THE RED KAISER
When Yakovlev failed to remove the Tsarevich from Tobolsk and to
“convert” the Tsar, he disappointed Mirbach more than he disappointed
Sverdlov.
The Jews feared the Russians, but the Germans wanted to use them. The
Red Tsar planned to exterminate the Romanovs, but the Red Kaiser
proposed to reinstate Nicholas.
For a time their respective schemes assumed divergent courses; in the
end, Wilhelm’s agents realised that they could not dissociate themselves
from the Red Tsar, and it was the latter’s plan that prevailed. But,
morally as well as practically, the German hand which had brought the
Jew murderers into Russia controlled and directed the assassins’ work.
Only when Berlin realised that the Romanovs were irrevocably on the side
of the Entente did they release the hands of the murderers.
The proposal that Yakovlev brought to Tobolsk was much more insidious
than the Tsar understood it to be. Nicholas was not only to endorse the
peace concluded at Brest; he was to seize the reins of power with the
help of German bayonets and to give his only son to be a lawful Tsar
under German tutelage.
This meant the intervention of Russia in the war again, but on the
German side. The Red Kaiser and his staff did not trust their Red agents
any more.
While Yakovlev went to Tobolsk as envoy extraordinary of the Tsik (but
in reality of the German G.H.Q.) the official representative of Germany
to the Soviet Government, with which she was in treaty and in virtual
alliance, was summoning a secret conference of Anti-Soviet Russians to
arrange for the advent of the “new government” desired by Ludendorff.
It was a very pretty scheme, quite on German lines. But it failed at
every point. The Germans once more had shown a total incapacity to
understand human nature. Nicholas scorned the base overtures; the
Russian _intelligentsia_ displayed, on this occasion, a sound
understanding of their duties and interests.[15] The illness of Alexis
was another obstacle, though in itself it made no difference.
Sverdlov was not disturbed by Yakovlev’s failure to bring Nicholas and
Alexis to Moscow. He had his agents everywhere. While Soloviev acted as
watch-dog over the captives of Tobolsk so that no stranger to German
plans should spirit them away, innumerable Red Solovievs hemmed the
captives in. The common herd of the Soviets knew nothing, of course.
The strings were cunningly, discreetly pulled from Moscow according to
the best methods of Potsdam and the Wilhelmstrasse.
No sooner had Yakovlev started on the terrible rush of 160 miles over
bogs and rivers running deep water over breaking ice to Tiumen than the
Jewish conclave in Ekaterinburg received its orders--to stop the
travellers at all costs. Omsk was at once “stampeded” by the false
statement that Yakovlev was trying to arrange a rescue. Yakovlev was
really seeking to escape the North Ural net by taking the south Ural
route. He did not have to go through Omsk at all, but to change from the
Perm on to the Samara line. There was no escaping out of the country by
that route then. It could lead only to Moscow. Nevertheless, this train
was turned back to Ekaterinburg. Sverdlov did not really want the
Romanovs to go further. He could not afford to quarrel openly with his
former paymasters, but he was probably shrewd enough and sufficiently
well informed to suspect their secret designs.
The talk of a trial in Moscow did not begin till much later, when Moscow
rumour reported the Tsar as already defunct, and solely as an antidote
to those rumours, as they threatened to upset the plan of murder.
Sakovich, formerly surgeon in a hussar regiment and ex-ultra-monarchist,
appertained to the Ural Regional Sovdep as Komisar of Health. He
deposed afterwards that he had overheard Goloshchekin, Safarov and
Voikov discussing with Beloborodov the alternative of wrecking the train
with Nicholas Romanov or of “arranging” an accident. In the former case,
the responsibility would be placed on “counter-revolutionaries” trying
to effect a rescue. He did not listen to all the details as it did not
concern his department. But the Jews did not have to carry out the plan
then. The Germans were still in favour of the survival of Nicholas. The
idea was utilised some months later at Alapaevsk. I have a copy of the
message sent afterwards to Moscow and Petrograd in which the murderers
seriously describe the “rescue” staged by them after the murder as
having been the cause of the grand ducal “disappearance.”
The Romanovs were suffered to live. A German mission (ostensibly Red
Cross) came to Ekaterinburg at the end of May to ascertain all about the
life of the “residents of Ipatiev’s house,” as the Imperial prisoners
were officially styled. These spies went straight to Berlin with their
report. The Red Kaiser knew full well what torments were being endured
by those whom he had professed to cherish, who after all were his kith
and kin. He could have saved them at any time. But ... they would not be
saved by him....
Mirbach’s death did not, perhaps, introduce any modification of the plan
of slaughter. He was assassinated one week before the event. The
Bolsheviks declared that his death was an act of provocation committed
by their Socialist opponents and gravely resolved that they must not
quarrel with Germany, because that would only be playing into the hands
of the assassins. This solemn farce had a deeper meaning.
During the summer of that year the Siberian anti-Bolshevist units began
to grow in numbers and strength. The Germans had themselves foolishly
promoted this reaction by arresting the departure of the Czechs and
compelling them to fight. A Siberian Army was quickly springing into
existence. It might drive the Red Tsar out of Moscow and thus, instead
of an ally or agent there, the Red Kaiser would find himself confronted
by a hostile Russia. The war was slowly dragging to its fateful end;
every battalion counted. The Entente knew what the assistance of Russia
meant, so the Entente went to the aid of the Czechs and Siberians.
Ludendorff does justice to this tragic dilemma in his book of “War
Memories” “...the Entente, realising that they could not work with a
Government which looked for support to Germany, took action against
Bolshevism, and instead of sending these troops (the Czechs) to France,
held them up along the Siberian railway on the frontier between Russia
and Siberia, in order to fight the Government in Moscow. In addition to
this, by garrisoning the railway, the Entente prevented the return of
our prisoners of war from Siberia. This was unquestionably a serious
loss to us.” (Vol. II, p. 654.)
