CLEARING FOR ACTION
_9th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian."_ Isles of the Aegean; one more lovely
than the other; weather warm; wireless off; a great ship steaming fast
towards a great adventure--why do I walk up and down the deck feeling a
ton's weight of trouble weighing down upon my shoulders? Never till
to-day has solicitude become painful. This is the fault of Birdwood,
Hunter-Weston and Paris. I read their "appreciations of the situation"
some days ago, but until to-day I have not had the unbroken hour needed
to digest them. Birdwood begins by excusing himself in advance against
any charge of vacillation. At our first meeting he said he was convinced
our best plan would be to go for the South of the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Now he has, in fact, very much shifted his ground under the influence of
a new consideration, "(which I only learned after leaving Lemnos) that
the Turks now have guns or howitzers on the Asiatic side which could
actually command our transports should they anchor off Morto Bay." "As I
told you," he says, "after thinking it out thoroughly, I was convinced
our best plan would be to go for the South of the Gallipoli Peninsula,"
but now he continues, he finds his Staff "all seem to be keen on a
landing somewhere between Saros Bay and Enos. For this I have no use, as
though I think we should doubtless be able to effect a landing there
pretty easily, yet I do not see that we shall be any 'forrarder' by
doing so. We might put ourselves in front of the Bulair Lines, but there
would be far less object in attacking them and working South-west with
the Navy only partially able to help us, than by working up from the
other end with the Navy on either flank."
Birdwood himself rather inclines towards a landing on the Asiatic side,
for preference somewhere South of Tenedos. The attractive part of his
idea is that if we did this the Turks must withdraw most of their mobile
artillery from the Peninsula to meet us, which would give the Navy just
the opportunity they require for mine-sweeping and so forcing the
Narrows forthwith. They know they can give the superstition of old Forts
being stronger than new ships its quietus if only they can clear a
passage through the minefield. There are forts and forts, ships and
ships, no doubt. But from what we have done already the sailors know
that our ships here can knock out those forts here. But first they must
tackle the light guns which protect the minefield from the sweepers.
Birdwood seems to think we might dominate the Peninsula from the country
round Chunuk. In his P.S. he suggests that anyway, if we are beaten off
in our attempt to land on the Peninsula we may have this Asiatic scheme
in our mind as a second string. Disembarkation plans already made would
"probably be suitable _anywhere_ with very slight modifications. We
might perhaps even think of this--if we try the other first and can't
pull it off?"
In my answer, I say I am still for taking the shortest, most direct
route to my objective, the Narrows.
First, because "I have no roving commission to conquer Asia Minor." My
instructions deny me the whole of that country when they lay down as a
principle that "The occupation of the Asiatic side by military forces is
to be strongly deprecated."
Secondly, because I agree that a landing between Saros Bay and Enos
would leave us no "forrarder." There we should be attacked in front from
Rodosto; in flank from Adrianople; in rear from Bulair; whilst, as we
advanced, we would lose touch with the Fleet. But if our scheme is to be
based on severance from the Fleet we must delay another month or six
weeks to collect pack transport.
Thirdly, the Asiatic side _does not_ dominate the Peninsula whereas the
Kilid Bahr plateau _does_ dominate the Asiatic narrows.
Fourthly, the whole point of our being here is to work hand-in-glove
with the Fleet. We are here to help get the Fleet through the
Dardanelles in the first instance and to help the Russians to take
Constantinople in the second. The War Office, the Admiralty, the
Vice-Admiral and the French Commander-in-Chief all agree now that the
Peninsula is the best place for our first step towards these objects.
Hunter-Weston's appreciation, written on his way out at Malta, is a
masterly piece of work. He understands clearly that our true objective
is to let our warships through the Narrows to attack Constantinople.
"The immediate object," he says, "of operations in the Dardanelles is to
enable our warships, with the necessary colliers and other unarmoured
supply ships--without which capital ships cannot maintain themselves--to
pass through the Straits in order to attack Constantinople."
And again:--
"It is evident that land operations at this stage must be directed
entirely towards assisting the Fleet; and no operations should be
commenced unless it is clear that their result will be to enable our
warships, with their necessary colliers, etc., to have the use of the
Straits."
The Fleet, he holds, cannot do this without our help because of:--
(1). Improvement of the defences.
(2). The mobile howitzers.
(3). The Leon floating mines.
Things being so, he sets himself to consider how far the Army can help,
in the light of the following premises:--
"The Turkish Army having been warned by our early bombardments and by
the landings carried out some time ago, has concentrated a large force
in and near the Gallipoli Peninsula."
"It has converted the Peninsula into an entrenched camp, has, under
German direction, made several lines of entrenchments covering the
landing places, with concealed machine gun emplacements and land mines
on the beach; and has put in concealed positions guns and howitzers
capable of covering the landing places and approaches with their fire."
"The Turkish Army in the Peninsula is being supplied and reinforced from
the Asiatic side and from the Sea of Marmora and is not dependent on the
Isthmus of Bulair. The passage of the Isthmus of Bulair by troops and
supplies at night cannot be denied by the guns of our Fleet."
After estimates of our forces and of the difficulties they may expect to
encounter, Hunter-Weston comes to the conclusion that, "the only landing
places worth serious consideration are:
"(1). Those near Cape Suvla,
(2). Those near Cape Helles."
Of these two he advises Helles, because:--"the Fleet can also surround
this end of the Peninsula and bring a concentrated fire on any Turks
holding it. We, therefore, should be able to make sure of securing the
Achi Baba position." Also, because our force is too weak to hold the big
country round Suvla Bay and at the same time operate against Kilid Bahr.
If this landing at Helles is successful, he considers the probable
further course of the operations. Broadly, he thinks that we are so
short of ammunition and particularly of high explosive shell that there
is every prospect of our getting tied up on an extended line across the
Peninsula in front of the Kilid Bahr trenches. Should the enemy
submarines arrive we should be "up a tree."
The cards in the game of life are the characters of men. Staking on
those cards I take my own opinions--always. But when we play the game of
death, things are our counters--guns, rivers, shells, bread, roads,
forests, ships--and in totting up the values of these my friend
Hunter-Weston has very few equals in the Army.
