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NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION
VOLUME III
Office of United States
Chief of Counsel For Prosecution
of Axis Criminality
[Illustration]
United States Government Printing Office
Washington · 1946
Sold in complete sets
by the
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
CONTENTS
_Pages_
Document number 001-PS through document number 1406-PS, arranged
numerically 1-1003
(A descriptive list of documents appears at the end of the last
volume.)
A Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by
the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the
International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
--against--
HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP, ROBERT
LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS
FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT,
GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER,
BALDUR von SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN,
FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN von
NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the
Following Groups or Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged,
Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN
LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly know as
the "SS") and including DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the
"SD"); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known
as the "GESTAPO"); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known
as the "SA") and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN
ARMED FORCES all as defined in Appendix B of the Indictment,
Defendants.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 001-PS
Copy to Regional Leader of the NSDAP
Extract of par. 1 to DEGENHARD 15 April
SECRET
Documentary Memorandum for the Fuehrer
_Concerning_: Jewish Possessions in France
In compliance with the order of the Fuehrer for protection of Jewish,
cultural possessions, a great number of Jewish dwellings remained
unguarded. Consequently, many furnishings have disappeared, because
a guard could, naturally, not be posted. In the whole East, the
administration has found terrible conditions of living quarters, and
the chances of procurement are so limited that it is not practical to
procure any more. Therefore, I beg the Fuehrer to permit the seizure of
all Jewish home furnishings of Jews in Paris, who have fled, or will
leave shortly, and that of Jews living in all parts of the occupied
West, to relieve the shortage of furnishings in the administration in
the East.
2. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short examination in
Paris, again released. The attempts on the lives of members of the
armed forces have not stopped, on the contrary they continue. This
reveals an unmistakable plan to disrupt the German-French cooperation,
to force Germany to retaliate, and, with this, evoke a new defense
on the part of the French against Germany. I suggest to the Fuehrer
that, instead of executing 100 Frenchmen, we substitute 100 Jewish
bankers, lawyers, etc. It is the Jews in London and New York who incite
the French communists to commit acts of violence, and it seems only
fair that the members of this race should pay for this. It is not the
_little_ Jews, but the _leading_ Jews in France, who should be held
responsible. That would tend to awaken the Anti-Jewish sentiment.
BERLIN 18 Dec 1941
R/H
signed: A. ROSENBERG
COPY OF DOCUMENT 001-A-PS
19 November 1945
I, Major William H. Coogan, 0-455814, Q.M.C., a commissioned officer of
the Army of the United States of America, do hereby certify as follows:
1. The United States Chief of Counsel in July 1945 charged the Field
Branch of the Documentation Division with the responsibility of
collecting, evaluating and assembling documentary evidence in the
European Theater for use in the prosecution of the major Axis war
criminals before the International Military Tribunal. I was appointed
Chief of the Field Branch on 20 July 1945. I am now the Chief of the
Documentation Division, Office of United States Chief of Counsel.
2. I have served in the United States Army for more than four years
and am a practicing attorney by profession. Based upon my experience
as an attorney and as a United States Army officer, I am familiar with
the operation of the United States Army in connection with seizing
and processing captured enemy documents. In my capacity as Chief of
the Documentation Division, Office of the United States Chief of
Counsel, I am familiar with and have supervised the processing, filing,
translation and photostating of all documentary evidence for the United
States Chief of Counsel.
3. As the Army overran German occupied territory and then Germany
itself, certain specialized personnel seized enemy documents, books,
and records for information of strategic and tactical value. During
the early stages such documents were handled in bulk, and assembled
at temporary centers. However, after the surrender of Germany, they
were transported to the various document centers established by Army
Headquarters in the United States Zone of Occupation. In addition
to the documents actually assembled at such document centers, Army
personnel maintained and secured considerable documents "in situ" at
or near the place of discovery. When such documents were located and
assembled they were catalogued by Army personnel into collections and
records were maintained which disclosed the source and such other
information available concerning the place and general circumstances
surrounding the acquisition of the documents.
4. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division was staffed by
personnel thoroughly conversant with the German language. Their task
was to search for and select captured enemy documents in the European
Theater which disclosed information relating to the prosecution of
the major Axis war criminals. Officers under my command were placed
on duty at various document centers and also dispatched on individual
missions to obtain original documents. When documents were located, my
representatives made a record of the circumstances under which they
were found and all information available concerning their authenticity
was recorded. Such documents were further identified by Field Branch
pre-trial serial numbers, assigned by my representatives who would then
periodically dispatch the original documents by courier to the Office
of the United States Chief of Counsel.
5. Upon receipt of these documents they were duly recorded and indexed.
After this operation, they were delivered to the Screening and Analysis
Branch of the Documentation Division of the Office of United States
Chief of Counsel, which Branch re-examined such documents in order to
finally determine whether or not they should be retained as evidence
for the prosecutors. This final screening was done by German-speaking
analysts on the staff of the United States Chief of Counsel. When the
document passed the screeners, it was then transmitted to the Document
Room of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, with a covering
sheet prepared by the screeners showing the title or nature of the
document, the personalities involved, and its importance. In the
Document Room, a trial identification number was given to each document
or to each group of documents, in cases where it was desirable for the
sake of clarity to file several documents together.
6. United States documents were given trial identification numbers in
one of five series designated by the letters: "PS", "L", "R", "C", and
"EC", indicating the means of acquisition of the documents. Within each
series documents were listed numerically.
7. After a document was so numbered, it was then sent to a
German-speaking analyst who prepared a summary of the document with
appropriate references to personalities involved, index headings,
information as to the source of the document as indicated by the Field
Branch, and the importance of the document to a particular phase of the
case. Next, the original document was returned to the Document Room
and then checked out to the photostating department, where photostatic
copies were made. Upon return from photostating, it was placed in an
envelope in one of several fireproof safes in the rear of the Document
Room. One of the photostatic copies of the document was sent to the
translators, thereafter leaving the original itself in the safe. A
commissioned officer has been, and is, responsible for the security of
the documents in the safe. At all times when he is not present the safe
is locked and a military guard is on duty outside the only door. If the
officers preparing the certified translation, or one of the officers
working on the briefs, found it necessary to examine the original
document, this was done within the Document Room in the section set
aside for that purpose. The only exception to this strict rule has
been where it has been occasionally necessary to present the original
document to the defendants for examination. In this case, the document
was entrusted to a responsible officer of the prosecution staff.
8. All original documents are now located in safes in the Document
Room, where they will be secured until they are presented by the
prosecution to the court during the progress of the trial.
9. Some of the documents which will be offered in evidence by the
United States Chief of Counsel were seized and processed by the British
Army. Also, personnel from the Office of the United States Chief of
Counsel and the British War Crimes Executive have acted jointly in
locating, seizing and processing such documents.
10. Substantially the same system of acquiring documentary evidence was
utilized by the British Army and the British War Crimes Executive as
that hereinabove set forth with respect to the United States Army and
the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel.
11. Therefore, I certify in my official capacity as hereinabove stated,
to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the documents captured
in the British Zone of Operations and Occupation, which will be
offered in evidence by the United States Chief of Counsel, have been
authenticated, translated, and processed in substantially the same
manner as hereinabove set forth with respect to the operations of the
United States Chief of Counsel.
12. Finally, I certify, that all Documentary evidence offered by the
United States Chief of Counsel, including those documents from British
Army sources, are in the same condition as captured by the United
States and British Armies; that they have been translated by competent
and qualified translators; that all photostatic copies are true and
correct copies of the originals and that they have been correctly
filed, numbered and processed as above outlined.
[Signed] WILLIAM H. COOGAN
Major, QMC, O-455814
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 002-PS
SECRET
25 March 1943
President of Reich Research Dept.
Head of Executive Council
To the Reichsminister of Finance
Berlin W 8
Wilhelmplatz 1-2
Ref 503/43 G SR/GE
In regard to your correspondence of the 19th Dec (J 4761-174 I g III.
Ang) to which I gave you a preliminary communication on the 19th Feb, I
finally take the following position:
The Surgeon General-SS and Police, in a personal discussion, told me
that the budget which he administers concerns primarily the purely
military sector of the Waffen SS. As for the small part used for the
enlarging of scientific research possibilities, it pertains exclusively
to such affairs that can be carried out only with the material
(prisoners), which is accessible to the Waffen SS and can therefore not
be undertaken by any other experimental agency.
I cannot object therefore on the part of the Reich Experimental Counsel
against the budget of the Surgeon General-SS and Police.
Signed: Mentzel
Ministerialdirektor
SECRET
Reich Leader SS
Reich Surgeon SS and Police
File: 135/ Secret / 43 TG, NR 24/43 geh.
Berlin 26 Feb 43
Subj.: Scientific Institutes
Ref to: Correspondence of 19 Feb. 43 Rf. 234/43 SR.--
To the Head of the Executive Counsel of the Reich Research
Counsel Ministerialdirektor Mentzel
Berlin-Steglitz
Grunewaldstrasse 35
My dear Ministerialdirektor:
In acknowledgment of your letter of the 19th Feb 1943, I am able to
reply the following to it today:
The appropriation for the 53 key positions for my office which you made
the basis of your memorandum was planned for peace times.
The special institutes of the SS which are to be partly staffed through
this appropriation are to serve the purpose to establish and make
accessible for the entire realm of scientific research, the particular
possibilities of research only possessed by the SS.
In view of the further developments of this war, I have already shelved
this plan for the time being as the result of negotiations with
the Reich Finance Minister in the past year, so that my authorized
personnel amounts to 25 key positions only. Of these positions, only 5
are filled at present.
Under these circumstances your objections with regard to an
unreasonable overlapping of work of scientific institutes for the war's
duration are void.
I will gladly be at your disposal at any time, however, to discuss the
particular research aims in connection with the SS, which I would like
to start after the war according to the direction of the Reich leader
SS.
Furthermore, it is important that these researches--once their
realization appears possible, will be tied in with the related research
aims of the state.
Hoping to have served you with my preliminary summary, I remain with
best greetings and
Heil Hitler
GRAWITZ
* * * * *
25 March 1943
Pres. of Reich Research Counsel
Head of Executive Counsel
To the Surgeon General SS and Police SS Lt. Gen. Prof. Dr.
Grawitz
Berlin W 15
Knesebeckstr. 51
Rf. 504/43 g SR/Ge.
Pertaining to: Letter of 26 Feb. 43
File: 135/geh. 43-Tgb.--Nr. 24/43 g.
I am sending the enclosed carbon copy of my letter to the
Reichsminister of Finance in regard to the conversation of 11 March,
this year, for your information.
Heil Hitler!
[rubber stamp] Signed: Mentzel
Ministerialdirektor SS Major General
Berlin-Steglitz
Grunewaldstr. 35
19 Feb 43
Pres. Reich Research Counsel
Head of Executive Counsel
To the Surgeon General SS and Police SS Lt. Gen. Prof. Dr.
Grawitz
W 15 Knesebeckstr. 51
RECEIPT
---------------+-----------+---------------
Letter Nr. | Date | Nr. of Pieces
-------------------------------------------
Rf. 234/43 Sr. | 19 Feb 43 | 1
---------------+-----------+---------------
Sent on: 20 Feb 43
Received on: 22 Feb 43
[Seal] [Signature illegible]
SS Lt. Col.
Signature of person receiving and opened registered letter
* * * * *
SECRET
19 Feb 43
Reich Research Counsel
Rf. 234/43 Sr.
The Head of Executive Counsel of the Reich Research Counsel
To the Surgeon General SS and Police SS Lt. Gen. Prof. Dr.
Grawitz
Berlin W. 15
Knesebeckstr. 51
The Reich minister of finance told me that you requested 53 leading
positions (BES. GR C3-C8) for your office, partly for a new research
institute.
After the Reichsmarshall of the Great-German Reich had, as President of
the Reich Research Counsel, taken over all German research, he issued
directives, among other things, that in the execution of militarily
important scientific tasks, the available institutions, including
equipment and personnel, should be utilized to the utmost for reasons
of necessary economy of effort.
The founding of new institutes is therefore only possible in as far as
there are no institutes available for the furtherance of important war
research tasks.
As I don't know your personal purpose and have insufficient information
from the explanation the Reich finance minister gave me about the
planned institute, I would be thankful if you would further explain
your plans and purposes.
I will gladly be at the disposal of one of your co-workers for an
interview or would be ready to call upon you personally.
I wish you would inform me as to when and where these discussions may
take place.
Heil Hitler!
[rubber stamp] Signed: Mentzel
Ministerialdirektor SS Major General
* * * * *
SECRET
19 Feb. 1943
REICH RESEARCH COUNSEL
Rf. 232/43 Sr.
To the Reich Minister of Finance
Head of Executive Counsel of the Reich Research Counsel
Berlin W. 8
Wilhelmplatz 1-2
You notified me on the 19th Dec. (J4761-174 I g III, Ang) concerning
the research work by the Surgeon General SS and Police, and asked
me what stand I take. Since the work of the state chief of research
started originally in the armament department, I was unable to clear
up any questions pertaining to the medical department, which came up
in the last weeks. But I shall do so in the near future, and I believe
I can already say that the new institutes requested by the surgeon
general of SS and police will be unnecessary since other institutes can
cover these planned missions.
I shall have a conference with the surgeon general SS and police
pertaining to details of this planned work and, at that time, I shall
let you know what my final stand will be. I would like to suggest,
therefore, to defer the decisions at this time.
In this connection I state that the health officer, State Secretary
Conti approached the president of the research counsel requesting funds
to establish an institute for virus research in Frankfurt on Main.
Investigations to date have shown that the institute is not necessary
since the planned work can, without doubt, be done * * *
* * * * *
Pres. Reich Research Counsel
Head of Executive Counsel
Berlin-Steglitz 19 Feb. 43
Grunewaldstr. 35
To the Reichsminister of Finance
W. 8, Wilhelmplatz 1-2
RECEIPT
---------------+-----------+--------------
Letter Nr. | Date | Nr. of Pieces
---------------------------+--------------
Rf. 232/43 Sr. | 19 Feb 43 | 1
---------------+-----------+--------------
Sent on: 2 Feb. 43
Received on:
Received 22 Feb. 43 Reich Finance Minister
[Seal] [Signature illegible]
Signature of person receiving and opening
* * * * *
SECRET
The Reich Minister of Finance
J4761-174 I g III, Ang
Berlin 19 Dec. 1942
Wilhelmplatz 1/2 Tel. 120015 Postal Check Acct. Berlin Nr. 25955
Assumption of Research Mission By the Surgeon General SS and
Police
The surgeon general SS and police has requested 53 key positions for
the new organization of his office (Bes. Gr. C3-38). The organization
plan shows that the surgeon general SS and police plans not only
special experts for "Research" in pharmaceutical chemistry, in dental
and clinical services and a special section of scientific service, but
also that plans are desired for a string of institutes which likewise
deal mainly with research work:
1. Central Institute for Medical Scientific Exploitation
2. Institute for the History of Medicine
3. Pharmaceutical Chemistry Research Institute
4. Pharmacy for Military Requirements
5. Special Institute Sachenhausen
6. Pathological Institute
7. Hygienic Research Institute
In the informal discussions it was referred to the fact that the plans
for the research arrangements for the Waffen-SS can only be granted if
the research missions which the Surgeon General SS embarked upon are
not already undertaken by other independent institutes, resp. by the
universities, or belong to their sphere.
The Hygienic Institute, according to the proposed plan, includes the
following seven divisions:
1. Division for combating epidemics with bacteriological and
serological laboratories
2. Division for hygiene with corresponding laboratories
3. Division for chemistry with chemical laboratories
4. Division for geology and hydrology
[Reich Research Counsel
In care of Ministerialdirektor, Prof. Dr. Mentzel]
5. Division for climatology and geography, especially in preparation
for cultural waging of war in sub tropical and tropical lands in Africa
6. Division for statistics and epidemic forecast which will, with new
developments, work against the spreading of epidemics for the coming
years
7. Division for the elimination of epidemics which will chiefly
concern itself with new installation of apparatus for delousing and
sterilization of drinking water for the fighting troops
I lack accurate data for other institutes. I have set aside the
decision on this budget.
Regarding the decree of the Fuehrer of the 9th June 42, (RGBL. I, 389),
and the emphasized necessity of coordinated scientific research, I ask
for your immediate opinion on the matter.
By order of
Signed: Dr. Bender
Certified Cunsich Chief Tax Secretary
(RGBL I 389)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 003-PS
A Short Report of the Activity of the Foreign Policy Office (APA)
The mission of the Foreign Policy Office (APA) of the National
Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) could not from its founding be
considered a replica of the development of the Foreign Office, but is
restricted in a very definite manner. From the entire foreign policy
complex the following concrete problems have been selected:
_The German-English Relationship, the North Eastern Region, the South
Eastern Region (Danube Region) along with boundary peoples holding
interests in these regions, and Soviet Russia._
With the realization that the entire present day foreign policy is tied
together in the closest manner with the question of foreign trade, a
definite division was established to deal with this subject. Thus the
following divisions were set up in the APA.:
England, the North, the South-East Region, the Near East, Foreign
Trade, and the Press.
_1. England_: The attempts to find persons in England who had the
desire to understand the German movement date back to 1929. Our English
agent R. in Berlin made possible my first trip to London in 1931. There
a number of connections were made which worked out well in a practical
fashion to bring about a German-English understanding. Above all was
Group Leader W., member of the Air General Staff, who was firmly of
the belief that Germany and England must stand together in the defense
against the Bolshevist danger. These different voicings of opinions had
the result that the circle in the English Air General Staff enlarged
and the Flying Club became a center of German-English understanding.
In 1934 Group Leader W. came to Germany where he was received by the
Fuehrer (Hitler). The utterances of the Fuehrer had the result to
further strengthen these already favorably inclined policies, and since
this time this cordiality has not been broken. The Air General Staff
always inquired of us what they could state to refute the anti-German
elements in London in a manner favorable to us. The German arguments
were then applied in a corresponding manner. In contrast to certain
English persons who would speak out very fervently for Germany, only
to speak the contrary some months later, this staunch group, namely,
the Air General Staff which was run by the younger officers, had proven
itself to be a solid and conscious support in all changing situations.
Not least in this influence was the great speech of Baldwin of the
previous year in which he promised Germany the right to air protection.
The English periodical "The Airplane" which is printed under the
guidance of the Air General Staff, began to express against Bolshevism
in an always increasing sharper tone, and always declared, when there
was agitation against German militarism, that one could today feel
well pleased if Germany had a strong air force to combat the Asiatic
barbarism. The English ministers who did not wish to adopt this point
of view were sharply criticized. In the change of foreign ministers the
pro-French candidate for foreign office was not selected, but rather
the ex-Minister of Air, Samuel Hoare, who till this day still keeps
up his personal contacts with the Air Ministry. Upon his request a
memorandum on the spiritual foundation of national socialism, inspired
by us, was translated to him; it being his desire to understand our
movement more fully.
During the reign of MacDonald this feeling of cordiality was supported
through the private secretary of MacDonald, Mr. Badlow whom I also met
in 1933 and with whom I had extensive discussions. Since this time he
has constantly been informed through us, and has had more than one
heated difference of opinion with MacDonald over this subject.
A resulting activity of this connection with the British Air General
Staff was the establishment of a liaison between our Air Ministry
and the British fliers. However, before it was possible for us to
reveal our armament, W. revealed to me on official stationery of the
British Air Ministry, a representative of the airplane motor factory
which was engaged in producing motors for the British Air Force,
and which said representative I later met here in Berlin. Since the
German industry itself had attained production capacity by now, this
almost official British offer for German air arming could not be fully
accepted. However, the Chief of our England Division (Kapitaenleutnant
Obermueller, reserve) took two representatives of the German Air
Ministry to London and himself undertook several trips to London. He
was the first German to receive an invitation from the vice-Air Marshal
to view the British Air Force and British air strength. The APA had
placed an automobile at the disposal of this same Air Marshal in which
to tour Germany when he was in Germany last year. A firmer bond has
also been accomplished between our English Division and Henry Deterding
and his associates. Misunderstandings in matter of taxes pertaining to
the German possessions of Deterding could be removed, thus preventing
a change of management in respect to Deterding and the Shell Works
whereby Germany would have lost some large contracts.
At the close of last year we received the message that the King
of England has expressed himself to be very dissatisfied over the
official press agency. The visit of the Duke of Kent to Munich had
made matters still worse pertaining to the King's views on the press
agency. Consequently we one day received the request from London to
make possible that our English agent take a trip to London in order
to orient the Duke of Kent in every detail pertaining to national
socialism in order to convey this information to the King. R. went with
me to London exactly as requested and there had an over three hour
long unobserved conference with the Duke of Kent, who then conveyed
this to the King of England. One can assume that this instruction has
served its purpose and exerted a definite strengthening pressure for
change of cabinet and head it in a direction of closer cordiality for
Germany.
A number of Englishmen were invited to the Party Day of 1934, of which
some at least portrayed a favorable attitude towards Germany. Above
all was Captain McCaw, semi-official counsel of the English Ministry
of War and liaison man between other ministries. McCaw was previously
adjutant to Lord Kitchener, and as we ascertained, has worked for a
German-British understanding in official quarters. Besides, there was
also the truly enthusiastic adjutant of the Duke of Connaught (uncle of
the English King), Archibald Boyle, who was called upon all matters of
foreign policy by the Air Transport Ministry, and who worked for the
same purpose. To these important contacts may be added a great number
of other connections with British politicians, officers, and members of
Parliament.
It naturally is to be understood that other personalities of the Nazi
Party (NSDAP) had important connections in England and have utilized
them. In conclusion I believe I can say that the England Division of
the Foreign Policy Office (APA), in spite of many difficulties and
counter-currents upon which I will not enter any further, has done
its duty in the special purpose of helping to create a German-English
understanding.
_2. Northern Division_: The winning over of the Scandinavian
countries to the side of Germany appears as a foregone necessity for
future German foreign policy, but the necessity is also as great to
prevent the Scandinavian countries from making a clean entry into
the circle of anti-German countries. The political possibilities
towards these Marxist governments were extremely difficult. Trade
policies, according to my belief, have suffered most through sins
of omissions, hence the APA restricted itself more to the cultural
political field. For this purpose it expanded the Nordic (Scandinavian)
Society. This formerly small society has grown to be a decisive bond
in the German-Scandinavian relationship since its support by the
APA two years ago. The society's leader, Lohse, is selected by the
APA. The offices in all sections [Gau] are headed by corresponding
section chiefs [Gauleiter]. Trade groups and other organizations and
branches of the party which have dealings with Scandinavia have come
to agreement so that almost all of the traffic between Germany and
Scandinavia today passes through the hands of the Nordic Society. The
society has to date celebrated in Germany all memorial days of great
Nordic scientists and artists (Hamsun, Holberg, Heidenstam) and has
brought a number of Nordic conductors to Germany, as well as having
furthered Nordic literature. Through its periodical "The North" [Der
Norden] thoughts have been exchanged. Finally, personal relations were
increasingly favored through conventions. Especially was the Convention
of 1935 a complete success. This convention met under the sanctity
of the Scandinavian ministers in Germany and the German ministers in
Scandinavia, as far as it applied to the Nordic Music Conclave as the
main purpose of the convention. The committee was composed of the
authoritative Nordic Music Society. Fourteen sold out concerts and over
200 Scandinavian visitors attest to the success of the convention.
Thereupon the First National Finnish Art Exhibition came to Germany,
followed by the request of the Finnish Government to the APA to hold a
German exposition in Helsinki in March of 1936. These psychologically
valuable affiliations have undoubtedly loosened the tension in many
circles and it would do well for a clever trade policy to make use
of this loosened tension, as for example, the trade treaties between
England and Finland expire in 1936. The Chief of the Northern Division
is my private secretary, Thilo von Trotha.
_3. Southeast (Danube-Region)_: Since the Fuehrer (Hitler) has reserved
Austria for his own, the APA has relayed on to the responsible places
any reports from Austria, and has not dealt in Austrian politics.
Relations with Hungary were immediately established. The APA invited
Premier Gombos to Berlin in 1933 for a private visit where he was
presented to the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer took him along to Erfurt to
observe a review of the SA. Specific discussions were undertaken with
Hungary to convince her of the futility of her demands for 100 percent
revision of boundaries. Finally in August of 1935 I spoke with his
excellence von Angian and made clear to him that although we well
understood her own interests, the necessity that Hungary must decline
its revision demands upon Yugoslavia and Rumania and address its
demands to Czechoslovakia. One can assume that the Hungarians are now
ready to realize the necessity of the boundary revisions as proposed.
Exceptionally long and drawn out discussions were in process with
Rumania because definite measures were necessary, not because we did
not wish to be intervening in Rumanian affairs without being called,
but because we had to await the attitude of the Party as a result of
the King of Rumania sending a friend to Berlin. Here on Rumanian
soil a bitter battle was going on between the pro-French Titulesco
and Jewish elements on one side against the anti-Jewish elements on
the other side. The King is well aware of the fact that in the end
his support of Bolshevism may cost him his throne. However, he is
so intimidated by the threats of France, so as not to call for an
election, and hopes only that the powers of the people, which are
mounting against Titulesco, are so strong that he can support himself
upon the will of the people. In order to create unity of expression
the APA suggested formation of a large German-Rumanian Chamber of
Commerce in Berlin. The profits of this business were not to benefit
any private associates, but were to go to those groups that worked for
a German-Rumanian understanding. Because of a false report of Herr von
Neurath to the Fuehrer (Hitler) in which it was stated as though the
action were taken in the name of the Fuehrer, the work was delayed
and hindered and finally stopped, even though all of the ministers
concerned had agreed to the plan. Through this many costly months
were lost and the APA was forced to try other means. Since it was not
possible to work with money, many conferences were arranged between the
coming Premier Goga. Finally, an agreement which had been considered
impossible, was concluded between Goga and the anti-Semitic leader
Cuza. Cuza, upon my wish, deleted several points from his program,
after which he informed us that it was necessary in the interest of his
fatherland (Rumania) and a German-Rumanian understanding that he comply
with my wish, as he had recognized in me an unyielding anti-Semite. I
have informed the Fuehrer of the complicated later relationships in
numerous reports. Germany is fighting France and Bolshevism in Rumania,
and when affairs have progressed so as to warrant further discussion,
the King of Rumania will invite me to a visit to discuss the matter
further.
Feelers have been sent out to Belgrade through Rumania. Here also
exists the possibility of splitting the "lesser entente," but as far
as I can ascertain, Yugoslavia is not considering withdrawal from this
alliance singly under certain guarantees, but will withdraw together
with Rumania. The work in Rumania has to a part been undertaken by Herr
Duckwitz, but especially by Party-Member Schickedanz.
_The Near East_: Next it was necessary that the position of the
national socialistic movement be secured not only within the confines
of the Party but also in public life. This was the more so necessary
since the old Rapallo Treaty was constantly being discussed in the
universities in numerous lectures. In relation with this was the Near
East Ideology of Moeller van dem Brock which exerted its influence
deep within the Party. The APA proceeded in the most tenacious fashion
to prevent the proponents of the Rapallo school from coming to the
universities, although this was not always possible. The APA prevented
that instructional lectures of the School of Rapallo and Moeller van
dem Brock were held within the Party and other societies. Through the
Reich Ministry for the Furtherance of German Literature were issued
many sharp criticisms over the eastern ideology of Moeller van dem
Brock to all government and party offices. Furthermore, Dr. Leibrandt,
the Chief of the Near East Division delivered several speeches on
this matter to Party Conventions, student societies, and so forth.
It was this activity which caused the APA to make enemies with many
governmental offices until the Fuehrer in his speech of May 21 set
forth the authenticity of this work and forced a withdrawal of those
who opposed this activity of the APA. From there on the Near East
Division has pursued the entire current Russian political activity,
collected and examined current Russian reports, made an exact study of
the minority feelings in Russia, and contacted anti-Soviet circles,
although only for purposes of study. The Near East Division has
supplied other divisions, namely the English Division with necessary
material about Russia, as well as making available to the Press
Division material for "Dem Voelkischen Beobachter" [official Nazi Party
newspaper].
_Foreign Trade_: In all these political connections the question of
foreign trade played an important part. Reluctantly one must say that
it was just in this field, according to my view, that much opportunity
has been lost. First of all, the Manchuko Incident, which came to
the attention of the Fuehrer, was without question sabotaged in the
worst fashion by the Foreign Offices in Berlin and Tokio. Still, it
is of significance that the form of the reciprocal trade treaties
which were written up by the Foreign Trade Division serve as models
for many other governmental treaties. In many instances the division
was able to establish order when things had been greatly neglected,
as the German-Finnish Discussions (for which the chief of the Foreign
Trade Division received the Finnish decoration), the German-Norwegian
Wal Agreement, and a great number of other questions. Problems dealing
with the foreign trade of Germany and the middle east (Turkey and Iran)
were also attacked. One may say today that a very cheerful cooperation
has been established in this field between the representatives of the
Foreign Office and our Foreign Trade Division. The German-Rumanian
question was tackled by our Foreign Trade Division during all this
time, but unfortunately did not produce the desired results. The
Foreign Trade Division produced a stimulus for German industry on the
question of German-Russian credit. As things stood, greedy circles
in heavy industry threatened the interests of the medium and small
industries whom they were willing to sacrifice for the tempting
Soviet business. Seventy million marks would have been lost in this
deal because Russia would not accept the decisions of the Board of
Arbitration, while heavy industry was willing to forego this sum.
Through the intervention of the APA the situation was changed. Shortly
thereafter the Board of Arbitration again met and acknowledged the
claims of little and medium business, and divided among the several
categories, thus saving the German Reich 70 million marks.
The Foreign Trade Division worked under the theory, that the question
of foreign trade would be a rapid development, and therefore formulated
exact recommendations in the discussions. The recommended foreign trade
drafts, as were recommended in these discussions, were not refuted by
Wagemann nor Josias Stamp in London. Opposition, however, has arisen
in the Reich Ministry of Commerce, which apparently, however, has not
given the matter a very exact examination. Thus the matter rests.
German foreign trade has not progressed, and the forced taxation by
means of export duties of over 700 million marks for German industry in
1935 can only be considered an emergency measure and not a fundamental
policy. Here again the APA recommends to the Fuehrer to give these
proposals a trial.
Party Member Daitz has worked with initiative on questions of foreign
trade. Party Member Malletke, who has proven himself to be a far-seeing
associate, has conducted the daily administration and the examination
of all problems.
_The Press_: The Press Division of the APA is comprised of persons who
together master all the languages that are in use. Daily they examine
approximately 300 newspapers and deliver to the Fuehrer, the deputy
Fuehrer, and all other interested offices the condensations of the
important trends of the entire world press. I know that these press
reports are highly praised by all who constantly follow them. The Press
Division furthermore conducts an exact archives on the attitudes of
the most important papers of the world and an exact archives on the
most important journalists of the world. Many embarrassments during
conferences in Germany could have been avoided had one consulted these
archives (case of Leumas, Nurnberg, 1934; case of Dorothy Thompson;
and others). Further, the Press Division was able to arrange a host of
interviews as well as conducting a great number of friendly foreign
journalists to the various official representatives of Germany. Hearst
then personally asked me to often write about the position of German
foreign policy in his papers. This year five continuous articles under
my name have appeared in Hearst papers all over the world. Since these
articles, as Hearst personally informed me, presented well founded
arguments, he begged me to write further articles for his papers.
The Press Division of the APA was able to step into a position of
arbitration in the conflict which arose between the representatives
of the foreign press in Germany and the Office of Propaganda because
of the general attack that the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels
had made upon the combined world press in July of 1934. Thus from
the combined press representatives it was able to select and take
care of those who were of a pro-German opinion, or at least conducted
themselves in a neutral manner. Because of the willingness to cooperate
that the Press Division under the skillful guidance of Dr. Bomer showed
the foreigners, the Press Division has won a position of honor, and can
today claim to have a truly personal and factual knowledge of world
journalism.
In general the APA has attempted in the last 1-1/2 years to establish
contact between diplomacy and the world press in Germany. For this
purpose the APA held a Beer Party [Bierabend] each month. On each of
these evenings a prominent representative of the party or government
spoke about the work of his division. The most prominent national
socialists spoke at these gatherings (Goering, Rust, Todt, Schirach,
Hierl, Dr. Gross, Frau Scholtz-Klinck, Frank, Ley, and others). These
evenings were constantly attended by the majority of the diplomatic
representatives. We could always count on having at least 350 to 400
visitors. Since we invited a great number of representatives of the
German ministries and party offices in the last year, a hefty traffic
has developed. Many items which later appeared in the papers can be
accredited to the personal clarification of a national socialistic
party member who attended these evenings. The APA furthermore conducted
a great number of foreigners to the labor battalions [Arbeitsdienst]
or acquainted them with other establishments. That has been a bit of
work that has constantly been going on so that the APA here too has
experience to answer all questions which may arise.
_The School of Instruction_ [_Das Schulungshaus_]: The 2-1/2 year work
of all those active in the APA has given them a very exact picture
of the practical workings of foreign policy and foreign trade. It has
also enabled them every bit of knowledge which can be obtained from a
national socialistic point of view in order to accurately judge the
questions of foreign policy at all. In order to also develop potential
and interested capable powers arising from the people and develop them
as successors in the movement of national socialism the Foreign Policy
School of Instruction [Aussenpolitisches Schulungshaus] was founded
in Dahlem in 1935. Students from all over Germany who displayed an
interest in foreign policy were assembled at this school. They were
here instructed and schooled through lectures and cooperative work
similar to seminars. Into this school were drawn the Hitler youths, SS,
and the plan exists to have persons who will later travel abroad as
representatives of large German concerns undergo an extensive course
of instruction. Furthermore, the foreign Policy School of Instruction
should also examine those students which the Academic Student Exchange
is sending abroad. Lectures at the school were given by a number
of German economists, as well as the Japanese and Chinese military
attaches. The Chief of the APA himself lectured there.
The administration of the APA as well as the School of Instruction rest
in the hands of Party Member Knauer, who in his youth was party to the
March on Coburg.
In conclusion I may well say that these 2-1/2 years were rich in
experiences and have tested people in their capacity to perform work.
These 2-1/2 years have led to the elimination of one or another
incompetents, but at least a dozen people have become so enriched
through experience that they can be a great help to the Fuehrer in the
field of their enterprise.
The lack of necessary and sufficient means naturally prevents a
complete exploitation of the entire activity, which surely would
be desired. But in spite of this one can say that the most humanly
possible was accomplished here with sacrifice, sense of duty, and
energy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 004-PS
Copy
The Political Preparation of the Norway Action
(The enclosures mentioned in the report have been omitted from this
paper since they are only relative to specific matters. The complete
report including appendices has been submitted to the Deputy of the
Fuehrer by Reichsleiter Rosenberg on 17 June 1940)
The Office of Foreign Relations [Aussenpolitisches Amt] of the
National Socialist Party (NSDAP) has had contact with Vidkun
Quisling, leader of the Nasjonal Samling in Norway, for years. The
director of the "Office North" [Amt Norden] of the office of Foreign
Relations--later victim of a fatal accident--paid him (Quisling) a
personal visit on one of his trips to Scandinavia.
When in 1939 the general political situation was beginning to grow
critical Quisling gave the Office of Foreign Relations an estimate
of the situation and his opinion about the possible intentions of
Great Britain with relation to Scandinavia in case of conflict (Great
Britain's) with the German Reich. Prior to the convention of the
Nordic Association [Nordische Gesellschaft] in Luebeck, Quisling was
received by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Berlin. He (Quisling) pointed
out the decisive geopolitical importance of Norway in the Scandinavian
region and the advantages gained by the Power in control of the
Norwegian coast in case of conflict between the German Reich and Great
Britain. He further explained the extraordinarily clever, democratic
and particularly anglo-saxon propaganda which had been accepted
favourably by almost the entire nation, also because of Norway's
economic dependence on the seas and therefore on England. Since he
did not believe that the small nations would remain neutral in case
of conflict--as had been the case in the World War of 1914--but was
convinced that they would become involved in one way or the other he
requested support for his party and press in Norway, basing his request
on the "pangermanic" ideology. Reichsleiter Rosenberg also requested
Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt to arrange a meeting between Quisling
and his Deputy Hagelin with State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner,
bearing in mind that this matter might be of particular interest to
General Field Marshall Goering with regard to air strategy. This
meeting with the State Secretary Koerner did take place. At the same
time Staff Director [Stabsleiter] Schickedanz, directed by Reichsleiter
Rosenberg, submitted the attached memorandum to Reich Minister and
Chief of the Chancellery [Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei]
Lammers for the information of the Fuehrer by the end of June 1939
(Enclosure No. 1).
After the Luebeck convention Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt took a
vacation trip to Norway to further pursue this matter. His observations
are found in the attached report (Enclosure No. 2). Even during his
presence in Germany Quisling had requested a short, pertinent training
program for reliable party functionaries especially selected by him.
This request was granted by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. In _August 1939_
a 14 day course was held at the School of the Office for Foreign
Relations of the NSDAP [Aussenpolitisches Schulungshaus der NSDAP] in
Berlin for 25 followers of the Nasjonal Samling who had been selected
by Quisling.
In September Burgermeister Dr. Winkler revealed that he had been
charged with the financial aspects of Quisling's request by General
Field Marshal Goering through State Secretary Koerner. The outbreak
of war and the beginning of the Polish campaign delayed the decisions
(Enclosure No. 3). A further reminder of Reichsleiter Rosenberg
to General Field Marshal Goering in the course of a talk about
the importance of Norway in connection with the matters set forth
originally by Quisling had no practical results.
At the same time political tension increased in Norway as Russian
activity made itself felt in the Baltic regions. Of this Quisling
kept the office (APA) informed through his deputies in Germany. The
outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war at the end of November helped to
further increase the anti-German currents in all Scandinavia and played
into the hands of the anglo-saxon propaganda which was now building
up to full strength. Greater Germany was represented as a secret ally
of Soviet Russia and as the real culprit in Finland's misfortune. At
the same time the Western Powers promised Finland military support
which could only be supplied via Norway and Sweden. The possibility
of a plan by Great Britain to occupy Norway and possibly Sweden to
effectively close the blockade against Greater Germany and further to
gain convenient air bases against Germany began to take shape under the
pretence of altruistic help to Finland. Its aim was to involve also the
Nordic Nations in a conflict against Greater Germany. Quisling informed
the office (APA) about these new possibilities shaping on the political
scene, acting through his deputy in Germany.
As the activities of the Allies became more and more noticeable in
Norway Quisling again came to Germany to voice his fears. He was
received by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the early part of December
and he again presented his ideas. Firmly convinced that in the long
run a genuinely neutral position in the great conflict would become
impossible for the small nations and in his firm faith in the victory
of Greater Germany in this conflict which also was an ideological one,
Quisling considered it his duty--supported as he was by a small but
determined minority--to tie Norway's fate to that of Greater Germany
as the new centre of strength of a nordic-germanic life community.
We knew that his courageous group was the _only_ pro-German Party.
His deputy in Germany, Hagelin, had also arranged for a talk between
Quisling and Grand Admiral Raeder which took place about this time.
During a report to the Fuehrer Reichsleiter Rosenberg again mentioned
Norway. He particularly pointed out her importance in the case of
England deciding to occupy Norway with the tacit consent of the
Norwegian Government, for the purpose of strengthening the blockade
and under the pretence of help for Finland. Grand Admiral Raeder, too,
upon his request, was called to the Fuehrer in connection with his
talks with Quisling. As a result of these steps Quisling was received
by the Fuehrer for personal instructions on the _16th of December_ and
again on the _18th of December_. During this interview the Fuehrer
emphasized repeatedly that the most preferable attitude of Norway
as well as all of Scandinavia would be one of complete neutrality.
He had no intentions to enlarge the theatres of war to draw other
nations into the conflict. If, however, the enemy were preparing an
enlargement of the zones of war with the aim to further throttle
and threaten the Greater German Reich then, of course, he would be
obliged to arm against such steps. Then the Fuehrer promised Quisling
financial support for his movement based on the pan-germanic ideology
and for the purpose of combatting the increasing enemy propaganda. The
military matters of the questions were now transferred to a special
military staff which assigned special missions to Quisling and heard
his opinions (Encl. No. 29). The political treatment was to be handled
by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, expenses were to be carried by the Foreign
Office [Auswaertiges Amt] and Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs
[Reichsminister vom Aussenpolitischen Amt] was to be kept informed
at all times. Maintenance of liaison with Quisling was assigned to
Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt who, as matters developed further, was
attached to the Naval Attache in Oslo, Commander [Korvettenkapitaen]
Schreiber. Strictest secrecy was ordered for the entire matter.
Then, in January, during a conference between Reichsleiter Rosenberg
and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop it was decided to appropriate to
Quisling an initial sum of 200,000 Goldmark. This money was to be taken
to Oslo, in two instalments, by the liaison agent Scheidt where it was
to be handed to Quisling. In the Foreign Office [Auswaertiges Amt]
Privy Councillor [Geheimrat] Von Grundherr was the only one to be told
of this arrangement (Encl. No. 3).
As shown in the attached documentary memoranda Quisling's reports
transmitted by his deputy in Germany Hagelin concerning the possibility
of active intervention of the Western Powers in Norway with consent of
the Norwegian Government became more and more alarming. These reports
continuously supplemented with more and more accurate confirmations
by Quisling's confidants were in certain contrast with the opinions
of the German Legation in Oslo. The Legation believed in the neutral
intentions of the Norwegian Government of that time, the Nygardsvold,
and was further convinced that the Government would take arms in
defence of its neutrality policy. The Foreign Office [Auswaertiges
Amt] held the same opinion as is shown in the attached documentary
memorandum dated January 8 which is the result of a talk between
Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt and Privy Councillor [Geheimrat] Von
Grundherr (Encl. 8). It is of special interest that Hagelin, Quisling's
Deputy in Germany, whose intimate connection with Quisling was not
known in Norway succeeded in getting a foothold in the circles of
the Nygardsvold Government. Thus he heard the uncolored opinions of
the members of the Government who conducted themselves like a secret
Norwegian-Anglophile society.
In the documentary memorandum of January 13 he relates the opinions
expressed to him by two Norwegian Ministers. The gist of the opinions
was that Germany had already lost the war and that Norway--if only
because of its large Merchant Marine--could not do other than favour
England in her politics, in war even more so than in peace. And further
that the entire nations agreed with this policy (Encl. 9). During
the night of February 16 to 17 the English raided the "Altmark" in
the Joessingsfjord. The reaction of the Norwegian Government to the
Altmark-affair seemed to indicate that certain secret arrangements had
been made between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. This was
further emphasized in Director Scheidt's consolidated report covering
January 20th to February 20th (Encl. No. 11) after he had received
Hagelin's report. Hagelin had overheard the conversation between two
members of the Storting during which one member said to the other
that the actions of the two commanders of the Norwegian torpedo boats
had been a "prearranged affair." The same report also refers to the
English demands for air bases in Norway and for freedom of trade in
the Norwegian waters. It goes on to say that although the Norwegian
Government refused those demands it was agreed that violations by the
English would be answered with paper protests only. Such reports, and
confirmations thereto were time and again supplied through Quisling. In
complete contrast to those opinions the German Legation, even after the
Altmark Affair, relied fully upon the good will of the Norwegians. The
Ambassador cited the signing of the Norwegian-German trade agreement as
weighing heavily in favour of his point of view. He already considered
the Norwegian Government Nygardsvold somewhat dependent on the Greater
German Reich (Encl. Nos. 11 and 12). All these reports were currently
submitted to the Fuehrer by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. Quisling always
emphasised that more than 90% of the country was behind England and
that he only represented a minority which, however, was chosen by
virtue of its intuition to take charge later on as representatives of a
new Norwegian nation.
Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from the Reich in
currency, Quisling had also been promised a shipment of material for
immediate use in Norway such as coal and sugar. Additional help was
promised. The shipments were to be conducted under cover of a new Trade
Company to be established in Germany or through especially selected
existing firms while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin
had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygardsvold
Government as for instance the Minister of Supply and Commerce
[Versorgungs-und Handelsminister] and had been assured permission for
the import of coal. At the same time the coal transports were to serve
possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch Quisling's
political action in Oslo with German help. It was Quisling's plan to
send a number of selected, particularly reliable men to Germany for
a brief military training course in a completely isolated camp. They
were then to be detailed as area and language specialists to German
Special Troops who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to
accomplish a political action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of
his leading opponents in Norway including the King, to prevent all
military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately following
this political action and upon an official request of Quisling to the
Government of the German Reich the military occupation of Norway was to
take place. All military preparations were to be completed previously.
Though this plan contained the great advantage of surprise it also
contained a great number of dangers which could possibly cause its
failure. For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment while,
at the same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians were
concerned.
In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal Goering,
Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the Office of the
Four Year Plan [Ministerialdirektor im Vierjahresplan] Wohlthat only
of the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named
confidant Hagelin. Further details were discussed in a conference
between Secretary Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz and Hagelin.
Since Wohlthat received no further instructions from the General Field
Marshal, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop--after a consultation with
Reichsleiter Rosenberg--consented to expedite these shipments through
his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Fuehrer
it was also arranged to pay Quisling ten thousand English pounds per
month for three months commencing on the 15th of March, to support his
work. This money was to be paid through liaison agent Scheidt.
Meanwhile Hagelin, through his connection in Norway as trusted agent
of the Norwegian Navy, had been commissioned with the purchase of
German AA-guns (Flaks) through the German Navy Ministry. Through this
connection he gained more and more insight into the actual ideas and
intentions of the Norwegian Nygardsvold Government and into the Allied
preparations which had already started in Norway. While in Germany
on the 20th of March to attend conferences regarding the delivery of
the German AA guns, he made a detailed report about the increasing
activities of the Allies in Norway, tolerated by the Nygardsvold
Government. According to his reports the Allies were already checking
the Norwegian coastal towns for landing and transport possibilities.
He also stated that the French Commandant Kermarrec who was charged
with this reconnaissance had a confidential talk with Colonel Sunolo,
Commandant of Narvik, who is a follower of Quisling; during the course
of the talk he told him of the Allied intentions to land motorized
troops in Stavanger, Dronthoim and possibly also at Kirkenes and to
occupy the airport at Sola (Encl. no. 14).
At the same time Hagelin increased his oral and written warnings
regarding the confidential agreements between the Allied and the
Norwegian Governments stipulating that in case of an Allied occupation
of coastal towns the Norwegian Government would not go beyond paper
protest, as was the case in the Altmark Affair. And again, in his
report of March 26 (Encl. Nos. 15 and 16) he pointed out that the
speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht dealing with Norwegian
neutrality and containing some protests was not being taken seriously
either in London by the English nor in Norway by the Norwegians. It
was well known that the Government had no intentions to take a stand
against England. However, to keep up appearances towards Germany up to
the last minute the Norwegian Government intended to issue an order
to fire. This was to demonstrate that everything within their power
had been done. There was a continuous series of conferences between
the King, the Commanding Admiral, the Crown Prince and the newly
appointed Minister of War Ljundberg who had been placed in office at
the special request of England as early as January. A person close to
the King as well as the commanding Admiral explained to Hagelin that
the above mentioned actions by England were quite unavoidable since
she knew that she could only win the war if she were in control of the
Norwegian ports. Furthermore England feared a German counterblow which
was not to be allowed to materialize. The Norwegian Government was also
notified by London that Germany intended to mine the waters between
Jutland and the Norwegian coast. Based on a message from England this
plan was revealed on or about March 15 during a secret session of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting by Foreign Minister Koht.
As a matter of fact, during the course of the military preparations
for the occupation of Norway this plan had been adopted by the German
military authorities and to this day it is a mystery how this plan got
to London. In view of all this news Quisling could no longer back his
earlier advice to continue watching the development of the situation
in Norway. He now had to point out that any further delay would mean
a grave risk. The above was probably the most decisive report ever
to be submitted here by Hagelin. Reichsleiter Rosenberg immediately
transmitted it to the Fuehrer (Encl. No. 15).
While still in Berlin Hagelin was requested by Colonel Schmundt to make
speedy arrangements for a conference between Quisling and a Colonel of
the General Staff, at some neutral location. This conference was held
in Copenhagen in the beginning of April.
In confirmation of all this information coming from Quisling and his
confidants and in contrast to the opinion held up to the end by German
Legation in Oslo and by the Foreign Office, the Allies, on April 8th.
initiated their first major blow as an introduction to their intended
occupation of Norway. During the night from the 7th. to the 8th. of
April they mined the Norwegian coast and made public announcement
of this act. Norway's reaction, consistent with the reports always
received by the Office of Foreign Relations [Aussenpolitisches Amt] of
the NSDAP, was nothing more than protests on paper growing weaker by
the hour. Then, after proper preparations and by command of the Fuehrer
Greater Germany undertook the counterblow in the morning of April 9th.
and occupied the most important Norwegian airfields and seaports.
Reports about the further political developments in Norway proper are
found in the appended documentary memorandum (Encl. Nos. 18 to 30).
After the success of the occupational operations in Norway seemed
assured the Fuehrer called for Reichsleiter Rosenberg for a short
talk before lunch, on April 25th. He oriented him (Rosenberg) about
the developments of the military action in Norway where the English
Auxiliary Corps had just suffered a decisive defeat combined with
the capture of important documents and plans. He further revealed to
Reichsleiter Rosenberg that he had based this most daring decision
which was now approaching successful completion on the continuous
warnings of Quisling as reported to him by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. And
that it actually happened in the Drontheimfjord that behind the stern
of the last German Troop Transport there appeared the bow of the first
English destroyer which convoyed the Allied Troop Transport fleet. This
destroyer was wiped out by the German Navy.
Berlin, June 15th. 1940
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 007-PS
Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party
from 1933 to 1943
When the Foreign Affairs Bureau [Aussenpolitisches Amt] was established
1 April 1933 the Fuehrer directed that it should not be expanded to a
large bureaucratic agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness
through initiative and suggestions.
Corresponding to the extra ordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the
Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning the newly-established
bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the
Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World Bolshevism primarily
in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most
variegated groups inclining towards National Socialism and combatting
Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations and States
bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one end those nations and states
constituted an _Insulating Ring_ encircling the Bolshevist neighbor;
on the other hand they were the lateral of German living space
[Fluegelstellung zum deutschen Lebensraum] and took up a flanking
position towards the Western Powers [Flankenstellung Gegenueber Den
Westmaechten] especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired
influence by one means or another, the Bureau was compelled to use
the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely
different living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history
of the movements observed by the Bureau in those countries.
In _Scandinavia_ an outspoken pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based on
economic considerations, had become progressively more dominant after
the World War of 1914/1918. There the Bureau put entire emphasis on
influencing general _cultural_ relations with the Nordic peoples. For
this purpose it took the Nordic Society [Nordische Gesellschaft] in
Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society
were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from
Finland. While there were no openings for purely political cooperation
in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic
ideology was found in Norway. Very close relations were established
with its founder, which led to further consequences. (See annex I for
more detailed exposition).
_South-Eastern Europe_ was dominated by the French post-war system
of alliances. The countries united in the Little Entente were aiming
at a more favorable defence of the booty accumulated during the
war. In addition each one of these countries sought to gain through
this mutual-assistance pact safety against a superior opponent:
Czechoslovakia against Germany; Yugoslavia against Italy; Rumania
against the Soviet Union. In _Czechoslovakia_ a common hatred against
everything German united the still remaining, partly pan-Slavic,
Masonic and pro-Jewish tendencies. In _Rumania_ the feeling of
insecurity and fear of the superior neighbor, from whom she had taken
Bessarabia was growing. In Rumania a primitive anti-Semitic group still
existed. Its academically doctrinaire attitude precluded large scale
political effectiveness, but nevertheless offered points of mutual
interest. The Foreign Affairs Bureau picked these up, developed them,
instigated the formation of a new party and thereby forced a decisive
change in the whole political situation in Rumania, which is still
having its effect today. (See Annex II for more detailed exposition).
_Hungary and Bulgaria_ alone, Allied nations of the World War which had
formerly been completely deprived of their rights, were attracted by
the newly-formed center of gravity in the north. This attraction was
nourished by the hope of obtaining an expansion of their own power
through the increasing strength of Germany. However, National Socialism
met a certain reserve or antipathy in Bulgaria because of widespread
contagion of the Communistic blight. In Hungary it met similar reserve
due to the still-fashionable feudal leading circles, who are bolstered
by Jewish capital. At any rate it may be mentioned here that _the first
foreign state visit after the seizure of power took place through the
mediation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau_. Julius Gombos, who in former
years had himself pursued anti-Semitic and racial tendencies, had
reached the Hungarian Premier's chair. The Bureau maintained a personal
connection with him. In September 1933 he paid a visit to Germany and
was received by the Fuehrer in Erfurt. With this visit the official
cordon of isolation surrounding National Socialism was pierced for the
first time. This visit had been preceded by the Fuehrer's reception
of the Rumanian poet and former minister Octavian Goga through the
Bureau's mediation. Goga later became the decisive exponent of a
political reproachment with Germany.
In _Yugoslavia_ other German Reich agencies had become active in the
same direction, so that the Foreign Affairs Bureau remained in the
background and shifted its efforts to the purely commercial sphere. It
initiated the first contracts with Croation and Serbian cooperatives.
Motivated by reasons of War Economy, the Bureau advocated _the transfer
of raw material purchases from overseas_ to the areas accessible by
overland traffic routes, i.e. primarily _in the Balkans_, naturally
insofar as practicable. At first little heed was paid to the Bureau in
these endeavors, but it later secured the active support especially
of the Food Estate; through its cooperation, e.g., on the subject of
fruit and vegetable imports, a very substantial shift in the source
of imports was attained, particularly through the currently initiated
cooperation with Croatian and Hungarian cooperatives as well as with
commercial associations all over the Balkans.
From the beginning, work in _Italy_ was out of the question because
ever since the days of our struggle for power ties of a personal
nature have existed, which were taken over by official institutions
or cultivated by individual personalities. Work in _Austria_ was also
excluded, since a special "Provincial Directorate for Austria" existed
within the Nazi Party.
The Bureau declined to concern itself with questions of Racial Germans
[Volksdeutsche] abroad. For this phase of the problem the "Racial
Germans" Central Agency [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle] was later created.
Towards _Western European States_ the Bureau limited its activities to
simple observation of existing conditions, or to the establishment of
relations, especially of a commercial nature, primarily in _Belgium,
Holland and Luxemburg_.
In accordance with the attitude on foreign policy laid down by the
Fuehrer, the Bureau endeavored to establish far-reaching connections
with England through continuous personal contacts with influential
personalities of English political life. Eminent Englishmen were
invited to the annual Party Rallies.
Pursuant to its self chosen task the Bureau devoted its attention
to the _Near East_. Turkey, newly consolidated by Mustapha Kemal,
adopted a hesitating attitude of watchful waiting. This position was
probably due to military impotence against Soviet Russia, clearly
recognized, on the one hand, and also to hostility to Fascist Italy,
already previously manifested, on the other hand. In _Iran_, however,
the Bureau's initiative in the economic field to stimulate the mutual
exchange of goods encountered greatest understanding and the greatest
readiness in carrying it through. The Bureau's initiative in developing
with the head of commercial circles, entirely new methods for the
economic penetration of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily
favorable way, in reciprocal trade relations. Naturally in Germany,
too, this initiative at first encountered a completely negative
attitude and resistance on the part of the competent state authorities,
an attitude that had first to be overcome. In the course of a few
years the volume of trade with Iran was multiplied five-fold, and in
1939 Iran's trade turnover with Germany had attained first place. Even
Soviet Russia, the competitor who had been biggest and most dreaded
previously, had been eliminated from the running. Concurrently with
the activation of commercial relations the Bureau had also intensified
cultural relations and had, in conjunction with growing commercial
influence and in closest collaboration with the Iranian Government,
created a series of cultural institutions headed and directed by
Germans. In consequence the dominant French cultural influence in Iran
has already been broken since the year 1936.
The Bureau simultaneously attempted to also draw Afghanistan into its
orbit. Relations established with leading individual personalities led
to the willing opening of this country, which had formerly been rather
neglected by Germany. All the leading personalities of Afghanistan were
guests of the Bureau. The Bureau favored the taking part of German
economy in the industrial upbuilding of the country; German experts in
all fields were called to Afghanistan in increasing numbers through
the Bureau's mediation. The German Colony became the dominant one in
Afghanistan. The preparation for expansion of the Afghan army was in
German hands; carrying it through was prevented by the outbreak of
war. Even though the German Colony had to leave Afghanistan later on,
Afghanistan's neutral position today is largely due to the Bureau's
activity.
The _Arab question_, too, became part of the work of the Bureau. In
spite of England's tutelage of _Iraq_ the Bureau established a series
of connections to a number of leading personalities of the Arab world,
smoothing the way for strong bonds to Germany. In this connection,
the growing influence of the Reich in Iran and Afghanistan did not
fail to have repercussions in Arabia. All these relations took place
on a purely economic basis and fostered the systematically directed
advancement of German influence and prestige in the domains reserved
by the Western Powers for themselves. In this connection it may be
mentioned in general that the internal peril to England's preponderance
in those areas would have been considerably more pronounced, if the
Bureau's foresighted initiative, which took Oriental conditions very
well into account, had not been forever ignored by official authorities.
The Bureau foresaw the necessity of technical improvement of the
_Danube water route_ to facilitate traffic, because of the shift in the
increase of the exchange in goods, especially in the Balkans and in
the Orient. On its own initiative it attempted to influence competent
authorities (especially of the Bavarian Government), together with
particularly interested private commercial circles, to enlarge our
Danube shipping facilities (primarily the port of Regensburg). Although
the Bureau throughout the years, asserted this necessity, which was
becoming more and more urgent, and although the Bureau relentlessly
maintained its initiative, its endeavors in this matter were
unfortunately not crowned by any success. Presumably all responsible
authorities regret it bitterly to-day.
Among other projects due to the Foreign Affairs Bureau's initiative,
endeavors to grow the _rubber-fibered Kok Sagys plant_ in Germany
deserve to be emphasized. This plant is being cultivated in the Soviet
Union. In spite of efforts during many years, no success was attained
in planting sizeable experimental crops, because of latent disunity
among competent authority. The Bureau was compelled to resort to
experimental fields in _Greece_ through its own connections in the
Balkans.
Somewhat off the beaten path was the Bureau's undertaking in _Brazil_,
which grew out of personal connections, large quantities of cotton
(60,000 tons) were successfully brought to Germany under a clearing
agreement at a time when imports of this raw material had become
very critically short, already necessitating work outs. A Bureau
representative was twice the Brazilian Government's guest. Brazil
and Iran were the only nations from whom Germany could purchase this
indispensable raw material for Reichsmark. The Brazilian Minister
expressed his thanks for this initial step to the Head of the Bureau in
an address delivered at the occasion of an exposition.
About 40 lecture evenings for diplomats and the foreign press should
also be listed. They dealt with the construction of the new Germany,
and speakers included many leading personalities of the Reich.
The Bureau has carried out the initiating of all politically feasible
projects. With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task
as terminated. The exploitation of the many _personal_ connections in
many lands can be resumed under a different guise.
Signed: ROSENBERG
2 Inclosures
I Norway
II Rumania
* * * * *
_Annex I_ to Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau
of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.
The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway During
the War Years 1939/1940.
As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandinavia
only "Nasjonal Samling", led in Norway by the Former Minister of War
and Major of the Reserve Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political
attention. This was a fighting political group, possessed by the idea
of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally all ruling powers were
hostile and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the
population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling and
attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy
on the middle class which had been taken in tow by the English.
From the beginning it appeared probable that without revolutionary
events, which would stir the population from their former attitude,
no successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. During
the winter 1938/1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of
the Bureau. When the political situation in Europe came to a head
in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic
Society [Nordische Gesellschaft] in Luebeck in June. He expounded
his conception of the situation, and his apprehensions concerning
Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive
importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the advantages
that would accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case
of a conflict between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain.
Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to the
Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling
was referred to State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner by the
Bureau. The Staff Director [Stabsleiter] of the Bureau handed the
Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the
Fuehrer. It dealt with the same subject, still taking into account
the then doubtful attitude of Soviet Russia. After the outbreak of
German-Polish hostilities and of the Soviet-Finnish war, tensions
in Scandinavia became more strained and facilitated the work of
Anglo-Saxon propaganda. It began to appear possible that, under the
pretext of altruistic aid to Finland, Great Britain might intend
to occupy Norway, and perhaps Sweden, to complete the anti-German
blockade in the North Sea for all practical purposes, and to gain
comfortable airplane bases against Germany. The aim would have been
to drag the Northern countries, too, into a military conflict with
Germany. Apprehensive about this development, Quisling again appeared
in Berlin in December 1939. He visited Reichsleiter Rosenberg and
Grand Admiral Raeder. In the course of a report to the Fuehrer,
Reichsleiter Rosenberg turned the conversation once more to Norway. He
especially pointed to Norway's importance should England, to tighten
her blockade and under the pretext of aid to Finland, take steps to
occupy the country, with the Norwegians' tacit consent. On the basis of
his conversation with Quisling and at his own request, Grand Admiral
Raeder, too, had been asked to see the Fuehrer. In consequence of
these steps, Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer
on 16 December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this
audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would
prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole
of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theaters of war
and to draw still other nations into the conflict. Should the enemy
attempt to spend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further
throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would
be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order
to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised
Quisling financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater
Germanic ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised
was assigned to the Special Military Staff, which transmitted special
missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political
exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs [Auswaertiges Amt], the Minister for Foreign
Affairs being kept continuously by the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Chief
of Section [Amtsleiter] Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison
with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to
the Naval Attache in Oslo, Lt. Commander [Korvettenkapitaen] Screiber.
Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest
secrecy.
Quisling's reports, transmitted through his representative in
Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of intervention
by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent of the Norwegian
government, became more urgent by January already. These increasingly
better substantiated communications were in sharpest contrast to the
view of the German Legation in Oslo, which relied on the desire for
neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardsvold cabinet and was convinced
of that government's intention and readiness to defend Norway's
neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's representative for
Germany maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded
in gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardsvold
cabinet, and in listening to cabinet members' true views. Hagelin
transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau, which conveyed the news to
the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of 16 to
17 February English destroyers attacked the German steamer "Altmark"
in Jossing fjord. The Norwegian government's reaction to this question
permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly
arrived at between the Norwegian government and the Allies. Such
assumption was confirmed by reports of Section [Amtsleiter] Scheidt who
in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even
after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite
view, and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the
Norwegians.
Thanks to his connections in Norway as agent of the Norwegian Navy,
Hagelin had succeeded, in the meantime, in being entrusted with the
purchase of German AA guns through the German Navy Ministry. Through
these connections he gained more and more insight into the real views
and intentions of the Norwegian Nygardsvold cabinet, and into the
preparations already initiated by the Allies in Norway. At the occasion
of his presence in Berlin on 20 March to negotiate about delivery of
German AA guns he mentioned that the Allies were now even examining
Norwegian ports for loading and transportation facilities. The French
Kommandant entrusted with this mission was said to have revealed Allied
intentions in confidential conversations with the commander of Narwik,
an adherent of Quisling. These intentions were to land motorized troops
at Stavanger, Drontheim and perhaps Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola
airdrome near Stavanger. Hagelin also re-emphasized his warnings about
agreements secretly concluded between the Allies and the Norwegian
government according to which the Norwegian government would content
itself solely with paper protests in case of a possible occupation of
port cities by the Allies. He pointed out that the Norwegian government
had never intended to seriously oppose England, and that it was playing
a two-faced game with Germany solely to gain time for faits accomplis.
He also mentioned that the Norwegian government had been informed by
England that Germany intended to lay a minefield from Jutland to the
Norwegian coast. In view of all the information that had reached him,
Quisling could no longer stand by his advice to await developments in
Norway for a little while longer; he was compelled to point out that
any delay of the German counter-thrust would entail extraordinary
risks. These reports were immediately transmitted to the Fuehrer by
Reichsleiter Rosenberg. On 8 April the Allies struck the first blow in
preparation for their intended occupation of Norway, thus confirming
these reports made by Quisling and his agents, and in contrast to the
views held to the end by the German Legation in Oslo and by the expert
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Auswaertiges Amt]. During the
night from 7 to 8 April minefields were laid alongside the Norwegian
coast by the Allied fleet, and the Allied governments informed the
world of the steps they had taken. In accordance with indications given
by the Bureau, only progressively more tepid protests were made by
Norway. By order of the Fuehrer Greater Germany counter-attacked, after
corresponding preparation, in the morning of 9 April and occupied the
most important Norwegian sea ports and airdromes.
* * * * *
_Annex II_: Rumania (From the overthrow of Titolescu to Marshal
Antonescu)
In spite of almost complete occupation by the Central Powers in the
last World War, Rumania was indebted to Versailles for her re-creation,
which was effected partially even at the expense of her one-time
Eastern ally. A basically sound anti-Semitic tendency existed in
this post-war country, which was torn asunder by dynastic squabbles
and innumerable party fights. But in spite of repeated efforts this
tendency had never risen above the limitations of a club, because of
solely scientific doctrinaire leadership. What was lacking was the
guiding leadership of a political personality. After manifold grouping
trials the Bureau believed to have found such a personality--the
former Minister, and poet, Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to
convince this poet, pervaded by instinctive inspiration, that a Greater
Rumania, though it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be
maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to create
in him the desire to link the fate of Rumania with the future of the
National Socialist German Reich in good time. By bringing continuing
influence to bear, the Bureau succeeded in inducing Octavian Goga as
well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate the parties under their leadership
on an Anti-Semitic basis. Thus they could carry on with united strength
the struggle for Rumania's renascence internally, and her affiliation
[Anschluss] with Germany externally. Through the Bureau's initiative
both parties, which had heretofore been known by distinct names, were
merged as the National-Christian Party, under Goga's leadership and
with Cuza as Honorary President. The attempts concurrently undertaken
by the Bureau to amalgamate this Party with the much more youthful,
but energetic Iron Guard movement were initially frustrated by the
apparently insurmountable personal incompatibility of Cuza and
Codreanu. At any rate these attempts led to the secret establishment of
good personal relations between Goga and the mystic-fanciful Codreanu.
In the course of the years after his return, the king had succeeded
in becoming the country's decisive factor through crafty tactics in
dealing with the dominant political parties. Had the Bureau also
succeeded in merging the National-Christian Party with Codreanu,
Rumania would have obtained sharply anti-Semitic leadership based on
strong mass support. Such leadership could have attained its aims even
against the will of the king. However, surviving rivalries between
the country's anti-Semitic trends later enabled the king to use them
separately for his plan, in order to destroy them as far as possible.
The struggle for re-orientation of Rumania's foreign policy was taken
up by Goga with bold elan. He had earlier succeeded in upsetting the
position of Foreign Minister Titulescu, the agent of Franco, of the
Geneva League of Nations and of the Little Entente. Titulescu was later
overthrown. Among the numerous, not very significant splinter parties,
the "Young Liberals", founded by George Bratianu, supported Goga's
campaign, without joining the anti-Semitic trend. The Rumanian front of
Vaida Voevod, wobbling to and fro among all camps, adopted a similar
position for some time.
_Through intermediaries_, the Bureau _maintained constant contact_
with both tendencies, just like it constantly consulted with Goga,
through Staff Director [Stabsleiter] Schickedanz, about tactics to
be followed. The whole struggle was accelerated by Soviet Russia's
increasing pressure in the Bessarabian question, and by the process
of political rapprochement with Moscow, which was supported by Paris
and Prague. Following a long period of recurring political trials
involving scandal and graft, Rumania's internal struggle for the future
make-up of the country had been aggravated by the coming to the front
of the Christian-Nationalist Party and of the Iron Guard. This struggle
was being fought with increasing bitterness. The king's attitude
towards the national movement was procrastinating and underhanded.
The movement was agreeable to him for eliminating the two parties
which, by tradition, took turns in the government. But he intended to
prevent the unequivocal victory of anti-Semitic and racial [Voelkisch]
principles, influenced by growing Nationalism, in the country. That is
why the Nationalists' foreign policy, secretly projected by Germany,
did not fit into his plans. Because he was in possession of the police
and of the army, he remained the decisive factor in the country.
After repeated postponement of the elections, which were legally due,
the king decided to hold an election. The decision was based on a
very reliable report of his then Prime Minister Taterescu. Taterescu
was convinced that the Liberal Party would again receive 40% of all
votes, through the machinations customary in Fomia. However, after a
bitter election campaign the Liberal Party suffered painful defeat.
The opposition National Movement had achieved indisputable victory in
spite of all chicanery and machinations by their opponents. The Iron
Guard received about 16% of the total vote, the National-Christian
Party Goga-Cuza about 11%, the government party about 35%. The rest
of the votes were scattered. After some vacillation and hesitancy, the
king appointed Goga Prime Minister on 27 December 1937 with a binding
promise that Parliament would be dismissed and new elections held
within the legally prescribed time limit. In spite of warnings by the
Bureau Goga believed the promise given by the king. But the king was
only attempting to gain time.
_Thus a second government on racial and anti-Semitic foundations
had appeared in Europe, in a country in which such an event had
been considered completely impossible._ The government immediately
made known its intention to proceed against Jewish predominance in
the country and declared repeatedly that it would have to subject
Rumania's previous foreign policy to re-examination and reform. In
the meantime the Judaic-Masonic and liberal opposition did not lose
time. Passions were inflamed and became increasingly more envenomed.
It looked like a hot and bloody election campaign. The prospects of
Goga's Christian-Nationalist Party pointed to a big victory with sure
certainty, especially since, with the Bureau's cooperation he had on
the sly made a secret agreement with Codreanu. To be sure, Goga did not
act on the Bureau's advice to immediately develop his party cadres,
to expand his party machine all over the country and to permeate the
police and gendarmerie. Goga postponed the execution of organizational
reform, which he also intended, until after the election. He considered
himself to be under obligation to the king not to undertake anything
until the electoral decisions had been rendered, but to take steps all
the more incisively after legally attaining the majority.
In innumerable interviews the opposition must have succeeded in
convincing the king that an electoral victory of Goga would react most
acutely against the king himself. In that case he would no longer
be able to get rid of the ghosts he had called in; if Goga attained
a two-thirds majority, he, the king, would be Goga's captive. These
expostulations, and the uncontrollable Judaic influences of the Jewish
clique at the Rumanian court, plus the pressure of the French and
British Ministers led to a change in the king's attitude, assuming
that this change had not already been anticipated by him at the time
of Goga's appointment. The king decided to prevent the elections.
Goga resisted. Thereupon the king offered Goga the formation of
an authoritarian government, i.e., a government created solely by
virtue of royal sovereignty. That meant a coup d'etat. Goga declined.
Thereupon the king informed Goga that he would accept the cabinet's
resignation, which, however, had not even been offered to him. Goga
realized too late that the strength at his disposal was entirely
inadequate to thwart the king's plans. He resigned.
But the course once embarked upon forced even the king to pay heed
to the mood that had been created in the country. Also, a return to
the disrupted foreign-policy ties was no longer possible. Although an
authoritarian system had been built up, Rumania found herself without
her former backing. The French security system had been ruptured and
could not be re-established, if only in view of Yugoslavia's attitude
in the South-East, where relations established by other German agencies
had simultaneously loosened the cohesiveness of the Little Entente.
That, at any rate, was the Goga government's success.
In his last great speech to the Rumania Academy, shortly before his
death, Goga welcomed Austria's affiliation with Germany, and affirmed
for the last time his belief in adherence to new Greater German Reich
and to Fascist Italy, a belief he had struggled for.
Now the king's war of extermination against the Iron Guard began.
Codreanu was arrested with his closest collaborators, to face a
specially convoked court-martial. Sole basis for the prosecution was an
alleged communication from Codreanu to the Fuehrer, which was proved
to be a forgery, and a telegram addressed to the Fuehrer. On the
basis of these "records" he was sentenced to ten years' hard labor.
In vain did the Bureau attempt to bring about an intervention of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in this episode, which diminished the
whole prestige of the German Reich. It did not prevail against the
official agencies, which condemned the entire project of the Bureau in
Rumania, because the official German delegation expected their sole
salvation from the attitude of the king and his creatures. Logically,
the acceptance without dissent of this challenge was interpreted in
Bucharest as granting carte blanche and Codreanu was shot with his
closest collaborators for establishment of the first personal contact
between the King and the Fuehrer.
