CHAPTER XIII.

RECONSTRUCTION.

The question of reconstructing the States that seceded will be

practically settled before these pages can see the light, and will

therefore be considered here only so far as necessary to complete the

view of the constitution of the United States. The manner in which the

government proposed to settle, has settled, or will settle the

question, proves that both it and the American people have only

confused views of the rights and powers of the General government, but

imperfectly comprehend the distinction between the legislative and

executive departments of that Government, and are far more familiar

with party tactics than with constitutional law.

It would be difficult to imagine any thing more unconstitutional, more

crude, or more glaringly impolitic than the mode of reconstruction

indicated by the various executive proclamations that have been issued,

bearing on the subject, or even by the bill for guaranteeing the States

republican governments, that passed Congress, but which failed to

obtain the President's signature. It is, in some measure,

characteristic of the American government to understand how things

ought to be done only when they are done and it is too late to do them

in the right way. Its wisdom comes after action, as if engaged in a

series of experiments. But, happily for the nation, few blunders are

committed that with our young life and elasticity are irreparable, and

that, after all, are greater than are ordinarily committed by older and

more experienced nations. They are not of the most fatal character,

and are, for the most part, such as are incident to the conceit, the

heedlessness, the ardor, and the impatience of youth, and need excite

no serious alarm for the future.

There has been no little confusion in the public mind, and in that of

the government itself, as to what reconstruction is, who has the power

to reconstruct, and how that power is to be exercised. Are the States

that seceded States in the Union, with no other disability than that of

having no legal governments? or are they Territories subject to the

Union? Is their reconstruction their erection into new States, or

their restoration as States previously in the Union? Is the power to

reconstruct in the States themselves? or is it in the General

government? If partly in the people and partly in the General

government, is the part in the General government in Congress, or in

the Executive? If in Congress, can the Executive, without the

authority of Congress, proceed to reconstruct, simply leaving it for

Congress to accept or reject the reconstructed State? If the power is

partly in the people of the disorganized States who or what defines

that people, decides who may or may not vote in the reorganization? On

all these questions there has been much crude, if not erroneous,

thinking, and much inconsistent and contradictory action.

The government started with the theory that no State had seceded or

could secede, and held that, throughout, the States in rebellion

continued to be States in the Union. That is, it held secession to be

a purely personal and not a territorial insurrection. Yet it

proclaimed eleven States to be in insurrection against the United

States, blockaded their ports, and interdicted all trade and

intercourse of any kind with them. The Supreme Court, in order to

sustain the blockade and interdict as legal, decided the war to be not

a war against simply individual or personal insurgents but "a

territorial civil war." This negatived the assumption that the States

that took up arms against the United States remained all the while

peaceable and loyal States, with all their political rights and powers

in the Union. The States in the Union are integral elements of the

political sovereignty, for the sovereignty of the American nation vests

in the States finite; and it is absurd to pretend that the eleven

States that made the rebellion and were carrying on a formidable war

against the United States, were in the Union, an integral element of

that sovereign authority which was carrying on a yet more formidable

war against them. Nevertheless, the government still held to its first

assumption, that the States in rebellion continued to be States in the

Union--loyal States, with all their rights and franchises unimpaired!

That the government should at first have favored or acquiesced in the

doctrine that no State had ceased to be a State in the Union, is not to

be wondered at. The extent and determination of the secession movement

were imperfectly understood, and the belief among the supporters of the

government, and, perhaps, of the government itself, was, that it was a

spasmodic movement for a temporary purpose, rather than a fixed

determination to found an independent separate nationality; that it was

and would be sustained by the real majority of the people of none of

the States, with perhaps the exception of South Carolina; that the true

policy of the government would be to treat the seceders with great

forbearance, to avoid all measures likely to exasperate them or to

embarrass their loyal fellow-citizens, to act simply on the defensive,

and to leave the Union men in the several seceding States to gain a

political victory at the polls over the secessionists, and to return

their States to their normal position in the Union.

The government may not have had much faith in this policy, and Mr.

Lincoln's personal authority might be cited to the effect that it had

not, but it was urged strongly by the Union men of the Border States.

