THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN.
On December 11th the boundary award was delivered to the Zulus
by four gentlemen selected for the purpose, who, by previous
arrangement, met the king’s envoys at the Lower Tugela Drift. The
award itself, as we already know, was in favour of the Zulus;
nevertheless it is impossible to read the terms in which it was given
without feeling that it was reluctantly done. It is fenced in with
warnings to the Zulus against transgressing the limits assigned to
them, without a word assuring them that _their_ rights also shall
in future be respected; and, while touching on _Zulu_ aggressions
on _Boers_ in the late disputed territory, it says nothing of those
committed _by_ Boers.
But perhaps the most remarkable phrase in the whole award is that in
which Sir Bartle Frere gives the Zulus to understand that _they_ will
have to pay the compensation due to the ejected Transvaal farmers,
while he entirely ignores all that can be said on the other side of
injuries to property and person inflicted on Zulus in the disputed
territory (of which the Blue-books contain ample proof), not to speak
of the rights and advantages so long withheld from them, and now
decided to be their due.
Sir Henry Bulwer plainly took a very different view on this point
when he summed up the judgment of the Commissioners (2220, p. 388),
and added as follows: “I would venture to suggest that it is a fair
matter for consideration if those Transvaal subjects, who have been
induced ... under the sanction, expressed or tacit, of the Government
of the Republic, to settle and remain in that portion of the country,
have not a claim for compensation from their Government for the
individual losses they may sustain.”
Sir Bartle Frere, starting with phrases which might be supposed
to agree with the above, gradually and ingeniously shifts his
ground through propositions for compensation to be paid to farmers
“_required_ or _obliged_ to leave” (omitting the detail of _who is to
pay_), and then for compensation to be paid to farmers _wishing_ to
remove, until he finally arrives, by a process peculiarly his own,
at a measure intended to “secure private rights of property,” which
eventually blossomed out into a scheme for maintaining, in spite of
the award, the Boer farmers on the land claimed by them, which we
shall presently relate in full. Although nothing appeared in the
award itself on this point, the whole tone of it was calculated to
take the edge off the pleasure which the justice done them at last
would naturally give the Zulus, and it was promptly followed up by an
“ultimatum” from the High Commissioner calculated to absorb their
whole attention.
This “ultimatum” contained the following thirteen demands, and was
delivered on the same day with the award, an hour later:
1. Surrender of Sihayo’s three sons and brother to be tried by
the Natal courts.
2. Payment of a fine of five hundred head of cattle for the
outrages committed by the above, and for Ketshwayo’s delay in
complying with the request (N.B., not _demand_) of the Natal
Government for the surrender of the offenders.
3. Payment of a hundred head of cattle for the offence committed
against Messrs. Smith and Deighton (N.B., twenty days were
allowed for compliance with the above demands, _i.e._ until
December 31st, inclusive).
4. Surrender of the Swazi chief Umbilini, and others to be named
hereafter, to be tried by the Transvaal courts (N.B., no time was
fixed for compliance with this demand).
5. Observance of the coronation “promises.”
6. That the Zulu army be disbanded, and the men allowed to go
home.
7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued, and other
military regulations adopted, to be decided upon after
consultation with the Great Council and British Representatives.
8. That every man, when he comes to man’s estate, shall be free
to marry.
9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in
Zululand, shall be allowed to return and reoccupy their stations.
10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach, and
any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to their
teaching.[111]
11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand, who
will see that the above provisions are carried out.
12. All disputes in which a missionary or European (_e.g._ trader
or traveller) is concerned, shall be heard by the king in
public, and in presence of the Resident.
13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out
until it has been approved by the Resident.
N.B.—Ten days more were allowed for compliance with the above
demands (4-13).
_The Natal Colonist_, August 21st, 1879, condenses the opinions of
Sir B. Pine upon the ultimatum—from his article in “The Contemporary
Review,” June, 1879—thus:
“He thinks the depriving Messrs. Smith and Deighton of their
handkerchiefs and pipes hardly a matter deserving of a place in such
a document; that the Sihayo and Umbilini affairs were more serious,
but that ‘full reparation ... might have been obtained by friendly
negotiations.’ He does not attach to the promises alleged to have
been made by Cetshwayo ‘the force of a treaty which we were bound to
see executed.’ And while approving of a British Resident being placed
in the Zulu country, he frankly recalls the fact that ‘Cetshwayo has
himself, on more than one occasion, requested such an arrangement.’
‘At the same time,’ he adds, ‘I think that the powers proposed to be
invested in this officer are more than are necessary or expedient,
and I would especially refer to those relating to the protection of
missionaries. Christianity ought not to be enforced at the point of
the sword.’ In reference to Cetshwayo’s alleged coronation promises,
we may note in passing that Sir B. Pine is careful to point out that
one chief reason for his sanctioning that expedition was ‘out of
deference to Mr. Shepstone’s judgment;’ and that it was expressly
stipulated by the High Commissioner that no British troops should
accompany Mr. Shepstone, ‘so that Her Majesty’s Government might
not be compromised in the matter.’ With such a stipulation it is
amazing that anyone should still contend that Cetshwayo entered into
engagements so solemn as to call for invasion of his country to
punish the breach of them.”
And the Special Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_ writes: “As regards
the alleged coronation engagements, Dunn affirms that no undertaking
was made by, or even asked from, Cetshwayo. In the act of coronation,
Mr. (now Sir T.) Shepstone gave to the king a piece of paternal
counsel, and the conditions were in reality nothing more than
recommendations urged upon his acceptance by the Special Commissioner.
“Lord Kimberley, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies at the
time of Sir T. Shepstone’s installation of Cetshwayo, spoke upon this
subject in the House of Lords;” which _The Daily News_, March 26th,
1879, reports as follows:
“With respect to the so-called coronation promises, nothing had more
astonished him in these papers than to learn that these promises were
supposed to constitute an engagement between us and the Zulu nation.
