THE HIERARCHY OF JOKES
Jokes may be divided into various types. Thus a joke or class of jokes
can only be the subject of a joke of higher order. Otherwise we would
get the same vicious-circle fallacy which gives rise to so many
paradoxes in logic and mathematics. A certain Oxford scholar succeeded,
to his own satisfaction, in reducing all jokes to primitive types,
consisting of thirty-seven proto-Aryan jokes. When any proposition was
propounded to him, he would reflect and afterwards pronounce on the
question as to whether the proposition was a joke or not. If he decided,
by his theory, that it was a joke, he would solemnly say: "There _is_
that joke." If this narration is accepted as a joke, since it cannot be
reduced to one of the proto-Aryan jokes under pain of leading us to
commit a vicious-circle fallacy, we must conclude that there is at least
one joke which is not proto-Aryan; and, in fact, is of a higher type.
There is no great difficulty in forming a hierarchy of jokes of various
types. Thus a joke of the fourth type (or order) is as follows: A joke
of the first order was told to a Scotchman, who, as we would expect, was
unable to see it.[117] The person (A) who told this joke told the story
of how the joke was received to another Scotchman thereby making a joke
about a joke of the first order, and thus making a joke of the second
order. A remarked on this joke that no joke could penetrate the head of
the Scotchman to whom the joke of the first order was told, even if it
were fired into his head with a gun. The Scotchman, after severe
thought, replied: "But ye couldn't do that, ye know!" A repeated the
whole story, which constituted a joke of the third order, to a third
Scotchman. This last Scotchman again, after prolonged thought, replied:
"He had ye there!" This whole story is a joke of the fourth order.
Most known jokes are of the first order, for the simple reason that the
majority of people find that the slightest mental effort effectually
destroys any perception of humour. It seems to me that a joke becomes
more pleasurable in proportion as logical faculties are brought into
play by it; and hence that logical power is allied, or possibly
identical, with the power of grasping more subtle jokes. The jokes which
amuse the frequenters of music-halls, Conservatives, and M. Bergson--and
which usually deal with accidents, physical defects, mothers-in-law,
foreigners, or over-ripe cheese--are usually jokes of the first order.
Jokes of the second, and even of the third, order appeal to ordinary
well-educated people; jokes of higher order require either special
ability or a sound logical training on the part of the hearer if the
joke is to be appreciated; while jokes of transfinite order presumably
only excite the inaudible laughter of the gods.
FOOTNOTES:
[117] [It may be that, like certain remarks about cheese and
mothers-in-law (see below), the statement that Scotchmen cannot see
jokes is a joke of the first order.--ED.]