Therefore, his conclusion depresses me very much, but not so much as it
would have done had I not seen him. For certainly during his conference
on the 30th March with d'Amade and myself he never said or implied in
any way that under conditions as he found them and as they were then set
before him, there was no reasonable prospect of success:--quite the
contrary. Here are the conclusions as written at Malta:--
"Conclusion. The information available goes to show that if this
Expedition had been carefully and secretly prepared in England, France
and Egypt, and the Naval and Military details of organisation, equipment
and disembarkation carefully worked out by the General Staff and the
Naval War Staff, and if no bombardment or other warning had been given
till the troops, landing gear, etc., were all ready and despatched, (the
troops from England ostensibly for service in Egypt and those in Egypt
ostensibly for service in France) the capture of the Gallipoli
Peninsula and the forcing of the Dardanelles would have been successful.
"Von der Goltz is reported to have visited the Dardanelles on 11th
February and before that date it appears that very little had been done.
"Now big guns have been brought from Chatalja, Adrianople and
elsewhere,--roads have been made,--heavy movable armaments
provided,--troops and machine guns have been poured into the
Peninsula,--several lines of trenches have been dug,--every landing
place has been trenched and mined, and all that clever German Officers
under Von der Goltz can design, and hard working diggers like the Turks
can carry out, has been done to make the Peninsula impregnable.
"The prizes of success in this Expedition are very great.
"It was indeed the most hopeful method of finishing the war.
"No loss would be too heavy and no risks too great if thereby success
would be attained.
"But if the views expressed in this paper be sound, there is not in
present circumstances a reasonable chance of success. (The views are
founded on the information available to the writer at the time of
leaving Malta, and may be modified by further information at first hand
on arrival at Force Head Quarters.)
"The return of the Expedition when it has gone so far will cause
discontent, much talk, and some laughter; will confirm Roumania and
Greece in the wisdom of their neutrality, and will impair the power of
our valuable friend M. Venezelos. It will be a heavy blow to all of us
soldiers, and will need great strength and moral courage on the part of
the Commander and Government.
"But it will not do irreparable harm to our cause, whereas to attempt a
landing and fail to secure a passage through the Dardanelles would be a
disaster to the Empire.
"The threat of invasion by the Allies is evidently having considerable
effect on the Balkan States.
"It is therefore advisable to continue our preparations;--to train our
troops for landing, and to get our expedition properly equipped and
organised for this difficult operation of war; so as to be ready to take
advantage of any opportunity for successful action that may occur.
"But I would repeat; no action should be taken unless it has been
carefully thought out in all its possibilities and details and unless
there is a reasonable _probability_ of success.
"A. HUNTER-WESTON, M.G."
Paris's appreciation gives no very clear lead. "The enemy is of strength
unknown," he says, "but within striking distance there must be 250,000."
He also lays stress on the point that the enemy are expecting
us--"Surprise is now impossible--.... The difficulties are now increased
a hundredfold.... To land would be difficult enough if surprise was
possible but hazardous in the extreme under present conditions." He
discusses Gaba Tepe as a landing place; also Smyrna, and Bulair. On the
whole, he favours Sedd-el-Bahr as it "is the only place where transports
could come in close and where the actual landing may be unopposed. It is
open to question whether a landing could be effected elsewhere. With the
aid of the Fleet it may be possible to land near Cape Helles almost
unopposed and an advance of ten miles would enormously facilitate the
landing of the remainder South of Gaba Tepe."
The truth is, every one of these fellows agrees in his heart with old
Von der Goltz, the Berlin experts, and the Sultan of Egypt that the
landing is impossible. Well, we shall see, D.V., we shall see!! One
thing is certain: we must work up our preparations to the _n_th degree
of perfection: the impossible can only be overborne by the
unprecedented; i.e., by an original method or idea.
_10th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Cast anchor at 7 a.m. After
breakfast went on board the _Queen Elizabeth_ where Braithwaite and I
worked for three hours with Admiral de Robeck, Admiral Wemyss and
Commodore Roger Keyes.
Last time the Admiral made the running; to-day it was my turn for I had
to unfold my scheme and go through it point by point with the sailors.
But first I felt it my duty to read out the appreciations of
Hunter-Weston, Birdwood and Paris. Then I gave them my own view that
history had never offered any nation so clean cut a chance of bringing
off an immeasurably big coup as she had done by putting our Fleet and
Army precisely where it was at present on the map of the war world. Half
that unique chance had already been muddled away by the lack of secrecy
and swiftness in our methods. With check mate within our grasp we had
given two moves to the enemy. Still, perhaps; nay, probably, there was
time. Were we to prolong hesitation, or, were we, now that we had done
the best we could with the means under our hands, to go boldly forward?
Here was the great issue: there was no use discussing detail until the
principle was settled. By God's mercy the Vice-Admiral, Wemyss and Keyes
were all quite clear and quite determined. They rejected Bulair; they
rejected Asia; most of all they spurned the thought of further delay or
of hanging about hoping for something to turn up.
So I then told them my plan. The more, I said, I had pondered over the
map and reflected upon the character, probable numbers and supposed
positions of the enemy, the more convinced I had become that the first
and foremost step towards a victorious landing was to upset the
equilibrium of Liman von Sanders, the enemy Commander who has succeeded
Djavad in the Command of the Fifth Army. I must try to move so that he
should be unable to concentrate either his mind or his men against us.
Here I was handicapped by having no knowledge of my opponent whereas the
German General Staff is certain to have transferred the "life-like
picture" Schröder told me they had of me to Constantinople. Still, sea
power and the mobility it confers is a great help, and we ought to be
able to rattle the enemy however imperturbable may be his nature and
whatever he knows about us if we throw every man we can carry in our
small craft in one simultaneous rush against selected points, whilst
using all the balance in feints against other likely places. Prudence
here is entirely out of place. There will be and can be no
reconnaissance, no half measures, no tentatives. Several cautious
proposals have been set before me but this is neither the time nor the
place for paddling about the shore putting one foot on to the beaches
with the idea of drawing it back again if it happens to alight upon a
land mine. No; we've got to take a good run at the Peninsula and jump
plump on--both feet together. At a given moment we must plunge and stake
everything on the one hazard.