He happened to have had some concern in that matter; and if he had
supposed that Sir T. Shepstone, in asking for these promises from
Cetshwayo, had rendered us responsible to the Zulu nation to see that
they were enforced, he would not have lost a mail in disavowing any
such responsibility. He was supported in the view which he took by
the late Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon). The fact was that these
were friendly assurances, given in response to friendly advice, and
constituted no engagement. But Sir B. Frere put these ‘coronation
promises’ in the foreground.” Sir M. Hicks-Beach, also, says (2144,
p. 1): “It is obvious that the position of Sir T. Shepstone in this
matter was that of a friendly counsellor, giving advice to the king
as to the good government of the country.”
The demands which we have recorded were delivered to the Zulu envoys,
who were not allowed to discuss or comment upon them, on the ground
that the Commission had no authority for that purpose. The envoys,
indeed, appeared seriously concerned by their import. They denied
that the coronation stipulations had ever been disregarded, and said
that they could not understand why the Zulu army should be disbanded;
the army was a national custom with them as with the English. They
also asked for an extension of time, and considered that on such
important matters no specified time should have been fixed; the reply
to which request was that the time was considered ample.
Sir B. Frere, in his covering despatch to the Secretary of State,
remarks that the “enclosed extracts from demi-official letters,” from
the Hon. Mr. Brownlee and the Hon. Mr. Littleton, “give an outline
of the proceedings, and show that the messages were _carefully
delivered_, _well explained_, and _thoroughly understood_, copies
of the English text with Zulu translations being given to the Zulu
envoys.” On turning to “the enclosed extracts,” however, we do not
find in them a single word of the sort from either gentleman, while
the extract from Mr. Littleton’s letter consists of not a dozen lines
describing the spot where the meeting took place, and in which the
writer’s opinions are limited to these: “they (the Zulus) seemed to
take the award very quietly,” but “were evidently disturbed” by the
ultimatum, and “Mr. Shepstone seemed to me to manage very well.” The
young gentleman could not well say any more, as he did not know a
word of Zulu; but one is puzzled to know how Sir B. Frere draws his
deductions from either extract. How far the opinions of the other
honourable gentleman are to be depended upon, may be gathered from
the following assertion made by him some months after the Boundary
Commissioners had deliberately decided that the Boers had no claim
whatever to the disputed territory, but that it would be expedient to
allow them to retain the Utrecht district.
“The falsehood of the Zulu king with regard to the Utrecht land
question,” says Mr. Brownlee, “is quite on a par with his other
actions. After misleading the Natal Government upon the merits of the
case, it is now discovered on the clearest and most incontrovertible
proof[112] that a formal cession was made of this disputed land to
the Transvaal Republic.”
The special correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, however, writes about
this time as follows: “Dunn states that Cetshwayo does not, even
now, know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the
subsequent memorandum.[113] The document was read over once, and its
length was such (2222, pp. 203-9)—six pages of the Blue-book—that the
messengers could not possibly fix the whole of it in their memory.”
True, a copy was given to Dunn himself; but, for sufficient reasons
of his own, he did not make known the contents of the document in
person, but sent word to the king by his own messengers, between whom
and the indunas there was a considerable discrepancy. According to
Dunn, Cetshwayo was in a great fury upon hearing the word of the High
Commissioner (? as to the maintenance of Boer “private rights” over
his land). He reproached his adviser with having thwarted his purpose
to exact satisfaction at the hands of the Dutch, and doubly blamed
him for having represented the English as just in their intercourse
and friendly in their intentions. Until this time he had thought, as
Dunn himself had, that the congregation of troops upon his borders
represented nothing but an idle scare. But he saw at length that the
English had thrown the bullock’s skin over his head, while they had
been devouring the tid-bits of the carcass.
The three causes alleged in the ultimatum for war—the raid of
Sihayo’s sons, the assault on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, and the
proceedings of Umbilini—occurred long after Sir B. Frere had been
preparing for war, in the full expectation that the Border Commission
would decide against the Zulu claims, and that Cetshwayo would not
acquiesce peacefully in such a decision. It would seem, indeed, from
his remarks on the subject (Correspondence, Letters II. and IV.),
that he would have even set aside the decision of the Commissioners,
if he had found it possible to do so. Although he failed in doing
this, he sought to attain practically the same end by means of a
remarkable “memorandum,” prepared and signed by himself—not submitted
to Sir Henry Bulwer, but “_prematurely_” published in the Natal
newspapers.
The memorandum in question was on the appointment of a Resident in
Zululand, and, as Sir Bartle Frere himself says, “it was intended to
explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession
to him of the ceded territory,” and it contained the following
clause: “It is intended that in that district (the late disputed
territory) individual rights of property, which were obtained under
the Transvaal Government, shall be respected and maintained, so
that any Transvaal farmers, who obtained rights from the Government
of the Republic, and who may now elect to remain on the territory,
may possess under British guarantee the same rights they would have
possessed had they been grantees holding from the Zulu king under the
guarantee of the great Zulu council.”
The _whole_ of the disputed territory had been apportioned in farms
to Transvaal subjects, and without doubt every one of these farms
would immediately be claimed, since their value would be immensely
raised by the fact that in future they would be held “under British
guarantee.” Therefore, to thus maintain the farmers upon them without
regard to the wishes of the Zulu king and nation was simply to take
away piecemeal with one hand what had just been given as a whole with
the other.
This “memorandum” was hailed with triumph by some of the colonial
papers, and the news that, after all, the Zulus were to get no solid
satisfaction from the award, soon circulated amongst all classes, not
excluding the Zulus themselves.
It was upon this subject that the “Correspondence” between Sir Bartle
Frere and the Bishop of Natal, already referred to, commenced. In
December, 1878, the High Commissioner was good enough to invite
the Bishop, both by message and personally, to “criticise” his
policy towards the Zulus. The invitation, indeed, came far too
late for any arguments or information, which the Bishop might be
able to afford, to be of the very slightest use. However, the High
Commissioner desired criticism, and received it in a series of
letters, which—except the last two, withheld for some reason best
known to himself—were published, with Sir B. Frere’s replies, in the
Blue-books.
