CHAPTER XI.

THE CONSTITUTION--CONTINUED.

Providence, or God operating through historical facts, constituted the

American people one political or sovereign people, existing and acting

in particular communities, organizations, called states. This one

people organized as states, meet in convention, frame and ordain the

constitution of government, or institute a general government in place

of the Continental Congress; and the same people, in their respective

State organizations, meet in convention in each State, and frame and

ordain a particular government for the State individually, which, in

union with the General government, constitutes the complete and supreme

government within the States, as the General government, in union with

all the particular governments, constitutes the complete and supreme

government of the nation or whole country. This is clearly the view

taken by Mr. Madison in his letter to Mr. Everett, when freed from his

theory of the origin of government in compact.

The constitution of the people as one people, and the distinction at

the same time of this one people into particular States, precedes the

convention, and is the unwritten constitution, the Providential

constitution, of the American people or civil society, as distinguished

from the constitution of the government, which, whether general or

particular, is the ordination of civil society itself. The unwritten

constitution is the creation or constitution of the sovereign, and the

sovereign providentially constituted constitutes in turn the

government, which is not sovereign, but is clothed with just so much

and just so little authority as the sovereign wills or ordains.

The sovereign in the republican order is the organic people, or State,

and is with us the United States, for with us the organic people exist

only as organized into States united, which in their union form one

compact and indissoluble whole. That is to say, the organic American

people do not exist as a consolidated people or state; they exist only

as organized into distinct but inseparable States. Each State is a

living member of the one body, and derives its life from its union with

the body, so that the American state is one body with many members; and

the members, instead of being simply individuals, are States, or

individuals organized into States. The body consists of many members,

and is one body, because the members are all members of it, and members

one of another. It does not exist as separate or distinct from the

members, but exists in their solidarity or membership one of another.

There is no sovereign people or existence of the United States

distinguishable from the people or existence of the particular States

united. The people of the United States, the state called the United

States, are the people of the particular States united. The solidarity

of the members constitutes the unity of the body. The difference

between this view and Mr. Madison's is, that while his view supposes

the solidarity to be conventional, originating and existing in compact,

or agreement, this supposes it to be real, living, and prior to the

convention, as much the work of Providence as the existence in the

human body of the living solidarity of its members. One law, one life,

circulates through all the members, constituting them a living

organism, binding them in living union, all to each and each to all.

Such is the sovereign people, and so far the original unwritten

constitution. The sovereign, in order to live and act, must have an

organ through which he expresses his will. This organ under the

American system, is primarily the Convention. The convention is the

supreme political body, the concrete sovereign authority, and exercises

practically the whole sovereign power of the people. The convention

persists always, although not in permanent session. It can at any time

be convened by the ordinary authority of the government, or, in its

failure, by a plebiscitum.

Next follows the Government created and constituted by the convention.