This appeared to doom the Iron Guard, too, Goga's party, deprived of
his leadership, was submerged into insignificance. But Goga left behind
a personal heir, who is now Marshal Antonescu. Against the king's
wish, Goga had appointed this politically insignificant provincial
general, with whom the king was on bad terms, as his Minister of
War. At first, completely pro French in outlook, Antonescu gradually
adopted a different view under Goga's influence. After Goga's
resignation, Antonescu still remained in the king's cabinet at Goga's
wish. He also maintained continued relations with the Iron Guard.
Thereby the possibility of eliminating the king was at hand--and was
exploited. Antonescu's to-day appears in practice as executor of the
heritage bequeathed to him by Goga, who had led him from political
insignificance into the political arena. Thereby a change to Germany's
liking had become possible in Rumania.
[signed] ROSENBERG
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 014-PS
Report to the Fuehrer
I report the arrival of the principal shipment of ownerless Jewish
"cultural property" [Kulturgut] in the salvage location Neuschwanstein
by special train on Saturday the 15th of this month. It was secured
by my staff for Special Purposes [Einsatzstab] in Paris. The especial
train, arranged for by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, comprised
25 express baggage cars filled with the most valuable paintings,
furniture, Gobelins, works of artistic craftsmanship and ornaments.
The shipment consisted chiefly of the most important parts of the
collections Rothschild, Seligmann, Bernheim-Jeune, Halphen, Kann,
Weil-Picard, Wildenstein, David-Weill, Levy-Benzion.
My Staff for Special Purposes started the confiscatory action in
Paris during October 1940 on the basis of your order, my Fuehrer.
With the help of the Security Service (SD) and the Secret Field
Police [Geheime Feldpolizei] all storage--and hiding-places of
art possessions belonging to the fugitive Jewish emigrants were
systematically ascertained. These possessions were then collected in
the locations provided for by the Louvre in Paris. The art historians
of my staff have itemized scientifically the complete art-material
and have photographed all works of value. Thus, after completion,
I shall be able to submit to you shortly a conclusive catalogue of
all confiscated works with exact data about origin plus scientific
evaluation and description. At this time the inventory includes more
than 4000 individual pieces of art, partly of the highest artistic
value. Besides this special train the masterpieces selected by the
Reichsmarschall--mainly from the Rothschild collection--have been
forwarded in two special cars to Munich already some time ago.
They have been deposited there in the air raid shelters of the
Fuehrer-building.
According to instruction the chief special train has been unloaded in
Fussen. The cases containing pictures, furniture etc. have been stored
in the castle Neuschwanstein. My deputies accompanied the special train
and took care of the unloading in Neuschwanstein too.
First of all the paintings have to be unpacked to determine any
possible damage suffered during the transport. Furthermore, the
observation of climatic influences upon the paintings and their future
careful maintenance necessitate their unpacking as well as their
skillful setting-up. Due to lack of time a part of the shipment has not
yet been fully inventoried in Paris. This has to be taken care of by my
co-workers on the spot in Neuschwanstein to supplement the inventory
in full. I have detached for Neuschwanstein the necessary technical
and scientific personnel of my staff for the execution of this work.
The required time for the unpacking and arranging in Neuschwanstein as
well as the preparing of the exhibition rooms will take approximately
4 weeks. I shall report the completion of the work to you then, and
request you, my Fuehrer, to let me show you the salvaged works of art
at the spot. This will give you a survey over the work accomplished by
my staff for Special Purposes.
Over and above the chief shipment there are secured in Paris a mass of
additional abandoned Jewish art possessions. These are being processed
in the same sense and prepared for shipment to Germany. Exact accounts
about the extent of this remaining shipment are at the moment not
available. However, it is estimated that the work in the Western areas
will be finished entirely within two to three months. Then a second
transport can be brought to Germany.
Berlin, 20 March 1941
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 015-PS
[Rosenberg Letter and Report to Hitler]
16 April 1943
673/R/Ma
Mr Fuehrer:
In my desire to give you, my Fuehrer, some joy for your birthday I take
the liberty to present to you a folder containing photos of some of the
most valuable paintings which my special purpose staff [Einsatzstab],
in compliance with your order, secured from ownerless Jewish art
collections in the occupied western territories. These photos represent
an addition to the collection of 53 of the most valuable objects of art
delivered some time ago to your collection. This folder also shows
only a small percentage of the exceptional value and extent of these
objects of art, seized by my service command [Dienststelle] in France,
and put into a safe place on the Reich.
I beg of you, my Fuehrer, to give me a chance during my next audience
to report to you orally on the whole extent and scope of this art
seizure action. I beg you to accept a short written intermediate report
of the progress and extent of the art seizure action which will be
used as a basis for this later oral report, and also accept 3 copies
of the temporary picture catalogues which, too, only show part of the
collection you own. I shall deliver further catalogues which are now
being compiled, when they are finished. I shall take the liberty during
the requested audience to give you, my Fuehrer, another 20 folders of
pictures, with the hope that this short occupation with the beautiful
things of art which are nearest to your heart will send a ray of beauty
and joy into your revered life.
Heil, my Fuehrer
* * * * *
Intermediate Report of the Seizure of Ownerless Jewish Art
Possessions, by the Special Purpose Staff [Einsatzstab] of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the Occupied Western Territories.
The seizure action began in compliance with the Fuehrer order of
17 Sept 1940. At first those art collections were seized which the
Jews, fleeing from occupied territories, left behind in Paris. The
seizure action was extended to all remaining cities and villages of
the occupied French territory where it was thought that Jewish art
collections might be hidden. By using all possible ways and means we
discovered and seized all Jewish art collections which were hidden
either in Jewish homes in Paris, in castles in the provinces or in
warehouses and other storage places. The seizure action was in part
very difficult and tedious and, up to now, not all completed. The
escaped Jews knew how to camouflage the hiding places of these objects
of art, and to find them was made more difficult by the Frenchmen
originally charged with the administration of the hiding places. The
special purpose staff [Einsatzstab] in connection with the security
police [Sicherheitsdienst-SD], the squad for the protection of the
foreign currency market [Devisenschutzkommando] and by using their own
ingenuity succeeded in securing the main part of art collections, left
behind by the escaped Jews, and bringing it safely to the Reich. The
most important part of the action was the securing of 79 collections
of well-known Jewish art collectors in France. The list of collections
is attached hereto. Top place on the list is taken by the famous
collections of the Jewish family of Rothschild. The difficulty of the
seizure action is shown by the fact that the Rothschild collections
were distributed over various places in Paris, in Bordeaux and in the
Loire castles of the Rothschilds, and could only be found after a long
and tedious search. Although the action covered the past 2 years, we
discovered and secured, through the use of trusted agents, quite a
large part of the Rothschild collection in 1942.
Besides the seizure of these complete Jewish art collections, we also
searched all vacant Jewish apartments in Paris and other places for
single art objects which might have been left behind. The main job in
this action was to ascertain all addresses of Jews, escaped from the
occupied territories, since we had to overcome quite a few difficulties
on the part of the French police force which naturally tried their best
to retard our progress. During this search through hundreds of single
Jewish apartments a large amount of art objects were secured.
These in this manner secured collections and single pieces of art
were transferred to central collecting points in Paris, located in
the so-called Jeu de Paume and rooms of the Louvre. The art expert of
the special purpose staff inventoried, photographed and packed all
secured objects of art. Taking the inventory was made more difficult
by the fact that all data pertaining to the collection were suppressed
by the former owners. For this reason each art object had to be
examined separately for origin, place where found, and period. The
work is so designed that at its conclusion the finished inventory
will represent an unimpeachable document, as far as the historical
background of the art collection is concerned. It will show, on one
side, the monetary, and on the other, the historical value. The Jewish
owners and collectors only judged these collections by their material
value. Consequently they did not recognize the historical value and
therefore showed no inclination to make these collections available
for research. However, this research has now been accomplished by the
sorely understaffed special purpose staff. All their findings were
incorporated into 3 temporary books which will serve as basis for one
catalogue, soon to be compiled.
During the time from 17 Sept 1940 to 7 April 1943, 10 transports of 92
cars or a total of 2775 crates were sent to Germany. The contents of
the crates were: paintings, antique furniture, Gobelins, objects of
art, etc. Besides all this another special transport of 53 art objects
was shipped to the Fuehrerbau in Muenchen, and 594 pieces (paintings,
plastics, furniture, textiles) delivered to Reichs Marshal [Goering].
Castle Neuschanstein was designated as the first shelter. After
this castle was filled, the Bavarian administration for state-owned
castles and parks saw fit to relinquish several rooms in the castle
Herrenchiemsee for further shipments.
Since these 2 shelters were not enough and since the Bavarian
administration could not supply any more we rented 2 more in the
neighborhood; it was made possible through the intervention of the
State Treasurer [Reichsschatzmeister]. We rented several rooms in the
former Salesianer monastery at Buxheim near Memmingen in Schwaben and
the privately owned castle Kogl near Voecklabruck at Upper Austria
[Oberdonau]. The location and condition of these 2 shelters is such
that they are perfect in regards to safety against air attack and fire,
and can easily be guarded. All art objects are so divided between the
4 shelters that it is possible to continue the inventory and care, and
that no large collections of valuable art objects will be concentrated
in any one place. All measures for safety are taken care of by the
combined efforts of: 1. the Bavarian administration for castles and
parks, 2. the central control of the fire prevention police, and 3.
the local representatives of State and Party. In this way the highest
degree of safety has been achieved.
_9455 articles_ in the aforementioned shelters have been completely
inventoried, as of 1 April 1943. The inventory is as follows:
5255 Paintings
297 Sculptures
1372 Pieces antique furniture
307 Textiles
2224 Small objects of art, including East-Asiatic art
The inventory in addition to records of seizure and lists of seizure
and transport, follows the pattern of the enclosed file card
[Karteikarte]. On this file card is noted all information necessary
to characterize all objects as to origin, master, technique, time,
etc. These file cards together with the extended explanations of the
men charged with taking the inventory constitute the basis for the
editing of the master catalogue. Besides this there is in preparation
a photo-library in one of the central offices in Berlin, as well as in
Neuschwanstein. Since the number of technicians was small, the time
short, and the necessity of a quick expert from Paris was paramount,
only the most valuable objects were inventoried in Paris. Therefore
the inventory has to be continued in the shelters. According to
the latest count there are approximately 10,000 more objects to be
inventoried.
At present there are 400 crates in Paris, ready for shipment which will
be sent to the Reich as soon as necessary preliminary work in Paris
is completed. Should the present 4 shelters not prove sufficient for
consequent shipments, 2 more places, namely the castle Bruck near Linz
and the camp Seisenegg near Amstetten on the lower Danube have been
prepared.
For reasons of fire prevention all art objects in the shelters had
to be unpacked skillfully. These measures were also necessary to
accomplish the inventory and to continue with the care of the valuable
art objects. Restoration has begun since many needed it when we
acquired them. At present a repair shop with all necessary tools is
being outfitted in Fuessen in which all paintings, pieces of furniture
and other objects will be restored, to safeguard preservation. The
unpacking, the continuation of the inventory, and the establishment of
the photo-library, and too, the editing of the master catalogue, will
take considerable time.
The action of seizure [Fassungaktion] in Paris and occupied Western
territories will be continued, although on a reduced scale, since
there are still new art objects of great value to be found. The
administration of the East not only will seize furniture, but also
the art objects which might yet be found there. Here too valuable art
objects were found in the last months. These art objects, found during
the collection of furniture, were also sent to the shelters and will
receive the same treatment as the others. Besides these objects, whose
art value is established, hundreds of modern French paintings were
seized which from the German standpoint are without value as far as the
national-socialist art conception is concerned. These works of modern
French painters will be listed separately, for a later decision as to
their disposition.
On orders from the Reichs Marshal some of the works of modern and
degenerate French art were exchanged in Paris for paintings of known
value. The exchange was of great advantage to us, since we received 87
works by Italian, Dutch and German masters who are known to be of great
value. We shall continue to trade whenever a chance presents itself. At
the completion of the action a proposal as to the disposition of the
modern and degenerate French paintings will be presented.
Berlin, 16 April 1943
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016-PS
The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan
The General Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization
GBA
Berlin W 8, 24 April 1942
Mohrenstrasse 65 (Thuringia/House)
Phone: 126571
Bureau of Ministry [Ministerburo] received 27. April 1942, No.
0887 Min. 28/v
Dr. K.P. has been informed
Very esteemed and dear Party-member Rosenberg!
Inclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please
excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections.
Heil Hitler!
Yours
[signed]: Fritz Sauckel
5 copies
copy for Mr. Wittenbacher
[signed]: WACHS
70x
[Stamp]
Chancellory 1 May 1942 (Kanzlei) Mischke
read: ILFL/KS 45.42
filed: I-5, 5/5 42 Pg
To The "Reichsminister" for the Occupied Territories of the
East, Party-Member Rosenberg
Berlin
* * * * *
The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for Labor-Mobilization
20 April 1942
Sckl./We.
The Labor-Mobilization Program
On the occasion of the Hero/Memorial Day, in 1942, the hardest and most
gigantic commitment of German soldiery in all history was announced to
the German people by the Fuehrer. Besides the heroic and victorious
conduct against an enemy of an unheard of superiority in number and
material, and fighting with the courage of utter despair and beastly
brutality, stands the endurance of hardships unparalleled in history
of severest winter of cold, ice, snow and story since 140 years. The
conquest of the unbelievable difficulties arising from such a climate
and terrible weather conditions elevates our soldiers of the East
Front, by comparison with the human and soldierly efforts of all times
up to now, without exaggeration, to supermen.
It is now the duty of the Home Front towards those soldiers to summon
all its strength for an equally gigantic effort to enable them to win
complete, final and most rapid victory.
All the burdens and further necessary restrictions, even in the field
of nutrition, must be endured with proud determination in consideration
of the shining example of the soldiers.
Our Armed Forces of Greater Germany surpassed themselves in heroism,
resistance and endurance at the Front of the East, in Africa, in
the air and on the sea. To insure their victory in any case, it
is necessary now to produce more and better weapons, materiel and
ammunition through another increased effort and endeavor of the entire
German people, that is, all the producing workers, intellectual and
manual, the women and the entire German Youth.
In this manner will the German Home Front contribute decisively to the
frustration of the hopes of our enemies to again escape their complete
and final defeat.
The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich
and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting
Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament
of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition of the Homeland. The
raw-materials as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and
their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously
to the profit of Germany and their allies.
In spite of the fact that most of the German people capable of doing
so have already made a most commendable effort for the war economy,
more considerable reserves must be found and made available under any
circumstances.
The decisive measure to realize this is in the uniformly regulated and
directed Labor-mobilization of the nation in the war.
To reach this goal, the following principles must be worked out and
executed:
A. All important Production Programs, actually in progress, must under
no circumstances be disturbed by the new measures. On the contrary,
they should even be increased.
B. All orders of the Fuehrer, Reichs-Fieldmarshal of the Greater German
Reich and the "Minister" for ammunition and armament are to be carried
out as quickly as possible. Labor supply necessary for that purpose
must be freed and made available either in Germany or in the occupied
territories.
C. The task concerning the seed and harvest of German peasantry and
all the territories under German control with the view to secure the
largest production is just as urgent. The lacking laborers must be made
available as quickly as possible.
D. A supply system for the vitally necessary materials for the German
people will be assured.
The realization of these principles for labor-mobilization requires:
1. The cooperation of all the forces of the party, economy and the
state under coordinated leadership.
2. The best will of all the German people.
3. The most far-reaching measures to imbue all the employed German
workmen and women with the highest confidence in the justice of the
consideration of their own personal welfare and their salaries as well
as the best possible care for their health and shelter under the actual
war circumstances.
4. The quickest and best solution of the question of the use of women
and youth labor.
To reach the goal determined by the Fuehrer the simultaneous and
quickest use of numerous different measures of unified purpose are
absolutely necessary. As any one of those must not interfere with the
others, but rather complement them, it is also absolutely necessary
that all the offices [Dienststellen] in the Reich, its territories
and communities, in party, state and economy, participating in this
decisive task act according to coordinated, synchronized directives.
Thus, the labor-mobilization of the nation contributes extraordinarily
to the quickest and victorious termination of the war. It requires
every effort of the German people on the Home front. It is for that
German people, for their preservation, their freedom, happiness and
amelioration of their nutrition and standards of living that this war
is being fought.
Basic Principles
I. In the districts [Gau], it is the task of the district-chief
[Gauleiter] to take in his hands the propaganda and orientation of the
German people concerning the necessity of labor-mobilization and to
carry out important measures for the care of the employed youth and
women as well as to supervise the condition of camps and shelters.
They also assure themselves of the closest and friendliest cooperation
of all the participating institutions.
II. It is not only the most distinguished duty of the General
Plenipotentiary, but a condition sine qua non for the success of his
task, to assure himself of the utmost cooperation and understanding
of all the highest Reichs-Bureaus [Reichs-stellen], especially those
offices [Dienststellen] of the Armed Forces whose departments are
concerned with his task.
III. Equally necessary is the mutual understanding of all the
Reichs-leaders [Reichsleiter] of the party, especially the cooperation
of the German Labor Front [Deutsche Arbeitsfront] and the institutions
of economy.
IV. The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization will therefore
use with the help of the smallest, personal staff of assistants the
existing party, state and economic institutions and assure the quickest
success of his measure with the good will and the cooperation of all
concerned.
V. The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization has therefore,
with the consent of the Fuehrer and the knowledge of the Reichsmarshal
of Greater Germany and the director [Leiter] of the Party Chancellory
[Reichskanzlei] appointed all the district chiefs [Gauleiters] as his
plenipotentiaries in the German Districts of the National Socialist
Party.
VI. The plenipotentiaries for labor mobilization are using all the
offices of the Party in their district. The chiefs of the highest
offices of the State and economy of their districts will assist
and advise the District chiefs in all matters concerning the labor
mobilization.
The most important for that purpose would be the following:
The President of the Land Labor Office [Praesident des
Landesarbeitsamtes],
The Trustee for Labor, [Treuhaender der Arbeit],
The leader of the Peasants [Landesbauernfuehrer],
The economic adviser of the district [Gauwirtschaftsberator],
The District Superintendant of the German Labor Front [Gauobmann der
Deutschen Arbeitsfront],
The leader of the womanhood of the district [Gaufrauenschaftsleiterin],
The leader of the Hitler Youth of the region [Gebietsfuehrer der
Hitler-Jugend],
The highest representative of the interior and general administration,
and of the office for Agriculture [der hoechste Vertreter der Inneren
und Allgemeinen Verwaltung bzw. des Landeswirtschaftsamtes].
Should the confines [Bezirk] of a Land-Labor Office comprise several
Districts, it seems advisable that the President of the Land-Labor
Office in question should make available to the District Chief, in
whose district capital there is no Land-Labor Office, his closest and
most capable assistants in such a way that also in those offices the
continuous information and instruction of the district-chiefs about all
the measures concerning the labor-mobilization remains assured.
VII. The most distinguished and important task of the district-chiefs
of the National Socialist Party in their capacity as plenipotentiaries
in their districts consists in assuring the best understanding and
cooperation of all the offices of their districts participating in the
labor-mobilization.
Nevertheless, it must be strictly observed that the dignitaries
of the party and the offices of the National Socialist Party, its
organizations, sub-divisions and attached institutions do not assume
functions coming under the jurisdiction of the State, the Armed Forces
or economic institutions and for which only those authorities are
responsible; they are not to interfere with official business not
coming under their jurisdiction, according to the wish of the Fuehrer.
Should we succeed with the help of the Party in convincing all the
German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of the
labor-mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed in taking
good care and keeping up the morale of all the men, women, and the
German youths who work within the labor-mobilization program under
extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, as far as their physical
and mental capabilities of endurance are concerned, and should we
furthermore be able, also with the help of the party, to use prisoners
of war as well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only
without harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our
war and nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most
difficult part of the labor mobilization program.
The Task and its Solution
(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can
assure you, nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest
labor-problem of all times, especially with regard to figures.)
A. The Task:
1. The conscription of new soldiers to a gigantic extent for all
branches and services of the Armed Forces has been rendered necessary
by the present war-situation.
This means:
_a._ The removal of workers from all professional enterprises,
especially of a great number of trained personnel from armament
producing war industries.
_b._ Also the removal of especially non-essential personnel from the
war nutrition industry.
2. The war situation also necessitates the continuation of the
tremendously increased and improved armament programs as ordered by the
Fuehrer.
3. The most essential commodities for the German people must continue
to be produced for minimum requirements.
4. The German housewife's health, particularly the health of those on
the farms, must not be endangered in their quality as mothers by the
war. On the contrary, they must be relieved in every possible way.
B. The Solution:
1. All skilled workers removed from defense plants through induction
into the Armed Forces must absolutely and immediately be replaced in
such a way that no bottleneck or decrease in the production of the war
product results. It is the responsibility of all the authorities for
the labor mobilization to make sure that this directive is considered
in each case.
The most capable workers must, therefore, be removed from the reserves
of discontinued, lesser defense installations, and the discontinued
construction industry and be made available to the enterprises from
which specialists are being called into the Armed Forces, 8 weeks
before their actual induction, in order to enable them to instruct and
familiarize their replacement with their work.
2. Workmen or women available because of destruction or damage of their
installations must just as quickly be made available and incorporated
again in the war industry.
3. The Armament and Nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only
to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign
labor.
Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program which I found
when I took charge of my mission.
The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of
May-June in order to assure in time and under any circumstances the
availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for
an increased production, in view of coming operations of the army,
as well as agricultural labor in the sector of the German Nutrition
Industry.
All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well of the
East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the
German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be
brought to the highest possible level.
It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous quantity
of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for
that purpose are the occupied territories of the East.
Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves
of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we
not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary
basis, we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.
Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied territories,
we must, therefore, requisition skilled or unskilled male and female
labor from the Soviet territory from the age of 15 up for the
labor-mobilization.
On the other hand, one quarter of the total need of foreign labor can
be procured in Europe's occupied territories West of Germany, according
to existing possibilities.
The procurement of labor from friendly and also neutral countries can
only cover a small part of the total need. Practically only skilled
workers and specialists can be considered in this case.
4. In order to relieve considerably the German housewife, especially
the mother with many children and the extremely busy farm-woman and in
order to avoid any further danger to their health, the Fuehrer also
charged me with the procurement of 400,000-500,000 selected, healthy
and strong girls from the territories of the East for Germany.
5. The spring cultivation of the fields [Fruehjahrsbestellung] will be
assured by the use of the German youth in class-formation, together
with their teachers according to an agreement with Reichs-Youth-Leader
[Reichsjugendfuehrer] and the responsible, highest Reichs-Authorities.
6. The labor mobilization of the German women is of very great
importance.
Examining this very difficult problem and after getting thoroughly
acquainted with the fundamental opinion of the Fuehrer as well as of
the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich and my own most careful
inquiries and their results, I must absolutely reject the possibility
of having an obligatory service decreed by the State for all German
women and girls for the German War and Nutrition industry.
Although, at the beginning, I myself, and probably the majority of
the leading personalities of the party and of the womanhood with me,
believed that for certain reasons an obligatory service for women
should be decreed, I am of the opinion that all responsible men and
women in party, state and economy should accept with the greatest
veneration and gratitude the judgment of our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler,
whose greatest concern has always been the health of the German women
and girls; in other words, the present and future mothers of our nation.
I cannot enumerate all the reasons which made me come to that decision.
I only ask for confidence in me as an old fanatical district chief of
the National Socialist party and to believe that this could be the only
possible decision.
We all agree that this decision might appear unjust towards millions
of women who are engaged in defense and nutrition industries under the
most strenuous conditions but we also realize that an evil cannot be
remedied by spreading it to the utmost.
The only possible way to eliminate the existing injustices and
hardships consists in winning the war in order to enable us to remove
all women and girls engaged from jobs unsuitable for women, namely
endangering their health, the birth-rate of our nation, and family and
national life.
We must also consider the difference, whether a woman or girl has been
used to work in the field or in a factory because of her young age, and
whether already she has proved to be able to stand this kind of work.
Aside from physical harm, the German women and girls under any
circumstances must be protected from moral and mental harm according to
the wish of the Fuehrer.
It is doubtful that these conditions could be fulfilled in the case
of mass-conscription and employment. It is impossible to compare the
German Woman with the German soldier in this case, because of the
existing fundamental natural and racial differences between man and
woman.
We cannot accept the responsibility for the dangers threatening the
life of the nation resulting from such a measure in the field of women
labor mobilization, in view of the countless men on the fighting
front--our dead soldiers.
The many millions of women, however, faithfully and industriously
engaged in the German economy, and especially now, in war time,
rendering valuable services, deserve the best possible care and
consideration. They, as well as the soldiers and workmen, deserve
the greatest gratitude of our nation. They must be treated in the
best possible way by the labor offices and labor authorities and
their economic and health necessities must be generously considered.
The Fuehrer as well as the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich
attach the greatest value to those measures. For instance, it would be
completely wrong to threaten pregnant women with punishment and court
procedures, as has happened already, if they miss a day of work because
of troubles resulting from their condition during the usual period
of precaution [Schonungsperiode]. Nevertheless, it must and will be
possible to maintain the necessary work discipline.
7. A last, but also important reserve consists in the possibility of
the personal increased production of each German worker. It will be
the most distinguished task of the party and the German labor front to
achieve that increased production. There is no doubt that the German
intellectual and mental worker will accomplish it, no matter where he
works and in spite of the difficult conditions of our present nutrition.
This will be the best way for the German worker on the home front to
express his gratitude towards the soldier on the fighting front who
bears the most gigantic and terrible hardships in this severe winter,
thus remaining victorious over our enemies.
It is also the task of the party, State and economy in cooperation to
improve the sick rate by 1 percent through the adequate cooperation
of health insurance institutions [Krankenkasse] and approved doctors
[Vertrauensarzt]. This was accomplished in the district of Thuringia.
Such an improvement of the sick rate throughout the Reich would mean
the gain of 200,000 new workers.
The severest measures must be used against loafers, as we can not allow
those parasites to shunt their duties in this decisive struggle of our
people at the cost of the others.
I tried to determine the exterior solution of the task concerning the
labor mobilization, as conditioned by the present war situation, under
paragraph B, 1-7.
It is only natural that all the possibilities contained in that
paragraph will be completely exhausted. The rejection of a general
conscription of all the women and girls does not mean that I condemn
absolutely the use of women and girls who are in a position to make
themselves available for a suitable job wherever they can be useful to
the war industry without violating the principles of the Fuehrer. This
will be done in closest cooperation with the competent offices of the
party, state, the Armed Forces and the economy.
The labor mobilization program as laid down in paragraph 1-7
constitutes not only the greatest labor mobilization of a people but
also in history.
Adolf Hitler, however, made it clear through his idea of National
Socialism that figures are not the decisive factor in the life of
nations. Besides the tremendous figure of the employed labor forces
stands their productive capacity. This productive capacity depends not
only on the amount of calories, which I put at their disposal in the
form of nourishment, but also on their moral and mental condition.
This makes it necessary to consider besides the gigantic,
organizational question, the questions of nutrition, shelter,
orientation, propaganda, and spiritual guidance.
Measures to be Taken to Assure the Well-Being of German Workmen and
Women
There must be no doubt for the German producing people that they out-do
by far all the other workers of the world through their conscientious
work and their readiness to accept the most strenuous tasks under
proper political and philosophical guidance.
The district Chiefs will at this decisive stage of the war assure with
the help of all the institutions and organizations of the party the
best political and ideological care ever known in the history of labor
and humanity in wartime, for the German producing people in their
districts.
I am convinced in my capacity as general plenipotentiary for labor
mobilization that everything will be done by the party to maintain
within or without the plants the attitude and morale of the German
workers on a high level through the use of all means of propaganda and
orientation, meetings and appeals, as the only way to make the home
front worthy of the fighting front, and the only means of accomplishing
this gigantic task and winning the war.
I will constantly see to it, that the authorities for labor
mobilization as well as the managers of the plants assist the party and
primarily the German labor front in its decisive and great task in this
field.
Even workmen and women employed in war plants in their home towns and
living and eating with their families must be properly looked after.
I mention only: Provisions of coal and potatoes, consideration of
their possibility to get to their place of work. The lack of spring
vegetables and other troubles caused by war conditions and affecting
the nerves and health of our people must be offset by the strength and
satisfaction gathered by the realization of the National Socialist
principles of folks community [Volksgemeinschaft] social justice and
the necessity to hold out together and the belief and the confidence in
our Fuehrer.
This task becomes much more complicated in the case of those millions
of workmen and women who have been conscripted for labor far from their
homes in jobs they are not used to. This is a necessity of war.
Such utilization of labor power can neither be restricted nor can the
hardships connected with it be reduced.
The aim is to make life for our folks comrades [Volkskameraden] as
agreeable as possible and to facilitate the conditions of their
utilization. All these German people must be assisted by billeting
them, if possible, in decently furnished rooms under as decent
conditions, by encouraging companionship during their free time through
the party and to assure prompt issue of ration tickets and other such
things.
In this connection the Politeness-Drive [Aktion "Hoeflichkeit"]
introduced by Reichs-Director party member Dr. Goebbels will be binding
to the utmost for all labor offices and all offices of economy and
nutrition.
All camps where German producing people, men or women, are to be
quartered, must be perfect examples of German cleanliness, order and
hygiene.
The German plants and the German economy must not hesitate to do
everything in their power to make life far from their own homes
and families tolerable for conscripted folks comrades men or women
quartered in those camps. As there is a complete order guaranteed in a
way for the German soldier of the Armed Forces in his company for his
external requirements as well as for his character, which elevates him
far above the soldiers of other nations, so should this also be made
possible in adequately applied form for the producing men within the
labor mobilization program.
The necessary measures for the care of the producing German people
within the labor mobilization program should therefore be carried out
to the fullest extent by the German labor front.
In case of more extensive commitment of women and girls away from
their home towns and families, the rules for shelter and care as
applied by the women's labor service [Weiblichen Arbeitsdienstes] must
fundamentally be respected.
Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers.
The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of
a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has
become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization
of labor program in this war.
All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as to
exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable
degree of expenditure.
It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty
and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he had proven
himself the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat
him correctly and humanly, even when we expect useful work of him.
As long as the German defense industry did not make it absolutely
necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet
prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the
Soviet territories. This has now become impossible and the labor power
of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent.
Consequently, I arranged my first measures concerning the food,
shelter and treatment of these foreign laborers with the highest
competent Reichs-authorities and with the consent of the Fuehrer and
the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich in such a way that a top
performance will be demanded and will be obtained.
It must be remembered, though, that even the effort of a machine is
conditioned by the amount of fuel, skill and care given to it. How many
more conditions must be considered in the case of men, even of low kind
and race, than in the case of a machine!
I could not accept the responsibility towards the German people,
if after having brought such a tremendous number of men to Germany
these men would one day become a burden for the German people or even
endanger their health, instead of doing very necessary and useful work,
because of mistakes made in their nutrition, shelter and treatment.
The principles of German cleanliness, order and hygiene must therefore
also be carefully applied to Russian camps.
Only in such a way will it be possible to exploit that labor to the
highest benefit of arms production for the fighting front and for the
war nutrition program, without any trace of false sentimentalism.
The necessary instructions concerning the food, shelter and treatment
of the people from the East have been communicated to the competent
authorities of the police, defense and nutrition bureaus; beyond that,
I turn to the district-chiefs of the National Socialist Party with the
request to assist me also in this field to the best of their abilities,
in order to avoid any harm that might result from the use of that kind
of labor to the German people.
The subjects of blood-related, allied and friendly nations are to be
treated with particular care and consideration.
All action making the stay and work in Germany more difficult and
unnecessarily unbearable for the foreign workers and exceeding the
restrictions and hardships imposed by the war must be avoided. We
depend to a large extent on their good will and their production.
It is therefore only logical to make their stay and work in Germany as
bearable as possible--without denying anything to ourselves.
This can be realized, for instance, by facilitating their national and
folk [volkstuemlich] habits concerning food, shelter, and organization
of their evenings after work, etc., as far as conditions and the
consideration of our own people permit.
It is very possible that, if the authorities for the labor
mobilization, the general and interior administration, party and labor
front cooperate in close harmony in this mobilization of foreign
workmen and women, the tremendous advantage resulting from this mass
commitment of millions of prisoners of war and foreign, civilian
working men and women for the German defense and nutrition industries
may be supplemented by an equal success for the propaganda of the
national socialist Great German Reich and for its prestige throughout
the world.
On the other hand the greatest harm for our war industry may result if
the cooperation of all forces involved is not assured and all those
problems are not solved by all competent offices.
Therefore in closing I would ask you to observe the following
principles carefully:
1. All technical and administrative matters for the labor mobilization
come exclusively under the authority and responsibility of the General
Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization, the National Labor Offices
[Landesarbeitsaemter] and the Labor Offices [Arbeitsaemter].
2. All questions and tasks concerning propaganda orientation,
observation of political consequences and care (of people engaged in
this labor-mobilization program) come under the jurisdiction of:
_a._ The party, if outside of the plant
_b._ The German Labor Front for manufacturing plants, the Bureau for
farm politics [Amt fuer Agrarpolitik] for agricultural enterprises.
3. The issue of food and clothing ration cards, financial indemnities
and relief come exclusively under the jurisdiction of the competent
authorities or institutions of economy.
Ask the district chiefs of the National Socialist Party, as my
plenipotentiaries, to assure a smooth cooperation between those various
bureaus as well as the best possible harmony and mutual complete
exchange of information.
4. The solution of the task concerning the war mobilization of labor
is of such decisive importance that even the most important local or
regional interests concerning most vital peace tasks must not interfere
with it. Whoever violates that rule must be made responsible if the
German soldier in his decisive struggle for the fate of our nation
lacks arms and ammunition, synthetic gasoline or rubber, vehicles or
airplanes.
Therefore, I want to deeply impress upon all the men and women who
participate decisively in this war in the labor mobilization program
with insistence to comply with all those necessities, decisions and
measures, according to the old National Socialist principle:
Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work, that is, for
the future of our Nation!
[signed]: Fritz Sauckel
[Stamp]
(The Deputy for the 4 year plan
The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 017-PS
Copy /T
The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
The General Deputy for the Mobilization of Labor
Va. Nr. 5780,28/4265
Berlin SW 11, 3 Oct 1942
Saarlandstrasse 96 (Reich Labor Ministry)
Phone of the Ministry 11 00 28
Postal Check account Pay Master Berlin 10019
Urgent Mail
To the Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
c/o Gauleiter Meyer
Berlin W. 35
B--StV
5 Oct. 1942
Nr. 904 A/42
Dear Party Fellow member Meyer!
The Fuehrer has worked out new and most urgent plans for the armament
which require the quick mobilization of two more million foreign
labor forces. The Fuehrer therefore has granted me, for the execution
of my decree of 21 March 1942, new powers for my new duties, and
has especially authorized me to take whatever measures I think are
necessary in the Reich, the Protectorate, the General Gouvernement, as
well as in the occupied territories, in order to assure at all costs
an orderly mobilization of labor for the German armament industry.
The additional required labor forces will have to be drafted for the
majority from the recently occupied eastern territories especially
from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Therefore the Reichskommissariat
Ukraine must furnish 225,000 labor forces by 31 December 1942 and
225,000 more by 1 May 1943. I ask you to inform Reichskommissar
Gauleiter party fellow member Koch about the new situation and
requirements and especially to see to it that he will support
personally in any possible way the execution of this new requirement.
I have the intention to visit Party member Koch shortly, and I would
be grateful to you if you could inform me as to where and when I could
meet him for a personal discussion.
Right now though, I ask that the procurement be taken up at once with
every possible pressure and the commitment of all powers especially
also of the experts of the labor offices. All the directives which had
limited temporarily the procurement of Eastern laborers are annulled.
The Reichs procurement for the next months must be given priority over
all other measures.
I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution of
this new requirement, but I am convinced that with the ruthless
commitment of all resources, and with the full cooperation of all those
interested, the execution of the new demands can be accomplished for
the fixed date. I have already communicated the new demands to the
Reichskommissar Ukraine via mail.
In reference to our long distance phone call of today, I will send you
the text of the Fuehrer's decree at the beginning of next week.
Heil Hitler!
Your devoted
[signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
[stamp] Certified conform to the original
[signed] ACKERMANN clerk
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 018-PS
The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
21 December 1942
Nr. 02926/42
To Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel
General deputy for labor deployment
Berlin W 8
Mohrenstrasse 65
Dear party member Sauckel:
I thank you very much for your report on the execution of the great
task given to you, and I am glad to hear that in carrying out your
mission you have always found the necessary support, even on the part
of the civilian authorities in the occupied Eastern territories. For
myself and the officials under my command this collaboration was and
is self-evident, especially since both you and I have, with regard to
the solution of the labor problem in the East, represented the same
viewpoints from the beginning. For political as well as efficiency
reasons, you have devoted your attention, above all, to the care of
the Eastern workers, employed in the Reich, and in the same sense
I also have striven toward an overall satisfactory solution, by
the establishment of special posts, collaborating with the welfare
organizations [Betreuungsorganisationen].
If there is now complete agreement between your and my conception of
the matter, I nevertheless find it necessary on the grounds of several
occurrences during the last months, to point out with reference to the
enclosure, the methods applied by your agencies and collaborators.
I thereby do not disregard the fact that considering the scope and
urgency of the task to be accomplished, difficulties and hardships,
yes even false measures by the executing branches, can in the long
run not be avoided. But it seems necessary to me, to follow up these
occurrences insofar as they touch the conduct of war and the interests
of the Reich. This would always be the case, where the acquisition of
new laborers is undertaken in a way which intimidates the population.
The reports I have received show, that the increase of the guerilla
bands in the occupied Eastern regions is largely due to the fact that
the methods used for procuring laborers in these regions are felt to
be forced measures of mass-deportation, so that the endangered persons
prefer to escape their fate by withdrawing into the woods or going
over to the guerilla bands. Add to the occasionally unfavorable news
regarding the treatment of the Eastern laborers in the Reich, about
experiences with the labor procurement authorities, then the result
can only be a strengthening of the number and fighting spirit of the
hostile troops. This development is further aided by the return of tens
of thousands of useless Eastern workers from the Reich (sick, cripples,
etc.).
To this point I should like to add that my repeated plea to establish
sick-camps in the regional labor office districts, instead of the
mass deportation of the Easterners who are incapable of work, has
so far not been answered. Hence I found it necessary to contact
the Reichskommissar [Commissioner] for health and sanitation on
this matter. In the session of the propaganda department called by
State Counselor, Professor Boerger on the 17th of this month, the
negative repercussions which will be caused in the native provinces
by the recently planned return transports were referred to not
only by the representatives of my agency, but particularly by the
representative of the economic staff East, since such events interfere
with the demands for labor and production in the rear military
zones. Measures such as conscription, return of the sick or similar
things not only impair the procurement and the legal validity of
the executive orders of the compulsory-labor order released by me
on Dec 19.41, but moreover endanger all the important war work in
the occupied Eastern territories. This goes as well for the urban
as for the rural procurement districts, where so far, thanks to the
self-sacrificing activity of the leaders of the economic land bases, an
atmosphere permitting productive work was created between the German
administration and the native population, which now threatens to become
lost. Even if I do not close my eyes to the necessity that the numbers
demanded by the Reichs minister for weapons and ammunition as well as
by the agricultural economy justify unusual and hard measures, I have
to ask, due to the responsibility for the occupied Eastern territories
which lies upon me, that in the accomplishment of ordered tasks such
measures be excluded, the toleration and prosecution of which will some
day be held against me, and my collaborators. In order to achieve this,
and to bring into agreement the requirements given by the peculiar
political situation of the Eastern territories with the measures of
the commissions and the staffs of your agencies, I have empowered the
Reichs commissioner for the Ukraine insofar as necessary to make use
of his right, and to see to it that methods which run contrary to the
interest of the conduct of the war and war economy in the occupied East
be abolished.
It appears strange to me, that in numerous cases which should
have been discussed with the civil authorities, we only receive
information through the police and other agencies. I am referring
in this connection to the note of my standing representative of
Nov. 11.42.--III wi 5--1231-3587--in which I asked for a discussion
concerning the mutual cooperation, and especially on the position of
your delegates, to which I have unfortunately never received an answer
from you. With consultation of our mutual wishes, which you personally
will certainly understand, it is unfortunately impossible for me to
accept a co-responsibility for the consequences, which result from the
recounted state of affairs.
I should not like to have informed you of this, without expressing
my hope that in the interests of both of us, this condition will be
terminated with the coming of the new year. I am personally convinced
that you, dear Party member Sauckel, have the same desire. I assume
that there will be an opportunity for discussion of this in the
conference prompted by me on Jan. 11.43.
I am gratefully looking forward to your reports in this connection.
Yours,
signed: A. ROSENBERG
* * * * *
Extracts from the Secret Report on Morale by the Foreign Mail
Censorship Post Berlin.
(Reg. No. 7328/42 secret Group VIII)
Selected letters from the occupied Eastern regions regarding the
period from Sept. 11 to Nov. 10, 1942.
In the letters from the Ukraine a further sharp decline in the morale
is pictured, and under the impact of an increased requisition of labor
forces for the Reich, the Ukrainian population has been seized by a
terrible fear.
Horrifying picturizations of _compulsory measures_ by the
administrative authorities for the seizure of Eastern laborers, form
a major part of the news from home to their relatives working in
Germany. The disinclination to answer the call to work in the Reich
has evidently grown steadily, not only due to the reports of Eastern
workers, which fled home and their workshops or have been dismissed.
In order to secure the required number for the labor transport, men
and women including youngsters from 15 years on up, are allegedly
taken from the street, from the market places and village festivals,
and carried off. The inhabitants therefore hide themselves in fear
and avoid any appearance in public. After public beatings during the
month of October, so available letters state, came the burning down of
homesteads, and of whole villages as retribution for failure to comply
with the demand for the appropriation of labor forces directed to the
communities. The execution of the latter measures is being reported
from various villages.
Parts from Two Letters
"At our place, new things have happened. People are being taken to
Germany. On Dec. 5, some people from the Kowkuski district were
scheduled to go, but they didn't want to and the village was set afire.
They threatened to do the same thing in Borowytschi, as not all who
were scheduled to depart wanted to go. Thereupon 3 truck-loads of
Germans arrived and set fire to their houses. In Wrasnytschi 12 houses
and in Borowytschi 3 houses were burned.
"On Oct. 1 a new conscription of labor forces took place. From what
has happened, I will describe the most important to you. You can not
imagine the bestiality. You probably remember what we were told about
the Soviets during the rule of the Poles. At that time we did not
believe it and now it seems just as incredible. The order came to
supply 25 workers, but no one reported. All had fled. Then the German
militia came and began to ignite the houses of those who had fled. The
fire became very violent, since it had not rained for 2 months. In
addition the grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can imagine what
took place. The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to
extinguish the flames, beaten and arrested, so that 7 homesteads burned
down. The policemen meanwhile ignited other houses. The people fall on
their knees and kiss their hands, but the policemen beat them with
rubber trunchions and threaten to burn down the whole village. I don't
know how this would have ended if I Sapurkany had not intervened. He
promised that there would be laborers by morning. During the fire the
militia went through the adjoining villages, seized the laborers, and
placed them under arrest. Wherever they did not find any laborers, they
detained the parents, until the children appeared. That is how they
raged throughout the night in Bielosirka. The workers which had not yet
appeared till then, were to be shot. All schools were closed and the
married teachers were sent to work here, while the unmarried ones go
to work in Germany. They are now catching humans like the dog-catchers
used to catch dogs. They are already hunting for one week and have not
yet enough. The imprisoned workers are locked in at the schoolhouse.
They cannot even go out to perform their natural functions, but have to
do it like pigs in the same room. People from many villages went on a
certain day to a pilgrimage to the monastery Potschaew. They were all
arrested, locked in, and will be sent to work. Among them there are
lame, blind and aged people."
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 019-PS
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
The Deputy General for Labor Supply
No. IVa 5780.28/1138
Berlin, SW 11, 17 March 1943
Saarlandstr. 96 (Reich's Ministry for Labor)
Tel. of the RAM: 11 00 28
Postal Checking Account of the RAM, Branch: Berlin 100.19
Copies:
1. Gauleiter
2. III W 5
3. Special Deputy for the Eastern Labor Supply
Receipt stamp 03487 dated 18 March 1943
Personal!
To: The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
Att. Mr. Reichsminister ROSENBERG, Berlin
Subject: Draft of workers from the East
Dear Party Member Rosenberg:
After a protracted illness my Deputy for Labor Supply in the occupied
Eastern Territories, State Councillor Peukert, is going there to
regulate the labor supply both for Germany and the territories
themselves.
I ask you sincerely, dear party member Rosenberg, to assist him to
your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peukert's mission.
Already now I may thank you for the hitherto good reception accorded
to Peukert. He himself has been charged by me with the absolute and
completely unreserved cooperation with all bureaus of the Eastern
Territories.
Especially the labor supply for the German agriculture, and likewise
for the most urgent armament production programs ordered by the Fuehrer
make the fastest importation of approximately 1 million women and men
from the Eastern Territories within the next 4 months a must. Starting
15 March the daily shipment must have reached 5000 female and male
workers respectively, while beginning of April this number has to be
stepped up to 10,000. This is a requisite of the most urgent programs,
and the spring tillage, and other agricultural tasks are not to suffer
to the detriment of the nutrition and of the armed forces.
I have foreseen the allotment of the draft quotas for the individual
territories in agreement with your experts for the labor supply as
follows:
Daily quota starting 15 March 1943:
From General Commissariat White Ruthenia 500 people
Economic Inspection Center 500 people
Reich's Commissariat Ukraine 3 000 people
Economic Inspection South 1 000 people
------------
Total 5 000 people
Starting 1 April 1943 the daily quota is to be doubled corresponding to
the doubling of the entire quota.
I hope to visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the end of
the month, and ask you once more for your kind support.
HEIL HITLER!
Signed: SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 025-PS
Copy
I H (ZO) 1/752/42
for the files on hand I 3 [handwritten]
SECRET!
Berlin NW 7, 4 Sept. 42
Subject: The importation of domestic workers from the East into the
Reich.
_Here_: Conference with the General Deputy for Labor mobilization on 3
Sept. 1942.
1. _Notice_
On 3 September 1942 a conference, under the presidency of the General
Deputy for Labor Mobilization, of the representatives of the highest
Reich authorities, the Party Chancellory, as well as of the German
Labor front (DAF) was held at the Thuringenhaus, Berlin W. S, for the
discussion of the pending importation of domestic workers from the East
from the Ukraine into the Reich. To this Gauleiter Sauckel declared the
following:
It is the definite wish of the Fuehrer that the law over the duty
year [Pflichtjahr] for women be not over extended, that all German
girls must work one additional year in housekeeping. This position of
the Fuehrer is motivated by the positive experiences which have been
made so far with the women's Reich's labor service; this service has
proved itself to be an instrument of political breeding through which
the German girls are made politically more reliable than through one
additional year of private housekeeping. Therefore, and this is also
the opinion of the Reichsmarshall and of Reichsleiter Bormann, the
housekeeping problem must be solved through a different way than the
above-mentioned one.
Therefore, the Fuehrer has ordered the immediate importation of
400,000 to 500,000 female domestic Eastern workers from the Ukraine
between the ages of 15 and 35, and has charged the General Deputy for
labor mobilization with the execution of this action which is to end
in about 3 months. In connection with this--this is also approved by
Reichsleiter Bormann, the illegal bringing of female housekeepers into
the Reich by members of the Armed Forces, or various other agencies,
is to be allowed subsequently, and furthermore, irrespective of the
official recruiting, is not to be prevented. The determining factor
for the recruiting of Ukrainian female domestic workers is this:
according to the specific wish of the Fuehrer only such girls are to
be recruited against whose permanent stay in Germany, to be determined
by their conduct and their physical appearance, there will be no
scruples; it is in accordance with a specific desire of the Fuehrer
that the greatest number of these girls be germanized through the
recruitment. To this, the Fuehrer declared that we have to review
our school knowledge about people migrations, to the extent that the
Lebensraum of the Germanic peoples is not only to be considered from
a point of view of the newly gained territories at that time, but
also from the point of view of the region of origin of those peoples.
The Germans have spread "like beer". Only the young people have left
whereas the old ones remained at home. This is the reason why there
are, especially in the Ukraine and in the northerly part of the Black
Sea, such a great number of blond haired and blue eyed people who have
neither Tartar nor Caucasian appearances. This can only be the case of
peasants, descendants of settled Germanic tribes; to re-germanize them
can only be a question of time. It is the Fuehrer's desire that in 100
years from now 250 million German speaking people will live in Europe.
If, therefore, the recruitment of Ukrainian domestic workers is not
only under a labor mobilization consideration but also a racial one,
it ensues forcibly that a special treatment of this labor mobilization
measure is necessary, which does not exclude the fact that the domestic
Ukrainian workers are to be considered in the first place as workers
from the East and are to be provided with the sign "OST". They are
to be employed in city households as well as in country households,
preferably in families with many children and essential constructive
families (Aufbau Familien) so that 200,000 of them will be furnished
to city households and 200,000 to country households. In order to
prevent a better position of the Eastern domestic workers employed in
country households as compared to the ones employed in cities, the
domestic workers from the Ukraine are to receive basically the same
food as the German civilian population. Because these regulations
necessitate a revision of the feeding precepts of Prisoners of War and
soviet civilian laborers as stated in a communication of the Reich's
nutrition ministry of April 4, 1942, the Reich's minister for nutrition
and agriculture has asked the General Deputy for labor mobilization
to refrain from the execution of the measures at least until the food
situation of the German people permits the importation of more foreign
labor forces and a better food situation for the workers from the East
can be assured. Gauleiter Sauckel spoke in harshest terms against the
stand of the Reich's minister for nutrition stating that he refuses to
discuss an order of the Fuehrer. He added furthermore that irrespective
of the importation of domestic workers, the mobilization of one more
million workers from the East is being planned, this being the only
way to realize in the years to come the Fuehrer's Armament and Steel
production program for the execution of the great plans in the West
and for the annihilation of the greatest war economy of the world, the
North American one. For the feeding of this million men labor force
which number furthermore is equilibrated by the fact that approximately
7 million German soldiers are in greater part supplied with food
from the foreign countries, party member Backe has only to solve the
organizational problem in order to take advantage of the first rate
harvest throughout Europe. Never before did a minister for nutrition
start his function under such favorable conditions as State Secretary
Backe. The reference to the difficult transportation conditions to
bring the foreign harvests into the Reich does not impress Gauleiter
Sauckel in the least; he would find ways and means to utilize the
harvest and the cattle from the Ukraine even if he has to draft the
whole Jewry of Europe to use them as a human road for the handling
of boxes to the Ukraine. "If the food rations both for the Germans
and the foreign workers are not increased shortly, then a scandal of
the greatest proportion will take place". The decreased resistance of
the bodies--especially with the shortage of doctors--will give rise
to great epidemics (see Diphtheria Epidemy). It is to be requested
from Party member Backe that the proposed increase of bread and meat
ration be not done with the start of the winter time only but at the
end of the present allotment period, so that the weakened bodies can
build up a reserve of strength which will get them well through the
winter. The Fuehrer cannot understand the fact that it has to be in
the country which carries the greatest weight in the fight for the
future of Europe that most people go hungry while this is not the
case with France, Holland, Hungary, and the Ukraine and everywhere
else; he desires that this be the contrary in the future. As far as
the foreign workers in Germany are concerned (with the exception of
the workers from the East) a slow reduction of food according to
renderment has to be applied to them; it cannot be tolerated that lazy
Dutchmen or Italians receive better food than a diligent worker from
the East. As far as the nutrition is concerned, here too the principle
of renderment has to be applied. Since the new nutrition regulation is
seen as being feasible by Gauleiter Sauckel in the above mentioned
way of thinking, therefore, the special action of the General Deputy
for labor mobilization (GBA) for the importation of domestic workers
from the East must be coupled with the current recruiting commission
in the Ukraine. The delegation from October to April of 200,000 to
300,000 male and female workers from the East already employed in the
German agriculture to industry factories is not affected by this; these
forces (incl. the female ones) will be returned in the spring to their
original peasant organizations, and there just as before, they will
not be employed at home but for agricultural work. A lawful ground for
special domestic action, a decree is being prepared, the text of which
was read at the conference by Councellor in the Ministry Dr. Letsch.
The recruiting which in the case of the female domestic workers will be
based especially on voluntariness will be executed in connection with
the office of the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German police
who intend to step in for the pre-examination with regard to a possible
worthiness of becoming a German. Those female workers from the East
found to be apt for housekeeping will be marked in a special way by the
labor and social officers so that they can be recognized as such on
the transport lists of the collective shipments. Independent of these,
special shipments of domestic female workers are to be considered
since Gauleiter Sauckel plans on having brought into the Reich 6,000
persons a day. With reference to the treatment of the female domestic
workers from the East in the Reich, this question has been talked
over with the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police,
the Reichswomen office, the Party Chancellory, the General Deputy for
labor mobilization, the result being a plan for a notice for the German
housewomen. The wages of the female domestic workers are to be paid
according to a remuneration table for workers from the East; however,
this has to be deviated through the fixation of special tariffs by the
labor trustees. In reference to the Eastern worker's tax for management
directors, it was decided to ask the Reich's finance minister to higher
the Eastern worker's tax by half for the families of up to three
children and to cut it out completely for families of 4 children and
more.
At the end of the conference, the Councellor to the Ministry Letsch--as
he had done previously with new notices--tried to get the proposed
notice for the German housewomen ratified by those who took part;
however, the undersigned protested against that by demanding a copy to
determine his position. The representatives of the party chancellery,
the nutrition ministry and other offices joined in this demand so that
Gauleiter Sauckel promised to make available the draft of the text for
September 4, 1942 with the request that final positions be taken by
1400 o'clock.
Generally one gathered from this conference that the questions
concerning the recruitment and mobilization as well as the treatment
of the female domestic workers from the East are being handled by
the General Deputy for labor mobilization, the Reichsfuehrer SS and
the Chief of the German police and the party chancellory and that
the Reich's ministry for the occupied territories of the East is not
considered as competent or only as half competent. In reference to this
the undersigned established specifically that the Reich's ministry for
the occupied territories for the East has not until now participated in
the drafting of the notice. He declared furthermore that the Reich's
ministry for the occupied territories of the East is greatly interested
in the Propaganda for the mobilization of domestic workers, and that it
be carried out in a favored way considering the necessity to have only
volunteer forces at the disposition for housekeeping.
Gauleiter Sauckel took knowledge of this with satisfaction.
(signed) Gutkelch
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 031-PS
Chief of the Political Directing Staff, personal referee
Berlin, 12 June 1944
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1 of 2 copies
Re: Evacuation of youths from the territory of Army Group "Center"
(Heu-Aktion).
1. Memorandum:
The Army Group "Center" has the intention to apprehend 40-50,000
youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army Territories, and
to transport them to the Reich. This measure was originally proposed
by the 9th Army. These youths cause considerable inconvenience in the
Theatre of Operations. To the greater part these youths are without
supervision of their parents since men and women in the theatres of
operations have been and will be conscripted into labor battalions to
be used in the construction of fortifications. Therefore Children's
Villages are to be established behind the front, for the younger age
groups, and under native supervision. To collect adequate experiences
the 9th Army has already established such a Children's Village and has
achieved good results also from the political viewpoint. Army Group
further emphasizes that these youths must not be allowed to fall into
the hands of the Bolsheviks in case of a withdrawal since that would
amount to reinforcing the enemy's potential war strength. This measure
is to be strongly fortified by propaganda under the slogan: Care of the
Reich for White-Ruthenian Children, Protection against Brigandry. The
action has already started in the 5 kilometer zone. The Youth Bureau
has already had preliminary talks with the Organization Todt and with
the Junkers works. It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to
the German trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2
years' training. This is to be arranged through the Organization Todt
which is especially equipped for such a task through its technical and
other set-ups. This action is being greatly welcomed by the German
trade since it represents a decisive measure for the alleviation of the
shortage of apprentices.
The Chief of the Political Directing Staff, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer
Berger, submitted the action to the Minister on the 10th of the month.
The Minister feared that the action would have most unfavorable
political consequences, that it would be regarded as abduction of
children, and that the juveniles did not represent a real asset to the
enemy's military strength anyhow. The Minister would like to see the
action confined to the 15-17 year olds.
Following are the arguments against this decision of the Minister:
1. This action is not only aimed at preventing a direct reinforcement
of the enemy's military strength but also at a reduction of his
biological potentialities as viewed from the perspective of the future.
These ideas have been voiced not only by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS
but also by the Fuehrer. Corresponding orders were given during last
year's withdrawals in the southern sector.
2. A similar action is being conducted at the present time in the
territory of the Army Group Ukraine-North (General Field Marshal
Model). Even in this politically especially preferred Galizian
territory recruiting measures were being taken with the aim to collect
135,000 laborers to be organized in battalions for the construction
of fortifications. The youths over 17 were to be detailed to the SS
Division and those under 17 to the SS Auxiliary. This action which
has been going on for several weeks has not led to any political
disturbances. While it is true that the population has to be recruited
by force, they do show a certain understanding, later on, for this
measure of purely military necessity. Provided, of course, that they
receive correct treatment, good food and lodgings, etc.
The unified organization of parents in labor battalions makes it
possible to extract this group as a whole in the case of withdrawals
which are quite conceivable in the case of Army Groups "Center" and
South. The children already transported into the Reich would serve as a
suitable incentive.
3. As to Army Group "Center" this measure is to be initiated in Army
Territories, that is to say in those territories not under a civil
administration. During a conference with the Chief of Staff of the
9th Army I gained the impression that the action will be executed,
if necessary, even without the consent of the Reich Ministry for the
Occupied Territories of the East.
4. If the Ministry for the East should not support or execute this
action, it is expected that the procurement will be undertaken by the
GBA [Generalbevollmaschtiger fuer den Arbeitseinsatz--General Deputy
for the Mobilization of Labor]. Army Group "Center" and especially 9th
Army thought it of greatest importance not to let the children be put
to work in the Reich through the General Deputy for the Mobilization
of Labor. They preferred the offices of the Reichs-minister for the
Occupied Territories of the East [RMfdbO]. Only through these offices
did they believe to have a guarantee for correct and proper treatment.
This desire of the Army Group is a particular expression of confidence
towards the Ministry for the East. Army Group desires that the action
be accomplished under the most loyal conditions, as had been done
previously in the case of recruiting for the SS Auxiliary. They further
desired special arrangements regarding care mail exchange with parents
etc. As far as possible the children are to remain in groups according
to their village communities, then be collected in small camps in the
Reich where they would be at the disposal of trade establishments.
These technical matters have already been discussed. They can be
accomplished with the help of the offices of the Hitler Youth through
the Youth Bureau of the Ministry. Thus the Ministry is also able to
exercise political guidance over the juveniles and has them at its
disposal at all times. If I should re-occupy the territory the Ministry
of the East could return the juveniles in the proper manner. Together
with their parents they would then most likely represent a positive
political element during the reconstruction of the territory.
* * * * *
The Chief of the Political Directing Staw, personal referee, p 612
a/44g
Berlin, 14 June 1944
SECRET
Re: "Heu-Aktion"
1. Annotation
The Obergruppenfuehrer has given his consent to again submit the matter
"Heu-Aktion" to the Minister, with the aim to bring about a reversal
of his decision. This was done on this day. The Minister has approved
the execution of the "Heu-Aktion" in the Army Territories, under the
conditions and provisions arrived at in talks with Army Group Center
[Heeresgruppe Mitte].
_Urgent!_
2. Write via radio to:
Army Group "Center"
Att: Councillor in the Ministry Tesmer
[Marginal note] Radio station 2 complied. 14 June 44 [signed]
_Re_: "Heu-Aktion"
"Heu-Aktion" approved under conditions and provision arrived at in
conference.
By order of
The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Signed: BRANDENBERG
3. Copies to:
[Marginal note] complied 15 June 44 signed: Sg
_a._ SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Berger, Chief of the Political Directing
Staff, respectfully submitted for information
_b._ Chief Labor Bureau, for information
4. Matter p5 for information. _Please return._
5. File
[Marginal notes]
returned from P5 without acknowledgement
August 25, 44
signed: Bz 24 Aug
June 14, 44
[Initials]
_P_ OK by Dr. Streube (?)
To the Chief of the Political Directing Staff, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer
Berger, respectfully submitted with the request to resubmit
the contents of this memorandum to the minister with view to
reconsideration of the Minister's decision.
Signed: BRANDENBERG
[Note in ink] regarding the above-Obergruppenfuehrer Berger received
the memorandum on June 14. Consequently the Reichsminister has approved
the Action.
Signed: Str. June 16
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 035-PS
SECRET
Berlin, 26 October 1943
Short report regarding security measures by Main Division Ukraine
[Hauptarbeitsgruppe Ukraine] during the withdrawal of the Armed Forces.
On 24 Sep 1943 a prohibited zone was created by a decree of the War
Commander in the city of Kiev--, which runs some 3 km west of the
Dnjepr. The whole civil population in this area, including non-military
officials, had to abandon this zone as of 2100, 26 Sep 1943. The office
of the Special Purposes Staff [Einsatzstabes] on Rowno Street #8 lies
in the prohibited zone. The apartment house on Theaterstrasse #9 was
evacuated and troops quartered within.
The removal of the materials on hand encountered extraordinary
difficulties due to lack of loading space. However the transporting of
the following was carried out:
24 Sep 43: _Materials of the Museum of Art at Charkow._
Taken over by party member Pfeiffer from General Commissioner,
Shitomir for shipping by trucks to Reichs Commissioner Ukraine [RKU]
in Rowno.
96 Ukrainian paintings.
185 Western European paintings.
12 wood carvings and etchings.
25 carpets and tapestries.
The inventory and files of those objects are in the hand of the staff
leaders. The Reich Commissioner kept a copy of the inventory.
26 Sep 43: _Materials of HAG_ [_Hauptarbeitsgruppe--Main Division_]
The document-house library, utensils, office supplies and the
administration were loaded in a freight car by 13 native workers for
Truskawiec under the supervision of Special Purpose Staff Director
FUCHS.
27 Sep 43: _Materials of the Department of Seizure_ [_Abteilung
Erfassung_]
This shipment went to Ratibor and contained
42 cases--10,186 books
7 cases--total catalog of the East Library
21 cases--selected publications
12 cases--art folios
11 packages of samples of magazines
9 crates and }
7 rolls } Bolshevist pictures
22 crates Bolshevist films
Several cases of negatives and positives from the photoarchive,
dispositives and slides, materials of Special Purpose Commandant Dr.
Huettig of the Special Purpose Staff "Science" 1 case of Bolshevist
data in German and others.
1 Oct. 43: _Materials of the Ukrainian Museum in Kiev._
On the basis of the General evacuation orders of the city commissioner
the following were sorted out by us and loaded for shipment to Krakow.
Textiles of all sorts
Collections of valuable embroidery patterns
Collections of brocades
Numerous items of wood, etc.
Moreover an essential part of the prehistoric museum was transported
away.
Since already on the 20 Sep the head of the provincial administration
of libraries, museums and archives, Dr. Winters, had requested his
assignment to the Special Purposes Staff. Because of the evacuation of
the civil administration, he left the city on 25 Sep on the basis of
the general evacuation order. Dr. Winter turned over to the leader of
the main division (HAG) a list of the articles under his protection in
case the Special Purpose Staff remained longer in Kiev and would also
take charge of these materials. Dr. Winter could only send 2 freight
cars of material into the interior. Shortly before his departure Dr.
Winter had turned over by a transfer document to the city commissioner
the administration of the materials entrusted to him. The latter had
charged Prof. Dr. Mansfeld with as complete an evacuation of these
articles as possible. Since Prof. Dr. Mansfeld knew little about the
articles, he requested support from the Special Purpose Staff of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg. On 1 Oct. it was possible to load 2 freight
cars with museum goods, but under great difficulty. Since labor was
unobtainable all the members still in Kiev on the Special Purpose Staff
of Reichsleiter Rosenberg undertook the loading themselves.
The activity in Kiev became more difficult since the German artillery
stands in the center of the city and from there fires its salvoes
toward the East bank.
Through the military measures the salvage work was carried out, under
ever-increasing difficulties. At the request of Prof. Dr. Mansfeld 2-3
collaborators were assigned to him for the evacuation of the articles
and institutes which up to now had been under the civil administration.
Since the remaining in Kiev of all members of the Chief Labor Group
Ukraine was impossible the leader of the Chief Labor Group HAG had come
to an agreement by the 2 Oct. with G-2 (Ic) on the following points
concerning the division in that area.
1. The Special Purposes Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg's Chief Labor
Group Ukraine will leave behind a detachment of 5 men for security and
safety of the cultural articles in the off-limits zone of the city of
Kiev.
2. The remaining detachment will at the request of the infantry
division (ID) and at the command of the 7th Army Corps (7 AK) work in
close cooperation with the G-2 (Ic) of the infantry division (ID).
3. The infantry division (ID) is prepared to take care of the
detachment and provide each member with corresponding identification
papers and thereby guarantee the utmost protection possible in the
prohibited zone.
4. At the request of G-2 (Ic) of the Infantry Division (ID) the
particular detachments were to take over tasks which lay in the
competence of the Armed Forces.
5. The Infantry Division (ID) places great value on further
evacuation of precious articles, since this battle zone can in no
case be protected sufficiently by the army. One may even count on
artillery shells falling at any time. Army installations, means of
transportation, etc., should be provided by the Infantry Division, if
possible.
Of course it was the duty of the Chief Labor Group Ukraine (HAG) to
hold out in Kiev as long as possible, until it was rendered impossible
by the military situation.
All members of the Chief Labor Group [HAG] have worked in harmony and
with strong interest to insure the safety and evacuation of the most
precious cultural goods. At the loading they lent a hand in order to
complete the loading work in the few hours remaining.
The remaining of the Chief Labor Group [HAG] and its work has greatly
impressed G-2 and the Division. The intention that the remaining
detachment would leave Kiev at the last possible moment met with strong
approval. This last movement was defined by the Army as the one on
which the remaining detachment would be "bombed out of office."
On 5 Oct 1943 the leader of the Chief Labor Group departed from Kiev
with his staff except those selected for the remaining detachment in
order to continue leading the work of the Chief Labor Group of Ukraine
[HAG] from Truskavice.
Signed: UTIKAL
* * * * *
The Staff Directorate
[Stabsfuehrung]
Referee East
Berlin 21 Oct. 1943
II b/Dr. Z./Z/
[handwritten notation]
Miss Girschberg for final copy to Reich Directorate, Staff Director,
Subordinate Leaders, etc.
Memorandum for the Reichs Leader
_Subject: Evacuation of the Office at Kiev._
As you all know the Chief Labor Office Group Ukraine (HAG) of the
Special Purposes Staff had to, for the time being shift its offices
[Dienstsitz] to Truskaviec near Drobobycz 90 km South of Lomberg.
This shifting was accomplished without any friction. A remaining
detachment was left behind in the prohibited zone in Kiev. This
remaining detachment still protects the cultural goods which lie in
the battle zone insofar as their salvage has not been carried out.
Numerous cultural goods were saved in the last hour by the Special
Purposes Staff before the destruction through enemy action, aided by
the strenuous work of the staff members as a whole. The following items
were shipped:
1. _24 Sept. 43: Materials from the Charkow Art Museum._
Taken over by party member (Pg.) Pfeiffer from General Commissioner
Shitomir to be transported by trucks (LKW) to Reich Commissioner
Ukraine in Rowno.
96 Ukrainian paintings
183 Western European paintings
12 wood carvings and etchings
25 carpets and tapestry
The files and inventory of these objects are in the hands of the staff
leaders [Stabsfuehrung]. The Reich Commissioner kept a copy of the
inventory.
2. _26 Sept. 43: Materials of the Main Divisions_ [_HAG_]
The documents, house library, utensils, office supplies, private
luggage, and the supplies of the administration were loaded in a
freight car by 13 native workers for Truskaviec under the supervision
of Special Purposes Staff Director FUCHS.
3. _27 Sept. 43: Materials of the Department of Seizure_ [_Abt.
Erfassung._]
This shipment went to Ratibor and contained:
42 chests--10,186 books, East library (OBR)
7 chests--Total catalog of the East library (OBR)
1 chest--books for the higher school
21 chests--selected publications
12 [?] chests--art folios
11 packages of model samples of magazines
9 crates
7 rolls (Bolshevist pictures)
22 frames [Vorschlaege] Bolshevist films
Several chests of negatives and positives from the photo-archives,
dispositives and slides, material of Special Purpose
Commandant, Dr. Huettig of the Special Purpose
Staff "Science."
1 chest of Bolshevist data in Germany and others.
4. _27 Sept 43: Material of the Prehistoric Museum._
Independently from the work of the Special Purposes, Staff of
Prehistoric History had packed and shipped to Krakau the most important
items of the Prehistoric Museum.
5. _1 Oct 43: Materials of the Ukrainian Museum in Kiev._
On the basis of the general evacuation orders of the city commissioner
the following were sorted out by us and loaded for shipment to Krakau:
Textiles of all kinds (clothes, blouses, shirts, coats, over-coats,
etc.)
Collection of valuable embroidery patterns
Collections of brocades
Collection of Ukrainian easter eggs
Numerous items of wood, etc.
6. _1 Oct 43: Materials of the Prehistoric Museum._
In a second inspection party member (Pg.) Prof. Dr. Stampfuss with
the help of several collaborators gathered another collection of
prehistoric articles and also shipped it to Krakau.
When the civil administration left Kiev the head of the provincial
administration for archives, libraries, and museums, Dr. Winter and
his helper Dr. Benzing, again joined the Special Purposes Staff on 20
Sep. However these two gentlemen also left Kiev on 25 Sep. The Special
Purpose Staff did then undertake again its original task of protecting
the cultural articles and goods. Though the personnel has been
decreased materially in the course of the development of the situation,
it was then arranged that right up to the last minute one group of
workers capable of action remained in Kiev for the carrying out of the
final tasks. The Special Purpose Staff is the last German office which
remains in the dead zone of Kiev. Its remaining and its assistance
to the G-2 (Ic) of the combat division involved has made a strong
impression on the army. We were permitted to remain in the fighting
zone up until the point when we would be bombed out of the office.
This successful work was in the main due to the devotion to duty and
to personal inspiration of the Chief of the Special Purposes Staff
Anton, but also due to the unselfish performance of duty of his other
co-workers.
Signed: Dr. ZEISS
Chief of the Special Purposes Staff.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 041-PS
Memorandum for the Fuehrer
By a decision of the Fuehrer the Reichsminister for the occupied
Eastern territories has received the authority to put to use for the
support of government arrangements in the Eastern territories the
available household goods of refugees, absent or deported Jews in the
occupied Western areas. This is the so-called Action "M". For the
execution of Action "M" the service office West [Dienststelle Westen]
has been set up in Paris with directive authority in France, Belgium
and the Netherlands. Up to the present time about 40,000 tons of
household goods have been loaded on free transportation space (ship and
railway) bound for the Reich.
In recognition of the fact that the requirements of bomb damaged
persons in the Reich must take precedence over the demands of the East,
the Reich Ministry has placed a major portion (over 19,500 tons) of
the household goods at the disposal of the bomb damaged persons in the
Reich. The goods have then been transported by the appropriate service
office west in the occupied territory. Likewise, the Reich Ministry
will place at the disposition of bomb damaged persons the greatest
portion, at least 80%, of the goods accruing from Action "N" [sic].
For its own purposes only these goods which are urgently needed in the
East will be reserved.
The execution of Action "M" has resulted in two categories of
difficulties up to the present time:
_a._ Transportation Question. The goods have been transported up to
this point as Armed Forces goods by means of railway cars and ships.
The transportation authorities [Kommandanturen] now wish to treat
the transport requirements of Action "M" as the transport of the
civilian sector. This would lead to unbearable delays and among other
difficulties would require the export-approval of the French State.
Because of this the following decree is required: Goods which the Reich
Minister for the East-Service Office West [Dienststelle Westen] Paris
or their directive authorities in France, Belgium and the Netherlands,
declare as goods accruing from Action "M", are to be transported as
Armed Forces goods.
_b._ Distribution of furniture among bombed-out persons. The giving up
of the furniture to bomb-damaged persons is being delayed in order that
it may be submitted upon import into the Reich territory to handling
by the customs. After time-losing determination of the value, the
furniture in many cases is auctioned to the bomb-damaged persons by
Chief Financial Commissioners [Oberfinanzpraesidenten]; to avoid these
red-tape procedures the following decree is proposed:
1. Goods accruing from Action "M" are exempt from all customs handling.
For such goods there are no obligations or duties to pay.