The Bishop pointed out that, under the interpretation of this
memorandum, “the award gives back the land in name only to the Zulus,
whereas in reality Ketshwayo will have no control over it; he will
not be able to exercise authority over his own people living on it,
without coming into collision immediately with their Boer masters,
who would fiercely resent any intrusion on his part on their farms;
he will not be able to send any of his people to live on it, or any
of his cattle to graze on it, or even to assign places in it to such
of his people as may elect to move from the Boer to the Zulu side
of the new boundary.”[114] To which Sir Bartle replies, that he had
“a strong impression[115] that, if Cetshwayo were simply told the
disputed land was assigned to him, he would at once conclude that it
was his in full Zulu sovereignty;” which he assumed to be impossible
with regard to any land which had once been under the British flag,
while to eject a settler who had bought the land from the Transvaal
Government, in the belief that it could maintain him upon it, he
regarded as an “unjust and immoral act.” In point of fact, the land
in question could only have been looked upon as “under the British
flag,” in trust for the rightful possessors, and the farmers had
settled upon it in the full knowledge that the title to it was in
dispute; while, even had it been otherwise as to the latter point,
the only just claim that could be raised would be against the Boer
Government, or its representative, and certainly not against the
right of the Zulu people to be restored to actual occupation of the
land.
But that from the first, and long before he left Capetown for Natal,
the High Commissioner was preparing for war with the Zulus, is
evident from his despatch and telegram of January 26th, 1878 (quoted
from at page 179), in the former of which he speaks of the delay
caused by the border inquiry being no disadvantage, as, besides other
reasons, it “will increase our means of defending whatever we may
find to be our unquestionable rights;” and in the latter he says
again: “I hope the delay caused will not be great, and whatever there
is will have compensating advantages, for I have some hopes of being
able to strengthen your hands.”
These phrases, indeed, might merely refer to Sir Bartle Frere’s
desire to be “ready to defend ourselves against further
aggressions;” but certain statements made by Commodore Sullivan show
that he had already in view the invasion of Zululand.
Extracts from these statements run as follows:
“I am informed by the Governor (Sir B. Frere) that there is every
chance of hostility in the debateable land between the Transvaal,
Zululand, and Natal.”—December 16th, 1877 (2000, p. 45).
“His Excellency (Sir B. Frere) pointed out to me that, as it appeared
almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the
Zulu tribe of Kafirs on the borders of Natal and the Transvaal, which
will necessitate active operations, he considered it better that the
_Active_ should remain here, in order to render such assistance by
sea and land as may be practicable.”—April 12th, 1878 (2144, p. 32).
“The object of my visit here was ... to make myself acquainted
with such points on the (Zulu) coast as might be available for
co-operating with Her Majesty’s land forces by landing troops or
stores.[116]
“It had been my intention (abandoned by Sir H. Bulwer’s desire) to
have examined the north of the Tugela River both by land and sea,
also a reported landing-place situated almost thirty miles eastward
of the Tugela by sea.”
The High Commissioner was plainly determined not to allow the Zulus
the slightest _law_, which, indeed, was wise in the interests of war,
as there was considerable fear that, in spite of all grievances and
vexations, Cetshwayo, knowing full well, as he certainly did, that
collision with the English must eventually result in his destruction,
might prefer half a loaf to no bread, and submit to our exactions
with what grace he could. And so probably he would; for, from all
accounts, every effort was made by the king to collect the fines of
cattle, to propitiate the Government.
Sir Bartle Frere, accordingly, was very particular in requesting Sir
Henry Bulwer to give Cetshwayo notice (C. 2222, p. 222) that “_rigid
punctuality with regard to time will be insisted on, and, unless
observed, such steps as may appear necessary will be immediately
taken to ensure compliance_,” which Sir H. Bulwer notifies to the
Zulu king upon the same day, December 16th (C. 2308, p. 31).
Two days later Mr. John Dunn wrote to say that he had received a
message from the king (2222, p. 227), requesting him “to write and
say that he agrees to the demands of giving up Sihayo’s sons and
brother, and the fines of cattle; but begs that, should the number
of days (twenty) have expired before the arrival of the cattle, His
Excellency will take no immediate action, as, owing to the many
heavy rains[117] we have had since the meeting of His Excellency’s
Commissioners and his indunas, they have not been able to reach him
yet; and Sihayo’s sons being at their kraals, which are some way from
him, it will take some days to send for them.”
“On the other demands he will give his answer on consulting his
indunas.”
Yet Sir Bartle Frere declares (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 136) that Cetshwayo
“was resolved on war rather than on compliance with any demand of
ours.”
Bishop Schreuder’s opinion, reported through Mr. Fannin on December
22nd (2308, p. 31), was that all the demands would be agreed to
except that of the disbandment of the army and the abolition of the
military system. “The king and nation will consider it a humiliation,
and a descent from their proud position as independent Zulus to
the lower and degrading position of Natal Kafirs, to agree to this
demand. I asked,” says Mr. Fannin, “if the announcement that the
restriction on marriage would be removed would not reconcile the
young men to the change. He (Bishop Schreuder) thinks not; they will
stand by their king, and fight for the old institutions of their
country.”
The king’s request for some indulgence as to time was peremptorily
refused, and was looked upon as “a pitiful evasion,” on the grounds
that he had already had four months to consider the question of
Sihayo’s sons. In point of fact, however, the first “demand” had only
been made a week before, and, until then, the word “request” having
been used, the king was at liberty to offer atonement for the offence
other than the surrender of the offenders, as Sir Henry Bulwer
himself suggested (2222, p. 173), by paying a fine of five thousand
head of cattle from the Zulu nation.
Sir B. Frere’s answer to Cetshwayo through Mr. Dunn (2222, p. 227)
was, “That the word of Government as already given, cannot now be
altered.
“Unless the prisoners and cattle are given up within the term
specified, Her Majesty’s troops will advance. But in consideration
of the disposition expressed in Mr. Dunn’s letter to comply with the
demands of Government, the troops will be halted at convenient posts
within the Zulu border, and will there await the expiration of the
term of thirty days without, in the meantime, taking any hostile
action unless it is provoked by the Zulus.”