The government is constituted in such manner, and has such and only

such powers, as the convention ordains. The government has, in the

strict sense, no political authority under the American system, which

separates the government from the convention. All political questions

proper, such as the elective franchise, eligibility, the constitution

of the several departments of government, as the legislative, the

judicial, and the executive, changing, altering, or amending the

constitution of government, enlarging, or contracting its powers, in a

word, all those questions that arise on which it is necessary to take

the immediate orders of the sovereign, belong not to the government,

but to the convention; and where the will of the sovereign is not

sufficiently expressed in the constitution, a new appeal to the

convention is necessary, and may always be had. The constitution of

Great Britain makes no distinction between the convention and the

government. Theoretically the constitution of Great Britain is feudal,

and there is, properly speaking, no British state; there are only the

estates, king, lords, and commons, and these three estates constitute

the Parliament, which is held to be omnipotent; that is, has the

plenitude of political sovereignty. The British Parliament, composed

of the three estates, possesses in itself all the powers of the

convention in the American constitution, and is at once the convention

and the government. The imperial constitution of France recognizes no

convention, but clothes the senate with certain political functions,

which, in some respects, subjects theoretically the sovereign to his

creature. The emperor confessedly holds his power by the grace of God

and the will of the nation, which is a clear acknowledgment that the

sovereignty vests in the French people as the French state; but the

imperial constitution, which is the constitution of the government, not

of the state, studies, while acknowledging the sovereignty of the

people, to render it nugatory, by transferring it, under various subtle

disguises, to the government, and practically to the emperor as chief

of the government. The senate, the council of state, the legislative

body, and the emperor, are all creatures of the French state, and have

properly no political functions, and to give them such functions is to

place the sovereign under his own subjects! The real aim of the

imperial constitution is to secure despotic power under the guise of

republicanism. It leaves and is intended to leave the nation no way of

practically asserting its sovereignty but by either a revolution or a

plebiscitum, and a plebiscitum is permissible only where there is no

regular government.

The British constitution is consistent with itself, but imposes no

restriction on the power of the government. The French imperial

constitution is illogical, inconsistent with itself as well as with the

free action of the nation. The American constitution has all the

advantages of both, and the disadvantages of neither. The convention

is not the government like the British Parliament, nor a creature of

the state like the French senate, but the sovereign state itself, in a

practical form. By means of the convention the government is

restricted to its delegated powers, and these, if found in practice

either too great or too small, can be enlarged or contracted in a

regular, orderly way, without resorting to a revolution or to a

plebiscitum. Whatever political grievances there may be, there is

always present the sovereign convention competent to redress them. The

efficiency of power is thus secured without danger to liberty, and

freedom without danger to power. The recognition of the convention,

the real political sovereign of the country and its separation from and

independence of the ordinary government, is one of the most striking

features of the American constitution.

The next thing to be noted, after the convention, is the constitution

by the convention of the government. This constitution, as Mr. Madison

well observes, divides the powers conceded by the convention to

government between the General Government and the particular State

governments. Strictly speaking, the government is one, and its powers

only are divided and exercised by two sets of agents or ministries.

This division of the powers of government could never have been

established by the convention if the American people had not been

providentially constituted one people, existing and acting through

particular State organizations. Here the unwritten constitution, or

the constitution written in the people themselves, rendered practicable

and dictated the written constitution, or constitution ordained by the

convention and engrossed on parchment. It only expresses in the

government the fact which pre-existed in the national organization and

life.

This division of the powers of government is peculiar to the United

States, and is an effective safeguard against both feudal

disintegration and Roman centralism. Misled by their prejudices and

peculiar interests, a portion of the people of the United States,

pleading in their justification the theory of State sovereignty,

attempted disintegration, secession, and national independence separate

from that of the United States, but the central force of the

constitution was too strong for them to succeed. The unity of the

nation was too strong to be effectually broken. No doubt the reaction

against secession and disintegration will strengthen the tendency to

centralism, but centralism can succeed no better than disintegration

has succeeded because the General government has no subsistentia, no

suppositum, to borrow a theological term, outside or independent of the

States. The particular governments are stronger, if there be any

difference, to protect the States against centralism than the General

government is to protect the Union against disintegration; and after

swinging for a time too far toward one extreme and then too far toward

the other, the public mind will recover its equilibrium, and the

government move on in its constitutional path.

Republican Rome attempted to guard against excessive centralism by the

tribunitial veto, or by the organization of a negative or obstructive

power. Mr. Calhoun thought this admirable, and wished to effect the

same end here, where it is secured by other, more effective, and less

objectionable means, by a State veto on the acts of Congress, by a dual

executive, and by substituting concurrent for numerical majorities.