I would like to land my whole force in one,--like a hammer stroke--with
the fullest violence of its mass effect--as close as I can to my
objective, the Kilid Bahr plateau. But, apart from lack of small craft,
the thing cannot be done; the beach space is so cramped that the men and
their stores could not be put ashore. I have to separate my forces and
the effect of momentum, which cannot be produced by cohesion, must be
reproduced by the simultaneous nature of the movement. From the South,
Achi Baba mountain is our first point of attack, and the direct move
against it will start from the beaches at Cape Helles and Sedd-el-Bahr.
As it is believed that the Turks are there in some force to oppose us,
envelopment will be attempted by landing detachments in Morto Bay and
opposite Krithia village. At the same time, also, the A. and N.Z. Corps
will land between Gaba Tepe and Fisherman's Hut to try and seize the
high backbone of the Peninsula and cut the line of retreat of the enemy
on the Kilid Bahr plateau. In any case, the move is bound to interfere
with the movements of Turkish reinforcements towards the toe of the
Peninsula. While these real attacks are taking place upon the foot and
at the waist of the Peninsula, the knife will be flourished at its neck.
Transports containing troops which cannot be landed during the first two
days must sail up to Bulair; make as much splash as they can with their
small boats and try to provide matter for alarm wires to Constantinople
and the enemy's Chief.
So much for Europe. Asia is forbidden but I hold myself free, as a
measure of battle tactics, to take half a step Troywards. The French are
to land a Brigade at Kum Kale (perhaps a Regiment may do) so as, first,
to draw the fire of any enemy big guns which can range Morto Bay;
secondly, to prevent Turkish troops being shipped across the Narrows.
With luck, then, within the space of an hour, the enemy Chief will be
beset by a series of S.O.S. signals. Over an area of 100 miles, from
five or six places; from Krithia and Morto Bay; from Gaba Tepe; from
Bulair and from Kum Kale in Asia, as well as, if the French can manage
it, from Besika Bay, the cables will pour in. I reckon Liman von
Sanders will not dare concentrate and that he will fight with his local
troops only for the first forty-eight hours. But what is the number of
these local troops? Alas, there is the doubtful point. We think forty
thousand rifles and a hundred guns, but, if my scheme comes off, not a
tenth of them should be South of Achi Baba for the first two days. Hints
have been thrown out that we are asking the French cat to pull the
hottest chestnut out of the fire. Not at all. At Kum Kale, with their
own ships at their back, and the deep Mendere River to their front,
d'Amade's men should easily be able to hold their own for a day or
two,--all that we ask of them.
The backbone of my enterprise is the 29th Division. At dawn I intend to
land the covering force of that Division at Sedd-el-Bahr, Cape Helles
and, D.V., in Morto Bay. I tack my D.V. on to Morto Bay because the
transports will there be under fire from Asia unless the French succeed
in silencing the guns about Troy or in diverting their aim. Whether then
our transports can stick it or not is uncertain, like everything else in
war, only more so. They must if they can and if they can they must; that
is all that can be said at present.
As to the effort to be made to envelop the enemy's right flank along the
coast between Helles and Krithia, I have not yet quite fixed on the
exact spot, but I am personally bent upon having it done as even a small
force so landed should threaten the line of retreat and tend to shake
the confidence of any Turks resisting us at the Southernmost point.
Some think these cliffs along that North-west coast unclimbable, but I
am sure our fellows will manage to scramble up, and I think their losses
should be less in doing so than in making the more easy seeming lodgment
at Sedd-el-Bahr or Helles. The more broken and precipitous the glacis,
the more the ground leading up to the objective is dead. The guns of the
Fleet can clear the crest of the cliffs and the strip of sand at their
foot should then be as healthy as Brighton. If the Turks down at Helles
are nervous, even a handful landing behind their first line (stretching
from the old Castle Northwards to the coast) should make them begin to
look over their shoulders.
As to the A. and N.Z. landing, that will be of the nature of a strong
feint, which may, and we hope will, develop into the real thing. My
General Staff have marked out on the maps a good circular holding
position, starting from Fisherman's Hut in the North round along the
Upper Spurs of the high ridges and following them down to where they
reach the sea, a little way above Gaba Tepe. If only Birdwood can seize
this line and fix himself there for a bit, he should in due course be
able to push on forward to Kojah Dere whence he will be able to choke
the Turks on the Southern part of the Peninsula with a closer grip and a
more deadly than we could ever hope to exercise from far away Bulair.
We are bound to suffer serious loss from concealed guns, both on the sea
and also during the first part of our landing before we can win ground
for our guns. That is part of the hardness of the nut. The landings at
Gaba Tepe and to the South will between them take up all our small craft
and launches. So I am unable to throw the Naval Division into action at
the first go off. They will man the transports that sail to make a show
at Bulair.
This is the substance of my opening remarks at the meeting: discussion
followed, and, at the end, the Navy signified full approval. Neither de
Robeck, Wemyss nor Roger Keyes are men to buy pigs in pokes; they wanted
to know all about it and to be quite sure they could play their part in
the programme. Their agreement is all the more precious. They (the
Admirals and the Commodore) are also, I fancy, happier in their minds
now that they know for sure what we soldiers are after. Rumours had been
busy in the Fleet that we were shaping our course for Bulair. Had that
been the basis of my plan, we should have come to loggerheads, I think.
As it is, the sailors seem eager to meet us in every possible way. So
now we've got to get our orders out.