And John Dunn adds on his own account (2308, p. 34), that the
king evidently does not attach sufficient importance to the time
stipulated. The cattle, he said, “are still being collected, and it
will be impossible now for them to be up in time.” John Dunn in the
same letter put in a petition on behalf of his own cattle and people,
saying that the latter would be willing to join in with any force
should they be required.
Meanwhile, from accounts given by Mr. Fannin (2308, pp. 35 and 37),
by Mr. Robson (2242, pp. 11, 12) (2308, p. 35), by Mr. Fynney (2308,
p. 36), and from other sources, it is plain that Cetshwayo was doing
his utmost to collect the required cattle in time, though hampered
in doing so by the extreme difficulty of complying in a hurry with
the other demands implying such radical changes in the administration
of the country, and exceedingly distressed at the turn affairs were
taking. Every report shows plainly enough that, far from desiring
war, and looking out for an opportunity to try their strength with
the English, the Zulu king and people, or the major part of it, were
thrown into utmost consternation by the menacing appearance of their
hitherto friendly neighbours. But all explanations were disregarded,
all requests for time treated as impudent pretexts, preparations on
our part for an invasion of Zululand were hurried on, while every
sign of agitation (the natural consequences of our own attitude) on
the other side of the border was construed into an intention on the
part of the Zulu king to attack Natal, and urged as an added reason
for our beginning hostilities. There were, at that time, no grounds
whatsoever for this supposition. It is plain enough that, when it
became apparent that war would be forced upon him by us, the Zulu
king contemplated nothing but self-defence, and that, during these
preliminaries to the unhappy campaign of 1879, there were numerous
occasions on which, by the exercise of a little patience, justice,
and moderation, any ruler less bent on conquering Zululand than was
Sir Bartle Frere could have brought matters to a peaceful issue,
without the loss of honour, men, and money which England has since
sustained.
Lord Chelmsford (then Lieut.-General the Hon. F. Thesiger) arrived
in Natal in August, 1878, and at once began his preparations for
the expected campaign. One of the measures upon which great stress
was laid was that of forming a native contingent to act with the
British troops. The original scheme for the organisation of this
contingent in case of necessity had been prepared and carefully
worked out by Colonel Durnford, R.E., and was based on his thorough
knowledge of the natives. During the eight years of his life in South
Africa he had had ample opportunity of learning, by experience, how
utterly and mischievously useless was the plan, hitherto invariably
followed, of employing disorganised, untrained bodies of natives as
troops under their own leaders, without any proper discipline or
control. The bravest men in the world would be apt to fail under such
circumstances; while mere bands of untaught savages, unaccustomed to
fighting and half-armed, had repeatedly proved themselves in former
campaigns excellent for running away, but otherwise useless except as
messengers, servants, and camp-followers. Added to which there was
no possibility of preventing such “troops” as these committing every
sort of lawless violence upon the wounded or captured enemy.
Colonel Durnford’s scheme was intended to meet both difficulties,
and, when laid before the General on his arrival in Natal, met with
his unqualified approval. So much was he struck with it that he was
at first disposed to entrust the organisation and chief command of
the entire contingent to one who, by the ability and completeness
with which he had worked out the scheme, proved himself the fittest
person to carry it out, and take command of the whole force. But the
General changed his mind, and decided to divide the native contingent
amongst the various columns, the details of its distribution being as
follows:
The 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent of three battalions
(Commandant Montgomery, Major Bengough, and Captain Cherry), and
five troops mounted natives formed No. 2 Column, commanded by
Lieut.-Colonel Durnford.
The 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under
Major Graves) was attached to No. 1 Column, commanded by Colonel
Pearson.
The 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under
Commandant Lonsdale) was attached to No. 3 Column, commanded by
Colonel Glyn, and about two hundred Natal Native Contingent were
attached to No. 4 Column, commanded by Colonel Wood.
Each battalion of Native Contingent was to consist of 5 staff and
90 officers and non-commissioned officers (white), and 110 officers
and non-commissioned officers and 900 privates (natives); the
native non-commissioned officer being armed with a gun, and being a
section-leader of 9 men armed with assegai and shield.
Lord Chelmsford speaks in various despatches (C. 2234) of this Native
Contingent in the following terms:
“The Lieut.-Governor, I am happy to say, has acceded to the request
I made some little time ago for the services of six thousand Natal
natives. I hope to be in a position to equip and officer them very
shortly” (p. 25).
“At the time of my arrival in the colony, three months ago, these
natives possessed no military organisation, nor had any arms provided
for them by Government.”
“The Natal Government have within the last fourteen days allowed me
to raise and organise seven thousand natives for service within or
without the border” (p. 26).
“The arrival of these officers (special service officers from
England) has also enabled me to place Imperial officers in command of
some of the battalions of native levies.”...
“The Natal Contingent consists of three regiments, two of two
battalions and one of three” (p. 39).
“There are in addition five troops of mounted natives and three
companies of pioneers.”...
“The pioneers have been raised, officered, and equipped under the
orders of the Natal Government, and are now placed at my disposal.
The remainder of the Contingent have been raised at the cost and
under the orders of the Imperial authorities” (p. 40).
In none of his despatches is there mention of any special officer
in connection with this native force, but the following officers
were responsible for the organisation of the various regiments: No.
1 Regiment and mounted contingent, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E.;
No. 2 Regiment, Major Graves; No. 3 Regiment, Commandant Lonsdale.
Great difficulties appear to have been thrown in the way of the
proper equipment, etc. of the native levies; but by untiring effort
and personal determination, better arrangements for pay, clothing,
and discipline were made for (at all events, a portion of) the levy
than had been known amongst South African troops. The indiscriminate
appointment of officers caused considerable trouble, illustrative
of which we may mention an anecdote. Men were repeatedly sent to
Lieut.-Colonel Durnford with orders from the military secretary
that they were to receive commissions, some of these unfitted by
disposition and education for the duties required of them. A friend
has lately furnished an instance very much to the point. “A young
fellow came one day to Colonel Durnford from Colonel Crealock, who
said he had served in the old colony, and boasted that _he_ knew how
to make Kafirs fight. ‘How is that?’ was the inquiry made. ‘Oh!’
replied the youth, ‘just to get behind them with a sjambok (_i.e._
whip)—that’s the way to do it!’ ‘All right,’ replied the Colonel
quietly; ‘I have just one piece of advice to give you though—_make
your will_ before you start! If you’re not stabbed by your own men,
you will deserve it.’”