2. Bomb damaged districts announce their needs in household furnishing
under the auspices of the competent Reich defense commissar to Reich
Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories--Central Section. The Reich
Ministry instigates the immediate removal of the objects placed at
its disposal by its service office West [Dienststelle Westen] and in
accordance with the indication of the Reich defense commissar ships
directly to the competent regional directorates [Gauleitungen]. These
give the furniture to the persons suffering the bomb damage on a
loan basis. The determination of the value of the furniture and the
definitive acquisition by the person suffering the bomb damage remains
in abeyance till a later accounting. Up to the time of reckoning the
goods are Reich property, and are subject to the evaluation right of
the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territory.
By these proposals a type of management would be achieved whereby
persons who have suffered bomb damage would have furniture and
household goods at their disposal in the shortest possible time. And
thereby also a portion of their most immediate difficulties would be
eliminated.
Berlin, 3 October 1942
Signed: A ROSENBERG
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 047-PS
HOTEL KAISERHOF
Berlin W 8
Berlin 24 August 1931
My dear Mr. Rosenberg:
I am just reading in the Voelkischer Beobachter, edition 235/236, page
1, an article entitled "Does Wirth intend to come over?". The tendency
of the article is to prevent on our part a crumbling away from the
present form of government. I myself am travelling all over Germany to
achieve exactly the opposite. May I therefore ask that my own paper
will not stab me in the back with tactically unwise articles.
Persons, who are known to seek connection or are even prepared to
break from the present constellation, _are to be spared under all
circumstances_. Our fight is to be directed in the first line against
the stubborn defenders of the present course and against persons who
reject us.
I ask therefore the Voelkischer Beobachter as well as the Party Press
Office to pay punctilious attention to this in the interest of our work.
With German greetings,
signed: ADOLF HITLER
An identical information went to Mr. Dr. Dietrich, Party Press Office
signed: WILHELM BRUECKNER, Adj.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 053-PS
The Deputy of the Reichs Ministry [Reichsministerium] for the Occupied
Eastern Provinces with the Army Group South.--Captain Dr. Koch
REPORT 10
(Concluded on 5th October 1941)
SECRET
(See also the morale report which will be ready in a short time
"Legacy of the Soviets in the Ukrainian Areas"--concluded at
the end of September 1941)
A. _The Ukraine on the Right of the Dnieper_ can, for all purposes, be
considered as inactive.
_a._ The German Wehrmacht was regarded by the populace now, as ever,
as emancipator and liberator from physical and mental pressure; the
political points of view at present are not as important as the
physical.
A temporary administration was almost put in everywhere by the troops,
especially by officers of Defense II, who were reserved for this, and
will be enlarged upon by the field commanders under the direction
of Section VII (military) with the commander-in-chief of the rear
communication zone; the proportional far-reaching net of the field
and Army post command will be support and condensed through the
organization of the office of the inspector of economy (especially the
chief group of agriculture) which is of the same opinion. Occasional
or regular conferences lead to unification of the points of view. Upon
my trip through the land (so far about 6000 km), I have tried through
personal contacts, to work for clearness and unification as much as
possible; through speeches, conferences, participation in informal
discussions, etc., I have reached, so far, some 600 native village
burgermeisters, 12 larger city governments with their burgermeisters,
about 500 professors or students, 30 ministers with their church
councils and 20 leaders of rayons or their assistants. I was asked by 4
commanders-in-chief, several garrison leaders [Standortaelteste], and a
few division commanders of various German garrisons, to lecture. I was
heard by almost all Ic officers of the armies and other higher command
posts, also some 100 agriculture leaders, 30 communications officers
and 3 propaganda companies. The present Defense II officers gladly
procured such connections for me and guaranteed continued execution of
probable decisions.
_b._ Where friction arises between German-(Retinue) sections and the
native populations, they are not of political, but economical or
personal nature.
Economy. The populace is aware and understands that a very large
part of their total harvest has to be given to the Wehrmacht (and
economical command); but they resist against "unjust" and "individual"
requisitions, that means against continued confiscation in the villages
along the same large routes of march, without uniformly requisitioning
in the country; and also against unrationalized or wild demands (the
confiscation of pregnant cows, requisition without proper receipts,
disregarding of letters of safe conduct issued by higher German
echelons, etc.).
Individual German economical commands made complaints, and rightly so,
over delayed terms and quantities; in most cases it was found that
technical hindrances were the reasons (delayed or curtailed orders,
lack of transportation) and not malice or sabotage. The farmers reply
to the oft heard remarks of their laziness and lack of working effort,
was that they brought in the large harvest on their own free will
without having many machines, manpower and the time.
Personal. The Bolshevists, using brutal measures (such as prison,
deportation, etc.) in general nevertheless refrained from punishing
individuals (by whipping). Now that it occasionally is done by German
troops, well meaning people blame it on the misunderstanding or
ignorance of the language; but should it be done too often, antipathy
and distrust will be created.
Furthermore the population emphasizes the difference which exists
between the occasional mistakes of the Germans and the systematic
oppressions by our allies. Here especially the Rumanians and Hungarians
caused much gossip. The German Army Command, which operated for the
safeguarding of German property in the newly acquired Rumanian special
(partly drastic) countermeasures. [sic]
_c._ A complete report on these so-called Partisan-movements was made
on 14 Sept 1941.
The Army High Command decided, therefore, in favor of centralizing the
work on the problem, and requested Captain Lazarek for this, who until
now was assigned to me (Koch).
Examples from Czernigow, Poltawa and other Army groups (for example,
Staraja Russa near Orscha) prove that the enemy in the future will
employ partisans using explosives and mines.
_d._ The inner political interest of the population is limited at
present to questions of administration and meritorious service in
offices or semi-military associations.
Of all the old, strong political parties in Kiev, only a subordinate
("Kultur") section of the "Sojus Wyzwolennia Ukrainy" (organisation
for the liberation of the Ukraine) could be found; other trails led to
Shitomir, Uman, and Lemberg, but were lost there in some remnants of
local organizations.
Up till now, the Bandera people could not fulfill their original
plan, the establishment of a self-supporting government in Kiev,
since the "Command Kiew" which was to perform this, was removed by
the security service [SD] in Fastow and Wassilkow; in the first days
after the occupation of the city, they pasted small propaganda placards
right next to the German governmental publications, however without
much result. Also handbills, in which it was tried to justify the
attentat of Shitomir, remain ineffective. The burning of Kiev and the
strict screening of the population following thereafter [Sichtungen]
have caused, it seems, a (passing) standstill in the organizational
construction of the Bandera group.
From the Melnyk organization it was possible to obtain a secret
directive called "in Matters of Propaganda"; aside from the old and
well-known requests (self-rule demands of totalitarianism, national
socialistic philosophy of life) the following is noticeable in regards
to the Reich's relative points (Par. 18): "The special aim is to
obtain a clarification of the relations to the German factors. It is
to be pointed out that Germany is at war with Moscow and therefore
is our ally which one must support in battle. At the same time it is
emphasized that the opportunity of the construction of a Ukrainian
political system does not only depend alone on the Germans but also
on our own combined organization and on our ability to produce. Our
motto here is: "Our strength lies in ourselves." (This settlement of a
German policy differentiates itself, despite their careful composure
and stipulation, fundamentally from the rules laid down by Banderas, in
which--to my knowledge--it was, up until now, referred to as "allies",
often set in quotation marks but never used in connection with the
specific references to the Reich.)"
_e._ A permanent security police force (military) is in every town.
It draws its replacements from newly captured Ukrainians, is entirely
under German command and wears the blue-yellow brassard; weapons
are only issued them for guard duty or patrols. At the beginning of
September a (melnyk-friendly) group of 300-500 Ukrainian fugitives out
of Bukawia was used in the district Winnica-Gaisin. They are mainly
serious men with some knowledge of German and up till now we received
no complaints about their services.
_f._ The _fire of Kiev_ (24-29 September 1941) destroyed the very
center, that is the most beautiful and most representative part
of the city with its two large hotels, the central Post Office,
the radio station, the telegraph office and several department
stores. An area of about 2 square kilometers was affected, some
50,000 people are homeless; they were scantily housed in abandoned
quarters. As reconciliation for the obvious sabotage, the Jews of the
city, approximately (according to figures from the SS-Commands for
commitment) 3,500 [sic] people, half women, were liquidated on the 29th
and 30th September. The population took the execution--as much as they
found out about it--calmly, many with satisfaction; the newly vacated
homes of the Jews were turned over for the relief of the housing
shortage. Even if certain relief was created in a social respect, the
care of the city of half a million is still in danger and one can
already foresee food shortages and eventual epidemics.
Up to date the danger of mines has not been eliminated--according
to official reports of the engineer officers--at least 10,000 (ten
thousand!) mines were deactivated, among them, of course, a great
number in the outskirts of the city (railroad station, civilian
airport, etc.) and in the tactical forward areas; in individual
buildings (also in museums) there were found 3-1/2 tons of explosives
in prepared, technically correct mine chambers; captured detonator
apparatus leads to the belief that other arrangements of similar nature
were built for wireless detonation. With consideration to possible
electrical mine detonation, the power supply has not yet been switched
on and therefore most staffs and commands are functioning only with
candle or poor petroleum lighting. The explosion and the burning of the
city caused several losses on officers, men and materials.
The inhabitants of the city remain quiet and disciplined as before;
German regulations are enforced to the best ability and without
resistance.
I reported over the evacuation measures of the Bolshevists in Kiev in
my telephone conversation of the 24-29 September; the picture has not
changed noticeably as a whole.
_g._ I safe-guarded as much of the local art treasures from libraries,
academies, institutes and museums with my special detail (2 officers,
2 drivers) as I could. Around 20, partly large, objects could be
safe-guarded in this manner and are at the disposal of the Reich.
B. A uniform and supervised administration has not become possible
in the Ukraine on the left of the Dnieper River; the streets to the
few Dnieper bridges are swarming with prisoners and fugitives, the
active troop counter-traffic eastward still hasn't stopped. The
Bolshevists were able to trash and carry away undetermined quantities
of the harvest, according to the populace. On the other hand, several
evacuees, formerly of Soviet authority, managed to stay back in the
"Kessel of Kiev" and to save themselves from further deportation; the
whole Kiev fire department with its equipment, which was evacuated by
the Russians, came back again in a like manner on the day before the
fire. In some cases it was possible to salvage several herds of cattle
and machinery.
II
The economical commands concerned and 1st Lt. Dr. Dittloff report
through channels about the special economical situation of the occupied
Ukrainian provinces.
III
With the continuation of the peace, the people are again concerned with
cultural and religious questions:
_a._ Where it was technically possible, the lower classes of schools
were opened. The initiative (and the cost) lie with the inhabitants
themselves. The administrative court will be held responsible for the
political attitude of the teachers, the supervision ties with the
Germans. The Soviet school texts are destroyed, all communistic emblems
removed from the buildings and institutes.
Request by Russian (and occasionally Polish) minorities to establish
Russian (or Polish)--especially private--schools will be denied in all
cases.
Junior high schools, business schools, or even colleges, will not even
be subject to discussion.
_b._ A permanent _press_ can be assumed to be existing (in a technical
sense).
There are Ukrainian newspapers in Kamienec Podolsk, Rowne, Berditschew,
Winnica, Shitomir, Uman, Kirowograd, Nowo-Ukrainka, Kriwoirog, Cherson,
Nikolajew and Kiev (perhaps in a few other places); the papers are
published from once to six times weekly and are mostly, fairly
pure newspapers; some (naturally censored) articles deal with the
anti-bolshevistics and in the field of German-Ukrainian cooperation
(thankfulness for the emancipation, similar parallels, etc.). The
following ground rules pertain to the technique of foreign propaganda:
The term "Ukraine" can only be used in a territorial (not pertaining
to state) sense; the Reich is not an "ally", but a "protector" of
the Ukraine; the German Wehrmacht is not "garrisoned" (or even
"occupationally army" as was formulated by several Bandera men) but
instead "saviors"; the title "Fuehrer-Emancipator" is to be used when
talking of Adolf Hitler, etc.; as far as these directives went, they
were looked upon as natural and obeyed without a trace of objection.
_c._ _Six_ different groups were found in the _religious circles_ in
the Ukrainian Province right of the Dnieper:
1. The old _Orthodox-Eastern Church_ (also named "Tychon" or
"Slavian"); it is the closest successor of the pre-bolshevistic
religious organization and includes the greater part of the
church-going populace, Ukrainians and Russians alike; amongst the
priests are several pro-Russians; the rest lean toward a final
re-establishment of the Ukraine. The strength of the group cannot yet
be given in figures. Alone in the Shitomir province for example, there
are 100 priests; in the city of Kiev there remained two small churches
during the time of the Russians. Bishops are not present. The 83 year
old Archbishop Antonij Abaschidse, who was found in Kiev, is crippled
and not capable of any conceivable service. A published appeal by the
metropolite and so-called patriarch Sergius from Moscow to resist
against "Fascism and the German bandits" (dated 22 June 1941) aroused
no interest among the populace.
2. _The Ukrainian "Autokephal" Church_, a (from an orthodox standpoint)
uncanonic group, consisting of a Ukrainian, home-conscious people,
without lawful bishops; it constitutes a religious minority, but
suffered especially severe persecutions from the Bolshevists and is
composed exclusively of radical enemies of Moscow and Bolshevism. It
has congregations and churches in almost all Ukrainian cities and
openly pledges ties to the national-Ukrainian bishops in Wolhynien and
to the general government.
Its union with the first mentioned group for a permanent, anti-Moscow
and pro-German organization is probable. The German authorities
[Behoerde], remembering the decree of the Fuehrer, did not hinder the
religious participation of both groups, however instructed them, in the
main intersession prayer--to first remember a prayer for the Fuehrer,
the Reich and the German Wehrmacht; the instructions were carried out
everywhere where they had been given. Larger religious services (in
open places, etc.) were often requested, but have so far been rejected.
3. The _Synodale_ (also "Erneuerungs Synodale" or "Lebende") church.
It is justified by laws of the church; however it stands at present
near an agreement with the Soviet government. Their services where
requested--for example in Berditschow--were not permitted.
4. The _Roman-Catholic Church_. Within the framework of the German
military administration, only one religious service was permitted
at the old cathedral in Shitomir (16 Sept 41), but was stopped
because of the following "misuse of the trust placed in the (Polish)
local priests." The Roman-Catholic cathedral of Shitomir was closed
again for Latin and Polish services and might be taken over by the
Ukrainian-Orthodox congregation.
5. The Sect of the Altglaeubigen (Russian and Ukrainian "Raskolniki").
6. _Sects converted to Protestantism_ (Adventists, Baptists,
Evangelical Christians, Stundists, etc.).
Both sect groups did not request religious services and did not openly
come into appearance and can be regarded as harmless.
Special director Dr. Stumpp, who was especially appointed for this,
reported on the situation of the _Evangelical Congregations in the
German Settling Space_; he is at present with Lt. Vohrer in the German
settlement on the Black Sea.
IV
Next _Intentions for the Future_:
As soon (around the end of October) as the civilian administration
occupies the whole territory right of the Dnieper and their
Headquarters are established in Kiev, I will follow--providing no other
commands are given--the high command of the Army Group South and report
at that place.
For the time, after the conclusion of the Eastern campaign, I request
permission for special proposals.
signed: GIRUS KOCH
Captain
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 054-PS
The Reichminister
_For The Occupied Eastern Territories_ C.P., 7 October 1942
The Representative at the Army Sector B. L 14/10
To the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
Chief Section I,
BERLIN, Unter den Linden 63.
_Reprint to Captain Lorenz Hq. of the High Command of the
Army_
Subject: Treatment of Ukrainian Specialists.
Enclosures:--2--
Attached I send you the copy of a report made by the Commandant of the
Collecting Center for Specialists at Charkow, (report submitted at the
end of September 1942) as well as the copy of a letter from April 1942.
Relative to the treatment of Ukrainian specialists in the Reich, I was
asked by the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief to attend to the
matter most emphatically since the complaints here never cease. I have
discussed it thoroughly with the chief of section VII at the Commander
in Chief's. I went to see Captain Schmid and visited the camp. As
synopsis of the discussions with the gentlemen and reading of reports
the following can be established in general:
_a._ With some few exceptions the Ukrainians employed individually in
the Reich e.g. at small trade plants, as agricultural laborers, as
domestic helps, etc., are very satisfied with their conditions.
_b._ The Ukrainians sheltered in the community camps, however, complain
very much.
The enclosed report of Captain Schmid reports these matters in detail.
The question of treatment of the Ukrainians, transported to the Reich
as workers of the East worries the bureaus of the Army concerned a
great deal. The Commander in Chief urged me to visit some of the camps
in the Reich myself as soon as possible and to report to the proper
authorities in order to bring about immediate relief. The Army zone is
by no means satisfied. All the circumstances of discontent contribute
more and more to more people joining the bands or wandering away to the
camp of the Bandera esp. other groups hostile to us.
The best propaganda of all would be to treat the workers of the
East well; great demands are not made by the Ukrainians anyhow. If
their treatment will only be somewhat better and humanely decent
these people, who make in part a good impression, will be more than
satisfied; these people after all came to the Greater German Reich--at
least at the beginning of the employment of workers of the East in
the Reich--of their own free will and full of hope. The unsuitable
treatment described in the reports is hardly propaganda and is not
profitable for us. After all, we are not at war with the Ukrainian
population and certainly not with people who by their voluntary
enlistment for labor, help us to win the war.
It also would serve our purposes definitely better to utilize the
specialist in his specialty.
[signed] THEURER
(Theurer)
1st Lieutenant
Copy of Copy
Collecting Center for Skilled Workers at Charkow.
Captain Schmid, Commandant.
To the Commander of the Army Sector B., Section VII
_CHARKOW_
_Subject_: Abuses in the treatment of Ukrainian skilled workers.
By reason of my capacity as commandant of the Collecting Center for
skilled workers and the transport of skilled workers to the Reich
connected with it and thereby being in touch with the various groups of
the Ukrainian population, I am informed of the morale of the Ukrainians
in the extended surroundings of the Eastern Ukraine. Resulting from
this knowledge I have to state that an atmosphere of animosity has
taken the place of the original attitude toward the Reich. This sudden
change of mood is connected partly with the scarcity of food for the
civilian population caused by the war and intensified by the measures
for centralization. The more important motive--the extreme abuses which
have taken place at various times in the treatment of skilled workers
shipped to Germany.
Since a prosperous economic cooperation with the 35 million people of
the Ukraine lies within the interest of our coming generations and
since the Ukrainians themselves are organically healthy, very capable
of development and rich in valuable and willing constructive forces, it
is necessary to prevent in time an estrangement starting at the roots
and to recognize the beginnings of the disastrous development before it
is too late, and to take effective countermeasures.
I. _Abuses in recruiting_
At the beginning of the action the recruiting worked on the basis of
voluntary enlistment. Later on a certain pressure had to be put on to
reach certain minimum quotas. This however did not give a license to
the starosts and to their militia, entrusted with the drafting, to the
brutalities mentioned in the following.
The starosts esp. village elders are frequently corruptible, they
continue to have the skilled workers, whom they drafted, dragged from
their beds at night to be locked up in cellars until they are shipped.
Since the male and female workers often are not given any time to pack
their luggage, etc., many skilled workers arrive at the Collecting
Center for Skilled Workers with equipment entirely insufficient
(without shoes, only two dresses, no eating and drinking utensils, no
blankets, etc.). In particularly extreme cases new arrivals therefore
have to be sent back again immediately to get the things most necessary
for them. If people do not come along at once, the threatening and
beating of skilled workers by the above mentioned militia is a daily
occurrence and is reported from most of the communities. In some cases
women were beaten until they could no longer march. One bad case in
particular was reported by me to the commander of the civil police
here (colonel Samek) for severe punishment (place Sozolinkow, district
Dergatschi). The encroachments of the starosts and the militia are of
a particularly grave nature because they usually justify themselves by
claiming that all that is done in the name of the German Armed Forces.
In reality the latter have conducted themselves almost throughout
in a highly understanding manner toward the skilled workers and the
Ukrainian population. The same, however, can not be said of some of the
administrative agencies. To illustrate this be it mentioned, that a
woman once arrived being dressed with barely more than a shirt.
Particularly distressing is the fact that, on account of issued
ordnances to prevent smuggling, all food acquired by the skilled
workers and the rest of the population by buying or bartering household
utensils, etc., is being taken away by the militia on the way. This is
not rarely accompanied by beatings (without regard to objections or
given circumstances).
It happened that skilled workers who came to Germany had sold or
bartered their own belongings partly or completely in that way, thus
they owned neither household furniture, etc., nor any other goods or
food. By combatting smuggling in that manner, unfortunately only too
often very poor people are being affected and robbed of their last
property, while the real smugglers are hard to catch. Furthermore food
has disappeared from the market due to a freezing of prices.
Family members left behind and formerly supported by those who went to
Germany get social care. This, however, is only the case in the city
of Charkow, not in the case of people on the country (note: used to
be the case, now all get special food distribution, the hardship thus
is removed). The taking away of food esp. the sale of goods mentioned
above often results in considerable hardships for those left behind and
has sometimes strong effects, since neither communal nor reciprocal
assistance exist here.
Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and the
population is the effect of those persons shipped back from Germany
for having become disabled or not having been fit for labor commitment
from the very beginning. Several times already transports of skilled
workers on their way to Germany have crossed returning transports
of such disabled persons and have stood on the tracks alongside of
each other for a long period of time. These returning transports
are insufficiently cared for. Nothing but sick, injured and weak
people, mostly 50-60 to a car, are usually escorted by 3-4 men. There
is neither sufficient care or food. The returnees made frequently
unfavorable--but surely exaggerated--statements relative to their
treatment in Germany and on the way. As a result of all this and of
what the people could see with their own eyes, a psychosis of fear
was evoked among the specialist workers esp. the whole transport
to Germany. Several transport leaders--of the 62nd and the 63rd in
particular-reported thereto in detail. In one case the leader of the
transport of skilled workers observed with his own eyes how a person
who died of hunger was unloaded from a returning transport on the
side track [1st Lt. Hoffmann of the 63rd transport, Station Darniza].
Another time it was reported that 3 dead had to be deposited by the
side of the tracks on the way and had to be left behind unburied by the
escort. It is also regrettable that these disabled persons arrive here
without any identification. According to the reports of the transport
commanders one gets the impression that these persons unable to work
are assembled, penned into the wagons and are sent off provided only
by a few men escort, and without special care for food and medical or
other attendance. The Labor Office at the place of arrival as well as
the transport commanders confirm this impression.
II. _Deficiencies on Transport_
During the transport to Germany provisions should be made for food,
water and drink, answering the call of nature, medical care, orderly
transportation, avoidance of maltreatment, delousing according to
regulation, and supervision. To take care of all this a military escort
is detailed consisting of 1 car commander for each car, 1 train guard
for every 6 cars, 1 supply man for every 5 cars, and 1 control staff
for every 3 cars. This is the minimum strength required according to
corresponding reports of all transport commanders. With less than that
orderly care and transportation of specialists is no longer secured.
It has been often confirmed that insufficient and uninstructed escorts
caused fatal accidents, insufficient food and care, escape of hundreds
of workers, most brutal maltreatment with consequent disorder and
confusion. Unfortunately the escorts were depleted on the way in
various manners by Army details esp. by commanders for the supervision
of furloughs or after the transports were taken over by the police.
This always affected the transports unfavorably. The transports
commanders are instructed to secure the interests of the transports by
all possible means against encroachments of all kind. They are of vital
importance for the Great German Reich.
Recently the practice started of handing the transports over to new
escorts in Przemysl. These escorts are under the command of a delegate
of the German Labor Front or the Ministry of Labor. This practice is
clearly against the regulations and rules of the Reich Marshal and
the Deputy General for Labor Supply. Taking a good management of the
transport by the delegates for granted, incoming reports here list the
following deficiencies: The escorts are understaffed which causes in
part lack of care and food and rough treatment, doctors and released
female domestic helpers are detained in camps without authority for
want of supplementary identification papers, social care is lacking.
A verbal report at hand relates in detail and with the witnesses the
irresponsibility and indecent conduct of delegate Albert Nuessen who
took over the 62nd transport. The transfer to the camp is made as
fast as possible and not perfect. The railroad offices are of course
directed to support the transport commanders. Unfortunately, however,
some of the office chiefs of the railroad treat the transports of
specialists often as very immaterial. The chief of transportation in
Romodan e.g. stated to a transport commander that these transports are
not important. Yet the Fuehrer himself ordered these transports, and
the problem of work power was declared to be the most important and
urgent in order to increase the potential of armament!
The food situation of the transports is now somewhat improved after
giving right notice ahead of time. Previously some of the food
stations failed grossly. However, it happens again and again that in
spite of giving advance notice of the transports strength in time,
no warm or cold food is ready or available. Sometimes this is due to
military or hospital transports which passed through before. This can
be easily understood. Sometimes, however, the notice was not passed
on or simply nothing at all was done. In the Reich it is generally
better. Of course it happens when trains are detoured a great deal of
the specialists go hungry for days. The iron ration is always taken
along and also used. It mostly depends on the transport commander and
the office chief for social care how unforeseen food difficulties are
overcome. The Army offices show always greatest understanding for
supplying these transports, the deputies of the labor front most of
the time fulfill their appointments well, however some of the deputies
of the attendance service have completely failed in their duties. The
transport commanders are instructed to give exact names and conditions
in the future. The red cross which at times is overburdened helps with
the supplying; unfortunately, however, the attitude and behavior of
many female red cross workers toward the specialists is based often
on uncomprehension of the Fuehrer's great action in regard to Eastern
workers, and they treat especially the female workers in an outrageous
manner. Food also has been refused at times with the reference that
these were "Russian swine." Nobody pays attention to the fact that
these are Ukrainians, because there is a lack of information to that
effect. In reference to this, attention is called to the fact that it
has happened on several occasions that people have broken out of the
cars after several days of hungering, hurried into the nearby villages,
sold their goods and acquired food. In such cases of course, it is not
to be expected that they all come back. Such gross incidents of the
transports of the first months have not, to our knowledge been repeated
in the summer. However, it has been reported that about 500 workers
escaped along the route out of a transport which started from Kiev,
accompanied by only a few policemen, supposedly 5 in all, (and without
medical personnel) and which convoy was badly supplied and taken care
of.
To understand the supply problem, it is important to know that often
only a short time is being allotted for the feeding of the many
hundred people by the train commander or the railway station officer.
Therefore all the workers can only be fed before the departure of the
train if there is a sufficient amount of accompanying and attendance
personnel and if the food is handed out quickly at several distributing
points; in addition close co-operation of the workers is needed.
Because the transports must often stop 1-3 Km outside of the stations
it still happens frequently that a small part of the workers remains
without rations because the engineers, in spite of agreements and the
stationmaster let the trains take off without warning. On the basis of
reported incidents, attention must be called to the fact that it is
irresponsible to keep the workers locked in the cars for many hours so
that they cannot even take care of the calls of nature. It is evident
that the people of a transport must be given an opportunity from
time to time to get drinking water, to wash, and in order to relieve
themselves. Cars have been showed in which people had made holes so
they could take care of the calls of nature. When nearing bigger
stations persons should, if possible relieve themselves far from these
stations.
The following abuses were reported from the delousing stations: In
the women's and girls' shower rooms, services was partly performed
by men or men would mingle around or even helped with the soaping!;
and vice versa, there was female personnel in the men's shower rooms;
men also for some time were taking photographs in the women's shower
rooms. Since mainly Ukrainian peasants were transported in the last
months, as far as the female portion of these are concerned they are
mostly of a high moral standard and used to strict decency, they
must have considered such a treatment as a national degradation. The
above mentioned abuses have been, according to our knowledge, settled
by the intervention of the transport commanders. The reports of the
photographing were made from Halle; the reports about the former were
made from Kiewerce. Such incidents in complete disregard of the honor
and respect of the Greater German Reich may still occur again here or
there.
III. _Abuses inside Germany_
Undoubtedly the higher authorities in the Reich do everything to
attend, in the best manner, to the workers from the East, especially
from the Ukraine, who have been called to Germany. In most of the
enterprises, too, in the countries and in households, one is not
only satisfied most of the time with the Ukrainian women and girls
as help, but they are also treated with a happy solicitude and with
understanding for their position and for our relations to the Ukraine.
Here too, unfortunately voices are heard that tell of bad treatment in
the collecting as well as other camps. All the time people tell about
beatings and thrashings and constantly also they write about them. It
seems that especially these men who have functions pertaining to order
and security violate sometimes very much the limits of admissibility
and identify the Ukrainians as Bolsheviks while they have actually for
decades opposed themselves to Bolshevism as its natural enemies. The
camp commanders also, usually show no understanding for the Ukrainians.
The treatment in the camps is described as being bad and very brutal.
With regard to food, it is being felt in Germany that in a war for life
and death, it is but natural to impose harsh restrictions in the first
place on foreigners who have been up to the present in the enemy's
camps. No doubt the Reich and the businesses make efforts to keep the
workers who were brought in, in good health and working condition.
If abuses take place here, it is harmful to ourselves and should be
remedied in each single case.
Disadvantageous also is the fact that a great portion of the German
population considers the Ukrainian labor forces as their worst enemies
and as _Russian Bolshevists_ and treat them accordingly. A definite
clarification is urgently needed here. In the face of such an attitude
of the Ukraine it will be completely impossible to have for decades and
centuries a successful and durable solution for the great economical
and political problem of the East especially of the Southern part.
Until recently the postal communication problem of the specialists with
their country was not fully solved and gave cause to ill rumor and
depression. At present an improvement is being planned.
Here in the Ukraine thousands of recruiting notices and placards have
been put out to get cooperation from the people and urging them to
report to the Reich with the assurance of best treatment. Therefore,
considering this and also the above mentioned abuses, it would seem
to be of interest to the Reich, and necessary for the security of our
future race and to prevent a later evil, to prevent by all means an
alienation of the Ukraine with its precious territories and population
by settling vicious abuses and by a clarification of the situation.
Certified True Copy C.P. 5 Oct 1942.
[illegible signature]
Envelope
At the V.O. of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied territories of
the East.
Deputy with Army, Territory B.
Official seal.
Copy of Copy
Copy of a letter of graduate engineer given to the Specialist
Collecting Camp. (Translated from the original in the Specialist
Collecting Camp.)
27 April 42
Camp Dabendorf, Berlin
Reich Railway direction.
Mister Franz H. Ergard and H. Nester!
Good Day!
As I have told you in my letter of 20 Apr. 42, we have been transported
to the Grunewald Railroad car repair factories. In the first week I
have worked as a manual laborer in the main warehouse of the works.
I have unloaded coal, have dug the ground and have stacked lumber.
This is supposed to be the "employment of Specialists" in their own
line of work. The question constantly arises, why did I go to Germany,
maybe that I who volunteered as a specialist (graduate engineer) for
Germany, am to be transformed into a banned prisoner? I wonder why?
What misdeeds have I committed against Germany? On the contrary, I
have believed all those who spoke in Charkow about the worker's life
in Germany. My attitude toward Germany has remained kind and friendly,
I want to work, but I do not want to be led astray, to be treated as
a civilian prisoner and without any care, or as a forgotten man who
can find nowhere and receives from nobody, care and moral backing. I
had hoped that we would be treated humanely and quite differently. It
should be clear that I did not come to Germany to beg for charity. I
had a job in Charkow and a decent working place; this I have renounced
for the good of Germany and sacrificed for the improvement of the
condition of my family. It was clear to me that I had to help that
state that delivered me from the Bolshevist yoke, from this yoke under
which I had to live for 24 years. Now I had expected a better future
for myself. Our food ration consists of: at 4 o'clock in the morning
3/4 of a liter of tea, in the evening at 6 o'clock 3/4 of a liter of
soup and 250 grams of bread a day. That is all. With such food we have
to dig the ground and great requirements are made from us just like
from manual laborers. On account of the under-nourishment and the heavy
work I am weak and exhausted today and I don't know if I can endure and
survive this much longer. To what conditions thoughtlessness can drive
a man! Into a condition which will probably not be pleasant to anybody.
I beg you all, deliver me, help that I can go back to my family!
If this is impossible, ease my condition otherwise I may commit a
stupidity, escape or suicide.
There is no possibility to continue to live like this.
Your,
Grigori.
P.S.: Expect with impatience to hear from you. What is the possibility
of sending me a work suit which in my stupidity I have not taken along.
Certified copy of Original 5 Oct. 42
Mamperl, employee
(At the V.O. of the Reich Ministry of the occupied territories of the
East. Deputy with Army, Territory B.)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 055-PS
SECRET
[rubber stamp]
German Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Regions of the East, Director
of Group P4.
P 4/894 a/44g Department: Goepel
Berlin, 12 Sept. 1944
Prinz Louis Ferdinand Str.
Received. Bau 9/12
DECREE
1. To the Chief of the Political Directorate Staff, In the Building
_Subject_: Presentation of a list of works of art which have been
shipped back from the Ukraine.
The Reichs Commissar for the Ukraine has stored the works of art and
paintings shipped in from Kiev and Charkow, in the following storage
places in East Prussia:
1. Domain Bichau bei Wehlau.
2. Manor House Wildenhoff (Owner Count Schwerin).
Concerned are 65 chests whose contents will be given completely in the
enclosure. There is as yet no inventory of some further 20 chests,
57 folios and one role of engravings. There are a great many of the
oldest icons, works of famous masters of the German, Dutch and Italian
schools of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, as well as works of the
best Russian artists of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the whole, the
contents include the most valuable works of the known Ukrainian art
possession, which in themselves represent a value of many millions
after a cursory appraisal. Beyond that they have a high ethical and
cultural-political meaning as the only collections of this sort in the
German orbit with international repute with which the Reich wishes to
carry out a collaboration at present or in the future.
In accordance with the ordinance of the Reichs Chancellery of 18 Nov.
1940--Rk. 15 666 B (enclosure 2) it appears necessary to submit a
list of the contents to the Fuehrer. I request your signature on the
proposed list which is enclosed.
2. Disseminate immediately.
(Copies for signature were presented in pencil to Ministry and
Chancellery of party on 15 Sept. 1944.)
Sv. 9/15
* * * * *
German Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Regions of the East
Director of Group P 4
P 894a/44
Berlin, 14 Sept. 1944
Prinz Louis Ferdinand-str. 2
Phone: 16 45 61
Received: Bau 14.9.44
DECREE
[Rubber stamp] SECRET
1. To the Reichs Minister
Via Chief of the Political Directorate Staff, in the Building
_Subject_: Works of art shipped back from Ukraine.
The Reichs Commissar for the Ukraine has stored the works of art and
paintings shipped in from Kiev and Charkow in the following storage
places in East Prussia:
1. Domain Richau bei Wehlau.
2. Manor House Wildenhoff (Owner Count Schwerin).
Concerned are 65 chests whose contents will be given completely in the
enclosure. There is as yet no inventory of some further 20 chests, 57
folios and one role of engravings. There are great many of the oldest
icons, works of famous masters of the German, Dutch and Italian
schools of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, as well as works of the
best Russian artists of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the whole the
contents include the most valuable works of the known Ukrainian art
possession, which in themselves represent a value of many millions
after a cursory appraisal. Beyond that they have a high ethic and
cultural-political meaning as the only collections of this sort in the
German orbit with international repute with which the Reich wishes to
carry out a collaboration at present or in the future.
I request an acknowledgement.
In accordance with the decree of the Reichs Chancellory of 18 Nov.
1940--RK. 15 666 B--a list of the contents was presented to the Fuehrer.
2. Disseminate.
[initialed] US 14/9
* * * * *
September 1944
16 43 61
received Bau 14.9.44
The Chief of the Political Directorate Staff
DECREE
[rubber stamp] SECRET
P 894a/44g
1. To the Reichs Chancellory
(1) Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstr.
Re: Reservation for the Fuehrer [Fuehrervorbehalt] of works of art
from the occupied territories of the East.
According to an expression of the Fuehrer's will (communication to
the Director of the Gallery of Paintings in Dresden--File number: RK
10 811 B) it is required to report all treasures of art which have
been shipped back from the occupied territories of the East. I submit,
therefore, in the enclosure a list of the items from the museums of
Kiev and Charkow which are at present stored in East Prussia with a
request for acknowledgement.
2. Disseminate.
By direction.
US 9/14
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 057-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALISTIC GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Party-Chancellory
The Head of the Party-Chancellory
Fuehrer headquarters, the 30.5.1944
[Fuehrerhauptquartier]
SECRET
[Receipt Stamp]
CHANCELLORY ROSENBERG
Dated 7 June 1944 Nr. 041 K
(Marked) Shown to RL 7/6
Circular Letter 125/44 Secret
(not for publication)
Concerns: Justice exercised by the people against Anglo-American
murderers.
In the last few weeks low-flying English and American flyers have
repeatedly shot children playing in squares, women and children at work
in the fields, peasants plowing, vehicles on the highways, trains,
etc. from a low altitude with their aircraft guns [Bordwaffen], and
have thus murdered defenseless civilians--particularly women and
children--in the vilest manner.
Several instances have occurred where members of the crews of such
aircraft who have bailed out or have made forced landings were lynched
on the spot immediately after capture by the populace which was
incensed to the highest degree.
No police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the
German civilians who participated in these incidents.
signed M. BORMANN.
Distributed List:
Members of the Executive Board of the NSDAP [Reichsleiter]
Regional leaders [Gauleiter]
Leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the
Party [Verbandefuehrer]
District leaders [Kreisleiter]
[STAMPED]
For Cognizance to
1) Staff Leader
[Stableiter]
2) Central Office
Authenticated:
Friedrichs
* * * * *
30.5.1944
To all Province and District Leaders:
Concerns: Circular letter 125/44 Secret.
The leader of the Party-Chancellory requests that the local group
leaders [Ortagruppenleiter] be instructed concerning the content of
this circular letter orally only.
signed: FRIEDRICHS
Authenticated:
Karms
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 058-PS
[Letterhead of the NSDAP Party Chancellery]
The Director of the Party Chancellery
Fuehrer Headquarters
30 Sept 1944
Circular letter 288/44g
SECRET
[Rubber stamped]
Chancellery Rosenberg
Received 3 Oct 1944 Nr 09640
Shown to Reichsleiter 3/10
Filed circular letter secret
Subject: Reorganization of the concerns of prisoners of war.
1. The Fuehrer has ordered under the date 25 Sept 1944:
The custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons, as well as
prisoner of war camps, and institutions with guards are transferred to
the commander of the reserve army from October 1, 1944.
For all questions which have to do with the fulfilling of the agreement
of 1939, as well as affairs of the police and aid societies, and for
the affairs of the German prisoners of war in the enemies hands,
the high command of the military forces will give particulars of
the transfer and the delineation of the twofold duties in direct
consultation with the commander of the reserve army and the divisions
of the military forces.
2. The Reichsfuehrer SS has commanded:
_a_. In my capacity as commander of the reserve army, I transfer the
affairs of prisoners of war to Gottlob Berger, SS-lieut. general and
[SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen-SS] chief of staff of the
Volksturm.
_b_. The commanders of prisoners of war with the individual military
commands are subject to the command of the senior SS officer effective
as of 1 October 1944.
[Rubber stamp] For cognizance to
1) Chief of Staff
2) Central Office
Back to chancellery
_c_. The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be
organized with the present labor mobilization office in joint action
between SS-Lieut. General Berger [SS-Obergruppenfuehrer] and SS-Lieut.
General Pohl.
The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner of war affairs
is to be accomplished between SS-Lieut. General Berger and the Chief of
the Security Police, SS-Lieut. Gen. Dr. Kaltenbrunner.
_d_. Particulars of the transfer will be determined in joint action
between SS-Lieut. Gen. Berger and the Chief of the General Office of
the Military Forces, General Reineck.
3. The Reichsfuehrer SS has also commanded:
All camp and labor commands are immediately to investigate with respect
to security and suppression of any attempt at uprising, and to take
all the proper measures. In this connection I order that from now
on, all canned goods which the prisoners receive in packages are to
be cut open and must be given to the prisoners opened because of the
notes and tools which are often hidden in the cans. This treatment is
to be accorded to any canned goods of prisoners which have been saved
unopened up to now.
4. I am passing this new order on for information. As soon as further
details of the transfer, future treatment of the affairs of prisoners
of war, and the exact delineation of the tasks of the Reichsfuehrer SS
and of the High Command are established, I shall forward them.
I request you work in closest collaboration with the offices to
whom the responsibility of the affairs of the prisoners of war was
transferred.
signed: M. BORMANN
Distribution:
Reich Directorate
Gauleiter
Chiefs of the organizations affiliated with NSDAP.
[Verbaendefuehrer]
Authenticated: Suergart [?]
File word: Prisoners of War
Order number 8810
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 061-PS
NSDAP
Party Chancellory
11 January 1944
Leader of Party Chancellory
Fuehrer's Headquarters
Announcement 9/44 secret
SECRET
_Re: Supply of Bombed Districts_
Since the supply of textiles and household goods for the bombed
populations is becoming increasingly difficult, the proposition was
made repeatedly to effect purchases in the occupied territories in
greater proportions. Various district leaders proposed to let these
purchases be handled by suitable private merchants who know these
districts and have corresponding connections.
I have brought these proposals to the attention of the National
Economic Minister and am quoting his reply of 16 December 1943 on
account of its fundamental importance: I consider it a specially
important task to make use of the economic power of the occupied
territories for the Nation. You are aware of the fact that since
the occupation of the Western territories the buying out of these
countries has been affected in the greatest proportion. Raw materials,
semi-finished products and stocks of finished goods have been rolling
to Germany for months, valuable machines were sent to our armaments
industry. Everything was done at that time to increase our armament
potentialities. Later on the shipments of these important economic
goods were replaced by the so-called distribution of orders from
industry to industry. These measures are running smoothly and with
good success for a long time. They were again strengthened these
last few months because we were more than ever before forced by the
shutting-down of the consumer goods industry in favor of armament to
use the economic powers of the Western occupied territories for these
German needs.
With the growing volume of the distribution of orders the black-market
also lost more ground and the termination of products as to kind,
quality and price was taken into our hands much more effectively. In
the spring of this year, therefore, the Reichsmarschal was able to
decide to prohibit all black-market purchases through German agencies.
Since, besides the industrial fabrication from old stocks and from
uncontrollable production in the Western occupied territories,
certain supplies always exist which are not covered by the industrial
displacement, the proper German agencies have received the order from
me to get also these free stocks of finished goods besides securing
production for the displacement. In doing so, one must not form a
wrong idea of the amount of these stocks. They usually are not as
big as they might appear to be in the display window of some cities
of the Western territories. These purchases are being made under the
control of central purchase agencies and according to the regulations
of the national agencies. Moreover, these purchases have already been
in the hands of German companies proven in foreign business. Since,
in addition to these firms, buyers have recently acted who used to
be active in the black-market and are not sufficiently competent
nor always reliable, I have formed recently for France and Belgium
each a common buying office for the companies permitted for certain
businesses. It is the task of these offices to purchase the finished
goods without disturbing the distribution of orders specially for the
supply for air attack losses. These offices represent a coordination
of the especially experienced German companies in Belgium and France.
Among them are, for instance, also a number of respectable Hamburg
firms. The offices are getting general directions from the Reich
offices as to which goods are urgently needed for the provision for
bombed out people. Besides, it is up to their private economical
initiative to develop fully these possibilities, on which I am also
putting the greatest importance.
Accordingly, I may assume that your proposals have already been carried
out. Difficulties in the delivery of the goods to the Reich are solely
due to the present specially strained transport situation. Frequently
during the last few weeks it was not possible to bring in even the most
important goods destined for the bombed out civilians from the Western
occupied territories. Upon an improvement of the transport situation,
the provision with these goods will also improve. Special actions,
therefore, can also not change this situation. They would only disturb
the order of the practice established after many troubles.
Signed M. Bormann
Distribution:
Reichsleiter
Gauleiter
Verbaendefuehrer
Correct [signed] Goerz
Subject index: Household goods--Airwar measures--Textiles--Supplies
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 062-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
[Receipt Stamp:
Chancellery Rosenberg
No. 941, dated 1 April 1940]
Munich 33, 13 March 1940
Brown House
TOP SECRET
(Initialled): R
DIRECTIVE A 5/40 g-
_Subject_: Instructions to the civilian population regarding
appropriate behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or
parachutists in German territory [Reichsgebiet]
The French civilian population was directed officially and by radio how
to behave in case of landings by German planes.
On account of this fact the Commander in Chief of the Air Force has
requested me to instruct the civilian population correspondingly by
means of party channels.
The attached directions as to procedure are to be disseminated only
orally via district leaders [Kreisleiter], local municipal leaders
[Ortsgruppenleiter], cell leaders [Zellenleiter], block leaders
[Blockleiter], leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations
of the party. Transmittal by official orders, posters, press or radio
is prohibited.
1 enclosure
Authenticated:
(F.d.R.)
FRIEDRICHS
signed: R. HESS
OFFICIAL STAMP: TOP SECRET
(gives the exact routine instructions how to handle state secrets)
1. This is a state secret in the sense of par. 88 Reich Criminal Code
in the wording of the law of 24 April 1934. German laws of 1934 Vol. 1
p. 341 ff.
2. To be passed on only personally or upon personal written request in
two envelopes against receipt certificate.
3. Transmission if possible through courier or trusted personality; in
case of postal transmission as money-letter (value 1050 marks).
4. Multiplication of any kind as well as making of excerpts is
prohibited.
5. Recipient responsible for safe keeping. Violation of this results in
severest punishment.
_DISTRIBUTION_
Members of the Executive Board of the NSDAP
Regional Leaders
Adjutant's Office of the Fuehrer
Liaison Staff of the NSDAP
Reich Organization Directorate
Reich Propaganda Directorate
Reich Student Leadership
SS Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH.
* * * * *
INCLOSURE TO DIRECTIVE--A 5/40 g
Direction about behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or
parachutists
1. Each enemy plane landing on German soil is to be put under effective
protection immediately.
2. The airmen are to be arrested at once, and, first of all, a
restarting as well as the destruction or burning of the plane or its
contents are to be prevented.
3. It is to be kept especially in mind that each part of the plane,
even the smallest, or of the equipment of the airmen is important
and of the utmost significance to the competent service office. The
retaining of any objects--possibly as souvenirs--is detrimental to the
country's defense, and will be punished as looting according to law.
This category includes also, i.e. notebooks, letters, postal cards,
either in the plane or in the clothing of killed or wounded airmen. Any
attempt by enemy airmen to destroy such objects is to be prevented by
all means.
4. Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or
liquidated [Unschadlich Gemacht].
5. The nearest military or constabulary post is to be informed at once.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 064-PS
[Letterhead--NSDAP]
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff
at present in Berlin, 27 Sept 40
Bo-An
[Rubber stamp]
Chancellery Rosenberg
Received No. 2565. 1 Oct 1940
To
Reichsleiter A. Rosenberg
_Berlin W 35_
Margaretenstr. 17
Dear party member Rosenberg:
I am sending you a photostatic copy of a letter from Gauleiter Florian
dated 23 Sept 1940 and I request you to take action on it.
Heil Hitler!
Yours very respectfully
signed: M. BORMANN
* * * * *
Enclosure
[Letterhead of the NSDAP]
Duesseldorf
Duesseldorf 23 Sept 1940
Gauleitung
Subject: Lecture of Major General von RABENAU
Our file: Fl./V.
Department: _The Gauleiter_
_Personal_
[Receipt stamp]
Deputy of the Fuehrer
27 Sept 1940
_To the_ Deputy of the Fuehrer
Party member
Rudolf HESS
_Munich_
Photocopy
[penciled]
Dear Party Member Hess:
A pamphlet entitled "The Spirit and Soul of the Soldiers" written
by Major General Dr. h. c. (doctor, honorus causa) von Rabenau has
appeared in the publications section of the NSDAP. Group I: German
Military Might, published by the Central Publishing Co. of the NSDAP,
Successors to Franz Eher Inc. Ltd. (GmbH) Berlin.
I cannot but point out this spiritual outpouring as a digression, at
least as inadequate. It is on the same order as the many lectures
which General von Rabenau gave to officers before the present war
and its tendencies are directed against the concept of the German
soldier which was born with the national-socialistic revolution, even
if this tendency is cleverly kept to a minimum in this case. Just
as in his lectures, Rabenau uses the method of arbitrary juggling
with philosophic learning, which on one hand displays a widespread
knowledge, and on the other consciously holds back from the clarity
for which we strive with the national-socialistic world philosophy
[Weltanschauung].
As I have reported before in conversation with you, General von Rabenau
gave a lecture in Aachen some time before this war to a group of some
60 to 70 younger officers and about 15 leaders of the party who were
invited, and among whom I chanced to be, about the development of the
people's army. According to Rabenau, the present people's army began
about 1813 during the wars of Liberation (Napoleonic) and developed in
the decades which followed to its present size, thanks to the great
German qualities of soldiery which reached their zenith in the army of
one hundred thousand men. The national-socialistic revolution which
created the popular will for soldiery, and with it the developments for
the establishment of the first German people's army is not mentioned in
any way, much less, in the role of being the dynamic creative force.
Rabenau contented himself with presenting only a few quotations from
the Fuehrer's "Mein Kampf". The politically ignorant officers got the
impression, as Rabenau knew how to talk vividly and convincingly,
that the size of the present day people's army was an accomplishment
of the old military forces, and in their later thinking they will ask
themselves: "Why is there so much emphasis on the Party? Why invite the
Party fuehrers? This is an affair for soldiers."
When I asked a question after the lecture, which unfortunately did
not offer a discussion period, and explained to him that he was in
no wise justified by history, that he had denied the mother of the
people's army, the Revolution, the Party, he overbore me in the
arrogant manner which is peculiar to him with references to Indian,
Chinese, French, English and German philosophies in order to prove to
me in front of several listeners that his lecture presentation was
correct. I replied with the philosophic ideas which I have won in
the practical struggle of life, and insisted on the correctness of my
concept. He professes not to be able to allow my contentions because
they were not scientifically based. According to all appearances only
those philosophic ideas are scientifically based, for him, which were
developed _before_ the national-socialistic revolution.
The inadequacy of Rabenau made itself clear at the close of this
conversation, when the church came into the debate as the educational
factor [Erziehungsfaktor]. After he had affirmed the necessity of the
churches, Rabenau said with emphasized self-assurance something like
the following, "Dear Gauleiter, the Party is making mistake after
mistake in the business with the churches. Obtain for me the necessary
powers from the Fuehrer, and I guarantee that I shall succeed in a
few months in establishing peace with the churches for all times."
After this catastrophic ignorance I gave up the conversation about the
importance of philosophic ideas for our ordinary life [Volksleben].
Dear Party Member Hess: The reading of General von Rabenau's pamphlet
"Spirit and Soul of the Soldier" has reminded me again of this. In this
brochure, just as at that time, Rabenau affirms the necessity of the
church, straightforward and clearly, even if it is prudently careful.
He writes on page 28:
There could be more examples, they would suffice to show that soldiers
in this world can scarcely get along without thoughts about the next
one.
Because General von Rabenau is falsely based spiritually, I consider
his activities as an educator in spiritual affairs as dangerous and I
am of the opinion that his educational writings are to be dispensed
with absolutely, and that the publications section of the NSDAP can and
must renounce these writings.
If such spiritual educational work should be done, in the interests of
the German armed forces, then the Publications Section of the NSDAP can
be permitted to accept for publication only brochures about "Spirit
and Soul of the Soldier" which point out most strongly the permanent
danger for "Spirit and Soul of the Soldier." The churches with their
Christianity are this danger against which the struggle must always be
carried on.
I considered it my duty to tell you again of my concept of General von
Rabenau, as well as to convey my criticism of the Publications Section
of the NSDAP.
Heil Hitler
signed: FLORIAN
Gauleiter
official seal of
Gauleiter
Gau Duesseldorf
enclosure.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 066-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff
Reichsleiter
Alfred Rosenberg
Berlin W 35
Margaretenstr 17
Munich 24 June 1940
The Brown House
III/Dr Kl--Eg
Chancellory Rosenberg
Receipt Nr 1799 M.
1 July 40
H
Copy to III for comment--2 July
Enclosed please find the draft of a decree about the judicial status
of religious organizations and congregations in the Reich district
Danzig-West Prussia, with a request for your comment.
The draft in its present form has been approved by District Leader
Forster.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: M. BORMANN
* * * * *
1 enclosure
Copy
DECREE
About the Juridical Status of Religious Organizations and Congregations
in the Reich district Danzig-West Prussia.
The following decree is issued under authority of par. 3 of the decree
of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the organization and
administration of the Eastern territories, dated October 8, 1939--Reich
Law Publication (Reichsgesetzblatt) 1 page 2042--and of par. 4 of law
of April 14, 1939--Reich Law Publ. I, page 780--with the approval of
the Reich Minister of the Interior and the competent Reich Ministers.
This shall not be binding for a subsequent general Reich decree.
Par. 1
Because of the peculiar folkloristic conditions in the Reich District
Danzig-West Prussia, all religious organizations and congregations
need the approval of the Reich Deputy, to assure legal competence.
Par. 2
The Reich Deputy may, with the consent of the Reich Minister of the
Treasury, grant subsidies to certain religious organizations and
congregations within his own judgement. The subsidies are subject to
cancellation at any time.
Par. 3
All claims of the existing religious organizations and congregations to
a state of municipal subsidy are suspended. The religious organizations
and congregations have no claim to Church dues.
Religious organization and congregations may not exercise their rights
of collecting dues without approval of the Reich Deputy. This also
relates to the issuance of regulations concerning dues.
The organization of collections as well as the acceptance of voluntary
contributions by the religious organizations and congregations is
subject to the approval of the Reich Deputy.
Par. 4
Yearly, and prior to each fiscal year, the religious organizations and
congregations will submit a budget plan about the intended expenditures
of their receipts, to the government inspector. Further, and upon
demand, they must substantiate their expenditures at the end of the
fiscal year.
The Government inspector is entitled to inspect the property
administration of the Church and to demand any explanations deemed
necessary about items in the budget. He may object to certain items in
the budget in which case such items are to be eliminated.
Par. 5
Acquisition of property, in particular of real estate by religious
organizations and congregations is subject to the approval of the Reich
Deputy. This regulation applies to acquisitions through deeds of living
persons as well as to testamentary dispositions.
Obligations of money, work or material contributions to religious
organizations or congregations, their institutions and affiliations,
must be ratified by the Reich Deputy to become lawful, insofar as these
obligations have been contracted prior to January 1, 1940.
Par. 6
With view to the peculiar conditions existing in the Eastern
territories organized under the Reich District [Reichsgau] Danzig-West
Prussia, the public administration of real estate which was owned or
possessed by the religious organizations and congregations prior to
1 Sept. 1939, will remain in effect in this territory until further
notice. This does not apply to tracts with no buildings other than
those intended for worship.
Par. 7
Unless otherwise indicated this decree is effective for the entire
Reich District of Danzig-West Prussia.
Par. 8
All regulations conflicting with this decree are void.
The Reich Deputy issues the necessary decrees for the execution and
amplification of this law. He designates the agency which will execute
the powers invested in the State by this law.
Par. 9
This decree is effective as of * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 068-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Berlin--Wilhelmstrasse 64
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Munich--Brown House
5 April 1940
III/Dr Kl.-Pu
[Stamped]
Office Rosenberg
Rec'd Nr 1028 M April 9, 1940
Submitted to R April 9
Copy AR and Urban H _Personal!_
To
Reichsleiter
Alfred Rosenberg
_Berlin W 35_
Margaretenstr. 17
_Subject: "Church Services_"
Enclosed please find a copy of the letter of the High Command of the
Navy as well as a copy of my reply of this date, for your personal
information.
Heil Hitler!
by [illegible]
signed: M BORMANN
2 enclosures
* * * * *
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Berlin--Wilhelmstrasse 64
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Munich--Brown House
April 5, 1940
III/Dr. Kl-Pu
To the High Command of the Navy
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72/76
Subject: "Church Services" Your letter of 9 Feb 1940--AMA/M Wehr IIb
B. Nr 896
In the opinion of the party the term "Church Service" cannot be
objected to. I consider it fitting since it properly implies meetings
arranged and organized by the _churches_.
Those Germans who are not members of a Christian Church may be offended
by an announcement in a daily newspaper that only the members of
the Christian confession are holding a "divine service". After the
National Socialist State has created the conception "God-believing"
[Gottglaubig] especially for those Germans who confess the belief in
God and who have placed their lives in the "Service of God"--without
being members of a Christian confession--it can no longer be justified
to refer exclusively to the Services arranged by the Christian
confessions as "Divine Services", even in the National Socialist
dailies.
Heil Hitler!
signed: M BORMANN (acting)
* * * * *
Copy
The High Command of the Navy, AMA/M Wehr IIb B Nr 896
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72/76 Feb 9, 1940
To the office of the Deputy of the Fuehrer.
With reference to the letter of the Supreme Commander of the Navy dated
Oct 24, 1939 and the reply of the Deputy of the Fuehrer dated Nov 3,
1939 I inform you that in the Wilhelmshaven newspapers the expression
"Church Services" is still being changed to "Divine Services".
The High Command requests that this regulation, apparently issued
erroneously to all principal newspapers by the Chief Press Agency in
Bremen, be revoked.
Heil Hitler!
by [illegible]
signed: [signature illegible]
Rear Admiral and Headquarters Commandant in the Supreme Headquarters
of the Navy.
certified a true copy: signed: PAFF
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 069-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Staff Director
Munich 33, Brown House, January 17, 1939
SECRET
Regulation No 1/39 g
_Subject: Jews_
After a report of General Field Marshal Goering the Fuehrer has made
some basic decisions regarding the Jewish question. The decisions are
brought to your attention in the enclosure. Strict compliance with
these directives is requested.
signed: M BORMANN
1 enclosure
Distribution: III b
Official:
[signed: signature illegible]
Office Rosenberg, Rec'd Nr 5827 Jan 19, 39; filed Feb 2
Submitted to
RL Jan 19
Urban Jan 20
Schickedanz Feb 13
* * * * *
Copy
Berlin, Dec 28, 1938
Minister President General Field Marshal Goering, Commissioner for the
Four Year Plan
SECRET
Pursuant to my report the Fuehrer has made the following decisions on
the Jewish question.
A.
_I: Housing of Jews_
1. _a._ Protective regulations for tenants will not be generally
revoked in the case of Jews. It is desirable, however, to proceed in
individual cases in such a way that Jews will live together in one
house, as much as feasible under rental conditions.
_b._ For this reason the arianization of real estate will be _the last
step of the total arianization_, that means that at present real
estate is only to be arianized in individual cases where there are
compelling reasons. An immediate concern is the arianization of plants
and business enterprises, farm property, forests, etc.
2. _The use of sleepers and dining cars is to be prohibited for Jews._
Apart from that no separate Jew-compartments must be arranged for.
Neither should any bans be pronounced regarding the use of railways,
streetcars, subways, buses and ships.
3. The ban for Jews is to be pronounced only for certain public
establishments etc. This includes such hotels and restaurants which
are mainly visited by Party members (for instance: Hotel Kaiserhof,
Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten, Munich; Hotel Deutscher Hof, Nurnberg;
Hotel Drei Mohren, Augsburg, etc.). The ban can further be pronounced
for swimming pools, certain public squares, resort towns, etc. Mineral
baths may, in individual cases and if prescribed by a doctor, be used
by Jews, but only in a manner not causing offense.
II. Pensions are not to be denied to Jews who have been civil servants
and who have been pensioned. It is to be investigated, however, whether
those Jews can manage on a smaller pension.
III. Jewish social care is not to be arianized or to be abolished,
so that Jews will not become a public burden but can be cared for by
Jewish institutions.
IV. Jewish patents are property values and therefore to be arianized
too. (A similar procedure was used during the World War by America and
other states pertaining to German citizens.)
B.
_Mixed Marriages_:
I. 1. _with children_ (half-Aryans 1 class)
_a._ If the father is German and the mother Jewish the family is
permitted to remain in their present apartment. No ban for Jews
regarding housing is to be pronounced against these families.
The property of the Jewish mother may be transferred in such cases to
the German husband respectively the half-Aryan children.
_b._ If the father is Jewish and the mother German these families
are neither to be housed in Jewish quarters for the time being. This
because the children (half-Aryan 1st class) are not to be exposed to
the Jewish agitation as they will have to serve later in the labor
service and the armed forces.
The property may for the time being be transferred partly or entirely
to the children.
2. _without children_
_a._ If the husband is German and the wife Jewish par. 1 a holds true
accordingly.
_b._ If the husband is Jewish and the wife German these childless
couples are to be treated as pure Jews.
Property values of the husband cannot be transferred to the wife. Both
can be lodged in Jewish houses or quarters. Especially in the case of
emigration both spouses are to be treated like Jews as soon as the
augmented emigration has been set into motion.
II. If the German wife divorces the Jewish husband she returns to the
German blood-kinship. All disadvantages for her are dropped in this
case.
signed: GOERING
Authenticated copy:
signed: JAHN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 070-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Staff
Munich 33, The Brown House, April 25, 1941
III D--Schw, 1180/0
Chancellery Rosenberg
Receipt No. 4746 Urg 5 May 41
Submitted to the RL on
May 6
H
To the Fuehrer's Commissioner for the Supervision of the entire mental
and world-philosophical training and education of the NSDAP
_Berlin W 35_, Margaretenstrasse 17
_Subject: National Socialist School Services_
We are inducing schools more and more to reduce and abolish religious
morning services. Similarly, the confessional and general prayers in
several parts of the Reich have already been replaced by national
socialist mottos. I would be grateful to know your opinion on a future
national socialist morning service instead of the present confessional
morning services which are usually conducted once per week.
Should those services be held at designated times, that is once per
week or once every other week, or should they only be held at special
occasions? I would further appreciate your advice on whether you have
prepared concrete suggestions for the arrangement of such national
socialist school services. If so I would be grateful to receive them.
Copy to Party member Scheller 5 April 41 complied
Dr. Stellbrechtstang complied 6 April
Heil Hitler!
signed: KRUEGER [?]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 071-PS
23 April 1941
4609/R/MA
To Reich Director Bormann at present at Fuehrer's Headquarters
Dear party member Bormann:
I cannot agree with your letter of the 19th inst., since some
misunderstandings occurred therein.
1. The clause concerning confiscations to be undertaken in Reich
territory is doubtless a regulation which has not yet been introduced,
and directly because of this I have asked you to propose such a
regulation to the Fuehrer. The proposal originated in a decree
of the Fuehrer relative to the work of the higher institutes of
learning whereby the question of research institutes and library
were given priority and the official bureaus of the Party and the
state were instructed to support me in this work. Now it is clear
that the philosophical opponents of the regime (this is especially
true in the case of the recently confiscated religious archives)
are concealing a quantity of the things which are of priceless,
perhaps of irreplaceable, value for the later research of the higher
institutes of learning. Because an actual necessity seems to be
present, I wish to make the already cited proposal. It is understood
that the confiscations are not executed by the regional authorities
[Gauleitungen] but that this is conducted by the Security Service
[SD] as well as by the police. Scientific work can only be done of
course after the confiscation by the police, but here--and this is
decisive--all must decide what is necessary for police compilations
(actual correspondence with philosophical opponents and other
material) and what does not fall under the competency of the police,
but under the research work done by seminary, that is the Reich
direction [Reichsleiter] of the Nazi Party. The taking of an office
by Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich is only to be considered as much, not as a
binding engagement. I therefore have decided on this proposal because
it has been communicated to me in writing by a Gauleiter, that the
Chief Office of the Reich Security [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] of
the SS has claimed the following from the library of a monastery: The
Catholic Handbook, Albertus Magnus; Edition of the Church Fathers;
History of the Papacy by L.V. Pastor and other works. That means that
already historical sources and works are being claimed for the Police
from the monastery libraries of the districts [Gaue] which must remain
reserved uniquely for the work of the Reich direction [Reichsleitung]
of the Nazi Party respectively the state research places. These aspects
have already been discussed thoroughly in the question of confiscated
property in occupied areas. I have transmitted to you a photocopy of
my convention with the Security Service [SD] which was reached with
the express approval of Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich. I would like also
to mention that this work has been executed in accordance with the
agreement and always in a loyal fashion (with the exception of a case
in Holland which I hope will be likewise solved in the same way).
Photocopies and written copies should be made available to me of all
material which the police has rightly confiscated for their political
police purposes, but which according to its nature, must also be
appropriated for a later research value. In my view there exists in
itself no fundamental difficulty if both sides adopt the viewpoint
of being loyal on their own and to the missions of the Partner. I
request once more special efforts to prevent that valuable writings are
arbitrarily extracted from the libraries in various districts by the
Chief Office of Reich Security [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] or other
police service offices. On this account I propose the regulation that
all confiscations remain under the full powers [Oberhoheit] of the
district leader and be examined by my deputies in case later research
value in the respective district itself appears possible.
2. There is a great misunderstanding with respect to what is
involved in the question of the south-east and the employment of
my administrative staff; art objects have always been treated as a
second line problem. In the first line an order of the chief of the
high command of the Armed Forces [OKW] on the instance of the Fuehrer
has gone twice to the occupied territories of the west to place all
scientific and archive materials of ideological opponents of the regime
[Weltanschaulicher Gegner] at my disposal for research purposes. That
has resulted also in close cooperation on the widest scale with the
Security Service [SD] and the military commanders, and I believe that
I have secured priceless research pieces for the Reich directorate
[Reichsleitung] of the Nazi party and its higher institutes of
learning. I wish to inform you especially that as many as 7000 crates
have been brought to Germany up to the present moment. In the course
of these confiscations we have found according to the nature of the
case other valuable cultural objects including very valuable works of
art. And in order that these things should not be dispersed and that
they be secured for the Fuehrer, the Chief of the high command of the
armed forces (OKW) on my request and on the instance of the Fuehrer
has ordered that these art objects should be catalogued by me. I ask
you that if necessary it should be established for the benefit of
the Reich Marshal that my working staff has executed these tasks in
a correct fashion and in an _objective_ blameless form. Art objects
generally do not come into question as far as the Balkans are concerned
although there are Free-Masonry archives and Jewish libraries and
other relevant research objects. In my opinion only the same attitude
as that prevailing in occupied French territory can be taken and what
I requested, was really only an expansion of an already existing
regulation. For General Field Marshal List, and likewise for the
General Quartermaster of the Army the work has already begun and my men
are at work with these circles in Belgrade. By command of General Field
Marshal List as well as of his deputy general, these men will also be
employed in closest relationship with the Security Service in Salonika.
As you know, Salonika is one of the largest Jewish centers.
I should like to remark in this connection that this affair has
already been executed on our side with the Security Service in the
most loyal fashion. One of our collaborators who also belongs to the
Security Service, had his duty-obligation countermanded by the Security
Service, whereupon it was impressed upon him that the Security Service
cooperates with my administrative staff in a most loyal fashion. The
position is thus clarified in a practical fashion and the work has
taken its course. What I asked was only a confirmation that the already
pronounced decisions for the West should also have validity under
the given circumstances for other occupied or to be occupied areas.
Finally the representative of the Fuehrer has expressly ordered that
the appropriate party members in this question should be placed, so as
not to permit this unique opportunity for an inquiry in the Jewish and
Masonic lodge question to be lost. The agreement on this matter is thus
general.
I trust that this letter has cleared up the resulting misunderstandings.
Heil Hitler!
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 072-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Staff Commander
Fuehrer Headquarters 19 April 1941
Fuehrer Bureau (Bo/Fu)
Chancellory Rosenberg
No 4609 H, 21 April 41
Shown to the Reichsleiter on the 22. 4
[rubber stamp]
To Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg
Berlin W 35, Margaretenstr. 17
Copy to Utikal
Dear party member Rosenberg!
In connection with the received draft of the decree I attended, as
ordered, a speech made by SS Brig. Gen. Heydrich. The latter called
attention to the fact that the sentence, "In the confiscations
undertaken, or to be undertaken in the Reich area, of the property of
ideological opponents, the same rules apply", anticipates a regulation
which has so far not been introduced and would for the first time set a
precedent through this decree-draft. Moreover, the regional governments
[Gauleitungen] are never allowed to carry out confiscations.
Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich further pointed out that he could under no
circumstances recognize the attempted regulation in the final sentence
of your decree-draft, since there existed some objections to it. The
scientific treatment of the ideological opposition could only be done
in conjunction with the political police work. Only the material should
be handed over to you, and the seminar respectively. If a speedier
treatment through your office is necessary, duplicates and photocopies
should be put at your disposal.
The Fuehrer emphasized that in the Balkans the use of your experts
would not be necessary, since there were no art-objects to be
confiscated. In Belgrade only the collection of Prince Paul existed,
which would be returned to him completely. The remaining material of
the lodges, etc. would be seized by the agencies of Gruppenfuehrer
Heydrich.
The libraries and art objects of the monasteries, confiscated in
the Reich, were to remain for the time being in these monasteries,
insofar as the Gauleiters had not determined otherwise. After the
war, a careful examination of the stock could be undertaken. Under no
circumstances, however, should a centralization of all the libraries be
undertaken, the Fuehrer has repeatedly rejected this suggestion.
signed: M. BORMANN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 078-PS
COPY
OFFICE IV
Berlin 28 June 1941
SECRET STATE MATTER!
Directives for the Chiefs of Security Police and Secret Service Teams
Assigned to PW Camps
These teams are assigned after agreement has been reached between the
chiefs of the Security Police, secret service and the Supreme Command
of the Army and * * * (see annex). The Commands work upon the special
authorization and according to the general directives in the Camp
regulations which was given to them and is independently in close
harmony with the AO.
The duty of the Commands is the political screening of prisoners and
the segregation and further handling of undesirable elements among them
with regard to political, criminal or similar respects.
Resources cannot be placed at the disposal of the Commands for the
fulfillment of their missions. The "German penal code" [Fahndungsbuch],
the "Temporary permit of Leave List" [Aufenthaltsermittlungsliste], and
"Special Penal Code USSR" will prove to be of little value; the Special
Penal Code USSR therefore does not suffice as only a small part therein
is dangerous to the designated Soviet Russians.
The Commands will therefore have to rely on their own specialty and
ingenuity upon establishment and self-producing knowledge. Therefore
they will only then be able to begin with the fulfillment of their
mission when they have gathered an appropriate amount of material.
For their work, the Commands are to make as much use of the experiences
of the Camp Commanders as possible, who in the meantime have profited
by the observation and examination of prisoners.
Further, the Commands will have to take pains from the beginning to
search among the prisoners for seemingly trustworthy elements, may
they be communists or not, in order to make them useful for their
intelligence purposes.
Through the establishment of such trusted personnel [V-Personen] and
through the use of all other present possibilities among the prisoners,
it must succeed to screen all elements.
In every case the Commands are to provide themselves with definite
clarity over the encountered measures through the examination and
eventual questioning of prisoners.
Above all it is important to find out:
1. all outstanding functionaries of the State and of the Party,
especially
2. professional revolutionists,
3. the functionaries of the Comintern,
4. all leading Party functionaries of the Russian Secret Police
[KPdSU] and their associated organizations in the Central, district,
and county Committees,
5. all the Peoples' Commissars and their Assistants,
6. all the former Polit-Commissars in the Red Army,
7. all leading personalities of the Central and Middle Offices among
the State authorities,
8. the leading economic personalities,
9. the Soviet Russian Intelligence agents,
10. all Jews,
11. all persons who are established as being instigators or fanatical
communists.
Just as important is the finding of persons who are devoted to the
reconstruction, the administration, and management of the conquered
Russian provinces.
Finally, such persons must be secured who can be used to transact
further discoveries, whether of the Police or similar work, and for the
clarification of universal interesting questions. In this category fall
all the higher State and Party functionaries who are in the camp on the
basis of their position and knowledge and who can give information on
the measures and working methods of the Soviet State, the Communistic
Party or the Cominterns.
In view of the pending decisions, considerations must also be given
to the peoples' membership. At the end of the screening, measures, to
be decided later, as to the transfer of prisoners from one command to
another, will follow.
The Camp Commanders are directed by the Supreme Command of the Army to
report such proposals.
Executions will not be carried out in the camps or immediate vicinity.
Should the camps in the General Government be situated in the immediate
vicinity of the border, then the prisoners for special handling are to
be taken care of in former Soviet Russian Provinces.