The administration was hardly seated in office, and its members were

new men, without administrative experience; the President, who had been

legally elected indeed, but without a majority of the popular votes,

was far from having the full confidence even of the party that elected

him; opinions were divided; party spirit ran high; the excitement was

great, the crisis was imminent, the government found itself left by its

predecessor without an army or a navy, and almost without arms or

ordnance; it knew not how far it could count on popular support, and

was hardly aware whom it could trust or should distrust; all was hurry

and confusion; and what could the government do but to gain time, keep

off active war as long as possible, conciliate all it could, and take

ground which at the time seemed likely to rally the largest number of

the people to its support? There were men then, warm friends of the

administration, and still warmer friends of their country, who believed

that a bolder, a less timid, a less cautious policy would have been

wiser, that in revolutionary times boldness, what in other times would

be rashness, is the highest prudence, on the side of the government as

well as on the side of the revolution; that when once it has shown

itself, the rebellion that hesitates, deliberates, consults, is

defeated and so is the government. The seceders owed from the first

their successes not to their superior organization, to their better

preparation, or to the better discipline and appointment of their

armies, but to their very rashness, to their audacity even, and the

hesitancy, cautious and deliberation of the government. Napoleon owed

his successes as general and civilian far more to the air of power he

assumed, and the conviction he produced of his invincibility in the

minds of his opponents, than to his civil or military strategy and

tactics, admirable as they both were. But the government believed it

wisest to adopt a conciliatory and, in many respects, a temporizing

policy, and to rely more on weakening the secessionists in their

respective States than on strengthening the hands and hearts of its own

staunch and uncompromising supporters. It must strengthen the Union

party in the insurrectionary States, and as this party hoped to succeed

by political manipulation rather than by military force, the government

must rely rather on a show of military power than on gaining any

decisive battle. As it hoped, or affected to hope, to suppress the

rebellion in the States that seceded through their loyal citizens, it

was obliged to assume that secession was the work of a faction, of a

few ambitious and disappointed politicians, and that the States were

all in the Union, and continued in the loyal portion of their

inhabitants. Hence its aid to the loyal Virginians to organize as the

State of Virginia, and its subsequent efforts to organize the Union men

in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, and its disposition to recognize

their organization in each of those States as the State itself, though

including only a small minority of the territorial people. Had the

facts been as assumed, the government might have treated the loyal

people of each State as the State itself, without any gross usurpation

of power; but, unhappily, the facts assumed were not facts, and it was

soon found that the Union party in all the States that seceded, except

the western part of Virginia and the eastern section of Tennessee,

after secession had been carried by the popular vote, went almost

unanimously with the secessionists; for they as well as the

secessionists held the doctrine of State sovereignty; and to treat the

handful of citizens that remained loyal in each State as the State

itself, became ridiculous, and the government should have seen and

acknowledged it.

The rebellion being really territorial, and not personal, the State

that seceded was no more continued in the loyal than in the disloyal

population. While the war lasted, both were public enemies of the

United States, and neither had or could have any rights as a State in

the Union. The law recognizes a solidarity of all the citizens of a

State, and assumes that, when a State is at war, all its citizens are

at war, whether approving the war or not. The loyal people in the

States that seceded incurred none of the pains and penalties of

treason, but they retained none of the political rights of the State in

the Union, and, in reorganizing the State after the suppression of the

rebellion, they have no more right to take part than the secessionists

themselves. They, as well as the secessionists, have followed the

territory. It was on this point that the government committed its

gravest mistake. As to the reorganization or reconstruction of the

State, the whole territorial people stood on the same footing.

Taking the decision of the Supreme Court as conclusive on the subject,

the rebellion was territorial, and, therefore, placed all the States as

States out of the Union, and retained them only as population and

territory, under or subject to the Union. The States ceased to exist,

that is, as integral elements of the national sovereignty. The

question then occurred, are they to be erected into new States, or are

they to be reconstructed and restored to the Union as the identical old

States that seceded? Shall their identity be revived and preserved, or

shall they be new States, regardless of that identity? There can be no

question that the work to be done was that of restoration, not of

creation; no tribe should perish from Israel, no star be struck from

the firmament of the Union. Every inhabitant of the fallen States, and

every citizen of the United States must desire them to be revived and

continued with their old names and boundaries, and all true Americans

wish to continue the constitution as it is, and the Union as it was.

Who would see old Virginia, the Virginia of revolutionary fame, of

Washington, Jefferson, Madison, of Monroe, the "Old Dominion," once the

leading State of the Union, dead without hope of resurrection? or South

Carolina, the land of Rutledge, Moultrie, Laurens, Hayne, Sumter, and

Marion? There is something grating to him who values State

associations, and would encourage State emulation and State pride, in

the mutilation of the Old Dominion and the erection within her borders

of the new State called West Virginia. States in the Union are not

mere prefectures, or mere dependencies on the General government,

created for the convenience of administration. They have an

individual, a real existence of their own, as much so as have the

individual members of society. They are free members, not of a

confederation indeed, but of a higher political community, and

reconstruction should restore the identity of their individual life,

suspended for a moment by secession, but capable of resuscitation.

