CHAPTER IX.

THE UNITED STATES

Sovereignty, under God, inheres in the organic people, or the people as

the republic; and every organic people fixed to the soil, and

politically independent of every other people, is a sovereign people,

and, in the modern sense, an independent sovereign nation.

Sovereign states may unite in an alliance, league, or confederation,

and mutually agree to exercise their sovereign powers or a portion of

them in common, through a common organ or agency; but in this agreement

they part with none of their sovereignty, and each remains a sovereign

state or nation as before. The common organ or agency created by the

convention is no state, is no nation, has no inherent sovereignty, and

derives all its vitality and force from the persisting sovereignty of

the states severally that have united in creating it. The agreement no

more affects the sovereignty of the several states entering into it,

than does the appointment of an agent affect the rights and powers of

the principal. The creature takes nothing from the Creator, exhausts

not, lessens not his creative energy, and it is only by his retaining

and continuously exerting his creative power that the creature

continues to exist.

An independent state or nation may, with or without its consent, lose

its sovereignty, but only by being merged in or subjected to another.

Independent sovereign states cannot by convention, or mutual agreement,

form themselves into a single sovereign state, or nation. The compact,

or agreement, is made by sovereign states, and binds by virtue of the

sovereign power of each of the contracting parties. To destroy that

sovereign power would be to annul the compact, and render void the

agreement. The agreement can be valid and binding only on condition

that each of the contracting parties retains the sovereignty that

rendered it competent to enter into the compact, and states that retain

severally their sovereignty do not form a single sovereign state or

nation. The states in convention cannot become a new and single

sovereign state, unless they lose their several sovereignty, and merge

it in the new sovereignty; but this they cannot do by agreement,

because the moment the parties to the agreement cease to be sovereign,

the agreement, on which alone depends the new sovereign state, is

vacated, in like manner as a contract is vacated by the death of the

contracting parties.

That a nation may voluntarily cede its sovereignty is frankly admitted,

but it can cede it only to something or somebody actually existing, for

to cede to nothing and not to cede is one and the same thing. They can

part with their own sovereignty by merging themselves in another

national existence, but not by merging themselves in nothing; and, till

they have parted with their own sovereignty, the new sovereign state

does not exist. A prince can abdicate his power, because by abdicating

he simply gives back to the people the trust he had received from them;

but a nation cannot, save by merging itself in another. An independent

state not merged in another, or that is not subject to another, cannot

cease to be a sovereign nation, even if it would.

That no sovereign state can be formed by agreement or compact has

already been shown in the refutation of the theory of the origin of

government in convention, or the so-called social compact. Sovereign

states are as unable to form themselves into a single sovereign state

by mutual compact as are the sovereign individuals imagined by

Rousseau. The convention, either of sovereign states or of sovereign

individuals, with the best will in the world, can form only a compact

or agreement between sovereigns, and an agreement or compact, whatever

its terms or conditions, is only an alliance, a league, or a

confederation, which no one can pretend is a sovereign state, nation,

or republic.

The question, then, whether the United States are a single sovereign

state or nation, or a confederacy of independent sovereign states

depends on the question whether the American people originally existed

as one people or as several independent states. Mr. Jefferson

maintains that before the convention of 1787 they existed as several

independent sovereign states, but that since that convention, or the

ratification of the constitution it proposed, they exist as one

political people in regard to foreign nations, and several sovereign

states in regard to their internal and domestic relations. Mr. Webster

concedes that originally the States existed as severally sovereign

states, but contends that by ratifying the constitution they have been

made one sovereign political people, state, or nation, and that the

General government is a supreme national government, though with a

reservation in favor of State rights. But both are wrong. If the

several States of the Union were severally sovereign states when they

met in the convention, they are so now; and the constitution is only an

agreement or compact between sovereigns, and the United States are, as

Mr. Calhoun maintained, only a confederation of sovereign states, and

not a single state or one political community.