The holding up of the Czechs was Ludendorff’s own work. He is ashamed to
admit it, and puts the cart before the horse in pleading that the
Entente displayed such far-sighted activity. Moreover, it was precisely
the German-Magyar prisoners of war who, rallying to the appeal of their
Kaisers, stopped the departure of the Czechs. Ludendorff is too modest.
But his statement makes one point crystal-clear: that in the German view
the plan to get rid of the played-out Red Tsar, to put a subservient
White Tsar in his place, had to be dropped. The Red Tsar might be useful
yet. As Dr. Ritzler had remarked: “The Bolsheviks are still necessary.”
The usefulness of the Bolsheviks was to be twofold: (1) to defend the
German front in Russia; (2) to prevent the White Tsar from joining the
Russian forces of the Entente.
This being the story of the Tsar’s murder, we are concerned chiefly with
the second part of Yankel Sverdlov’s German programme. How was it to be
carried out, so that there should be no possible mistake? Obviously,
there was only one way--through death’s dark portals. To bring the Tsar
or the Tsarevich to Moscow would involve risks. The Jews were in a
fright; telegrams discovered in Ekaterinburg show that they trusted none
of the Russians in their employ. That is why the Romanovs remained in
Ekaterinburg.
Four days before Mirbach’s assassination, consequently while the Red
Tsar had his daily audiences with the representative of the Red Kaiser,
Goloshchekin was already in Moscow, had discussed the murder with
Sverdlov, and had telegraphed to Beloborodov to send another member of
the Conclave to Moscow.
The Germans approved the murder; there can be no doubt on this point.
The position held by Mirbach in Moscow, his daily reports from the
members of the Red Inquisition, which naturally had the closest
connection with the arrangements for the murder, such as the sending to
Ekaterinburg of the ten Magyar-German “Letts” as executioners, are
conclusive evidences. The Red Tsar and the Red Kaiser were in accord.
But it was absolutely essential that no Russians should be left inside
the house where the Romanovs were to die. Whether the Germans assented
to the wholesale slaughter that took place remains in doubt. By that
time Mirbach had gone to his last account, and the bloodthirstiness of
the Jewish murderers perhaps exceeded the German design, and therein may
be found a good reason for the report of the “safety” of the family, but
the Red Kaiser cannot escape responsibility for the whole crime, any
more than can the Red Tsar who planned it and the Soviet _régime_ that
rendered such a crime possible.
Here is a translation of the original typewritten telegram found in the
archives of the Telegraph Office in Ekaterinburg and included in the
_dossier_:
“MOSCOW.
“_To President of_ TSIK SVERDLOV _for_ GOLOSHCHEKIN.
“Syromolotov has just gone for organisation of affair in accordance
with directions of Centre. Apprehensions unfounded stop Avdeiev
superseded, his assistant Moshkin arrested. Yurovsky replaces
Avdeiev. Interior guard all relieved replaced by others. stop.
4558.
“BELOBORODOV.”
Below the text in black ink is marked the date: “4/VII” and further, in
ink of the same colour: “Telegram received,” after which in black pencil
is the signature: “Komisar To ...” (the rest of the name illegible),
this representative of the Soviet being in charge of the telegraph
office and endorsing all official messages as they were handed in for
transmission.
This message needs no explanation. It is a full and crushing
confirmation of all that has preceded: Fear of the Russians; preparation
of the murder; direction of the plan from Moscow; and eagerness of the
local Jews to anticipate the signal for the butchery. The horrible
servility of the dummy president Beloborodov is disclosed in all its
nakedness. He hastens to assure his Jewish masters that their
“apprehensions” are “unfounded.” The German-Magyars who had done their
best to carry out the Red Kaiser’s behest to capture Siberia and to
crush any hope of Russia’s military revival, they were now called in to
consummate the Red Kaiser’s plan by murdering the Tsar.
For all that has been stated in these chapters there is unimpeachable
authority. There is the _dossier_. And there is the overwhelming
corroboration of the horrible realities that have converted a large part
of Europe into a charnel, Russia into a pest-house and the rest of the
world into a hot-bed of unrest.
And pre-eminent among the Doers of Evil, murderers and despoilers, has
been the Red Kaiser.
When, in 1915, he wrote to the Tsar, asking him to recall the days when
they were friends, and Nicholas, mindful of the bitter lessons that
friendship had entailed, replied that those days must forever be
forgotten, Wilhelm of Hohenzollern started the machinery that was to
sweep out of existence the Tsardom and Russia, and the hapless Romanovs.
In the autumn of 1915 there assembled in Vienna the representatives of
the German and Austrian General-Staffs to discuss a plan for the
promotion of a revolutionary movement in Russia. It was then that all
the outlines of the “Russian” revolution were laid down; it was at this
meeting that the leading actors in the Red tragedy were chosen: the
Lenins and the Sverdlovs and the host of Jewish wreckers, who spent the
interval between their engagement and their appearance on the Russian
stage in the calm of Swiss resorts, studying and rehearsing their parts.
The money that financed the “Russian” revolution was German money,
and--I say it on the strongest evidence which can be corroborated in the
German secret archives--YANKEL SVERDLOV RECEIVED A SALARY FROM THE
GERMANS TILL NOVEMBER 7, 1917, when, becoming Red Tsar of All the
Russias, he had at his disposal loot unimaginable.
And thus it came to pass that the Germans who slew the Tsar and the Jews
who organised, aided and abetted the murder each left his mark upon the
walls of Ipatiev’s house.