On maps and charts the scheme may look neat and simple. On land and
water, the trouble will begin and only by the closest thought and
prevision will we find ourselves in a position to cope with it. To throw
so many men ashore in so short a time in the teeth of so rapid a current
on to a few cramped beaches; to take the chances of finding drinking
water and of a smooth sea; these elemental hazards alone would suffice
to give a man grey hairs were we practising a manoeuvre exercise on
the peaceful Essex coast. So much thought; so much _band-o-bast_; so
much dove-tailing and welding together of naval and military methods,
signals, technical words, etc., and the worst punishment should any link
in the composite chain give way. And then--taking success for
granted--on the top of all this--comes the Turk; "unspeakable" he used
to be, "unknowable" now. But we shall give him a startler too. If only
our plans come off the Turk won't have time to turn; much less to bring
into play all the clever moves foreseen for him by some whose stomachs
for the fight have been satisfied by their appreciation of its dangers.
Units of the 29th Division have been coming along in their transports
all day. The bay is alive with ships.
_11th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian."_ One of those exquisite days when
the sunlight penetrates to the heart. Admiral Guépratte, commanding the
French Fleet, called at 9.45 and in due course I returned his visit,
when I was electrified to find at his cabin door no common sentry but a
Beefeater armed with a large battleaxe, dating from about the period of
Charlemagne. The Admiral lives quite in the old style and is a
delightful personage; very gay and very eager for a chance to measure
himself against the enemy. Guépratte, though he knows nothing
officially, believes that his Government are holding up their sleeve a
second French Division ear-marked Gallipoli! But why bottle up trumps;
trumps worth a King's ransome, or a Kaiser's? He gives twice who gives
quickly (in peace); he gives tenfold who gives quickly (in war). The
devil of it is the French dare not cable home to ask questions, and as
for myself, I have not been much encouraged--so far!
During the afternoon Admirals de Robeck and Wemyss came on board to work
together with the General Staff on technical details. They too have
heard these rumours about the second French Division, and Wemyss is in
dismay at the thought of having to squeeze more ships into Mudros
harbour. His anxiety has given me exactly the excuse I wanted, so I have
dropped this fly just in front of K.'s nose, telling him that "There are
persistent rumours here amongst the French that General d'Amade's
Command is to be joined by another French Division. Just in case there
is truth in the report you should know that Mudros harbour is as full as
it will hold until our dash for the Peninsula has been made." We will
see what he says. If the Division exists, then the Naval people will
recommend Bizerta for their base; the ships can sail right up to the
Peninsula from there and land right away until things on Lemnos and
Tenedos have shaken themselves down.
Our first Taube: it passed over the harbour at a great height. One of
our lumbering seaplanes went up after it like an owl in sunlight, but
could rise no higher than the masts of the Fleet.
_12th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ The _Queen Elizabeth_ has
been having some trouble with her engines and in the battle of the 18th
was only able to use one of her propellers. Now she has been overhauled
and the Admiral has asked me to come on board for her steam trials.
These are to take place along the coastline of the Peninsula and I have
got leave to bring with me a party selected from Divisions and Brigades.
So when I went aboard this morning at 8.30 there were about thirty-five
Officers present. Starting at once, we steamed at great pace half way up
the Gulf of Saros and about 1 o'clock turned to go back, slowing down
and closing in to let me take a second good look at the coast. Our
studies were enlivened by an amusing incident. Nearing Cape Helles, the
_Queen Elizabeth_ went astern, so as to test her reverse turbines. The
enemy, who must have been watching us like a mouse does a cat, had the
ill-luck to select just this moment to salute us with a couple of
shells. As they had been allowing for our speed they were ludicrously
out of it, the shot striking the water half a mile ahead. We then lay
off Cape Helles whilst a very careful survey of the whole of that
section was being made. The Turks, disgusted by their own bad aim, did
not fire again. On our way back we passed three fakes, old liners
painted up, funnelled and armed with dummy guns to take off the _Tiger_,
the _Inflexible_ and the _Indomitable_. Riding at anchor there, they had
quite the man-o'-war air and if they draw the teeth of enemy submarines
(their torpedoes), as they are meant to do, the artists should be given
decorations. At 6 p.m. dropped anchor and I transhipped myself to the
_Arcadian_. Birdwood and Hunter-Weston had turned up during the day; the
latter dined and is now more sanguine than myself. He has been getting
to know his new command better and he says that he did not appreciate
the 29th Division when he wrote his appreciation!
_13th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian."_ Heavy squalls of rain and wind last
night. _Band-o-bast_ badly upset; boats also bottoms upwards and at
dawn--here in harbour--we found ourselves clean cut off from the shore.
What a ticklish affair the great landing is going to be! How much at the
mercy of the winds and waves! Aeolus and Neptune have hardly lost power
since Greeks and Trojans made history out yonder!
Have sent K. an electrical pick-me-up saying that the height of the
_Queen Elizabeth_ fire control station had enabled me to see the lie of
the land better than on my previous reconnaissance, and that, given good
luck, we hope to get ashore without too great a loss.
In the afternoon the wind moderated and I spent an hour or two watching
practice landings by Senegalese. Our delay is loss, but yet not clear
loss; that's a sure thing. These niggy-wigs were as awkward as
golly-wogs in the boats. Every extra hour's practice will save some
lives by teaching them how to make short work of the ugliest bit of
their job.
_14th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian," Lemnos._ A day so exquisitely lovely
that it should be chronicled in deathless verse. But we gaze at the
glassy sea and turn to the deep blue cloudless sky, victory our only
thought.
Colonel Dick, King's Messenger, has arrived bringing letters up to 3rd
instant. Or rather, he was supposed to have brought them, and it was
hoped the abundance of his intelligence would have borne some relation
to the cost of his journey,--about £80 it has been reckoned. As a matter
of fact, apart from some rubbish, he brings _one_ letter for me; none
for any of the others. Not even a file of newspapers; not even a
newspaper! In India many, many years ago, we used to call Dick _Burra
dik haì_, Hindustani for, _it is a great worry_. So he is only playing
up to his sobriquet. The little ewe lamb is an epistle from Fitz giving
me a lively sketch of the rumpus at the War Office when its pontiffs
grasped for the first time the true bearing of their own orders. There
was a rush to saddle poor us with the delay as soon as the Cabinet began
to show impatience. They seem to have expected the 29th Division to
arrive at top speed in a united squadron to rush straightway ashore.