The Commands are to keep records of the fulfillment of special
handlings; which must include:
Serial number
Family and Surname
Date of birth and place
Military rank
Profession
Last residence
Reason for special handling
Day and place of special handling
Office IV
* * * * *
SECRET STATE MATTER
Supplement to the Directives for the Commands of the Security Police
and Security Service assigned to P.W. camps
1. In the directives of the 17th July 1941, I have repeatedly pointed
to the fact that it is the duty of the Special Purpose Command of the
Security Police and Security Service to find not only the untrustworthy
but also those trustworthy elements in general which can come into
consideration for the reconstruction of the Eastern provinces.
_I reemphasize that one duty is as important as the other._
In order to obtain a most extensive view of the co-activity of the
Special Purpose Command, I order that the numeral 4 (number of those
persons found to be trustworthy) will be especially heeded in the
weekly reports.
The war prisoners who are found to be trustworthy and who were formerly
in leading positions in the Soviet Russian economic circles, are to be
listed, if possible, according to branch their last employment, and by
name.
2. I reemphasize again the fact that in view of the pending decisions,
consideration must especially be given to the peoples' citizenship.
Ukrainians, White Russians, Aserbeidschanians, Armenians, North
Caucasians, Georgians, Turks are only to be designated as definitely
untrustworthy and dealt with according to the directive when they
are definitely proven to be Bolshevists, Polit-Commissars, or other
dangerous functionaries.
One must be careful, in as much as the Turkish people frequently have a
Jewish appearance and the circumcision alone does not denote a Jewish
descent (for example, Mohammedans).
3. The conception "highbrow" [Intelligenzler] should not be interpreted
along European viewpoints.
The simplest, most primitive Soviet-Russian illiterate can, in his
political fanaticism, be more dangerous than, for instance, the
Soviet-Russian engineer, who due to his ability, went to High School,
even though, he only outwardly appeared to be in accord with the
Bolshevistic system.
In this respect the highbrow are mainly the professional
revolutionists, writers, editors, and persons in the Comintern.
4. Those Soviet Russians who are definitely found to be untrustworthy
are to be forthwith reported--as designated in the directives of
the 17th July 1941. Following the introduction of the execution
authorization, further fulfillment of the designated measures are to
begin _without further delay_.
A further custody in the camps in question are to be avoided for
various reasons.
Finally I reemphasize that under no circumstances are the executions to
be carried out either in the Camp or in the near vicinity.
It is self-understood that these executions are not public. It is a
matter of principle not to admit spectators.
5. I again charge the leaders and members of the Special Service Staff
with the following: exemplary behavior during and after duty hours, top
cooperation with camp commanders and careful checking of work.
signed: Heydrich
(S)
Verified:
signed: Wolfert, Member of the Chancellory
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 081-PS
[TOP SECRET]
28 February 1942
1/1 /41 g.Ks
To the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [OKW]
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76
_Subject_: Prisoners of war.
Since the beginning of its existence, the Reich Ministry for the
occupied Eastern territories has taken the viewpoint, that the large
number of Soviet prisoners of war constitute a highly valuable material
for propaganda. The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war must be
considered differently than the treatment of prisoners of war of other
nations, for various reasons:
1. The war in the East has not been concluded, and the treatment
of the prisoners of war must have far-reaching results on the
will-to-desert of the Red Army man who is still fighting.
2. Germany intends to keep a large part of the former Soviet Union
occupied, even after the end of the war, and to develop it industrially
for her purposes. Therefore she depends on a far-reaching cooperation
of the population.
3. Germany is conducting the fight against the Soviet Union because of
ideological viewpoints. Bolshevism must be overthrown and something
better must be put in its place. Even the prisoners of war themselves
must realize that national socialism is willing and in the position to
bring them a better future. They must return later to their homes from
Germany with a feeling of admiration and esteem for Germany and German
institutions; and thus become propagandists for the cause of Germany
and national socialism.
This attempted goal has not been attained so far. The fate of the
Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a tragedy of the
greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only several
hundred thousand are still able to work fully. A large part of them
has starved, or died, because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands
also died from spotted fever. It is understood, of course, that there
are difficulties encountered in the feeding of such a large number
of prisoners of war. Anyhow, with a certain amount of understanding
for goals aimed at by German politics, dying and deterioration could
have been avoided in the extent described. For instance, according to
information on hand, the native population within the Soviet Union are
absolutely willing to put food at the disposal of the prisoners of
war. Several understanding camp commanders have successfully chosen
this course. However in the majority of the cases, the camp commanders
have forbidden the civilian population to put food at the disposal of
the prisoners, and they have rather let them starve to death. Even on
the march to the camps, the civilian population was not allowed to
give the prisoners of war food. In many cases, when prisoners of war
could no longer keep up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion,
they were shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population,
and the corpses were left. In numerous camps, no shelter for the
prisoners of war was provided at all. They lay under the open sky
during rain or snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes
or caves. A systematic delousing of the prisoners of war in the camps
and of the camps themselves has apparently been missed. Utterances
such as these have been heard: "The more of these prisoners die, the
better it is for us". The consequence of this treatment is now this,
that spotted fever is spreading due to the escape and discharge of
prisoners and has claimed its victims among the armed forces as well
as among the civilian population, even in the old part of Germany.
Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned; these were
partly carried out according to viewpoints which ignore all political
understanding. For instance, in various camps, all the "Asiatics" were
shot, although the inhabitants of the areas, considered belonging
to Asia, of Transcaucasia and Turkestan especially, are among those
people in the Soviet Union who are most strongly opposed to Russian
subjugation and to Bolshevism. The Reich ministry of the occupied
Eastern territories has repeatedly emphasized these abuses. However, in
November for instance, a detail [Kommando] appeared in a prisoner of
war camp in Nikolajew, which wanted to liquidate all Asiatics.
The treatment of prisoners of war appears to be founded for a great
part on serious misconceptions about the people of the Soviet Union.
One finds the opinion that the people become more inferior the further
one goes East. If the Poles already were given harsh treatment, one
argues, it should therefore be done to a much greater extent to the
Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Russians, and finally the "Asiatics".
It was apparently completely ignored, in the treatment of prisoners
of war, that Germany found, in contrast to the West (France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Norway), a people who went through all the terror of
Bolshevism, and who now, happy about their liberation, put themselves
willingly at the disposal of Germany. A better gift could not come to
Germany in this war, which requires every last man. But instead of
accepting this gift, the people of the East are being treated more
contemptibly and worse than the people of the West, who do not hide
their enmity towards Germany.
It was a basic mistake that no difference was made between real
prisoners of war and deserters. It is known that German propaganda
deposited millions of leaflets beyond the lines, and encouraged the
Red soldiers to desert, whereby good treatment and sufficient food
was specifically assured to them. These promises were not kept. The
deserters were beaten and left to starve the same as so many prisoners
of war. A natural consequence of this politically and militarily unwise
treatment was not only a paralyzing of the will to desert, but a plain
deadly fear to get into German captivity. It would be naive to assume
that the occurences in the prisoner of war camps could be kept hidden
from the Soviet government. As can be seen in Molotov's circular,
the Soviets have in fact an excellent knowledge of the conditions
described above, and naturally they have done everything in their power
to influence the Soviet population and Red soldiers accordingly. It
can be said without exaggeration that the mistakes in the treatment of
prisoners of war are to a great extent the cause for the stiffening
power of resistance of the Red Army, and therefore also cause for the
death of thousands of German soldiers.
After the Reich ministry for occupied Eastern territories was finally
successful in overcoming the prejudice against Soviet prisoners of war
partially, and when the prisoners of war were to come to Germany to a
great extent for work, it was found that of 3.6 million only several
hundred thousand were still able to work. Thus, German economy and
armament industry also must suffer for the treatment of prisoners of
war.
The above explanations are not intended to be a belated, fruitless
criticism, nor are they directed against any official agency,
especially since very many objective situations came into play, as has
been mentioned, and the responsibility is shared. They should only
become the basis for a new policy toward the prisoners of war which
corresponds more to our military and civilian interests. The Reich
ministry for the occupied Eastern territories is endeavoring with all
its powers to assist the fighting troops by effective propaganda for
the deterioration of the enemy's military forces. All propaganda will
be useless, however, if there is more fear of captivity than of death
and wounds on the battlefield.
The primary demand is that the treatment of the prisoners of war ensues
according to the laws of humanity and according to the dignity of the
German nation. It is understandable that inhuman treatment, proven
many times, of German prisoners of war, by members of the Red Army
has embittered the German troops so much that they retaliate with the
same treatment. However, such retaliatory measures do not improve the
situation of German prisoners of war by any means, but must have as
their last consequence the fact that neither side will take any more
prisoners, thus that they conduct the war in a most inhuman manner.
At any rate, as much as is known, such retaliatory measures have not
been able up to now to cause the enemy to change. They were therefore
without purpose.
Furthermore, sufficient food, and at least primitive shelter, are to
be provided for the prisoners within the framework of possibility. In
the camps for prisoners, scheduled for work projects, as well as in
those for the others, skillful propaganda is necessary, which must
be carried out by camp newspapers, movies, lectures, simple musical
events, games, etc.
Every camp commandant must be made responsible that every prisoner of
war, guarded by him, will return to his home later on as a propagandist
for Germany. Of course, on the other side, action must be taken with
utmost severity against possible agitators. In any case, in the future
a difference must be made between real prisoners of war and deserters.
The deserters are to be provided with identification certificates,
and in any case are to be treated better than the prisoners of war.
Especially this measure should have far-reaching success in reference
to the deterioration of the Red Army.
I would appreciate an expression of opinion soon, and information of
appropriate action.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS
Berlin NW 7, The 30 Sept.
Hegelplatz 2
_Central Office [Zentralstelle] for Members of Eastern Nationals._ In
(ZO)
_Concerning_: Present Status of the question of Eastern Laborers.
The _commitment_ and _treatment_ of foreign laborers, who have been
brought into the Reich from occupied Eastern territories, depicts a
proceeding which will not only be of significant importance to the
German war production and the securing of food, but also for the
carrying out of German administrative interests in a former Soviet
area. Two large fields of action are affected by the way in which the
problems connected with the inclusion of millions of Eastern nationals
in the Reich are solved: 1. Development of the _war situation_. 2. The
enforcement of the German _claim to leadership in the East after the
war_.
When the call for labor in Germany was increased in January, 1942 among
the occupied Eastern territories, this set up a situation among those
classes of Russian and Ukrainian civilians concerned which had by all
means the appearance of a risk. Even if one group (the volunteers) set
excessive hopes on the journey into the Reich under the impression of
irresponsible promises while the other (forced laborers) left their
homes reluctantly or at least with misgivings because of memories of
former Bolshevist deportations as well as planted anti-German rumors,
the fact remains that the trip to Germany had to be felt as _journey
into the unknown_ not only by the two concerned but also by those
relatives who remained behind because of the isolation of the USSR
from Europe for decades. The public judgment of the Reich and its
leadership would be dependent upon the outcome of this measure taken by
the German military and civilian authorities in the occupied Eastern
territories. The employment in Germany offered an unusual opportunity
to learn to know by personal experience, which no propaganda could
replace. The greater German Reich was much slandered by the Soviet
press, and the National Socialistic position to the working class and
thus to gain a basis of comparison to the corresponding Communistic
doctrines and methods. This meant no more nor less, than that the
draft of Eastern laborers would be of importance in the development
of political opinions among the Eastern nationals towards the power
which was presently occupying the region which would aid measures taken
to accomplish the recruitment, the housing etc., in the Reich, which
should have been taken into consideration _from the start_, since in
view of the necessity to keep the aid of the native inhabitants in
the huge areas behind the front, factors which cannot be controlled
by regulations or orders, namely the _frame of mind_, which is of war
potential value, must be considered.
Instead of taking consideration of this, the drafting and the
employment as well as the housing, treatment etc. of the so-called
Eastern laborers has so far been taken care of exclusively according
to labor, technical and the security police points of view, with the
result that the headquarters responsible for this were able to report
the due numerical fulfilment of the program as well as the security of
the German nationality and of the businesses. At the time, however,
facts had to be hushed which could have been avoided not only in the
interests of German prestige and to the satisfaction of the occupied
Eastern territories but which even today cost the lives of thousands
of German soldiers by their efforts. The facts which up to the fall of
1942, have undergone only part or incomplete changes, among others, the
following.
1. The _concept_ of the workers from the occupied territories of the
USSR was narrowed down to the labor- and social-legal term "Eastern
Laborers". A labor condition among "Foreigners" was hereby created in a
segregated "Employment under Special Conditions" which had to be looked
upon by those affected, as degrading.
2. _The drafting of Eastern_ workers and women workers often
occurred without the necessary examination of the capabilities of
those concerned, so that 5-10 out of a hundred, sick and children,
were transported along. On the other hand, in those places where no
volunteers were obtained, instead of using the lawful employment
obligations, coercive measures were used by the police (imprisonment,
penal expedition, and similar measures.)
3. _The employment_ in businesses was not undertaken by considering the
occupation and previous training but according to the chance assignment
of the individual to the respective transports or transient camps.
4. _The billeting_ did not follow the policies according to which the
other foreigners are governed, but just as for civilian prisoners in
camps which were fenced in with barbed wire and were heavily guarded,
from which no exit was permitted.
5. _The treatment_ by the guards was on the average without
intelligence and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, in
enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, were
exposed to the scorn of the Poles and the Czechs among other things.
6. _The food and care_ was so bad and insufficient in the camps for the
Eastern Laborers being employed in the industry and in the mines that
the good average capability of the camp members dropped down shortly
and many sicknesses and deaths took place.
7. _Payment_ was carried out in the form of a ruling in which the
industrial worker would keep on the average 2 or 3 RM each week and the
farm laborers even less, so that the transfer of pay to their homes
became illusory, not to mention the fact there had been no satisfactory
procedure developed for this.
8. The _postal service_ with their families was not feasible for months
because of the lack of a precautionary ruling; so that instead of
factual reports, wild rumors arrived in their countries,--among other
means by means of emigration.
9. _The promises_ which had been made time and time again in the areas
of enlistment stood in contradiction with those facts mentioned under
3-8.
Apart from the natural impairment of the frame of mind and capabilities
which these measures, as well as conditions, brought with them, the
result was that the _Soviet propaganda_ took over the matter and
evaluated it carefully. Not only the actual conditions and the letters
which reached the country, in spite of the initial blockade, as well as
the stories of fugitives and such, but also the clumsy publications in
the German press of the legal rulings relative to the matter gave them
enough to manipulate with. Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov in his
_note_ to the enemy powers referred already in April 1942 to this,
especially in para. III of this document in which among others it is
stated:
"The German administration is treading under its feet the long
recognized laws and customs governing war, in that it has given the
orders to the troops to take into captivity all male civilians and in
many places even the women, and to use against them those measures
which the Hitlerites have introduced towards prisoners of war. This
does not only mean _slave labor_ for the captured peaceful inhabitants
but in most cases it also means inescapable starvation or death
through sickness, corporal punishments, and organized mass murders.
"The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear, which has been
widely practiced by the German-Fascist army, begins to take on a mass
character. It is carried out under direct rulings of the German High
Command (OKW) and its effects are especially cruel in the immediate
rear areas during a retreat of the German army. In a series of
documents, which have been found with the staffs of destroyed German
units, there is a directive to the order of the High-Command under
Nlr. 2974/41 of 6 Dec. 1942 which directs that all grown men are to be
deported from occupied populated points into prisoner of war camps.
From the order to the 37th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division of
2 Dec. 1941 under the heading "About the deportation of the Civilian
Population" it can be deduced that for the period from the 4 to the 12
Dec the _capture and forceful deportation of the total population_ of
7 villages to the German rear areas was planned, for which a carefully
worked out plan was proposed.
"Sometimes all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the men were
torn away from their families or mothers were separated from their
children. Only the smallest number of these deported people have been
able to return to their home village. _These returnees report terrible
degradations, heaviest forced labor, abundant deaths among inhabitants
because of starvation and tortures, and murder by the Fascists of all
the weak, wounded, and sick._"
Further, there are even today announcements in the Soviet newspapers as
well as radio about the treatment of Eastern laborers which might have
as an effect a strengthening of the moral power to resist in the Red
Army. Further, there is mentioned the text of a letter which arrived
in Ordshonikidsegrad from a Russian girl and which was published in
a "_Proclamation_" of the police administration of the North-Western
Front of the Red army under the heading of "A Russian Girl in Cologne",
attaching in connection with it an effective propaganda viewpoint about
the "Fascist Forced Laborers" in Germany.
"Do you know"--, it goes on at the end of the proclamation,--"that
every one of us who goes to Germany will meet the same fate as Olga
Selesnewa! Do not forget that the German monster will make each
and every one of you, who has remained behind, a slave on your own
soil or drag you to eternal _forced labor_ in Germany! Dear brothers
and sisters ... Go to the partisan detachments! Injure the German
occupants at every step. Hit the Hitler thieves everywhere and
continuously. The Russian soil shall become their graves!"
The effects of this large scale documentary proven radio-press-and
leaflet propaganda, operating even into German administered
territories, must be considered as one of the main reasons for this
year's stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as the threatening
increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the General Government.
In the meantime, after a _betterment of the condition of the Eastern
laborers_ had been insisted upon, not only by the main office for
politics in the Reichs ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
which has been able to find support in the repeated requests by the
High Command of the Armed Forces, but also by the gentleman charged
with the responsibility for all labor employment as well as the
Department of Labor Employment in the German Labor Movement, which has
the supervision of the Eastern Laborers--those previously existing
legal and police rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in
the 8-10,000 camps in the Reich have, on the whole, been improved.
Thus those fixed wages, which have been determined by the tables of
compensation in a ruling of the Council of Ministers, upon which
deductions were made up to 75%, have been replaced by new tariffs.
The Eastern Laborers were left free of duty according to it, and the
taxes were paid in a form of an Eastern Laborer Tax by the owner of
the enterprise (Ruling of Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich of 30/6/42). Thus after many months of negotiations, with the
cooperation of the Central Economic Bank in Rowno, a salary transfer,
in the form of a savings stamp procedure, was regulated. Thus, the
ruling of the Reichs Chief of the SS of 20/2/42 prescribing barbed
wire has been dropped by a supplementary ruling of 9/4/42 and at the
same time, in exceptional cases, groups were permitted to go out
under German guards, of late, it has even been permitted under their
own supervision. The food supply was adjusted by a special delivery
letter of the Reichs Food minister dated 17/4/42, to a degree where the
"Soviet Civilian Laborer", as well as the prisoners of war received a
uniform ration. This was still not enough compared to the normal amount
of food given to those employed in the industry and in the mines,
besides it was still much less and worse than that for the Poles, but
it was an improvement compared to former conditions. Furthermore the
postal communication has been adjusted for those Eastern Laborers who
come from the civilian administered as well as those who are from the
regions directly to the rear of the army,--at least theoretically--.
On account of the burden placed on the censorship office for foreign
countries the High Command of the Armed Forces has recently asked again
for a reduction of this measure.
In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, which in
many cases can be traced back to the personal intervention of the
Deputy General of Labor Employment, the total situation of the Eastern
Laborer (sampling date: 1 October 1942) must still be considered
_unsatisfactory_, namely, not only in respect to the differences
in the treatment of industrial workers and farm laborers but in
the differences found in the different States and enterprises. On
the average there are still about 40% of the lodgings for Eastern
laborers which would not meet the requirements even if all the wartime
restrictions were considered. Among these are a frightening number
of camps whose conditions are such as to destroy the success of the
attempt of improving relationship and the corresponding radiating
uplift of the morale within the Eastern territories. Not even to
mention the fact that the marking OST (East), an identification
ordered by the police, is being felt as degrading there remains such a
_quantity of grievances and problems_ that it would be impossible to
relate them now. Only the following points are to be mentioned:
1. _The Enlisting and Employing of persons of German Parentage,
as Eastern laborers._ Several observations made by the commission
from the central office to inspect camps, as well as petitions
which have reached them, show that persons of German parentage were
enlisted,--against regulations,--as Eastern Laborers. Even if they
are not recognized people of German parentage according to the
"RKFestigung", they are, however persons of German descent and with
German names, as Mr. Middelhauve could establish in a camp near Berlin.
It is to be doubted that the branch offices of the sub-office for
Germans living in foreign countries had enough qualified help who could
separate these persons capable of becoming Germans again.
2. _Enlisting and Employing as Eastern Laborers of Tartars from the
Crimea._ To increase the fighting numbers of the Tartar legions it
would be indispensable to return all those Tartars, who have been
employed in the Reich as Eastern Laborers, to their homes before the
coming of winter; a similar report to the "GBA" is being prepared.
Besides climatic reasons, the necessity for this return is to intensify
the wine and tobacco growths in the Crimea by experienced help and
at the same time, to prevent the invasion of Greek and Bulgarian
planters and traders. To prepare this return as well as to deal with
other Tartan problems a commissioner, namely a Crimean Tartar, has
been installed by the "ZO". In the meantime, difficulties have arisen
because of the effect of the furloughing of Tartan Eastern Laborers for
participation in the Mohammedan festival during the 4th and 5/10/42 as
well as the procurement of the meat and millet supply needed for this
occasion. The authority in these and similar matters will have to be
voiced, at the time of their return, by those White Ruthanian Tartars
who have been selected for resettlement.
3. _Enlisting and Employing as Eastern Laborers of Ukrainians from
Transnistrian._ During an inspection of the camps for munition workers
at Topchin (Kreteltow) into which the Central Office was induced
because of an escape which became known to them, it was found that
the Eastern Laborers employed there were enlisted January 1942 in
Odessa. They do not come according to para. I of the Rulings of the
Council of Ministers dated 30/6/42, under the category of Eastern
Laborers. But will have to be termed, because of the fact that the
State of "Transnistrian" was placed in the Fall of 1941 under Rumanian
sovereignty, as stateless members of the Kingdom of Rumania. To clarify
this point for all times, negotiations have been made with the GBA and
the Foreign Office as well as the Feldzeuginspektion of the Office for
General Affairs in the High-Command of the Army.
4. _Employment of Skilled Laborers in Occupations foreign to their
skills._ Up until recently petitions have continually come to the
publishers of camp newspapers to the Reichs Ministry for the occupied
Eastern territories, to the German Workers Front and in error also to
the bureau for foreign nationals in the Reich from Eastern laborers,
men and women who are in occupations foreign to their skills or
inferior to their skills, without the transfer proposals, which were
approved by the central office as well as by other offices, having led
to success--except in rare cases. Gauleiter Sauckel, who has repeatedly
disclosed--the last time at the conference in Weimar on the 10 and
11/9/42--that the "inner arrangement" of the occupational employment
would be his next point on the program, does not seem to be informed
about the real conditions in which doctors, engineers, teachers,
qualified skilled laborers and such are employed as unskilled workers,
mechanics as farmers, and farmers as industrial workers. In any case,
one of his close associates, the Gauamtsleiter Orr Escher received the
information about this which was given him by Dr. Thiell, in accordance
with instructions of the Central Office, with unusual interest.
5. _Separation in employment of members of one Family._ The repeated
separation of family members who have come to the Reich as Eastern
Laborers and Eastern Women Workers (married couples, parents, brothers
and sisters, and children) seems utterly contrary to the usual customs
governing other employments of foreigners. The bringing together of
those relatives who have been mistakenly separated during the transport
is principally desired just as much as is the employment of family
members in the same location. It does however, in practice, encounter
some difficulties. In order to make possible at least the transfer of
information from both parties, the Reichs Ministry for the occupied
Eastern territories in August 1942, in conjunction with the Reich Main
office and Reich Security Service has allowed the limited publication
of encoded advertisements seeking information. Besides this an
agreement has been made in September 1942 between the Central Office
and the German Red Cross in accordance with which this organization
will take over the communication between these Eastern Laborers
separated in the Reich, keeping the place of employment secret however.
6. _Disregarding the Nationality in Employment and Billeting._ The
plan of the Herr Reichsmarshall to create special "Enterprises for
the Russians" could not be accomplished as yet on account of reasons
of wartime economy. The demands for a joint employment by the members
of Eastern nationalities, according to their racial background could
not be carried out in practice to any great degree. In addition to
the reasons of business, the usual variegated composition of the
transports coming from the great realms of the Reichs Commissariate
Ukraine opposed it. Basically, a regrouping to racial membership might
be possible after completion of an examination of this membership which
would have to be made in conjunction with the issuance of employment
permits for Eastern Laborers, especially when a group of foremen has
been found among the Eastern Laborers based on partial pre-training
independently of the solution to this question, the commissions from
the Central Office will be striving to effect a rough sifting of the
camps according to racial membership, and to house them accordingly in
special barracks. The supplying of experienced interpreters for this
job and then systematic instruction has been begun.
7. _Distinctive, Mostly Insufficient Food Rations._ The inadequate
food ration for Eastern Laborers is important not only in the matter
of performance but also politically, since the majority of the help
coming from the occupied Eastern territories were previously accustomed
to better rations. After using up all the food supplies which had
been brought along, a general lowering of the ability to work and of
the morale was noticeable. The written request to the Herr Reichs
Food-Minister on the matter, to examine the food quotas in respect
to the fact that the Eastern Laborer was in a worse position in the
matter of nourishment than the Poles, was answered by a telephone
communication from the respective Chief of Section, that to his
knowledge the Russians were better off than the Poles. With this
ignorance of the condition decisive measures could hardly be expected
on the part of the Reichs Food Ministry. Nevertheless Gauleiter
Sauckel has declared, in Weimar as a part of his program, that the
feeding of the German as well as the foreign laborer inside of Germany
would be shortly adapted to the requirements in accordance with their
performance--here he supported his program on an utterance of the
Fuehrer--. In connection with this a conference took place in the
Reichs Food Ministry on 29/9/42 in which an improved food quota of the
Eastern Laborer was decided upon. The decree which is being co-signed
by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the GBA, [?] upon which the
"Special Delivery Letter" of the 17/4/42 will be nullified, provides
for laborers of all types an additional 1750 grams of potatoes, for
workers in heavy industry and additional 200 grams, and for the group,
to be newly instituted, of "overtime" and "night" workers a weekly 2600
grams of bread, 300 of meat, and 150 of fat. Besides this, instead of
the tasteless bread made of turnips the usual kind will be delivered
in the future. Even though a complete equality of food rationing with
the other foreigners should be aspired to, this new measure, whose
enforcement is imminent, will counteract the intestinal diseases and
swelling of the stomach, as well as the sending of bread from relatives
in the Ukraine, which can not be hindered on political grounds.
8. _Partly insufficient, and Unjust Payment of Wages._ The wage
adjustments for Eastern laborers and Eastern women workers must still
be considered unsatisfactory even after the new wage scales, by the
ruling of the Council of Ministers dated 30/6/42, as well as the lower
evaluation of those agricultural workers who are quartered and fed
free. The determining factor in keeping the net salary down is the
necessity even today of maintaining the natural lower social level
as compared to the German laborer, and to protect the German produce
market as well as--in the case of transfer accounts--the enterprises
in the domain of the Reichs Commissariat from an accumulation of
surplus purchasing power. The Central Office took the viewpoint, in
the conferences concerned with this matter, that it is far better to
keep the wage level, as such, down than later to lower a nominally
higher net salary to about half by means of the forced savings plan,
reportedly proposed by the Reichs Finance Minister. The change of
the hourly pay scale, as well as pay on contracts and pay by means
of premiums is therefore closely connected with the success of the
voluntary stamp savings plan, which was installed in September 1942.
This on the other hand will depend upon the fact that the saved amount,
which has been sent to the respective home banks of the relatives in
the form of savings books--a system which has finally been introduced
by the Herr Reichs Commissar for the Ukraine--will at least be
redeemable in cash to half of the amount shown, even if no interest is
paid on it at the time. A change in the question of wages, considering
that this is the first time in bank technological procedure that
savings and transfer accounts have been joined together, would have
prospects only if an eventual rearrangement does not materially raise
the total wage increase of Eastern Laborers. A throttling measure would
otherwise be necessary eventually which would shatter the trust in
the honesty of the German social methods and would give irresponsible
material to the Soviet propaganda. A way to correctness in the matter
of pay within the limitations determined by this viewpoint, could be
seen in the proposal of the Reichs Trustee Dr. Kimmich, who expounded
it in a short report in Weimar on 11/9/42. In accordance with this a
plan for arranging salaries should be carried out by the industries
by inserting increasing measures for part time, apprenticeship,
and instructional work, to bring into prominence the principle of
pay according to performance even in the occupied territories. The
foundation for the pay scale based on this will be the evaluation
according to eight categories of difficulty in the performance of
work, the use of which would exclude the evaluation of previous
preparatory training (in the judging of differences) in favor of the
success in performance. The complete stoppage of wages would thereby
be abolished with finality and the offering of work premiums be made
possible to foreign laborers. This,--as Dr. Kimmich characterizes
it,--"Re-establishment of a just salary and contract" will have as
an effect a general increase in performance which will be advertised
as "The thanks of the German laborer to the combat soldier." Should
these principles shortly be made obligatory in all the states, this
would also bring, in connection with the measures of the project
of occupational instruction, an improvement to the former Soviet
specialist without having impaired the pre-eminence of the German
specialist. The safeguarding of the superiority of the latter is in
spite of the wartime needs among other things thereby guaranteed by
the fact that the Herr Reichs Minister for armament and ammunition has
been able to carry out through the High Command of the Armed Forces on
September 1942, that these 500,000 German war industrial workers, who
are going to be inducted during the winter half year, will only receive
an eight week training, after that they will, however, be returned to
their key-positions in the plants. How far the coming change of wage
structure will affect not only the leading position of the German
specialist as opposed to the Eastern Laborer but also the relationship
between these and the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian workers is not
to be seen in advance without further information. First of all, the
Herr Reichs Minister of Finance will examine at the instigation of the
Reichs Minister for the occupied Eastern Territories, if and in how far
the increase of the so-called "Salary Equalizing Tax" as an addition to
the Income Tax on the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian in the Reich in
spite of the low rate of 15% will in many cases place them worse off
than comparable Eastern Laborers. This would be all the less tolerable
as the employment of Eastern Laborers in the General Territory of
Estonia leads up to the opposite problems.
9. _Insufficient Equipping of clothes and shoes._ The clothing of
almost all Eastern Laborers, men and women, must be considered as
insufficient. Transports were arriving even in the last days of the
month of September whose occupants did not carry any winter clothing
with them. The recruiting agents seem to leave the workers in the
opinion that there is no winter in Germany and moreover, that the
Eastern Laborers would receive everything they need. In view of the
coming cold months and of the inadequacy of many quarters a catastrophe
must arise on account of the existing lack of clothing and shoes, if a
successful remedy is not found immediately. The main difficulties in
the supplying of missing equipment, which has already led in our large
industrial plant to the loss of 10% of its employees,--lies in the fact
that the clothing set aside from the collection of textile goods,
does not even come close to covering the demand and that the available
booty as well as confiscated goods in occupied territories will not
be handed out by the competent management without the delivery of the
existing ration cards. Since the Eastern Laborer does not possess the
latter this could then only be carried out if the enterprises would
requisition the needed clothing for the German workers and would offer
those to the Eastern Laborers,--unfortunately however, deducting it
from their wages from time to time. The sending of clothing, coats
and shoes by the families of Eastern laborers by means of individual
shipment can not be carried out without further directives on account
of the necessity of delousing the garments at the border, wherefore a
measure was proposed after previous negotiations of the Central office
with the deputy of the Generalarbeitsfuehrer Kretschman at the GBA
under the direction of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern
territories; in accordance with this measure collective addresses will
be sent to the occupied territories by the enterprises in collaboration
with the censorship office and special collection offices set up there.
The success of this action must remain in doubt at present. During the
meeting in Weimar it was then announced that from January 1943 on,
uniform work clothes will be made of cellulose material which, however,
will not be of very good quality and would look baggy after a short
wear. Independently of this creation of work clothes, which naturally
can not be considered a costume or uniform, the Central Office has made
it one of its tasks to help with the action to provide clothes to help
decrease to a minimum the expected lowering of performance, loss of
morale, increased escapes, and cases of freezing.
10. _Insufficient Supervision of the Eastern Laborers Employed in
Agriculture._ According to ruling No. 4 of the Deputy General for
Labor of 7 May 1942, the supervision of those Eastern workers and
women workers employed in agriculture is delegated to the Reichs Food
Administration. Practical supervision in the rural areas by the state,
regional and local authorities of the Reichs Peasant Leader must be
considered as illusory with respect to the lack of knowledge and to the
insufficient knowledge of these people as well as to the fact that the
seizing of Eastern Laborers in the midst of all the foreign workers
in the rural areas can only be carried out with difficulty. To inform
at least the rural superintendent of the principles which govern the
treatment of the Eastern laborers, the publication department of the
Reichs Food Administration has, in accord with the Reichs Minister
for occupied Eastern territories sent out guiding instructions for
the present enlightenment campaign during the fall quarter. No
objections can so far be made against a strict observance of these
guiding instructions since, on account of the shortage of labor in the
rural areas during the past months, a pampering of the Eastern workers
and women workers was noticed, which was not only a threat towards
the temporary transfer of 200,000 agricultural workers into industry
but also in respect to the damage of a lack of migration into other
areas. To intensify the supervision in the rural enterprises, a policy
forming meeting took place in August 1942 with the representatives of
the Reichs Food Administration during which among other things the
sending of interpreters by the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern
Territory to the Reichs Peasant leader was taken into consideration.
Since the Reichs Food Administration was only willing to approve in the
latter part of September, the taking over of the payment of special
supervision with a knowledge of the language, in spite of exemption
from payment of contributions on the part of Eastern laborers, and
since there is still at the present time no clear settlement of the
number and conditions for this it will be necessary to balance the
lack of activity of the Reichs Food Administration with an appropriate
initiative action on the part of the Central Office of the Reichs
Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories.
11. _Insufficient Recreation._ In spite of repeated efforts for a
satisfactory and meaningful organization of the recreation period for
the Eastern laborer the German Arbeitsfront has still not been able to
create and carry out a satisfactory recreational program. While the
enterprises have organized excursions in groups because of necessity,
the recreational program in the camps have so far lacked a uniform
outline. The showing of moving pictures often runs into difficulties
since the theaters, which have been created for this purpose, are
only accessible to German workers and the Eastern laborer could not
enter because of the danger of contamination of lice. The daily radio
program in Russian and Ukrainian language which in the beginning was
proposed by the Reichsminister of Enlightenment and Propaganda has
still not been carried out because of several reasons. The performance
of several artists is only possible in exceptional cases among the
Eastern races because of the existing travel difficulties. What
drawbacks and difficulties are connected with this can be shown in the
circumstances under which a Ukrainian group of artists, who are now
stationed in the Reich after an agreement was made between Gauleiter
Sauckel and the Commissioner General of Kiew, are performing. After
this group was barely sufficiently housed in an Eastern Labor Camp
near Halle for a period of two weeks, a meeting took place in the RAM
in which it was decided upon a suggestion by the representative of
the Reichs Ministry, for the occupied Eastern territories, that the
National Socialistic Organization should send three organizational
trustees, the Reichs Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda three
propaganda trustees, and the Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories three political trustees, to Halle. By the combined efforts
of these trustees it was finally possible to employ the group of
artists, who were made up of three separate groups, in several of the
central German States [Gaue], during which the management, even in
organizational matters, soon went to the member of the Eastern office
who was sent by the Central Office of the Reichs Minister for the
Occupied Eastern territory. Until 30/9/42, on which day the Central
office in Berlin sponsored an afternoon reception for the 38 Ukrainian
artists, the Reichs Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda had still
not decided upon the amount of wages, which had accrued because of the
performances, still less who was to pay for it, so that a temporary
solution by using an agent who would carry out the bare essential down
payment had to be found. Because of this lack of clarity, the wish of
the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz to retain the group in the
Reich during the winter months can not be supported.
12. _Return under Unworthy Conditions of Eastern laborers and women
laborers who are not fit for work._ The carelessness during the
enlistment and reception of millions of Eastern laborers and women
laborers has resulted in the fact that,--according to a careful
estimate,--about five percent of the persons transported into the
Reich have proved not to be capable of work. That means nothing less
than that about 80 to 100,000 returnees will stream into the occupied
Eastern territories in the coming days. The dangers included in this
returning process can be seen in the fact that this deals with sick,
crippled, mothers-to-be, as well as such persons whom the enterprises
are glad to reject and who because of that are not being taken care of.
The mood of these returnees is temporarily forced to be anti-German,
and nothing has been done, in spite of repeated suggestions in the
Reichs Labor Ministry to reconcile the returnees with at least a few
favorable impressions of Germany. During the latter part of September
1942, a collecting camp in Berlin-Blankenfelde, which was quartered
with Eastern laborers who were destined for return, was inspected upon
the instigation of the Central Office by a commission consisting of
different authorities, at which time revolting conditions were met.
Among other things a shot was fired by the guard at an Eastern laborer
who was caring for his natural needs, without the President of the
States Employment Office who was present making any protest against
it. All of the camp inmates gave an impression of neglect. Since the
returning of these 1600 persons as well as a further 4400 returnees
from other camps, could not be reconciled politically with respect to
the danger of contaminating their native districts with reports of
horror, and since the postponement of a necessary re-quartering of
the collecting camps could no longer be provided (in the meantime)
the chief of the branch offices of the Central Police-Vice-counsel
in retirement Miller--Dr. of Law Boywidt and Mrs. Miller were sent
at the same time to Brest-Litowsk, to stop the transport at least at
this point and to carry out according to the situation a quarantining
of the people or, belatedly to take care of them. How necessary this
interference was is shown by the fact that this train with returning
laborers had stopped at the same place where a train with newly
recruited Eastern laborers had stopped. Because of the corpses in
the trainload of returning laborers, a catastrophe might have been
precipitated had it not been for the mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this
train women gave birth to babies who were thrown out of the windows
during the journey, people having tuberculosis and venereal diseases
rode in the same car, dying people lay in freight cars without straw,
and one of the dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same must
have occurred in other returning transports. To end these terrible
conditions, it is intended to create special transient camps in the
Reich area for returning workers where those who contracted diseases
in the Reich will be separated from the chronically sick. They will be
sent to an organization caring for the sick. Those finally chosen to
return would receive medical and psychological treatment for at least
a week. The chief of the Reich health program and his chief of liaison
with the GBA, resp., have approved this central office plan of giving
aid to returning workers, which aid should also be extended during
transport. The directorate of the German Red Cross wants to share in
the execution of this plan by making available trained personnel, among
other things. The first of these transient camps for returnees could be
established at Bad Frankenhausen in Thuringia where, according to the
statement of the local mayor, suitable area is available.
To solve these and numerous other problems, as well as the removal of
the described difficulties and abuses, two things are advised.
I. _Consultation of the Reich minister with the Fuehrer_ with the
purpose of asking him for personal energetic intervention; this
conference will have to include among others the following requests as
laid down in the note 1 f 5 of 6/7/42:
1. _Treatment by the police._ The Fuehrer should beseech the Reichs
Leader of the SS in a personal consultation, to repeal the General
Regulations of 20/2/42 including the supplementary Decree of 9/4/42.
_that is Section A of the General Regulations_.
Laborers from the former Soviet Russian territory and to replace them
and among other things with new regulations which are to be voted
upon in conjunction with the GBA (2) and the Reichs Ministry for the
occupied Eastern territory.
2. _Direction of people._ The Fuehrer should direct the Chancellor of
the party as well as the Reich propaganda office of NSDAP to adjust
suitable urgent measures in agreement with the Reich Ministry M.G.A.B.
and respectively with the Z.O. to enlighten those party members who
are handling the supervision of the relations between Germans and
foreigners about the scope of the employment of the Eastern laborers
and furthermore to inform the entire German population of the political
mission which history has bestowed upon them by the taking in of
millions of former Soviet citizens.
3. _The competences of the R.M.fdBO._ The Fuehrer should inform the
supreme authorities of the Reich, if possible through the Reich
Minister and the chief of the Reichs chancellory that not only those
measures of theirs, which concern themselves with occupied Eastern
territories but also those that affect the labor from these territories
employed in the Reich may only be decided in every action with the
Reich ministry for the occupied Eastern territories.
II. Further expansion of the General Office for member Races, so that
an extended arm of the R.M.fdBO in the Reich and as a representative of
the foreign people from the occupied Eastern territories living here it
can quickly perceive its instructed interests. The following would be
essential for this.
(1) _Commitment of a special Commissioner._ The appointment of a
special commissioner for the Reich ministries provided with specific
authority to take care of the interests of the central office, should
serve especially two purposes; to take an active influence upon the
handling of enlistments inside the occupied eastern territories.
(2) To carry out definite aims of the central Office by cultivating a
personal contact with Gauleiter Sauckel.
(3) _Reinforcing of the Branch Officers._ The commissions which
serve under the chief of the branch officer and which are employed
to inspect the camps, urgently need reinforcements; to be able to
work successfully in thousands of camps for this purpose about
50 interpreters are needed besides liaison agents to the country
employment offices and those trustees of the Gau who worked in an
honorary capacity, the chief of the commissions need a uniform.
(4) _Reinforcing the Sections._ The four sections of the Central
Office, (Matters of organization, legal and information service,
supervision aid, and psychological training) need to be immediately
filled by at least six representatives. On account of the avalanche
of problems brought to the Central Office, urgent questions remain
otherwise unsolved and hundreds of transactions unsettled in spite of
the twelve hour day and sometimes several hours of night work, as well.
Of what far reaching importance it is to see to it that a political
use is made of the stay of several million Eastern laborers in the
Reich. That on 8/9/42 their members already amounted to 1,737,000 is
lower as from many other reasons by a glance at the present condition
of the German censored figures. In spite of all measures to Germanize
and re-Germanize people who are unfortunately confronted by increased
war casualties the future of the German people when measured against
the breadth of age levels placed on top of each other as characterized
by a population pyramid whose outlines deviate from the biologically
normal picture of a bell, if one compares the present curve of the
future professionals with the similar curves of the Eastern peoples
it will be frighteningly apparent that especially during the decisive
decades after this war the number of German people of the Harz areas in
the East which will be required for a normal administrative development
will not be on hand, the willingness and cooperation of members of
the Eastern peoples is herewith an unavoidable necessity, wherefore
the years commiting an army of millions of Eastern laborers in the
Reich are not only seen from the view-point of overcoming the problems
concerned but actively must be used to create a reliable propaganda
army which after its return home will perhaps one day will be just as
decisive for the German fate in the East as the victory of our weapons.
signed: DR. GUTKELCH.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 089-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff
Munich 33, Brown House, at present Berlin w8
Wilhelmstr. 64, March 8, 1940
III-DR Kl/Gf
Personal
Chancellory Rosenberg
Receipt Nr 705. 14 Mar 40
To Mr. Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Berlin w 35, Margaretenstr. 17
Concerns: Confessional writing
In the enclosure I am sending you a carbon copy of my letter of today
to Reichsleiter Amann for recognition.
signed: M BORMANN
Enclosure
* * * * *
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff
Munich 33, Brown House, at present Berlin w8
Wilhelmstr. 64, March 8, 1940
III-DR Kl/Gf
Personal
To Mr. Reichsleiter Amann
Munich, Thierschstr. 11
_Concerns: Confessional writing._
I am referring to the discussion of my expert, party member Dr.
Klopfer, with party member Dr. Rienhardt, and inform you once more of
the fact that according to a report I have received, only 10% of the
over 3000 Protestant periodicals in Germany, such as Sunday papers
etc. have ceased publication for reason of paper saving. Party member
Dr. Rienhardt has already informed my expert that at present the
distribution of any paper whatsoever for such periodicals was barred.
I urge you to see to it in any redistribution of paper to be considered
later that the confessional writing, which according to experiences
so far gathered, possesses very doubtful value for strengthening the
power of resistance of the people toward the external foe, receives
still sharper restrictions in favor of literature, politically and
ideologically more valuable.
Without doubt the draft of an order "for fulfillment of the
organizational duty by the production of writings", presented upon your
request, will be a suitable means for this purpose.
signed: M BORMANN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 090-PS
18 September 1940
2474-R/Dt.
SECRET
To the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP
Reich Director F.X. Schwarz,
_Munich 33._
Dear Party Member Schwarz,
Thanks for your helpfulness in regard to the safeguarding of scientific
materials in the occupied territories. I deduce from this that you are
interested in this work and would therefore like to inform you about
several matters.
It took some time until we found by and by the several treasures, and
until we could ascertain that a lot had been abducted from Paris into
other towns. Thus the treasures of the Rothschilds, robbed together
from all parts of the world, are being secured by us not only in
Paris but also in the various castles of the Rothschilds (Bordeaux,
Deauville and so on). Legal doubts arose and I have discussed them
with the Fuehrer. Subsequently he caused a new order to be issued by
the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces which I enclose
in duplicate. Thus the Seminary (Hohe Schule) will still receive a
Polish library of 130,000 volumes. This will include the complete
history of the East, probably a large Slavic library and many other
items. Together with a lot of scientific material many extremely
valuable objects of art have been found in cases at the residence of
the Rothschilds. This has been secured and the Fuehrer will decide at a
later date as to the final disposal.
In Brussels and Amsterdam we are on the track of valuable objects too.
I believe that we shall be able to bring quite some material from there
to Germany.
You see that we are industrially endeavoring to exploit the present
moment. Such an opportunity will hardly present itself again. I am
trying to keep the Staff for Special Purposes down to a minimum.
Nevertheless it is unavoidable that a number of experts have to work at
various places. And the work takes longer than was anticipated in the
beginning.
Once more many thanks. If I should come to Munich in the near future I
hope to meet you.
Heil Hitler!
28 January 1941
3581/R/dt
[initials] Sch
* * * * *
To: The Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP
Reich Director F.X. Schwarz
_Munich 33_
_Subject: Staff for Special Purposes in Paris_
Dear Party Member Schwarz,
About the work of my Staff for Special Purposes in France, Holland and
Belgium I can inform you that the major part of the work in France
will be finished by the end of February. Then only a few men have to
remain in Paris.--However, in Belgium and Holland extensive research
work has still to be carried out. I hope nevertheless to wind up the
main part of the work there within a measurable space of time. The
arrangement and registration of the large art treasures claimed a lot
of special work. I had these treasures confiscated simultaneously with
the scientific material. The Fuehrer is going to decide what to do with
them shortly. As I informed you previously the values involved will
come close to a billion dollars according to expert estimates.
I told you already verbally that the largest Jewish library of the
world, consisting of 350,000 volumes, will be placed in the institution
which is going to be opened at Frankfurt on the Main within a short
time. Another 200,000 volumes will be added from Holland.
The library of the IInd International about the history of the social
movements cannot be transferred for the moment to Germany due to
lack of space. Two will have to take charge of it in Amsterdam where
scientific work can start immediately. This library consists of 130,000
volumes.
The account of the expenditures up till now will be submitted to
your deputy by the administrative branch of my office. However, I
have to request that you put another amount of 100,000 Reichsmark
at my disposal so that I can complete the work satisfactorily. At
the same time I propose once more that you have parts of those sums
reimbursed--be it from the Reich Marshal or from the Fuehrer's funds
for cultural purposes. There is no doubt that I also have collected
treasures which will not benefit the Seminary directly.
Once more I want to express my deepest thanks for letting us have the
Schrenck-Notzing-Palais in Munich for our institution. Prof. Harder,
the future director of this institution, is extremely pleased with it
and will soon get in touch with your deputy.
A depiction of the situation regarding the branch offices of the
Seminary in the various cities is just being completed and will be
submitted to you within a short time.
Once more many thanks for your generous support.
Heil Hitler
Yours
[in pencil] Sch
* * * * *
[SYNOPSIS]
Letter of 22 May 1941, 4592/4863/R/Ma
To the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP, Reich Director Schwarz,
Munich 33.
Written by Rosenberg
* * * * *
Letter of 9 May 1941, K IV/te. 4363 H. [Initialed] Sch
To the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete
mental and doctrinal [Weltanschaulich] education of the NSDAP Mr.
Reich Director Alfred Rosenberg, Berlin W 35, 17 Margareten Str.
Written and signed by the Reich Treasurer of the Party Schwarz.
* * * * *
Letter 19 April 1941 from the Office for Jewish and Masonic Problems.
Frankfurt on the Main, 1 Schwindstrasse; Schi/Fl.
To the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete mental
and doctrinal training and education of the NSDAP, attention Adjutant,
Berlin W 35, 17 Margaretenstr., Party member Koeppin.
Written by Chief Reich Director (Oberreichsleiter) Schimner and signed
by him.
* * * * *
Letter of 3 April 1941, K IV/kr.
To the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete
mental and doctrinal education of the NSDAP,
Reich Director Alfred Rosenberg, Berlin W 35, 17 Margareten Str.
Written and signed by the Reich Treasurer of the Party Schwarz.
Copy of a letter of 28 March 1941, from the Reich Commissar for the
occupied territories of the Netherlands, General Commissar for Special
Purposes, Section ro. international organizations, Den Haag, Fluweelen
Burgwal 22; SCH/R.
To F.J.M. Rehse, Munich 2 M, 1 Residenzstrasse (residence)
Written by Schwier, authenticated by Kretzer.
* * * * *
Copy of a letter from NSDAP, Collection FJM. Rehse, 2 April 1941,
Munich, 1 Residenzstr.
To the Reich Treasurer Schwarz, Munich, Administration Building
Written by F.J.M. Rehse, Authenticated by Reigl
* * * * *
[The five previously enumerated letters all deal with the request of
party member Rehse to obtain the furnishings, paraphernalia and books
of a masonic lodge for the party collection Rehse. This was finally
granted in the letter of 22 May 1941 by Rosenberg.]
* * * * *
11 June 1942
R./K. 1035/42
To the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP,
Reich Director Franz Xavier Schwarz
Munich 33
Dear Party Member Schwarz,
The work of my staff for special purposes has been hampered through
lack of personnel. Nevertheless, the tabulating of the cultural
objects secured from France has progressed so far that an exhibition
of selected paintings can be arranged in the castle Neuschwanstein.
The overall catalogue will be ready for type-setting in a few weeks.
I would enjoy it tremendously if the two of us could be the first
ones to visit this exhibition. We could then decide which objects and
tapestries to suggest to the Fuehrer to be used for the furnishing
of the Seminary [Hohe Schule] respectively of my office. The Fuehrer
will hardly be able to visit the exhibition due to the fact that he is
presently overburdened with work. However I shall ask him to visit it
later and shall inform you when the Fuehrer will be able to come.
Once more I thank you for your generous support extended to my staff
for special purposes. I am convinced that a large number of most
valuable cultural objects have been secured for the German people.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 091-PS
11 Sept 1944 R/U/K 2500/44
To the Reich's commissar for the Netherlands
Reich's minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart
Subject: Removal of the library of the social institute of Amsterdam
Dear esteemed Party Member Dr. Seyss-Inquart!
The development of the military situation in the West has caused me
to instruct my special purpose staff in Amsterdam, to remove the
library of the social institute there, to the Reich by the quickest
way. However, great difficulties have arisen to that effect due
to the proximity of the front lines. I have therefore put at the
disposal of the Chief of my main work division Netherlands, SS Major
Schmidt-Staehler, the special purpose chief Gummert with full powers
for the execution of this task. Since this library is mainly composed
of a unique collection of the writings of the European Marxism, it is
therefore irreplaceable for our ideological-political struggles.
I request therefore sincerely from you to be of assistance to my
deputies Schmidt-Staehler and Gummert, with your authority as Reich's
commissar for the Netherlands, in case the difficulties arising by the
removal of the library cannot be surmounted by them.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 098-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY
Munich, 33, Brown house
at present Berlin, 22 Feb 40
Deputy of the Fuehrer
Staff Leader
Mr. Reich leader Alfred Rosenberg
_Berlin W 35_
Margareten Str. 17
Chancellery Rosenbery, 24 Feb 40
rec. No. 555 copy AR and Urban St
_Subject: Directions for the administration of classes in religion_
Dear Party Member Rosenberg:
The deputy of the Fuehrer has heard from different sources, that Reich
Bishop Mueller tells everywhere, that he received a commission from you
to work out directions for formulating the teaching of religion for the
schools.
I have not been able to examine the statements of Reich Bishop Mueller
as to their correctness. The question, having come up for discussion
again by the statements of Reich Bishop Mueller, is however in my mind
of such fundamental importance for the future ideological position of
the party, that I find it necessary, already now to point out to you
the serious objections I have in regard to such a commission.
The ministry for education of the Reich has repeatedly indicated its
desire in the course of the past few years for new directions for
formulating the teaching of religion, which would also be acceptable to
the NSDAP.
With your agreement, this request has repeatedly been refused by the
Fuehrer's deputy. Just as your ministry did, so the deputy of the
Fuehrer took the position based on the assumption, that it could not
be the task of the party to give directions for the instruction of the
teachings of Christian religions.
Christianity and National Socialism are phenomena which originated from
entirely different basic causes. Both differ fundamentally so strongly,
that it will not be possible to construct a Christian teaching which
would be completely compatible with the point of view of the national
socialist ideology; just as the communities of Christian faith would
never be able to stand by the ideology of national socialism in its
entirety. The issuing of national socialist directions for the teaching
of religious classes would however be based on a synthesis of national
socialism and Christianity which I find impossible.
If the directions should really be permeated by the spirit of
national socialism, some very fundamental articles of faith of the
Christian teachings could not be recognized. I am referring here only
to the position of the Christian churches to the race question, to
the question of hindrance or destruction of life not valuable, its
position to marriage, which speaks for the celibacy of priests and the
toleration and furtherance of orders for monks and nuns, the teaching,
contradictory to German feeling, of the immaculate conception of Mary,
etc.
No matter how these directions may be formulated, in no case will they
ever simultaneously find the approval of the church and the party.
In addition to this, the religions themselves cannot agree on the
contents of the Christian teachings; as far as the Protestants
themselves are concerned, there are not only the followers of the
confessional church in the Reich and the German Christians, but also
the adherents of a teaching, which is endeavoring to create a new
Lutheran Christendom of a particular kind approximately in the shape
which seems desirable to the Reich Minister of churches, party member
Kerrl. The party thus would have to decide first which of these
directions of faith it would give preference, or if it should even
decide for a fourth. I do not think it entirely impossible that the
Reich Bishop may take this latter road, since according to his last
publication he himself has already turned sharply away from conceptions
which up to now have been part of the faith of the German Christians.
But if directions for the instruction of religion should ever be worked
out, it will not be enough, to my mind, to make them for Protestants
only; respective directions should also be worked out for Catholics.
To work out directions for instructions of Catholic faith, the Reich
Bishop is hardly the suitable person, and one would probably have to
choose a Catholic. Of course the directions for both faiths would
differ in fundamental questions, each, however would lay claim to the
fact that it really contained the truly authentic interpretation of
article 24 of the party program.
By issuing directions nothing would therefore be improved in the
present situation in the field of the churches. The fight between the
faiths would be carried on in the old form and spread into the lines of
the party. Yes, all faiths and Christian groups would attack state and
party, because they had assumed to encroach upon their own territory,
that of teaching the Christian faith and to try to reform it.
The churches cannot be conquered by a compromise between national
socialism and Christian teachings, but only through a new ideology,
whose coming you yourself have announced in your writings. Because of
this conviction we have always been careful, not to exert a reforming
influence on the Christian dogma in any shape nor to exert any
influence on the church directives for religious teachings. In complete
mutual agreement we have rejected the intention of the Reich Minister
for churches who, against the objection of the party, always tried anew
to renew the church life in the frame of national socialist spirit, in
searching for a compromise between Christian teachings and the ideology
of national socialism.
Should, however, any one personality emanating from the life of the
church, be charged now to work out directions for the teaching of the
Christian religion, the party would thereby basically approve and
accept for itself the position of the Reich Minister for the churches
previously opposed by it as there is no basic difference between a
position which wants to reform and reorganize the church life in its
entirety, and one which aims at this goal solely in the realm of the
education of youth.
So far we have always been in accord, that by taking such a step the
party would leave the soil on which it is firmly planted and would
step on the swaying ground of the controversial Christian doctrines.
It would enter into the domain of the interpretation of the teachings
of Jesus, and there would doubtless be subordinate to those who for
centuries have done nothing but interpret and rewrite the words and
deeds of Jesus of Nazareth as written in the old books about the actual
wording of which the scientists fight even today. When in later decades
and centuries the German people's soul liberated by national socialism
should once again be choked and crippled by Christian doctrines, it
could be possible that it may have been caused by today's attempt to
effect a synthesis between national socialism and Christianity.
On the other hand, of course I am also of the opinion that it is not
possible to eliminate the religious instruction in schools without
replacing it with something better for the moral education of youth.
Religious instruction as given in schools today does not only comprise
the instruction in the Christian doctrines of faith, the teachings of
the creation of the world and of the life thereafter; besides, the
children receive also instructions in the ten commandments, which for
most comrades of the people to this day still are the only directives
for their moral behavior and for an orderly collective life in the
people's community. If this instruction is taken from the children
without replacing it with something better, the objection can be
made--in my estimation not without reason, that, as many contend, the
present degradation of youth is in part caused by the lack of religious
instruction in schools.
What, in my opinion, is therefore necessary is the preparation of a
short directive about a national socialist life formulation. We need
for the work of education in the party, especially also in the Hitler
Youth a short resume in which the ethical principles are documented,
to respect which each German boy and girl, who at one time will be
representatives of the national socialistic Germany, must be educated.
In such a directive for instance belongs the law of bravery, the law
against cowardness, the commandment of love for the soulful nature in
which God makes himself apparent also in the animal and the plant, a
commandment to keep the blood pure; many principles also belong here
which are for instance also contained in the decalogue of the Old
Testament, as far as they can be regarded as moral principles of all
people's life.
The publication of such a directive can and must only come out of our
national socialist conduct of life. Its commandments of customs need to
be explained by reference to any doctrines of faith about the creation
of life and about life of the soul after death.
They can and must originate beyond any confessional discussions.
I take the publication of such a directive to be of utmost importance,
because the German boys and girls must once be told what they can and
must do, and what is forbidden for them to do. I don't even think it
necessary to introduce this directive immediately into the schools
as a text; it would be sufficient if for the time being it would be
introduced into the party and its affiliations. Later it could also be
taken over by the schools just as the little Catechism also was not
created by the school boards, but first taught by the Church and later
taken over by the schools.
As far as the religious instructions in the schools is concerned, I do
not think that anything has to be changed in the present situation. No
fault can be found with any national socialist teacher, who after the
unmistakenly clear instructions of the Fuehrer's deputy, is ready to
give school instructions in the Christian religion. For the contents
of this instruction, however, the directives should still be binding
which have in former years been made by the churches themselves. In
the circular of the Fuehrer's deputy No. 3/39 of 4 Jan 1939 it is
stated explicitly that the teachers charged with religious instruction
are not to choose from the material on biblical history at their own
discretion, but have the obligation to teach the entire biblical
instruction material. Interpretations, explanations and separations in
the sense of several attempts of particular church directions have to
be omitted. The pupils must be given the entire picture of the biblical
instruction material.
However, the teachers have the right to present this material as
property of biblical thought and not as that of Germany or national
socialism. If thus in some cases comparison will be drawn, this,
according to the circular, corresponds only to the duties of the
educator. Against such instruction of religion the churches cannot have
any objections.
When, sometime later, the proposed directive for a new German conduct
of life first to be used in the educational work of the party, will
have found entry into the schools, it shall in no way supplant classes
in religion. It may perhaps be used as a foundation for some classes in
German and must have validity for all pupils, without consideration of
their religious affiliations. Against such educational procedure the
churches could not object, either because it would really be a matter
of additional education, which would take place next to the religious
instruction and without any connection with it. On the contrary, the
churches would have reason to be thankful to the state because it is
not satisfied with the religious instruction according to the very
insufficient moral education based on the ten commandments, but that
it is giving youth an additional Education, which makes much higher
demands on its moral conduct.
Parallel to that the desire of the parents for the instruction in the
doctrines of faith may thus well go on. The stronger and more fertile
our _positive_ educational work in the schools will be formulated,
however the more certain it is that instruction of religions will be
losing in importance.
If the youth which is now being educated according to our moral laws
will later have to decide if it is still willing to have its children
brought up in the far inferior Christian doctrines, the decision will
in most cases be negative.
I would think that today, seven years after taking over the power,
it should be possible to set up principles for a national socialist
conduct of life. They have long been apparent to the people from the
numerous early fighters for the national socialist idea.
As long as we do not master this task, however, it will always be
pointed out from various sides, and rightly so, that children, not
taking part in religious instruction, are no longer taught even the
most simple moral laws which are a standard for the communal life of
all nations.
The Fuehrer's deputy finds it necessary that all these questions should
be thoroughly discussed in the near future in the presence of the Reich
leaders, who are especially affected by them. I would appreciate it
very much if you would let me know your position in this matter before
the discussion.
Heil Hitler!
/s/ M. Bormann
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 099-PS
National Socialist German Workers Party.
The Fuehrer's Deputy
Staff leader
Munich 33, Brown House,
at present Berlin W 8, 9 Jan., 1940. Wilhelmstr. 64 III
Dr. Kl/Gf.
To Reichsleiter Party Comrade Alfred Rosenberg
_Berlin W 35_
Margareten Strasse 17
_Subject_: Raising of a War Fund from the Churches.
Enclosed, I forward to you the copy of a letter, sent today to the
Reichsminister for Finance, for cognizance.
Heil Hitler
/s/ M. Bormann
(M. Bormann)
_Enclosure._
* * * * *
Berlin 19 Jan 1940
Dr. Kl/Gf.
To the Reichsminister for Finance
_Berlin W 8_
Wilhelmplatz 1-2
_Subject_: Raising of a War Fund from the Churches.
As it has been reported to me, the war fund of the churches has been
specified from the 1 November 1939 on, at first for the duration of
three months at RM 1,800,000.--per month, of which Rm 1,000,000.--are
to be paid by the Protestant church and RM 800,000.--by the Catholic
church per month.
The establishment of such a low amount has surprised me. I construe
from numerous reports, that the political communities have to raise
such a large war fund, that the execution of their tasks, partially
very important for example in the field of public welfare, is
endangered. In consideration of that, a larger quota from the churches
appears to be absolutely appropriate.
* * * * *
In my opinion, the determination of the amount cannot be affected by
the argument that the fund could only have as a consequence a decrease
of the material expenses, but not of the personnel expenses of the
churches. I consider it absolutely bearable, to decrease also the
personnel expenses, especially for the Catholic clergymen. In contrast
to all other German men, obliged to serve, not one Catholic clergyman
is in the field as the soldier; also none of the Catholic clergymen
takes obligations unto himself voluntarily, like the ones which must be
borne by every German family head.
As far as the technical handling of the war fund to be determined for
the Catholic Church is concerned, in my opinion, the state does not
have to bother to figure out the individual partial contributions,
which must be raised by the various Orders and religious associations.
I would rather consider it correct if the amount is determined in one
for the entire Catholic Church, and if one then leaves it to the Church
to divide up this amount according to its own best knowledge. However,
the state must be free to call upon the property and funds of the
various individual parts and groups of the church arbitrarily to make
its demands valid.
As far as the Evangelical Church is concerned, for years the efforts
of the Reichminister for Church Affairs have been in the direction to
organize all the State Churches [Landeskirchen] of the Evangelical
Church into one unified organization with a unified leadership for the
spiritual as well as for the financial affairs. Despite the objections,
raised by the party, these plans were more and more elaborated upon;
even during the war, they were followed up without interruption.
Therefore it is not unjust, to determine in one for the Evangelical
Church the war fund to be raised according to the same principles,
which have been developed for the Catholic Church.
It should be left up to the State Churches [Landeskirchen] and
religious associations, who consider such treatment unjust, to
demonstrate in an easily perceptible manner, that they are not in any
dependent relationship to the leadership of the German Evangelical
Church, and do not desire to come under the latter's dominion.
I would be thankful to you, if you could inform us very soon, how high
the amount of the war fund of the churches has been set at. The sum,
calculated for the duration of the first three months, of which, as I
understand, the churches have not paid one penny, may not correspond in
any way to the capability, as figured from the entire fortune and from
the contribution and/or tax income of the Churches.
Heil Hitler
By order
M B (M. Bormann)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 100-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Munich 33 Brown House
at present Berlin, 18 Jan 40 Bo/Si
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Chief of Staff
Mr. Rosenberg, member of the executive board of the Party
[Reichsleiter]
Berlin W 35
Margaretenstr. 17
Office Rosenberg No of entry 196. 20 Jan 40
submitted to RL Rosbg 1/20 Copies AR and Urban
Dear Party Member Rosenberg:
A few days ago you expressed to the Fuehrer at the Reich Chancellory
that Reich Bishop Mueller had written an excellent book for the German
soldier. I am of different opinion. This book familiarizes a new
soldier who has already given up Christianity with partly camouflaged
trains of thought.
As I have written to you already, I consider it the most essential
demand of the hour that NS publications worth reading for the German
soldier should be written immediately by your Office and other
qualified National Socialists. This opinion has been confirmed by many
regional Party leaders. Thus we set against the sale of Christian
pamphlets the highly increased sale of national socialist publications
which are popular.
Heil Hitler:
Yours
Signed: BORMANN
(M. Bormann)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 101-PS
National Socialist German Workers' Party
Munich 33, the Brown House
At Present, Berlin W 8,
17 Jan. 1940
Wilhelmstrasse 64 III--Dr. Kl/Gf
Rosenberg Chancellory
Entry No. 187--[? ?] 18 Jan. 40
Reich Director Rosenberg
--Shown 189
--Copy [? ?]
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Staff Director
To Reich Director Party Member Rosenberg
_Berlin W 35_ Margaretenstr. 17
Nearly all the districts report to me regularly, that the Churches of
both confessions are administering spiritually to members of the Armed
Forces. This administering finds its expression especially in the fact
that soldiers are being sent religious publications by the spiritual
leaders of the home congregations. These publications are in part very
cleverly composed. I have repeated reports that these publications are
being read by the troops and thereby exercise a certain influence on
the morale.
I have in the past sought by sounding out the General Field Marshall,
the High Command of the Armed Forces and Party Member Reich Director
Amann, to restrict considerably the production and shipment of
publications of this type. The result of these efforts remain
unsatisfactory. As Reich Director [Reichsleiter] Amann has repeatedly
informed me, the restriction of these pamphlets by means of the
printing paper rationing has not been achieved because the paper used
for the production of these writings is being purchased on the open
market. Publications can only be confiscated by special police measures
because they are designed to weaken the morale of the troops. Such
police measures are really unsatisfactory and in their final execution
very much disputed.
Likewise, the prior censorship of all writings by the High Command
of the Armed Forces which takes place at the distribution points of
the Armed Forces service bureau, is not sufficient in my opinion, to
guarantee that the soldiers are not given an undesired influence by the
Churches. A publication, the contents of which are clearly tied to the
Christian dogma and which do not contain attacks against Party, State
or the Armed Forces, can not in general be refused permission by this
examining commission.
If the influencing of the soldiers by the Church is to be effectively
combatted, this will only be accomplished, in my opinion, by producing
many good publications in the shortest time possible under the
supervision of the Party. These publications should be so composed that
the soldiers will really prefer to read them, and at the same time,
indoctrinate the soldiers with a National Socialist World philosophy,
not the Christian viewpoint.
Thus at the last meeting of the deputy Gauleiters complaints were
uttered on this matter to the effect that a considerable quantity
of such publications are not available. This is the reason I
believe, that the publication by your expert, Office Director
[Amtsleiter] Party Member Ziegler, "_Soldier Belief--Soldier Honor_"
[Soldatenglaube--Soldatenehre] has had so great a sale in a short time.
I maintain that it is necessary that in the near future we
transmit to the Party Service Offices down to local group directors
[Ortsgruppenleitern] a list of additional publications of this sort
which should be sent to our soldiers by the local groups, Party
military units [Sturme] or their adherents and friends in the field.
I should not regard it as necessary or even good if the majority of
these publications should have a spiritual or philosophical character.
Rather I should regard it as much preferable if these publications in
their finished form were styled in as varied a manner as possible, thus
having an appeal to all members of the Armed Forces, regardless of
their occupational or professional achievements, regardless of their
interests and their background.
I should be very appreciative if you would devote your very special
attention to this task, in the near future. My expert, Party Member Dr.
Klopfer, is available to you for consultation about the material on
hand here which is at your disposal at any time upon your call.
As the production of these publications (which at the moment are not
in existence) will take a certain amount of time, and as, on the other
hand, I believe that the supplying of the troops with good publications
ought not to be delayed a day, I should be indebted to you if you would
transmit to me a list of the already existing publications which the
deputy of the Fuehrer can recommend to the Party Service Offices as
suitable for dispatch to the Armed Forces.
Heil Hitler!
[Signed] M. BORMANN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 107-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Munich 17 June 1938 The Brown House
Deputy of the Fuehrer Staff Leader
CIRCULAR LETTER NR. 72/38
To all Reichsleiter and Regional Directors [Gauleiter]
Enclosed please find, for your information, a copy directions for
participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienstes in religious celebrations.
Signed: M. BORMANN
Rosenberg Chancellory In Nr. 226601 on 21 June 38
Certified true copy
M
1 inclosure
* * * * *
Copy
Directions for the participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienstes in
religious celebrations.
The Reichsarbeitsdienst is a training school in which the German
youth should be educated to national unity in the spirit of National
Socialism.
This problem can only be solved, if all the ideas which at one time
were directed to the breaking up of national unity, are subdued in
Reichsarbeitsdienst. Therefore it is forbidden to have any class,
professional and religious barriers in the Reichsarbeitsdienst.
What religious beliefs a person has is not a decisive factor, but it is
decisive that he first of all feels himself a German.
Every religious practice is forbidden in the Reichsarbeitsdienst
because it disturbs the comrade-like harmony of all working men and
women.
On this basis every participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienst in
churchly, that is religious, arrangements and celebrations is not
possible.
A religious creed will strive within the German people for
predominance. The Reichsarbeitsdienst in all its male and female
leaders, working men and women strive for the indissoluble binding of
the whole people.
Therefore not only allowing the members of the Reichsarbeitsdienst
to attend church in a body, but also participation by the members
of the Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious celebrations for example,
weddings or funerals, violates the educational task which is facing the
organization.
As little as it is the affair of the Reichsarbeitsdienst to forbid its
individual members to have a church wedding or funeral, so definitely
must the Reichsarbeitsdienst avoid taking part as an organization in a
festival which is strictly religious, that is, which excludes Germans
of other beliefs.
It is therefore, in any case, necessary to execute a clear temporal
separation between the churchly celebration and the debut of the
Reichsarbeitsdienst.
The Reichsarbeitsdienst does not participate in religious celebrations,
but rather turns her support to the marriage or burial of a member
before or after the churchly celebration.
The participation of the musical band of the Reichsarbeitsdienst
in classical churchly concerts (for example, production of the
"Schoepfung" by Haydn) is not to be regarded as a partaking in a
religious celebration, and is always to be decided according to the
local conditions.
Signed: HIERL
Authenticated:
REISMEIR
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 113-PS
Rosenberg
[in pencil]
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff
Munich, Brown House, 27 July 1938
III Entered 11 Aug 38 6691
[Stamped]
Rosenberg Chancellery
[Stamped] Entry No. 2896k 3 Aug 38
REGULATION NR 104/38
(Not to be published)
Requested to be returned from III, Returned 22 Aug
[in pencil]
With regard to the constantly emphasized neutrality of the party with
the churches, it is pertinent to eliminate, as far as possible, the
existing frictions. Since pastors, as political and subordinate leaders
have shown in the past that they were not able to make decisions when
the job of trusteeship was added to the danger of having them drawn
into church conflicts, the Deputy of the Fuehrer has decreed the
following:
1. Pastors are to be released immediately from their party function as
standard bearers [Hoheitstraeger].
2. Pastors are to be interchanged little by little according to
replacements at hand as political or subordinate leaders of the
congregations.
3. As of now, it is forbidden to continue appointments of pastors
to positions in the Party, to their congregations, and to groups
associated with church activities.
Signed: M. BORMANN
Certified true copy:
Friedrichs
Distributor: II b
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 116-PS
SECRET
Copy Dt.
National Socialist German Workers Party
The deputy of the Fuehrer Staff Director.
Munich, 24 January 1939.
III D--Es 3230/0/15--4278 g.
Rosenberg Chancellery
Receipt Nr. 6007-31 Jan 3
To the Delegate of the Fuehrer for the surveillance of the whole
spiritual and world political philosophy schooling and education of
the Nazi Party.