But if the sovereignty persists in the States severally, any State,

saving its faith, may whenever it chooses to do so, withdraw from the

Union, absolve its subjects from all obligation to the Federal

authorities, and make it treason in them to adhere to the Federal

government. Secession is, then, an incontestable right; not a right

held under the constitution or derived from the convention but a right

held prior to it, independently of it, inherent in the State

sovereignty, and inseparable from it. The State is bound by the

constitution of the Union only while she is in it, and is one of the

States united. In ratifying the constitution she did not part with her

sovereignty, or with any portion of it, any more than France has parted

with her sovereignty, and ceased to be an independent sovereign nation,

by vesting the imperial power in Napoleon III. and his legitimate heirs

male. The principal parts not with his power to his agent, for the

agent is an agent only by virtue of the continued power of the

principal. Napoleon is emperor by the will of the French people, and

governs only by the authority of the French nation, which is as

competent to revoke the powers it has conferred on him, when it judges

proper, as it was to confer them. The Union exists and governs, if the

States are sovereign, only by the will of the State, and she is as

competent to revoke the powers she has delegated as she was to delegate

them. The Union, as far as she is concerned, is her creation, and what

she is competent to make she is competent to unmake.

In seceding or withdrawing from the Union a State may act very

unwisely, very much against her own interests and the interests of the

other members of the confederacy; but, if sovereign, she in doing so

only exercises her unquestionable right. The other members may regret

her action, both for her sake and their own, but they cannot accuse her

or her citizens of disloyalty in seceding, nor of rebellion, if in

obedience to her authority they defend their independence by force of

arms against the Union. Neither she nor they, on the supposition, ever

owed allegiance to the Union. Allegiance is due from the citizen to

the sovereign state, but never from a sovereign state or from its

citizens to any other sovereign state. While the State is in the Union

the citizen owes obedience to the United States, but only because his

State has, in ratifying the Federal constitution, enacted that it and

all laws and treaties made under it shall be law within her territory.

The repeal by the State of the act of ratification releases the citizen

from the obligation even of obedience, and renders it criminal for him

to yield it without her permission.

It avails nothing, on the hypothesis of the sovereignty of the States

as distinguished from that of the United States, to appeal to the

language or provisions of the Federal constitution. That constitutes

the government, not the state or the sovereign. It is ordained by the

sovereign, and if the States were severally independent and sovereign

states, that sovereign is the States severally, not the States united.

The constitution is law for the citizens of a State only so long as the

State remains one of the United States. No matter, then, how clear and

express the language, or stringent the provisions of the constitution,

they bind only the citizens of the States that enact the constitution.

The written constitution is simply a compact, and obliges only while

the compact is continued by the States, each for itself. The

sovereignty of the United States as a single or political people must

be established before any thing in the constitution can be adduced as

denying the right of secession.

That this doctrine would deprive the General government of all right to

enforce the laws of the Union on a State that secedes, or the citizens

thereof, is no doubt true; that it would weaken the central power and

make the Union a simple voluntary association of states, no better than

a rope of sand, is no less true; but what then? It is simply saying

that a confederation is inferior to a nation, and that a federal

government lacks many of the advantages of a national government.

Confederacies are always weak in the centre, always lack unity, and are

liable to be dissolved by the influence of local passions, prejudices,

and interests. But if the United States are a confederation of states

or nations, not a single nation or sovereign state, then there is no

remedy.

If the Anglo-American colonies, when their independence of Great

Britain was achieved and acknowledged, were severally sovereign states,

it has never since been in their power to unite and form a single

sovereign state, or to form themselves into one indivisible sovereign

nation. They could unite only by mutual agreement, which gives only a

confederation, in which each retains its own sovereignty, as two

individuals, however closely united, retain each his own individuality.

No sovereignty is of conventional origin, and none can emerge from the

convention that did not enter it. Either the states are one sovereign

people or they are not. If they are not, it is undoubtedly a great

disadvantage; but a disadvantage that must be accepted, and submitted

to without a murmur.