Imperial Rome gradually swept away the tribunitial veto, concentrated

all power in the hands of the emperor, became completely centralized,

and fell. The British constitution seeks the same end by substituting

estates for the state, and establishing a mixed government, in which

monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy temper, check, or balance each

other; but practically the commons estate has become supreme, and the

nobility govern not in the house of lords, and can really influence

public affairs only through the house of commons. The principle of the

British constitution is not the division of the powers of government,

but the antagonism of estates, or rather of interests, trusting to the

obstructive influence of that antagonism to preserve the government

from pure centralism. Hence the study of the British statesman is to

manage diverse and antagonistic parties and interests so as to gain the

ability to act, which he can do only by intrigue, cajolery, bribery in

one form or another, and corruption of every sort. The British

government cannot be carried on by fair, honest, and honorable means,

any more than could the Roman under the antagonism created by the

tribunitial veto. The French tried the English system of organized

antagonism in 1789, as a cure for the centralism introduced by

Richelieu and Louis XIV., and again under the Restoration and Louis

Philippe, and called it the system of constitutional guarantees; but

they could never manage it, and they have taken refuge in unmitigated

centralism under Napoleon III., who, however well disposed, finds no

means in the constitution of the French nation of tempering it. The

English system, called the constitutional, and sometimes the

parliamentary system, will not work in France, and indeed works really

well nowhere.

The American system, sometimes called the Federal system, is not

founded on antagonism of classes, estates, or interests, and is in no

sense a system of checks and balances. It needs and tolerates no

obstructive forces. It does not pit section against section, the

States severally against the General government, nor the General

government against the State governments, and nothing is more hurtful

than the attempt to explain it and work it on the principles of British

constitutionalism. The convention created no antagonistic powers; it

simply divided the powers of government, and gave neither to the

General government nor to the State governments all the powers of

government, nor in any instance did it give to the two governments

jurisdiction in the same matters. Hence each has its own sphere, in

which it can move on without colliding with that of the other. Each is

independent and complete in relation to its own work, incomplete and

dependent on the other for the complete work of government.

The division of power is not between a NATIONAL government and State

governments, but between a GENERAL government and particular

governments. The General government, inasmuch as it extends to matters

common to all the States, is usually called the Government of the

United States, and sometimes the Federal government, to distinguish it

from the particular or State governments, but without strict propriety;

for the government of the United States, or the Federal government,

means, in strictness, both the General government and the particular

Governments, since neither is in itself the complete government of the

country. The General government has authority within each of the

States, and each of the State governments has authority in the Union.

The line between the Union and the States severally, is not precisely

the line between the General government and the particular governments.

As, for instance, the General government lays direct taxes on the

people of the States, and collects internal revenue within them; and

the citizens of a particular State, and none others, are electors of

President and Vice-President of the United States, and representatives

in the lower house of Congress, while senators in Congress are elected

by the State legislatures themselves.

The line that distinguishes the two governments is that which

distinguishes the general relations and interests from the particular

relations and interests of the people of the United States. These

general relations and interests are placed under the General

government, which, because its jurisdiction is coextensive with the

Union, is called the Government of the United States; the particular

relations and interests are placed under particular governments, which,

because their jurisdiction is only coextensive, with the States

respectively, are called State governments. The General government

governs supremely all the people of the United States and Territories

belonging to the Union, in all their general relations and interests,

or relations and interests common alike to them all; the particular or

State government governs supremely the people of a particular State, as

Massachusetts, New York, or New Jersey, in all that pertains to their

particular or private rights, relations, and interests. The powers of

each are equally sovereign, and neither are derived from the other.

The State governments are not subordinate to the General government,

nor the General government to the State governments. They are

co-ordinate governments, each standing on the same level, and deriving

its powers from the same sovereign authority. In their respective

spheres neither yields to the other. In relation to the matters within

its jurisdiction, each government is independent and supreme in regard

of the other, and subject only to the convention.

The powers of the General government are the power--

To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the

debts and provide for the general welfare of the United States; to

borrow money on the credit of the United States; to regulate commerce

with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian

tribes; to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws

on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; to coin

money and regulate the value thereof, and fix the standard of weights

and measures; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the

securities and current coin of the United States; to establish

post-offices and post-roads; to promote the progress of science and of

the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors

the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; to

define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and

offences against the law of nations; to declare war, grant letters of

marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and

water; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to

make rules for the government of the land and naval forces; to provide

for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,

suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; to provide for organizing,

arming, and disciplining the militia, and of governing such part of

them as may be employed in the service of the United States; to

exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such

district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by cession of

particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of

the government of the United States, and to exercise a like authority

over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the

State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,

arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and to make all laws

which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the

foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in

the government of the United States, or in any department or office

thereof.