They don't yet quite realise, I daresay, that not one of their lovely
ships has yet put in an appearance. That the men who packed the
transports and fixed their time tables should say we are too slow is
hardly playing the game.
Never lose your hair: that is a good soldier's motto. My cable of last
night, wherein I tried to calm their minds by telling them the sea was
rough and that, even if every one had been here with gaiter buttons
complete, I must have waited for a change in the weather, has answered
Fitz's letter by anticipation.
Worked all day in my office like a nigger and by mid-day had got almost
as black as my simile! We are coaling and life has grown dark and noisy.
In the middle of it, Ashmead-Bartlett came aboard to see me. He has his
quarters on the _Queen Elizabeth_ as one of the Admiralty authorised
Press Correspondents, or rather, as the only authorised correspondent.
In Manchuria he was known and his writing was well liked. When he had
gone, de Robeck and I put through a good lot of business very smoothly.
A little later on, Captain Ivanoff, commanding H.I.M.S. _Askold_, (a
Russian cruiser well-known to fame in Manchurian days), did me the
honour to call.
After lunch went ashore and saw parties of Australians at embarking and
disembarking drill. Colonel Paterson, the very man who bear-led me on
tour during my Australian inspection, was keeping an eye on the "Boys."
The work of the Australians and Senegalese gave us a good object lesson
of the relative brain capacities of the two races. Next I went and
inspected the Armoured Car Section of the Royal Naval Division under
Lieutenant-Commander Wedgwood. He is a mighty queer chap. Took active
part in the South African War. Afterwards became a pacifist M.P.; here
he is again with war paint and tomahawk. Give me a Pacifist in peace and
a Jingo in war. Too often it is the other way about.
All this took me on to 5.30 p.m. and when I came back on board,
Hunter-Weston was here. He has been out since last night on H.M.S.
_Dartmouth_ to inspect the various landing places. His whole tone about
the Expedition has been transformed. Now he has become the most sanguine
of us all. He has great hopes that we shall have Achi Baba in our hands
by sunset on the day of landing. If so he thinks we need have no fear
for the future.
All is worked out now and I do not quite see how we could improve upon
our scheme with the means at our disposal. If these "means" included a
larger number of boats and steam launches, then certainly, by
strengthening our forces on either flank, viz., at Morto Bay (where we
are sending only one Battalion) and at a landing under the cliffs a mile
West of Krithia (where we are sending one Battalion), we should greatly
better our chances. Also, a battery of field guns attached to the Morto
Bay column, and a couple of mountain guns added to the Krithia column
would add to our prospects of making a real big scoop. But we cannot
spare the sea transport except by too much weakening and delaying the
landing at the point of the Peninsula; nor dare I leave myself without
any reserve under my own hand. I am inclined, all the same, to squeeze
one Marine Battalion out of the Naval Division to strengthen our threat
to Krithia. Hunter-Weston will be in executive command of everything
South of Achi Baba; Birdwood of everything to the North.
I went very closely with Hunter-Weston into the question of a day or
night attack. My own leanings are in favour of the first boat-loads
getting ashore before break of dawn, but Hunter-Weston is clear and
strong for daylight. There is a very strong current running round the
point; the exact lie of the beaches is unknown and he thinks the
confusion inseparable from any landing will be so aggravated by
attempting it in the dark that he had rather face the losses the men in
boats must suffer from aimed fire. Executively he is responsible and he
is backed by his naval associates.
Birdwood, on the other hand, is of one mind with me and is going to get
his first boat-loads ashore before it is light enough to aim. He has no
current to trouble him, it is true, but he is not landing on any
surveyed beach and the opposition he will meet with is even more unknown
than in the case of Helles and Sedd-el-Bahr.
When a sportsman goes shark fishing, he should beware lest he be
mistaken for the bait. Gaily I cast my fly over K. and now he has
snapped off my head. That story about a second French Division was
false. K. merely quotes the number of my question and adds, "The rumour
is baseless." Well, "_tant pis_," as Guépratte would say with a shrug of
his shoulders. Our first step won't have the weight behind it we had
permitted ourselves for some hours to hope. _Everywhere_ the first is
the step that counts but _nowhere_ more so than in an Oriental War.
Now that the French Division has been snuffed out, how about the Grand
Duke Nicholas, General Istomine and their Russian Divisions? Are they
also to prove phantoms? Certainly, in some form or another, they ought
to be brought into our scheme and, even if only at a distance, bring
some pressure to bear upon the Turks at the time of our opening move. I
think my best way of getting into touch will be by wireless from de
Robeck to the Russian Admiral in the Black Sea.
Dick dines, also Birdwood.
_15th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Boarded H.M.S. _Dublin_
(Captain Kelly) at 9.30 this morning, where Admiral de Robeck met me.
Sailed at once and dropped anchor off Tenedos at noon.
Landed and made a close inspection of the Aerodrome where we were taken
round by two young friends of mine, Commander Samson and Captain Davies,
Naval Air Service. By a queer fluke these are the very two men with whom
I did my very first flight! On that never to be forgotten day Samson
took up Winston and Davies took me. Like mallards we shot over the
Medway and saw the battleships as if they were little children's
playthings far away down below us. Now the children are going to use
their pretty toys and will make a nice noise with them in the world.
After lunch spent the best part of two hours in a small cottage with
Samson and Keyes trying to digest the honey brought back by our busy
aeroplane bees from their various flights over Gallipoli. The Admiral
went off on some other naval quest.
Samson and Davies are fliers of the first water--and not only in the
air. They carry the whole technique of their job at their finger tips.
The result of K.'s washing his hands of the Air is that the Admiralty
run that element entirely. Samson is Boss. He has brought with him two
Maurice Farmans and three B.E.2s. The Maurice Farmans with 100 H.P.
Renaults; the B.E.2s with 70 Renaults. These five machines are good
although one of the B.E.2s is dead old.
Also, he brought eight Henri Farmans with 80 Gnome engines. He took them
because they were new and there was nothing else new; but they are no
use for war.
Two B.E.2C.s with 70 Renaults: these are absolutely useless as they
won't take a passenger.