These States had become, indeed, for a moment, territory under the

Union; but in no instance had they or could they become territory that

had never existed as States. The fact that the territory and people

had existed as a State, could with regard to none of them be

obliterated, and, therefore, they could not be erected into absolutely

new States. The process of reconstructing them could not be the same

as that of creating new States. In creating a new State, Congress, ex

necessitate, because there is no other power except the national

convention competent to do it, defines the boundaries of the new State,

and prescribes the electoral people, or who may take part in the

preliminary organization but in reconstructing States it does neither,

for both are done by a law Congress is not competent to abrogate or

modify, and which can be done only by the United States in convention

assembled, or by the State itself after its restoration. The

government has conceded this, and, in part, has acted on it. It

preserves, except in Virginia, the old boundaries, and recognizes, or

rather professes to recognize the old electoral law, only it claims the

right to exclude from the electoral people those who have voluntarily

taken part in the rebellion.

The work to be done in States that have seceded is that of

reconstruction, not creation; and this work is not and cannot be done,

exclusively nor chiefly by the General government, either by the

Executive or by Congress. That government can appoint military, or

even provisional governors, who may designate the time and place of

holding the convention of the electoral people of the disorganized

State, as also the time and place of holding the elections of delegates

to it, and superintend the elections so far as to see the polls are

opened, and that none but qualified electors vote, but nothing more.

All the rest is the work of the territorial electoral people

themselves, for the State within its own sphere must, as one of the

United States, be a self-governing community. The General government

may concede or withhold permission to the disorganized State to

reorganize, as it judges advisable, but it cannot itself reorganize it.

If it concedes the permission, it must leave the whole electoral people

under the preexisting electoral law free to take part in the work of

reorganization, and to vote according to their own judgment. It has no

authority to purge the electoral people, and say who may or may not

vote, for the whole question of suffrage and the qualifications of

electors is left to the State, and can be settled neither by an act of

Congress nor by an Executive proclamation.

If the government theory were admissible, that the disorganized States

remain States in the Union, the General government could have nothing

to say on the subject, and could no more interfere with elections in

any one of them than it could with elections in Massachusetts or New

York. But even on the doctrine here defended it can interfere with

them only by way of general superintendence. The citizens have,

indeed, lost their political rights, but not their private rights.

Secession has not dissolved civil society, or abrogated any of the laws

of the disorganized State that were in force at the time of secession.

The error of the government is not in maintaining that these laws

survive the secession ordinances, and remain the territorial law, or

lex loci, but in maintaining that they do so by will of the State, that

has, as a State, really lapsed. They do so by will of the United

States, which enacted them through the individual State, and which has

not in convention abrogated them, save the law authorizing slavery, and

its dependent laws.

This point has already been made, but as it is one of the niceties of

the American constitution, it may not be amiss to elaborate it at

greater length. The doctrine of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and the

majority of our jurists, would see to be that the States, under God,

are severally sovereign in all matters not expressly confided to the

General government, and therefore that the American sovereignty is

divided, and the citizen owes a double allegiance--allegiance to his

State, and allegiance to the United States--as if there was a United

States distinguishable from the States. Hence Mr. Seward, in an

official dispatch to our minister at the court of St. James, says: "The

citizen owes allegiance to the State and to the United States." And

nearly all who hold allegiance is due to the Union at all, hold that it

is also due to the States, only that which is due to the United States

is paramount, as that under feudalism due to the overlord. But this is

not the case. There is no divided sovereignty, no divided allegiance.

Sovereignty is one, and vests not in the General government or in the

State government, but in the United States, and allegiance is due to

the United States, and to them alone. Treason can be committed only

against the United States, and against a State only because against the

United States, and is properly cognizable only by the Federal courts.

Hence the Union men committed no treason in refusing to submit to the

secession ordinances of their respective States, and in sustaining the

national arms against secession.

There are two very common mistakes: the one that the States

individually possess all the powers not delegated to the General

government; and the other that the Union, or United States, have only

delegated powers. But the United States possess all the powers of a

sovereign state, and the States individually and the General government

possess only such powers as the United States in convention delegate to

them respectively. The sovereign is neither the General government nor

the States severally, but the United States in convention. The United

States are the one indivisible sovereign, and this sovereign governs

alike general matters in the General government, and particular matters

in the several State governments. All legal authority in either

emanates from this one indivisible and plenary sovereign, and hence the

law enacted by a State are really enacted by the United States, and

derive from them their force and vitality as laws. Hence, as the United

States survive the particular State, the lapse of the State does not

abrogate the State laws, or dissolve civil society within its

jurisdiction.