In addition to these, the General government is clothed with the

treaty-making power, and the whole charge of the foreign relations of

the country; with power to admit new States into the Union; to dispose

of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning the territory

and all other property belonging to the United States; to declare, with

certain restrictions, the punishment of treason, the constitution

itself defining what is treason against the United States; and to

propose, or to call, on the application of the legislatures of

two-thirds of all the states, a convention for proposing amendments to

this constitution; and is vested with supreme judicial power, original

or appellate, in all cases of law and equity arising under this

constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or to be

made under their authority, in all cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers, and consuls, in all cases of admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction, in all controversies to which the United States shall be

a party, all controversies between two or more States, between a State

and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States,

between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of

different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof and

foreign states, citizens, or subjects.

These, with what is incidental to them, and what is necessary and

proper to carry them into effect, are all the positive powers with

which the convention vests the General government, or government of the

United States, as distinguished from the governments of the particular

States; and these, with the exception of what relates to the district

in which it has its seat, and places of forts, magazines, &c., are of a

general nature, and restricted to the common relations and interests of

the people, or at least to interests and relations which extend beyond

the limits of a particular State. They are all powers that regard

matters which extend beyond not only the individual citizen, but the

individual State, and affect alike the relations and interests of all

the States, or matters which cannot be disposed of by a State

government without the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction.

They give the government no jurisdiction of questions which affect

individuals or citizens only in their private and domestic relations

which lie wholly within a particular State. The General government

does not legislate concerning private rights, whether of persons or

things, the tenure of real estate, marriage, dower, inheritance, wills,

the transferrence or transmission of property, real or personal; it can

charter no private corporations, out of the District of Columbia, for

business, literary, scientific, or eleemosynary purposes, establish no

schools, found no colleges or universities, and promote science and the

useful arts only by securing to authors and inventors for a time the

exclusive right to their writings and discoveries. The United States

Bank was manifestly unconstitutional, as probably are the present

so-called national banks. The United States Bank was a private or

particular corporation, and the present national banks are only

corporations of the same sort, though organized under a general law.

The pretence that they are established to supply a national currency,

does not save their constitutionality, for the convention has not given

the General government the power nor imposed on it the duty of

furnishing a national currency. To coin money, and regulate the value

thereof, is something very different from authorizing private companies

to issue bank notes, on the basis of the public stocks held as private

property, or even on what is called a specie basis. To claim the power

under the general welfare clause would be a simple mockery of good

sense. It is no more for the general welfare than any other successful

private business. The private welfare of each is, no doubt, for the

welfare of all, but not therefore is it the "general welfare," for what

is private, particular in its nature, is not and cannot be general. To

understand by general welfare that which is for the individual welfare

of all or the greater number, would be to claim for the General

government all the powers of government, and to deny that very division

of powers which is the crowning merit of the American system. The

general welfare, by the very force of the words themselves, means the

common as distinguished from the private or individual welfare. The

system of national banks may or may not be a good and desirable system,

but it is difficult to understand the constitutional power of the

General government to establish it.

On the ground that its powers are general, not particular, the General

government has no power to lay a protective tariff. It can lay a

tariff for revenue, not for protection of home manufactures or home

industry; for the interests fostered, even though indirectly

advantageous to the whole people, are in their nature private or

particular, not general interests, and chiefly interests of private

corporations and capitalists. Their incidental or even consequential

effects do not change their direct and essential nature. So with

domestic slavery. Slavery comes under the head of private rights,

whether regarded on the side of the master or on the side of the slave.

The right of a citizen to hold a slave, if a right at all, is the

private right of property, and the right of the slave to his freedom is

a private and personal right, and neither is placed under the safeguard

of the General government, which has nowhere, unless in the District of

Columbia and the places over which it has exclusive legislative power

in all cases whatsoever, either the right to establish it or to abolish

it, except perhaps under the war power, as a military necessity, an

indemnity for the past, or a security for the future.