Reich Director [Reichsleiter] Party Member Alfred Rosenberg,--or
representative.--
Berlin W. 35. Margarethenstr. 17
_Concerning: Theological Faculties._
My dear Party Member Rosenberg:
I am transmitting to you by the attached enclosure a copy of a letter I
have written today to the Reich Minister for Knowledge, Education and
Popular Education. I request that you take cognizance of the same.
Heil Hitler.
Your very devoted,
(signed) M. BORMANN.
I Attachment.
* * * * *
SECRET
Copy Dt.
National Socialist German Workers Party
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Munich, 24 January 1939
III D-Fs 3230/0/15-4278 g
To the Reich Minister for Knowledge, Education and Popular Education.
To the Attention of Government Counsel Jahnert--or representative in
the Office.
Berlin W. 8 Unter den Linden 69.
Concerning: Theological Faculties.
In regard to your letter of 28 Nov 38--(Office Chief W)--and the
conference between Mr. State Minister Dr. Wacker and my expert party
member Wemmer, I would like to again inform you of the stand the Party
is taking.
Fundamentally, theological inquiry cannot be placed on the same footing
as the general fields of knowledge in the Universities as it represents
less a free field of knowledge than a confessional (i.e. religious)
aim of research. No doubts exist on this ground if the theological
faculties in the German High schools are appreciably restricted.
In this case, as you have likewise pointed out in your letter, the
clause of the Concordat and the Church Treaties are to be taken
into consideration. In the case of certain faculties, which are not
mentioned by a specific clause in the Concordat and Church Treaties, as
for example Munich and a few others, a suppression can be begun without
further to do. This is equally true of the theological faculties in
Austria, Vienna and Graz.
But also, in the case of the faculties which are specifically
mentioned in the Concordat or Church Treaties, there now exists a
special legal situation which has been created by the general change
in circumstances. Particularly, the introduction of military service
and the execution of the Four Year Plan must be considered. By
virtue of these measures, and in addition by virtue of the fact of
an extraordinary lack of replacement men in contrast to the earlier
numerous replacement men available, it will be necessary to execute a
certain reorganization of the German High Schools. Thus economics and
simplifications are necessary. I should like to refer particularly once
more to these questions on the basis of the oral discussion between
Mr. State Minister Dr. Wacker and my expert. Because of this I would
appreciate it very much if you would restrict the theological faculties
insofar as they cannot be wholly suppressed in accordance with the
above statement. In this event the matter concerns not only the
theological faculties in the universities, but also the various state
establishments which still exist in many places as institutes of high
learning exclusively devoted to theology and without connection with a
university.
I request in this instance the omission of any express declaration
to the churches or to other places as well as the avoiding of a
public announcement of these measures. Complaints and the like must
be answered (if they are to be replied to) in the fashion that these
measures are being executed in the course of the economic plan of
reorganization and that similar things are happening to other faculties.
I would appreciate it very much if professorial chairs, thus vacated,
can be then turned over to the newly created fields of inquiry of these
last years, such as racial research, archaeology studies, etc.
Heil Hitler!
as representative
Signed: M. BORMANN
Certified true copy
Signed: Engel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 117-PS
National Socialist German Workers' Party
The delegate of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff
Munich 28 Jan. 1939
III D--Es 2240/0/21 3400 g.
Personal
Secret
To: The Fuehrer's delegate for the supervision of the entire mental
and doctrinal teaching and education of the National Socialist German
Worker's Party
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
Berlin W 35 Margarethenstr. 17.
Chancellery Rosenberg
In: Nr. 6231--10 Feb. 39.
Subject: Armed Forces and Church
Dear Esteemed Party Member Rosenberg,
I sent to you in the annex for your reference a copy of my letter of
to-day to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Heil Hitler
Your very devoted,
Signed: BORMANN.
1 Enclosure.
* * * * *
SECRET
National Socialist German Workers' Party
Carbon copy
28 January 1939
III D Es 2240/0/21--34 g.
The Fuehrer's Deputy.
To: The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
To: Captain Thomee or his representative.
Berlin W 35 Tirpitzufer 72-76
Subject: Armed Forces and Church
In reference to the conference between Brigadier General Reinecke and
my expert party member, Chief Councillor to the Government Wemmer, of
Wednesday the 11th of this month, I want to explain to you once more in
order to confirm the arrangements made by my expert, the attitude of
the party with regard to these questions.
In the last years, the party had to announce its position, time and
time again, to the plan of establishing a State Church, or of a closer
connection between the State and the Church. The party has repudiated
these plans with all its force and for the following reasons. In the
first place it would not be compatible for the doctrinal demands of
National Socialism to unite the State with the churches as the outer
organization of the religious communions which do not have as aim in
all their fields the carrying out of the National Socialist principles.
In the second place, considerations of a political nature oppose such
an outer unity. At present, the churches, the Protestant as well as
the Catholic one, are disunited internally, and partly externally too,
seen from an organizational point of view, they do not form a unity
any longer. A union of these churches with a State built on a strong
close leadership and on any National Socialist principles is bound
to fail. Such a union, furthermore, would result in constant arguing
between Church and State. Furthermore, competence quarrels would arise
constantly there, where measures have to be taken concerning either
the State or the Church; in this case also one must always count with
the difficulty that the Churches would refuse such decisions out
of dogmatic reasons. Numerous examples of such an attitude can be
found there, where out of historical reasons, there still is a union
between State and Church, such as for instance in the case of the
School. But even there where the State has recently tried to bring
order in the affairs of the Church by making decisions such as for
instance the setting up of a State's finance committee for the Church
administration, experience has been made that one portion of the
churches thought these decisions were necessary, but another portion
thought, for dogmatic reasons, that this was an intolerable meddling
with the church life. With such unfortunate circumstances, there is
always a danger for the State that it has to execute its decisions
forcibly if these are not being carried out; this particular condition
must be prevented for several reasons.
For these reasons of doctrinal and political nature, the deputy of
the Fuehrer has opposed the setting up of a State Church; he has also
rejected the attempts to make use of the authority of the State for
a different kind of union between the State and Church and to settle
outer organizational matters which should be the task of the Church.
The party, therefore, would regret very much if contrary to this
attitude, the Armed Forces would continue with their plans to set up
a private consistory for the Armed Forces, that is to say to create
a private church for the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces Church would
indeed be nothing else but a State Church within the Armed Forces. To
supplement this I would like to bring out the following points:
1. A great portion of the ministers of both churches stand, in
accordance with the attitude of the churches, in concealed and also
open opposition to National Socialism and the State led by it. In these
questions a different judgment of the case is presented as it would
have been before or during the World War when the churches were in a
more positive relationship to the State. Today, however, the churches
and the ministers, should a crisis arise for this National Socialist
State, would pass from concealed to open opposition. They will not in
times of crisis support or help this state but at best leave it to
its own fate. That they will even fight this State in these times in
order to regain lost fields is clearly demonstrated by the Protestant
beseeching prayer in reference to the Sudetenland crisis; I want to
bring this incident to your attention once more. This high treasonlike
beseeching prayer proves that the churches have only been waiting till
the National Socialist State found itself, at least in their opinion,
in a moment of uneasiness, to take up the fight against the State with
their whole psychological influential means. In my opinion this fact
deserves special attention, because this beseeching prayer clearly
demonstrates in which spiritually extraordinary successful way these
churches try to influence the individuals. I do not think that the
ministers of these churches will be a support to the fighting troops,
but that on the contrary, they will be to a great extent dangerous
destroyers of the spiritual fighting strength in the decisive moment.
I want to emphasize that at that time this beseeching prayer was
approved by most of the country's churches and that it was only later
on, once these trying days were put to a good end, and often drawn out
negotiations from the part of the Reich's church ministry had been
ended, that some of the country's churches announced their disapproval;
this disapproval, however, in the meantime was in part repudiated.
A separate church from the Armed Forces even though it might free
itself, as to its organization, from the other country's churches, will
not be spared from this danger. The Armed Forces church would have to
get its recruits from the other churches. Even if one would go as far,
and this in my opinion is practically impossible, as to how the Armed
Forces form their own ministery from youth on, this separation of an
Armed Forces church from the rest of the churches will not be possible
because their church faith ideas will remain the same because they are
all based on dogmatic principles.
2. It is known to me that certain disputes arose when the Armed Forces
tried to bring about a union between the Protestant and Catholic
churches; furthermore, that certain organizational measures such as
for instance the combining of the Church song book, the creation of
a unified Church service etc. would be appropriate. But according
to experiences which the party and the State encountered in these
questions, the difficulties, instead of decreasing, on the contrary
increase when these matters are taken in hand by authorities other
than the church. But the party, by its logical attitude towards
these matters, wanted to spare the State from these difficulties and
arguments within the churches, that are always led back on dogmatic
principles. It should remain up to the church if they can, want or
do not, to accomplish these desirable organizational measures and
unifications. The State or the party would furthermore oppose an
inevitable development in this field by meddling in church matters;
namely a development which would lead to leaving these affairs to
forces which still want to be in connection with the Church.
The Fuehrer's Deputy has therefore considered it as his duty, after
the basic decision to reject a union between State and Church had been
made, to see to it that the basic ideological freedom of faith and
conscience be also practically realized in all the State's decrees,
decisions etc. Everywhere the church matters have been left up to the
church, but also every religious constraint, wherever present, was
removed. At the same time, those who wanted to busy themselves, with
Church and religious matters in a correct carrying out of the basic
faith and conscience freedom were given the possibility to do so.
The Fuehrer's Deputy would welcome it if the Armed Forces would act in
these essential ideological decisions, after the same principles as
the party and also now the State have laid out for themselves, instead
of pursuing the plans for a creation of an Armed Forces Church or
any other closer union between the Armed Forces and the church. I am
convinced that in a short time there will be no more difficulties for
the Armed Forces either, which difficulties had been brought about by
the plan to create a separate Armed Forces Church. In fact the Armed
Forces have already taken a position to these questions and basically
also in the sense of accomplishing freedom of faith and conscience.
It should be decisive, however, in this respect to note that these
instructions are in many cases not always completely carried out. To
assure a right execution of this principle of freedom of faith and
conscience it would be in my opinion necessary to observe the following
points:
(1) The orders stating that no constraint can be exercised in the
attendance of church services during the free evening hours in army
camps would really have to be complied with. The carrying out of these
orders should not, as in reality it sometimes is, be left up to the
discretion of some higher or lower ranking superiors. In most cases, no
direct constraint is exercised but in some cases the non-assistance of
church services is punished by extra duty etc. Such incidents should
lead in the future to disciplinary action.
(2) The duty of Army Chaplains, if they are available in the Armed
Forces, should be to give an opportunity to those members of the Armed
Forces who have a need to talk things over with them. They could hold
religious services if there is a need for it and if the members of the
Armed Forces cannot attend the regular services. But the attendance
would have to be on a voluntary basis for everybody.
It is evident that in the Armed Forces which grasp all German men,
there will be a need to a certain extent for attendance of Church
services. These members of the Armed Forces should be given an
opportunity, provided it does not interfere with the service, to
visit churches and ministers on their own. But further than that,
Army chaplains should not be used to hold church services, to arrange
evening hours etc. and to exercise any constraint to that effect. They
should only be available in order to be present there where a need
arises for them.
(3) Special officer ranks of the church service and similar
institutions should be abolished.
(4) The building of own Armed Forces Churches should also be
discontinued. I hardly think that there will be many cases where the
members of the Armed Forces will not have the possibility to visit a
church, outside of the Army, just like everybody else.
(5) No formation Church attendance should take place.
(6) Church organizations should have nothing to do with the Armed
Forces. Everything should be left up to the individual in his field.
In conclusion, I think I can say that with these and other measures,
namely with the complete and exact accomplishment of the principle
of freedom of faith and conscience, in a short time the technical
difficulties which might have arisen here and there could be overcome.
I want to point once more to the order dated 13.12.1938, issued by
the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. According to
this order, military celebrations are not to be connected any more
with a religious benediction at the time the recruits are being sworn
in. The attendance of Church services of the soldiers, which takes
place possibly right after they are sworn in, is voluntary. The church
services are to be held separately from the swearing in ceremonies.
It would, in my opinion be very necessary, it would also be in
accordance with the basic attitude of the Fuehrer's deputy that these
principles contained in this order would be applied wherever the
question of the relationship between the Armed Forces and the church
arises. Such a correct and exact accomplishment of the principle of
freedom of faith and conscience would present the proof that the Armed
Forces cannot be accused of being anti-Church or anti-Christian; on
the other hand, it would also prove that the Armed Forces are not
based on different ideological principles than the ones represented
and executed by the State, the National Socialist Workers' Party and
its affiliation. In this way it would be made certain that the same
educational principles exist in all the organizations as well as the
teaching institutions of our German people, namely the Armed Forces,
the Hitler Youth, School labor service and affiliations of the party.
I think that this fact would do much more for the spiritual integrity
of the German soldier than if the young German would find himself
confronted, during the various stages of his education, with various
attitudes toward these questions.
Heil Hitler
1 Enclosure. Signed: M. BORMANN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 122-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff
Munich, 17 April 1939 Brown House
[Rubber stamp]:
Receipt Rosenberg Chancellory 24 Apr 39
III/16--Tho 3230/0/15 270 g
To the Official appointed by the Fuehrer for the Supervision of
spiritual and philosophical schooling and education of the NSDAP.
Attention of office director Kerksiek or his deputy in the office.
Berlin W 35 Margaretenstrasse 17.
[Rubber stamp]
SECRET
[handwritten note: submitted to Pg Bradmann for comment--R]
_Subject: Theological faculties._
I send you the enclosed photostatic copy of a plan suggested by the
Reichs Minister for Science, Education and training, for the combining
of theological faculties with a request for your cognizance and prompt
action.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: M. BORMANN
1 enclosure
* * * * *
[SYNOPSIS OF DOCUMENT]
Berlin W 8, 6 April 1939
Letterhead of Reichs Minister of Science, Education and Training
The plan which I expect to put into operation at the beginning of the
winter semester 1939/40 presents the following picture.
In the East the following faculties will be maintained: Koenigsberg
(Evangelic), Braunsberg (Catholic), Breslau (Evangelic and Catholic),
Vienna (Evangelic and Catholic). I have already ordered the combination
of the Catholic faculty in Graz with the one in Vienna which will
remain the only place in Austria with both faculties.
In Bavaria after closing the Munich faculty there will remain the
Catholic faculty at Wurzburg and the Evangelic faculty at Erlangen.
The continuation of these is important but the five state theological
institutes of Bavaria should be reduced to three. I ask you to suggest
the two to be closed.
In the Southwest regions I suggest the removal of the Evangelical
faculty in Heidelberg to Tubingen and of the Catholic faculty in
Tubingen to Freiberg. That will provide an exchange between Wurttemberg
and Baden based on the Catholic predominance in Baden and Evangelic
predominance in Wurttemberg.
In West Germany a similar exchange between Bonn and Munster is proposed
but which shall be designated Catholic or Evangelic is a difficult
question. A decision I should like to postpone a little time.
A similar question arises with the proposed transfer of the faculty
from Giessen to Marburg. Since the closing of the forestry faculty at
Giessen this university has not many students. The reversal of transfer
is perhaps the solution but that is not feasible at this time because
of the newly organized Institute for Religious Science. Professor
Frick who is to head this institute has pointed out that his transfer
from religious to philosophical endeavors may be viewed as a tendency
against religion. I have suggested a gradual transfer of activity and
consider the final time of transfer to be the propitious moment for
such a transfer of the Evangelic faculty of the University of Marburg
to that of the University of Bonn. Until that time it will be best to
maintain the faculty at Gottingen since its influence in the Anglican
world is great.
In the central German regions I propose a transfer of the Leipzig
faculty to the University of Halle. The small faculty at Jena I should
like to maintain because of its German-Christian stand.
In north German regions a combination of the Evangelic faculties of
Rostock and Kiel at Kiel is planned.
Finally I should like to combine the faculties of Berlin and Greifswald
in Greifswald. A double purpose would be achieved. Greifswald's weak
enrollment would be improved and the Berlin faculty would not have
to be included in the new university city of Berlin. I am sure this
proposal will rouse the Berlin faculty but believe I can handle that
problem.
To recapitulate this plan would include the complete closing of
theological faculties at Innsbruck, Salzburg and Munich, the transfer
of the faculty of Graz to Vienna and the vanishing of four Catholic
faculties.
_a._ Closing of three Catholic theological faculties or Higher Schools
and of four Evangelic faculties in the winter semester 1939/40.
_b._ Closing of one further Catholic and of three further Evangelic
faculties in the near future.
I ask your comments at your earliest opportunity. I propose then to
give the Ministry of Churches this information.
By direction:
ZSCHINTZSCH
(Authenticated).
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 123-PS
Copy
NSDAP
The Deputy Fuehrer, Chief of Staff
Munich, 23 June 1939, Brown House
III D-ES 3230/0/15 2131 g.A.E 50/39
SECRET
To the Fuehrer's Commissioner for the supervision of all spiritual and
political instruction and education of the NSDAP.
Attention: Verwaltungsleiter Kerksiek or deputy
Berlin W. 35, Margarethen St. 17
Chancery Rosenberg Receipt No. 29 June 39 8487
_Subject: Theological Faculties_
With regard to the Conference of Specialists on the Liaison Staff of
the NSDAP please find enclosed a copy of my letter of today to the
Reich Minister for Science, Education and National Education for your
information.
I would like to request you to inform me in due time as to your further
wishes regarding the point of view cited in my letter. I will also
arrange that conferences on this subject take place in an inter-party
form in order to put the wishes of the party offices before the Reichs
Ministry of Education as soon as possible.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: M. Bormann
1. Enclosure
* * * * *
Copy
NSDAP
The Deputy Fuehrer
Transcript
Munich 23 June 1939
III D-ES 3230/0/15 2131 g.A.
CONFIDENTIAL
TO: The Reich Minister for Science, Education and National Education
Attention: Regierungsrat Jaehnert or Deputy
Berlin Unter den Linden 69
_Subject: Theological Faculties._
I have noted statements regarding the combining of the theological
faculties at the German Universities, in your letter of the 6 April
1939--W.A. No. 76/39g. Concerning this subject a conference has taken
place between all the party offices concerned, in which the principal
points of view for the party as well as your statement were discussed.
I would therefore like to inform you in detail of the Party's decisions
as a result of this comprehensive discussion:
1. The Evangelical faculty of the _Koenigsberg_ University must remain
for the time being as it is, since it is the only one of this type for
East Prussia as well as for the whole northeast area.
2. In future there will no longer exist any necessity for the
preservation of the state Catholic educational institution in
_Braunsberg_. I request you, therefore, to combine this institution
with the Catholic faculty of the University of Breslau.
3. Regarding Breslau, the Protestant as well as the Catholic faculties
must be retained for the time being.
4. Similarly both faculties of the University of _Prag_ must remain for
the present as at this time it would not be advisable to reduce the
University of Prag in any manner. Although in regard to a dispersal of
the theological faculty in Prag there would be no difficulties with
the Concordat, I do not deem it advisable at the moment to initiate
measures of this sort there. Action regarding the University of Prag
must still be retarded for a time.
5. The situation at the University of _Vienna_ is very similar. Vienna
is the only university of the Ostmark, at which the theological faculty
is still in existence. I request, therefore, that you reserve any
decisions in this matter a little longer, until the situation in regard
to the University of Prag has been further cleared up. Nevertheless I
would like to emphasize now that at a later date the dissolution of the
theological faculties of the Universities of Wien and Prag will also be
necessary in my opinion.
6. I request you to combine the Protestant theological faculty
in _Rostock_ with the Protestant theological faculty in Kiel, in
conformance with both the arrangements described in your message and
the proposal that I have already put forward.
7. In regard to the theological faculty in _Berlin_ I am in complete
agreement with you in that under no circumstances should this
faculty be included in the new University Town [Hochschulstadt]. The
theological faculty of Berlin must disappear in the near future.
I do not deem it advisable, as you suggest should next be done to
transfer this faculty to Greifswald. Fundamentally it is inadvisable
to shift the theological faculty of a large city to a small town. The
possibility must not be allowed to arise of such a large number of
theological students, as would come to a small university city as a
result of such a transfer, giving this character to this city, and
even perhaps to the whole region. Since this danger does not exist in
a large city, I request you to leave the theological faculty in Berlin
for the time being. I do not deem it necessary to determine the future
of this faculty today, since the new university town will presumably
not be completed for several years.
8. Since three theological faculties in the German Baltic area are
not necessary, I request you to transfer the theological faculty of
the University of _Greifswald_ as well as that of Rostock to Kiel.
The theological faculties in Koenigsberg and Kiel should be quite
sufficient. I do not believe special consideration for Greifswald in
regard to the northern states to be necessary since the university of
Kiel has made the furthering of ties with the north its particular
mission.
9. For _Bavaria_ I request that more extensive measures be carried
out than were provided for in your communication of the 6.4.1939. In
the future the preservation of the five state philosophic-theological
universities in Bavaria will no longer be necessary. In so far as
these are to be theological faculties in the future, the training
of theologians is to be carried out by them and not by any state
universities serving the church exclusively. I would ask you therefore
not only to reduce these institutions to three, but also to break them
up completely in the shortest possible time, if it is not possible
to do so immediately. Above all, I request you to dissolve the
universities in Passau, Regensburg and Bamberg in the aforementioned
order, because they are the cores of extremely strong confessional
activity against National Socialism.
10. In addition there is also in Bavaria the Church's own Institution
in _Eichstadt_ for training bishops which receives considerable state
subsidies. Even though there is no question of dissolving this church
institution, nevertheless, I would like you to ensure that the State
subsidies to this institution cease immediately.
11. I request that the Catholic faculty of the university of
_Wuerzburg_ be retained until further notice.
12. In the same manner the Protestant faculty of the University of
_Erlangen_ will have to be retained.
13. Regarding the south German area, I do not agree with your plan to
transfer the Protestant faculty in _Heidelberg_ to Tuebingen. Tuebingen
has already become a confirmed Protestant-theological center. It is
feared that the transferring of the Heidelberg Protestant faculty to
Tuebingen would only still further emphasize this characteristic of
the university town. I wish, therefore, that the Protestant faculty of
Tuebingen be combined with that in Heidelberg.
14. May I give you my decision later regarding your plan to transfer
the Catholic faculty from Tuebingen to Freiburg, since the necessity
has arisen to reconsider this matter.
15. In western Germany, I do not deem your projected exchange between
_Bonn_ and _Muenster_ expedient. I wish you to combine both theological
faculties in Bonn.
16. Furthermore, I would request you to transfer the Protestant faculty
of the University of _Marburg_ to Giessen. I do not consider that the
ideas which you asserted regarding working with foreign Forscher (odd
sects) at the institute for Religious Science which will be established
in Marburg, solve the problem.
17. In addition, I wish you to transfer the theological faculty of
_Goettingen_ to Giessen.
18. The theological faculty of _Jena_ would probably have to be
retained until further notice.
19. Also the theological faculty in _Leipzig_ should be combined with
that in Halle.
In the above I have informed you of the Party's wishes after thorough
investigation of the matter with all party offices. I would be grateful
if you would initiate the necessary measures as quickly as possible,
in regard to the great political significance for the Gau concerned,
which will be the result in every single case of such a combination.
I would like you to always keep in contact with me when instituting
these measures, in particular with regard to the arranging of
the actual time, since I am in touch with the competent Gau
administrations. Furthermore, I would like you to take into
consideration the following in connection with the mergers which we
have planned:
1. As a result of these mergers a rather large number of professional
chairs will become vacant. I believe it of the utmost importance that
these positions should not remain unfilled, but that they should be
occupied again or at least the greater portion of them. When doing
this, those branches of science must be primarily considered which have
been able to prove that they formerly had too few professional chairs.
I would like to reserve the opportunity of getting in touch with you
again regarding details.
2. Furthermore, as a result of these mergers a large number of
institutes, libraries, buildings, etc. will be vacated. I do not deem
it wise to place all these accommodations at the disposal of the new
theological faculties connected with these mergers. The necessity will
probably arise of dealing specially with each separate case according
to the circumstances. Here I would also like to request that you
consult me when making decisions.
3. Above all, I request that you keep me continually informed regarding
the individual arrangements to be carried out by you in order that
I be able to inform the party offices interested and especially the
appropriate Gau administration, which is mainly concerned, in time.
Heil Hitler!
I.V. Signed: M. Bormann
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 129-PS
Reich Minister Kerrl
Berlin W 8, 6 September 1939
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr. Stapel!
I have received your letter of 31 August and in no wise neglected your
memorandum on the situation of the Evangelical Church in Germany, but
read it through immediately. I must tell you that I agree with the
portrayal of the situation down to the last word, although I must
assume that the "inflation of principles" is also aimed at me. However
that did not annoy me, I understand your idea rather completely. So
that you understand me too, I want to continue your memorandum with my
reasons. You close with the absolutely correct conclusion:
The State should neither combat existing religion nor introduce a new
religion. It should allow Christianity to prove by itself that it still
has vital force. It should confine itself to spiritual affairs and only
exercise compulsion in the production of a legal and administrative
unity of the Evangelical Church.
Correct!
My action is determined however by the following situation:
As you know from the speech of the Fuehrer in the Reichstag on 30
January 1939, every power in exercising compulsion in the production
of a legal and administrative unity of the Evangelical Church was
completely withdrawn from me. The Fuehrer considers his efforts
to bring the Evangelical Church to reason, unsuccessful and the
Evangelical Church with respect to its condition rightfully a useless
pile of sects. As you emphasize the Party has previously carried on
not only a fight against the political element of the Christianity of
the Church, but also a fight against membership of Party Members in a
Christian confession.
I am of the opinion that in this situation it can very easily eventuate
that the "Organization of German Understanding of the Christian
Religion Through Luther" will collapse of its own accord, if, as in
Austria and in the Sudetan Gau, the privileges, namely of collecting
taxes and state subsidies are entirely removed from the Evangelical
Church. If it comes to that then from the collapse of the organization
of the Evangelical Church the advantage will redound not to the
State but to the Catholic Church which cannot receive a mortal blow
through such measures in its well-aimed unified, basically political
organization.
The Catholic Church will and must, according to the law under which it
is set up, remain a thorn in the flesh of a Racial State. An effective
combatting of it cannot ensue from a State which thanks to its secure
ideological basis desires and must refrain from every intervention
into religious things. The National Socialistic State can therefore
put nothing positive or new in the place of that which it must perhaps
destroy and from the collapsing Evangelical Church the people somewhat
deceived about their religion would in large numbers stream into the
Catholic Church, and this Church would then divide the people into two
mutually hostile groups in a much more regrettable manner than has
happened through the confessions.
In addition every negative struggle, which cannot in a positive manner
replace that which has been destroyed, is anyhow condemned to failure.
In this factual situation I see an unheard of danger for the religious
peace of the German people approaching and, all my efforts--you will
understand that--have previously been only directed at eliminating this
danger. But that is only possible if the Party learns to distinguish in
the clearest manner between religion and ideology and thus, as Luther
established and Kant scientifically proved, realizes, that ideology
must limit itself to the area of experience, where alone reason can
become knowledge. It must further realize that knowledge based on
reason alone cannot satisfy the human being here on earth, but, that
he (the human being) according to the structure of the "world of
freedom within himself", or let us say, according to "the Kingdom of
God within himself" cannot overcome the compelling moral necessity to
attain certainty concerning the essence of God. The human being is now
no "_purely moral being_", but the torture and the happiness of his
earthly life consists in moving about in flesh and blood. Therefore
however we have power over the inevitable weakness of not always being
able to harmonize moral thought and deed. To be sure we do not need
to be ashamed of original sin or to find our body despicable, for it,
and thereby original sin is from God and we are no gods, but human
beings. But how could we, who must believe in the moral importance of
our life and the world, get along, because we without being sure of our
immortality would not be able to yield our bodily life in fulfillment
of our duty itself, without a religion going beyond the boundaries
of reason? How could we who ourselves are righteous, doubt the fact
that God must be just, and how could we demand of him the all-knowing,
who knows our thoughts, that he confer on us immortality, if our
righteousness condemns the one whom it recognizes as acting against his
better moral conviction. Our life here on earth would be senseless,
if we could find out nothing about the true essence of God, if we
were not in some way certain that it is not righteousness but divine
love. But we cannot find it out through knowledge based on reason, but
only by the power of faith which we can get for ourselves through the
personality of Christ, therefore from the true Christian religion, for
which in no wise is the presentation of the priests standard, but only
Christ himself.
The "Foundation of the Religion of Christ" rests in our own inner
being. The Evangelical Church of today has not been able to lead us to
this real "Religion of Christ". This Religion of Christ is only to be
grasped if not only the genius of a Luther, but everybody has learned
to distinguish the domains of reason and faith. It depends neither on
sacred orders nor on sacraments, but one finds the way to it only if
one has learned to doubt reason, as this reason has most accurately
become acquainted with its magnitude and its narrow boundaries, and
only Priests who have grasped that with reason and heart, can penetrate
from pseudo-priesthood to the true priesthood and thus fill the hearts
of the people with true faith.
Therefore for 15 years I have been working on a book which explains
to everybody the scientific basis of National Socialism in such a way
that one learns to recognize the extent and the boundaries of reason as
well as of ideology and the necessity of the religion of Christ, and
comprehends, that in this area Party and State can do only one thing:
to completely take one's own position and to renounce any claim to a
decision.
I believe I can finish this work at this time; its publication however
will not be possible until the return of peace.
However, in order that meanwhile these conclusions mentioned above
which would lead to the destruction of the organization of the
Evangelical Church, might not occur, it was my most important job to
see to it that today's pile of sects in the Evangelical Church would
consolidate of their own accord into an organ at least filled with a
desire for unity.
Therefore, as I was no longer allowed to issue orders under the State
I tried again and again to exercise influence on the district church
leaders even though they seemed to be powerless according to your
statements approved by me in your memorandum, at least to create
this condition for the possibility of preserving the organization of
the Lutheran Church. These efforts have at least reached a certain
conclusion and become fruitful to such an extent that it was possible
to aim at a unity among them over three men, who as a confidential
council of the church chancellery now possess the possibility of
finding _by positive work_ confidence of the people who feel united in
the Evangelical Church.
If these men, Bishop Mardahrens, Bishop Schultz of Mecklenburg and
Oberkonsistorialrat Hymmen apprehend the commandment of the hour, then
by positive work they can line up the direction of the Evangelical
Church with the goals desired by me into a complete legal and
administrative unity. If they do not understand how to direct this
positive work correctly, then both of us will have to bury the hope of
a preservation of the organization of the Lutheran Church, because only
the success of such a work can give the Fuehrer the justification of
giving us full power in the direction desired by us.
You can imagine that I would much prefer to see you among these three
men, because I would then know that the work was being actively and
successfully lined up with the goal jointly desired by both of us.
However I shall pursue this aim with all the energy in my power as long
as I am in my job and the decision of the Fuehrer gives me approval or
disapproval.
These are difficult times into which our people are now entering, but
I believe that Providence even here has correctly guided everything.
It has through the Fuehrer created for conditions for the inevitable
battle, as they cannot be found more favorable. If the German people
maintain themselves--and what justifies us in doubting it--everything
must come to a good and victorious end, and thereby would be created
just the proper condition for the extension of the Third Reich
externally in tranquil safety and in well-aimed work at home, but
then would be created just the right soil for the possibility of
nationalistic church work in the congregations, which you rightfully
consider the most important thing.
Please be convinced that I am always happy to think of you and rejoice
at every communication from you.
I know that you are a man who has already accomplished extraordinary
things for the spiritual enlightenment of the German people and I am
convinced that you will still accomplish in the future fruitful things
in this work.
I need not emphasize to you that this letter is confidential. However,
I shall make accessible to the Confidential Council copies of your
splendid memorandum as well as copies of this letter for confidential
cognizance. I would be especially glad if in the near future I found
the opportunity to discuss orally with Reich Minister Hess your
memorandum and my answer.
With hearty greetings and with
Heil Hitler!
Yours
[Signed] Kerrl
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 131-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKER'S PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff
Munich, 12 December 1939 Brown House
III--So./Eis. 3230/0
To: The Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete
mental and doctrinal training and education of the NSDAP Reich Leader
A. ROSENBERG
Berlin W 35 Margareten Strasse 17
Ministerial-Director Mentzel has recently informed us verbally that
you intend to take over the seven existing professorships of the
former catholic-theological faculty at the University of Munich.
These are to serve as a fundament for the Seminary (Hohe Schule) for
National-Socialism. Gauleiter Adolf Wagner is supposed to have agreed
to this.
I would appreciate it if you would confirm the correctness of the
information given by Ministerial-Director Mentzel.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: M. BORMANN
(M. Bormann)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 136-PS
Copy
_Information to all Sections of Party and State._
The "Hohe Schule" is supposed to become the center for national
socialistic ideological and educational research. It will be
established after the conclusion of the war. I order that the already
initiated preparations be continued by Reichsleiter Rosenberg,
especially in the way of research and the setting up of the library.
All sections of party and State are requested to cooperate with him in
this task.
(Signed) ADOLF HITLER
Berlin, 29 January 1940
Certified a true copy
Berlin 15 Dec 1943
Dr. Zeiss
Stabseinsatzfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 137-PS
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, No. 2850/40 secret
Adj. Chief OKW
(Please indicate above file number, the date and short contents in the
answer)
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 5 July 1940
Telephone: Local 218191
Long distance 218091
To the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces in Holland.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg has requested from the Fuehrer to have:
1. The State libraries and archives searched for documents which are
valuable for Germany.
2. The chanceries of the high church authorities and lodges searched
for political activities which are directed against us, and to have the
material in question confiscated.
The Fuehrer has ordered that this plan should be complied with and that
the Secret State police--supported by the keepers of the archives of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg--should be entrusted with the search. The Chief
of the Security Police, SS Lt. General Heydrich, has been notified; he
will get in touch with the responsible military commanders to carry out
this order.
This measure should be carried out in all the territories of Holland,
Belgium, Luxembourg and France which are occupied by us.
It is requested that the subordinate agencies should be notified.
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
(Signed) KEITEL
To Reich leader Rosenberg
Copy for information
(Signed) [Illegible]
Captain [Rittmeister] and executive officer.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 138-PS
Copy
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76, 17 Sept 1940
Tel: 21 81 91
_2 f 28.14 W.Z. No. 3812/40 g_
To the Chief of Army High Command for the Military Administration in
Occupied France.
In supplement to the order of the Fuehrer transmitted at the time to
Reichsleiter Rosenberg to search lodges, libraries and archives in the
occupied territories of the west for material valuable to Germany, and
to safeguard the latter through the Gestapo, the Fuehrer has decided:
The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the declaration
of war on 1 September 1939, shall be the criterion.
Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers completed
after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid (for example, Polish
and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions of the Palais Rothschild or
other ownerless Jewish possessions). Reservations regarding search,
seizure and transportation to Germany on the basis of the above reasons
will not be recognized.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg and/or his deputy Reichshauptsellenleiter Ebert
has received clear instructions from the Fuehrer personally governing
the right of seizure; he is entitled to transport to Germany cultural
goods which appear valuable to him and to safeguard them there. The
Fuehrer has reserved for himself the decision as to their use.
It is requested that the services in question be informed
correspondingly.
Signed: KEITEL
For information:
Attention: Reichsleiter Rosenberg
certified true copy
Berlin 15 December 43
(Dr. Zeiss)
[Rosenberg special purpose staff seal]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 139-PS
Copy
SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
Berlin W 35 Tirpitzufer 72-75 10 October 1940.
Tel: Local Service 21 81 91
Long Distance 21 80 91
_Az 2 f 28 J (Ia)._
No. 1838/40 g.
Reference: Chief Supreme Command Armed Forces
No. 3812/40 g WZ of 17 September 1940.
To: Supreme Army High Commander.
As supplement to the above-mentioned letter, addressed to the Military
Administration of Occupied France, it is requested that corresponding
directions be given also to the Military Administration in Belgium.
Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
Signed: REINECKE
_For Information_:
Attention Reichsleiter ROSENBERG's Adjutant.
Reference: 2606/ a.
Rosenberg's special purpose staff seal.
Certified true copy
Berlin 15 December 1943
(Dr. Zeiss)
Chief special purpose Staff.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 140-PS
SECRET
Copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Az.Zf.285 (G-3) Nr. 1838/40
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 30 Oct. 1940
Tel. local 218191, long distance 218091
To: The Armed Forces Commander in the Netherlands
In supplement to the order of the Fuehrer transmitted, under Nr 2850/40
secret Adj. Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, of
5.7.1940, to Reichsleiter Rosenberg, to search lodges, libraries and
archives of the occupied territories of the West, for material valuable
to Germany, and to safeguard the latter through the Gestapo, the
Fuehrer has decided:
The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the declaration
of war on 1 Sept. 1939, shall be the criterion.
Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers completed
after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid (for example, Polish
and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions of the Palais Rothschild or
other ownerless Jewish possessions). Reservations regarding search,
seizure and transportation to Germany on the basis of the above reasons
will not be recognized.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg and/or his deputy Reichshauptstellenleiter Ebert
has received clear instructions from the Fuehrer personally governing
the right of seizure, he is entitled to transport to Germany cultural
goods which appear valuable to him and to safeguard them there. The
Fuehrer has reserved for himself the decision as to their use.
It is requested that the services in question be informed
correspondingly.
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By order
Signed: REINECKE
Certified a true copy
Berlin 15 Dec 1943
(Dr. Zeiss)
Chief of special purpose staff
For information:
Attention Adj. of Reichleiter Rosenberg
Re Nr 2606/Ma
signed Reinecke
[Rosenberg's Special Purpose Staff SEAL]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 141-PS
In conveying the measures taken until now, for the securing of Jewish
art property by the Chief of the Military administration Paris and the
special service staff Rosenberg (The Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces 2 f 28.14.W.Z.Nr 3812/40 g), the art objects brought
to the Louvre will be disposed of in the following way:
1. Those art objects about which the Fuehrer has reserved for himself
the decision as to their use.
2. Those art objects which serve to the completion of the Reichs
Marshal's collection.
3. Those art objects and library stocks the use of which seem useful to
the establishing of the higher institutes of learning and which come
within the jurisdiction of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
4. Those art objects that are suited to be sent to German museums,
of all these art objects, a systematic inventory will be made by the
special purpose staff Rosenberg; they will then be packed and shipped
to Germany with the assistance of the Luftwaffe.
5. Those art objects that are suited to be given to French museums or
might be of use for the German-French art trade, will be auctioned off
at a date yet to be fixed; the profit of this auction will be given to
the French State for the benefit of those bereaved by the war.
6. The further securing of Jewish art property in France will be
continued by the special purpose staff Rosenberg in the same way as
heretofore in connection with the Chief of the military administration
Paris.
Paris, 5 November 1940
I will submit this proposal to the Fuehrer. Those instructions are in
effect until he has reached a decision.
Signed: GOERING
Certified true copy:
Berlin 15 Dec. 1943
(Dr. Zeiss)
Chief of special purpose staff
[Rosenberg's special purpose staff seal]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 145-PS
The Reichs Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin W 35, Rauch Street 17/18, 20 Aug 1941
Tel: 21 95 15 and 39 50 46
Cable address: Reichminister East
Na 369/R/H
Director of the Reichs Main Office UTIKAL [Reichshauptstellenleiter]
Berlin
Subject: Safeguarding the cultural goods in the occupied Eastern
Territories
I have instructed the Reichs Commissioner for the Eastland and his
subordinate general and district commissioners to secure all cultural
goods in the Reichs Commissariat of the East which are appropriate
in general for national-socialistic research as well as research of
the activities of the opponents of National-Socialism. I delegate
you to carry out with an "Einsatzstab" to be formed for this purpose
this work of the Reichs Commissioner, the General, Main and Regional
Commissioners, for their support. During the execution of this mission
you will remain directly subordinate to Main Division II of my ministry
whose directors will provide you with additional instructions. The
orders issued by the Fuehrer for the "Einsatzstab" in the West remain
also the same for the East.
The execution of your job will be financed, as in the occupied western
territories, through the Reichs treasurer of the NSDAP. A later
accounting between him and the ministry for the occupied eastern
territories, respectively with the Reichs Commissariats is held in
reserve.
I am including a letter of mine to the Reich Commissioner of the
Eastland.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: ROSENBERG
1 inclosure
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 149-PS
FUEHRER DECREE
Jews, freemasons and the ideological enemies of National Socialism who
are allied with them are the originators of the present war against the
Reich. Spiritual struggle according to plan against these powers is a
measure necessitated by war.
I have therefore ordered Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg to accomplish
this task in cooperation with the chief of the High Command of the
armed forces. To accomplish this task, his Einsatzstab for the right
occupation territories has the right to explore libraries, archives,
lodges, and other ideological and cultural establishments of all kinds
for suitable material and to confiscate such material and for the
ideological tasks of the NSDAP and for scientific research work by the
university [Hoch Schule]. The same rule applies to cultural goods which
are in the possession or are the property of Jews, which are abandoned
or whose origin cannot be clearly established. The regulations for the
execution of this task with the cooperation will be issued by the Chief
of the High Command of the armed forces in agreement with Reichsleiter
Rosenberg.
In necessary measures for the eastern territories under German
administration will be taken by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity
as Reich Minister for occupied eastern territories.
(Signed) A. HITLER
Fuehrers Headquarters, March 1942
To all Bureaus _of the Armed Forces, the Party and the State_.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 151-PS
The Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territory
Berlin W 35, Kurfuerstenstrasse 134 7 April 1942
Tel. 21 99 51
N. I/1/13/42
To: Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, Riga
Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Rowno
SUBJECT: Safeguarding of Cultural Goods, Research Material and
Scientific Institutions in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
I
I have assigned Reichsleiter Rosenberg's Einsatzstab for the Occupied
Territories with the seizure and uniform handling of cultural goods,
research material and scientific apparatus from libraries, archives,
scientific institutions, museums, etc., which are found in public,
religious or private buildings. The Einsatzstab begins its work, as
newly directed by the Fuehrer's decree of 1 March 1942, immediately
after occupation of the territories by the combat troops, in
agreement with the Quartermaster General of the Army, and completes
it in agreement with the competent Reich Commissioners after civil
administration has been established. I request all authorities of
my administration to support as far as possible the members of the
Einsatzstab in carrying out all measures and in giving all necessary
information, especially in regard to objects which may have been
already seized from the occupied Eastern territories and removed from
their previous location, and information as to where this material is
located at the present time.
Any activity for the purpose of safeguarding cultural goods can be
permitted only if it is carried out in agreement with Reichsleiter
Rosenberg's Einsatzstab. The Einsatzstab will be constantly informed
concerning the method and extent of investigations, work projects and
measures.
All authorities of my administration are hereby instructed that objects
of the afore-mentioned type will be seized only by Reichsleiter
Rosenberg's Einsatzstab, and to abstain from arbitrary handling as a
matter of principle.
Insofar as seizures or transports have already taken place contrary
to these provisions, Reichsleiter Rosenberg's Einsatzstab,
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Bismarckstrasse 1, telephone: 34 00 18, will
be informed without delay, with an exact list of the objects as well as
indication of the current storage place and persons entitled to dispose
of them.
II
In exceptional cases immediate measures may be taken to safeguard or
transport objects to a safe place in order to avoid threatened danger
(for example, danger of collapse of buildings, enemy action, damage
by weather, etc.). In all cases a written report will be submitted
immediately to my Einsatzstab.
Decision regarding exceptions lies with the Reich or General
Commissioners in agreement with the commissioners of the staff.
III
I have sent copies of this order directly to the General Commissioners.
By order
Signed/t/ Dr. LEIBBRANDT
OFFICIAL:
/s/ [Illegible]
Office Employee
Authenticated copy
Berlin Dec 15, 1943
signed: ZEISS
(Dr. Zeiss)
Leader of Stabseinsatz
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 153-PS
Copy /B
Reich Ministry for the Occupied Territories of the East
Enclosure 1
Berlin 27 April 1942
To--
_a._ Commissar of the Reich for the East _Riga_
_b._ Commissar of the Reich for the Ukraine _Rowno_
Subject: Formation of a control unit for the seizure and securing of
objects of cultural value in the occupied eastern territories.
There has been established in the Reich Ministry for the occupied
eastern territories a "central bureau for the seizure and securing
of objects of cultural value in the occupied eastern territories" to
last for a limited period as a special reference department within
department I (Political). As head of the central bureau I designate
the chief of staff of the "Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for
occupied territories", Party member Utikal. He is directly under the
authority of Department I and will carry on this task in addition to
his other duties.
On the central bureau devolves the general planning of all projects
connected with the seizure and securing of objects of cultural value
in the occupied eastern territories and also the supervision of the
measures already taken.
Apart from exceptional cases in which the securing of objects of
cultural value is exceptionally urgent, the bureau does not concern
itself primarily with the securing of objects of cultural value,
but rather makes use for the execution of measures of seizure and
securing of the "Einsatzstab" of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the
occupied territories; the Einsatzstab will carry on its activities as
before in close contact with the competent authorities of the civil
administration that come under my jurisdiction.
With the commissars of the Reich a special department within Department
II (political) has been set up for a limited time for the seizure and
securing of objects of cultural value. This office is under the control
of the head of the main work group [Hauptarbeitgruppe] of "Einsatzstab"
of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the occupied territories. The head
of this special department is directly responsible to the chief of
Department II.
Signed: ROSENBERG
Certified true copy
Berlin 13 Dec. 1943
(Dr. Zeiss)
Chief of Staff
[Seal of "Einsatzstab" of RL Rosenberg]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 154-PS
The Reichminister and Chief of Chancellery.
Berlin W 8, Voss-strasse 6, 5 July 1942
Present Headquarters of the Fuehrer
To: The Highest Reich Authorities and
The Services directly subordinate to the Fuehrer.
The Fuehrer has delegated Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity
of commissioner of the Fuehrer to supervise the total spiritual
and philosophical indoctrination and education of the NSDAP in the
spiritual battle against Jews and Free-Masons as well as against
the affiliated philosophical opponents of National Socialism, who
are the cause of the present war. For this purpose, the Fuehrer has
ordered that Reichsleiter Rosenberg's Staff should be authorized, in
the occupied territories under military administration and in the
occupied Eastern territories under civil administration (exclusive
of the General Gouvernement), to search libraries, archives, lodges
and other philosophical and cultural institutions of all types for
relevant material for the execution of his task and to request the
competent Wehrmacht and police services to seize the material found in
order to support the NSDAP in fulfillment of its spiritual task and
for the later scientific research work of the "Hohe Schule", whereby
police files concerning political activities will remain with the
police, and all others be transferred to Reichsleiter Rosenberg's
Staff. The staff is authorized to make the same request with regard
to cultural goods that are ownerless goods or the ownership of which
cannot be readily determined. The Chief of the Army High Command, in
agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg, will issue regulations governing
the cooperation with the Wehrmacht. The necessary measures within
the Eastern territories under German administration will be taken
by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity as Reichsminister for the
occupied Eastern territories.
I inform you of this order of the Fuehrer and request you to support
Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his task.
/s/ Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 155-PS
Army High Command, General Staff of the General Headquarters
Headquarters Army High Command 30/9/1942.
_Az. Dept. War Administration_
No. II/11564/42
SUBJECT: Deployment of Special Units of the Special Service Staff of
Reischleiter Rosenberg, for the occupied Eastern areas.
I. _Tasks_:
The Fuehrer, in his decree of 1/3/1942, has delegated Reichsleiter
Rosenberg in his capacity as "Commissioner for the supervision of the
entire spiritual and philosophical indoctrination and education of
that NSDAP", with the spiritual battle against Jews, Free-Masons and
the affiliated philosophical opponents of National Socialism, who are
the cause of the present war. The planned spiritual battle against
these powers was declared essential to the war effort by the Fuehrer.
For this purpose, the Fuehrer has ordered, among other things, that
the "Special Purpose Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the occupied
areas" should be authorized in the occupied areas under military
administration and in the occupied Eastern territories under civil
administration--exclusive of the General Government--to
_a._ Search libraries, archives, lodges, and other philosophical and
cultural institutions of all kinds, for material suitable to the
accomplishment of his task, and to have this material seized.
_b._ To cause the seizure of cultural goods which are owned by Jews, or
without ownership, or the owner of which cannot readily be determined.
_c._ The Reich minister of the occupied Eastern territories has
established on 12/6/1942 a "Central Office for the seizure and
safe-keeping of cultural goods in the occupied Eastern Territories."
Disregarding exceptional cases, in which the safeguarding of endangered
cultural goods is urgent, it is desired to keep these goods in place
for the present. This has been agreed upon, according to the agreement
reached between Armed Forces High Command General Staff of the General
Headquarters, and the Special Purpose Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
_d._ In the Eastern Theatre of operations, also such cultural goods as
do not fall under §_b_--especially museum pieces--are to be concealed,
respectively safeguarded, to save them from damage or destruction.
For the accomplishment of the missions named in I_a_, _b_ and _c_, the
"Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg" employs special units.
With the consent of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, the deployment of these
special units is regulated as follows:
1. For the central steering of the Special Units, according to need, a
delegate of the Special Purpose Staff of Reichsleiter is employed, who
is director of the Special Units in the Army Group area, respectively
the Army area. This man is obligated to inform the Supreme Commander
of the Army Group respectively Army in time, of the directives he
has received from Reichsleiter Rosenberg or from the staff leader.
The Supreme Commander is authorized to give the delegate directives
which are necessary to avoid disturbing the operations. These
directives supersede all others. The delegates depend upon steady and
close co-operation with the G-2 (Intelligence Officer). The Special
Unit authorities can demand the furnishing of a liaison man by the
delegate to the G-2. The G-2 has to coordinate, the missions of
the Special Purpose Units with the military intelligence [Abwehr]
and the secret field police. For the cooperation with the defense
officers, respectively defense offices, the decisions reached in the
talks between Special Purpose Staff Rosenberg and Armed Forces High
Command/Foreign intelligence, will apply.
2. The Special Units of Reichsleiter Rosenberg carry out their work
in their own responsibility and according to the directives given by
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
3. For the accomplishment of the missions described in I_a_, _b_,
_c_, the Special Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg have the right to
search buildings in the theater of operations for relevant material
and confiscate it. The secret field police is to be informed of the
confiscations. The secret field police furnishes official aid to the
Special Units if necessary.
4. The demarcation line between the working territory of the Special
Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg and the Special Units of the Chief of
the Security Police and the security service is regulated by direct
agreement between both service offices.
5. _a._ The Special Units belong to the Armed Forces. They wear brown
uniforms with the swastika insignia.
_b._ The Special Units have a strength of 20-25 men, their clothes and
equipment, together with a corresponding number of vehicles, is secured
by the Special Purpose Staff, Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
_c._ The Special Units are always subordinated, to the service branches
to which they are attached for the execution of their mission, with
respect to care, march, accommodation and rations.
_d._ The members of the Special Units are identified by a
"service-book" of the Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg,
which corresponds to the pay-book. This service-book is to contain
always the rank of the owner. It is further noted there, how the owner
is to be treated in comparison (E.M., NCO, Officer). The service
branch, which receives a Special Purpose Unit, has to certify on a
special sheet, provided for this purpose by the service office, the
fact and duration of the deployment with this branch as members of the
Armed Forces. The service-book counts as identity card.
_e._ The Special Units are eligible for medical care. They are to be
vaccinated according to the orders given to the Army.
_f._ Distribution of a fuel contingent is always to be arranged with
the chief quartermaster of the Army with which a special unit is
placed. Vehicles are to be cared for by the H.K.P.
_g._ Field postal service of the Special Units during movement, is
carried by way of the field post number of the service branch which has
a Special Unit attached. By transformation to long, permanent work,
application for their own field post number can be made with the army
field postmaster concerned.
_h._ Under priority of military necessity the Special Units have the
right to use Armed Forces telephone and telegraph lines forward,
and, when possible also to the rear. Within the area of the military
administrations, connection with the Armed Forces telephone net is to
be made possible.
_i._ With regard to the use of means of transportation, the rules
decreed for the army also apply to the Special Units. Armed Forces
driving licenses are to be furnished by the service branch, to which a
Special Unit is attached.
It is to be made certain, that the above regulations are always made
known to the commanding authorities, which receive Special Units for
deployment.
The Special Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg are to be supported in every
way in the execution of their mission. Particularly, insofar as
operations permit, deployment directly with the fighting troops is to
be made possible.
IV. Independent of the missions of the Special Units Reichsleiter
Rosenberg, in accordance with paragraph I_a_, _b_, _c_, the troops and
all military service offices employed in the theater of operations,
are directed to save valuable art monuments whenever possible, and
safeguard them from destructions or damages.
The preliminary safeguarding of cultural goods, museums etc. by
the troops and military service units under subsequent agreement,
respectively yield to Special Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg, wins
particular significance in the occupied Eastern territories where, in
contrast to the West and South East no organizations for the protection
of art have been designated by Armed Forces High Command/General Staff
of the Army/Generals' Quarters.
By direction
/s/ Wagner
_Distribution_
All High Commands of the Army Groups with signal co's
[Nachrichtenabteilung] 5; each for all field commanders of the Army
territory.
All Army High Commands and Panzer Army High Commands with signal
co's [Nachrichtenabteilung] each, Staff Don with 3 signal co's
[Nachrichtenabteilungen].
Military Commander in France, Paris
Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France, Brussels
Army Territory (W.B.) South East
(with each 6 Signal co's [Nachrichtenabteilung])
With each 2 signal co's for Commander, General and
Military Governor of Serbia
Military Governor of Soloniki-Agnis
Military Governor Southern Greece
With each 1 Signal Co's for the Commander of the Fortress Crete,
Foreign branch Armed Forces High Command/General headquarters South,
Armed Forces High Command/ Armed Forces Command Staff.
With each 2 Signal Battalions for Military Governor Eastland, Military
Governor Ukraine.
Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories Berlin, with each
2 Signal Co's [Nachrichtenabteilungen].
Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the
occupied territories, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Bismarckstr. 1.
Center--Force--East.
* * * * *
8/10/1942
Special Purpose Staff Rosenberg for the occupied territories.
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Bismarckstr. 1.
To all Chief Labor Groups, Labor Groups, Special Units and Liaison
Agencies in the Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg
High Command of the Armed Forces
_3 a 54 Armed Forces Command Staff/Org. (III)_
Reference: No. 0655/42 Secret Armed Forces Command Staff/ Quarter (II)
of 28/2/42.
SUBJECT: Special Purpose Staff Rosenberg.
In carrying out the relevant order, it has been determined:
The material from libraries, archives, lodges and similar things,
safeguarded by the Special Purpose Staff Rosenberg in the execution of
its mission, is to be treated like Armed Forces goods.
All other goods are expressly excluded from this.
The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
By direction,
/s/ MUENCH
_Distribution_:
General Staff of the Army--General Quartermaster Navy High Command
High Command of the Air Force--General Staff--Gen. Qu.
Armed Forces High Command--A Foreign Intelligence
OGW II--Intelligence III.
Chief of the Army Transport System.
Armed Forces Command Staff/Quartermaster Org. (III) Draft Ktb.
Informatory: Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the
occupied territories.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 158-PS
Berlin W 35, Margaretenstr. 17, 1 June 1944
22 95 51 St--U/Sz
MESSAGE
The Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the occupied
territories has dispatched a Sonderkommando under the direction of
Stabseinsatzfuehrer Dr. Zeiss, who is identified by means of his
Service Book Number 187, for the accomplishment of the missions of the
Einsatzstab in Hungary described in the Fuehrer's Decree of 1 March
1942.
According to the Fuehrer's Decree of 1 March 1942 (transmitted to
the Supreme Reichs authorities by means of a letter of the Reichs
Minister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory RK 9495 B) in connection
with the Army High Command Order #II 11564/42 General Army Staff (Gen
d H)/General Quartermaster-Az (Gen Qu-Az) Section K Administration
(Administration) of 30 Sept 42, all offices are requested to support
and help the Sonderkommando.
initial: U [Utikal]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 159-PS
Berlin 6 June 1944
_Movement Order_
Colonel-Einsatzfuehrer H.W. Ebeling is traveling to Denmark and Norway
in order to carry out a special mission of Reichsleiter Rosenberg
in harmony with the person authorized by the Reich in Denmark and
the Reichs Commissar in Norway in conjunction with the Fuehrer's
decree of 1 March 1942 (distributed to the highest Reich authorities
through correspondence of the Reichs Minister and the Chief of the
Reich Chancellery RK 9495 B) and the Supreme Army Command order Nr.
II/11564/42, General Staff of the Army/General Quartermaster Az. Section
K Administration of the 30th Sept. 42.
As long as it is necessary for him to stay, all the offices of the
State and the Army are directed to support the activities of the person
mentioned on the basis of the Fuehrer decree of the 1 March 1942, the
Supreme Army Command order of the 30 September 1942, and the Einsatz
directive of the Head of the Security Police and Security Service of
the 1st July 1942.
initialled: U [Utikal]
Chief of the Einsatzstab
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 171-PS
_Library for Exploration of the Jewish Question_ "Hohe Schule",
District Office, Frankfurt/Main.
Institute for Exploration of the Jewish question
On 26 March 1941 Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg inaugurated as the first
district office of the "Hohe Schule" in Frankfurt/Main the Institute
for Exploration of the Jewish Question (Frankfurt/Main Bockenheimer
Landstrasse 68).
According to the order of the Fuehrer from 29 Jan 1940 the "Hohe
Schule" is supposed to represent "the center of the national-socialist
doctrine and education." At the same time Reichsleiter Rosenberg was
authorized to make all necessary preparations for the foundation of the
"Hohe Schule" in the realm of research and organization of libraries.
The district office in Frankfurt/Main, activated under those
preparatory measures, competent for the domain of the Jewish question,
contains besides a research-department and archives, a voluminous
library whose stock shall be the subject of this article.
The basis for the library for exploration of the Jewish question is
made up of the libraries from occupied territories, confiscated by
the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in accordance with the orders
of the Fuehrer from 5 July 1940, 17 Sept 1940 and 1 March 1942. This
material is derived from Jewish property, now centrally collected to
serve the research, doctrine and education of the German people.
The most significant book-collections today belonging to the stock
of the "Library for exploration of the Jewish question", are the
following:
1. The library of the _Alliance Israelite Universelle_. Among the
approximately _40,000 volumes_ of this library from Paris (mainly
Judaica and Hebraica) are numerous volumes of magazines, voluminous
pamphlet material, a very detailed literature and collection of
clippings from newspapers regarding the affair Dreyfus, about 200
Hebrew manuscripts and 30 manuscripts in other languages, about 20
incunabula.
2. The stock of the _Ecole Rabbinique_ consists mostly of Judaica and
Hebraica, altogether about _10,000 volumes_. The Jewish texts of this
Rabbi-school in Paris offers valuable Talmud-material and complete
magazine series.
3. The library of the _Federation de Societe des Juifs de France_
(about _4000 volumes_) contains besides general literature about Jewry
mostly Russian literature about the Jewish question.
4. The stock of the Jewish bookstore in Paris _Lipschuetz_ (about
_20,000 volumes_) contains in its most valuable part bibliographical
works, Hebraica and so on.
5. The various collections from former property of the _Rothschilds_
of Paris generally are of no more than common interest, but they also
show that the various members of the Rothschild family collected Jewish
literature for their own orientation. The collections in question are
the following:
_a._ Collection _Edouard Rothschild_ (about _6,000 volumes_)
_b._ Collection _Edouard and Guy Rothschild_ (about _3,000 volumes_)
_c._ Collection _Maurice Rothschild_ (about _6,000 volumes_)
_d._ Collection _Robert Rothschild_ (about _10,000 volumes_)
_e._ Collection of the Rothschild family from hunting lodge
_Armainvilliers_ (about _3,000 volumes_)
These Rothschild collections contain, besides the valuable book stock,
important archive material which gives information on connections
between Jews and non-Jews in France and abroad. In this connection it
should be mentioned that the district office Frankfurt/Main also is in
possession of the archives of the last 100 years of the Parisian bank
of Rothchild (760 boxes).
6. The _Rosenthaliana_ from Amsterdam with _20,000 volumes_ (mostly
German language literature on the Jewish question).
7. The library of the _Sefardic Jewish community in Amsterdam_ with
about _25,000 volumes_ (mostly Hebraica).
8. The large amount of books secured in the _occupied eastern
territories_ (prevalent Soviet-Jewish and Polish-Jewish literature,
voluminous Talmud literature) are from collecting points in Riga,
Kauen, Wilna, Minsk and Kiev (about _280,000 volumes_).
9. Book collections from Jewish communities in _Greece_ (about _10,000
volumes_).
10. Book material from a "Sonderaktion" in the Rhineland (collecting
point _Neuwied_) with about _5,000 volumes_.
11. The book collections mentioned under 1-10 were turned over to the
Library for Exploration of the Jewish Question by the Einsatzstab
Reichsleiter Rosenberg and are constantly being filled up by new
shipments from the Einsatzstab. Besides that, some 100,000 volumes
which were obtained from other sources (finance offices and so on)
by the district office, belong to the library for exploration of the
Jewish question. Therefore, the library for exploration of the Jewish
questions contains as of 1 April 1943:
Approximately _550,000 volumes_ (about 3,300 book boxes) including 325
boxes (approx. 24,000 volumes) earmarked for the district office but
still kept in Berlin with the Staff, and including approx. 220,000
volumes (about 650 boxes) prepared for shipment to Frankfurt/Main at
the various collecting points of the Einsatzstab and partly packed.
In detail, these stocks deposited in Berlin cover the material of the
above under Nos. 3, 5_b_, _d_ and _e_ mentioned libraries (about 17,000
volumes), furthermore parts of the collections mentioned under Nos.
5_a_ and _c_ (about 7,000 volumes); all the books at the collecting
points ready for shipment to Frankfurt/Main cover the whole stock as
the collections mentioned under Nos. 6 and 7 (about 50,000 volumes),
part of that material secured in the East (compare No. 8 above; there
are in Minsk about 20,000 volumes, in Wilno about 50,000 volumes and in
Kiev about 100,000 volumes). The stocks mentioned here which are still
in Berlin or at the collecting points, make up approximately another
_240,000 volumes_. The district office in Frankfurt/Main has received
so far approximately _300,000 volumes_ (about 2,325 boxes).
Of these, approximately 2,325 book boxes which arrived at the library
for exploration of the Jewish question, were so far unpacked and put on
bookshelves:
567 boxes of the Alliance Israelite Universelle (out of 656 boxes)
165 boxes of the Ecole Rabbinique (out of 243 boxes)
50 boxes of the book store Lipschuetz (out of 197 boxes)
84 boxes of the collection Edouard Rothschild (the remaining 75 boxes
are still in Berlin)
23 boxes of the collection Maurice Rothschild (the remaining 39 boxes
are still in Berlin)
159 boxes of the collection point Riga (the whole stock)
Thus 1,048 book boxes (about 150,000 volumes) were unpacked that is
half of the book boxes, so far received in Frankfurt Main.
27,848 volumes were catalogued in Frankfurt Main from 1 May 1941
(beginning of cataloguing) to 31 March 1943 (catalogued according
to authors and subjects). According to the same principle the new
publication which were put into the library for the exploration of the
Jewish question since 1941, were catalogued--9,325 volumes.
Apart from the actual importance of the Jewish question, the library
for the research of the Jewish question assumes a high position in the
realm of German libraries with its present collection of about 550,000
volumes because this Frankfurt library could be brought to such a
degree of completeness as regards the literature on the Jewish question
as never before in Europe or elsewhere. In the New Order of Europe
Organization _the_ library for the Jewish question not only for Europe
but for the world will arise in Frankfurt am Main.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 176-PS
REPORT
On the activities of the Einsatzstab of the Bureau of the Reichsleiter
Rosenberg in the occupied Western Territories and The Netherlands.
Working Group Netherland
The Working Group Netherland of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg
began its work in agreement with the competent representative of the
Reichskommissar during the first days of September, 1940. The execution
of the past, conforming with the Fuehrer's orders, coordinated itself
with the liquidation, that is confiscation, according to civil law, of
the various subversive institutions--as set forth in the circulars of
the OKW (A2 Nr. 2850/40g Adj. Chief OKW), dated 5 July 1940, and of the
Chief of the OKW to the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht in France
(2 f 28.14WZ Nr. 3812/40g) dated 17 September 1940, as well as to the
Commander in Chief of the OKW in the Netherlands. (Az 2 f 28 J (IA) Nr.
1338 40g) dated 30 October 1940. The screening of the material of the
various Masonic lodges was taken care of primarily, and the library
and the archives of the following lodges were sifted and all useful
material was packed.
Droit Humain:
Lodge "v. Volmaking", Amsterdam
Lodge "George Martin II", Amsterdam
Lodge "Nr. 4", Amsterdam
Lodge "Washington Nr. 53", Amsterdam
Lodge "Hiram Abif", Amsterdam
Lodge "Eenheid", Amsterdam
Lodge "De drie zuilen", Amsterdam
Lodge "George Martin I", Den Haag
Lodge "St. Germain", Den Haag
Lodge "v. Volmaking", Den Haag
Groot Oosten der Nederlande
Lodge "Jacob vanCampen", Amersfoort
Lodge "La Bien Aimee", Amsterdam
Lodge "La Charite", Amsterdam
Lodge "La Paix", Amsterdam
Lodge "Concordia V.A.", Amsterdam
Lodge "Willem Frederik", Amsterdam
Lodge "Post Nobila Lux", Amsterdam
Lodge "Nes Vincit Libertas", Amsterdam
Lodge "Eendracht", Amsterdam
Lodge "De Geldersche Broederschap", Arnhem
Lodge "In Vrijheid Een", Bussum
Lodge "Silentium", Delft
Lodge "L'Union Royale", Den Haag
Lodge "Hiram Abiff", Den Haag
Lodge "L'Union Frederic", Den Haag
Lodge "Groot Nederland", Den Haag
Lodge "De Oude Plichten", Den Haag
Lodge "L'Union Provinciale", Groningen
Lodge "Vincit Vim Virtus", Haarlem
Lodge "Kennermerland", Haarlem
Lodge "Ad Lucem et Pacem", Haarlem
Lodge "Willem Frederic Karel", Den Helder
Lodge "De Gooische Broederschap", Hilversum
Lodge "La Vertu", Leiden
Lodge "Sint Lodewijk", Nijmegen
Lodge "De drie Kolommen", Rotterdam
Lodge "Frederic Royal", Rotterdam
Lodge "Acacia", Rotterdam
Lodge "Concordia", Rotterdam
Lodge "Ultrajectina", Utrecht
Lodge "Anna Paulowna", Zaandam
I.O.O.F.
Victorie--Lodge No. 50, Alkmaar
Paradijs--Lodge No. 1, Amsterdam
Mount Sinai--Lodge No. 2, Amsterdam
Ware Bataven--Lodge No. 4, Amsterdam
Concordia--Lodge No. 5, Amsterdam
Amstel--Lodge No. 12, Amsterdam
Spinoza--Lodge No. 13, Amsterdam
Eensgezindheids--Lodge No. 17, Amsterdam
Patria--Lodge No. 26, Amsterdam
Excelsior--Lodge No. 32, Amsterdam
Broederschaps--Lodge No. 47, Amsterdam
Wilson--Lodge No. 51, Amsterdam
Mozart--Lodge No. 55, Amsterdam
Rebekkah--Lodge "Hollandia" No. 1, Amsterdam
Gooische--Lodge No. 28, Bussum
Humanitas--Lodge No. 23, Den Haag
Charitas--Lodge No. 24, Den Haag
Fidelitas--Lodge No. 53, Den Haag
Rebekkah--Lodge "Acacia" No. 3, Den Haag
Rebekkah--Lodge "Vrede", No. 4, Den Haag
Drie Schakels--Lodge No. 7, Groningen
St. Maarten--Lodge No. 15, Groningen
Kennemer--Lodge No. 27, Haarlem
Eem--Lodge No. 36, Hilversum
Sleutel--Lodge No. 57, Leiden
Maas--Lodge No. 16, Rotterdam
Luctor et Emerge--Lodge No. 48, Rotterdam
Rebekkah--Lodge, "Omhoog," Nor. 2, Rotterdam
Sic Semper--Lodge No. 43, Utrecht
Amicitia--Lodge No. 54, Utrecht
Rebekkah--Lodge, "Tolerantia," Utrecht
Zaan--Lodge No. 20, Zaandam
Harmonie--Lodge No. 38, Zaandam
Czaar Peter Club, Zaandam
Rebekkah--Lodge, "Humanite" No. 5, Zaandam
Rotary Club
Rotary Club No. 3521, Alkmaar
Rotary Club No. 3533, Amersfoort
Rotary Club No. 1336, Amsterdam
Rotary Club No. 3233, Arnhem
Rotary Club No. 5180, Bussum
Rotary Club No. 4079, Delfo
Rotary Club No. 1919, Den Haag
Rotary Club No. 3013, Groningen
Rotary Club No. 2299, Haarlem
Rotary Club No. 2943, Hilversum
Rotary Club No. 2386, Leiden
Rotary Club No. 3467, Nijmegen
Rotary Club No. 1879, Rotterdam
Rotary Club No. 1481, Utrecht
Rotary Club No. 4721, Zaandam
All together 470 cases combining material from the here mentioned
lodges and from organizations of a similar status were packed and
transported to Germany. Furthermore, everything the temple of the lodge
in Nijmegen and the temple of the I.O. O.F. in Haarlem contained, was
sent to Germany. Also, steel-shelves for about 30,000 books were taken
from the building belonging to the Grooten Oosten in Den Haag where
they have so far been used for the Bibliotheka Klossiana, containing
parts of one library of the Grooten Oosten, and the library of the
Vrijmetselar-Stichting, Amsterdam, are of great value. And so are
the archives of the Grooten Oosten in Den Haag, containing all the
historical documents of the lodges affiliated with the Grooten Oosten.
To estimate the value of the Bibliotheka Klossiana, containing many
rare pieces, it is to be remembered that in 1930 the Grooten Oosten
der Nederlande was offered $5,000,000 for the Bibliotheka Klossiana by
Freemasons in the U.S.
A particularly valuable discovery was made by the working group
searching the altars in the building of the Grooten Oosten in Den Haag.
The Master-Hammer of the Grooten Oosten, made of pure gold, with which
some of its members had presented to the Grooten Oosten on its 60th
Anniversary, fell into our hands. It is a piece of high quality whose
money-value alone is estimated to be 3,000 Reichsmark.
The Working Group took over the International Institute for Social
History in Amsterdam with its library and archives, boxes of
extraordinary value. It seems that this institute was founded in 1934
with the intention of creating a center of intellectual resistance
against National Socialism. Its employees were mainly Jewish refugees
from Germany. The contents of its library and its archives with many
very valuable items were brought together from all over the world. In
the library, there are about 160,000 volumes, though most of them will
have to be catalogued. Of particular interest is the German, French
and Russian Department. According to the decision made by Reichsleiter
Rosenberg, the Institute was taken over in its entirety. A member of
the Dienstelle was nominated as director of the Institute--he, together
with his collaborators will arrange the books, catalogue the scientific
material and get the Institute ready for the work of the Party. What
may be said already is that the scientific value of the library and the
archives is that they contain a complete collection of material on the
social and socialist movements in certain countries.
The libraries of the Societas Spinozana in Den Haag and of the
Spinoza-House in Rijnsburg also were packed. Packed in 18 cases, they,
too, contain extremely valuable early works of great importance for
the exploration of the Spinoza problem. Not without reason did the
Director of the Societas Spinozana try, under false pretenses which we
uncovered, to withhold the library from us.
Then the library of the Alliance Francaise, Den Haag, was packed (6
cases) as well as the German publication of the refugee-publishers
Aller de Lange, Querido, Fischer-Beerman, Forum-Zeek, of the Kultura
Bookshop and the publications of the Pegasus-Verlag, all in Amsterdam,
a total of 17 cases. After that, the Working Group concentrated
on packing the newspaper and magazine stocks of the International
Institute for Social History. The very exclusive racks which had been
brought together from all over the world were kept at the Institute
in complete disorder and left to self-destruction; they were properly
packed into 776 cases and stored, for the time being, in the Working
Group's store-houses. It is very strongly suggested that these
newspapers and magazines be bound and the volumes be put up in proper
libraries as fast as possible; otherwise, an irreparable loss will be
the result since these newspapers and magazines are from all over the
world.