This is evidently so, because civil society in the particular State

does not rest on the State alone, nor on Congress, but on the United

States. Hence all civil rights of every sort created by the individual

State are really held from the United States, and therefore it was that

the people of non-slaveholding States were, as citizens of the United

States, responsible for the existence of slavery in the States that

seceded. There is a solidarity of States in the Union as there is of

individuals in each of the States. The political error of the

Abolitionists was not in calling upon the people of the United States

to abolish slavery, but in calling upon them to abolish it through the

General government, which had no jurisdiction in the case; or in their

sole capacity as men, on purely humanitarian grounds, which were the

abrogation of all government and civil society itself, instead of

calling upon them to do it as the United States in convention

assembled, or by an amendment to the constitution of the United States

in the way ordained by that constitution itself. This understood, the

constitution and laws of a defunct State remain in force by virtue of

the will of the United States, till the State is raised from the dead,

restored to life and activity, and repeals or alters them, or till they

are repealed or altered by the United States or the national

convention. But as the defunct State could not, and the convention had

not repealed or altered them, save in the one case mentioned, the

General government had no alternative but to treat them and all rights

created by them as the territorial law, and to respect them as such.

What then do the people of the several States that seceded lose by

secession? They lose, besides incurring, so far as disloyal, the pains

and penalties of treason, their political rights, or right, as has just

been said, to be in their own department self-governing communities,

with the right of representation in Congress and the electoral

colleges, and to sit in the national convention, or of being counted in

the ratification of amendments to the constitution--precisely what it

was shown a Territorial people gain by being admitted as a State into

the Union. This is the difference between the constitutional doctrine

and that adopted by Mr. Lincoln's and Mr. Johnson's Administrations.

But what authority, on this constitutional doctrine, does the General

government gain over the people of States that secede, that it has not

over others! As to their internal constitution, their private rights

of person or property, it gains none. It has over them, till they are

reconstructed and restored to the Union, the right to institute for

them provisional governments, civil or military, precisely as it has

for the people of a territory that is not and has never been one of the

United States; but in their reconstruction it has less, for the

geographical boundaries and electoral people of each are already

defined by a law which does not depend on its will, and which it can

neither abrogate nor modify. Here is the difference between the

constitutional doctrine and that of the so-called radicals. The State

has gone, but its laws remain, so far as the United States in

convention does not abrogate them; not because the authority of the

State survives, but because the United States so will, or are presumed

to will. The United States have by a constitutional amendment

abrogated the laws of the several States authorizing slavery, and

prohibited slavery forever within the jurisdiction of the Union; and no

State can now be reconstructed and be admitted into the Union with a

constitution that permits slavery, for that would be repugnant to the

constitution of the United States. If the constitutional amendment is

not recognized as ratified by the requisite number of States, it is the

fault of the government in persisting in counting as States what are no

States. Negro suffrage, as white suffrage, is at present a question

for States.

The United States guarantee to such State a republican form of

government. And this guarantee, no doubt, authorizes Congress to

intervene in the internal constitution of a State so far as to force it

to adopt a republican form of government, but not so far as to organize

a government for a State, or to compel a territorial people to accept

or adopt a State constitution for themselves. If a State attempts to

organize a form of government not republican, it can prevent it; and if

a Territory adopts an unrepublican form, it can force it to change its

constitution to one that is republican, or compel it to remain a

Territory under a provisional government. But this gives the General

government no authority in the organization or re-organization of

States beyond seeing that the form of government adopted by the

territorial people is republican. To press it further, to make the

constitutional clause a pretext for assuming the entire control of the

organization or re-organization of a State, is a manifest abuse--a

palpable violation of the constitution and of the whole American

system. The authority given by the clause is specific, and is no

authority for intervention in the general reconstruction of the lapsed

State. It gives authority in no question raised by secession or its

consequences, and can give none, except, from within or from without,

there is an overt attempt to organize a State in the Union with an

unrepublican form of government.

The General government gives permission to the territorial people of

the defunct State to re-organize, or it contents itself with suffering

them, without special recognition, to reorganize in their own way, and

apply to Congress for admission, leaving it to Congress to admit them

as a State, or not, according to its own discretion, in like manner as

it admits a new State; but the re-organization itself must be the work

of the territorial people themselves, under their old electoral law.