This applies to what are called Territories as well as to the States.

The right of the government to govern the Territories in regard to

private and particular rights and interests, is derived from no express

grant of power, and is held only ex necessitate--the United States

owning the domain, and there being no other authority competent to

govern them. But, as in the case of all powers held ex necessitate,

the power is restricted to the absolute necessity in the case. What

are called Territorial governments, to distinguish them from the State

governments, are only provisional governments, and can touch private

rights and interests no further than is necessary to preserve order and

prepare the way for the organization and installation of a regular

State government. Till then the law governing private rights is the

law that was in force, if any such there was, when the territory became

by purchase, by conquest, or by treaty, attached to the domain of the

United States.

Hence the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the ordinance of

1787, prohibiting slavery in what was called the territory of the

Northwest, and the so-called Missouri Compromise, prohibiting slavery

north of the parallel 36° 30'. The Wilmot proviso was for the same

reason unconstitutional. The General government never had and has not

any power to exclude slavery from the Territories, any more than to

abolish it in the States. But slavery being a local institution,

sustained neither by the law of nature nor the law of nations, no

citizen migrating from a slave State could carry his slaves with him,

and hold them as slaves in the Territory. Rights enacted by local law

are rights only in that locality, and slaves carried by their masters

into a slave State even, are free, unless the State into which they are

carried enacts to the contrary. The only persons that could be held as

slaves in a Territory would be those who were slaves or the children of

those who were slaves in the Territory when it passed to the United

States. The whole controversy on, slavery in the Territories, and

which culminated in the civil war, was wholly unnecessary, and never

could have occurred had the constitution been properly understood and

adhered to by both sides. True, Congress could not exclude slavery

from the Territory, but neither could citizens migrating to them hold

slaves in them; and so really slavery was virtually excluded, for the

inhabitants in nearly all of them, not emigrants from the States after

the cession to the United States, were too few to be counted.

The General government has power to establish a uniform rule of

naturalization, to which all the States must conform, and it was very

proper that it should have this power, so as to prevent one State from

gaining by its naturalization laws an undue advantage over another; but

the General government has itself no power to naturalize a single

foreigner, or in any case to say who shall or who shall not be

citizens, either of a State or of the United States, or to declare who

may or may not be electors even of its own officers. The convention

ordains that members of the house of representatives shall be chosen by

electors who have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most

numerous branch of the State legislature, but the State determines

these qualifications, and who do or do not possess them; that the

senators shall be chosen by the State legislatures, and that the

electors of President and Vice-President shall be appointed in such

manner as the respective State legislatures may direct. The whole

question of citizenship, what shall or shall not be the qualifications

of electors, who shall or shall not be freemen, is reserved to the

States, as coming under the head of personal or private rights and

franchises. In practice, the exact line of demarcation may not always

have been strictly observed either by the General government or by the

State governments; but a careful study of the constitution cannot fail

to show that the division of powers is the division or distinction

between the public and general relations and interests, rights and

duties of the people, and their private and particular relations and

interests, rights and duties. As these two classes of relations and

interests, rights and duties, though distinguishable, are really

inseparable in nature, it follows that the two governments are

essential to the existence of a complete government, or to the

existence of a real government in its plenitude and integrity. Left to

either alone, the people would have only an incomplete, an initial, or

inchoate government. The General government is the complement of the

State governments, and the State governments are the complement of the

General government.

The consideration of the powers denied by the convention to the General

government and to the State governments respectively, will lead to the

same conclusion. To the General government is denied expressly or by

necessary implication all jurisdiction in matters of private rights and

interests, and to the State government is denied all jurisdiction in

right, or interests which extend, as has been said, beyond the

boundaries of the State. "No State shall enter into any treaty,

alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin

money, emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver coin a

tender in the payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post

facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any

title of nobility. No State shall, without the consent of Congress,

lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be

absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws and the net

produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports and

exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and

all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress.