A large unknown amount of material classified as "Enemy Goods" and
coming from the so-called "Overseas-Gifts", that is, household goods of
Jewish refugees, is falling into our hands daily. These gifts are being
kept at the so-called "House in Holland", and so far 43 cases were
packed there, including the private library of the former Minister of
the Eisner-Government, Neurath.
In agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in the
Netherlands, all libraries in houses of Jewish refugees and confiscated
by the Wehrmacht, are being turned over to the Working Group. So far,
the library of the Jew De Cat in Haarlem was packed into 4 cases.
An extremely valuable library, containing inestimable works in
Sanskrit, was confiscated when the Theosophic Society in Amsterdam was
dissolved, and packed into 96 cases.
A number of smaller libraries belonging to the Spiritists, Esperanto
Movement, the Bellamy Movement, the International Biblical Research
and various other minor international organizations were packed into
7 cases; texts belonging to various minor Jewish organizations were
packed into 4 cases, and a library of the Anthroposophic Society in
Amsterdam into three.
It is safe to say that the racks of books confiscated, packed and
so far sent to Germany by the Working Group are of extraordinary
scientific value and shall contribute an integral part of the library
of the "Hohe Schule." The money-value of these libraries, as shown in
the case of the "Klossiana", can only be estimated, but surely amount
to 30-40,000,000 Reichsmark.
For the coming months, action is planned on the following, enumerated
here in chronological order:
1. The libraries of the Theosophic Society and similar organizations in
Den Haag, Rotterdam and several other places.
2. Continuous sifting of objects confiscated in the "House in Holland"
and other buildings.
3. Screening of several archives with Press-photos, consisting
altogether of 2.6 million pictures which shall be turned over to us by
the Reichskommissariat.
4. The Jewish private libraries in Amsterdam, particularly:
A. The Israelite Library Beth-Hamidrasch Etz Chaim, Amsterdam,
Rapenburgerstraat 109. This library, founded in 1740, contains about
4,000 volumes, particularly Jewish theology.
B. Library of the Netherland Israelite Seminar, Amsterdam,
Rapenburgerstraat 177. It contains 4,300 volumes of Hebraica and 2,000
volumes Judaica. At the time, it took over the library of the Jewish
Society for Literature, Thoelet (1830-1837) and valuable Jewish private
collections. Amongst other things, it contains precious old prints from
the years 1480 to 1560 and some manuscripts.
C. The Portuguese-Israelite Seminar, Amsterdam, Jonas Daniel Meyerplein
5. There are 25,000 volumes, 450 manuscripts, 600 prints [Inkunablen]
and numerous Exlibris, coins and the like and the famous material on
Talmud Literature.
D. The so-called Rosentaliana, primarily a foundation by the Jew
Rosenthal from Hannover. From there, it was at the time transferred and
affiliated with the local university library. In the meantime, it has
on account of donations, grown considerably. Technically, it belongs to
the Municipality of Amsterdam, but in the Catalogue of Libraries in the
Netherlands of 1931, it is designated as "Private". According to the
catalogue, it contains 25,000 volumes and 300 manuscripts. However, the
amount of volumes reaches 100,000 indeed.
The libraries mentioned under 4. ought to be of particular interest for
the history of Western Europe. It is very likely that hitherto unknown
facts may be brought into the open, on the era of Cromwell and that
of the glorious Revolution of 1688 and the resulting personal union
between England and the Netherlands. In particular, light may be thrown
on Cromwell's attitude towards the Jews, possibly even on the Jewish
influence on the development of the Secret Service.
The temple and the museum of the Grooten Oosten der Nederlande. At
present, both are needed for exhibitions on behalf of the Dienststelle
of the Reichskommissar. With the end of the exhibition temple
furnishings and museum shall be turned over to us.
A very conservative estimate of the value of the objects enumerated
in 1. to 5. may be about three times as much as that of the libraries
already packed. Therefore, it is safe to say that the library of the
Hohe Schule shall, with very little effort, receive an extraordinary
amount of treasures which shall give it a unique position in the realm
of questions regarding Judaism and Free-Masonism.
The Working Group, in executing the afore-mentioned tasks is bound
strictly to the pace set by the Reichskommissar for the handling of
the Jewish questions and that of the international organizations. This
pace again is determined by the political evolution which is taking
shape according to decisions made on a higher level, and which must
not be hampered by individual acts. Work that has been authorized
to be done by the Working Group, but has not yet been accomplished
should now, with twice as much personnel as before, be finished within
2 to 3 months. It may be mentioned that the Working Group has been
working overtime for weeks now, and also is working, as is done on the
battlefield, on Sundays.
The leader of the Working Group Netherland.
Schimmer
Oberbereichsleiter.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 197-PS
Berlin, 27 August 1941.
Notes
Concerning the conference that has taken place on the OKH concerning
the transfer of a part of the Ukraine to the civil administration.
On 25.8.1941, a conference took place in headquarters OKH/
Quartermaster General regarding preparation for the transfer of the
Reich Commissary of the Ukraine to the civil administration scheduled
to take place on 1.9.41.
Besides myself and the expert of the Q.M. General, the following took
part in the conference:
Major i. G. Altenstadt Chairman
Ministerialdirigent Dr. Chief of the Administrative
Danckwarts Branch within the Army Administrative
Group.
Colonel i. G. von Krosigk Chief of the General Staff of
the commander of the southern
Army Zone Rear.
Chief of Staff of the
Commander of the Office
of the Armed Forces.
Regierungspraesident
Dargs Representative of Reich Commissar
Koch.
Oberregierungsrat Dr.
Labs
Captain Dr. Braeutigam.... Representative of the Ministry
for the East.
Major Wagner.
The letter first explained the boundaries of the Reich Commissariat
Ukraine as of the 1.9.41. In Bessarabia and Bukovinia Rumania is in
accord with the O.K.W. and has already set up the civil administration,
although until now there has been no official surrender of the area
to Rumania. The official assignment to the Rumanian administration
is expected in the next few days. The area around Brest is still at
present, under the military commander of the General Government; the
remainder of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine is under the commander of
the Southern Army Zone Rear. At the time that a civil administration
was inaugurated on the 1.9.1941, these areas (which apply to the
military sector) were transferred to the jurisdiction of the commander
of the Wehrmacht in the Ukraine.
The area to be transferred is for the most part pacified. Only in the
region of the Pripet Marshes is there still unrest produced by Partisan
groups. The rather strong forces there at present of the Southern Army
Zone Rear have been concentrated and recently destroyed 8 out of 10
Partisan battalions (strength of each battalion approximately 100 men).
Should the Partisans not be wholly liquidated by the 1.9.1941, forces
of the above mentioned commander will remain in the area for this
purpose.
The security of the part of the Reich Commissary Ukraine to be set
up on the 1.9.1941, will be carried out in the south by a Hungarian
Division (2 brigades), connected in the north with a Slovakian security
division besides 4 battalions of militia. All units, including the
Hungarian and Slovakians are under the command of the commander of
the Wehrmacht. In the area are two district commands and five town
commands, and the district commands are in Luck and Kamenez-Podolsk.
The units of the transport and intelligence services remain directly
under the command of the O.K.W. Furthermore the economic inspection
of the south remains with the commander of the Army Zone Rear. The
economic command in Kiev placed under this inspection has its seat for
the time being in Shitomir. This command is responsible for the civil
administration in the whole area to be transferred.
Near Kamenez-Podolsk, the Hungarians have pushed about 11,000 Jews
over the border. In the negotiations up to the present it has not been
possible to arrive at any measures for the return of these Jews. The
higher SS and Police leader (SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln) hopes,
however, to have completed the liquidation of these Jews by the
1.9.1941.
Ministerialdirigent Dr. Danckwarts asserts that both district
commands have confined themselves to the fulfilment of all the most
necessary projects in the administrative field. In the communities
for the most part Volksdeutsche or Ukrainians have been placed in
office as Burgermeister. According to experiences up to date these
people are scarcely in a position to administer to their communities
independently, but require in every single case instruction and
guidance from the German units.
Colonel von Krosigk states that the military units in many towns of the
region have set up a Ukrainian militia, which it is agreed would now be
taken over by the higher SS and Police leader as auxiliary police.
In this militia strong efforts for independence have been noticed since
this militia is in part composed of active elements (members of the
Bandera National independentist movement). The populace is in general
obliging but wholly intimidated and uneasy. They have made themselves
deserving by their searching for Russian paratroopers who were dropped
almost every night by the Russians, especially around the main railroad
lines. These paratroops are harmless, since they are badly armed and
instructed. They are for the most part in civilian clothes. From the
directive for the treatment of the collective question great success in
the field of propaganda is promised in military circles.
In many Ukrainian districts the Ukrainians themselves have put their
burgermeisters in office. These men had with them quantities of written
messages and statements from national Ukrainian parties. The Wehrmacht
has not recognized such people, but took the statements from them and
sent them home again.
The administrative officials of the two district commands remains until
the 15.9.1941 at the district commands in order to assist the units by
their familiarity with the civil administration, without their being
engaged in the actual work of administration themselves. Particularly,
Kriegsverwaltungsrat Schwarz, one of the two administrative officials
of the commander of the southern Army Zone Rear still remained in the
area and would go to Rowno in case the civil administration should
desire it. The 454th division becomes the security division in the area
of the Reich Commissariat insofar as the security was not taken over by
the Rumanians.
* * * * *
In a private conference between (Ministerialdirigent) Dr. Danckwarts,
(Regierungspraesident) Darge, Captain Dr. Braeutigam and the
undersigned, a few more administrative questions were briefly
discussed. On this occasion (Ministerialdirigent) Dr. Danckwarts stated
that the Rumanians in the southern part of the Ukraine would take
over as far as civil administration was concerned, the old borders of
Bessarabia, forming a zone as far as the Bug, including Odessa, without
being promised the eventual possession of this zone.
Furthermore, with 15 divisions they would take over the security of a
larger portion of the Ukraine, which in this zone would be under the
control of the German civil administration.
Captain Dr. Braeutigam was requested by telephone by Dr. Koeppen at
the Fuehrer's Headquarters to be careful that the Rumanians should not
form a Ukrainian group under a former military attache in Berlin in
the zone taken over by their civil administration. This question was
discussed with Major Altenstadt in my presence. He explained that the
Wehrmacht has no administrative control in influencing the Rumanians
in the zone under their civil administration; this could only be done
through the Foreign Office.
* * * * *
In discussion with several officers who had recently been in the
Ukraine, I learned that the prohibiting of army chaplains from
conducting religious services for the civilian population and also the
Ethnic Germans [Volksdeutsche] has led to depression and disturbance
among the Volksdeutsche. One should not fail to realize that the
church has been the common connecting-link of the Volksdeutsche in the
Ukraine. Although not many Ukrainian clergy are present a few still
hold religious services for the Ukrainians. The Volksdeutsche fail to
understand why the only possibility of their caring for their souls,
namely through the agency of Army Chaplains, is denied to them.
LABS
Oberregierungsrat
[illegible]
Ministerialdirektor.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 199-PS
COPY
Reichs Ministry for the Occupied East
Berlin 11 July 1944
Correspondence
To the General Deputy for the Labor Employment, Gauleiter Sauckel
_Berlin SW 11_
I just learned that refugee camps for the White Russians in Bialystok,
Krajewo and Olitai were closed for the recruiting for the war Einsatz
Command middle. I call your attention to the following:
1. That the war employment command [Kriegseinsatzkommando] formerly
stationed in Minsk must continue under all circumstances the calling in
of young white Ruthenian and Russian manpower for military employment
in the Reich. In addition, the command has the mission to bring young
boys of 10-14 years of age to the Reich.
2. It deals here with a military employment approved by the Fuehrer,
the measures of which will be increased in a newly released directive
by the Fuehrer. Such military missions must forego all others.
3. Nothing changes these relative missions by the evacuation of these
provinces in which the recruiting originally took place. The recruiting
order does not pertain to certain territories but to the people living
in these territories.
4. I must reject every responsibility for the consequences arising from
the closing of the Refugee Camp and am compelled, upon further closing
of camps, to request immediately a Fuehrer decision.
The same principle must prevail in the recruiting of Air Corps helpers
in Estonia and Lithuania. I carefully point to this fact should similar
situations occur there.
For.
Signed: Alfred MEYER
Copies to:
Gauleiter bureau
Chief group leader Berger
Dr. Braeutigam
Chief bannfuehrer Nickel
Ministry director Beil.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 200-PS
Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories
P 719a/44g [ink note]
Special Train, Gotenland 8.7.1944
CONFIDENTIAL
TELEGRAM
1. Chief of the Civil Administration, _Bialystok_
2. Offices of the SS and Police Chiefs concerned, _Bialystok_
3. SD Unit concerned, _Bialystok_
_Subject_: HJ--Kriegseinsatzkommando Center.
The HJ Kriegseinsatzkommando center, which until now has been stationed
in Minsk, must under all circumstances continue its duties, as regards
the enrollment of young White Ruthenians and Russians for a military
reserve in the Reich. The Command is further charged with the
transferring of worth-while Russian youth between 10-14 years of age,
to the Reich. The authority is not affected by the changes connected
with the evacuation and transportation to the reception camps of
Bialystok, Krajewo, and Olitei. The Fuehrer wishes that this activity
be increased even more.
I request that the Command of Bialystok be assisted in the execution of
its duties in every possible way. Should difficulties arise contrary to
expectations, I request that I be informed immediately by wire.
Ministry for the East
[signed] Berger
Chief of the Command Staff for Politics
4. Copies to:
Office of the Gauleiter
_Ministerialdirigent Dr. Braeutigam_
Hauptbannfuehrer Nickel
initialled B 11/7
PARTIAL SYNOPSIS AND TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 204-PS
The City Commissioner in Kauen
Kauen, 18 February 1944
Release of Indigenous Labor for Purposes of the Reich
[Translator's Synopsis]
After entry into Lithuania thousands of workers were recruited to work
for a period of 6 months in Gau Ost Prussen. Contrary to all promises
these laborers were not released even after twelve months, and their
various connections at home received no compensations. They did not
even get a short furlough home for a long time. Now it is intended to
put them in the munitions industry against their will.
In the early part of 1942 another recruiting was made by the Wehrmacht
for 7000 male transport-aides. They forced the Lithuanians to register
at an office and then locked them up in barracks as they came in.
Naturally they dislike the Germans almost as much as the Russians.
Recently the recruiting drives for new volunteers for the army, police
and labor service, and for laborers in the munitions industry within
the Reich have been started. However the Russians removed 40,000
professional personnel in 1941, and more than 100,000 were removed from
work, so many positions cannot be filled now.
After the recruiting campaigns the populace did not trust any further
proclamations or measures as far as working within Germany was
concerned. Furthermore the Lithuanians do not feel that they have in
their state a political unit. Because of previous unsettled political
conditions, the Lithuanian does not think much about politics. Since he
pays little attention to his own laws, he heeds ours even less. They do
not attend the musterings and must be brought by the police.
Although the civilian administration promised to produce the labor,
they were not too successful, as the following will show:
1. _Seizure of the age classes of 1919/24_
This was ordered by the Reichs Commissar for the East, but due to the
inefficiency of the officials, it was only partially successful.
The actual seizure was done by members of the Wehrmacht, police, local
administration and the labor office. Energetic propaganda campaigns
were initiated to induce the male members of the age groups to register
at the designated offices.
Soon however opposition arose on the part of the Lithuanian
intelligentia. To counteract this the following measures were taken.
[Translation]
Renunciation of the formation of a Lithuanian legion, closing of the
native universities, and arresting of a number of members of the
Lithuanian intelligentia.
[Translator's Synopsis]
These measures were not practicable; consequently the General Commissar
ordered another registering, with severe penalties for non-appearance.
Although every effort was made, the results were still unsatisfactory.
From an expected total enrolment of 5800 men, only 47% appeared, and
among this percentage were many of no use to us for various reasons.
[Translation]
2. The completely unsatisfactory experience of the previous action made
_a further seizure of the age group 1912/18 and also of the female
age group 1914/22_ necessary. These two further actions also brought
no satisfactory result. In a lecture which the Plenipotentiary for
the Arbeitseinsatz Gauleiter Sauckel made on 18 July 1943 in Kauen,
and in an official conference following it, between Gauleiter Sauckel
and the General Commissar, the pool of labor in the Reich was again
brought up urgently; Gauleiter Sauckel again demanded that Lithuanian
labor be furnished in greater volume for the purposes of the Reich. As
the minutes of this conference show, the General Commissar described
very forcibly the very great difficulties opposing the preparation of
indigenous labor forces, and asked urgently for the preparation of a
larger number of German police forces. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem
Bach promised explicitly at that time "a real strengthening of the
police force in Lithuania". This real strengthening of the police force
in Lithuania meanwhile was not carried out in the course of further
actions.
[Translator's Synopsis]
3. Sauckel wanted 30,000 workers. Although the civilian administration
did their best, conditions were in confusion and only 8200 of the
30,000 were on hand.
4. Then Sauckel made a new requisition, this time for 100,000 workers.
Although fulfillment of this requisition would vacate many positions
in the country, the General Commissar promised to fill the order.
However, many difficulties will arise. In the country it is easier
to recruit labor because it is possible to study the labor situation
in more detail than in a large city like Kauen. In the country the
administration has a closer tie with the populace for one thing.
To fulfill the requisition of labor made on Lithuania, assistance from
the German Civil Administration is a necessity. The police force will
have to be increased temporarily, severe treatment in case of sabotage,
a temporary increase in the allotment of motor fuel, and the use of the
quartermaster facilities of the Wehrmacht; all these measures will be
necessary if the required amount of labor is to be supplied.
This new action of Sauckel's will probably not work. The only way of
gaining any successes in this matter is to have at our disposal large
numbers of German police.
[signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 205-PS
National Socialist Labor Party
Party Chancellory
Fuehrer's Headquarters 5 May 1943
The Chief of the Party Chancellory
Chancery Rosenberg
Admit. No. 931 K
24 May 1943.
Circular No. 70/43
Subject: Memorandum concerning the general principles for the
treatment of foreign laborers employed within the Reich.
The Reich Propaganda Ministry and the RSHA have together issued a
memorandum concerning the treatment of foreign laborers employees
within the Reich.
I request in the attached copy that the necessity for a firm but just
treatment of the foreign workers be made clear to members of the Party
and the People.
A publication of this memorandum is not to be made.
Signed: M. Bormann.
Distribution:
Reichsleiter
Gauleiter
Verbaendefuehrer
Kreisleiter
Ortsgruppenleiter
Index File Card: Foreign Laborers--Treatment--Behavior
* * * * *
Memorandum concerning the general principles for the treatment of
foreign workers employed within the Reich.
The struggle of the Reich against the destructive forces of Bolshevism
becomes more and more a European affair. There is an apparent practical
result in the employment within the Reich of millions of foreign
workers from almost all the European countries on the continent, in
addition to a large number of members of the conquered forces of
hostile nations. From this fact arise special obligations for the
German people, which are submitted first of all in the following
principles:
1. Of primary importance is the security of the Reich. The
Reichsfuehrer of the SS and his units settle all questions on measures
of the security police for the protection of the Reich and the German
people.
2. The humane, production-increasing treatment of the foreign workers
and the facilities granted them can obviously lead to the effacement
of the clear lines of demarcation between the workers of foreign
peoples and members of the German race. It is demanded of members of
the German race that they observe the difference between themselves
and foreign nationals as a patriotic duty. By disregarding the
fundamental principles of the National Socialist conception of blood
[Blutauffassung] a member of the German race must be aware of being
liable to the severest penalties. The knowledge, that the outcome will
be either victory or a Bolshevist chaos, must cause every German to
draw the necessary conclusions in dealings with workers of foreign
nationalities.
Everything is subordinated to the mission of ending the war
victoriously. The foreign workers employed within the Reich are to
be treated in such a manner that their reliability is retained and
expedited; that consequences unfavorable to the Reich be limited to a
minimum in their home countries and that full labor be retained at a
future date for the German war economy, yes, so that even a rise in
production ensues. The following is to be regarded here as decided:
1. Everyone even the primitive man, has a fine perception for justice!
Consequently every unjust treatment must have a very bad effect.
Injustices, insults, trickery, mistreatment etc. must be discontinued.
Punishment by beating is forbidden. The workers of foreign nationality
are to be correspondingly informed concerning the severe measures for
insubordinate and seditious elements.
2. Winning someone to active cooperation for a new idea is impossible,
if his innate consciousness of value is insulted at the same time.
From people who are described as beasts, barbarians and sub-humans, no
great accomplishment can be demanded: In contrast to all opportunities
that arise, positive characteristics such as the will to fight against
Bolshevism, security of their own existence and of their country,
readiness to enlist and the willingness to work, all are to be spurred
on and expedited.
3. Moreover everything must be done in order to further the necessary
cooperation of the European peoples in the struggle against Bolshevism.
The foreign worker is not to be convinced by words alone that a German
victory is also favorable for him and his people. Supposition is a
suitable treatment.
Digressing from these view-points, the responsible plenipotentiaries
for Arbeitseinsatz responsible for the recruiting and the working
conditions of the foreign laborers as well as the other bureaus
concerned, have issued the necessary directives for the employment
of foreign laborers within the Reich. From these instructions the
following are especially to be stressed:
_a._ If possible every foreign worker will receive a position for
which he has the greatest ability according to his training and former
employment.
_b._ The quartering of foreign labor personnel is to be, as a rule, in
camps. The accommodations must be provided with all the necessities
in respect to orderliness, cleanliness and sanitation. Measures of
imprisonment such as confinement and barbwire are forbidden. It is
especially emphasized that in this quartering, the national customs
of the foreign workers, (male and female) are to be given the utmost
consideration in conformation with the possibilities conditioned by
war. The foreigners are as much as possible divided into national
groups, and are to be quartered together. The assistance of the foreign
workers in the administration of the camp and the maintenance of
order within the camp is to be secured. For all camps there are camp
directives which outline in particular the duties and right of the camp
and the leaders.
_c._ At the time of enlistment the foreign workers are to be urged to
bring clothing and foot gear with them to Germany. So far as this is
not possible and so far as it has become necessary to replace articles
of clothing that have become unusable, they are to be provided with
clothing and footgear, considering limitations imposed by war, so that
the necessary protection for the preservation of health against weather
is guaranteed.
_d._ The foreign workers are to receive, in reference to diet, the
same ration allowance as the German workers from the Reich Minister
for nutrition and agriculture. In this matter the usual cost will
be considered. Care will be taken that supplies are issued to the
foreign workers in accordance with the numbers placed at their
disposal. Embezzlements, usurious prices etc. by supervisory bureaus or
administrative officers will be punished as if the act were committed
against Germans.
_e._ Every foreign worker has claim to efficient sanitation measures.
The regulations for prevention of epidemics and contagious diseases
are not to be deviated from. Medical attention according to local
conditions is to be assured by the doctors of the camp district or
insurance [Kasse]. For permanent treatment in districts or hospitals
the number of beds necessary are to be kept ready in a suitable
manner. For nursing and maintenance nursing personnel of the same
nationality are if possible to be called up, and if circumstances
permit doctors and army-surgeons of the same nationality. For pregnant
workers obstetrical necessities are to be provided; also peaceful
accommodations and nurseries of suitable size are to be supplied.
Female members of the nationality concerned are to be used for care of
patients. The return home [Rueckbefoerderungen] of pregnant workers is
to take place only in extremely exceptional cases on the request of the
party concerned.
_f._ Recreation for the foreign workers is of the greatest importance
for the conservation of working power and morale. Entertaining
organizations, periods of free time, sports, etc. are of prime
importance in the camp itself and are to be carried on by camp
personnel. In addition, special performers and national groups of
the various nationalities are to be used for the further development
of this recreation. In addition insofar as possible their own moving
picture films will be presented. Furthermore books, periodicals and
newspapers translated into the various foreign languages are to be
available in every camp. Language courses are to promote understanding
in the place of work. For the various nationalities special
dictionaries are to be published.
In addition the workers from the East have at least the possibility of
going out on their free day.
_g._ For all foreign workers recreation is possible, insofar as it is
desired. For members of the Occupied Eastern Territories care only from
lay-priests is considered. Care from Russian and Ukrainian emigrants is
forbidden.
In case of death all foreigners will be buried in the public cemeteries.
_h._ The political influence is directed mainly against Bolshevism and
ought to be molded accordingly.
The above-mentioned principles are considered binding as policies of
conduct for all organizations, bureaus and personnel, since they have
been published as directives by the respective bureaus. All units
which are concerned with the employment and care of foreign workers
and particularly factory and camp leaders, are responsible for these
principles being put into practice and being adhered to. They must
understand quite clearly that violations of the forgiving fundamentals
damage the German war economy and indirectly, the Front. Therefore they
are not only punishable from the point of view of the non-political
crime (for example, assault, embezzlement, usury) but also can be
punished for treasonable crimes. Not only the author of such an act
can be held responsible but also the responsible office chief. Also
defective instruction or supervision of subordinate offices can lead to
an official punishment.
All existing directives and instructions for the treatment of foreign
workers will be tested by the bureaus concerned as to whether they
conform to the principles set forth here. Where this is not the case,
they will be immediately revised by suitable measures.
Berlin, 16 April 1943
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 212-PS
COPY
Directions for the handling of the Jewish question
1. _In General._ The competency of the Chief of the Security Police
and Security Service, who is charged with the mission of solving
the European Jewish question, extends even to the occupied eastern
provinces. Accordingly, the offices under the Security Police for
the purpose of handling the Jewish question in the occupied eastern
provinces are qualified for their present sphere of activity.
In the individual Reichs commissariats, and within these, in the
General commissariats, Jewry represents a portion of the population
which is very varied in strength. For example, millions of Jews live in
White Russia and in the Ukraine who have lived here for generations.
In the central province of the USSR however, the Jews have moved in,
for by far the greatest part, during Bolshevistic times. Those Russian
Jews who followed in the wake of the invading Red Army of 1939 and 1940
to East Poland, West Ukraine, West White Russia, the Baltic lands,
Bessarabia, and Buchenland are one particular group.
All measures for the Jewish question in the occupied eastern provinces
must be met with the point of view that the whole Jewish question will
be solved in general for all of Europe after the war at the latest.
They are therefore to be instituted as preparatory partial measures and
must be in agreement with those decisions which may otherwise be met
in this field. This is especially true for the preparation of at least
temporary reception centers for Jews from the Reich province.
An eventual act by the civilian population against the Jews is not
to be prevented as long as this is compatible with the maintenance
of order and security in the rear of the fighting troops. Namely
retaliatory measures are to be allowed against the Jews who come into
the provinces which were newly occupied by the Red Army in the last few
years. However, strict measures are to be taken against street mobs and
other evil elements for whom it concerns only plunder of Jewish stores
and stealing Jewish property for their own personal gain.
2. _Definition of the term "Jew"._ The peaceful settlement of the
Jewish question requires the previous determining as to who is to be
considered a Jew in the occupied Eastern provinces. In reference to the
solving of the European Jewish question and to the strong influence
which Jewry had upon the remaining Russian population until the
invasion of German troops, and which it still exercises at present, it
appears necessary from a political, as well as from a popular point of
view, for the purpose of avoiding a later regaining of strength of the
Jews, to grasp the term "Jew" in the most far-reaching sense.
Therefore, he is a Jew, who belongs to the Jewish religion, or has been
recognized as Jewish by other circumstances; he who has a parent who is
a Jew in accordance with the above sentence is also a Jew.
3. _Comprehension, mark of recognition, suspension of the rights of
freedom and segregation._ The first main goal of the German measures
must be strict segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population.
In the execution of this, first of all is the seizing of the Jewish
populace by the introduction of a registration order and similar
appropriate measures. Soviet Jewry has, constantly, attempted,
since the Bolshevistic Revolution, to disguise itself in order to
unobtrusively move into leading positions, especially in the grain
regions of the USSR. For this purpose many Jews have dropped their
Jewish names and have taken Russian family names and Russian surnames.
It is to be decreed, that the person who must register must report
all changes of name by Jews during his lifetime, or as far as he
knows during the time of his forefathers, to his superior and to
make them retrogressive. The same goes for previous departure from
the religious congregation and acceptance of other faiths (other
manifold). The erasure of the Jewish deception will be easier in the
Reich commissariat Eastland and Ukraine, where the larger part of
the Jews have been living for generations than in the other Reichs
commissariats. The Soviet archive material, in so far as it is
preserved, is to be brought to use for this.
Then immediately, the wearing of the recognition sign consisting of a
yellow Jewish star is to be brought about and all rights of freedom for
Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to be placed in Ghettos and at the
same time are to be separated according to sexes. The presence of many
more or less closed Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the
Ukraine makes this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen
which make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case labor
needs are present. These Ghettos can be placed under the supervision
of a Jewish self-government with Jewish officials. The guarding of the
boundaries between the Ghettos and the outer world is, however, the
duty of the police.
Also in the cases in which a Ghetto could not yet be established,
care is to be taken through strict prohibitions and similar suitable
measures that a further intermingling of blood of the Jews and the rest
of the populace does not continue.
4. _Removal of the Jewish influence in political, economical, cultural
and social fields._ Relative with the measures to segregate the Jews
physically from the rest of the populace, everything necessary is to
be used in order to eliminate every influence of the Jewry upon the
Russian people. This is to happen immediately in political and cultural
fields, whereas in all other cases consideration is to be taken that
the common interests are not impaired. This is especially true for the
economic missions which are important due to the demands of the war and
those which concern the national economy.
An entire reconversion of Jewish professional life must be brought
about insofar as it does not deal with manual laborers. The group of
State employees in the Russian government along with the strongest
Jewish professional groups shall vanish entirely. Likewise, similar
professional groups are to be divorced from the public life, whereby,
however, the tempo of these measures must correspond with the general
economical and social need.
The entire Jewish property is to be seized and confiscated with
exception of that which is necessary for a bare existence. As far
as the economical situation permits, the power of disposal of their
property is to be taken from the Jews as soon as possible through
orders and other measures given by the commissariat, so that the moving
of property will quickly cease.
Any cultural activity will be completely forbidden to the Jew. This
includes the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish theatres and
schools.
The slaughtering of animals according to Jewish rites is also to be
prohibited.
5. _Forced Labor._ The present manpower shortage in the occupied
eastern territories as well as ideological-political considerations
make the demand appear of basic significance to introduce forced labor
commitment in the strictest form. This will have to take place move
by move by the elimination of the Jews from their professional life
although they are to be permitted to work in their own occupations
if they fall within the scope of the labor commitment. Moreover, the
Jewish manpower is to be used for heavy manual labor.
The standing rule for the Jewish labor employment is the complete
and unyielding use of Jewish manpower regardless of age in the
reconstruction of the occupied eastern territories. The missions,
which are to be given to the Jews in their labor employment, are
especially the highway, railroad and canal construction, as far as the
ameliorations, etc. are considered. Also, it seems that agricultural
employment above all, will be brought about under strict supervision.
Nothing is to be done against the employment of the Jews in cutting of
wood, production of straw shoes, brooms and brushes within the Ghettos.
In the employment of the Jews, care is to be taken that Jewish labor is
only so used in those productions which will later suffer no noticeable
interruption in case of a rapid withdrawal of these labor forces, and
which excludes a specialization of Jewish workers. It is to be avoided
in every case that Jewish workers become indispensable in essential
production.
6. _Violations_. Violations against German measures, especially against
the forced labor regulations, are to be punishable by death to the
Jews. All violations are to be dealt with by courts-martial.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 228-PS
Circular No. 163/43
(Not for Publication)
Subject: Treatment of PWs
Individual Gau-administrations often refer in reports to a too
indulgent treatment of PWs on the part of the guard personnel. In many
places, according to these reports, the guarding authorities have even
developed into protectors and caretakers of the PWs.
I informed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of these reports
with the comment that the productive German population absolutely
cannot understand it, if, in a time in which the German people is
fighting for existence or non-existence, PWs--hence our enemies--are
leading a better life than the German working-man, and that it is an
urgent duty of every German who has to do with PWs, to bring about a
complete utilization of their manpower.
The Chief of PW affairs in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has
now given out the unequivocal order, attached hereto in copy form, to
the commanders of PWs in the military districts. I request that this
order _be brought orally to the attention of all party office holders
in an appropriate manner_.
In case that in the future complaints about unsuitable treatment of PWs
still come to light, they are to be immediately communicated to the
commanders of the PWs with a reference to the attached order.
Fuehrer--HQ, 25 November 1943
(Signed): M. Bormann
Distribution: Distribution A and B
File reference: Treatment--PWs--Guard personnel.
* * * * *
Chief of PW affairs in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Az. 2f24, 74f Kriegsgef. Allg. (Ia) No. 11082143
Berlin, Badenschestr. 51, 26 October 1943
To: the Commanders of PWs in the Military Districts I to XIII, XVII,
XVIII, XX, XXI, Government-General with the commanders of the Armed
Forces in the Ukraine and the East; the PW District Commandant with
the Commander of the Armed Forces in Norway.
For information: to the Commanders of PWs in the Operational Areas I
to IV
to the PW District Commandants in Italy and Serbia
Subject: Treatment of PWs.
I. The intention of treating non-Soviet PWs strictly according to the
Convention of 29 and the Soviet PWs according to the special directions
of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, has in many cases led to
forms, which are not in harmony with the total war forced upon us.
The PW must according to the convention "be treated humanely and
especially be protected against acts of violence, insults, and public
curiosity". This does not mean, however, that a similar care must be
granted him, as is required for German soldiers.
In the case of the Soviet PWs, insofar as their diet is brought into
harmony with the work output expected of them and they have recovered
from the unavoidable rigors of the Eastern war, the sharp health
supervision originally necessary, in part consisting of continuous
weight check-ups is as a rule no longer required. Weight check-ups may
only have the aim of determining undernourishment; they are only to be
utilized in individual cases.
The aerial terrorism of the enemy forces great parts of the German
people into a way of life similar to that prevailing in the operational
area. As a result of this, the treatment and conduct of PWs, who enjoy
the protection of the convention of 29 and who are, moreover, through
the receipt of packages, in many ways better nourished than their
countrymen on the enemy side, are regarded critically. Especially, a
too mild treatment of Soviet PWs will not be understood anywhere, as
it is known what frightful sufferings German soldiers must endure, who
have fallen into Soviet hands.
The leaders of the labor detachments and the guard personnel must,
moreover, receive unequivocal orders and it must continually be pointed
out to them through teaching and instruction that their primary duty
consists in keeping the PWs to the full output of their working energy,
and in insuring that the lazy be apprehended most rapidly through such
measures as are permitted to the entrepreneurs or by the punishments
reserved to the military superiors and that intractable elements be
recognized and segregated.
Leaders of labor detachments and guard personnel must be conscious
of the fact that, in a time when unconditional and extreme effort is
demanded from every member of the German nation, inferior production on
the part of the PWs, which are traceable to malevolence or carelessness
can in no case be tolerated. The great labor battle of the homeland
depends upon the work output of every individual and thereby also of
every PW.
The thought that PWs through their work primarily fill the wallet of
the entrepreneur, and hence must be protected from him is erroneous.
Entrepreneurs are now agents of the German people. They have
exclusively to deliver things of importance to the war effort usually
in a very limited time and for this to utilize completely all manpower
at their disposal according to its best occupational suitability. The
entrepreneurs know that manpower cannot be replaced and must therefore
for this reason too, have the greatest interest in the preservation of
this power.
Labor detachment leaders, guard personnel, entrepreneurs and German
workers form one front and have a common goal: the attainment of
victory! To this end they must, by putting aside all personal wishes,
and in closest and most unified cooperation make use of the manpower of
the PWs put at their disposal by the Reich. Whoever does not work for
this goal or interferes with its attainment is harmful to the nation
and injures our comrades at the front.
Hence, the treatment of the PWs employed at labor is to be arranged
solely to raise the labor output to the highest possible degree and
immediately to take sharp action if the PWs are careless, lazy, or
recalcitrant. The PWs are not to be "cared for" but are to be handled
in such a manner that the required highest degree of work output be
attained. With this, needless to say, goes, besides just treatment of
the PWs, the supplying of the PWs with the rations, clothing, etc., due
them according to existing directives.
II. The development of the situation and the increasing requirements
for PW labor power force us to bring more and more PWs into the Reich.
Despite this it cannot be counted upon that the guard forces will be
correspondingly increased, also the quality of the guard personnel will
not on the average be able to be improved.
In addition the problem becomes more difficult because the PWs
erroneously believe that they can discern an advantage to themselves
in the situation. Hence they become arrogant in many cases and attempt
to escape to a greater extent. These symptoms can only be countered
by immediately taking sharp measures against the PWs in case of
recalcitrance or escape.
Weaklings, who should express themselves to the effect that in the
present situation one must assure oneself of "friends" among the PWs by
means of mild treatment, are defeatists and are to be prosecuted on the
charge of subversion of national defense.
The PWs must not be in doubt for an instant that weapons will be
ruthlessly employed against them, if they give any sort of passive
resistance or should try to mutiny.
The commanding officers must take care that this policy concerning
the treatment of PWs becomes the common property of all officers,
officials, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men subordinated
to them. This is not to be attained through written directives and
pamphlets alone, but primarily by the spoken word and by a persistent
and conscientious education of subordinates in the spirit of these
statements.
I request that the local agencies of the National Socialist Party be,
in a suitable manner, orally informed of this policy and that it be
reported to the Commanders.
I request that no reproduction of this document be made.
[signed] v. Graevenitz
Reprinting, even in part, forbidden.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 232-PS
National Socialist German Workers Party
Party Chancellery
The Chief of the Party Chancellery
Fuehrer Headquarters, 13 Sep 1944
_Proclamation_
Chancellery Rosenberg, Rec'd No. 2594 K/ 19 Sep 44
Presented to the Reichsleiter on the 20 Sept. Rdsdir.
For the Information of:
1. Staff leader [Init.] 2. Central Office 27 Sep 44 [Init.] 3.
Administration 27 Sep 44 [Init.] Returned to the Chancellery
Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War--Tasks of the guard units.
The regulations, valid until now, on the treatment of Prisoners of War,
and the tasks of the guard units are no longer justified in view of the
demands of the total war effort. Therefore, the Supreme Command (OKW)
of the Armed Forces, on my suggestion, issued the regulation, a copy of
which is enclosed.
The following is cited for its contents:
1. The understanding exists between the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces (OKW) and myself, that _the cooperation of the
party in the commitment of prisoners of war is inevitable_. Therefore,
the officers, assigned to the prisoner of war system, have been
instructed, to _cooperate most closely with the bearers of sovereignty_
[_Hoheitstraeger_]; the commandants of the prisoner of war camps have
to detail immediately _liaison officers to the Kreisleiters_.
Thus the opportunity will be afforded the Hoheitstraeger, to alleviate
existing difficulties locally, to exercise influence on the behavior
of the guard units and to _better assimilate the commitment of the
prisoners of war to the political and economic demands_.
2. The increase of performance [Leistungssteigerung] of the prisoners
of war depends decisively on how the guard and auxiliary units
understand their task, and what position they take toward the prisoners
of war. From this knowledge the necessity is derived, _to orient them
again and again politically and ideologically_, to put the meaning of
their mission constantly before their eyes. For that, in all base camps
[Stalags] National Socialist leaders from headquarters [hauptamtliche
NS-Fuehrungsoffiziere] are being assigned.
I request the Hoheitstraeger to support the commandants of the
prisoners of war in the selection of capable officers. Above that,
the Hoheitstraeger are to furnish the commandants of the prisoner of
war camps with capable speakers for the orientation of the guard and
auxiliary units. Collaborators of the offices for national questions
[Volkstumfragen] are to be called upon especially for that.
Furthermore, a constant political orientation of the plant owner, who
is invested now with special rights toward the prisoners of war and
toward the guard units, must take place in cooperation with the German
Labor Front (DAF).
/s/ M. Bormann.
1 Enclosure!
Distribution:
Reichsleiter
Gauleiter
Verbaendefuehrer
Kreisleiter,
Authenticated: [illegible] Cross index file: Prisoners of
war--Treatment--Guard units File No. 8810. */
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 254-PS
Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories.
II Pers c--1--Raab Berlin, June 29th 1944.
SECRET
To the Fuehrungsgruppe Pl, _Special Unit_--"_Gotenland_"
_Concerning_: Burning of houses in the Wassilkow district.
_Reference_: Your letter from May 24th 1944--P 26 a/44 geh--.
Enclosed I am sending you a copy of the point of view of
Nachwuchsfuehrer Paul Raab.
I don't see any reasons for taking measures of any kind against Raab.
By order:
Signed: Jennes
Certified Schrader
Adm employee.
* * * * *
SECRET
Grambusch 7.6.44
Paul Raab, Nachwuchsfuehrer
Copy
To the Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories. _Berlin W
35_, Kurfuerstendamm 134
_Concerning_: Letter from June 2nd 1944--II--Pers c 1--Raab _Diary #
81/44 g_
According to a charge by the supreme command of the armed forces
I burned down a few houses in the territory of Wassilkow/Ukr.
belonging to insubordinate people ordered for work-duty
[Arbeitseinsatzpflichtigen]. This accusation is true.
I was committed as district commissioner in the information service in
the territory of Wassilkow from May 5th 1942 up to December 28th 1944.
Besides many work districts, I was made fully responsible by district
commissioner Doehrer to completely fill the district quota of workers
to be delivered to Germany. Although the task wasn't agreeable to me, I
carried it out conscientiously, with skill, and where it was necessary
with sternness. Up until the penetration of the Soviet Armies, this
territory delivered more than 31,000 workers to Germany.
During the year of 1942 the conscription of workers was accomplished
by way of propaganda. Only very rarely was force necessary. Only
in August 1942, measures had to be taken against 2 families in the
villages Glewenka and Salisny-Chutter, each of which were to supply
one person for labor. Both were requested in June for the first time,
but didn't obey although requested repeatedly. They had to be brought
up by force, but succeeded twice to escape from the collecting camp,
or when being on transport. Before the second arrest, the fathers of
both of the men were taken into custody, to be kept as hostages and to
be released only when their sons would show up. When, after the second
escape, rearrest of both the fathers and boys was ordered, the police
patrols ordered to do so, found the houses to be empty.
That time I decided to take measures to show the increasingly
rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to be followed. I
ordered the burning down of the houses of the fugitives. The result
was, that in the future people obeyed willingly, orders concerning
labor obligations. However, the measure of burning houses has not
become known, for the first time by my actions, but was suggested in
a secret letter from the commissioner for the commitment of labor
as a forced measure, in case other measures should fail. This hard
punishment was accepted by the population with satisfaction, previous
to the measures, because both families ridiculed all the other duty
anxious families, which sent their children partly voluntarily to the
labor commitment.
The year 1943 brought about a new regulation concerning the commitment
of labor, by way of regular yearly conscription. Previous to the
coming of the conscription, I trained the staff for this task. I had
the collecting camp in the territory of Wassilkow fixed to the best of
possibilities with clean, light bedrooms, clean sanitary installations,
good food, and entertainment. First of all, everything was done away
with, which could have caused the Ukrainian to feel that he is being
departed by force. A well meaning propaganda was put to work on all
workers, right after their arrival into the camp and didn't allow a
low feeling to arise. I had reserved for myself the right of exemption
on the basis of labor, political, and social reasons; it was handled
as big heartedly as the task permitted. Mostly after the start of
the first conscription period, the districts of Wassilkow received
a local commander in the person of Count Griese. This officer, who
caused already great quarrels in the district of Lodwiza and Gadjatsch
on account of his arrogant behaviour, also created difficulties in
Wassilkow between the armed forces and the civil administration, up
to then unknown. First of all he took care of the labor commitment
and not only criticized measures taken by me, but received also at
any time every complaining Ukrainian, and promised them help against
the office of the district commissioner. Up to then I didn't have to
take serious measures, because the population was fairly willing. Only
a few fugitives had to pay families, and until the money came in, I
had secured more or less of their property according to the security
of the case. The punished paid their penalties without exception and
had their property returned to them. But before they got around to
do so, one part complained to the local commander, who didn't by any
chance reproach these people, but on the contrary, took care of all the
interests of those people, in front of me, and sometimes ordered me
with a commanding voice, to nullify my measures. I didn't let it scare
me, but carried out the task, for which I was responsible, according
to my judgment. But the job was unbearably hard now, since it became
known to the population, that the local commander accepts complaints
against the district commissioner. After the initial successes, a
passive resistance of the population started, which finally forced me
to start again on making arrests, confiscations, and transfers to labor
camps. After a while a transport of people, obliged to work, overran
the police in the railroad station in Wassilkow and escaped. I saw
again the necessity for strict measures. A few ring leaders, which of
course escaped before they were found in Plissezkoje and in Mitnitza.
After repeated attempts to get a hold of them, their houses were burned
down. Thereupon, military police were sent to the villages by the local
commander and extensive interrogations concerning this affair were made
by him. Besides that he hired young Ukrainians as voluntary helpers,
which were fugitives from the transient camp. Therefore, every work was
made impossible for me, in this sector.
It is not possible for me to give the exact dates of the mentioned
happenings above, because after I was last committed in the district
of Gaissin, I got into a Soviet ambush in March 1944 near Stanislau. I
could only hide my weapons and had to burn my whole baggage including
my diary.
In conclusion, I want to point out the following:
1. I had the responsibility within the territory of Wassilkow for the
conscripting of the local workers for the Reich. The choice of means,
which were used to execute my task, was to be left to me.
2. I worked with the utmost patience and only reverted to stricter
punishments, when the success accomplished was in no comparison to the
time used.
3. Strict measures, like the burning down of houses, were only used in
a few cases. By this means, it was accomplished--at least in 1942--that
the recruiting of workers didn't tie down too many police forces, who
because of other functions, couldn't be used for that purpose all the
time.
4. I was entitled to use such measures by the secret labor-directive
for labor commitment staff in the district of Kiew. They, therefor,
don't display by any means, any individual actions.
5. The delivery of 31,000 workers to the Reich is definitely important
to the war effort. Stern measures are definitely justified in order to
prevent a failure of this action.
6. My measures were thought to be just by the biggest part of the
population. They only caused displeasure with the Germans, who had only
small tasks to perform in the Ukraine, and therefore had too much time
for philosophy.
7. My actions against fugitive people obliged to work
[Arbeitseinsatz-pflichtige], were always reported to district
commissioner Doehrer, in office in Wassilkow, and to the
general-commissioner [General kommissar] in Kiew. Both of them know the
circumstances and agreed with my measures, because of their success.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: Paul Raab.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS
SECRET
Shitomir, 30 June 1943
_The Commissioner General_
Oral report on the situation in the general district Shitomir, by
Commissioner General Leyser, delivered at an official conference, with
Reichs Minister Rosenberg, in Winniza on 17 June 1943.
Mr. Reichs Minister
The employees of the civil administration in the General District of
Shitomir have, aside from their administrative work, been charged with
the following special tasks:
Agricultural production and collection
Recruiting of workers for Germany and management of forests and timber.
The above-mentioned tasks became virtually a problem due to the fact
that the general district of Shitomir is particularly "blessed" with
bands. Regarding the _agriculture_, it should be primarily interesting
to note that, in the year of 1942, _altogether 289 establishments
were declared_ as agricultural cooperatives. In 1943 altogether _501
establishments were, respectively will be_, proclaimed agricultural
cooperatives. The allotment of farm-land amounted in 1942 to 18%, in
1943, so far, to 10.4% and an additional 10% are expected in the fall.
As a consequence of the strong activity of bands, _only about 40%_ of
the acreage of the general district remain, at present, for the regular
production and collection; approximately 60% are under the control of
the bands. These actually supply the population, in part, with seed
and have the fields cultivated by their order and naturally have the
intention to take possession of the crop in the fall.
In consequence of the activity of the bands we have access to only
36% of the cattle, 41% of the pigs and 28% of the sheep out of the
total stock. As we have to supply particularly the front with meat,
we are therefore forced to a certain waste of our cattle stocks. Due
to the strong drainage on the substance, there can be no more regular
breeding. And too, only 42% of the milk total and 51% of the eggs could
be salvaged. The spring cultivation has been performed thoroughly.
It was amazing, nonetheless, that in spite of the strong drainage of
labor forces into the Reich the tilling was executed with a rapidity
which could not have been taken for granted. To judge by the present
condition and the weather, an average crop can be expected. However,
the securing and salvage of the crop gives much reason to worry. It
must be avoided under all circumstances, that the bands get hold of
considerable parts of the crop, respectively destroy the farm products
which have been brought to collecting points. Sufficient protection for
the various collecting points is not provided, the previous experiences
do not promise favorable results.
The leaders of agriculture deserve particular praise for their
self-sacrificing and dangerous work. In many cases they are only
able to fulfill their duties by risking their lives daily. They made
numerous sacrifices in blood, in particular lately. Nonetheless,
they refuse to be prevented from fulfilling their duty. The present
situation is best illuminated by the fact that at this time the
agricultural leaders can only work at full, or approximately full,
capacity in 5 out of 18 local areas. In all the other areas, we have
been forced to withdraw the leaders of the strong points, and rally
them at the local or district farmers. From there, they are in most
cases only able to perform their work under strong protection of the
police or army.
The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no doubt, well
known to the Reichs Minister through reports and his own observations.
Therefore, I shall not report them. It is certain that a recruitment
of labor, in the sense of the word, can hardly be spoken of. _In most
cases, it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force._
The population has been stirred up to a large extent and views the
transports to the Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from
the former exile to Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems.
In the foreground stands, at the moment, the mobilization of the young
classes of 1923 and 1925. To accomplish this, the active propaganda
on our part was used to an extent previously unknown. Therefore, it
can be stated that the action had been particularly well prepared
and consolidated. In spite of that it did not lead to the desired
success. It has to be added that, in the course of the action, the
desired contingents had been raised by the Chief Plenipotentiary for
the mobilization of labor. I could not confine myself therefore to the
classes of 1923 and 1925 alone, but also called up the class of 1922.
Beyond that, even other sections of the population which originally
should have been spared had to be included. With this our propaganda
became for the greater part illusory. But as the Chief Plenipotentiary
for the mobilization of labor explained to us the gravity of the
situation, we had no other device. I consequently have authorized the
commissioners of the areas to apply the severest measures in order to
achieve the imposed quota. The deterioration of morale in conjunction
with this does not necessitate any further proof. It is nevertheless
essential, to win the war on this front too! The problem of labor
mobilization cannot be handled with gloves.
Up-to-date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have been sent to
the Reich from the general district Shitomir. It can be taken for
granted that, during the month of June, this number is going to rise to
approximately 200,000.
Management of forests and timber is also one of the principal worries.
The general district of Shitomir is very rich in woods. As an average,
the wooded area amounts to 26% of the total acreage. In the north,
large sections of the country are covered 100% with woods. But this
great abundance in woods is also the cause of the many bands. About
1,400,000 hectare of wood, that is 80% of the total, are controlled by
bands. Like in the agricultural sector, only a relatively small part
of the wood remains for use. Our yearly production potential in timber
amounts to 1,300,000 cubic meter. Presumably 1,000,000 cubic meter
can be cut. The yearly potential in firewood amounts to 900,000 cubic
meter. We hope to achieve this. I may point out that the supply of wood
for mines, RR ties, construction and heating purposes is especially
important. The activity of the bands permits us at present to cut, on
a larger scale, only in the more southern scantily wooded regions.
Consequently, the old stock of wood there is being consumed rapidly.
The final result, if no change in the condition occurs, will be the
careless cutting down of woods, which is going to result in extensive
waste land. The fact that we are cutting down wood on a larger scale
only in the south, brought strong impetus to the timber industry in
the region of Winniza. The time can be foreseen when this period of
prosperity will end, and the timber industry in the south will succumb.
Whether then a removal of the timber industry into the northern part
will be possible depends on the circumstances which at present cannot
completely be foreseen.
Regarding the activity of the bands I would like to refer to the
numerous reports laid before the Reichs Minister. There can be said
hardly anything else on this subject except that the situation is
becoming more unfavorable day by day. The situation can be judged best
by the fact that at present only one of the larger roads in the general
district, the one leading from Shitomir to Winniza, can be used without
convoy. Because the activity of the bands is now also growing daily in
the south, it is not sure that we shall not be obliged to introduce,
sooner or later, the convoy system here too. All other roads of the
country are at present passable in convoy only when rifles or machine
pistols are held ready to shoot. The sacrifices brought to date in
battle with bandits are very great. In about one year's time, the
losses through fighting with them in the general district of Shitomir
on the German and allied side, including the natives in German service,
amount up to now _to 2,568 persons_. The number of missing could not
be ascertained exactly, because among them are also people who have
joined the bands voluntarily or have been recruited forcibly. Their
number amounts to an estimated 2,000 persons. Experience shows that
these missing persons all die miserably, so the total number of deaths
in battle with the bands in the course of the year can be given as
about 4,500. Opposing this is the following two demands: (1) Constant
transfer of army units into those areas threatened respectively
occupied by the bands; (2) Unity of command. The demand to transfer
units of the armed forces into the areas controlled by the bands, is
supported by special instructions of the OKW [High Command of the
Armed Forces] in order to fight the bands. It is regrettable that too
frequently the opinion from the respective branches of the armed forces
is that this demand cannot be executed on account of technical reasons
concerning training. That this objection is always and everywhere true,
does not seem credible to me. Frequent violations against the unity
of command have been committed. The need for prestige, the quest for
power, vanity, etc. have not become extinct as yet. I have to say with
regret that so far I found the least understanding for the necessity
of our common struggle in the armed forces. At any rate, I have the
impression that under the pressure of conditions they arrived at the
conclusion, that one cannot take the responsibility anymore to lead an
existence alone, but that the collection of all forces alone could only
bring us victory.
The struggle which has to be carried on, is hard and full of
sacrifices. But it will and must be carried through. Vast psychic
forces have been awakened in the members of the civil administration
anew daily. The successes, which they were able to achieve so far
are impressive particularly with regard to the resistance. May I
therefore be permitted at the conclusion of this report to thank
all my co-workers for their excellent work. They know that they are
practically on the front. I can promise your excellency, that we all
shall do our duty now, and in the future, as our Fuehrer has ordered--.
Signed: LEYSER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 285-PS
The Reichs Commissar for the Sudetenland
Stamped: Rosenberg Chancellory
In Nr 4459 3 Nov 38 Shown to RL 3/11
Reichenberg 31 Oct 1938
Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg
Berlin W 35 Margaretenstrasse 17
[Handwritten note]: Copy to Himmler
Dear party member Rosenberg!
Unfortunately it was not possible for me to thank you for your friendly
letter of the 15th of this month, because your news was forwarded to
Asch. The technical transportation difficulties under which we had to
suffer in the first days of the liberation of the Sudetenland have
caused the late deliveries.
I thank you very much for your invitation to visit you in Berlin at the
next occasion. Thanking you, I accept your invitation. The important
tasks before the elections and the supervision of the reconstruction
work keep me very busy. As soon as possible I will give you the date of
my arrival in Berlin.
For securing the Marxist, Jewish and confessional literature for
your educational and instructional work, my co-worker Dr. Suchy is
instructed. He will report to your competent deputy.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: KONRAD HENLEIN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 286-PS
15 October 1938
4149/R
1b
To Konrad Henlein Commissioner [Reichskommissar] for the
Sudeten-German territory,
Asch, Egerland.
Dear Party Comrade Henlein,
Since the incorporation of Sudeten Germany into the Greater German
Reich has finally been executed, I would like to heartily congratulate
you on this success in your work.
It is my wish that, in my capacity as Deputy of the Fuehrer for the
supervision of the entire education and schooling of the NSDAP, both
mentally and ideologically, I shall be able to establish contact
between your department and mine as soon as possible. I assume that you
will be in Berlin in the not too distant future and would appreciate
your information about the date of your visit in order to ask you for
the pleasure to be my guest; then we could discuss personally some
elementary questions.
However, the following matter has to be taken care of primarily:
It can be assumed that, as a consequence of the retrocession, a larger
amount of marxist, Jewish and also of religious literature is due
to be confiscated. Such material offers invaluable resources to the
library and the scientific research work of the "Hohe Schule" which
is in the process of coming into being. Therefore, I am interested
particularly in the decisive participation of my department in the
screening of material, with the purpose to take over the material
particularly of use to my work.
I ask of you to appoint one of your co-workers with whom my
representative can get in touch immediately about this particular
question.
Heil Hitler.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 290-PS
II Pers. c--Journal No. 322
To Leadership Staff Politics
Unter den Linden 63
Berlin 12 Nov 1943
Secret
[pencilled note illegible]
SECRET
Chief of Leadership staff politics
Journal No. P1755/43 g Rel. 15. II 1943
Inclosure
Subject: Encroachment by District Commissioner Government Councillor
Fritz Mueller in connection with the national campaign for the
utilization of labor.
_Reference_: Your letter of 22 July 1943--I 1006/43 g.
In connection with my letter of 27 Sep. 1943--II Pers, Journal No.
322--I am sending you enclosed a copy of the teletype of RKU of 29 Oct.
1943--I 7252 Journal No. 637/43 geh, for your information.
According to the explanations of RKU, the conduct of government
Councillor Mueller is no cause for disciplinary action against him, I
therefore consider the case as closed.
Your files are herewith returned.
By order
1. RKU wants to transfer district Commissioner Mueller for reasons
which he will bring later.
Await report.
Signed: Jonnes
[Rubber stamp]
Ministry for occupied eastern territories
2. Suspend until 10 Jan.
Official Kreis Employees
* * * * *
Copy
SECRET
RKU Rowno 13-929 29 Oct. 1943--1700--
Ministry of Eastern affairs Berlin
_Subject_: Alleged encroachment of district commissioner government
councillor Mueller in Kremiancz in connection with the national
campaign for the utilization of labor.
_Reference_: Decree of 27 Sep 1943-II Pers. c Journal No. 322--
For various reasons which I will report later, it is contemplated to
replace government councillor Mueller as district commissioner in
Kremianez in the near future.
The case on hand is by no means fit to be used for official actions
against District Commissioner Mueller. First of all, in my opinion
Mueller is not to be considered guilty in this case. It cannot be
established, either by the letter from the village Biloserka, which
letter caused this investigation, nor by the conduct of district
commissioner Mueller, himself, that he was present at the happenings in
Biloserka. He therefore cannot be held personally responsible. But even
if Mueller had been present at the burning of houses in connection with
the national conscription in Biloserka, this should by no means lend to
the relief of Mueller from office. It is mentioned specifically in a
directive of the Commissioner General in Lusk of 21 Sep 1942, referring
to the extreme urgency of the national conscription.
"Estates of those who refuse to work are to be burned, their relatives
are to be arrested as hostages and to be brought to forced labor
camps." It is obvious that this decree was merely directive in nature
and was not a binding order of the individual commissioner to decide
according to his own discretion, when the interest of the conscription,
such severe measures were to be applied.
I request therefore to consider the case closed.
Reich Commissioner Rowno I 7252 Journal No. 637/43 geh.
My order signed: Paltzo
to P i 755/439 [in pencil]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294-PS
Copy
TOP SECRET
Handwritten:
II 1 1161/44/ g
Memorandum
In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the
destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the greater
Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial
territory for colonizing purposes and economic exploitation.
This threefold mission of the Eastern campaign has brought about
the enormous resistance of the Eastern peoples. Were the war being
conducted only for the smashing of Bolshevism, then it would have
been decided long ago in our favor, for, as all experiences of this
war have confirmed, Bolshevism is hated to the utmost by the Eastern
peoples, above all by the great mass of peasants. Also the dissolution
of the greater Russian Empire into its national components would
not have provoked the resistance which we meet now. As the numerous
prisoner interrogations and other experiences show the shrewd Russians
have a complete understanding that this war will end in territorial
losses for them and the non-Russian peoples will break out from the
confinement within which Russia has forced them. The reduction of
the power of resistance of the Red Army is the major portion of the
third goal of our campaign. With the inherent instinct of the Eastern
peoples the primitive man soon found out also that for Germany the
slogan: "Liberation from Bolshevism" was only a pretext to enslave
the Eastern peoples according to her own methods. In order that there
exist no doubt at all on the German war aim, however, German publicity
refers openly to this intention in increasing measure. The conquered
territory is claimed publicly not only for Germany as a colonization
area, but even for Germany's embittered enemies, the Dutch, Norwegians,
and others. The economic exploitation is proclaimed verbally and in
print, and carried out with almost elimination of the demands of the
indigenous population, even with the greatest lack of consideration.
The populace has more of an understanding of the measures and duties
necessitated by war than the conquered peoples of the West. But the
laborer and peasant, who were educated to the highest degree of
self-consciousness by Bolshevism, soon perceived that Germany did not
regard them as partners of equal rights, but considered them only as
the objective of her political and economic aims. That disillusioned
them unspeakably, all the more since they had placed colossal hopes on
Germany.
The main department for politics of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern territories claims that it has been quite aware of this
situation from the beginning. It was soon apparent that the war could
not be decided in a short time by arms alone, because of the vast areas
and the enemy's inexhaustible reserves of manpower and material, but
that as in all great wars of recent times a spiritual disintegration
would have to come and the war would have to be changed at the final
conclusion to a civil war, all the more since the German Wehrmacht does
not intend to occupy completely the territory of the Soviet Union.
The Russian collapse of 1917 and the German break-down of 1918 were
actually not brought about by weapons alone, but primarily by political
disintegration. What Lenin achieved in Russia, the 14 points of Wilson
and the undermining effect of Marxism accomplished in Germany. In the
Soviet Union we found on our arrival a population weary of Bolshevism,
which waited longingly for new slogans, holding out the prospect of
a better future to them. It was Germany's duty to find such slogans,
but they remained unuttered. The population greeted us with joy as
liberators, and placed themselves at our disposal willingly and freely
with body and life. Wherever Ukrainians, Russians, White Ruthenians and
members of the Baltic peoples were enlisted in the German Wehrmacht
or in the police they have proved themselves and fought excellently
almost without exception. The Main Department for Politics tried every
means of keeping this vast capital that had fallen into our lap, and
of utilizing it for our purposes. To this purpose it was necessary
that National Socialism separate itself from Bolshevism with a sharp
line of distinction and open to the populace prospects of a new better
life. All measures which the Main Department for Politics suggested
were directed toward this one goal of preserving this capital. They
have been many times attacked as the expression of a weak sentimental
humanitarian attitude, of a form of German sentimentalism, and they
were in reality only the expression of completely coarse material
politics. For nothing else was contemplated than to preserve the
mass millions of the Eastern area in the adjustment to us which was
encountered with, in order to draw from it the greatest possible use
for Germany both militaristically, politically and economically. Should
this political policy succeed, the greatest reactions on the enemy
troops were to be expected. For years the masses of the S.U. (Soviet
Union) were stirred up against the surrounding world by the most
efficient propaganda machine that has ever existed. Until 1939 National
Socialism had been the target of the most spiteful attacks. Day after
day it was hammered into the laborers and peasants that the active
masses in Germany were a sacrifice to the most terrible exploitation.
With extreme tension workers and peasants looked forward to the
German administration. To be sure they had not completely trusted the
Bolshevist propaganda, but in spite of that they met the new masters
with a certain feeling of doubt.
As we all know, the peoples of the S.U. (Soviet Union) have gone
through the hardest times. Consequently, they are of a simplicity
inconceivable to us, even in the political sphere. A form of government
which was not intent only on plundering and exploitation and which put
aside the Bolshevist methods would have kindled the greatest enthusiasm
and put at our disposal a mass of millions. And the enthusiasm in the
occupied Eastern territories would have had its reaction on the force
of resistance of the Red Army. It would have been easily attainable to
have the Red Army man say to himself: "I fight for a system that is
throughout worse than that which awaits me in the case of a defeat. I
will be better off in every respect among the Germans than I have been
until now". If the Red Army man had become convinced of his general
well-being, the war would have been at an end very soon.
Knowing this the Main Department for Politics believed it to be its
primary duty to assist our combat troops with all their power by a
propaganda campaign aimed at crippling the power of resistance of
the Red Army and to shorten the war in this way. For the attainment
of this goal there are, among the measures proposed, two of the
utmost importance: The Agrarian Law and Religious Freedom, which is
essentially distinct from that of the Bolshevists.
Considering the exceptionally great significance which approaches the
agrarian question in the Soviet Union, the Main Department for Politics
was demanding even before the beginning of the Eastern campaign,
that the Kolchos be dissolved and an individual agrarian economy be
introduced again. This proposal was turned down by the Four Year Plan
with the remark that organic changes were not to be considered during
the war. Not until August of 1st year was an increase of the farmland
successfully put through.
Before the realization could be carried out, however, the Four Year
Plan had recognized that the impetuous pressure of the whole peasant
population for the dissolution of the collective would have to be
reckoned with in some way in the interest of production itself. The
proposal of the Main Department for Politics for the dissolution of
the collective found its defeat in the new agrarian decree. A few
months had been sufficient to make clear, not only to all Wehrmacht
units down to the youngest lieutenant in the line farthest forward,
but also to the units in the home country and the civil administration
in the occupied Eastern territories, the need of reform in the Kolchos
constitution. The only exceptions in this knowledge were the two Reich
Commissars, whose disagreement unfortunately caused a delay of several
weeks. The new Agrarian Decree came out shortly before the spring
planting and was greatly played up in the territories by the Press
and Propaganda Dept. of Main Department I. Its direct success was a
hitherto inconceivable piece of work of the populace in the spring
planting, which was able to be carried out in spite of unfavorable
preliminary conditions. In spite of this no lasting effect on the enemy
has appeared so far. Naturally, the enemy propaganda countered our
Agrarian Decree with every means. Their main argument was that in this
it was only a matter of a promise which had as its purpose a momentary
tactical success, that moreover Germany intended to make use of the
land later for her own purposes. This argument found support in the
very slow execution of the Agrarian Decree, which is to be attributed
in part to objective reasons (lack of surveyors, land registration,
surveying instruments and so forth).
It has been foreseen that in 1942 in the Ukraine 20% of the general
economy was to be changed to agriculture cooperatives. The increasing
of the farmland, which forms the main criterion of the general economy
and is carried through everywhere immediately, has still not been
achieved to the extent of 10% of the general economy, although it was
decreed, as has been mentioned, in August 1941. The transformation to
agricultural cooperatives has generally begun only a short time ago,
and according to the directives of the farmer's leader Koerner is not
to reach more than 10% by the end of August of this year. In this state
of affairs it is understandable that great sections of the Ukrainian
peasantry are under the control of enemy propaganda and have lost
belief in the earnestness of our intentions.
The religious freedom was likewise to call forth a great propaganda
effect. After months long negotiations, it was eventually decided
not to announce the freedom of religion ceremoniously, but to let it
come into existence as quietly as possible. The propaganda effect
consequently slipped from the picture.
When the Main Department for Politics noticed the hesitation of
decision in the church question, it searched for a substitute in
another means of propaganda, in the question of returning property
rights of the individual. In this the whole world could be clearly
shown that National Socialism contrasts distinctly with the Bolshevist
expropriation measures and a new property law would be ushered in. The
first display of this slogan for propaganda use would have been the
immediate raising of the expropriation measures in the Baltic states,
which Bolshevism had not yet controlled for a year, and consequently
it would have been possible to resume the former property situation
without further ado. To the unbounded astonishment of the populace,
however, the German administration marched forward to play the role
of receiver of the goods stolen by the Bolshevists. The necessity for
the restoration of private ownership for the psychological treatment
of the populace was referred to by all the General Commissioners in
the Baltic states; this population, as everybody knows, ought to be
won for German patriotism. Even after the Four Year Plan gave up its
old ideas in recognition that a further protraction of the restoration
of private ownership would damage even the German economic interests.
The fundamental profession of the reinstallation of the pre-Bolshevist
property law did not follow, though it was against every political
judgment and based only on the unfounded opposition of the Reichs
Commissar.
Again a real weapon for the disintegration of the enemy front had been
twisted out of our hand, a weapon whose effect may not be undervalued.
For the unrecompensed expropriation of private property by the
Bolshevists had aroused at the time not only the terror of Russian
bourgeois circles including the more prosperous peasants, but also
of the entire civilized world. The world, including the laborers and
peasants in the Soviet Union who were disillusioned by Bolshevism,
awaited now a clear policy in this question on the part of Germany.
This silence on the part of Germany obviously made itself of use to the
enemy propaganda, which could reliably persuade the Soviet masses that
Germany plans no restoration of individual ownership.
The Main Department for Politics furthermore has always emphasized that
the Eastern peoples must be told something concrete about their future.
The Department refers to the fact that in case we should not oppose
the propaganda of Stalin, the peoples would have to succumb to this
propaganda, that is to say, they would believe in their own enslavement
by Germany. The Main Department for Politics has accordingly often
directed the attention of Wehrmacht units to the expediency of having
the Slavic Eastern peoples receive calming assurances regarding their
future from the authoritative German quarters. As the best means, the
establishment of a sort of counter-regime to Stalin with a captured Red
general was indicated; or, if the word government should be avoided,
then just a rebellious general somewhat after the model of de Gaulle,
who should become the point of crystallization for all the Red soldiers
who are dissatisfied with Stalin. The correctness of this conception
has been confirmed in the time following its inception by countless
statements of prisoners of war, who have all stated independently that
the silence of Germany regarding the future of Russia allows the worst
to be feared. Many would like to desert, but they did not know to whom
they should go. Under the banner of a recognized counter-revolutionary
leader they would gladly and bravely fight against the Bolshevist
regime.
All the suggestions concerning this were rejected in their essentials.
Permission for front-line duty was effected only for groups of Turkish
and Caucasian peoples and finally after several refusals also for the
Estonians. Because of the difficulty of recruiting troops, the unit
generally came to the point of impressing civilians and prisoners of
war into their ranks, in the first line of rear-echelon services. But
even in the foremost line they found employment and fought well. Only
in the last few weeks under the pressure of danger from the partisans
was the formation of native units allowed and that only for combat
with the bandits. But even this measure will remain ineffective as far
as propaganda is concerned if a combat unit is not activated and a
personality with a resounding name is not put at its head.
The Main Department for Politics was compelled, for the sake of
attaining the above-outlined goal, to rescind or at least greatly
change measures from German quarters which would strengthen the enemy's
power of resistance.
Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be
named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of
thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps.
Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It
is especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only
for prisoners of war from the Soviet Unions, while complaints about
the treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French
and English, have not become loud. It is obvious that nothing is so
suitable for strengthening the power of resistance of the Red Army as
the knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to
be met. To be sure the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here
by unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the
fate of the prisoners of war. However this improvement is not to be
ascribed to political acumen, but to the sudden realization that our
labor market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced
the grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from
the occupied Eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of
hunger like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within
Germany. Now the food question no longer existed. In the prevailing
limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity, "recruiting" methods were used
which probably have their origin only in the blackest periods of the
slave trade. A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration
of health or age the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned
out immediately that far more than 100,000 had to be sent back because
of serious illnesses and other incapabilities for work. This system
in no way considered that these methods would of necessity have their
effect on the power of resistance of the Red Army, since these methods
were used only in the Soviet Union of course, and in no way remotely
resembling this form in enemy countries like Holland or Norway.
Actually we have made it quite easy for Soviet propaganda to augment
the hate for Germany and the National Socialist system. The Soviet
soldier fights more and more bravely in spite of the efforts of our
politicians to find another name for this bravery. Valuable German
blood must flow more and more, in order to break the resistance of the
Red Army. Obviously the Main Department for Politics has struggled
unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring workers and their
treatment within Germany on a rational foundation. Originally it was
thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost efforts at a minimum
cost of the biological knowledge has led to an improvement. Now 400,000
female household workers from the Ukraine are to come to Germany, and
already the German press announces publicly that these people have no
right to free time and may not visit theaters, movies, restaurants,
etc. and may leave the house at the most three hours a week apart from
exception concerning duty.
In addition there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reichs
Commissariat itself. With a presumption unequalled we put aside all
political knowledge and to the glad surprise of all the colored world
treat the peoples of the occupied Eastern territories as whites of
Class 2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for
Germany and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for
them, no solicitude can be given them. Their sustenance interests us
only insofar as they are still capable of labor, and in every respect
they are given to understand that we regard them as of the most minute
value.
In these circumstances the following can be determined:
1. The resistance power of the Red Army and the strength of the
partisan movement has mounted in the same degree as the population
realized our true enlistment for them. The feats of arms of our
noble army have been neutralized exactly as in 1918 by an inadequate
political policy. Our political policy has forced both Bolshevists and
Russian nationals into a common front against us. The Russian fights
today with exceptional bravery and self-sacrifice for nothing more or
less than recognition of his human dignity.