How successful was the training of the men of the 2nd Column may
be judged by the behaviour of the “Natal Native Horse,” a body of
mounted men (Basuto, Edendale, and Zikali natives) who fought at
Isandhlwana; and did right good service throughout the campaign.[118]
He also raised, equipped, and trained the three companies of Native
Pioneers, organising two field-parks, and providing complete bridge
equipment for crossing the Tugela; besides preparing, mainly from
his own personal observations (having been at Ulundi in 1873, and in
Zululand on many occasions), the map of Zululand in universal use
during the campaign, and mentioned in despatches as “Durnford’s map.”
In reply to Sir Bartle Frere’s inquiries as to proposed movements of
troops up to Natal, Sir H. Bulwer writes, July 18th, 1878, that in
his opinion “it is desirable under the present circumstances, and
pending the final decision in the matter of the boundary dispute, to
avoid as much as possible any military demonstration, as liable to
be misunderstood and to be interpreted as showing our intention to
settle the question by force. The delay, too, that has occurred since
the sitting of the Commission might be attributed by the Zulu king to
our desire to make preparations, and it might be thought that we were
playing false.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 395).
And here we may appropriately refer to the opinion expressed by the
Home Government at a later date.
Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes to Sir B. Frere, 21st November, 1878:
“I trust that ... Cetywayo may have been informed that a decision
regarding the disputed boundary would speedily be communicated to
him. His complaint that the Lieut.-Governor of Natal ‘is hiding from
him the answer that has come from across the sea, about the land
boundary question, and is only making an excuse for taking time, so
as to surprise him,’ is not altogether an unnatural one for a native
chief situated in his circumstances, who is necessarily ignorant of
much that has passed on this subject, and of many of the causes to
which the delay is attributable. But it is a misunderstanding which
it should be the earnest endeavour of the Government to remove, and I
am confident that there is no need to impress upon you the importance
of losing no time in dealing with this question or the beneficial
effect which its satisfactory settlement may be expected to have upon
the strained relations which you describe as now existing between
the colony of Natal and the Zulu nation.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 322).
We must now briefly run through the principal points in despatches
bearing on the question of increasing the military strength in Natal.
Sir B. Frere, writing from Cape Town on September 10th, says: “I
have consulted General Thesiger on the subject. He is very unwilling
to ask for reinforcements on the Natal border without the full
concurrence of the Government of that colony, and I understand that
His Excellency Sir H. Bulwer is specially anxious that nothing should
be done in Natal which could possibly justify to the Zulu chief
the belief that we were preparing for active hostilities against
him. I confess that, as at present informed, I very imperfectly
comprehend the grounds on which the objections of His Excellency the
Lieut.-Governor, as I understand them, to strengthening the Natal
frontier are based.[119] They will doubtless be more fully explained
when I have the advantage of personal communication with him. In
the meantime I feel quite certain that the preservation or speedy
restoration of peace will be rendered much more certain if General
Thesiger had two more battalions of Her Majesty’s Army within his
reach.”—(P. P. [C. 2220] pp. 282, 283).
On September 14th, referring to the above despatch, Sir B. Frere
says he has “since received a telegraphic communication from
General Thesiger, in which he expresses his views in regard to his
military requirements in the event of hostilities breaking out with
the Zulus.” The General asks for six more special duty officers,
and fifteen captains or subalterns for transport duties. “General
Thesiger considers that an addition of two regiments would be
essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of
enormous advantage” (_ibid._ p. 254).
From Durban, Sir B. Frere telegraphs on September 23rd to Sir
M. Hicks-Beach: “I find that the urgency of supporting General
Thesiger’s request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust
there will be no delay in complying with his request to its fullest
extent” (_ibid._ p. 255).
There had been serious and disturbing reports of a Zulu force being
assembled on the Tugela River, for the ostensible purpose of hunting,
with reference to which Sir H. Bulwer writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach,
14th September, “on the subject of the gathering of a Zulu force
within a short distance of our border across the Tugela. You will
learn from these papers that the gathering has broken up, and the
Zulus returned home” (_ibid._ p. 270).
Sir M. Hicks-Beach, on October 17th, replies to Sir B. Frere’s
despatches of 14th and 23rd September, that “arrangements will be
made for the early despatch of some additional officers for special
duty. Her Majesty’s Government are, however, not prepared to comply
with the request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information
that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of
affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that,
by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of
forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert
the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo; and they cannot but
think that the forces now at your disposal in South Africa, together
with the additional officers about to be sent, should suffice to meet
any other emergency that may arise, without a further increase to the
Imperial troops” (_ibid._ p. 273).
On September 30th, Sir B. Frere writes from Pietermaritzburg: “I
regret that I find the position of affairs in this colony far more
critical even than I expected;” and, after a very exaggerated
description of the state of affairs, he says: “An attempt of native
tribes to combine to resist the white man and drive him back has
been long foreseen. There can be no doubt that this design is now in
process of attempted execution” (_ibid._ pp. 278-82).
Of the truth of this startling assertion, let Sir H. Bulwer’s
despatches, as well as after-events, speak.
Enclosed in this despatch of Sir B. Frere is General Thesiger’s
memorandum on the military requirements, and his sketch for a
defensive scheme for Natal, for which he requires “6000 natives, 600
mounted men, 6 guns, and 3 battalions of British infantry;” but he
remarks: “I cannot, however, conceal from myself that security from
invasion depends almost entirely upon the forbearance of Cetywayo;”
and says, “for defensive purposes alone, therefore, Natal and
Transvaal colonies require 3 battalions of infantry in addition to
what they have already got” (_ibid._ pp. 285, 286).