One Broguet 200 H.P. Canton engine; won't fly.
Two Sopwith Scouts: 80 Gnome engines; very old and can't be used owing
to weakness of engine mounting.
One very old but still useful Maurice Farman with 140 Canton engine.
That is the demnition total and it pans out at five serviceable
aeroplanes for the Army. There are also some seaplanes with us but they
are not under Samson, and are purely for naval purposes. Amongst those
are two good "Shorts," but the others are no use, they say, being wrong
type and underpowered.
The total nominal strength of Samson's Corps is eleven pilots and one
hundred and twenty men. As everyone knows, no Corps or Service is ever
up to its nominal strength; least of all an Air Corps. The dangerous
shortage is that in two-seater aeroplanes as we want our Air Service now
for spotting and reconnaissances. If, _after_ that requirement had been
met, we had only a bombing force at our disposal, the Gallipoli
Peninsula, being a very limited space with only one road and two or
three harbours on it, could probably be made untenable.
Commander Samson's estimate of a minimum force for this "stunt," as he
calls our great enterprise, is 30 good two-seater machines; 24 fighters;
40 pilots and 400 men. So equipped he reckons he could take the
Peninsula by himself and save us all a vast lot of trouble.
But, strange as it may seem, flying is not my "stunt." I dare not even
mention the word "aeroplane" to K., and I have cut myself off from
correspondence with Winston. I did this thing deliberately as
Braithwaite reminds me every time I am tempted to sit down and unbosom
myself to one who would sympathise and lend us a hand if he could: in
truth, I am torn in two about this; but I still feel it is wiser and
better so; not only from the K. point of view but also from de Robeck's.
He (de Robeck) might be quite glad I should write once to Winston on one
subject but he would never be sure afterwards I was not writing on
others. On the way back I spoke to the Admiral, but I don't know whether
he will write himself or not. Ventured also a little bit out of my own
element in another direction, and begged him not to put off sending the
submarine through the Straits until the day of our landing, but to let
her go directly she was ready. He does not agree. He has an idea (I hope
a premonition) that the submarine will catch Enver hurrying down to the
scene of action if we wait till the day of the attack.
Even more than in the Fleet I find in the Air Service the profound
conviction that, if they could only get into direct touch with Winston
Churchill, all would be well. Their faith in the First Lord is, in every
sense, _touching_. But they can't get the contact and they are
thoroughly imbued with the idea that the Sea Lords are at the best
half-hearted; at the worst, actively antagonistic to us and to the whole
of our enterprise. The photographs, etc., I have studied make it only
too clear that the Turks have not let the grass grow under their feet
since the first bombardment; the Peninsula, in fact, is better defended
than it was. _Per contra_ the momentum, precision, swiftness and staying
power of our actual attack will be at least twice as great now as it
would have been at the end of March.
Returned to Lemnos about 7.30 p.m.
While we were away my Staff got aboard the destroyer _Colne_ and steamed
in her to the mouth of the Dardanelles. There the whole precious load of
red tabs transshipped to H.M.S. _Triumph_ (Captain Fitzmaurice), who
forthwith took up her station opposite Morto Bay and began firing salvos
with her 6-inch guns at the trenches on the face of the hill. At first
the Staff watched the show with much enjoyment from the bridge, but
when howitzers from the Asiatic side began to lob shell over the ship,
the Captain hustled them all into the conning tower. The Turks seem to
have shot pretty straight. The first three fell fifty yards short of the
ship; the fourth shell about twenty yards over her. The next three got
home. One cut plumb through the bridge (where all my brains had been
playing about two minutes previously) and burst on the deck just outside
the conning tower. Some cordite cartridges were lying outside of it and
these went off with a great flare. Another struck the funnel and the
third came in on the waterline. Fifteen more shells were then fired with
just a little bit too much elevation and passed over. Only two men were
wounded,--fractured legs. Captain Fitzmaurice now decided that honour
and dignity were satisfied and so fell back slowly towards Cape Helles
to try the effect of his guns on the barbed wire entanglements. A good
deal of ammunition was expended but only one hit on the entanglement was
registered, and that did not seem to do any harm. The fire was described
to me as inaccurate. The fact is, as was agreed between the two services
at Malta, the whole principle of naval gunnery is different from the
principles of garrison or field artillery shooting. Before they will be
much good at landmarks, the sailors will have to take lessons in the
art.
Passed a very interesting evening, every one excited, I with my
aeroplane reports; the Staff with the powder they had smelt.
Two of the Australian Commanding Officers dined and I showed them the
aerial photographs of the enemy trenches, etc. The face of one of them
grew very long; so long, in fact, that I feared he was afraid; for I own
these photos are frightening. So I said, "You don't seem to like the
look of that barbed wire, Colonel?" To which he replied, "I was worrying
how and where I would feed and water the prisoners."
_16th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Spent the forenoon in
interviews beginning at 10 a.m. with de Robeck and Mr. Fitzmaurice, late
dragoman at the Embassy at Constantinople. Mr. Fitzmaurice says the
Turks will put up a great fight at the Dardanelles. They had believed in
the British Navy, and, a month ago, they were shaking in their shoes.
But they had not believed in the British Army or that a body so
infinitely small would be so saucy as to attack them on their own chosen
ground. Even now, he says, they can hardly credit their spies, or their
eyes, and it ought to be easy enough to make them think all this is a
blind, and that we are really going to Smyrna or Adramiti. They are fond
of saying, "If the English are fools enough to enter our mouth we only
have to close it." Enver especially brags he will make very short work
with us if we set foot so near to the heart of his Empire, and gives it
out that the whole of us will be marching through the streets of
Constantinople, not as conquerors, but as prisoners, within a week from
the date of our making the attempt. All the same, despite this bragging,
the Turks realise that if we were to get the Fleet through the Narrows;
or, if it were to force its own way through whilst we absorb the
attention of their mobile guns, the game would be up. So they are
straining every nerve to be ready for anything. The moral of all these
rather contradictory remarks is just what I have said time and again
since South Africa. The fact that war has become a highly scientific
business should not blind us to the other fact that its roots still draw
their nutriment from primitive feelings and methods; the feelings and
methods of boy scouts and Red Indians. It is a huge handicap to us here
that our great men keep all their tricks for their political friends and
have none to spare for their natural enemies. There has been very little
attempt to disguise our aims in England, and Maxwell and McMahon in
Egypt have allowed their Press to report every arrival of French and
British troops, and to announce openly that we are about to attack at
Gallipoli. I have protested and reported the matter to K. but nothing in
the strategic sphere can be done now although, in the tactical sphere,
we have several deceptions ready for them.