Whether the United States are one sovereign people or only a

confederation is a question of very grave importance. If they are only

a confederation of states--and if they ever were severally sovereign

states, only a confederation they certainly are--state secession is an

inalienable right, and the government has had no right to make war on

the secessionists as rebels, or to treat them, when their military

power is broken, as traitors, or disloyal persons. The honor of the

government, and of the people who have sustained it, is then deeply

compromised.

What then is the fact? Are the United States politically one people,

nation, state, or republic, or are they simply independent sovereign

states united in close and intimate alliance, league, or federation, by

a mutual pact or agreement? Were the people of the United States who

ordained and established the written constitution one people, or were

they not? If they were not before ordaining and establishing the

government, they are not now; for the adoption of the constitution did

not and could not make them one. Whether they are one or many is then

simply a question of fact, to be decided by the facts in the case, not

by the theories of American statesmen, the opinion of jurists, or even

by constitutional law itself. The old Articles of Confederation and

the later Constitution can serve here only as historical documents.

Constitutions and laws presuppose the existence of a national sovereign

from which they emanate, and that ordains them, for they are the formal

expression of a sovereign will. The nation must exist as an historical

fact, prior to the possession or exercise of sovereign power, prior to

the existence of written Constitutions and laws of any kind, and its

existence must be established before they can be recognized as having

any legal force or vitality.

The existence of any nation, as an independent sovereign nation, is a

purely historical fact, for its right to exist as such is in the simple

fact that it does so exist. A nation de facto is a nation de jure, and

when we have ascertained the fact, we have ascertained the right.

There is no right in the case separate from the fact--only the fact

must be really a fact. A people hitherto a part of another people, or

subject to another sovereign, is not in fact a nation, because they

have declared themselves independent, and have organized a government,

and are engaged in what promises to be a successful struggle for

independence. The struggle must be practically over; the former

sovereign must have practically abandoned the effort to reduce them to

submission, or to bring them back under his authority, and if he

continues it, does it as a matter of mere form; the postulant must have

proved his ability to maintain civil government, and to fulfil within

and without the obligations which attach to every civilized nation,

before it can be recognized as an independent sovereign nation; because

before it is not a fact that it is a sovereign nation. The prior

sovereign, when no longer willing or able to vindicate his right, has

lost it, and no one is any longer bound to respect it, for humanity

demands not martyrs to lost causes.

This doctrine may seem harsh, and untenable even, to those sickly

philanthropists who are always weeping over extinct or oppressed

nationalities; but nationality in modern civilization is a fact, not a

right antecedent to the fact. The repugnance felt to this assertion

arises chiefly from using the word nation sometimes in a strictly

political sense, and sometimes in its original sense of tribe, and

understanding by it not simply the body politic, but a certain relation

of origin, family, kindred, blood, or race. But God has made of one

blood, or race, all the nations of men; and, besides, no political

rights are founded by the law of nature on relations of blood, kindred,

or family. Under the patriarchal or tribal system, and, to some

extent, under feudalism, these relations form the basis of government,

but they are economical relations rather than civil or political, and,

under Christian and modern civilization, are restricted to the

household, are domestic relations, and enter not the state or body

politic, except by way of reminiscence or abuse. They are protected by

the state, but do not found or constitute it. The vicissitudes of

time, the revolutions of states and empires, migration, conquest, and

intermixture of families and races, have rendered it impracticable,

even if it were desirable, to distribute people into nations according

to their relations of blood or descent.

There is no civilized nation now existing that has been, developed from

a common ancestor this side of Adam, and the most mixed are the most

civilized. The nearer a nation approaches to a primitive people of

pure unmixed blood, the farther removed it is from civilization. All

civilized nations are political nations, and are founded in the fact,

not on rights antecedent to the fact. A hundred or more lost

nationalities went to form the Roman empire, and who can tell us how

many layers of crushed nationalities, superposed one upon another,

serve for the foundation of the present French, English, Russian,

Austrian, or Spanish nationalities? What other title to independence

and sovereignty, than the fact, can you plead in behalf of any European

nation? Every one has absorbed and extinguished--no one can say how

many--nationalities, that once had as good a right to be as it has, or

can have. Whether those nationalities have been justly extinguished or

not, is no question for the statesman; it is the secret of Providence.