2. Our political policy of utilizing the Ukraine as a counter-weight
against mighty Russia, against Poland and the Balkans, and as a bridge
to the Caucasus, has suffered complete ship-wreck. The 40 million
Ukrainians who joyfully greeted us as liberators, are today indifferent
to us and already begin to swing into the enemy camp. Should we not
succeed in checking this situation in the last moment, then we run the
danger from day to day of having a partisan movement in the Ukraine,
which not only eliminates the Ukraine as a furnisher of food, but also
ties up the reinforcements of the German army, endangers its existence
and accordingly involves the danger of a German defeat.
If this danger which threatens the German people is to be prevented in
the last moment, then the following is necessary.
1. For the Ukraine an absolutely positive political policy must be
carried out in every respect. The Ukraine must not be merely an
objective of exploitation to us, but the populace must sincerely feel
that Germany is its friend and liberator. The German economic agencies
must be responsible for assuring the populace a minimum on which they
can exist. A compulsory conscription of labor in the occupied Eastern
territories must be restrained immediately. The treatment of Ukrainians
and other Eastern peoples within the Reich must be fair and human. In
publicity, both oral and written, everything must be avoided that is
in any way cognizant of the fact that we regard this territory as an
objective of exploitation. The Russian people must be told something
concrete about their future, particularly because Germany does not
have the intention nor the power to occupy the whole Russian area.
2. The policy of the officials of the Reichs Commissar for the Ukraine
is in general the exponent for the above described policy, which has
not recognized the role of the Ukraine in world politics, and has
succeeded in throwing away the friendship of 40 million people; and
which is guilty in this way of strengthening the power of resistance
of the Red Army and prolonging the war with all its consequences.
These officials see their only mission as the economic exploitation
of the country. The longer the war lasts, however, the more political
forces must be interposed. Therefore it would be opportune to place at
the head of the Reich Commissariat a personality who also possesses
sufficient political ability.
If we do not accomplish this change of course at once, then one can say
with certainty that the power of resistance of the Red Army and of the
whole Russian people will mount still more, and Germany must continue
to sacrifice her best blood. Yes, it must be openly stated that the
possibility of a German defeat approaches in a tangible proximity, all
the more so if the partisan movement for which Stalin is striving with
every means, should spread over a greater part of the Ukraine. One
should protest that in the South Ukraine such a danger does not exist
because of the lack of swamps and forests. The bandit leader Machino
needs to be remembered, he who for about 2 years terrorized the Ukraine
and knew how to avoid all persecutions. One should also not place his
hopes on the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Certainly the
losses in fertile land, raw materials and industrial projects are very
significant. On the other hand the Soviet Union still has the Ural
territory, fabulously rich in raw materials of all kinds, which for
fourteen years has been industrially developed with all power, as well
as rich Siberia. Finally we know that the Soviets have systematically
carried on an economic policy of hoarding reserves, and we cannot
completely tie up the English-American reserves.
However, if we accomplish the proposed change in policy, then it can
be believed certain that the decomposition of the Red Army will also
succeed. For the power of resistance of the Red Army man is broken the
moment that he becomes convinced that Germany brings him a better life
than he has led under the Soviets, and that Germany has a small bit
of consideration for his national qualities, in other words does not
intend to rob him of his soul.
The problem is too serious to be allowed to remain undecided. Here it
is a question of the future of the German race, under circumstances
concerning even its existence or non-existence. The permanent thesis of
the Main Department for Politics has proved itself true, that a quick
victory cannot be attained entirely by the aid of arms, but only in
conjunction with the application of a great political offensive. That
the administration of the occupied Eastern territories is composed
almost entirely of personnel not acquainted with Russia is probably one
of the reasons why this thesis has not been carried out. The gentlemen
slowly grope their way into the problem, for which the majority still
require interpreters. Nevertheless it is today already confirmed that
wide circles of the lower administrative chiefs in the Ukraine are
plainly frightened of the policy commanded by the higher echelon.
However, they are not in a position to have their way. So much the
more reason one should trust the interpretation of the Main Department
for Politics based on the best technical and social knowledge; the
Department is even today convinced of a speedy victorious conclusion of
the war, insofar as its political directives are followed.
Berlin, 25 October 1942
Signed: BRAEUTIGAM
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 315-PS
Copy
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 72, 12 March 1943
Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture
Current No... IV/1a - 907
Note
on a meeting held in the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda on 10 March 1943
Presiding: State Secretary Gutterer
For the participating agencies see invitation list of 5 March, among
others
Oberregierungsrat Hucho (GBA)
Reich Council for Agriculture Dr. Hatesaul
Referent Schwarz RNSI
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Brendler (Ministry for Food)
_Subject_: Directives for treatment of foreign workers employed in the
Reich.
In his introductory remarks, State Secretary Gutterer said that at the
suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels the Fuehrer has decided that
out of political considerations a uniform treatment of the problems
concerning foreigners will have to be secured immediately in all
agencies and a corresponding education of the German people will have
to be instituted.
The consolidation of the new Europe and the increased anti-communist
trend which have been played up by the foreign propaganda office demand
that in the treatment of foreign workers in the Reich immediately every
material which would be an incentive for a hostile attitude on the
part of the foreign workers should be eliminated. This is particularly
necessary in the treatment of the workers from the East. In this
instance the hitherto prevailing treatment of the Eastern workers has
led not only to a diminished production, but has most disadvantageously
influenced the political orientation of the people in the conquered
Eastern territories and has resulted in the well-known difficulties
for our troops. In order to facilitate military operations the morale
has to be improved by a better treatment of the Eastern workers in the
Reich.
In a decree issued 15 February to all district leaders [Gauleiter] and
Reich directors [Reichsleiter], Reich Ministry Dr. Goebbels has given
corresponding directives to party agencies. In order to instruct all
other agencies, managers and trade union members who are concerned with
Arbeitseinsatz, the Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda
has planned directives; these directives, issued in a draft (see
enclosure), served as a working basis for discussion.
In general the following is to be said about these directives:
The treatment of foreigners which until now was markedly different for
subjects of Western and Eastern countries will be put on a uniform
basis as much as possible, particularly the living standards of the
Eastern workers will be raised. The change introduced herewith in the
treatment of the foreigners will mainly affect the hitherto prevailing
Security Police measures of the Reichsfuehrer SS and of the Main
Security Office. The measures introduced by the management will be less
influenced. In general, the decrees which have been issued by the GBA
already and which, among others, are dealt with in the note for the
managers will be less affected. However, an increased repudiation of
mistreatment and beatings will come into effect. Accordingly, a more
severe punishment is planned for those supervisors and under officials
who commit such offenses. During the meeting considerable doubts were
voiced by the representatives of the Main Security Office of the Reich
and of the Party Chancellery. The former expounded the necessity for
the strict security police measures for the protection of the German
population and for the security of the Reich. The representative of
the party chancellery particularly pointed out the controversies which
already are appearing and which would result for the German population
if more freedom were granted to the foreigners.
The Reich Food Ministry is particularly interested in the following
points of the directives:
Under _Point 5_ it is declared that it is desired _to accommodate
the various nationalities separately_ in factories and camps. It was
pointed out by representatives of the GBA and Reichsnaehrstand that in
the future this cannot be carried out fully in agriculture too, because
of reasons of the Arbeitseinsatz. However, with the warning that this
measure is to be "striven for" in the future, permission has been given
to avoid changes in personnel beyond those hitherto exercised and that
this principle will be considered by the GBA in cases of new draftees,
just as it was done before.
_Point 7_: In principle, the foreign workers should receive the same
food rations. To this, the undersigned remarks that the rations are
varied according to nationalities (Eastern workers, Poles, other
foreigners) in order to account for the home customs. Also the
rations are varied according to the types of work performed (camp
rations, agricultural workers who provide their own food and special
rations for individual employees of the factory). The rations of the
foreign agricultural migrant labor differ insofar that on the basis
of state contracts various allowances in kind are given to them for a
part of their pay. A uniformity is being striven for. For the above
mentioned reasons, however, a complete uniformity on the basis of the
German allowances is impossible. The validity of these arguments was
recognized and the passage was deleted. Instead, clauses were added to
the effect that "full rations, as laid down in the regulations, should
be distributed" and that "the rations for those performing heavy and
extremely heavy work should be handed out only if the production is
accordingly great". Against these additional clauses no opposition was
voiced, final decision however was withheld.
_Point 8_: The demanded _new basis for wages_ of the Eastern workers
has been discussed already by the departments. A corresponding draft
of the GBA, equalizing the wages of Eastern and Polish workers, will
reach the departments in the near future. This new regulation would
fulfill an old wish of the Reich Food Ministry to equalize the wages
of the Polish and Eastern workers in order to increase production and
simplify the pay procedure.
_Point 9_: _Sick and pregnant female workers_ will not be _returned
anymore_ since they usually spread negative propaganda in their
country. Erection of dispensaries will meet with less difficulty in
the industry than in agriculture. However, they will be required
in agriculture too in order to free the farms from the care of
foreign workers. For the same reason, collective accommodations are
necessary for foreign children who were born in the Reich. Appropriate
negotiations are now in progress in the GBA.
On _page 7_ of the draft, all the above directives for all
organizations, agencies and individuals are declared as binding; the
agencies will be held responsible for the execution of these directives
in an orderly fashion. The latter seems to be an extremely far-reaching
demand, since the execution of a great part of these directives does
not depend on the wish of the agencies but on the limited possibilities
during the 4th year of the war, such as providing adequate clothing,
erection of barracks for the sick and for the foreign children born in
the Reich.
Also the suggested stricter punishment of infringements against these
directives seems to be objectionable. The arrogant and recalcitrant
attitude of some of the foreigners frequently forces the managers and
their representatives to use sharp measures in order to keep up the
production of the foreign workers. Insofar as certain abuses will
emerge in this process and these are punished not only as unpolitical
criminal actions but as acts of sabotage and in some cases as high
treason, the positions of the managers and their representatives will
be considerably weakened before the foreigners, and uncertainties will
result in regard to the treatment of the foreigners. These will lead to
a marked lack of discipline on the part of the foreigners. It would be
desirable that the final decision should be against this clause.
State Secretary Gutterer asked for comments on the draft by 16 March at
the latest. The Reich peasant leader [Dr. Hatesaul] agreed to deliver
to us the comments of the Reichsnaehrstand immediately.
Dead line matter, 15 March 1943!
To the Referat II B 2, II B 3, IV 9 in this building
Herewith I forward above copy of notes on a meeting held 10 March and
a copy of the draft with the request for comment. I ask for a prompt
reply in view of the deadline set by the Ministry for Enlightenment and
Propaganda.
Referat IV I a
Signed: DR. BRENDLER
certified
Signed: ROTZOW
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 318-PS
Main Bureau for Science
Chief of the Main Bureau
Ha/Sch. 2370
Berlin, the 5th December 1941
To Record Office for Cultural Policy
Attention Party Member Dr. Killer!
Inter-office Communication
_Concerns_: National Socialist German Association of University
Lecturers
Most Honored Party Member Dr. Killer!
After long negotiations we succeeded in reorganizing and fixing the
relations of the National Socialist German Association of University
Lecturers to one bureau. All details are in the enclosed photostatic
copy.
Heil Hitler!
Haertle
1 Enclosure Entrusted with the leadership
* * * * *
Principles concerning relations of the National Socialist German
Association of University Lecturers to the Fuehrer's Commissioner for
the supervision of the whole intellectual and ideological training and
education of the NSDAP as well as to the Chief of the Seminary [Hohe
Schule].
1. The Chief of the National Socialist German Association of University
Lecturers is bound by orders and directives of Reichsleiter Rosenberg
in all questions concerning intellectual and ideological training,
research and education.
2. The main task of the National Socialist German Association of
University Lecturers is to present the university lecturers a picture
of the history, the formation and the tasks of the National Socialist
movement, and to coordinate them in accordance with our ideology with
the great political aims of the Reich. The training has to correspond
with the requirements of the body of university lecturers.
3. Insofar as beyond this general education a supplementary training,
through working communities, university camps, etc. is required--these
training measures may be carried out with the provision that the tasks
mentioned in Art. 6 are not encroached upon.
4. The National Socialist German Association of University Lecturers
is obliged to submit to the Reichsleiter all plans for working
communities, conferences, camps, etc., with designation of topics and
names of the participants, always in time enough that the possibility
of his changing them in accordance with his duty as a leader is
assured. His objections and directives resulting from this are binding
and authoritative for the National Socialist German Association of
University Lecturers. This applies accordingly to the work of the
Association done abroad also.
5. Publications will be limited to the above mentioned tasks and
are to be submitted to the Main Bureau for Science 14 days before
publication. All publications have to bear a remark that the scientific
responsibility for the individual contributions lies exclusively upon
the author,--in order to avoid the impression of an official party
opinion. Reichsleiter Rosenberg will make the decision as to whether
the publications of the National Socialist German University Lecturers
Association are to be published by the Hoheneichen press.
6. When Reichsleiter Rosenberg plans for his mission, especially for
the seminary [Hohe Schule], the collection of professional groups in
the different fields of science, or the organization of scientific
meetings of university lecturers--the organizational measures will be
carried out by the National Socialist German Association of University
Lecturers.
7. Judgments and opinions of the National Socialist German Association
of University Lecturers concerning the appointments, assignments and
transfers of university lecturers are to be submitted to the Main
Bureau for Science and, at the same time, to the party chancery.
8. The appointment of the educational director of the National
Socialist German Association of University Lecturers will take place
with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. He will be called into
the Reich working community as a member for the education of the whole
NS movement.
Munich, the 2nd December 1941
Rosenberg
Fuehrer's Commissioner for the supervising
of the whole intellectual and ideological
training and education of the NSDAP and
Chief of the Seminary [Hohe Schule]
[Signature illegible]
Chief of the Party Chancellery
[Signature illegible] Chief of the National Socialist German
Association of University Lecturers.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 327-PS
DRMfdbO.
II 1 c 1183/44g.
Copies for the Political Main Staff Str. 19/10
Q 19/x: 20/10 Dr. Wetzelz.k W 21/10
P_{1} P_{2}
with request for acknowledgment, Dr. Kinkelein n.r.
Z.d. A. Str. 31/10
Pencilled Notes
Berlin, 17 October 1944
Copy
SECRET
To: The Chief of the Party Chancellery Reich Leader Martin Bormann
_Berlin W 8_ Wilhelmstr. 63/64
[Stamp]
Political Main Staff
Journal No. P1011 a/44g
Received 18 Oct. 1944
encl.
Subject: Actions against civilians in rear echelons.
Your circular No. 309/44 of 9 Oct. 1944.
Dear Party comrade Bormann:--
In order to prevent difficulties and delay--which is of course
not desired by you--in the liquidation of the companies under my
supervision, I have today dispatched the following telegram to the Gau
Leaders because of the particular urgency:
In order not to delay the liquidation of companies under my
supervision, I beg to point out that the companies concerned are
not private firms but business enterprises of the Reich so that also
actions with regard to them just as with regard to government offices
are reserved to the highest authorities of the Reich. I supervise the
following companies:
(_a_) Zentralhandelsgesselschaft Ost fuer landwirtschaftlichen Absatz
und Bedarf m.b.H. (ZO). (Central Trading Company East for Agricultural
Marketing and Requirements Limited)
(_b_) Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ostlund und Ukraine
(Agricultural Development Company Eastern Territories and Ukraine)
(_c_) Beschaffungsgessellschaft Ost m.b.H. (Supply Company East
Limited)
(_d_) Pharm.--Ost G.m.b.H. (Pharmaceutics--East Company Limited)
The following banks under my supervision are also not private firms:
(_e_) Zentralnotenbank Ukraine (Central Exchange Bank Ukraine)
(_f_) Notenbank Ostland (Exchange Bank Eastern Territories)
(_g_) Zentralwirtschaftsbank Ukraine (Central Commercial Bank Ukraine)
(_h_) Verband der Wirtschaftsbanken in der Ukraine. (Association of
Commercial Banks in the Ukraine)
(_i_) Gemeinschaftsbank Ostland und Weissruthenien. (Cooperative Bank
Eastern Territories and White Ruthenia)
The liquidation of these companies and banks has been discussed with
the Reich Plenipotentiary for total war effort and will be brought to
a close not later than by the end of this year. Assets suitable for
restitution of the companies have already been earmarked for the armed
forces and war economy. Therefore, any intervention with regard to
stocks and personnel does not only impede the liquidation of business
which is inevitably necessary but also delays the supply of goods to
the armed forces and war industry. For this reason I beg, to refrain
from any intervention.
The Chief of the Party Chancellory has a copy hereof.
Enclosed I am sending you a copy of my letter of today to the Reich
Plenipotentiary for total war effort from which you will note that the
liquidation of the companies under my supervision has been agreed upon
with the Reich Plenipotentiary and will be concluded at a relatively
close date considering the vast operations which are indispensable for
the liquidation in the interest of an orderly war economy. Restored
property not yet surrendered has already been earmarked for the armed
forces and war economy, so that any delay of the liquidation or perhaps
even independent confiscation of the property by the Gau Leaders would
impair or destroy an organized plan, something that should not be done
without a compelling reason in the interest of war economy. In order to
give you an idea of the past and present problems of these companies, I
am attaching enclosed a corresponding survey.
I beg you to acknowledge receipt of the telegram to the Gau Leaders.
Finally, I want to point out also that in my mind it is not correct
to simply order the Gau Leaders under the heading "actions against
civilians in rear echelons" to press the speeding up of the liquidation
of offices and establishments which have been brought back from the
occupied territories. Without doubt cases have occurred where such
pressure was warranted by all means. On the other hand, it has been
proven that, for instance, thousands of decent men and women as well
as firms, who have done their duty under the most difficult conditions
there, have been brought back from the occupied territories and have
recognized the need of the hour immediately, but can simply not
complete their work still necessary for the liquidation at present from
one day to the other. As far as the Eastern territories are concerned,
the above applies to the majority of the people assigned, so that I am
obliged to regret that you also associate these people with the most
ill-reputed term of rear-echelon.
Heil Hitler
Yours
Signed: A Rosenberg
SECRET
(1). _Zentralhandelsgessellschaft Ost fuer landwirtschaftlichen
Absatz und Bodarf m.b.H. (Z.O.)._ (Central Trading Company East for
Agricultural Marketing and Requirements Limited).
The following has been the mission of the Z.O. as a monopoly company
for the Eastern Territories:
(_a_) Collection of all agricultural products as well as commercial
marketing and transportation thereof. (Delivery to armed forces and
the Reich),
(_b_) Trusteeship of enterprises dealing with food supplies,
(_c_) Providing enterprises dealing with food supplies with special
equipment, supplying the agriculture with means of production and the
rural population with commodities (premium goods).
The following is the present mission of the Z.O.:
(_aa_) Winding up of transactions relative to commodities and
finances, particularly utilization of evacuated goods brought back
from the Eastern Territories and goods which did not come into use
there any more,
(_bb_) Collection of goods brought back from the agriculture and food
industry of other occupied territories (General Government West),
(_cc_) Remaining current business,
(_a_) Fulfillment of the original assignments in the remainder of the
Eastern Territories,
(_b_) Inter-territorial exchange of machines for the agriculture as
well as for the dairy industry and inter-territorial exchange of seeds
according to directives of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year
Plan--business section food.
The actual significance of the Z.O. and the volume of its transactions
can be seen from the following:
(1) 30 offices with 200 agencies were subordinated to each main office
for the Eastern Territories, the Central District and the Ukraine.
(2) 11 subsidiary companies of the food industry with 130 branches
were founded in the Ukraine.
(3) The Z.O. including its subsidiary companies employed at the peak
of its business during the summer of 1943 about 7,000 German party
members of the Reich and in addition has set up about 250 German firms
of the Reich.
(4) The total turn-over of the Z.O. amounted to about 5.6 milliard
Reichsmark, from its foundation until the 31st of March 1944.
(5) During this period, the Z.O. together with its subsidiaries has
collected:
Grain 9,200,000 tons
Meat and meat products 622,000 tons
Linseed 950,000 tons
Butter 208,000 tons
Sugar 400,000 tons
Fodder 2,500,000 tons
Potatoes 3,200,000 tons
Seeds 141,000 tons
Other agricultural products 1,200,000 tons
Eggs 1,075 million eggs
The following was required for transportation:
1,418,000 railroad box cars and 472,000 tons of boat shipping space.
(6) A total of 32,900 box cars of evacuated goods has been brought
back by the Z.O. of which
22,400 are grain, linseed and other seeds, etc.,
9,000 are agricultural machines, other machines, etc., and
1,500 are goods for supply and consumption.
While the utilization of the evacuated agricultural products has been
completed in the main part in spite of all difficulties by means of
transfer to the Reich Agencies, it has not been possible to effect the
utilization of the remaining goods (machines, furniture, supply goods
etc.) in the same time and with as little friction. The utilization of
these goods is being effected with the cooperation of the Commissioner
for utilization of goods, Dr. Kemna, for the Reich Minister of Economy
and the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production. Moreover, part
of these goods which are composed of thousands of types of different
goods must first be overhauled and repaired.
The number of personnel of the Z.O. and its subsidiary companies has
already been reduced from 7,000 to 681 employees, exclusive of 50
workers who are still working in the Eastern Territories.
(2). _Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ukraine_. (_Agricultural
Development Company, Ukraine_)
The Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ukraine (LBGU) had the following
missions (Figures according to status of 1st July 1943):
(_a_) Supervisory management of almost 31,000 collective farms and
agricultural cooperatives [former Kolhoze] with 1.7 million farms, of
almost 540,000 individual farms with an area used for cultivation of
maximum 38 million hektars (93.9 million acres)--24.5 million hectars
(60.5 million acres) during summer 1943--,
(_b_) Managing trusteeship of 1875 state-owned estates with an area
used for agriculture of 2.8 million hectars (6.9 million acres),
(_c_) Managing trusteeship of 72 breeding stations with an area of
124,000 hectars (306,400 acres), seed reproducing areas of 424,000
hectars (1,047,700 acres),
Trustee management of 17 offices for distribution of seeds of 270 seed
distribution points and of 619 seed depots with a seed capacity of
192,000 tons.
(_d_) Managing trusteeship of 900 machine and tractor stations (MTS)
with 49,600 tractors.
The LBGU maintained 1 central business office, 6 district offices (with
5 branch offices), 114 regional offices, 431 county offices, 2,870 base
offices and 400 supervisory bodies.
The LBGU has already completed the liquidation of the following affairs:
(1) Management of the general enterprises (see above under _a_),
(2) Management of the state-owned estates (see above under _b_),
(3) Sheep-breeders association Ukraine,
(4) Financial liquidation (balance-sheet of liquidation as of 1st July
1944 will be completed on 20th Oct. 1944).
At present the LBGU still attends to the following matters:
(_aa_) Utilization of still remaining 5,400 tons of highly valuable,
evacuated seeds (a total of 98,000 tons have been brought back), most
of which will be transferred to the Landbau-Gesellschaft m.b.H. (Land
Development Company Limited) founded recently by the Commissioner for
the Four Year Plan,--termination by the end of this year--,
(_bb_) Utilization of the rolling stock, parts of equipment and
similar matters confiscated by the armed forces.
(_cc_) Realization of the MTS evacuation depots and work shops. The
personnel used in connection with this (90 civilians, 34 military
personnel) occupied mainly with new problems regarding the employment
of agricultural machines and the repair thereof. The transfer of
these machines to the above mentioned Landbau-Gesellschaft has been
projected in the near future.
The number of personnel employed by the LBGU has been reduced from
4,500 German and Dutch workers as of 30 June 1943 to 410 as of 1st Oct.
1944.
Of these latter 248 were made available for other important war jobs,
especially in the general government, by way of orders and leaves from
present jobs. 28 employees are assigned to supervise 50,000 Ukrainian
workers in key-positions and skilled laborers of the LBGU. Another 90,
as mentioned, are employed for the problems of utilizing agricultural
machines and for the repair thereof (see above _cc_). Consequently,
only 44 persons are employed to wind up the remaining affairs.
(3). _Beschaffungsgesellschaft Ost m.b.H. (BGO). (Supply Company East
Limited)_
The BGO has been founded with the purpose to procure machines and other
investment goods for the economy of the Eastern Territories as well as
to perform special assignments.
Today, it has the following assignments:
(_a_) Winding-up of concluded business-contracts (50 mill. Reichsmark
of a total procurement in the value of 115 mill. Reichsmark),
according to which deliveries will be made within the next 9 months;
(_b_) Procurement of machine tools and wood-working machines by order
of the Reich Minister for Armament and War production.
(_c_) Collection and utilization of economic assets evacuated from
the Eastern Territories and the General Government whereby the BGO
acts as an executive company for Dr. Kemna, the Commissioner for the
utilization of goods for the Reich Minister for Economy and the Reich
Minister for Armament and War-production (see Annex (1) and (2)).
(_d_) Liquidation of the Steine und Erden Ost G.m.b.H. (Stone and Soil
East Company Limited).
_To (a)_: According to orders by the Reich Minister for Armament and
War production the machines which are being delivered in agreement with
current business contracts are being transferred particularly to German
industries damaged by bombing. The other deliveries are being disposed
of in accordance with orders of the OKH/Chief H Ruest u.BdH. (Supreme
Command Army) as well as of the economic administrative agencies and of
the Planning Commissioners.
_To (b)_: This procurement is also done for the German industry.
_To (c)_: The execution of these assignments is in full swing, and
the work connected with it is steadily increasing. So far the BGO has
collected about 1,000 carloads of evacuated goods. One part of these
is directed by the B.G.O. to agencies charged with their utilization
which operate under its management. Another part--particularly machines
and investment goods--are stored in own depots, repaired, catalogued
and catalogue submitted to the Office of Armament Supplies as well
as to Special Agencies [Sonderringe--Committees set up by Speer to
organize the production of component parts of the armament industry]
and apportioned according to their directions to the Armament Industry.
The number of personnel employed at present by the BGO is 118 employees
of whom 55 are male employees.
(4). _Pharm-Ost G.m.b.H._ (Pharmaceutics--East Company Limited).
The company had the assignment to supply the Eastern Territories with
medicines and other drugs within the range of human and veterinary
medicines as well as with all equipment for medical and veterinary
requirements, hospital requirements, etc.
Apart from supplying the remainder of the Eastern Territories, the
company's main assignment at present is essentially to direct the
evacuated goods to other consumers, the armed forces in particular, its
stocks and those goods which are to be delivered according to business
contracts already concluded, while observing the necessary financial
liquidation procedure.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 342-PS
Reichs Commissioner for the East [Ostland] Sect. II h
Directions concerning the Treatment of Jewish Property in the Reich
Commissariat Ostland of 13 October 1941
Par. 1
The total, movable and immovable properties of the Jewish population in
the territories governed by the Reich's Commissioner for Eastern areas
are placed under confiscation by the administration for the commission
and the seizure according to the following regulations.
Par. 2
Property is defined as movable and immovable objects along with all
accessories, claims, commissions, rights and interests of all types.
Par. 3
1. The confiscation will be carried out by the Reich's commissioner
for the East or those officers who have been authorized by him. It can
be carried out by directives to individual persons or in general by a
proclamation and can be limited to individual objects of wealth.
2. The following shall be excluded from confiscation:
_a._ That part of the household furniture which will take care of the
base essentials of life.
_b._ Cash, bank and savings credit, as well as bonds, up to a total
value of one hundred Reichsmarks.
Par. 4
1. With the confiscation the previous owner loses all rights to dispose
of the confiscated property.
2. Whoever has confiscated property in possession or custody, will
administer it until further notice. The changing or disposal of the
property or of its profits will only be allowed inside the bounds of
orderly management. All other measures taken beyond this will need the
approval of the Reichs commissioner for the East or those agencies
authorized by him.
Par. 5
1. The property that is placed under confiscation can be brought under
the administration of the commission, so far as it is necessary for
orderly management.
2. The assuming of control by the administrative commission will at the
same time be looked upon as confiscation.
3. The Reichs commission for the East will issue directives about the
arrangement and management of this administration.
Par. 6
1. Confiscated property can be called in by the Reichs commissioner for
the East or by the agencies authorized by him.
2. The disposal of the confiscated property will be left to the
authorized agencies.
3. These agencies will decide with finality, using administrative
means, on the debts which belong to the confiscated property. The
responsibility will be limited to the sales value of the confiscated
property.
Par. 7
Bids for the purchase of the property which comes under confiscation
can be publicly advertised.
Par. 8
The responsible authorities can demand information from everyone to
carry out their task.
Par. 9
1. The following will be punished with a prison sentence and monetary
fine or one of those punishments.
_a._ Those who will undertake to withdraw an object of value from the
offices of the civil authorities or those installed with the authority
for disposal, or in any other manner to thwart, to evade, or to impair
the action of confiscation.
_b._ Those who intentionally or carelessly do not fulfill in due time
or completely one of those directives imposed upon him such as an
order of execution or other directive of execution, and the report and
information obligations concerning it.
2. In severe cases the punishment is penal servitude. If the accused is
charged with willful disobedience or should it be any other especially
severe case the death sentence is authorized.
Par. 10
The Reichs commissioner for the East will issue the necessary measures
to carry out those directives.
Par. 11
The directive will go into effect on the day of its publication.
Riga, the 13 October 1941
The Reichs Commissioner for the East
Signed: LOHSE
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 343-PS
Field Marshal Milch
Berlin,--W 8, Leipzigerstrasse 7, 31 Aug 1942
Dear Mr. Himmler!
I thank you very much for your letter of the 25 Aug. I have read
with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg. I am
informed about the current experiments. I shall ask the two gentlemen
to give a lecture combined with the showing of motion pictures to my
men in the near future.
Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the occasion of my
next visit to Headquarters I remain with best regards and
Heil Hitler!
yours
[signed] E. Milch
Mr. Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler _Berlin SW
11_.
SECRET
Field Marshal Milch
Berlin W 8, Leipzigerstrasse 7, 20 May 1942
Dear Wolffy!
In reference to your telegram of 12 May our sanitary inspector reports
to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Air Force
at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments
seems essentially unreasonable. However the carrying out of experiments
of some other kind, in regard to perils at high seas, would be
important. These have been prepared in immediate agreement with the
proper offices; Major (M.C.) Weltz will be charged with the execution
and Capt (M.C.) Rascher will be made available until further orders in
addition to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A
change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an enlargement
of the task is not considered pressing at this time.
The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperature
experiments. It is urgently needed at another place and therefore can
no longer remain in Dachau.
I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the Air Corps
to the SS for their extensive cooperation.
I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with
Heil Hitler!
Always yours
[Signed] E. Milch
Mr. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff
_Berlin SW 11_
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 347-PS
Copy of a Copy
I Ju 3 D 9 Tgb No 783/449
18 April 44 [in pencil]
To the Reich Youth Leader Artur Axmann
Berlin-Charlottenburg 9
Kaiserdamm 45/46
Dear Party Member Axmann:
My chief of the department youth, Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer has proposed
to me the plan to let the youth of the Latvian and Estonian peoples
participate in complete age groups in the military education camps of
the Hitler Youth.
I thank you, party member Axmann, for the generous invitation of the
Hitler Youth to the Youth organization of the Baltic districts [General
Bezirken]. I agree with you in the expectations, which we connect with
the enlargements of the camps, begun with such success in East-Prussia.
The experience of Germany is best able to liberate the youth from
thinking about small states and to explain to them the understanding
for the European obligation. Furthermore, I expect especially through
the conscription of entire age groups, that the military education
will make itself felt in the military aspect. Only the education of an
entire age group has influence on the reserve situation. The reserve
situation of the Estonian and Latvian Legion is marked especially
by the lack of noncommissioned officers and instructors. If we can
eliminate this lack by the universal military education of the growing
age groups, that will mean for the future a considerable inner
strengthening of not small parts of our Northern front.
The first General directors as well as state directors in Estonia
and Latvia in the meantime have been instructed, to create the legal
basis, which are necessary for the execution of required military
education. Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer could assure me that the inner
readiness exists on the part of the youth. Also the organization and
leaders of the youth will never close their ears to this commitment.
However, I must draw your attention to the doubts, which are in the
way of the military education of the _Latvian and Estonian youth on
German soil_; I have consciously refrained from issuing the necessary
orders on my own competence, but have asked Commissioner General to
cause the countries own administration to publish the appropriate
orders. Because of their own orders, these agencies will also have
to issue the specific orders for the individual commitments. This is
according to our policy, to relieve the German authorities from all the
more technical and administrative problems, which touch little on our
leadership and educational mission, and to leave to the countries own
administration freedom of action.
However, according to the conferences which have taken place so far,
it cannot be expected that General Dankers or Dr. Mae will order their
youth organizations on their own, to conduct the military education
not in Latvia or Estonia, but in East-Prussia or in Warthegau. This
viewpoint is partly caused by the more or less expressed fear, to be
suspected by reactionary circles to favor a so called Germanization.
General Dankers and Dr. Mae can also point out, that the transfer
of the Latvian and Estonian pre-military education of the youth
contradicts the above-mentioned principles, which we customarily
observe in the realm of the remaining administration. I cannot
include a camp education, which primarily is to alleviate the most
dire needs of an inadequate recruit training as a matter of our
basic German educational mission. In the military education camps,
the young Latvians are trained under Latvian leaders in the Latvian
language,--not because this is our ideal, but because absolute military
necessity demands this. If General Dankers or Dr. Mae express the
wish, and they have done so, to conduct such camps on Latvian or
Estonian soil, I am not able to oppose them with any serious reasons.
I consider the arrangement of the most necessary suppositions for the
future military service an immediate and simply practical mission of
the countries own youth activity. The permission, that the countries
own youth organizations, even if only in part and under German
leadership, can carry out the military education in the country,
gives them a considerable power toward those circles, still opposing,
and is also able to increase the enthusiasm, especially of the
youth. Our policy must adapt itself in the necessary extent toward
this immediate goal, to rouse the Baltic peoples to the highest war
effort of all forces. I am sure that the adaptability and educational
capacity of the youth demand other measures from us, than those which
can be advocated by us in our policies toward the adult parts of the
population. However, politics and the education of the youth must
perform in common according to the necessities of war, which gives
us the problem to mobilize all available forces for victory. Even
under these conditions, there are enough possibilities for Germany to
exercise influence. The universal execution of the military education
based on compulsory service with regard to the location of the camp
gives us the possibility to increase the share of the German camps. Two
or three camps in Estonia and Latvia therefore act as advertising for
the camps within Germany; for in contrast to the Germanic peoples of
the West, the military education is no longer to be carried out through
_voluntary enlistments, but through legal conscription_. The camps in
Estonia and Latvia as well, will have to be under German leadership,
and as military education camps of the Hitler youth, they must be a
symbol of our educational mission beyond Germany's borders.
I consider the execution of the military education of the Estonian and
Latvian youth not only a military necessity, but also a war mission of
the Hitler youth especially. I would be thankful to you, party member
Axmann, if the Hitler youth would put itself at our disposal with the
same readiness, with which they have so far supported our work in the
Baltic Area.
Heil Hitler!
[signed] Lohse
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 351-PS
LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE REICH CABINET SINCE 30 JANUARY 1933
_Reichs Chancellor_ Adolf Hitler, appointed 30 January 1933
_Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor_ since 2 August 1934
-------------------------------------+-----------+-------------+---------
Name | Appointed | Reappointed | Resigned
-------------------------------------+-----------+-------------+---------
The Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor | | |
von Papen | 30.1.1933 | |30.7.1934
| | |
1. The Deputy of the Fuehrer | | |
Hess, Reichsminister without | | |
portfolio | 1.12.33 | |
| | |
2. Reichs Minister of Foreign | | |
Affairs--Freiherr von Neurath | 2.6.32 | 30.1.33 |
| | |
3. Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
of the Interior--Dr. Frick | 30.1.33 | |
| | |
4. Reichs War Minister and | | |
Supreme Commander of the | | |
Armed Forces--von Blomberg | 30.1.33 | |
| | |
5. Reichs Minister for Finance--Graf | | |
Schwerin von Krosigk | 2.6.32 | 30.1.33 |
| | |
6. Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
of Economy--Dr. Hugenberg--Dr. | 30.1.33 | | 29.6.33
Schmitt | 29.6.33 | [1] | 30.7.34
| | [2] | 30.1.35
| | |
Commissioned: | | |
President of the Reichs Bank | | |
Directorate--Dr. Schacht | 30.7.34 | Temporary or
| | 6 months
| 30.1.35 | Until further notice
| | |
7. Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
for Labor--Seldte | 30.1.33 | |
| | |
8. Reichs Minister of Justice--Dr. | | |
H.C. Guertner | 2.6.32 | 1.2.33 |
| | |
9. Reichs Postmaster General | | |
and Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
of Transportation--Freiherr | | |
von Eltz-Ruebenach | 1.6.32 | 30.1.33 |
| | |
10. Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
for Food and Agriculture-- | | |
Dr. Hugenberg | 30.1.33 | | 29.6.33
Darre | 29.6.33 | |
| | |
11. Reichs Minister for | | |
Enlightenment and Propaganda--Dr. | | |
Goebbels | 13.3.33 | |
| | |
12. Reichs Minister for | | |
Aviation--Goering | | |
Reichs Minister without portfolio | 30.1.33 | |
Reichs Minister for Aviation | 5.5.33 | |
| | |
13. Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
for Science and Education-- | | |
Rust | 1.5.34 | |
| | |
14. Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
for Church Affairs--Kerrl | | |
Reichs Minister without portfolio | 16.6.34 | |
Reichs and Prussian Minister | | |
for Church Affairs | 16.7.35 | |
| | |
15. Reichs Minister without | | |
portfolio | 19.12.34 | |
| | |
| | |
State Secretary of the Reichs | | |
Cabinet: | | |
| | |
Dr. Lammers, State Secretary and | | |
Chief of the Reichs Chancellory | 30.1.33 | |
| | |
Press Chief of the Reichs Cabinet-- | | |
Funk | 30.1.33 | |
| | |
Director of the Ministry | 30.1.33 | |
| | |
State Secretary in the Reichs | | |
Ministry for Enlightenment | | |
and Propaganda | 13.3.33 | |
-------------------------------------+-----------+-------------+---------
[Footnote 1: 30.7.34 Relieved from the Office of the Reichs Minister
for Economy for 6 mos.]
[Footnote 2: 30.1.35 Relieved of his offices.]
Present at the First Session of the Cabinet of Adolf Hitler on 30
January 1933 at 5:00 p.m.
-----------------------------------------+---------------------
Present: |
-----------------------------------------+---------------------
Reichs Chancellor | Hitler
|
Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor |
and Reichs Commissar for the |
State of Prussia | von Papen
|
Reichs Minister of Foreign Affairs | Freiherr von Neurath
|
Reichs Minister of the Interior | Dr. Frick
|
Reichs Minister of Finance | Graf Schwerin
| von Krosigk
|
Reichs Minister of Economy | Dr. Hugenberg
|
Reichs Minister of Labor | Seldte
|
Reichs Minister of Justice |
|
Reichs Defense Minister | von Blomberg
|
Reichs Postmaster General and |
Reichs Minister for Transportation | Freiherr von
| Eltz-Ruebenach
|
Reichs Minister and Reichs Commissar |
for Aviation | Goering
|
Reichs Commissar for Procurement |
of Labor | Dr. Gercke
|
State Secretary in the Reichs |
Chancellory | Dr. Lammers
|
State Secretary in the Office of |
the Reichs President | Dr. Meissner
|
Reichs Press Chief, Director in the |
Ministry | Funk
|
Responsible for the Protocol Counsellor |
in the Ministry | Wienstein
|
Reichs Minister for Food and Agriculture | Dr. Hugenberg
-----------------------------------------+---------------------
_Subject: The Political Situation._
The _Reichs Chancellor_ opens the session and explains that millions of
people within Germany would joyfully greet this day on which a Reich
Cabinet under his leadership had been appointed by the Reich President.
He asked the members of the Cabinet to give him their confidence as he
himself had confidence in each member of the Cabinet.
Then the Chancellor stated that he intended to suggest to the Reich
President the appointment of the Counsellor in the Ministry, Dr.
Lammers, to the post of State Secretary in the Reich Chancellor in
place of the retired State Secretary Planck, and the appointment of
the member of the Reichstag, Walter Funk, to the post of Director in
the Ministry and Director of the Press Office in place of the retired
Director in the Ministry, Marcks.
The Reich Cabinet took note of this. There were no objections against
his proposal.
The Reich Chancellor then opened a discussion about the political
situation.
Reich Minister Goering stated that he had contacted the Center Party.
The Center Party felt offended because they had not been informed
about the development of the situation. As he had been informed Reich
Chancellor von Papen had not contacted the representatives of the
Center Party. He, Reich Minister Goering, was under the impression that
the Center Party expected certain concessions from the present Reich
Cabinet.
The Reich Minister for Economy and Reich Minister for Food and
Agriculture stated that it would be wise to avoid any brusque actions
toward the Center Party. However, the representation of the Center
Party in the Reich Cabinet was to be avoided since, in his opinion, it
would endanger the unity of decisions of that body.
The Reich Chancellor pointed out that adjournment of the Reichstag
would be impossible without the collaboration of the Center Party. One
might, however, consider suppressing the Communist Party to eliminate
its votes in the Reichstag and by this measure achieve a majority in
the Reichstag. Based on his experiences, however, such suppressions of
parties were of no avail. He was afraid that heavy political fights
and possibly a general strike might be the result of this contemplated
suppression of the Communist Party of Germany. Surely the economy
of the count needed settled conditions. If, however, one discussed
the question of the greater danger for the national economy, the
uncertainty and unrest connected with new elections or a general
strike, then one had to arrive at the conclusion that a general strike
would be far more dangerous for the national economy.
It appeared flatly impossible to suppress the 6,000,000 people who
stood behind the Communist Party of Germany. It might be possible,
however, to achieve a majority for the new Reich Cabinet after
dissolving the Reichstag and the new elections which had to fall soon.
The best thing, however, would be if the Reichstag should adjourn
itself voluntarily.
The Reich Minister for Economy and the Reich Minister for Food and
Agriculture explained that he certainly has no longing for a general
strike. In his opinion, however, it was impossible to avoid the
suppression of the Communist Party of Germany. If that were not done
one could not achieve a majority in the Reichstag, certainly not a
majority of two-thirds.
After the suppression of the KPD the passage of an enabling law through
the Reichstag would be possible. He doubted that there would be a
general strike after the suppression of the KPD. He preferred the
suppression of the KPD to new elections.
Reich Minister Goering stated that the Communists had planned a
demonstration for this evening (30 January), which he had prohibited.
On the basis of his investigations the KPD would not be prepared for a
general strike at the present. The social democrats were pressing for a
discussion in Reichstag.
In his opinion it would be best to dissolve the Reichstag as soon as
possible and to hold new elections. The Reich Chancellor had given his
word that the present constellation of the Reich Cabinet would not be
altered even after new elections.
The Reich Chancellor confirmed the correctness of this statement.
The Reich Minister for Labor declared that there was great joy in the
ranks of the Steel Helmet [Stahlhelm] about the forming of the present
Reich Cabinet. There was no more friction between the Steel Helmet and
the SA.
In his opinion it would not be wise to let the first act of the present
Reich Cabinet consist in the suppression of the KPD which might result
in a general strike.
The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Commissar for Prussia
pointed out that the German nation needed a rest. In his opinion it
would be best initially to request an Enabling Law from the Reichstag.
If such a law would not be passed the situation could be tackled anew.
The Reich Chancellor declared that the general strike was not to be
taken lightly. To suppress a possible general strike the Reichswehr
should not be committed, if possible.
The Reich Minister for Defense thanked the Reich Chancellor for this
attitude and emphasized that the soldier is only used to thinking of
his opponent as an enemy from outside.
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the question of
whether a suppression of the KPD with the possible consequence of a
general strike were to be preferred to new elections for the Reichstag
under foreign political consideration. He came to the conclusion that
a suppression of the KPD with the possible consequence of a general
strike would be, by far, the more serious outlook.
The Reich Minister for Finance pointed out that the financial status
of the Reich, the States, and the Counties could only be adjusted
through a slow improvement of the economic situation. He regarded the
suppression of the KPD as a last political means. State Secretary Dr.
Meissner proposed for the discussion whether an Enabling Law was to be
proposed which would contain provisions for measures to be taken by
the Reich Cabinet in the interest of combating unemployment. Such an
Enabling Law would only require a simple majority in the Reichstag.
Reich Commissar Dr. Gereke stated that the Center Party would not
tolerate the Cabinet. Speedy new elections to the Reichstag would
become necessary. The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich
Commissar for the State of Prussia suggested that the Reich Chancellor,
in an interview, would state at the earliest opportunity that the
rumors about the danger of inflation and the rumors about the danger
of the rights of civil servants are untrue. The Reich Chancellor
agreed to this. He further informed the meeting that he would contact
representatives of the Center Party in the morning of 31 January.
A new meeting of the Ministers is to take place on 31 January at 4:00
p.m.
The Reich Cabinet took note of this.
Signed: Wienstein 31.1.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 352-PS
Copy
THE REICH MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE REICH CHANCELLERY
Rk. 8008D
Berlin, 14 June 1942
Fuehrer's Headquarters
To the Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration [General
bevollmaechtigter die Reichs Norwaltung]
Subject: The Jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers for the Defense
of the Reich [Ministerats fuer die Reichsverteidigung]
Your letter of 3 June 1942--CBV Nr. 493/42/2882--. Recently the Fuehrer
announced in accord with the opinions of the Reich Marshal of the
Greater German Reich as shown in my letter of 20 Feb. 1940-RK. 624B-
that he believes it practical to reserve certain legislative missions
for the Reich Cabinet. With this he has not limited the competency
of the Council of Ministers for the defense of the Reich but given a
directive as to how legislation should be handled under the point of
view of practicability. I have no doubt that the Fuehrer, as well as
the Reich Marshal, have not changed their point of view, in particular
regarding the fact that at the present there should be only legislation
important in the cause of war, and that they will stress the fact that
the Fuehrer himself and the Reich Cabinet should not be eliminated
from the powers of legislation. It will have to be tested from time to
time what measures will be reserved for the Reich Cabinet. My letter
of 20 February 1940, and the opinions of the Fuehrer therein expressed
may serve as a directive even if the limitations indicated by me are
no longer applicable in their full meaning. I would therefore suggest
not basing the discussions with the Reich Minister of Finance on the
question of competency of the Reich Cabinet or the Council of Ministers
for the defense of the Reich, but on the question of whether it would
be practical to achieve settlement through either Reich law or a Decree
from the Council of Ministers for the defense of the Reich in the sense
of the opinions voiced by the Fuehrer.
Signed: Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 374-PS
Berlin Nr 234404 9.11.2355
To all state police offices and state police administrative offices.
--To director or his deputy.
This teletype message is to be transmitted immediately in the most
rapid way.
1. Actions against the Jews and in particular against their synagogues
will occur in a short time, in all of Germany. They are not to be
hindered. However, it is to be made certain, in agreement with the
ordinary police, that plundering and similar law breaking will be held
to a minimum.
2. Insofar as important archive material is present in the synagogues,
it is to be secured by immediate measures.
3. The seizure of some 20 to 30 thousand Jews in the Reich is to be
prepared. Wealthy Jews above all are to be chosen. More detailed
directives will appear in the course of this night.
4. If, in the course of this action, Jews are found in possession of
arms then the sharpest measures are to be employed. Special troops of
the SS as well as the general SS can be drawn into the total action. In
any case the direction of the actions through the State police is to be
assured by proper measures.
_Addenda for State Police Cologne_:
In the synagogue of Cologne there is especially important material.
This is to be made safe, immediately, by the quickest measures in
agreement with the Security Services.
Gestapo I Mueller
This teletype is secret
* * * * *
SECRET
Blitz Munich 47767 10,11.38 0120
To all State police administrative offices and State police offices.
To all Security Service O.A. and W.S.
_Subject_: Tonight's measures against Jews.
On the basis of the attack upon Legation Secretary v. Rath in Paris
demonstrations against the Jews are to be expected in the entire Reich
tonight 9 to 10 November 38. The following orders are issued for the
treatment of these incidents.
1. The directors of the administrative offices of the State police or
their deputies have to take up, by long-distance phone, negotiations
with the proper political directorates of their regions --Gauleitung
or Kreisleitung--immediately upon the receipt of this telegram and to
unify a discussion of the carrying out of the demonstrations to which
the proper inspector or commander of the regular police is to be drawn.
In this conference the political direction is to be informed that the
German police has received from the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of
the Police the following orders to which the measures of the political
directorate should comply.
2. Only such measures are to be taken, which do not entail a danger to
German life and property (for example: burning of synagogues only if no
fire hazard is present in the neighborhood).
3. As soon as the course of events tonight permits the use of the
appointed officials for this purpose, as many Jews are to be seized,
especially wealthy ones, in all regions as can be accommodated in the
prisons at hand. Moreover, only healthy, male Jews of not too great
an age are to be seized. After carrying out the seizure, negotiations
are to be taken up at once with the proper concentration camps for the
quickest accommodation of the Jews.
Signed: HEYDRICH
SS Gruppenfuehrer
* * * * *
Police radio service--Radio Hannover
_Urgent--Secret_
SSD Berlin 133 10; 11 2110
To all political authorities
As soon as notices of the ending of the action arrive from the Gau
administration take action that destroyed shops are so shut up with
boards, etc., that the destruction is as little visible as possible.
Have owners directed in certain cases to work under police orders to
carry this out. Have the ruins of synagogues, etc., removed as quickly
as possible.
Chief of the regular police
Special command staff of the High Command g. a. Nr 224/38
* * * * *
Appendix
National Socialist German Workers Party
Gau Coblenz--Trier
Coblenz June 7, 1933
Propaganda Department
To all Kreis directorates
_Subject_: List M. 18, Jew baiting Nr 2
You will receive in the next few days a list of the communities of
your districts in which you will find the Jewish firms and businesses
of your district. You will immediately check in your whole district
whether the addresses given are correct or whether some have been
forgotten. The highest importance is to be placed on accuracy since the
list is to be printed.
_Subject_: Jew baiting
The district directorate will set up a committee which has the task of
directing and supervising the communities in the whole district. The
strength of this committee will be determined by the district directed.
You are to inform the Gau-propaganda directorate at once of the
committees named. The Gau propaganda directorate will then set itself
in coordinating with these committees through you.
_Present tasks of the committees._
The committee will form in all the local groups and support localities
such committees whose names shall be known only to the district
committee. The members of the sub-committees shall report to the
district committee the names of those Party members and other Germans
who buy from Jews. The district committee will publish articles whose
content is such that it will point out to the miscreant members of the
nation the shamefulness of their deed, and will make them aware of the
shame to which they would be subjected if they were proceeded against
publicly. This article must be arranged so that only the addresses of
those involved, the business and the time in which he made the purchase
will be given. The article should bear no signature and will be posted
on various posting spots. Further the committees have to secure female
clerks from Jewish stores, who can then very easily name those who
purchase in Jewish shops. This demands some caution and has to be done
with the greatest secrecy. The names of these clerks shall in no case
be mentioned. Negotiations are to be undertaken with the association
for the employed middle class so that it will prepare the means for
this action and will assume the responsibility of finding a new job in
another shop of equal importance in case the clerk loses her job. Her
name must not be given, only the number.
The district directorate will point out in all gatherings of members
or in all public gatherings that the Jew in all countries is again
carrying on a low attack which is greatly harmful to Germany. It must
be made clear to the masses that no German may buy from a Jew. It is
also to be demanded of the Party membership that it constantly bring
this to the attention of its friends and acquaintances. The Party
membership must go so far in the interest of the nation that it cease
friendship with best acquaintances if the latter continue to purchase
from Jews. It must go so far that no German will speak to a Jew if it
is not absolutely necessary, and this must be particularly pointed out.
German girls who go with Jews are to be made cognizant of the
shamefulness of their actions. A member of our party must, in no way,
have anything to do with such a person.
Heil Hitler
Signed: Bang
Gau-Propagandaleiter
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 375-PS
TOP SECRET
Berlin, 25 August 1938
General Staff of the 5th Section (German Air Force)
(Genstb. 5. Abteilung)
No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2)
_For Commanders only_ [_CHEF-SACHE_]
THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY
Subject: Extended Case Green [GRUEN--code for Czechoslovakia.]
Estimate of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.
A. _Initial Political Situation_:
1. The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case
Green.
It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if _active
military assistance by Great Britain_ is definitely assured.
2. The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the Western
Powers.
3. It is _not_ expected for the moment that other states will intervene
against Germany.
_The Dutch-Belgian area_ assumes in this connection much more
importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during
the World War. This mainly as an advanced base for the air war.
4. _The United States of America_ will immediately support the fight of
the Western Powers with strong ideological and economic means.
5. _Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan_ are regarded as
benevolent neutrals.
B. _Initial Military Situation_:
1. The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military assistance
only in the case of an _unprovoked_ attack. At least an agreement of
the French and British views as to the legal aspect has to be achieved.
If only for _political reasons_ we have to consider the 2nd day as the
earliest possible day of war on a European scale. In cast of a 24 hour
ultimatum it would be the 3rd day.
2. It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hostilities
will only take place after the French armed forces _have been
tactically deployed_. That means within the fourth to eighteenth day.
This to
a. use the deployment as a means of political pressure,
b. and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed.
3. _The war aim of the Entente Powers_ is to be considered as the
overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. With other
words through a _long_ war.
4. The following are possible methods of operation for the French army:
a. to man and hold the Maginot-line,
b. to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the beginning of the
war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr-territory.
_All suppositions support the first alternative._
5. _The French Air Force_ will probably attack both economic and German
Air Force targets as well as military and communication objectives.
Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved at any one place.
6. The _French Navy_ will probably cooperate through operations with
the _British sea power_ to supplant the North Sea blockade. The aim
will be the maintenance of naval predominance in the Atlantic and the
Western Mediterranean.
7. The _British Air Force_ is assumed to be committed from English
bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and the North Sea
ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neutrality will be violated.
A _camouflaged aircraft reporting network_ in Belgium and the
Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of the
war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air Force need
be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it is held to be out
of the question for any large parts of the British armed forces to be
transferred to France.
8. Provision seems to have been made for the use of North French ground
organizations during the _course of the war_ at least by part of the
attacking British Air Forces.
The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields in
Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of moving
advanced elements of the air defenses of London (light fighters and
reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while.
9. Thanks to the expected neutrality of Poland, the active
_participation of Soviet Russia_ will be largely restricted to the
prosecution of the war in the Baltic.
Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic coast
are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are regarded as
possible.
10. The basic assumption in respect to _our own prosecution of the
war_ is that two war plane air forces will be available in the West at
the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war plane air forces
in all after three to four weeks. The aim will be to bring about a
decision by the defeat of the Western powers.
C. _Task of the German Air Force_:
The German Air Force has at present not all the forces necessary to
seek a decision by attacking the enemy's war economy with the aid of
the navy. The prime responsibility of the German Air Force in the
present situation must be to help the armed forces immobilized opposite
a fortified front to achieve operational freedom.
D. _Enemy War Plane Forces_:
1. The _French Air Force_ will have on the 1st October some 640 war
planes in the front line units on French home territory of which not
more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of performance. Available
reserves total about 320 obsolete war planes.
There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa for use in
colonial war or against Southern Italy.
It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be deployed
for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France at the
beginning of the war. They will be employed against various targets
(air force targets, industrial and communications targets, military
installations, Army targets) in the operational area as well as in
depth according to the capabilities of their personnel and equipment.
Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslovakia is
regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, as is the
concentrated commitment of large formations against the armies fighting
in Czechoslovakia.
2. _The British war plane force_ will consist of some 850 war planes on
October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as modern. The majority
of the front line aircraft as well as some 200 to 300 reserve aircraft
can be described as only conditionally serviceable in the face of
modern defences.
Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane formations
are _not_ in a position to carry on a _vigorous_ air war from their
home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch or Belgian territory.
Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the modern war
planes need to be taken into account as a serious threat to the Ruhr.
A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be expected
at the earliest, after several weeks of war.
If the French Army Command decides to march through Belgium and the
Netherlands the immediate influx of British fighters into this area
becomes probable.
Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based aircraft
need not be reckoned with:
_a._ because the equipment and training of these aircraft is designed
to fit them for specific naval tasks;
_b._ because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will be
committed in the North Sea only for very pressing reasons, which do
not exist in this instance.
On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces against
targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable.
E. _Enemy Aircraft Industries_:
1. The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of the
expansion of _French military aircraft industry_ during the years 1934
to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. At the moment
the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with deliveries.
In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined military
aircraft were delivered to the French Air Forces. It must be assumed
that these figures will be increased during the coming months to 100
aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 50 twin-engined.
A further moderate increase in production is possible and to be
expected from spring 1939 on.
2. _In Great Britain_ existing plants have been extended since 1936
with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament situation
will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 on. If the
present plans will be observed the program will be completely carried
out by 1941.
Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 aircraft
of _all types_ (commercial and military aircraft) a month. It
must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long-range
reconnaissance aircraft from the United States and Canada is intended.
3. _North American aircraft industry_ (United States and Canada) is at
the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has yet taken place but
is possible. A possible expansion would have no practical effects in
1939.
250 aircraft of _all types_ (commercial and military) a month for the
home and foreign market may be stated as the present production rate.
Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufactured.
F. _Position with regard to preparation of target data_:
1. It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with the
following _target data for France_:
_a._ Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, air force
fuel dumps). About 90% of existing installations are included.
_b._ _Fuel Supply._
100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total storage
capacity (including the above-mentioned Air Force fuel dumps).
_c._ _Ammunition Supply._
An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive capacity of explosive
and gunpowder factories and 17 large supply dumps (main ammunition
depots and ammunition depots, Army and Air Force) are included.
_d._ _Power Supply._
All the large power plants are included.
_e._ _Key Industries._
In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been included.
_f._ _Targets in the Paris area._
Further target data, particularly for essential industrial targets,
are accumulating currently.
In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the tactical
situation and of target groups on or before the above-mentioned date.
2. Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) are
approximately 90% ready. They have been passed on to Air Force Group
2 for printing and for the adding of sectional excerpts of maps. They
have been ordered to be ready by 15 September.
As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has been
carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and docks in
the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector maps, partially
covered also by aerial and ground panoramas).
These will be reproduced after the ground organization targets have
been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready before 20 October.
Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be issued to the
command authorities prior to the end of September.
3. The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for _Belgium and
the Netherlands_ are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution
(including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.
4. In general it must be emphasized that, unlike Czechoslovakia, there
are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets
available.
G. _Recommendations for our own Prosecution of the Air War._
1. A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is
appropriate to postpone the massed commitment of our striking power
until the spring. The _balance of force_ would probably have altered
by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and
British aircraft industry and imports from North America.
2. From a _climatological_ point of view the autumn offers _our_ forces
greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good
training in instrument flying.
3. As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the
figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by
concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.
For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care
and must be restricted to the decisive points.
4. As long as only _2 air forces_ are available prosecution of the war
on the _basis of gaining time is advisable_. This is seen in attacks
against the enemy _air forces_ in the airfields where they are deployed
in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance
by the enemy.
_Attacks on Paris_ should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially
as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must
however be possible at all times.
Direct _cooperation with the Army_ is only considered desirable if the
enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western
German fortifications by a break through or out-flanking.
Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks:
_a._ against transports, troop concentrations and movements,
_b._ against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with his armed
forces in great numbers.
Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifications,
a further measure would be to concentrate _fighter forces_ scattered in
the West on the decisive ground front.
Attacks against objectives in the _British Isles_ are to be regarded as
unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our combat forces.
Should the enemy remain on the defensive in the ground war and withdraw
with his war plane forces to the West there will be no urgent reason
for us to commit our own forces. In this case it would seem better to
save our forces until reinforcements arrive.
5. As soon as _strong forces_ are freed for the prosecution of the war
in the West, operations in the air must be directed without delay at
_reaching a decision_.
It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking:
_a._ fuel refineries and dumps;
_b._ gunpowder and high explosive factories, _main ammunition depots
and ammunition depots_;
_c._ the most important parks handling imports which are also centers
for the transfer and reshipment of fuel and ammunition.
Thus the enemy's fuel and ammunition supply system for his ground and
air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed to an intolerable
degree.
Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after the other
successively attacked until eliminated it would appear that by the use
of 5 air forces a sufficient measure of success could be achieved to
enable the Army to break through the enemy's fortified front.
_No_ large-scale operations against targets in _the British Isles_
could be carried out in addition to this task.
Everything should however be prepared to make _reprisal attacks_
against London possible at any time.
Considering the strength of the air defences in and around London
success in such attacks is only likely if _strong_ forces are committed.
In addition occasional _harassing attacks_ against targets in South
and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, particularly if
the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary aim of such attacks
would be to pin down strong defence forces in Great Britain.
6. Should still stronger war plane forces--at least 3 air forces--be
available after the French targets had been successfully attacked, they
might be committed to advantage in attacks against the _food supply
of Great Britain_, notably of London. It must however be emphasized
that it is only regarded as possible to achieve decisive successes if
considerably stronger forces are committed and if the western ports are
also subjected to air attacks.
H. _Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy_:
1. The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bordeaux and
possibly against those in Marseilles would valuably supplement our
attacks of the French fuel supply system.
2. The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy
as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the
air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive
thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition
supplies stored in the Maginot Line itself and accessible to air attack.
3. The Navy should hamper _imports_ through the French Atlantic ports
to as great an extent as is compatible with its other tasks and the
forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of
the attack against the fuel supply of France.
4. Belgium and the Netherlands would, _in German hands_, represent an
extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great
Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential
to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which
an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would
take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment
against Great Britain.
Signed: For: WOLTER
1 inclosure
_Distribution_:
Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff
General Staff/5th Section (Draft)
1. copy with 1 inclosure
2. copy with 1 inclosure
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 376-PS
SECRET
FUEHRER'S H.Q.
29/10/40
Major (General Staff) Freiherr von Falkenstein
[Addressed to an unspecified General] "Chefsache"
In order to supplement today's telephone conversation of 10:00 A.M. I
take the liberty of submitting to you a brief resume of the military
questions current here for _your personal information_ before I go on
leave. Major Queisner, my deputy, is informed of the questions touched
on here and can supply further information if necessary.
The exception is Gibraltar, General Warlimont having requested that
all inquiries be made to him, as this territory is regarded as a
particularly ticklish business.
1. At the moment no intervention in Greece is intended. Nor for the
moment is anything to be undertaken with regard to Crete.
2. The question of _beginning preparation_ in Libya in _conjunction
with Italy_ is to be examined in the light of a report by General
Ritter von Thoma, which will be received during the next few days.
In the light of this report a proposal is to be submitted to the
Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel with regard to strength required, date
of offensive, etc. Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Badoglio will then
meet in mid-November and will settle details. Large-scale preparations
should not be expected before then.
The Quartermaster-General (Colonel Langemeyer) has been informed by us
of the necessity for timely disposal of special war material, equipment
and clothing.
3. No orders respecting Case East [Fall Ost] have been given and no
orders are to be expected at the moment.
At the moment the Russian action against Rumania is dismissed as a
trifling matter.
Transports to Rumania are proceeding according to plan as ordered by
the Fuehrer and are not to be speeded up.
4. No activity should be expected at present on the part of Spain. The
conversation between the Fuehrer and Franco therefore covered only
economic collaboration and long-term developments.
The Gibraltar affair should not however be lost to mind though it will
have to be treated with extreme care.
The Army will shortly send a small reconnaissance staff
[Erkundungsstab] to Spain where it will cooperate with Admiral
Canaris: this has been authorized by the Fuehrer. The GAF will request
permission to participate on its own account.
There will be further orders from the Armed Forces Supreme Command; the
details requested in tele-printer message 00 926/40 are required for
this purpose.
5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the
occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of
war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are
being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:--
_a._ No other operational commitment,
_b._ Portuguese neutrality,
_c._ Support of France and Spain.
A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases
and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.
Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurferst
(C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange
that he be supplied with the information he desires.
6. C. in C. Armed Forces Norway has expressed fears that as a result
of the Order: Armed Forces Supreme Command, Armed Forces Operations
Staff/Abteilung L. No. 35 331/40 top secret and Chefsache dated
22/10/40 greater activity on the part of the British will develop
against Norway, and has requested naval and air force reinforcements.
The question of moving Stuka Staffeln was touched upon. I expressed my
opinion that Stuka units had at present to prepare for other tasks, but
would however request that the matter be further examined.
7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially
in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion
too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are
being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed
at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was
a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the
matter to you on its own merits.
[Signed] Falkenstein.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 382-PS
_WRITTEN STATEMENT BY
KORVETTENKAPITAN MOEHLE
DATED 19th JULY, 1945_
A. _Order of September, 1942_
In September 1942 (I can no longer recollect the exact date), the
following W/T message was given to all U-boats and operational
flotillas by the Commander in Chief U-boats in officers' cypher, i.e.
Top Secret:--
1. "All rescue measures such as righting of capsized life-boats,
going alongside, provisioning, towing to land, etc., are absolutely
forbidden and must cease.
2. Previous orders concerning the rescue and taking prisoner of
masters and chief engineers remain in force since their interrogation
is of the highest importance to the High Command. Boats should rescue
as many as they can carry.
3. All rescue measures contradict the most primitive demands of
warfare that ships and crews should be destroyed.
4. You must be hard and remember that the enemy in his bombing attacks
on German towns has no consideration for women and children."
This W/T message was without any doubt sent out at the instigation of
the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e. Grand Admiral Doenitz. In
view of my knowledge of the way in which the Staff of the Chief Command
U-boats worked, I consider it quite impossible that an order of such
importance could have been given without his knowledge.
I do not know whether the order was given with the concurrence
or at the instigation of the Supreme Command, i.e. the Fuehrer's
headquarters, or at the instigation of the Fuehrer himself after one of
his many conferences with Grand Admiral Doenitz.
As Senior Officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla, it was my duty to pass
on these instructions of Commander in Chief U-boats to Commanding
Officers of U-boats which were leaving on their war patrols.
So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and in
particular for those who know the manner in which Commander in Chief
U-boats is wont to give his orders, that the High Command regard it as
desirable that not only ships but also their crews should be regarded
as objects of attack, i.e. that they should be destroyed; at that time
German propaganda was continually stressing the shortage of crews for
enemy merchant ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood
this order in that way.
Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the order
would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words. It would then
only have stated that for reasons of security rescue measures were to
cease and this order would have been passed as a normal secret W/T
message. It was perhaps even the intention that this order could be
interpreted in two ways and the reason may be that in the first place,
it contravenes international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was
an order which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in
commanding officers.
It was very difficult for me as senior officer of the Flotilla to ask
for clarification of this order from the Commander in Chief U-boats
since while I was senior officer (15.6.41-5.5.45) I could only,
owing to lack of time, visit the Commander in Chief U-boats four
or five times. I could not discuss this order with officers on my
staff as all messages in officers' cypher might only be received by
me. I was moreover of the opinion that commanding officers who were
uncertain as to the meaning of this particular point always had the
opportunity (an opportunity which they often took on other points) to
obtain a clear understanding of this point when they went for their
instructions to the staff of Commander in Chief U-boats itself; these
instructions by the staff of the Commander in Chief U-boats were for
the great part given by very young officers with much more recent
operational experience than I had--the officers on Commander in Chief
U-boats' staff changed frequently. Generally speaking, with very few
exceptions, commanding officers received their instruction from the
staff of Commander in Chief U-boats after I myself had given them their
instructions. Commanding officers were generally speaking in much
closer personal contact with these young staff officers than they were
with myself as senior officer of a purely transit flotilla. There were
many commanding officers whom I only saw and got to know for a few
days in Kiel while they were fitting their boats out for operations.
Having given considerable thought to the whole of this matter I
now remember that during one of my visits to Commander in Chief
U-boats' staff in the winter of 1942/3 or the summer '43, one of the
staff officers, Korvettenkapitaen Hessler or perhaps more likely
Korvettenkapitaen Kuppisch, with whom because of very close ties of
friendship I used to converse intimately as long as he was Commander
in Chief U-boats' staff, told me of the following occurrence (whether
I broached the subject or how the matter came up I can no longer
remember).
A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when outward
bound from a base in France, she met far out in the Bay of Biscay a
raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to take them on board
owing to shortage of room (she had a complement of 54 and carried full
provisions for 14 weeks). The boat therefore proceeded without taking
any notice of the survivors.
This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the Commander
in Chief U-boats' staff. It was stated that she would have acted more
correctly in destroying this raft since it was highly probable that the
enemy air crew would be rescued by the enemy and in the meantime might
once more have destroyed a German U-boat.
This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief U-boats clear
to me.
As concerns making the order known to commanding officers: the order
was always passed on during a commanding officers' conference while
their boats were having their final overhaul or while they were being
fitted out in Kiel for operational patrols; during these conferences I
passed on to commanding officers once again all important orders about
the equipping of their boats, procedure on departure, in home waters
and while in convoy to Norway. Operational orders were not given by
the flotilla; they were always given by the Commander in Chief U-boats
himself or by Captain U-boats West on his behalf.
I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with more or
less the following words:--"I have now to inform you of a High Command
order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is a very ticklish
matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September 1942 gave the following
order in an 'officers only' signal ( ... the exact words of the order
were then read out)."
Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement with this
order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding officers raised no
queries and I was therefore relieved of any further discussion on this
point.
Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer somewhat
as follows:--
"I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave this
order, by reference to the following event": I then mentioned the
example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay together with the
explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by Commander in Chief
U-boats' staff. I then went on to say, "Gentlemen, you must yourselves
decide what is compatible with own consciences. The safety of your own
boat must always remain your prime consideration."
Since the introduction of total underwater war ("Schnorchel"), I have
in this connection in various ways further stated that commanding
officers were in a much easier position in this respect since they had
no occasion to surface and that the order was therefore illusory for
them. They had to keep clear of everything which was not worth the
firing of a torpedo.
I also remember that many commanding officers after the order of
September 1942 had been read said, "That is quite clear and unequivocal
however hard it may be". Had this order been given to me as a
commanding officer I would have taken note of it in silence but in
practice would always have been able with a clear conscience not to
carry it out since I consider I would endanger my own boat by acting in
this way, (i.e., by shooting at life-boats).
If therefore U-boat commanding officers state that they had received
from me the order to destroy life-boats, this does not correspond with
the facts, but they received from me quite insufficiently clearly
expressed instructions from the High Command together with my personal
views thereon.
Before the order of September 1942 was issued I never discussed this
difficult question at a commanding officers' conference and the subject
of conduct towards survivors was never broached.
B. _Conduct Towards Neutral and Hospital Ships_
On this matter, which I treated together with what has gone before, I
gave commanding officers the following directions:
There was an express order of the High Command, and Commander in Chief
U-boats was adamant on this point and would relentlessly pursue the
breach of it by court martial (i.e., he insisted on the order being
strictly obeyed), that no neutral or Red Cross ship might be molested
even if the enemy misused neutral flags or the Red Cross.
The political results of sinking a neutral were much more serious than
would have been the usefulness of the tonnage sunk.
I told commanding officers for their guidance in doubtful cases--in bad
visibility, when neutral markings were not distinct, etc.--that it was
better to allow five enemy vessels to go free than to sink one neutral.
So far as concerns the stopping and examination of neutrals, an order
was made in January 1944 that in particular Spanish and Portuguese
steamers in the North and Central Atlantic were to be stopped and
examined for contraband and members of enemy nations of military age.
I told commanding officers "Don't touch them. Stay underwater. You are
endangering yourselves too much by that because you will certainly
be reported by wireless and we know from experience that when such
examinations are made watchfulness is liable to suffer. You are only
exposing yourself to the danger of being surprised. If a ship carries
neutral markings let it go by unscathed."
Objection was often made that German hospital ships had often been
destroyed by the enemy, as German propaganda had stressed for years.
My answer was: That does not matter, however unpleasant it may be. The
order of the High Command is decisive and binding. Politics come before
warfare.
C. _Rendering of Reports_
There was an order--I do not remember whether it was in the form of a
written or verbal instruction--that no events during a war patrol which
contravened established international agreements should be entered in
the war log. I believe that the reason for this order was that eight
copies were made of war logs and were available to many authorities;
there was always the danger therefore that events of this nature
would become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of
propaganda that this should be so.
Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for when
commanding officers made their personal reports; these were invariably
made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in
certain instances to Captain U-boats.
I also gave the commanding officers instructions on this point.
To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942
appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total disagreement
with it at heart. As a serving officer I had however to carry out
the command to pass on this order to commanding officers for their
instruction.
During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla no
single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not reconcile
obedience to this order with his conscience and that he was therefore
unable to carry it out.