Colonel Napier, Military Attaché at Sofia, and Braithwaite came in after
these pseudo-secrets had been discussed and joined in the conversation.
I doubt whether either Fitzmaurice or Napier have solid information as
to what is in front of us, and their yarns about Balkan politics are
neither here nor there. John Bull is quite out of his depth in the
defiles of the Balkans. With just so much pull over the bulk of my
compatriots as has been given me by my having spent a little time with
their Armies, I may say that the Balkan nations loathe and mistrust one
another to so great a degree that it is sheer waste of time to think of
roping them all in on our side, as Fitzmaurice and Napier seem to
propose. We may get Greece to join us, and Russia may get Roumania to
join her--_if we win here_--but then we make an enemy of Bulgaria, and
_vice versa_. If they will unearth my 1909 report at the War Office they
will see that, at that time, one Bulgarian Battalion of Infantry was
worth two Battalions of Roumanian Infantry--which may be a help to them
in making their choice. The Balkan problem is so intricate that it must
be simply handled. The simple thing is to pay your money and pick the
best card, knowing you can't have a full hand. So let us have no more
beating about the bush and may we be inspired to make use of the big
boom this Expedition has given to Great Britain in the Balkans to pick
out a partner straightway.
Birdie came later and we took stock together of ways and means. We see
eye to eye now on every point. Just before lunch we heard the transport
_Manitou_ had been attacked by a Turkish torpedo boat from Smyrna. The
first wireless came in saying the enemy had made a bad shot and only a
few men had been drowned lowering the boats. Admiral Rosy Wemyss and
Hope, the Flag-Captain, of the Q.E. were my guests and naturally they
were greatly perturbed. Late in the evening we heard that the Turkish
T.B. had been chased by our destroyers and had run ashore on a Greek
Island where she was destroyed (international laws notwithstanding) by
our landing parties.
At 7.30 p.m. Hunter-Weston came along and I had the best part of an hour
with him.
_17th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Hunter-Weston came over
early to finish off business left undone last night. Admiral Wemyss also
took part in our discussions over the landing. Picture puzzles are
child's play compared with this game of working an unheard of number of
craft to and fro, in and out, of little bits of beaches. At mid-day the
_Manitou_ steamed into harbour and Colonel Peel, Commander of the
troops, came on board and reported fully to me about the attack by the
Turkish torpedo boat. The Turks seem to have behaved quite decently
giving our men time to get into their boats and steaming some distance
off whilst they did so. During the interval the Turks must have got wind
of British warships, for they rushed back in a great hurry and fired
torpedoes at so short a range that they passed under the ship. Very
exciting, we were told, watching them dart beneath the keel through the
crystal clear water. I can well believe it.
Went ashore in the afternoon to watch the Australian Artillery embark.
Spoke to a lot of the men, some of whom had met me during my tour
through Australia last year.
General Paris came to see me this evening.
_18th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Working all morning in
office. In the afternoon inspected embarkation of some howitzers.
D'Amade turned up later from the _Southland_. We went over the landing
at Kum Kale. He is in full sympathy and understands. Winter, Woodward
and their administrative Staffs also arrived in the _Southland_ and have
taken up their quarters on this ship. They report everything fixed up at
Alexandria before they sailed. We are all together now and their coming
will be a great relief to the General Staff.
Quite hot to-day. Sea dead smooth. The usual ebb and flow of visitors.
Saw the three Corps Commanders and many Staff Officers. We are rather on
wires now that the time is drawing near; Woodward, though he has only
been here one night, is on barbed wires. His cabin is next the
signallers and he could not get to sleep. He wants some medical
detachments sent up post haste from Alexandria. I have agreed to cable
for them and now he is more calm. A big pow-wow on the "Q.E." (d'Amade,
Birdie, Hunter-Weston, Godley, Bridges, Guépratte, Thursby, Wemyss,
Phillimore, Vyvian, Dent, Loring), whereat the 23rd was fixed for our
attack and the naval landing orders were read and fully threshed out. I
did not attend as the meeting was rather for the purpose of going point
by point into orders already approved in principle than of starting any
fresh hares. Staff Officers who have only had to do with land operations
would be surprised, I am sure, at the amount of original thinking and
improvisation demanded by a landing operation. The Naval and Military
Beach Personnel is in itself a very big and intricate business which
has no place in ordinary soldier tactics. The diagrams of the ships and
transports; the lists of tows; the action of the Destroyers; tugs;
lighters; signal arrangements for combined operations: these are
unfamiliar subjects and need very careful fitting in. Braithwaite came
back and reported all serene; everyone keen and cooperating very
loyally. D'Amade has now received the formal letter I wrote him
yesterday after my interview and sees his way clear about Kum Kale.
Went ashore in the afternoon and saw big landing by Australians, who
took mules and donkeys with them and got them in and out of lighters.
These Australians are shaping into Marines in double quick time and
Cairo high jinks are wild oats sown and buried. Where everyone wants to
do well and to do it in the same way, discipline goes down as slick as
Mother's milk. Action is a discipline in itself.
The three Officers forming the French Mission to my Headquarters made
salaams, viz., Captain Bertier de Sauvigny, Lieutenant Pelliot and
Lieutenant de la Borde. The first is a man of the world, with manners
suave and distinguished; the second is a savant and knows the habits of
obscure and out of the way people. What de la Borde's points may be, I
do not know: he is a frank, good looking young fellow and spoke perfect
English.
_20th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ A big wind rose in the
night.