No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of

tonnage, keep troops or ships-of-war in time of peace, enter into any

agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or

engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as

will not admit of delay."

The powers denied to the States in some matters which are rather

private and particular, such as bills of attainder, ex post facto laws,

laws impairing the obligation of contracts, granting titles of

nobility, are denied equally to the General government. There is

evidently a profound logic in the constitution, and there is not a

single provision in it that is arbitrary, or anomalous, or that does

not harmonize dialectically with the whole, and with the real

constitution of the American people. At first sight the reservation to

the State of the appointment of the officers of the militia might seem

an anomaly; but as the whole subject of internal police belongs to the

State, it should have some military force at its command. The subject

of bankruptcies, also, might seem to be more properly within the

province of the State, and so it would be if commerce between the

several States had not been placed under Congress, or if trade were

confined to the citizens of the State and within its boundaries; but as

such is not the case, it was necessary to place it under the General

government, in order that laws on the subject might be uniform

throughout the Union, and that the citizens of all the States, and

foreigners trading with them, should be placed on an equal footing, and

have the same remedies. The subject follows naturally in the train of

commerce, for bankruptcies, as understood at the time, were confined to

the mercantile class, bankers, and brokers; and since the regulation of

commerce, foreign and inter-state, was to be placed under the sole

charge of the General government, it was necessary that bankruptcy

should be included. The subject of patents is placed under the General

government, though the patent is a private right, because it was the

will of the convention that the patent should be good in all the

States, as affording more encouragement to science and the useful arts

than if good only within a single State, or if the power were left to

each State to recognize or not patents granted by another. The right

created, though private in its nature, is Yet general or common to all

the States in its enjoyment or exercise.

The division of the powers of government between a General government

and particular governments, rendered possible and practicable by the

original constitution of the people themselves, as one people existing

and acting through State organizations, is the American method of

guarding against the undue centralism to which Roman imperialism

inevitably tends; and it is far simpler and more effective than any of

the European systems of mixed governments, which seek their end by

organizing an antagonism of interests or classes. The American method

demands no such antagonism, no neutralizing of one social force by

another, but avails itself of all the forces of society, organizes them

dialectically, not antagonistically, and thus protects with, equal

efficiency both public authority and private rights. The General

government can never oppress the people as individuals, or abridge

their private rights or personal freedom and independence, because

these are not within its jurisdiction, but are placed in charge, within

each State, of the State government, which, within its sphere, governs

as supremely as the General government: the State governments cannot

weaken the public authority of the nation or oppress the people in

their general rights and interests, for these are withdrawn from State

jurisdiction, and placed under charge of a General government, which,

in its sphere, governs as supremely as the State government. There is

no resort to a system of checks and balances; there is no restraint on

power, and no systematic distrust of power, but simply a division of

powers between two co-ordinate governments, distinct but inseparable,

moving in distinct spheres, but in the same direction, or to a common

end. The system is no invention of man, is no creation of the

convention, but is given us by Providence in the living constitution of

the American people. The merit of the statesmen of 1787 is that they

did not destroy or deface the work of Providence, but accepted it, and

organized the government in harmony with the real orders the real

elements given them. They suffered themselves in all their positive

substantial work to be governed by reality, not by theories and

speculations. In this they proved themselves statesmen, and their work

survives; and the republic, laugh as sciolists may, is, for the present

and future, the model republic--as much so as was Rome in her day; and

it is not simply national pride nor American self-conceit that

pronounces its establishment the beginning of a new and more advanced

order of civilization; such is really the fact.

