent the morning writing for the King's Messenger. My
letter to K. (an answer to that of Fitz to me) tells him:--
(1) That we have passed through the most promising week since the first
landing. The thousand yards' advance on the left and the rows of dead
Turks left by the receding tide of their counter-attack are solid
evidences to the results of the 28th ult., and of the six very heavy
Turkish assaults which have since broken themselves to pieces against
us.
(2) That Gouraud's loss almost wipes out our gains. Bailloud does not
attack till next week when he hopes to have more men and more
ammunition, but will this help us so much if the Turks also have more
men and more ammunition?
(3) That the Asiatic guns are giving us worry, but that I hope to knock
them out with our own heavy guns (the French 9.4s and our own 9.2s) just
being mounted. When the new Monitors come they ought to help us here.
(4) That "_power of digestion, sleeping and nerve power are what are
essential above all things to anyone who would command successfully at
the Dardanelles. Compared with these qualifications most others are
secondary._"
(5) That the British and Australians are marvels of endurance, but that
I am having to pull the Indian Brigade right out and send them to
Imbros. Their Commander, fine soldier though he be, is too old for the
post of Brigadier; he ought to be commanding a Division; and the men are
morally and physically tired and have lost three-fourths of their
officers: with rest they will all of them come round.
(6) That Baldwin's Brigade of the 13th Division have been landed on the
Peninsula and are now mixed up by platoons with the 29th Division where
they are tumbling to their new conditions quite quickly. They have
already created a very good impression at Helles.
Godley and his New Zealander A.D.C. (Lieutenant Rhodes), both old
friends, came over from H.M.S. _Triad_ to lunch. Hunter-Weston crossed
from Helles to dine and stay the night.
_10th July, 1915. Imbros._ These Imbros flies actually drink my fountain
pen dry! Hunter-Weston left for Helles in the evening.
Yesterday a cable saying there were no men left in England to fill
either the 42nd Division or the 52nd. We have already heard that the
Naval Division must fade away. Poor old Territorials! The War Office are
behaving like an architect who tries to mend shaky foundations by
clapping on another storey to the top of the building. Once upon a time
President Lincoln and the Federal States let their matured units starve
and thought to balance the account by the dispatch of untried
formations. Why go on making these assurances to the B.P. that we have
as many men coming in voluntarily as we can use?
Have refused the request made by His Excellency, Weber Pasha, who signs
himself Commandant of the Ottoman Forces, to have a five hours' truce
for burying their piles of dead. The British Officers who have been out
to meet the Turkish parlementaires say that the sight of the Turkish
dead lying in thousands just over the crestline where Baikie's guns
caught them on the 5th inst. is indeed an astonishing sight. Our
Intelligence are clear that the reason the Turks make this request is
that they cannot get their men to charge over the corpses of their
comrades. Dead Turks are better than barbed wire and so, though on
grounds of humanity as well as health, I should like the poor chaps to
be decently buried, I find myself forced to say no.
Patrick Shaw Stewart came to see me. I made Peter take his photo. He was
on a rat of a pony and sported a long red beard. How his lady friends
would laugh!
END OF VOL. I.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Except in a small way at some foreign manoeuvres.
[2] The letters, cables, etc., published here have either: (_a_) been
submitted to the Dardanelles Commission; or, (_b_) have been printed by
permission.--_Ian H._
[3] I.e. after the others had come in.--_Ian H., 1920._
[4] More than four years after this was written a member of a British
Commission sent out to collect facts at the Dardanelles was speaking to
the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, Djavad Pasha. In the course of the
conversation His Excellency said, "I prefer the British to the Germans
for they resemble us so closely--the Germans do not. The Germans are
good organisers but they do not love fighting for itself as we do--and
as you do. Then again, although the Turks and British are so fond of
righting they are never ready for it:--in that respect also the
resemblance between our nations is extraordinary."--_Ian H_., 1920.
[5] Arrangements.--_Ian H., 1920._
[6] Since these early days, Birdwood has told me he does not think a
scheme of an immediate landing could have been carried out.--_Ian H.
1920._
[7] Para. 2. "Before any serious undertaking is carried out in the
Gallipoli Peninsula all the British military forces detailed for the
expedition should be assembled so that their full weight can be thrown
in."
[8] An Indian word denoting anxious thought.
[9] Enemy.
[10] Kudos.
[11] The 1st Manchesters.
[12] This was my original draft; it was slightly condensed for cyphering
home.--_Ian H., 1920._
[13] I wanted very much to get this brave fellow a decoration but we
were never able to trace him.--_Ian H., 1920._
[14] Quoted on pp. 62-63.
[15] Captured by the Gurkhas five days later--by surprise.--_Ian H.,
1920._
[16] This was by General Hunter-Weston's order: the machine guns of the
enemy had too good a field of fire.--_Ian. H., 1920._
[17] Long afterwards I heard that a responsible naval officer, being
determined that this instance of lack of method should be brought to my
personal notice, had hit upon the plan of ordering the Fleet-sweeper
crew to do what they did.--_Ian H., 1920._
[18] I learnt afterwards that great play had been made with this third
paragraph of my cable by the opponents of the Dardanelles idea; in doing
so they slurred over the words "at present," also the fifth paragraph of
the same cable, overleaf.--_Ian H., 1920._
[19] The Fifth Lancs Fusiliers were also working with this Brigade and
behaved with great bravery.--_Ian H., 1920._
[20] See page 302.
[21] Stated no more Japanese bombs could be supplied.
[22] All this was based, be it remembered, upon a complete misconception
of the state these two divisions, formerly, good, afterwards destined to
become splendid, had been allowed to fall into. No one at the
Dardanelles, least of all myself, had an inkling that since I had
inspected them late in 1914 and found them good, they had passed into a
squeezed-lemon stage of existence and had ceased to be able "to press
forward to Chanak." The fact that they were at half strength and that
the best of their officers and men had been picked out for the Western
theatre was unknown to us at the Dardanelles.--_Ian H., 1920._
[23] See Appendix I for the exact facts which were not known to me until
long afterwards.--_Ian H., 1920._
[24] The considered opinion proved right.--_Ian H., 1920._
[25] This period fell between two of my despatches. As most writers have
naturally based themselves on those despatches, the full understanding
of the blows inflicted on the Turks between June 29th and July 13th has
never yet been grasped; nor, it may be added, the effect which would
have been produced had the August offensive been undertaken three weeks
earlier.--_Ian H., 1920._
[26] Lawrence never looked back. After his good work at Mudros I put him
in to command the 53rd Division, and the War Office made no objection, I
suppose because they were beginning to hear about him. As is well known,
he went on then from one post to another till he wound up gloriously as
Chief of the General Staff on the Western Front.--_Ian H., 1920._
End of Project Gutenberg's Gallipoli Diary, Volume I, by Ian Hamilton