A clerk from my central office at the Horse Guards developed small pox
this morning. No doubt he has been in some rotten hole in Alexandria and
this is the result,--a disgusting one to all of us as we have had to be
vaccinated.
Ready now, but so long as the wind blows, we have to twiddle our thumbs.
Got the full text of d'Amades' orders for his Kum Kale landing as well
as for the Besika Bay make-believe.
_21st April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Blowing big guns. The event
with which old mother time is in labour is so big that her pains are
prodigious and prolonged out of all nature. So near are we now to our
opening that the storm means a twenty four hours' delay.
Have issued my orders to the troops. Yesterday our plans were but plans.
To-day the irrevocable steps out on to the stage.
General Headquarters,
_21st April, 1915._
_Soldiers of France and of the King._
Before us lies an adventure unprecedented in modern war. Together with
our comrades of the Fleet, we are about to force a landing upon an open
beach in face of positions which have been vaunted by our enemies as
impregnable.
The landing will be made good, by the help of God and the Navy; the
positions will be stormed, and the War brought one step nearer to a
glorious close.
"Remember," said Lord Kitchener when bidding adieu to your Commander,
"Remember, once you set foot upon the Gallipoli Peninsula, you must
fight the thing through to a finish."
The whole world will be watching your progress. Let us prove our selves
worthy of the great feat of arms entrusted to us.
IAN HAMILTON, _General_.
_22nd April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Wind worse than ever, but
weather brighter. Another twenty four hours' delay. Russian Military
Attaché from Athens (Makalinsky) came to see me at 2.30 p.m. He cannot
give me much idea of how the minds of the Athenians are working. He says
our Russian troops are of the very best. Delay is the worst
nerve-cracker.
Charley Burn, King's Messenger, came; with him a Captain Coddan, to be
liaison between me and Istomine's Russians.
The King sends his blessing.
SPECIAL ORDER,
General Headquarters,
_22nd April, 1915._
The following gracious message has been received to-day by the General
Commanding:--
"The King wishes you and your Army every success, and you are
constantly in His Majesty's thoughts and prayers."
_23rd April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ A gorgeous day at last;
fitting frame to the most brilliant and yet touching of pageants.
All afternoon transports were very, very slowly coming out of harbour
winding their way in and out through the other painted ships lying thick
on the wonderful blue of the bay. The troops wild with enthusiasm and
tremendously cheering especially as they passed the warships of our
Allies.
_Nunc Dimittis_, O Lord of Hosts! Not a man but knows he is making for
the jaws of death. They know, these men do, they are being asked to
prove their enemies to have lied when they swore a landing on
Gallipoli's shore could never make good. They know that lie must pass
for truth until they have become targets to guns, machine guns and
rifles--huddled together in boats, helpless, plain to the enemy's sight.
And they are wild with joy; uplifted! Life spins superbly through their
veins at the very moment they seek to sacrifice it for a cause. O death,
where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?
A shadow has been cast over the wonders of the day by a wireless to say
that Rupert Brooke is very dangerously ill--from the wording we fear
there can be no hope.
Dent, principal Naval Transport Officer, left to-day to get ready.
Wemyss said good-bye on going to take up command of his Squadron.
Have got d'Amade's revised orders for the landing at Kum Kale and also
for the feint at Besika Bay. Very clear and good.
At 7.15 p.m. we got this message from K.:--
"Please communicate the following messages at a propitious moment to
each of those concerned.
"(1) My best wishes to you and all your force in carrying to a
successful conclusion the operations you have before you, which will
undoubtedly have a momentous effect on the war. The task they have to
perform will need all the grit Britishers have never failed to show, and
I am confident your troops will victoriously clear the way for the Fleet
to advance on Constantinople.
"(2) Convey to the Admiral my best wishes that all success may attend
the Fleet. The Army knows they can rely on their energy and effective
co-operation while dealing with the land forces of the enemy.
"(3) Assure General d'Amade and the French troops of our entire
confidence that their courage and skill will result in the triumph of
their arms.
"(End of message)--" Personal:
"All my thoughts will be with you when operations begin."
We, here, think of Lord K. too. May his shadow fall dark upon the
Germans and strike the fear of death into their hearts.
Just got following from the Admiral:--
"H.M.S. _Queen Elizabeth_,
"_23rd April, 1915._
"My dear General,
"I have sent orders to all Admirals that operations are to proceed and
they are to take the necessary measures to have their commands in their
assigned positions by Sunday morning, April 25th!
"I pray that the weather may be favourable and nothing will prevent our
proceeding with the scheme. 'May heaven's light be our guide' and God
give us the victory.
"Think everything is ready and in some ways the delay has been useful,
as we have now a few more lighters and tugs available.
"Yours sincerely,
(_Sd._) "J. M. de Robeck."
I have sent a reply:--
"S.S. _Arcadian_,
_23rd April, 1915._
"My dear Admiral,
"Your note just received gives expression to my own sentiments. The
sooner we get to work now the better and may the best cause win.
"Yours sincerely,
(_Sd._) "Ian Hamilton."
Rupert Brooke is dead. Straightaway he will be buried. The rest is
silence.
Twice was "the sight" vouchsafed me:--in London when I told Eddie I
would bespeak the boy's services; at Port Said when I bespoke them.
Death on the eve of battle, death on a wedding day--nothing so tragic
save that most black mishap, death in action after peace has been
signed. Death grins at my elbow. I cannot get him out of my thoughts. He
is fed up with the old and sick--only the flower of the flock will serve
him now, for God has started a celestial spring cleaning, and our star
is to be scrubbed bright with the blood of our bravest and our best.
Youth and poetry are the links binding the children of the world to come
to the grandsires of the world that was. War will smash, pulverise,
sweep into the dustbins of eternity the whole fabric of the old world:
therefore, the firstborn in intellect must die. Is _that_ the reading of
the riddle?
Almighty God, Watchman of the Milky Way, Shepherd of the Golden Stars,
have mercy upon us, smallest of the heavenly Shiners. Our star burns dim
as a corpse light: the huge black chasm of space closes in: if only by
blood ...? Thy Will be done. _En avant_--at all costs--_en avant_!