The power that reconstructs is in the people themselves; the power that

admits them, or receives them into the Union, is Congress. The

Executive, therefore, has no authority in the matter, beyond that of

seeing that the laws are duly complied with; and whatever power he

assumes, whether by proclamation or by instructions given to the

provisional governors, civil or military, is simply a usurpation of the

power of Congress, which it rests with Congress to condone or not, as

it may see fit. Executive proclamations, excluding a larger or a

smaller portion of the electoral or territorial people from the

exercise of the elective franchise in reorganizing the State, and

executive efforts to throw the State into the hands of one political

party or another, are an unwarrantable assumption of power, for the

President, in relation to reconstruction, acts only under the peace

powers of the constitution, and simply as the first executive officer

of the Union. His business is to execute the laws, not to make them.

His legislative authority is confined to his qualified veto on the acts

of Congress, and to the recommendation to Congress of such measures as

he believes are needed by the country.

In reconstructing a disorganized State, neither Congress nor the

Executive has any power that either has not in time of peace. The

Executive, as commander-in-chief of the army, may ex necessitate, pace

it ad interim under a military governor, but he cannot appoint even a

provisional civil governor till Congress has created the office and

given him authority to fill it; far less can be legally give

instructions to the civil governor as to the mode or manner of

reconstructing the disorganized State, or decide who may or may not

vote in the preliminary reorganization. The Executive could do nothing

of the sort, even in regard to a Territory never erected into a State.

It belongs to Congress, not to the Executive, to erect Territorial or

provisional governments, like those of Dacotah, Colorado, Montana,

Nebraska, and New Mexico; and, Congress, not the executive, determines

the boundaries of the Territory, passes the enabling act, and defines

the electoral people, till the State is organized and able to act

herself. Even Congress, in reconstructing and restoring to life and

vigor in the Union a disorganized State, has nothing to say as to its

boundaries or its electoral people, nor any right to interfere between

parties in the State, to throw the reconstructed State into the hands

of one or another party. All that Congress can insist on is, that the

territorial people shall reconstruct with a government republican in

form; that its senators and representatives in Congress, and the

members of the State legislature, and all executive and judicial

officers of the State shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support

and defend the constitution of the United States. In the whole work

the President has nothing to do with reconstruction, except to see that

peace is preserved and the laws are fully executed.

It may be at least doubted that the Executive has power to proclaim

amnesty and pardon to rebels after the civil war has ceased, and ceased

it has when the rebels have thrown down their arms and submitted; for

his pardoning power is only to pardon after conviction and judgment of

the court: it is certain that he has no power to proscribe or punish

even traitors, except by due process of law. When the war is over he

has only his ordinary peace powers. He cannot then disfranchise any

portion of the electoral people of a State that seceded, even though

there is no doubt that they have taken part in the rebellion, and may

still be suspected of disloyal sentiments. Not even Congress can do

it, and no power known to the constitution till the State is

reconstructed can do it without due process of law, except the national

convention. Should the President do any of the things supposed, he

would both abuse the power he has and usurp power that he has not, and

render himself liable to impeachment. There are many things very

proper, and even necessary to be done, which are high crimes when done

by an improper person or agent. The duty of the President, when there

are steps to be taken or things to be done which he believes very

necessary, but which are not within his competency, is, if Congress is

not in session, to call it together at the earliest practicable moment,

and submit the matter to its wisdom and discretion.

It must be remembered that the late rebellion was not a merely personal

but a territorial rebellion. In such a rebellion, embracing eleven

States, and, excluding slaves, a population of at least seven millions,

acting under an organized territorial government, preserving internal

civil order, supporting an army and navy under regularly commissioned

officers, and carrying on war as a sovereign nation--in such a

territorial rebellion no one in particular can be accused and punished

as a traitor. The rebellion is not the work of a few ambitious or

reckless leaders, but of the people, and the responsibility of the

crime, whether civil or military, is not individual, but common to the

whole territorial people engaged in it; and seven millions, or the half

of them, are too many to ban to exile, or even to disfranchise Their

defeat and the failure of their cause must be their punishment. The

interest of the country, as well the sentiment of the civilized

world--it might almost be said the law of nations--demands their

permission to return to their allegiance, to be treated according to

their future merits, as an integral portion of the American people.