The only apparently weak point in the system is in the particular

States themselves. Feudalism protected the feudal aristocracy

effectively for a time against both the king and the people, but left

the king and the people without protection against the aristocracy, and

hence it fell. It was not adequate to the wants of civil society, did

not harmonize all social elements, and protect all social and

individual rights and interests, and therefore could not but fail. The

General government takes care of public authority and rights; the State

protects private rights and personal freedom as against the General

government: but what protects the citizens in their private rights,

their personal freedom and independence, against the particular State

government? Universal suffrage, answers the democrat. Armed with the

ballot, more powerful than the sword, each citizen is able to protect

himself. But this is theory, not reality. If it were true, the

division of the powers of government between two co-ordinate,

governments would be of no practical importance. Experience does not

sustain the theory, and the power of the ballot to protect the

individual may be rendered ineffective by the tyranny of party.

Experience proves that the ballot is far less effective in securing the

freedom and independence of the individual citizen than is commonly

pretended. The ballot of an isolated individual counts for nothing.

The individual, though armed with the ballot, is as powerless, if he

stands alone, as if he had it not. To render it of any avail he must

associate himself with a party, and look for his success in the success

of his party; and to secure the success of his party, he must give up

to it his own private convictions and free will. In practice,

individuals are nothing individually, and parties are every thing.

Even the suppression of the late rebellion, and the support of the

Administration in doing it, was made a party question, and the

government found the leaders of the party opposed to the Republican

party an obstacle hardly less difficult to surmount than the chiefs of

the armies of the so-called Confederate States.

Parties are formed, one hardly knows how, and controlled, no one knows

by whom; but usually by demagogues, men who have some private or

personal purposes, for which they wish, through party to use the

government. Parties have no conscience, no responsibility, and their

very reason of being is, the usurpation and concentration of power.

The real practical tendency of universal suffrage is to democratic,

instead of an imperial, centralism. What is to guard against this

centralism? Not universal suffrage, for that tends to create it; and if

the government is left to it, the government becomes practically the

will of an ever shifting and irresponsible majority. Is the remedy in

written or paper constitutions? Party can break through them, and by

making the judges elective by party, for short terms, and re-eligible,

can do so with impunity. In several of the States, the dominant

majority have gained the power to govern at will, without any let or

hindrance. Besides, constitutions can be altered, and have been

altered, very nearly at the will of the majority. No mere paper

constitutions are any protection against the usurpations of party, for

party will always grasp all the power it can.

Yet the evil is not so great as it seems, for in most of the States the

principle of division of powers is carried into the bosom of the State

itself; in some States further than in others, but in all it obtains to

some extent. In what are called the New England States, the best

governed portion of the Union, each town is a corporation, having

important powers and the charge of all purely local matters--chooses

its own officers, manages its own finances, takes charge of its own

poor, of its own roads and bridges, and of the education of its own

children. Between these corporations and the State government are the

counties, that take charge of another class of interests, more general

than those under the charge of the town, but less general than those of

the State. In the great central and Northwestern States the same

system obtains, though less completely carried out. In the Southern

and Southwestern States, the town corporations hardly exist, and the

rights and interests of the poorer classes of persons have been less

well protected in them than in the Northern and Eastern States. But

with the abolition of slavery, and the lessening of the influence of

the wealthy slaveholding class, with the return of peace and the

revival of agricultural, industrial, and commercial prosperity, the New

England system, in its main features, is pretty sure to be gradually

introduced, or developed, and the division of powers in the State to be

as effectively and as systematically carried out as it is between the

General government and the particular or State governments. So, though

universal suffrage, good as far as it goes, is not alone sufficient,

the division of powers affords with it a not inadequate protection.

No government, whose workings are intrusted to men, ever is or can be

practically perfect--secure all good, and guard against all evil. In

all human governments there will be defects and abuses, and he is no

wise man who expects perfection from imperfection. But the American

constitution, taken as a whole, and in all its parts, is the least

imperfect that has ever existed, and under it individual rights,

personal freedom and independence, as well as public authority or

society, are better protected than under any other; and as the few

barbaric elements retained from the feudal ages are eliminated, the

standard of education elevated, and the whole population Americanized,

moulded by and to the American system, it will be found to effect all

the good, with as little of the evil, as can be reasonably expected

from any possible civil government or political constitution of society.

The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny · 第 11 / 15 章