In reply, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes, 21st November: “The several
circumstances which you have reported as tending to cause an open
rupture do not appear, in themselves, to present any difficulties
which are not capable of a peaceful solution.... On a full review,
therefore, of all the circumstances reported by you, and influenced
by the strong representations made by Lord Chelmsford as to the
insufficiency of his present force to ensure the safety of the
European residents in Natal and the Transvaal, Her Majesty’s
Government have felt themselves justified in directing that further
reinforcements of troops, as well as the additional officers recently
placed under orders for special service, should be sent out to Natal,
and the necessary steps will at once be taken for this purpose. But
in conveying to you the decision at which, in compliance with your
urgent representations, Her Majesty’s Government have arrived, it is
my duty to impress upon you that in supplying these reinforcements it
is the desire of Her Majesty’s Government not to furnish means for a
campaign of invasion and conquest, but to afford such protection as
may be necessary at this juncture to the lives and property of the
colonists. Though the present aspect of affairs is menacing in a high
degree, I can by no means arrive at the conclusion that war with the
Zulus should be unavoidable, and I am confident that you, in concert
with Sir H. Bulwer, will use every effort to overcome the existing
difficulties by judgment and forbearance, and to avoid an evil so
much to be deprecated as a Zulu war” (_ibid._ pp. 320, 321).
On November 11th, the Lieut.-General says that he has just been
permitted by the Natal Government to raise and organise 7000
natives, and ventures “to express an opinion that the demand for
two extra battalions cannot be considered unreasonable even for
purely defensive purposes;” but he goes on to say: “a defensive plan,
however, cannot be considered as satisfactory unless there is the
possibility of taking the offensive at the right moment. This I am
doing my best to prepare for; and, so soon as my native contingent is
mobilised, I shall be ready, so far as my limited means will allow,
to enter Zululand, should such a measure become necessary.”—(P. P.
[C. 2222] p. 19).
On December 18th, Sir M. Hicks-Beach says: “I take this occasion,
however, of reminding you that it is the desire of Her Majesty’s
Government, in sending these reinforcements, to assist the local
Government as far as possible in providing for the protection of the
settlers in the present emergency, and not to furnish the means for
any aggressive operations not directly connected with the defence of
Her Majesty’s possessions and subjects” (_ibid._ p. 21).
On December 2nd, Sir B. Frere forwards copies of memoranda by Sir T.
Shepstone and Mr. Brownlee, in which the former proposes measures
which “involve the extinction of the Zulu power as it now is, and
the attempt to adopt them must, if decided upon, be made with the
knowledge that the Zulu chief will oppose them, whatever course the
headmen and common people may adopt” (_ibid._ p. 134).
Mr. Brownlee says plainly: “The time has arrived for decisive action;
we will never again have so favourable an opportunity as the present;
if it is lost, sooner or later we will be taken at a disadvantage”
(_ibid._ p. 138).
On December 10th, Sir B. Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach: “The
chance of avoiding war under such circumstances by any exercise of
prudence, or by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance or
reasonable compromise, may depend upon ourselves or upon the Zulus,
or upon the nature of the issues pending between us.... Can we then
rest on an armed truce?... After the most anxious consideration, I
can arrive at no other conclusion than that it is impossible to evade
the necessity for now settling this Zulu question thoroughly and
finally ... there is clearly no possibility of now evading bringing
matters to an issue with the Zulus” (_ibid._ pp. 183-85).
On the 23rd January, 1879, Sir M. Hicks-Beach acknowledges the
receipt of Sir B. Frere’s despatches containing “the demands with
which Cetywayo has been called upon to comply, together with your
own descriptions of the situation with which you have to deal, as
well as other very important memoranda by Sir H. Bulwer, Sir T.
Shepstone, and Mr. Brownlee,” and says, “I may observe that the
communications which had previously been received from you had not
entirely prepared them” (Her Majesty’s Government) “for the course
which you have deemed it necessary to take. The representations
made by Lord Chelmsford and yourself last autumn as to the urgent
need of strengthening Her Majesty’s forces in South Africa were
based upon the imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus,
and the inadequate means at that time at your disposal for meeting
it. In order to afford protection to the lives and property of the
colonists, the reinforcements asked for were supplied, and, in
informing you of the decision of Her Majesty’s Government, I took
the opportunity of impressing upon you the importance of using every
effort to avoid war. But the terms which you have dictated to the
Zulu king, however necessary to relieve the colony in future from
an impending and increasing danger, are evidently such as he may
not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war; and I regret that
the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so
imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would
have been involved in consulting Her Majesty’s Government upon a
subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetywayo should be
required to accept before those terms were actually presented to the
Zulu king” (_ibid._ pp. 187, 188).
The preliminary arrangements for the campaign were the formation of
four columns, with sufficient transport, etc. to enter Zululand at
different points, and concentrate on Ulundi.
No. 1 Column, Colonel Pearson, to assemble on the Lower Tugela,
garrison Fort Pearson, and cross and encamp on the Zulu side, under
the protection of the guns of the fort.
This Column at first was composed of 2 guns Royal Artillery, 1
company Royal Engineers, 2nd Battalion “The Buffs,” 99th Regiment,
Naval Brigade (2 guns and 1 Gatling), 1 squadron Mounted Infantry,
about 200 Natal Volunteers, 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (2
battalions), and 1 company Natal Native Pioneers.
No. 2 Column, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., to cover the Tugela, and
co-operate with Colonel Pearson, was almost entirely composed of
natives. Its strength, a rocket battery, 1st Regiment (3 battalions)
Natal Native Contingent, 315 “Natal Native Horse,” and 1 company
Natal Native Pioneers.