The sentiment of the civilized world has much relaxed from its former

severity toward political offenders. It regards with horror the savage

cruelties of Great Britain to the unfortunate Jacobites, after their

defeat under Charles Edward, at Culloden, in 1746, their barbarous

treatment of the United Irishmen in 1798, and her brutality to the

mutinous Hindoos in 1857-'58; the harshness of Russia toward the

insurgent Poles, defeated in their mad attempts to recover their lost

nationality; the severity of Austria, under Haynau, toward the defeated

Magyars. The liberal press kept up for years, especially in England

and the United States, a perpetual howl against the Papal and

Neapolitan governments for arresting and imprisoning men who conspired

to overthrow them. Louis Kossuth was no less a traitor than Jefferson

Davis, and yet the United States solicited his release from a Turkish

prison, and sent a national ship to bring him hither as the nation's

guest. The people of the United States have held from the first "the

right of insurrection," and have given their moral support to every

insurrection in the Old or New World they discovered, and for them to

treat with severity any portion of the Southern secessionists, who, at

the very worst, only acted on the principles the nation had uniformly

avowed and pronounced sacred, would be regarded, and justly, by the

civilized world as little less than infamous.

Not only the fair fame, but the interest of the Union forbids any

severity toward the people lately in arms against the government. The

interest of the nation demands not the death or the expulsion of the

secessionists, and, least of all, of those classes proscribed by the

President's proclamation of the 29th of May, 1865, nor even their

disfranchisement, perpetual or temporary; but their restoration to

citizenship, and their loyal co-operation with all true-hearted

Americans, in hearing the wounds inflicted on the whole country by the

civil war. There need be no fear to trust them. Their cause is lost;

they may or may not regret it, but lost it is, and lost forever. They

appealed to the ballot-box, and were defeated; they appealed from the

ballot-box to arms, to war, and have been again defeated, terribly

defeated. They know it and feel it. There is no further appeal for

them; the judgment of the court of last resort has been rendered, and

rendered against them. The cause is finished, the controversy closed,

never to be re-opened. Henceforth the Union is invincible, and it is

worse than idle to attempt to renew the war against it. Henceforth

their lot is bound up with that of the nation, and all their hopes and

interests, for themselves and their children, and their children's

children, depend on their being permitted to demean themselves

henceforth as peaceable and loyal American citizens. They must seek

their freedom, greatness, and glory in the freedom, greatness, and

glory of the American republic, in which, after all, they can be far

freer, greater, more glorious than in a separate and independent

confederacy. All the arguments and considerations urged by Union men

against their secession, come back to them now with redoubled force to

keep them henceforth loyal to the Union.

They cannot afford to lose the nation, and the nation cannot afford to

lose them. To hang or exile them, and depopulate and suffer to run to

waste the lands they had cultivated, were sad thrift, sadder than that

of deporting four millions of negroes and colored men. To exchange

only those excepted from amnesty and pardon by President Johnson,

embracing some two millions or more, the very pars sanior of the

Southern population, for what would remain or flock in to supply their

place, would be only the exchange of Glaucus and Diomed, gold for

brass; to disfranchise them, confiscate their estates, and place them

under the political control of the freedmen, lately their slaves, and

the ignorant and miserable "white trash," would be simply to render

rebellion chronic, and to convert seven millions of Americans, willing

and anxious to be free, loyal American citizens, eternal enemies. They

have yielded to superior numbers and resources; beaten, but not

disgraced, for they have, even in rebellion, proved themselves what

they are--real Americans. They are the product of the American soil,

the free growth of the American republic, and to disgrace them were to

disgrace the whole American character and people.

The wise Romans never allowed a triumph to a Roman general for

victories, however brilliant, won over Romans. In civil war, the

victory won by the government troops is held to be a victory for the

country, in which all parties are victors, and nobody is vanquished.

It was as truly for the good of the secessionists to fail, as it was

for those, who sustained the government to succeed; and the government

having forced their submission and vindicated its own authority, it

should now leave them to enjoy, with others, the victory which it his

won for the common good of all. When war becomes a stern necessity,

when it breaks out, and while it lasts, humanity requires it to be

waged in earnest, prosecuted with vigor, and made as damaging, as

distressful to the enemy as the laws of civilized nations permit. It

is the way to bring it to a speedy close, and to save life and

property. But when it is over, when the enemy submits, and peace

returns, the vanquished should be treated with gentleness and love. No

rancor should remain, no vengeance should be sought; they who met in

mortal conflict on the battle-field should be no longer enemies, but

embrace as comrades, as friends, as brothers. None but a coward kicks

a fallen foe; a brave people is generous, and the victors in the late

war can afford to be generous generously. They fought for the Union,

and the Union has no longer an enemy; their late enemies are willing

and proud to be their countrymen, fellow-citizens, and friends; and

they should look to it that small politicians do not rob them in the

eyes of the world, by unnecessary and ill-timed severity to the

submissive, of the glory of being, as they are, a great, noble,

chivalric, generous, and magnanimous people.