Failure in this world is not always a proof of wrong; nor success, of

right. The good is sometimes overborne, and the bad sometimes

triumphs; but it is consoling, and even just, to believe that the good

oftener triumphs than the bad.

In the political order, the fact, under God, precedes the law. The

nation holds not from the law, but the law holds from the nation.

Doubtless the courts of every civilized nation recognize and apply both

the law of nature and the law of nations, but only on the ground that

they are included, or are presumed to be included, in the national law,

or jurisprudence. Doubtless, too, the nation holds from God, under the

law of nature, but only by virtue of the fact that it is a nation; and

when it is a nation dependent on no other, it holds from God all the

rights and powers of any independent sovereign nation. There is no

right behind the fact needed to legalize the fact, or to put the nation

that is in fact a nation in possession of full national rights. In the

case of a new nation, or people, lately an integral part of another

people, or subject to another people@ the right of the prior sovereign

must be extinguished indeed, but the extinction of that right is

necessary to complete the fact, which otherwise would be only an

initial, inchoate fact, not a fait accompli. But that right ceases when

its claimant, willingly or unwillingly, formally or virtually, abandons

it; and he does so when he practically abandons the struggle, and shows

no ability or intention of soon renewing it with any reasonable

prospect of success.

The notion of right, independent of the fact as applied to sovereignty,

is founded in error. Empty titles to states and kingdoms are of no

validity. The sovereignty is, under God, in the nation and the title

and the possession are inseparable. The title of the Palaeologi to the

Roman Empire of the East, of the king of Sicily, the king of Sardinia,

or the king of Spain--for they are all claimants--to the kingdom of

Jerusalem founded by Godfrey and his crusaders, of the Stuarts to the

thrones of England, Ireland, and Scotland, or of the Bourbons to the

throne of France, are vacated and not worth the parchment on which they

are engrossed. The contrary opinion, so generally entertained, belongs

to barbarism, not to civilization. It is in modern society a relic of

feudalism, which places the state in the government, and makes the

government a private estate--a private, and not a public right--a right

to govern the public, not a right to govern held from or by the public.

The proprietor may be dispossessed in fact of his estate by violence,

by illegal or unjust means, without losing his right, and another may

usurp it, occupy it, and possess it in fact without acquiring any right

or legal title to it. The man who holds the legal title has the right

to oust him and re-enter upon his estate whenever able to do so. Here,

in the economical order, the fact and the right are distinguishable,

and the actual occupant may be required to show his title-deeds.

Holding sovereignty to be a private estate, the feudal lawyers very

properly distinguish between governments de facto and governments de

jure, and argue very logically that violent dispossession of a prince

does not invalidate his title. But sovereignty, it has been shown, is

not in the government, but in the state, and the state is inseparable

from the public domain. The people organized and held by the domain or

national territory, are under God the sovereign nation, and remain so

as long as the nation subsists without subjection to another. The

government, as distinguished from the state or nation, has only a

delegated authority, governs only by a commission from the nation. The

revocation of the commission vacates, its title and extinguishes its

rights. The nation is always sovereign, and every organic people fixed

to the soil, and actually independent of every other, is a nation.

There can then be no independent nation de facto that is not an

independent nation de jure, nor de jure that is not de facto. The

moment a people cease to be an independent nation in fact, they cease

to be sovereign, and the moment they become in fact an independent

nation, they are so of right. Hence in the political order the fact and

the right are born and expire together; and when it is proved that a

people, are in fact an independent nation, there is no question to be

asked as to their right to be such nation.

In the case of the United States there is only the question of fact.