No. 3 Column, Colonel Glyn, C.B., to cross at Rorke’s Drift, when
the time granted the Zulu king had expired. “On the advance being
ordered,” it would “require two days for this column to reach a good
military position;” and it was to keep up communications “with the
columns on the left and right.” Strength of column, 6 guns Royal
Artillery, 1 squadron Mounted Infantry, 1-24th Regiment, 2-24th
Regiment, about 200 Natal Volunteers, 150 Mounted Police, and 3rd
Regiment (2nd Battalion) Natal Native Contingent, also one company
Natal Native Pioneers. A company of Royal Engineers was ordered to
join this column.
No. 4 Column, Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., to advance to the Blood
River. Strength, 6 guns Royal Artillery, 1-13th Regiment, 90th
Regiment, Frontier Light Horse, some 200 Native Contingent; and a
small Dutch force was expected to join this column.
A 5th Column (which had been operating against Sekukuni) was under
the command of Colonel Rowlands, V.C., C.B., composed of the 80th
Regiment, three guns, and mounted irregulars.
The strength of the columns is given as:
Imperial Native Conductors
and Contingent. and Waggons and Carts.
Colonial Troops. Drivers.
No. 1 Column 1872 2256 238 266 (144 hired)
” 2 ” 5 3488 84 30
” 3 ” 1747 2566 293 233 (82 ” )
” 4 ” 1843 387 162 102 (21 ” )
” 5 ” 1202 338 25 62 (50 ” )
Forming a grand total of
Imperial Native Conductors, Waggons, etc.
and Contingent. etc.
Colonial Troops.
6669 9035 802 693
(of which 297 were hired)
with about 1200 horses belonging to cavalry, etc., and 691 horses,
361 mules, and 5231 oxen. In addition, there were the conductors,
drivers, etc., and 4572 oxen of the hired waggons.
The columns to operate on the following bases and lines:
No. 1. Durban—Lower Tugela.
” 2. Pietermaritzburg, Greytown—Middle Drift (Tugela).
” 3. Ladysmith—Rorke’s Drift (Buffalo River).
” 4. Newcastle—Utrecht—Blood River.
” 5. Middleburg—Derby—Pongolo River.
Ulundi being the objective point of the force.
In place of any urgent necessity for commencing the war, putting
political questions on one side, there were strong military reasons
for postponing it.
Sir Bartle Frere, in his despatch of 30th June, 1879 (P. P. [C. 2454]
p. 137), seeks to prove that the time of moving across the border
was “well chosen,” and accorded with information received, yet the
fact remains that advice _was_ given that the most favourable time
for military operations in Zululand was between the periods of summer
rains and winter grass-fires—_i.e._ the months of March, April,
and May. In spite of Sir Bartle Frere’s pleas, we must hold that
no competent “military critic” would recommend invading an enemy’s
country during the rainy season, when rivers are in flood, plains in
many cases marshes, and roads almost impassable; especially if the
invading forces were required to move with a ponderous waggon-train.
Lord Chelmsford himself proves the case: he writes (January 12th)
on the day after crossing the border: “The country is in a terrible
state from the rain, and I do not know how we shall manage to get our
waggons across the valley near Sirayo’s kraals.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p.
43).
And again on January 14th, from the head-quarter camp, Zululand, near
Rorke’s Drift, he writes: “Between this camp and Greytown alone, a
distance of some seventy miles, three rivers are now impassable, and
waggons have to cross by ferries, a laborious operation requiring
more skilled labour than we at present have available.
“The road at various points requires the most constant supervision,
and in some parts the heavy rain frequently dislodges huge boulders
from the hill-sides overhanging the roadway, and in many places
watercourses become torrents after an hour’s rain.
“Beyond this camp towards the Izipezi Hill (my first objective point)
the road will require great labour to make it passable; but strong
working-parties have already been at work. The transport difficulties
are augmented by the great mortality in oxen; this is inevitable, but
it will probably decrease in a few weeks’ time” (_ibid._ p. 47).
It is believed that the first project of operations was to advance
in three lines on Ulundi—from the Lower Tugela, Rorke’s Drift, and
Blood River—the columns to move forward by short marches, entrenching
strongly at each halting-place, doing no injury to the Zulu people,
and thus inducing them to submit quietly. This wise and consistent
idea was unfortunately never even attempted.
On the 8th January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford writes: “All the reports
which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to
make raids into Natal[120] when the several columns move forward....
The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4, is only just
sufficient to enable them to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 26).
The directions for the various columns were, briefly—No. 1. To cross
the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered
to advance, to move on Etshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood,
to form a depôt, well entrenched.
No. 2. To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately,
reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the Middle Tugela frontier
till an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Etshowe.
The defence of the frontier was to rest with the Colonial Government;
but on the 8th January the General altered the instructions for No. 2
Column, and directed two-thirds of it to move up to the Sand Spruit
Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border, and to operate in
conjunction with No. 3 Column. The third battalion to remain at
Middle Drift.
No. 3 Column to cross at Rorke’s Drift when the thirty days expired;
to move forward and form an advanced depôt, strongly entrenched,
as found advisable from the nature of the country, etc. To assist
in clearing the border south-east of Rorke’s Drift, and to keep up
communication with the columns on left and right.
No. 4 Column to advance to the Blood River. “The civil authorities
on the border will take every care to warn the Zulus that our first
advance need not be deemed hostile, but that no collection of armed
natives in the vicinity of our forces can be permitted; no act on our
part to unnecessarily bring on hostilities should be permitted.”—(P.
P. [C. 2222] p. 223).
In the event of a further advance, the advanced depôt of this column
to be near the intersection of the roads from Utrecht to Ulundi,
and Rorke’s Drift to Swaziland; but “to delay its advance toward
the Umvolosi River until the border is cleared, and to move in a
southerly direction towards Colonel Glyn’s column to assist it
against Sirayo.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 27, 28).
On January 11th, the General met Colonel Wood, and arranged with
him that he should “occupy himself with the tribes in his front and
left flank,” till the General was “ready to advance to Izipezi Hill”
(_ibid._ p. 42).
By this unfortunate change of plan, the left of No. 3 Column was
exposed, of which the Zulus took fatal advantage.