The government and the small politicians, who usually are the most

influential with all governments, should remember that none of the

secessionists, however much in error they have been, have committed the

moral crime of treason. They held, with the majority of the American

people, the doctrine of State sovereignty, and on that doctrine they

had a right to secede, and have committed no treason, been guilty of no

rebellion. That was, indeed, no reason why the government should not

use all its force, if necessary, to preserve the national unity and the

integrity of the national domain; but it is a reason, and a sufficient

reason, why no penalty of treason should be inflicted on secessionists

or their leaders, after their submission, and recognition of the

sovereignty of the United States as that to which they owe allegiance.

None of the secessionists have been rebels or traitors, except in

outward act, and there can, after the act has ceased, be no just

punishment where there has been no criminal intent. Treason is the

highest crime, and deserves exemplary punishment; but not where there

has been no treasonable intent, where they who committed it did not

believe it was treason, and on principles held by the majority of their

countrymen, and by the party that had generally held the government,

there really was no treason. Concede State sovereignty, and Jefferson

Davis was no traitor in the war he made on the United States, for he

made none till his State had seceded. He could not then be arraigned

for his acts after secession, and at most, only for conspiracy, if at

all, before secession.

But, if you permit all to vote in the re-organization of the State who,

under the old electoral law, have the elective franchise, you throw the

State into the hands of those who have been disloyal to the Union. If

so, and you cannot trust them, the remedy is not in disfranchising the

majority, but in prohibiting re-organization, and in holding the

territorial people still longer under the provisional government, civil

or military. The old electoral law disqualifies all who have been

convicted of treason either to the State or the United States, and

neither Congress nor the Executive can declare any others disqualified

on account of disloyalty. But you must throw the State into the hands

of those who took part, directly or indirectly, in the rebellion, if

you reconstruct the States at all, for they are undeniably the great

body of the territorial people in all the States that seceded. These

people having submitted, and declared their intention to reconstruct

the State as a State in the Union, you must amend the constitution of

the United States, unless they are convicted of a disqualifying crime

by due process of law, before you can disfranchise them. It is

impossible to reconstruct any one of the disorganized States with those

alone, or as the dominant party, who have adhered to the Union

throughout the fearful struggle, as self-governing States. The State,

resting on so small a portion of the people, would have no internal

strength, no self-support, and could stand only as upheld by federal

arms, which would greatly impair the free and healthy action of the

whole American system.

The government attempted to do it in Virginia, Louisiana, Arkansas, and

Tennessee, before the rebellion was suppressed, but without authority

and without success. The organizations, effected at great expense, and

sustained only by military force, were neither States nor State

governments, nor capable of being made so by any executive or

congressional action. If the disorganized States, as the government

held, were still States in the Union, these organizations were

flagrantly revolutionary, as effected not only without, but in defiance

of State authority; if they had seceded and ceased to be States, as was

the fact, they were equally unconstitutional and void of authority,

because not created by the free suffrage of the territorial people, who

alone are competent to construct or reconstruct a state.

If the Unionists had retained the State organization and government,

however small their number, they would have held the State, and the

government would have been bound to recognize and to defend them as

such with all the force of the Union. The rebellion would then have

been personal, not territorial. But such was not the case. The State

organization, the State government, the whole State authority rebelled,

made the rebellion territorial, not personal, and left the Unionists,

very respectable persons assuredly, residing, if they remained at home,

in rebel territory, traitors in the eye of their respective States, and

shorn of all political status or rights. Their political status was

simply that of the old loyalists, or adherents of the British crown in

the American war for Independence, and it was as absurd to call them

the State, as it would have been for Great Britain to have called the

old Tories the colonies.

The theory on which the government attempted to re-organize the

disorganized States rested on two false assumptions: first, that the

people are personally sovereign; and, second, that all the power of the

Union vests in the General government. The first, as we have seen, is

the principle of so-called "squatter sovereignty," embodied in the

famous Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which gave birth, in opposition, to the

Republican party of 1856. The people are sovereign only as the State,

and the State is inseparable from the domain. The Unionists without

the State government, without any State organization, could not hold

the domain, which, when the State organization is gone, escheats to the

United States, that is to say, ceases to exist. The American democracy

is territorial, not personal.