If they are in fact one people they are so in right, whatever the

opinions and theories of statesmen, or even the decisions of courts;

for the courts hold from the national authority, and the theories and

opinions of statesmen may be erroneous. Certain it is that the States

in the American Union have never existed and acted as severally

sovereign states. Prior to independence, they were colonies under the

sovereignty of Great Britain, and since independence they have existed

and acted only as states united. The colonists, before separation and

independence, were British subjects, and whatever rights the colonies

had they held by charter or concession from the British crown. The

colonists never pretended to be other than British subjects, and the

alleged ground of their complaint against the mother country was not

that she had violated their natural rights as men, but their rights as

British subjects--rights, as contended by the colonists, secured by the

English constitution to all Englishmen or British subjects. The denial

to them of these common rights of Englishmen they called tyranny, and

they defended themselves in throwing off their allegiance to George

III., on the ground that he had, in their regard, become a tyrant, and

the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance.

In the Declaration of Independence they declared themselves independent

states indeed, but not severally independent. The declaration was not

made by the states severally, but by the states jointly, as the United

States. They unitedly declared their independence; they carried on the

war for independence, won it, and were acknowledged by foreign powers

and by the mother country as the United States, not as severally

independent sovereign states. Severally they have never exercised the

full powers of sovereign states; they have had no flag--symbol of

sovereignty--recognized by foreign powers, have made no foreign

treaties, held no foreign relations, had no commerce foreign or

interstate, coined no money, entered into no alliances or confederacies

with foreign states or with one another, and in several respects have

been more restricted in their powers in the Union than they were as

British colonies.

Colonies are initial or inchoate states, and become complete states by

declaring and winning their independence; and if the English colonies,

now the United States, had separately declared and won their

independence, they would unquestionably have become separately

independent states, each invested by the law of nature with all the

rights and powers of a sovereign nation. But they did not do this.

They declared and won their independence jointly, and have since

existed and exercised sovereignty only as states united, or the United

States, that is, states sovereign in their union, but not in their

separation. This is of itself decisive of the whole question.

But the colonists have not only never exercised the full powers of

sovereignty save as citizens of states united, therefore as one people,

but they were, so far as a people at all, one people even before

independence. The colonies were all erected and endowed with their

rights and powers by one and the same national authority, and the

colonists were subjects of one and the same national sovereign. Mr.

Quincy Adams, who almost alone among our prominent statesmen maintains

the unity of the colonial people, adds indeed to their subjection to

the same sovereign authority, community of origin, of language,

manners, customs, and law. All these, except the last, or common law,

may exist without national unity in the modern political sense of the

term nation. The English common law was recognized by the colonial

courts, and in force in all the colonies, not by virtue of colonial

legislation, but by virtue of English authority, as expressed in

English jurisprudence. The colonists were under the Common Law,

because they were Englishmen, and subjects of the English sovereign.

This proves that they were really one people with the English people,

though existing in a state of colonial dependence, and not a separate

people having nothing politically in common with them but in the

accident of having the same royal person for their king. The union

with the mother country was national, not personal, as was the union

existing between England and Hanover, or that still existing between

the empire of Austria, formerly Germany, and the kingdom of Hungary;

and hence the British parliament claimed, and not illegally, the right

to tax the colonies for the support of the empire, and to bind them in

all cases whatsoever--a claim the colonies themselves admitted in

principle by recognizing and observing the British navigation laws.

The people of the several colonies being really one people before

independence, in the sovereignty of the mother country, must be so

still, unless they have since, by some valid act, divided themselves or

been divided into separate and independent states.

The king, say the jurists, never dies, and the heralds cry, "The king

is dead! Live the king!" Sovereignty never lapses, is never in

abeyance, and the moment it ceases in one people it is renewed in

another. The British sovereignty ceased in the colonies with

independence, and the American took its place. Did the sovereignty,

which before independence was in Great Britain, pass from Great Britain

to the States severally, or to the States united? It might have passed

to them severally, but did it? There is no question of law or

antecedent right in the case, but a simple question of fact, and the

fact is determined by determining who it was that assumed it, exercised

it, and has continued to exercise it. As to this there is no doubt.

The sovereignty as a fact has been assumed and exercised by the United

States, the States united, and never by the States separately or

severally. Then as a fact the sovereignty that before independence was

in Great Britain, passed, on independence to the States united, and

reappears in all its vigor in the United States, the only successor to

Great Britain known to or recognized by the civilized world.