We must now return to Sir Bartle Frere, who, considering that
he had “exhausted all peaceable means for obtaining redress for
the past, and security for the future,” “by a notification dated
the 4th of January, 1879, placed in the hands of Lieut.-General
Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., commanding Her Majesty’s forces in South
Africa, the further enforcement of all demands;” and remarks, “it
only remains for us to await the issue with perfect confidence in
the justice of our cause. The contest has not been provoked by the
British Government. That Government has done its best to avoid war
by every means consistent with honour.” An absolute truth as regards
the Home Government. “_That_” Government, as Sir B. Frere cleverly
remarks, “_had_ done its best to avoid war,” and did not see the
necessity, or, at all events, the immediate necessity, of that war
into which its servant, contrary to its instructions, plunged it.
The period allowed to Cetshwayo having expired, on the 11th January,
1879, the following notification was published in both English and
Zulu:
NOTIFICATION.
_January 11th, 1879._
The British forces are crossing into Zululand to exact from
Cetywayo reparation for violations of British territory committed
by the sons of Sirayo and others; and to enforce compliance with
the promises, made by Cetywayo at his coronation, for the better
government of his people.
The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people. All
Zulus who come in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be
provided for till the troubles of their country are over; and
will then, if they please, be allowed to return to their own
land; but all who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies.
When the war is finished, the British Government will make the
best arrangements in its power for the future good government of
the Zulus in their own country, in peace and quietness, and will
not permit the killing and oppression they have suffered from
Cetywayo to continue.
H. B. E. FRERE,
_High Commissioner_.
(This is followed by a translation in the Zulu language.)
“This,” Sir B. Frere says, is “a message to the Zulu population which
the General will make as widely known as possible.”—(P. P. [C. 2242]
p. 24).
On December 29th, Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, writes at the request
of the Lieut.-General Commanding to the Lieut.-Governor of Natal
that the General “has taken the opportunity offered by the return of
Sintwangu and Umpepa to send the following message to the Zulu king:
“‘That, in the event of the cattle demanded as a fine, together with
Sirayo’s sons and brother, not being delivered before the expiration
of the time allowed, Her Majesty’s troops will occupy Zulu territory
without delay.
“‘2. That no forward movement into Zululand will be made till the
expiration of the thirty days; but at the end of that time, if all
the demands are not complied with, the troops will advance.
“‘3. That such advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation,
but against the king, who has broken the promises he made at his
coronation. So that in the event of hostilities, all Zulu subjects
willing to lay down their arms, and wishing to take refuge in British
territory, will be fed and protected till such time as peace is
restored, when they will be at liberty to return to their homes; but
that all who remain in Zululand will be considered as enemies.
“‘5. That these are His Excellency’s instructions, which he intends
to carry out to the best of his ability.’” (P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39).
On the 11th January, Lord Chelmsford, with No. 3 Column, crossed
the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift, the infantry crossing on a
barrel-raft, a punt, and a small boat; the cavalry and natives by a
ford lower down the river. The force encamped in the Zulu country
where it crossed.
The General, with the cavalry, rode to the left to meet Colonel
Wood—commanding No. 4 Column, which was at Bemba’s Kop—about
thirty-five miles off. They met about halfway. Colonel Wood, on his
return, commenced operations against the Zulus by seizing some 2000
cattle belonging to Inkomi and Sihayo, the Zulus only making “a show
of resistance.” In addition to this, Colonel Wood reports, on the
13th January, that he had also captured 2000 or 3000 head of cattle
from the Sondolosi tribe, and on the same day an attack was made on a
petty chief, Mbuna, whose men refused to disarm, and seven Zulus were
killed.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 45).
Colonel Wood crossed the Blood River on the 6th January, and here we
must leave No. 4 Column for the present.
No. 1 Column had some difficulty in effecting the passage of the
Tugela, the river being in flood. The fortunes of this column will be
followed in a future chapter.
Colonel Durnford, No. 2 Column, reported to the General (on his
return to camp on the 11th) that the country in his front was quite
quiet. He then returned to his command with further instructions as
to its disposition, when “he and the mounted men and rocket battery
were to join me with No. 3 Column,” writes the General on January
14th.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 47).
On the 11th, the General writes: “Both Colonel Wood and Major Russell
took a good number of Sirayo’s cattle this morning, which we found
quietly grazing along our line of advance.” And again: “Several
hundred head of cattle, etc. were taken by Nos. 3 and 4 Columns
on the 11th. This I considered desirable on political grounds, as
they all belonged to Usirayo, as well as from military necessities”
(_ibid._ pp. 43-46). It is rather difficult to reconcile this
commencement of operations with the words “The British Government
has no quarrel with the Zulu people;” or with the General’s message
to the Zulu king (through Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, and the Zulu
messengers Sintwangu and Umpepa, December 29th, 1878) ... “if all
the demands are not complied with the troops will advance. That such
advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation, but against the
King....”—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39).
On the 12th January, No. 3 Column first came into contact with the
Zulus. The General made a reconnaissance in the Bashi Valley and
towards Izipezi Hill. Sihayo’s people were seen driving the cattle
to the shelter of the hills, “as, however,” the General says, “it is
well known that we had made a distinct demand for the punishment of
the sons of this chief, and that his clan was one of the bravest and
most warlike of the Zulu nation, I considered it very desirable to
punish them at once by capturing their cattle.”
The Ingqutu Mountain was occupied by infantry, when “a fire was
opened upon them by the Zulus, who were occupying very strong
positions in the caves and rocks above.” An officer present states
that the actual first shot was from the side of the British, but
this is not of great importance, as it is impossible to imagine the
Zulus could have been expected to look calmly on, whilst their cattle
were being captured. After about half-an-hour’s fight the cattle and
horses were taken. The mounted force was likewise engaged higher up
the mountain. Our loss, 2 Native Contingent killed and 12 wounded.
The loss inflicted on the enemy, 30 killed, 4 wounded, and 10
prisoners; the cattle, etc. taken, 13 horses, 413 cattle, 332 goats,
and 235 sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 47, 48).
These first steps in Zululand have been given in considerable detail,
as they afford much food for reflection on the contrast between
“words” and “deeds.”