The General government, in time of war or rebellion, is indeed

invested, for war purposes, with all the power of the Union. This is

the war power. But, though apparently unlimited, the war power is yet

restricted to war purposes, and expires by natural limitation when

peace returns; and peace returns, in a civil war, when the rebels have

thrown down their arms and submitted to the national authority, and

without any formal declaration. During the war, or while the rebellion

lasts, it can suspend the civil courts, the civil laws, the State

constitutions, any thing necessary to the success of the war--and of

the necessity the military authorities are the judges; but it cannot

abolish, abrogate, or reconstitute them. On the return of peace they

revive of themselves in all their vigor. The emancipation proclamation

of the President, if it emancipated the slaves in certain States and

parts of States, and if those whom it emancipated could not be

re-enslaved, did not anywhere abolish slavery, or change the laws

authorizing it; and if the Government should be sustained by Congress

or by the Supreme Court in counting the disorganized States as States

in the Union, the legal status of slavery throughout the Union, with

the exception of Maryland, and perhaps Missouri, is what it was before

the war.[1]

The Government undoubtedly supposed, in the reconstructions it

attempted, that it was acting under the war power; but as

reconstruction can never be necessary for war purposes, and as it is in

its very nature a work of peace, incapable of being effected by

military force, since its validity depends entirely on its being the

free action of the territorial people to be reconstructed, the General

government had and could have, with regard to it, only its ordinary

peace powers. Reconstruction is jure pacis, not jure belli.

Yet such illegal organizations, though they are neither States nor

State governments, and incapable of being legalized by any action of

the Executive or of Congress, may, nevertheless, be legalized by being

indorsed or acquiesced in by the territorial people. They are wrong,

as are all usurpations; they are undemocratic, inasmuch as they attempt

to give the minority the power to rule the majority; they are dangerous

inasmuch as they place the State in the hands of a party that can stand

only as supported by the General government, and thus destroy the

proper freedom and independence of the State, and open the door to

corruption, tend to keep alive rancor and ill feeling, and to retard

the period of complete pacification, which might be effected in three

months as well as in three years, or twenty years; yet they can become

legal, as other governments illegal in their origin become legal, with

time and popular acquiescence. The right way is always the shortest and

easiest; but when a government must oftener follow than lead the

public, it is not always easy to hit the right way, and still less easy

to take it. The general instincts of the people are right as to the end

to be gained, but seldom right as to the means of gaining it; and

politicians of the Union party, as well as of the late secession party,

have an eye in reconstructing, to the future political control of the

State when it is reconstructed.

The secessionists, if permitted to retain their franchise, would, even

if they accepted abolition, no doubt re-organize their respective

States on the basis of white suffrage, and so would the Unionists, if

left to themselves. There is no party at the South prepared to adopt

negro suffrage, and there would be none at the North if the negroes

constituted any considerable portion of the population. As the

reconstruction of a State cannot be done under the war power, the

General government can no more enfranchise than it can disfranchise any

portion of the territorial people, and the question of negro suffrage

must be left, where the constitution leaves it--to the States

severally, each to dispose of it for itself. Negro suffrage will, no

doubt, come in time, as soon as the freedmen are prepared for it, and

the danger is that it will be attempted too soon.

It would be a convenience to have the negro vote in the reconstruction

of the States disorganized by secession, for it would secure their

re-construction with antislavery constitutions, and also make sure of

the proposed antislavery amendment to the Constitution of the United

States; but there is no power in Congress to enfranchise the negroes in

the States needing reconstruction, and, once assured of their freedom,

the freedmen would care little for the Union, of which they understand

nothing. They would vote, for the most part, with their former

masters, their employers, the wealthier and more intelligent classes,

whether loyal or disloyal; for, as a rule, these will treat them with

greater personal consideration and kindness than others. The dislike

of the negro, and hostility to negro equality, increase as you descend

in the social scale. The freedmen, without political instruction or

experience, who have had no country, no domicile, understand nothing of

loyalty or of disloyalty. They have strong local attachments, but they

can have no patriotism. If they adhered to the Union in the rebellion,

fought for it, bled for it, it was not from loyalty, but because they

knew that their freedom could come only from the success of the Union

arms. That freedom secured, they have no longer any interest in the

Union, and their local attachments, personal associations, habits,

tastes, likes and dislikes, are Southern, not Northern. In any contest

between the North and the South, they would take, to a man, the

Southern side. After the taunts of the women, the captured soldiers of

the Union found, until nearly the last year of the war, nothing harder

to bear, when marched as prisoners into Richmond, than the antics and

hootings of the negroes. Negro suffrage on the score of loyalty, is at

best a matter of indifference to the Union, and as the elective

franchise is not a natural right, but a civil trust, the friends of the

negro should, for the present, be contented with securing him simply

equal rights of person and property.

[1] This was the case in August, 1865. It may be quite otherwise

before these pages see the light.

The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny · 第 13 / 15 章