As the colonial people were, though distributed in distinct colonies,

still one people, the people of the United States, though distributed

into distinct and mutually independent States, are yet one sovereign

people, therefore a sovereign state or nation, and not a simple league

or confederacy of nations.

There is no doubt that all the powers exercised by the General

Government, though embracing all foreign relations and all general

interests and relations of all the States, might have been exercised by

it under the authority of a mutual compact of the several States, and

practically the difference between the compact theory and the national

view would be very little, unless in cases like that of secession. On

the supposition that the American people are one political people, the

government would have the right to treat secession, in the sense in

which the seceders understand it, as rebellion, and to suppress it by

employing all the physical force at its command; but on the compact

theory it would have no such right. But the question now under

discussion turns simply on what has been and is the historical fact.

Before the States could enter into the compact and delegate sovereign

powers to the Union, they must have severally possessed them. It is

historically certain that they did not possess them before

independence; they did not obtain them by independence, for they did

not severally succeed to the British sovereignty, to which they

succeeded only as States united. When, then, and by what means did

they or could they become severally sovereign States? The United

States having succeeded to the British sovereignty in the

Anglo-American colonies, they came into possession of full national

sovereignty, and have alone held and exercised it ever since

independence became a fact. The States severally succeeding only to

the colonies, never held, and have never been competent to delegate

sovereign powers.

The old Articles of Confederation, it is conceded, were framed on the

assumption that the States are severally sovereign; but the several

States, at the same time, were regarded as forming one nation, and,

though divided into separate States, the people were regarded as one

people. The Legislature of New York, as early as 1782, calls for an

essential change In the Articles of Confederation, as proved to be

inadequate to secure the peace, security, and prosperity of "the

nation." All the proceedings that preceded and led to the call of the

convention of 1781 were based on the assumption that the people of the

United States were one people. The States were called united, not

confederated States, even in the very Articles of Confederation

themselves, and officially the United States were called "the Union."

That the united colonies by independence became united States, and

formed really one and only one people, was in the thought, the belief,

the instinct of the great mass of the people. They acted as they

existed through State as they had previously acted through colonial

organization, for in throwing off the British authority there was no

other organization through which they could act. The States, or people

of the States, severally sent their delegates to the Congress of the

United States, and these delegates adopted the rule of voting in

Congress by States, a rule that might be revived without detriment to

national unity. Nothing was more natural, then, than that Congress,

composed of delegates elected or appointed by States, should draw up

articles of confederation rather than articles of union, in order, if

for no other reason, to conciliate the smaller States, and to prevent

their jealousy of the larger States such as Virginia, Massachusetts,

and Pennsylvania.

Moreover, the Articles of Confederation were drawn up and adopted

during the transition from colonial dependence to national

independence. Independence was declared in 1776, but it was not a fact

till 1782, when the preliminary treaty acknowledging it was signed at

Paris. Till then the United States were not an independent nation;

they were only a people struggling to become an independent nation.

Prior to that preliminary treaty, neither the Union nor the States

severally were sovereign. The articles were agreed on in Congress in

1777, but they were not ratified by all the States till May, 1781, and

in 1782 the movement was commenced in the Legislature of New York for

their amendment. Till the organization under the constitution ordained

by the people of the United States in 1787, and which went into

operation in 1789, the United States had in reality only a provisional

government, and it was not till then that the national government was

definitively organized, and the line of demarcation between the General

Government and the particular State governments was fixed.

The Confederation was an acknowledged failure, and was rejected by the

American people, precisely because it was not in harmony with the

unwritten or Providential constitution of the nation; and it was not in

harmony with that constitution precisely because it recognized the

States as severally sovereign, and substituted confederation for union.

The failure of confederation and the success of union are ample proofs

of the unity of the American nation. The instinct of unity rejected

State sovereignty in 1787 as it did in 1861. The first and the last

attempt to establish State sovereignty have failed, and the failure

vindicates the fact that the sovereignty is in the States united, not

in the States severally.

The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny · 第 9 / 15 章