An order of this nature was never given by me, i.e. on my own
initiative, and could not be given by me since, had I exceeded my
authority in so serious a way, I would immediately and without question
have been relieved.
[signed] MOEHLE
Korvettenkapitaen
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386-PS
Berlin, 10 Nov 1937
NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615-2030 hours
Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h. c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSSBACH
The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's
conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed
discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However,
he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the
larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His
subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and
of the experiences of his 4-1/2 years in Government; he desired to
explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and
necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a
far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in
the case of his death as his last will and testament.
The Fuehrer then stated:
The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the
nation, and its propagation. This is, consequently, a problem of space.
The German nation is composed of 85 million people, which, because of
the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a
homogeneous European racial body which cannot be found in any other
country. On the other hand, it justifies the demand for larger living
space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists
in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the
consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should
this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the
greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation [Volkstum] at
its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German
element in Austria and Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as
the preservation of the present state in Germany itself. Instead of
growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of
a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political
and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they
are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim
of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent
exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a
solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1-3
generations.
Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space,
it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a
good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of
an increased share in universal commerce and industry.
Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict
National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can
be achieved the results are as follows:
A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy
can be attained:
1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials
autarchy is feasible.
2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult.
Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves.
Copper and tin, however, can NOT.
3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient
wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.
4. Edible fats--possible.
B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered
with a definite "NO".
The general increase of living standards, compared with 30-40 years
ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand for an
increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers,
themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture
have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they
represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in
production by making greater demands on the soil is _not_ possible
because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of
artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the
greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world
market could NOT be avoided.
The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food
by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases
catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility
of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in
population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about
an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread
eater than the adult.
Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering
the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a
continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of
living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into
effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in
our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale
alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy
becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well
as generally.
_Participation in World Economy._ There are limits to this which we are
unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to
a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial
agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It
must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an
industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported
food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency
to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated
colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of
their will to expand, the economic need will also drive Germany to it.
Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties
in expanding economically.
The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to
armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic
settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption
caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those
States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports
are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by Britain, it is
more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign
currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in
wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the
securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has
been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations.
It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and
in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our
foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought
in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely
on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of
conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the
purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly
adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have
to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be
required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent
generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is
naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial
root, has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart
of the European Continent. The history of all times--Roman Empire,
British Empire--has proved that every space expansion can only be
effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an
owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.
The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could
be made at lowest cost.
German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and
France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would
be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement
of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they
would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the
building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their
overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and
retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.
England is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions
to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions.
After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the
transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can
no longer be expected. Any resistance on England's part would at best
consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away
colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g.
Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.
A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be
considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and
the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share
the opinion that the Empire is unshakable. Resistance against the
Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its
competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared
with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the
latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving
effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which
creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to
subjugate Ancient Rome.
Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are
stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its
colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own
power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against an
attack by America or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by
Japan.
The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is
in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained
permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers
in this respect.
_a._ Ireland's tendency for independence.
_b._ Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her
half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to
utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon
against Britain.
_c._ The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.
_d._ The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which--by virtue
of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius--expands its
power position and must consequently infringe British interests to
an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of
prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring
up discontent in the Mohammedan world.
It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held
permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all
the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the
Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act
as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the
level of our population to become too low.
France's position is more favorable than that of England. The French
Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial
possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is
faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only
10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments
whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless
we have to take the following into our political considerations as
power factors:
Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller States.
The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is
never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia,
and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous
risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria
from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force
with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left
to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to
decide upon three different cases.
_Case 1. Period 1943-45._ After this we can only expect a change for
the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force,
as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically
concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with
further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase.
In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be
safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current
recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would
be no longer available.
In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out
at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative
power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence
of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the
countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency.
This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over
and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase
counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we
should be forced on the offensive.
What the actual position would be in the years 1943-1945 no one knows
today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.
On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing
their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on
the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and
a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the
Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to
solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for
action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.
_Case 2._ Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal
political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and
thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then
the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.
_Case 3._ It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia
if France should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it
cannot "proceed" against Germany.
For the improvement of our military political position it must be
our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer
Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any
threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In
the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to
assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France.
However, Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will
increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened.
Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on
Silesia, either towards the North or the West.
Once Czechoslovakia is conquered--and a mutual frontier,
Germany-Hungary is obtained--then a neutral attitude by Poland in a
German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements
with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany's strength remains
unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland
against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must
be taken into account.
Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned
attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of France,
Poland and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following
manner:
The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability England and
perhaps also France have already silently written off Czechoslovakia,
and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one
day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire
and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European
War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a
war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain
without influence on France's attitude. An attack by France without
British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would
stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support,
it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by
France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be
reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case
it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally,
we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation
of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken
into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will
increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the
inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course
of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place
is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would
nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on
the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia
and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of
the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute
a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the
freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility
of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions,
representing a new division per 1 million population.
No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part
of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude
in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the
Duce were alive at the time or not.
The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude.
Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a
victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.
Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of
our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into
consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.
Should Case 2 occur--paralyzation of France by a Civil War--then the
situation should be utilized _at any time_ for operations against
Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.
The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the
existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur he has
firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as
1938.
Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war
in Spain, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there.
Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by
Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of
possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100
per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested
in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the
Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish
Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the
presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed
towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future
policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic
Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic
Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could
lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain,
if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the
side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears
very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via
Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be
to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and
carry out operations against France from Libya against North African
French colonial possessions.
As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be
discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy
would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the
strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the
Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting
personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers
with Italy and Germany France will have at its disposal solely the
metropolitan fighting forces.
If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian
and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that
England--being at war with Italy--would not decide to commence
operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by
France against Germany is not to be anticipated.
The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made
dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would
not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements
with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique
favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations
against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take
place with the "speed of lightning" [blitzartig schnell].
Feldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving
their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England
and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the
war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that
it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western
frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated
the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine
frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a
strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier.
The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance
into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got
in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our
then existing fortifications--which was pointed out particularly by
Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg--the four motorized divisions which
had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of
movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction,
Feldmarschall von Blomberg draws special attention to the strength of
the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed
the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme
difficulties to our attack.
Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of
a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the
possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with
special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system
of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the
prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad,
which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by
the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict
was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French
conflict be not as near as the Fuehrer appeared to assume, the Fuehrer
stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was
summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von
Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's
attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that
he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently
he did not believe in military action by France against Germany.
Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general
mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations
against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not
participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then
Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.
In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst Goering
considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our
military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as
he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.
The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.
(Signed) HOSSBACH
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY
[pencil note]
S.O. Only
"FALL GRUEN"
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
[ITEM 1] [_Handwritten notes_]
* * * _of the Fuehrer_: [semi-illegible]
1. Does Mussolini regard his work as completed or not.
_a._ if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia, West; then wait
and see. "Return with the bag empty."
_b._ if not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German
help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with
Czechoslovakia in the bag."
2. Mussolini, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's
military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims with
that.
3. Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled
only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not intervene.
(Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)
4. Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)
5. State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor:
_a._ Deliveries of ores: France--600,000 tons; Germany--2 million tons.
_b._ Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launchings not for 2 years.
_c._ Out of date air force equipment.
6. _No_ general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed
Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through
Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept secret.
7. Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units,
but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.
8. Replacement of officers doubtful.
* * * * *
Schm
[Major Schmundt's writing and initialled by him]
* * * * *
[ITEM 2] [_Typed notes_]
S.O. Only
Berlin, 22 April 1938
BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON "GRUEN"
Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:
A. _Political Aspect_
1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or
possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be:
hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a
measure is justified only for the elimination of the _last_ opponent on
the mainland.
2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a
crisis and lead to war.
3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g.
assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German
demonstration).
B. _Military Conclusions_
1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities
2 and 3. Case 2 is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken
security measures.
2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions
by rail--which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as
possible--must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the
action.
3. "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to
penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a
strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to
the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the
columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by
the Army and Air Force.
The Air Force is to support the individual columns, (e.g. dive-bombers:
sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing
up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby
isolating the garrisons.)
4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive
ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis
will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness
of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division
of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".
Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless
thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague],
5. If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A
simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired
measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into
operation at any time.
C. _Propaganda_
1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).
2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).
Schm
[initialled by Schmundt]
Written by an officer
[_The following are handwritten notes_]
22 April
A. POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES
1. Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion
can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate
conflict without the threat of other opponents.
2. Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the
situation.
3. Action as the result of an incident. (example)
B. MILITARY NECESSITIES
Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be
taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.
1. Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in a
direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must
be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads
reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe, cooperation with
Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of
communications.
2. "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be
avoided under all circumstances. Must be bridged through motorized
army. Penetrating via Pilsen. Hamper mobilization.
3. Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",
_a._ in order not to aggravate "Rot",
_b._ but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary.
Basic Principle: Create Accomplished Facts so that
_a._ help comes too late--other powers do not intervene
_b._ Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it)
_c._ State collapse from within.
Propaganda: Directions to Germans. Threats to others.
_Submit:_
1. Fortifications (strength in detail)
2. Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.
* * * * *
[ITEM 3] [_Four Telegrams_]
MOS 1 16/5 0925-- Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ZEITZLER
Most Secret--1. Which divisions on the "Gruen" frontiers ready to march
within 12 hours, in the case of mobilization? 2. What is the final day
of mobilization?
SCHMUNDT
MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ
[the same also in Schmundt's handwriting]
* * * * *
MOS No. 2 1115--
MBZ 02 16/5 1114--
Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer--
Most Secret to Question 1, 12 of them--in garrisons
to Question 2, Third day--Please state time of
receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110--NN.
ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff
* * * * *
MOS 03 16/5 1155
OKW for Oberstleutnant Zeitzler--_Most Secret_
1. Teleprint received 1115
2. Please send the numbers of the divisions.
Schmundt
1159 MOS 03 Wagner (?)
[the same also in Schmundt's handwriting]
* * * * *
MBZ 04 16/5 1302--
Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer--
_Most Secret_ to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 8,
armored and mountain.
Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.
* * * * *
[ITEM 4] [_Telegram_]
MBZ 05 17/5 1505
TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT, ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER--_MOST SECRET_
IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF
FORTIFICATIONS:
FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL
AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY
MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF
STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER
KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY
MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION
IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER
KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND
HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE
POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST
ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL
CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST
CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST
CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.
ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF
* * * * *
[ITEM 5] [_Covering letter, with draft for Gruen attached_]
MOST SECRET
Berlin, 20 May 1938
Tirpitzufer 72.76
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
_L Ia No. 38/38 S.O. Only_
S.O. Only
access only through Officer
Schm [initialled by Schmundt]
My Fuehrer!
Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for
the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political
bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.
For the _meantime_, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section
of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes
into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the
incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected
intentions of the Czech General Staff.
A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with
the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in
its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it
can then be resubmitted to be signed.
Heil, my Fuehrer
[signed] Keitel
* * * * *
L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Only
written by an officer
MOST SECRET
S.O. Only
access only through officer
Berlin, 20 May 1938
DRAFT for THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN"
_3 Copies_
1st Copy
(Provisional)-[pencil note]
1. _Political Prerequisites:_ It is not my intention to smash
Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through
military action. Therefore inevitable political developments _within_
Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe
create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come
again.
2. _Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:_
An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient
political justification cannot be considered with reference to the
possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.
Rather will the action be initiated either:
_a._ after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which
is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the
war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the
war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which
must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or
_b._ by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident,
through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at
least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of
military action.
"_b_" is militarily and politically the more favorable.
3. _Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen"_; which must take
into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 _a_ and 2 _b_.
_a._ For _Armed War_ it is essential to create--already in the
first 4 days--a military situation which plainly proves to hostile
nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian
military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims
on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against
Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary
against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to
Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to
unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.
It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support
to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not
achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few
days, a European crisis will certainly arise.
_b._ The _Propaganda War_ must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia
by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand, give
instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War
and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.
_c._ The _Economic War_ has the task of employing all means at the
disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.
The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed
war. I myself will determine the date.
Z
[initialled at end by Zeitzler]
[Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this draft are set forth with minor changes
under ITEM 11.]
* * * * *
[ITEM 6] [_Typescript_]
Questions on "Gruen"
1. Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.
2. Strength of mobile divisions.
3. Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.
4. Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit
(motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.
5. When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?
6. What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are
available for combating fortifications such as fortresses?
* * * * *
MOST SECRET
L Ia
Berlin, 23 May
Questionnaire of 23 May
1. _Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness._
Strength of a peacetime division 14,000 men
Strength of a division made ready to march 14,000 men
(but composition is different from that of a peacetime division, i.e.
some men are left out and others included).
2. _Strength of mobile divisions._
Strength of a mobile division 17,000 men
3. _Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of
Mobilization._ In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is
composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.
The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions
and one motorcycle rifle battalion.
The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.
The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of
2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank
Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion
motorized.
Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light Machine
guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8
light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns, 16 37 cm.
guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.
4. _Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit
(motorized divisions) for independent thrust._ In the case of
mobilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. C-in-C
Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new employment.
Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions (rapid march
readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light division
(for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readiness; presumably
from 1 October).
5. _When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?_
Mobilization of the infantry guns (= 15 cm. mortars) planned only for
the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be available. For
training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps have the heavy
infantry guns at the moment without live ammunition, however.
6. _What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are
available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses?_ Only 21
cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East Prussia) with
16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia).
[In Schmundt writing]: In general, single experimental artillery piece
(guns).
Z
[Initialled by Zeitzler]
* * * * *
[On next page the questions are put again, plus the following
additional questions:]
7. What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent frontier
fortifications look like? Profile?
8. Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for attacks
against enemy strong points etc.?
9. Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the form of
MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the employment of work
columns of the Inspector of Road Construction?
10. What progress has been made in the howitzer (Moerser) programme?
What progress has been made in the conversion of heavy naval guns?
* * * * *
[Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers
to them in a teleprint message, beginning: "I am answering several
questions which the Fuehrer put to me during conferences. I request
that you report the answers to the Fuehrer."]
* * * * *
[ITEM 8] [_Telegram_]
1. INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN
DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED
MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT
THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY
BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.
2. INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:
A. THE FUEHRER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1, HIMSELF
SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS
BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A
CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT
MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.
B. THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD
GREATLY THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST.
(NOTE FOR K. KPT. V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1 AND 2 AFTER
USE)
[ITEM 9] [_Telegram_]
REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICE
MOST SECRET
CANARIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPECIAL OCCURRENCES.
THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES ORDERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE
FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN DRAFTED: CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COMPLETE AND
SPECIALISTS ONLY FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04,
06, 09. I SHALL KEEP YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER IT
NECESSARY THAT THE FUEHRER INFORM HIS C'S-IN-C OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON.
HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?
* * * * *
[ITEM 10] [_Handwritten notes_]
[ILLEGIBLE]
* * * * *
[ITEM 11] [_Covering letter, with directive for Gruen attached_]
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L I
Berlin, 30 May 1938
Copy of the 4th Copy
S.O. Only
Access only through Officer
_3 Copies_, 1st Copy
_Written by an Officer_
By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section
II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed
Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L
Ia) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East--strategic
concentration 'Gruen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its
execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.
Alterations in the other parts of the directive must be expected during
the next few weeks.
By order
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
1 Appendix
sgd. Keitel
To: C-in-C Army--Copy 1
C-in-C Navy--Copy 2
C-in-C Air Force--Copy 3
OWK Section L--Copy 4-5
Certified a true copy
Zeitzler
Oberstleutnant on the General Staff
* * * * *
MOST SECRET
Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 42/38 Most
Secret S.O. Only L Ia dated 30.5.38.
Copy of the 4th Copy
S.O. Only
Access only through Officer
_Written by an Officer_ _3 Copies_, 1st Copy
II. Two front war with main effort in the South East
(strategic concentration "Gruen")
1. _Political Prerequisites._ It is my unalterable decision to smash
Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job
of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
militarily suitable moment.
An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or
other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable
opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take
early action.
The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable
moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations
are to be made at once.
2. _Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action._ The
following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:
_a._ suitable obvious cause and, with it
_b._ sufficient political justification,
_c._ action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to
the least possible degree.
From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable
course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through
which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part
of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.
But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, must
terminate in sudden action on our part--which must have the elements of
surprise as regards time and extent--before the enemy is so advanced in
military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.
3. _Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen"._
_a._ For the _Armed War_ it is essential that the surprise element
as the most important factor contributing to success be made full
use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peacetime and
by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential
to create a situation within the first four days which plainly
demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness
of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same
time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an
incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a
case, intervention by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be
expected, especially if France--due to the obvious pro-German attitude
of Italy--fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war
by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military
support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected.
If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within
the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This
knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and
bold action.
_b._ The _Propaganda War_ must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the
other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed
War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve
further directions and determination of the date.
4. _Tasks of the Armed Forces._ Armed Forces Preparations are to be
made on the following basis:
_a._ The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.
_b._ For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover
which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland
and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be
watched.
_c._ The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force
the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into
Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk
of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations
for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections
of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the
appointed time at the _same time_ as the penetration by the Air Force
*before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*
* For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out
in conjunction with the OKW and submitted to me for approval.*
5. _Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces._
_a._ _Army._ The basic principle of the surprise attack against
Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required
for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the
initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all
essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be
employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force.
These assault columns--the composition of each, according to their
tasks at that time--must be formed with troops which can be employed
rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization
and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of
these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines
at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to
achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For
the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German
frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army,
with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage
service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of
* frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing
the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing
a battle,* of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying
Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of
Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and
armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault
columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover
provided for the _West_ must be limited in numbers and quality to
the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether
the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier
immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my
special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security
detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the
strategic concentration "Gruen". Independent of this, a first security
garrison must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in
constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps.
The _remaining frontiers_, as well as East Prussia, are to be weakly
protected. But, always depending on the political situation, the
transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of
East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.
[*--* Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in
Item 5]
_b._ _Air Force._ While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the
West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack
against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same
time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (see 5_a_)
The _most important task_ of the Air Force is the destruction of the
Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest
possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment
as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion
arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the
German army and against the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the
crippling of enemy mobilization, of the direction of the government and
Armed Forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of
the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization
and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial
success of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger
sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of the defensive
system* might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German
Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must
be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared
as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against
the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers
of air defense are to be created throughout Berlin, the central German
industrial area and the Ruhr area *and gradually prepared even now in
an inconspicuous fashion.*
_c._ _Navy._ The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the
Danube-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders
of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only
those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the
careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden
intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be
confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness
must be guaranteed. It is of decisive importance that all actions,
which might influence the political attitude of the European Great
Powers unfavorably, be avoided.
6. _Tasks of the War Economy._ In the war economy it is essential
that in the field of the armament industry a maximum deployment of
forces is made possible through increased supplies. In the course of
operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the
total war--economic strength--by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting
important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian
industrial and works installations--insofar as military operations
permit--can be of decisive importance to us.
7. *All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW.
They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement
of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with
the operations of the Army and Air Force.*
signed ADOLF HITLER
Certified copy
signed Zeitzler
Oberstleutnant on the General Staff
[*--* Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in
Item 5]
* * * * *
[ITEM 12] [_Typescript_] Berlin, 9 June 1938
L I a H
SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY
1. _SMALL ARMS_
Armed uniformly with Mauser Rifle, Model 24, calibre 7.92 mm (similar
to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher for rifle grenades is
attached to the rifle.
2. _MACHINE GUNS_
Light MG Z.B. 26, weight 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.
Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in
range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced
(especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.
3. _MORTARS_
8.1 cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.
9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.
14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.
26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.
4. _INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK DEFENSE_
Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns.
Calibre 37--40 mm and/or 66--70 mm.
5. _ARTILLERY PIECES_
_a._ _Light and Mountain Artillery_:
8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km
8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)
10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.
7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.
10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.
_b._ _Heavy Artillery_:
10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.
15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.
15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.
15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.
24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.
21cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 18, range 10 km.
30.5cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.
Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.
_c._ _A A Artillery_:
9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km.
8.35cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12
km.
7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.
6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.
Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]
* * * * *
[ITEM 13] [_Typescript_]
L I a
Berlin, 9 June 1938
MOST SECRET
_FUEHRER'S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938_
Berlin, 9 June 1938
2 copies
1st copy
MOST SECRET
_Question 1_: Armament of the Czech Army?
_Answer_:
Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is progressing,
thanks to the excellent production capacity of the Czech armament
industry.
The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Austrian Army. It
is slowly and steadily being modernized.
_In Detail_:
_Artillery_: Light field artillery. At present the old armament from
the Austrian Army predominates. Mountain Artillery: the same. Medium
artillery. New armament predominates. Heavy artillery, old armament
predominates.
_Infantry Weapons_: The following are available: a uniform new infantry
rifle; a uniform new light MG; a uniform old improved heavy MG.
Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AT-guns, Infantry Howitzers,
Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete.
A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet available in
sufficient numbers.
Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed.
_Summary_: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as far as
armament and equipment are concerned.
Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]
* * * * *
L I a
Berlin, 9 June 1938
MOST SECRET
2 copies
1st copy
_Question 2_: How many battalions, etc., are employed in the West for
the construction of emplacements?
_Answer_:
Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications:
The 36th Infantry Battalion
The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company
The 12th Anti-Tank Company
The 10th Battery
The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions
In addition:
The 78th German Labor Service Battalion, and later the 190th German
Labor Corps Battalion.
In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) has the
authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps for the
construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary.
Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]
[Pencilled notes by Schmundt:]
Number of troops
Production possibilities
* * * * *
L I a
Berlin, 9 June 1938
MOST SECRET
2 copies
1st copy
_Question 3_: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occupied
in unreduced strength?
_Answer_:
The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the fortifications
and are housed in local billets. The fortifications themselves are
guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened.
Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]
* * * * *
L I a
Berlin, 9 June 1938
MOST SECRET
2 copies
1st copy
_Question 4_: Frontier protection in the West?
_Answer_:
In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protection is
undertaken by the VGAD, then the Frontier Guard.
This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the frontier. At
the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the fortification
installations, which lie further back, receive security garrisons
(reserve personnel).
Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier:
15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.
For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.
Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]
* * * * *
[ITEM 14] [_Typescript_]
L I a
Berlin, 18 June 1938
S.O. Only
Access only through Officer
1. _DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE_
(1st copy)
In three parts.
MOST SECRET
4 copies
1st copy
Written by an officer.
S.O. Only
Access only through Officer
_Part 1_
_GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES_
1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against
Germany.
Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would
automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.
The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free
decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I
am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity
to realize this aim.
Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to
take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even
though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in
one of these categories.
However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only
if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the
demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not
march and therefore England will not intervene.
2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover:
_a._ thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall
Gruen"). See Part 2.
_b._ Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration
with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.
_c._ Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and
deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See Part 3.
_d._ Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and
abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.
3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly
violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will
be offered _without any special order_.
Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower their
competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their
own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack
should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).
In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by
troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my
order.
It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st
sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the
frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the over-eagerness
of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to
faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters
with obviously no hostile intentions.
4. This directive concerns the uniform _preparation_ for war and the
general strategic considerations applying to the _outbreak_ of the
war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic
concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special
Administration and War Economy.
The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be
issued by me from time to time.
K [Initialled by Keitel]
Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]
* * * * *
MOST SECRET
4 copies
1st copy
_Written by an officer_
S.O. Only
Access only through officer
_Part 2_
_STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS_
1. _Action against Czecho-Slovakia_ ("_Fall Gruen_")
The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S.O. only L I dated
30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing with special
matters, Administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are
still to be issued.
2. _Two Front War with the main effort in the West_ ("_Fall Rot_")
Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations _must_,
in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of
Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war
with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no
longer of primary importance.
The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain
in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards
camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and
serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting
of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under
certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as
preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.
It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic
concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new
mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.
The tasks which arise for the _Navy_ in "Fall Rot" will be the same as
those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European
nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the
previous objective.
J
K [Initialled by Keitel and Jodl]
* * * * *
_Written by an officer_
_2. DRAFT_
MOST SECRET
Berlin, 7 July 38
2 copies
1st copy
S.O. Only
Access only through officer
_Part 3_
_CONSIDERATIONS_
I. _In connection with "Gruen"._
How the political situation will develop during the execution or after
the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed
Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given
in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems
expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations
for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared.
These considerations would have to cover:
_a._ What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us
during the execution of "Gruen"--contrary to our expectations.
_b._ What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".
To _a_. If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against
us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary
essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications,
until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed.
Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small
effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force,
the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces
Communications), however, to carry out far-sighted deliberations in
their sphere.
Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This,
in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement
of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be
neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to
come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even
wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.
In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern
fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other
formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives
us freedom of movement.
To _b_. If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this
Mobilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of
"Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.
In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part
1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German
frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Forces, and still
have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It
would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration,
"Frontier Protection," into force separately for the various frontiers.
II. _Independent of "Fall Gruen"_
Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memel-territory by a
lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict occurring.
The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the directive issued
18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Kdos L Ia).
III. _General_
The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to deliberate
further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These however,
may be carried out only as theoretical studies within the Supreme
Commands without the participation of subordinate authorities.
Z
K [Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler]
* * * * *
[Item 15]
[_Six pages of mobilization schedules, not translated_]
* * * * *
[ITEM 16] [_Covering memorandum, with report attached_]
Berlin, 22 July 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
_No. 1233/38 Most Secret L Ia_
_2 Copies_
1st Copy
MOST SECRET
To: Major Schmundt or deputy
I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested (e.g. the
remark of Chief OKW).
Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By order
[Signed] Zeitzler
Submitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8.
Schm [pencil note by Schmundt]
[Stamp]
Adjutants' Office of the Armed Forces to the Fuehrer and Reich
Chancellor
Recd. 26 July 1938 App. 1
No. 82/38 Most Secret
* * * * *
[pencil note:] Maj. Schmundt
1 copy 3rd report to Fuehrer
Berlin, 12 July 1938
L Ia
to L No. 1233/38 Most Secret
2 copies 1st Copy
_Conference Notes_
K [Initialled by Keitel]
MOST SECRET
OKH issues new manoeuvre intentions for 1938. Reason for alteration:
development of the western fortifications and spreading of the
foot-and-mouth-disease.
Details:
1. Of the previously _intended training manoeuvres_, the following
remain:
Fall exercise for the I Army Corps
Training exercise for the XI Army Corps
Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command
2. _New training manoeuvres_:
_a._ Fighting for fortifications
_b._ Coordination with the Air Force
_c._ Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field units
commencing 1 August in the exercise area.
_d._ Mobilization exercises for the Staffs
_e._ Supply and communications control
_f._ Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas
3. _Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions_:
1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the
XVI Army Corps will also be there
2nd Armored Division remains in Austria
3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGS-BRUEK, from 25
September near BRESLAU West of the ODER
4. _Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to march_:
2nd motorized Division in exercise area A, from 28 September, in
NEUHAMMER
29th motorized Division in exercise area B
20th motorized Division in exercise area C
13th motorized Division in exercise area D
1st light Division in exercise area E
Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the end 24
November.
5. _Terrain exercises for units ready to march_:
These take place in the following Wehrkreise:
II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,
Commencement of terrain exercises: 20 September
6. _Training Manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed as on
mobilization_:
2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR-PICHL-WEGER
3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING-BRUCK
Commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November
7. _Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Divisions)_:
_a._ 15 August to 13 September:
Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units Exercise
Area NEUHAMMER,
Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units Exercise
Area GROSSBORN,
Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units Exercise
Area JUETERBOG.
_b._ 9 September to 24 November:
Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units Exercise
Area OHRDRUF
Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units Exercise
Area SENNE
Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units Exercise
Area MUENDINGEN
Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units Exercise
Area WAHN
From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.
8. _New dispositions_:
_a._ Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by III
Army Corps.
_b. Army Artillery_:
6 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training
11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.
Of these, beginning 24 September:
5 battalions, to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE
6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"
_c. Engineer Battalions_:
3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and
training.
of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of troops
"ready to march"
1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West of the Rhine.
_d. Artillery Intelligence Regiments_:
4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized) 9
September to 24 November.
Disposition and training; from 28 September, the battalions will be
situated in the neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR, NEWHAMMER,
INGOLSTADT.
9. _Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western fortifications_:
Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no longer than 3
weeks, also 7 engineer battalions will be added.
10. _Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival_:
Participation remains as intended.
11. _Foreign Military Delegations_:
The foreign military delegations as well as foreign military attaches
will be invited to attend the fall exercises of the I Army Corps.
Z [Initialled by ZEITZLER]
* * * * *
[Item 17] [_Typescript_]
Chief Section L
Written by General Staff Officer
MOST SECRET
Berlin, 24 August 1938
S.O. Only
Access only through Officer
1 Copy
TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES
The _Luftwaffe's_ endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at
their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures
taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order
itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of
Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.
The _Army's_ efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends
to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X
minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the
mobilization. With this in mind _OKH also demands_ that the X order be
given _not later than 1400 on X minus 1_.
To this the following must be said:
Operation (Aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an
"incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for
military intervention. The fixing of the _exact time_ for this incident
is of the utmost importance.
It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our
superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable
authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.
It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at
1400 on X minus 1.
On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an
advance warning.
If the _Fuehrer_ intends to follow this plan of action, all further
discussion is superfluous.
For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which
there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to
have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance
measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of
the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.
Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether
all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy
territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from
Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.
Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could
be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack
(e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).
If, for technical reasons, the _evening hours_ should be considered
desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but
it must be the day after that.
In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done
before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the
swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall).
It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest
the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the
Fuehrer's intentions in good time--insofar as the Abwehr Section is not
also charged with the organization of the incident.
I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.
J 26/8
[Initialled by Jodl]
Notes: [in Schmundt's handwriting]
Submitted on 30.8
The Fuehrer will act on these lines.
On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8
* * * * *
[ITEM 18] [_In Schmundt's handwriting_]
CONFERENCE
on 3 September 38 at the BERGHOF
Present: The Fuehrer
Generaloberst v. Brauchitsch
General of Artillery Keitel
Major Schmundt
I.
_Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch_
Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to "exercise
areas" for "Gruen". Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From
here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field
units carry out exercises in opposite directions.
_Fuehrer_
Has objection. Troops assemble; field units a 2-day march away. Carry
out camouflage exercises everywhere.
?
OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.
II.
_The Fuehrer_
Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen".
Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strongest Cz.
fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th Army area,
however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition
also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hindrance. The Czechs will stop
opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of Prague. A thrust
against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th
army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble
all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust.
Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite
our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart
of Bohemia will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of
Verdun in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to
death for a task which cannot be accomplished.
_v. Brauchitsch_
Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply and
untrained leaders.
_The Fuehrer_:
The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations.
Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete
emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people
(uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th
and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly
the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive
is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd
army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a
strategic one. _The Fuehrer_ gives orders for the development of the
western fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen
and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600
artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.
Certified.
SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff
BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938
* * * * *
[In Schmundt's writing]
[ITEM 19] [_In Schmundt's handwriting_]
S.O. Only
MOST SECRET
_DISCUSSION_
Nurnberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.
Present: Fuehrer
Generaloberst v. Brauchitsch
General Halder
General Keitel
Major Schmundt
Hauptmann Engel
Hauptmann v. Below [?]
_General Halder_ states reasons for operational plan "Gruen". Mission:
to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia-Bohemia area. To beat army.
To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer
attack in the direction of Olmutz and Brunn to be undertaken by 2nd
and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore
main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held.
Withdrawal certain on part of Cz. forces. Several defensive lines
favorable but terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be
gained for a Cz. retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be
avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker
in the last phase will favor probable Cz. line of action. The pincer
attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This
operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local.
Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time
to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured
forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.
_2nd Army._ Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations
only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There are great gaps.
Olmutz will be reached on the second day. Oppa is no obstacle, can be
crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd forces opposing. Freudenthal
only 35 men garrison. So-called light motorized forces on right flank
are no danger. Consist partly of mounted units and will be engaged by
adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then
under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic
concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to
the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the Glaz mountain
area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a
tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.
On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9?) Corps, and in the frontier
sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.
_12th and 14th Armies_ will work together. Their columns must
necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front
to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to
120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly
direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not
be able to employ reserves according to plan.
_10th Army faces_ Pilsen Riegel which is strongly fortified. Bad roads.
Tanks must break through here and establish bridge-heads for following
up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units.
After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be
brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is
in the balance.
_The Fuehrer_: We should not plan the action on the operations as
we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of
action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two
factors are decisive: 1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934
and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured to secure himself against
a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between
Trappau and Nikolsburg. Against us this would imply the building
of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an
agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or
an advance to the Danube to protect the Southern flank.
2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the
situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that
they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The
enemy must hold there--otherwise there is no sense in holding the
remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are
to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide
the "To be or Not to be" of Cz. There is no doubt that the planned
pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place.
But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended
on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point
of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive; within that week
a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery
(210cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an
attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from
experience it is difficult to refrain from an action that achieves
only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks, and
bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid sets in (Verdun!!). Tanks
are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining
operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance
without tanks. ("Tables Turned")
Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and
can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well
gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to
influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces
to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large
free space, the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare
with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is
catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This
contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications
can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward Brunn will
be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this
division should operate with the 29th motorized division. _Therefore
the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day._ The 2nd Pz
must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.). Are the
road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no
prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be
transferred to the Reichenau Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus
2 chances for victory will be created.
If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th
Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both
operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. In place of the
two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further
divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and buses. For the 10th
Army the turn Northeast toward Prague may become necessary.
_General Oberst v. Brauchitsch_: Employment of motorized divisions was
based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties
in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right
time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept.,
if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23rd, by relays.
Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.
_The Fuehrer_: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as
X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day.
Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.
_General Keitel_: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district
commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.
_v. Brauchitsch_: 235,000 men RAD [Labour Service] will be drafted. 96
Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained
laborers stay in the West.
_Fuehrer_: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed
divisions on 2nd line.
_Brauchitsch_: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization
orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.
_General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt (late brought into the
conference)_: Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover
in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their
appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the
Infantry zone. Build battery positions.
Certified
/s/ SCHMUNDT
Major on Gen. Staff
* * * * *
[ITEM 20] [_Typescript_]
Schm [initialled by Schmundt]
Nurnberg, 10 September 1938
[Stamp]
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the
Fuehrer Reich Chancellor
Received 19 September 1938
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
TOP SECRET
1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme
Command of the Army effective 15 September.
2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this
organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader
(Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the
Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions
arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in
accordance with my instructions.
3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the
departments and personnel immediately concerned.
[signed] ADOLF HITLER
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
_No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc_
T 9.9
_Distribution_:
C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
C-in-C of the Navy
Reichsminister of the Interior
for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danckwerts
Head of Reich Labor Service through Admin Office (VOA)
_Distribution_:
Adjutant to the Fuehrer--1st Copy
WZ, WH, WR--2nd to 4th Copies
Armed Forces Ops. Dept.--5th Copy
LIa, Ib, Ic, IV, VOA--6th to 10th Copies
WNV--11th Copy
Office for Ausl/Abwehr--12th to 14th Copies
General Armed Forces Office--15th to 17th Copies
Armed Forces Staff--18th to 20th Copies
Spare--21st to 25th Copies
25 Copies 1st Copy
A true copy:
Hofmann
Oberst (Reserve)
[ITEM 21] [_Typescript_]
Berlin, 14 September 1938
12 Copies
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc
[Stamp]
Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached
to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Received 19 Sept. 1938
Reg. No. 198/35
Despatched Schm
Clerk [initialled by Schmundt]
_Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with
Wehrmacht._
I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of
the C-in-C of the Army
1. The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions.
2. Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed
from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD
Battalions of Wehrkreis HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group
HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises
within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.
3. _a._ The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and
group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western
fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those
branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the
C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).
_b._ Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the
Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of
the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the
moment for purposes of the country's Kultur, etc., will retain these
tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls [AWJ] is excepted
from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.
_c._ It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those
sections of the RAD named in _a_ and _b_ above, that in accordance
with Appendix 7 to the Army
Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when
mobilization takes place.
4. The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to
discuss all details under 1 and 3 direct.
II. 5. Light road construction battalions are training-units of the
Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed
Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.
6. The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been
taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until
mobilization.
But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for
administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are
encountered in prompt payment of the men.
The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to
settle details by direct agreement.
7. In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix
7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect
automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which
there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their
coming fully under the command of the Army.
III. 8. Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe
in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for
Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same
regulations apply in essence to them.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By Order
Signed Keitel
_Distribution_:
C-in-C of the Army--1st to 3rd Copy
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces--4th to 6th Copy
Head of Reich Labor Service--7th to 8th Copy
L Ia, II, IV--9th to 11th Copy
Draft (VOA)--12th Copy
_Distribution 2: 25 Copies_
Adjutant to the Fuehrer--1st Copy
WZ, WH, WR--2nd to 4th Copy
Armed Forces Ops Dept--5th Copy
Armed Forces Ops Dept/L Ib, Ic--6th Copy
Armed Forces Communications (WNV)--7th Copy
Office of Ausl/Abwehr--8th to 10th Copy
General Armed Forces Office--11th to 13th Copy
Armed Forces Staff--14th to 16th Copy
Draft--17th Copy
Spare--18th to 25th Copy
A true Copy:
HOFMANN
Oberst (Reserve)
* * * * *
[ITEM 22] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
Berlin, 16 September 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia
S.O. Only
Access only through Officer
7 Copies 5th Copy
19.9.38
Schm
_Subject_: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.
The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by
September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task
now takes precedence over all others.
Therefore the train-loads for the Limes-job will have to be cut down
after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date
unloaded by September 20.
The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General
Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the
authorities concerned.
However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort
should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large
quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for
reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important
work on the Limes.
Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Signed Keitel
Distribution:
Supreme Command of the Army--1 (Copy 1)
C-in-C of the Air Force (Ketzinger's staff)--1 (Copy 2)
General Inspector for Roads--1 (Copy 3)
Certified
Zeitzler
Oberst on the General Staff
Major Schmundt
[There is no ITEM 23 in the file]
* * * * *
[ITEM 24] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
Berlin, September 16, 1939
30 Copies 4th Copy
T 9.9
[Stamp]
Schm
[initialled by Schmundt]
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Rec. 19th Sept. 1938,
Enclosures
Reg. No. 199138
Despatched
Clerk
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc
_Subject_: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)
1. The following RAD forces will receive military training; in
accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:
From the area of the--
IInd Army Korps (AKs) 7 Battalions
IIIrd 2 Battalions
IVth 31 Battalions
Vth 1 Battalion
VIth 78 Battalions
VIIth 1 Battalion
IXth 65 Battalions
Xth 84 Battalions
XIth 33 Battalions
For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in
matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.
2. The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to
settle all details by direct agreement.
For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By Order
Jodl
_Distribution_:
Supreme Command of the Army--1st Copy
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces--2nd Copy
Head of Reich Labor Service--3rd Copy
WZ, WH, WR--5th-7th Copies
Armed Forces Ops Division--8th Copy
L Ia, Ib, Ic, IV, VOA--9th-13th Copies
Armed Forces Communications Dept.--14th Copy
Office of Ausl/Abwehr--15th-17th Copies
General Armed Force Office--18th-20th Copies
Armed Forces Staff--21st-23rd Copies
Spare--24th-30th Copies
* * * * *
[ITEM 25] [_Telegram_]
[Handwritten note]
MOST SECRET
S.O. ONLY
LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUEHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT
KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL. KOECHLING REMAINS
DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN
AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS
FROM THE FUEHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE
TO KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS
AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES. THE FREE CORPS WILL BE
ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES
OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
[Pencil Note] 1045, 18 Sept 38
RADIOED to Capt.
Engel, Berlin.
* * * * *
[ITEM 26] [_Telegram_]
[Handwritten note]
MOST SECRET
S.O. ONLY
[In Ink]
18.9
38
1030
vb
GERMAN 2nd ARMY--COSEL--7 Inf. Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks,
1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of
one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.
On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.
On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.
8th Army:--FREIBURG--4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for
arrival:
On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div
On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div
On 4th and 5th X Day: One Inf Div each day.
4th Army Corps--Herrenhut, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the
1st day, the other on the 3rd day.
10th Army:--SCHWANDORF--3 Inf Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot
Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.
On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
12th Army:--PASSAU--7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks,
Regt. They arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks
On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.
On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
14th Army:--VIENNA--1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light
Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot [?] They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.
On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.
END
Reich War Ministry/Naval Communication Service
MOST SECRET 18.9
Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy
regarding following message. Noted. Message begins--
[There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.]
Any questions?
* * * * *
[ITEM 27] [_Typescript_]
_Army Appointments Held_
Army Group Command: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. Adam
CofS : Gen. of Inf. Wietersheim
G-3 : Lt. Col. Muller
1st Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty Beck
CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Apell
G-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg
2nd Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. v. Rundstedt
CofS : Brig Gen v. Salmuth
G-3 : Lt. Col. Hasse
3rd Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Kuechler
CofS : Brig. Gen. Hollidt
G-3 : Lt. Col. Wagner
4th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties)
v. Hamerstein
CofS : Maj. Gen. Viebahn
G-3 : Lieut. Col. Metz
5th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Liebmann
CofS : Brig. Gen. v. Sodenstern
G-3 : Col. Duvert
7th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. (for special
duties) Baron Zeutter
v. Lotzen
CofS : Brig. Gen. Modl
G-3 : Col. v. Witzleben
8th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. v. Bock
CofS : Brig. Gen. Felber
G-3 : Col. Hauffe
10th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Reichenau
CofS : Brig. Gen. Bernard
G-3 : Col. Dostler
12th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for special
duties) v. Leeb
CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Lewinsky,
known as v. Manstein
G-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt
14th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf List
CofS : Maj. Gen. Ruoff
G-3 : Col. Wohler
* * * * *
[ITEM 28: _One Page Mobilization Schedule, not translated_]
* * * * *
Berlin, 21 Sept 1938
[ITEM 29] [_Typescript_]
Chief, OKW
If the Czech Government accepts terms:
_a._ Cession of Sudeten German territory
_b._ Plebiscite in Czech-German territories,
The following military measures are to be considered:
1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police
and Gendarmerie and other military units.
2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.
3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all
arms and equipment.
4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside
the above territories.
5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which
will include the fortifications under (4).
6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation
and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.
7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air
security up to the security line.
8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining
railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields,
etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.
9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:
a. German Police (originally)
b. International Police (later for plebiscite)
10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining
area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.
11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from
the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.
12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all
negotiations.
13. _a._ Prohibition of any new fortifications and field
fortifications opposite the security line.
_b._ Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated
beyond the future German borders.
14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the
Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector
west of the Elbe to Laun.
15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to
Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5.)
16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against
Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.
17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans,
convicted of espionage.
18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time
garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.
19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military
installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the
territories to be ceded.
20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of
all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in
the areas to be ceded.
21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock,
undamaged.
22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works,
etc.) undamaged.
23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials,
provisions, livestock, etc.).
24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.
25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.
* * * * *
[ITEM 30] [_Typescript_]
Bayreuth 134
[Pencil note written by Schmundt:] Not sent off. Schm
26 September 1938
HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS
Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that
he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical
group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein
knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation
of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of
Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border.
Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were
forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of
work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to
induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even
in the first few hours after the appeal (probably the first instance in
the history of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in
extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen
who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.
Since 19 Sept.--in more than 300 missions--the Free Corps has executed
its task with an amazing spirit of _attack_ (defense)* and with a
willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The
result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners,
25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from
serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by the _enemy_ (The Czech
Terrorists).*
Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder
to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one
desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolf Hitler's Greater
Germany.
For Konrad Henlein
The Chief of Staff
[*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections on the
original manuscript.]
* * * * *
[ITEM 31] [_Typescript_]
Adj to the Fuehrer
[Note in pencil]
28/7
Schm.
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin 27.9.1938
MOST SECRET 1920 hours.
WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II 45 copies, 16th copy
The Fuehrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five
regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuehrer
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the
right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and
the evacuation of this zone by workers of the Todt organization.
It is left to the OHK--to assemble as far as possible first of all the
sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the
divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.
CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF
THE ARMED FORCES.
Signed: Keitel
Distribution: II.
* * * * *
[ITEM 32] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp]
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached
To the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor
Recd. 3 Oct 1938
Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret
[pencil note] Adjutant to the Fuehrer
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II
MOST SECRET
Berlin, 27 Sept. 1938
Subject: Mobilization Measures
To: The Deputy Fuehrer, via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reischsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police attn: S.S.
Oberfuehrer Petri.
Express
47 copies, 18th copy
As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chancellor
has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the
political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X)
order or corresponding code-words.
Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary
for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party
authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the
previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or
special code names.
The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met
(even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and
without being referred to higher authorities.
OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions
to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be
carried out according to plan.
Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization
measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously
endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:
1. The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned
by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations,
because mobilization has not yet taken place.
2. Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization
regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken
place. (NSKK-School Kreischwitzsilesia).
3. Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the
A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already
been called up.
The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all
measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party
Organizations or Police units as a result of the political situation,
be reported _in every case_ and _in plenty of time_ to the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these
measures can be carried out in practice.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces.
KEITEL
Further:
Distribution II
* * * * *
[ITEM 33] [_Typescript_]
28.9.38
MOST SECRET
MEMORANDUM
At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise
areas to their jumping-off points.
The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,)
must be ready to begin the action against "Gruen" on September 30, the
decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.
This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major
Schmundt.
[pencil note by Schmundt]
* * * * *
[ITEM 34] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant Attached to the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor
[initialled] Schm.
Recd: 3 October 1938
Req. No.: 261/38 Most Secret
Adj. to the Fuehrer
Berlin, 28 Sept 38
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a 45 copies, 16th copy
MOST SECRET
To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the
following orders are issued:
Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility
has shifted entirely on to the army, that is on to the competent
general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are
subordinate to them.
No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the
immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters
concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without
such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the
knowledge of the army headquarters.
For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle
remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuehrer
and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the
competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will
have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately
before crossing the frontier.
Those units remaining forward of the frontier should--in their own
interests--get into communication with the frontier guard as often as
possible.
As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will
be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector
to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army
boundaries later.
The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German frontier, and
not to take part in operations on the other side of the border. Any
support to the Free Corps by the frontier guards anywhere over the
frontier is prohibited.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces
Keitel
Distribution II
plus:
Reich Minister of the Interior.
Reich Finance Minister
Deputy of the Fuehrer
S.A. Hqs.
Reichsfuehrer SS
Reich Labour Service
Free Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Koechling)
[The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33]
* * * * *
[ITEM 35] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
(pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuehrer)
Recd: 3 October 1938
Req. No: 262/39 Most Secret
Berlin, Sept. 28, 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2315/38 Most Secret WFA/L II
MOST SECRET.
Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) Special
Appendix 5
Following advance measures may be carried out:
On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII)
1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148--preparation of organization for
the reception of refugees.
2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145--Preparation of employment of
district offices and staffs of collecting areas for the discharging of
reservists.
Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
(Signed) Keitel
Distribution II
* * * * *
[ITEM 36] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
[pencil note:] Adjutant to the Fuehrer
Schm.
Recd: 3 Oct. 1938
Req. No: 260/38 SECRET
Berlin, Sept. 28, 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II
MOST SECRET
45 copies, 16th copy
Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Battalions subordinate to the C in C Army.
To: Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. (SS Central
Office) (36 copies)
By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following
battalions of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command
of the C in C Army with immediate effect.
II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg, at present
in Brieg (Upper Silesia)
I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia, at present in
Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.
C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West (Upper
Rhine), according to the Fuehrer's instructions.
These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II
Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when
they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the
German-Cz. frontier.
It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C
Army and Reichsfuehrer-SS. (SS Central Office)
For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
Jodl
Further:
Distribution II
* * * * *
[ITEM 37] [_Typescript_]
L II b
28.9.38
MEMORANDUM
SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant's Office, Chief of Staff
of the SA, 1600:
Reichsfuehrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff
of Sudeten German Free Corps, Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret, according
to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the
Reichsfuehrer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German
territory.
The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.
J. [initialled by Jodl]
* * * * *
[ITEM 38] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp--as usual]
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a
Adjutant to the Fuehrer
Berlin 30.9.38
1600 hrs
120 Copies, 16th copy
MOST SECRET
Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 Most
Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I.
1. _Attachment of Henlein Free Corps_:
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the
Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command
of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.
It is, therefore, not at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit
for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the
police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS.
The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th Sept (last
paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are
amended accordingly.
2. _Rate of Exchange for the Cz. Krone_:
The following rate of exchange will apply for all transactions and
payments: 100 Cz. Kronen--10.00 Marks (1 Cz. Krone--10 Rpfg)
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
Keitel
Distribution III
and Special Distribution
(including Henlein Free Corps and
Reichsfuehrer SS through OKW/L II)
* * * * *
[ITEM 39] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:]
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 265/38 Most Secret
Adj. to the Fuehrer
Berlin, 30 Sept 1938
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret
WFA/L I A
MOST SECRET
60 copies, 16th copy
DIRECTIVE #1
Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.
1. The sectors separated from Czechoslovakia will be occupied by the
Armed Forces as follows:
The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the
sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4
and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The remaining area up to
Oct 10.
The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The extent of
the remaining areas will be announced later.
2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:
The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained
completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding
of measures taken is held over.
The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be
converted into operation "Gruen".
The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the
details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international
committee.
_a. Army_: First of all the following units are available for the
invasion:
Training Bns.
Motorized and Armoured Units
Adolf Hitler SS Bodyguard Regiment
I and II Bns of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayern)
Henlein Free Corps
All combat action on the part of the Free Corps must cease
as from 1st October.
_b. Air Force_: Those ground installations (including supply and signal
installations) situated in the separated areas are to be occupied
immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. Flying units
can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the _air_ defense of
the territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall Gruen" in
accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not yet cleared for
occupation by German troops must be avoided at all costs. Flak must be
assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected by Flak under
the command of the Army.
3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of
sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct
1st.
4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken.
Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are
to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against
the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action
against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.
5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that
they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harassed
for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.
6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech
frontier, as before.
7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still
in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.
For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
KEITEL
Distribution: III
[Attached map is not reproduced].
* * * * *
[ITEM 40] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:]
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No. 264/38 Most Secret
Adj. to the Fuehrer
Berlin, 30 Sept 1938
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
_OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WFA/L I a_
MOST SECRET
Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1
Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz.
1. _Operational Area of the Army_:
The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational area of
the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will have
full powers and authority to delegate these powers to the C-in-C's of
the armies.
The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish laws,
institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid for the
operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities,
the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the executive board
of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regulations has priority over
regulations issued by other Superior authorities.
2. _Units under Command of Army_:
_a._ The units of the military SS (V.T.) and SS Totenkopf Regiments
intended for the occupation of the sector remain under OKH control.
_b._ The Sudeten German Free Corps comes under the control of OKH. The
Bn's of the Free Corps are to be employed in the direction of their
native territory wherever possible. They retain their present armament.
Provisioning to be guaranteed through the army Hqs. Members of the Free
Corps do not come under the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free
Corps, after occupation of territory III, is to be transferred from
Bayreuth to Eger.
_c._ The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with
Reichsfuehrer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will direct Police
Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret Field Police forces
in the occupied areas. As required for Military Police duties, the
Special Police (SdP) will be drawn in as much as possible.
3. _Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installations_:
_a._ All military installations, barracks and property will be turned
over in the occupied Sudeten German territories _by OKH_ in so far as
they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. _By OKL_ if they were
property of the Cz. Air Force (including civil aviation.)
_b._ The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with the
Reich RR's regarding the taking over of rail installations.
4. _Signal Communications_:
_a._ The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication
facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the
Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under
the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending on the
situation, the most important communication installations are to be put
into operation as soon as possible, secured and screened against Cz.
Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and
confiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and
permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured through
OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL.
5. _Customs Frontier Guard_
After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the securing of
the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs Frontier Guard
(Zollgrenzschutz); the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will put
the necessary personnel from the Frontier Guard at their disposal.
The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be occupied,
will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in
conjunction with the Inspector General of Customs. Liaison officials
are still at the disposal of Corps Headquarters acc. to #16 of the
regulations governing the VGAD. Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well
as members of the Wehrmacht are not subject to customs regulations.
6. _Application of Laws_:
_a._ Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the border.
Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. Requisitioned
articles do not become the property of the armed forces. Compensation
for services rendered in cash (German currency).
_b._ Special regulations will be issued with regard to the introduction
of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas.
7. _Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population_:
Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian personnel. But
all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly demands made by
armed force authorities.
The following measures are especially requested in order to guarantee
the tasks of the armed forces.
_a._ Reichs Postal Ministry
Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas Breslau, Dresden,
Wuerzburg, Nurnberg, Munchen, Vienna, Berlin. Establishing of Special
Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to the armed forces to whatever
degree they may be required. (Compare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section
IX No. 3501, 3503, 3532). Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the
restoring of signal networks in occupied areas.
_b._ Ministry of Propaganda:
Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration in the
operational area. Prohibition of publication of military news of any
kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) Part V No. 1758 and
1600).
8. _Organizations of the Party_:
The Fuehrer's Deputy has been asked to inform the party organizations
that OKH must furnish permission if party units are to be brought into
the Sudeten area.
9. _Economic Directives_:
Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions (Kredit
instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. Requisitioning
is also prohibited. Supplying of the armed forces with food, forage
and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. The following rate of
exchange applies for all transactions and payments: _100 Cz. kronen =
9.00 RM (1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg)_ [the underlined crossed out.]
[pencil note: will be published this afternoon]
10. _Payment of the armed forces_
For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in
accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale maneuvers
will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly areas. All
additional costs arising through the operation are to be deleted under
chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury).
11. _Administrative Directives_:
The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own
responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their
disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.)
12. _Supply Installations_:
For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations
OKW Admin. Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s
------------+---------+---------------+------------
| | | App Time of
Army H.Q. | Tech Hq | To | Arrival
------------+---------+---------------+------------
12 | 13 | LANDAU/ISAR | 10.1 2000
10 | 4 | PLAUEN | 10.2 2000
8 | 3 | GORLITZ | 10.1 2000
2 | 8 | LAMSDORF | 10.5 2000
| | (SW/OPPELN) |
------------+---------+---------------+------------
13. _Propaganda Companies_:
Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment
made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.
Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
KEITEL
DISTRIBUTION: III and Special Distribution
* * * * *
[ITEM 41] [_Typescript_]
[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer
and Reichs Chancellor
[pencil note] Adjutant to the Fuehrer
Recd: 3 Oct. 1938
Req. No: 266/38 Most Secret
Berlin 30.9.38
200 copies, 153rd copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a.
MOST SECRET
Subject: _OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY_
1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of
the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning
1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed
Forces (or case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the time
being, remain at their present posts.
2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander
in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be
occupied, together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in
C of the Armies.
The Commander in Chief can exercise these powers, and pass laws,
install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate
departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid
for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich
authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board
of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has
priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area
of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be
occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area
will be ordered separately.
3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere.
However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the
demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the
tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:
_a. Reich Postal Ministry_:
Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the
Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nurnberg, Muenchen,
Vienna and Berlin.
Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of
equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob.
Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).
Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards
restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.
_b. Propaganda Ministry_:
Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration
operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of
any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)
_c. Reichsbank_:
Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender
is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) Part XVIII, Nr 8031)
4. _Application of Laws_:
_a._ There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the
_German Criminal Code_ into the occupied territory.
_b. The Army Compensation Law_ [Wehrleistungsgesetz] will be in force
on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets
primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed
forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German
currency).
5. _Economic Directives_:
Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions
[Kredit Instituten] is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area.
Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel
for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate
of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:
100 Czech kronen--10.00 RM (1 Czech krone--10 Pfg)
6. _Payment of the Armed Forces_:
For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in
accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers,
effective from time of departure from areas or garrisons.
7. _Customs Frontier Guard_:
After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of
the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at
whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the
necessary personnel.
The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of
the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties)
with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according
to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be
at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.
Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed
forces are not subject to customs inspection.
8. _Administrative Directives_:
The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own
responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at their
disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc.). In all
matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
(signed) Keitel
Distribution: Overleaf
DISTRIBUTION
The Fuehrer's deputy for the attention of SS-Oberfuehrer
Knoblauch--1st copy
Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery for the attention of
Reichminister Dr. Lammers--2nd copy
Foreign Office for the attention of Leg. Rat. Freiherr v. d.
Heyden-Rynsch--3rd copy
Reichminister of the Interior for the attention of Min. Div. Dr.
Danckwerts--4th copy
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police--Reich Defence (RV)
Section--for the attention of SS-Brigadefuehrer Petri--5th copy
Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda for the attention of
Major (Reserve) Wentscher--6th copy
Reich Minister of Justice for the attention of Min. Rat. Haastert--7th
copy
Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Geh. Rat. Dr.
Bender--8th copy
Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Mitze--9th
copy
Reich Minister of Communications--Motor Transport Service, Shipping
Hydraulic Structures--for the attention of Min. Rat. Pigge--10th copy
Reich Minister of Transport--Railroad Dept.--for the attention of Div.
Dr. Ebeling--11th copy
Reich Minister for Science, Education--National Culture for the
attention of Min. Div. Prof. Dr. Krummel--12th copy
Reich Postal Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Honold--13th copy
General Inspector for German Roadways for the attention of Reg. Baurat
Schaeffler--14th copy
Minister President General Fieldmarshall Goering, Director of the Four
Year Plan and the Prussian State Ministry for the attention of Min.
Rat. Bergbohm--15th & 16th copy
Operational Staff G B for the attention of Ministerial Director
Sarnow--17th & 18th copies
Reich Minister of Economies for the attention of Ob. Reg. Rat. Dr.
Burandt--19th copy
Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture for the attention of Min. Rat.
Dr. Dietrich--20th copy
Reich Labour Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Schroeder--21st
copy
Directorate of the Reichsbank for the attention of the Reichsbank dir.
Dr. Mueller--22nd copy
Reich Conservator of Forests for the attention of Oberlandforstmeister
Hausmann--23rd copy
Reich Office for long range regional planning (Raunoreburg) for the
attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Schepers--24th copy
President of the Secret Cabinet Council Reich Minister Freiherr von
Neurath--25th copy
Reich Minister Frank for the attention of Oberstaatsanwalt Dr.
Buhler--26th copy
Head of Reich Labour Service for the attention of Oberarbeitsfuehrer
Richter--27th copy
_OKH_ (2nd Div. Army General Staff) (80X)--28th-107th copy
_Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force_ (2nd Div. Air Force
General Staff) (30X)--108th-137th copy
_OKM_ (A II) (15 x)--138th-152nd copy
_Adjutant to the Fuehrer_--153rd copy
OKW: Chief of OKW--154th copy
WZ--155th copy
Ausl/Abwehr (with NA for Foreign Abwehr I, II & III) (5
X)--156th-160th copy
General Armed Forces Office (with NA for J. Pressegr. Vers.)
(4X)--161st-164th copy
Armed Forces Staff (with NA for WWi, WRo, WRue) (4X)--165th-168th copy
Armed Forces Communications (WNV) (2X)--169th-170th copy
L (Chief, Ia, Ib, Ic, II, IVa, IVb, IVc, IVd, K)--171st-180th copy
WH--181st copy
WR--182nd copy
Special Staff W--183rd copy
Stock kept at L IV--184th-200th copy
* * * * *
[ITEM 42] [_Typescript_]
200 copies, 153rd copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IV A
_Subject_: Occupation of the Sudeten-German area.
Berlin, 30.9.38
[STAMP]
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor
Rec. 3 Oct 1938
Enclosures: Reg. No. 267138
Dispatched--
Clerk
1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the
occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will
be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military
operations at any time.
For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the
Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the
possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be
arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.
2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic
conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought
about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has
been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 Reichmarks so as to enable
the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary
settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with
regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the
Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are
bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which
fill the immediate needs of life. _Any exploitation of the present
economic situation is a serious offense._
3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from
the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities
who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is
requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the
Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the
previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise
of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army HQ) for the transfer of
departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is
under military authorities.
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
Keitel
[Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41]
* * * * *
[ITEM 43 is seven pages of handwritten notes too illegible to
translate.]
* * * * *
[ITEM 44] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2400/38 Most Secret LIa
Top Secret
Berlin, 1st October 1938
150 copies, 18th copy
[Stamp]
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the
Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct. 3rd 1938, Encl. 2-30
Reg. No. 268338 Secret
Dispatched--
Check--
SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 3 to DIRECTIVE No. 1
_Parts of the Army Employed._
In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been
approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also
be used for the occupation:
Command (Generalkommando) III
10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf. Div)
The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army
By direction
Jodl
_Distribution_: III and special distribution
* * * * *
[ITEM 45] [_Telegram_]
Army Teleprint Network
Teleprint Office Notes
Received from
HDZG Pass to Date Time Re. No. by
9.10 Dept 9.10 Schm. [?]
Klimnisch [?]
Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304
TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT FUEHRER'S TRAIN (FUHRERZUG)
1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN
AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.G.A.D. IN THE WEST AS
FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME
STATIONS * * *
2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY
WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS
BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS
BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA, FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS. FUEHRER'S
CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 * * *
signed KEITEL
[Ink Notes:--] Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 2100
10.9 to Capt. Deyle. Fuehrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection
with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after
short warning.
SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col.
* * * * *
[ITEM 46] [_Typewritten letter_]
The C-in-C of the Army
Berlin, W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76, 10 October 1938
[Pencil notes]
11.10.38
1800 hours Schm.
My Fuehrer!
I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as
ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are
not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was
given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new
frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision
service [Grenzaufsichtsdienst] in the next few days.
It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration
of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the
control of one person.
I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to relieve me with effect from October
15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me--that of exercising executive
powers in Sudeten German territory.
Heil my Fuehrer,
VON BRAUCHITSCH
[Handwritten Note:] Submitted to Fuehrer 11 October. Agreed. Schm.
[ITEM 47] [_Telegram_]
Remarks of teleprint office
Army Telegraph Network
Pass to Date Time R. No. by
Schmundt's 10.10 1940 Schm.
Dept.
Received from HOZ6, 10.10, 1930
* * * * *
Telegram SECRET
HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.
TELEGRAM TO FUEHRER'S TRAIN, LT. COL. SCHMUNDT IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS
THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW
INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION
PRINCIPLE: 1 TO SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUEN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT
STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE
INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.
2 ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND
REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY
BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.
3 TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS
OF ECONOMY.
4 IN THE WEST--GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LIMES.
5 INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE
POWERS ON 10.15
FUEHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED
OKW
[_Handwritten notes_]
Fuehrer's decision:
1--Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen. Keitel.
Decision will then be reached.
3--Agreed
4--Agreed
5--Agreed
NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division
Relayed to Lt. Colonel Zeitzler at 2300, 10.11
SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col.
[in Schmundt's writing]
* * * * *
[Next page contains illegible notes]
[_Handwritten notes_]
10.10.38
_What is in the Zone?_
_5_ 1 (motorized) For special duties 1 mountain
1 (light) 3 div
1 armoured 1 truck transport regt.
1 mountain
1 div.
_4_ 3 motorized div _3_ 4 div
1 light Germania
1 armoured
2 div
Liebstandarte
_1_ 1 armoured 13 div
3 div 4 div (motorized)
3 armoured
2 mountain
2 light
-------------
24 divisions
[notes in Schmundt's writing]
* * * * *
[_Telegram_]
Army Telegraph Network
Notes of Telegraph Office
Received from HOZG 11.10.10.45
Pass to Date Time R. No. by
Lt. Col. 11.10 Schm.
Schmundt
HBZG 008 1040
TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUEHRER AND SUPREME
COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS
POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED
AS FROM 10.15 AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON
THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY
OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO
THE FUEHRER HAS BEEN DISPATCHED.
OKH 6th Div. (Five)
General Staff of the German Army
11.37/38
* * * * *
[ITEM 48]
[_Ink note_]
1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.
2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between
Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.
[Rest of note impossible to decipher completely]
* * * * *
[_Telegram_]
Army Telegraph Network
Notes of the telegraph office
Received from HBZC 11.10.1955.
Pass to Date Time R. No. by 1)4 Mot.
Lt. Col. 11.10 2030 Joe Div.
Schmundt 1 B'n
ready
to
March
[?] 1 Arm'd
Brig.
24
+5
--
29 [Undecipherable
note]
TOP SECRET
HBZG 13 1930.11.10
Lt. Col. Schmundt
Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION
TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?
Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS:
ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing
ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.
ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing
ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division
ARMY GROUP 1: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division
B LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW
BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT
THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH
RESISTANCE.
Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP
OF NEW FORCES?
Answer: A Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES
FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)
B Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME
Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT
IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?
Answer: A Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.--IN THE EAST 9
to 10 DAYS.
B Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS
AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION--THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND
THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE--LENGTH OF TIME IN
SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION
IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE
ARMY.
Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF
READINESS OF OCT. 1st?
Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days
at least.
Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION,
WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 HOURS.
(signed) KEITEL
* * * * *
[ITEM 49] [_Typewritten table_]
LI a
Berlin, 12 October 1938
3 copies, 1st copy
REFLECTIONS Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of
Forces from the Sudeten-German Area
---------------+-------------------------------------+
| Present Strength |
|-------------------------------------|
| | Div. Nos. Earmarked |
Army Group | No. of Divs. | for |
| | Withdrawal |
---------------+---------------+---------------------+
Army Group | 5 1/3 | 1/3 44, _2 Mtn_, |
Command 5 | | _3 Mtn_, _29th_ |
| | _Mot_, 4 light, _2nd|
| | _Armoured_ |
| | |
Army Group | 4 1/3 plus | _1/3 5th_, _7th_, |
Command for | 1 SS Regt | _9th_, _45th_, _1st_|
Special Duties | | _Mtn._ |
| | |
Army Group | 7 (plus 1 | 10th, 24th, _2nd_ |
Command | SS Regt) | _(Mot)_, _13th_ |
4 | | _(Mot)_, _20th_ |
| | _(Mot)_, 1st |
| | Light, 1st Armd. |
| | |
Army Group | 3 (plus 1 | 4th, _3rd_, _18th_ |
Command | SS Regt) | |
3 | | |
| | |
Army Group | 4 | 8th, 28th, 30th, |
Command | | _3rd_ Arm'd. |
---------------+---------------+---------------------+
TOTAL | 22 2/3 (Plus | |
| 3 SS Regts) | |
| | |
| _Namely_: | |
| 11 2/3 Inf. | |
| Div | |
| 3 Mtn Divs | |
| 3 Mot Divs | |
| 3 Light Divs | |
| 3 Armd Divs | |
| | |
---------------+---------------+---------------------+
---------------+-----------------+-----------------
| |
| No. of Div. | Strength
| To be Withdrawn | After Withdrawal
Army Group | |
| |
---------------+-----------------+-----------------
Army Group | 3 | 2 1/3 1 1/3
Command 5 | |
| |
| |
| |
Army Group | 1 1/3 | 3 1
Command for | |
Special Duties | |
| |
Army Group | 2 | 4 2
Command | |
4 | |
| |
| |
| |
Army Group | 2 | 2 1
Command | |
3 | |
| |
Army Group | 1 | 3 2
Command | |
---------------+-----------------+-----------------
TOTAL | 8 1/3 | 14 2/3 (Plus
| | 3 SS Regts)
| |
| _Namely_: | _Namely_:
| 3 1/3 Inf Divs | 8 2/3 Inf Div
| 2 Mtn Divs | 1 Mtn Div
| 1 Mot Div | 2 Mot Divs
| 1 Light Div | 1 Light Div.
| 1 Arm'd Div | 2 Arm'd Divs
| |
| | 7 1/3
---------------+-----------------+----------------
[ITEM 50] [_Telegram_]
REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
MOST SECRET
Received on 17.10 from kg at 1535 by [Indecipherable]
MBZ O 61
Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525
Lt. Colonel Schmundt
OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still
remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14-1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments)
should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old
age group at the end of October--this is necessary for the building up
of the Army--and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible
by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div, 7th Div,
13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div).
Fuehrer's decision requested today.
Signed Keitel
[Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:] The Fuehrer has given his
consent 17 Oct. By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel,
Section L, OKW.
Schmundt, Lt. Col.
* * * * *
[ITEM 51] [_Typescript_]
The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces
Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938
Despatched 19 X 39 M
TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN
The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the
operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces,
the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.
Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3-1/2 millions of German
compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.
The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938.
Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power,
while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.
Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people
express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of
the Sudeten-Land.
(signed) Adolf Hitler
Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938
(signed) Schmundt,
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.
The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
After Delivery:
To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
I request that publication in the press be initiated from there.
1st Draft.
To The C-in-C of the Army
The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory had been completed
according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the
Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3-1/2 million German compatriots have
returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the
protection of the Armed Forces.
You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country
and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in,
and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to
exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry
being October 20th 1938.
My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the
Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and
devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.
J.
[Handwritten note]
The military SS (SS Verfuegungstruppe), the SS and SA
* * * * *
[ITEM 52] [_Typescript_]
Berlin, 18 October 1938
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
_No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a_ 1300 hours
[Stamp] 60 copies
Copy
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich
Chancellor
Recd. 20 Oct. 1938
Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret
Despatch Clerk W
MOST SECRET Directive No. 4
The Fuehrer has ordered:
1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in
Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.
2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of
the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force.
The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten
Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.
Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
Keitel
Distribution: III
* * * * *
[ITEM 53] [_Telegram_]
REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
MOST SECRET
Received at 1040 by [Indecipherable] Initials
MBZ 066
Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030
LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:
(SECRET)--OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE:
ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE
COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION
OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS.
THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY
DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38
Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL
[Handwritten:] Consent given, 21 Oct 38.
Passed to Colonel Jodl's Ante-Room at 1400
Sch 22/10
* * * * *
[ITEM 54] [_Typescript_]
MOST SECRET
TOP SECRET
Only through officer
_Conference Notes_
L I a Berlin, 27.9.38
4 copies, 1st copy
[Pencil note]
Time of Attack "Gruen".
(Z. v. A. Gruen)
COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY
As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated
attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.
The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615; it also wishes to
conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which, however,
would not alarm the entire Czech front.
Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could
change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The
weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the
start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.
If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no
tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it
would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of
flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired
a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would
be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both
Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone
the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.
If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as
indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force,--desirable as it
may be,--may possibly have to be dispensed with.
_Thus it is Proposed_:
Attack by the Army--independent of the attack by the air force--at the
time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations
to take place before them, however, only to an extent that will not
alarm the entire Czech front.
The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.
J.
[Initialled by Jodl.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 392-PS
The Social Life of New Germany with Special Consideration of the
German Labor Front [Das Sociale Leben in neuen Deutschland unter
besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront] (Berlin,
1938) by Prof. Willy Mueller. Pages 51-54. [Prof. Mueller was Reich
Indoctrination Administrator in the German Labor Front].
"The Supreme Directorate of the Political Organization--The Staff
Director"
Munich, 21 April 1933
Circular Letter Nr. 6/33
On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination action
[Gleichschaltungsaktion] of the free trade unions begins.
The direction of the entire action lies in the hands of the Action
Committee.
The Action Committee is composed as follows:
Dr. Robert Ley, Chairman.
Rudolf Schmeer, Deputy.
Schuhmann, Commissar of the General German Trade Union Federation
[ADGB].
Peppler, Commissar for the General Independent Employees Federation
[AFA].
Muchow Organization.
Bank Director Muller, Commissar, Director of the Bank for Workers,
Employees and Officials.
Brinckmann, Commissar Chief Cashier.
Biallas, Propaganda and Press.
All the commissar directors of the unions belong to the broader Action
Committee.
The essential part of the action is to be directed against the General
German Trade Union Federation [ADGB] and the General Independent
Employees Federation [AFA]. Anything beyond that which is dependent
upon the free trade unions is left to the discretion of the Gauleiter's
judgment.
The Gauleiters are responsible for the execution of the coordination
action in the individual areas. Supporters of the action should be
members of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organizations [NSBO or
National-Sozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation].
SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade union
properties and for taking into protective custody personalities
concerned.
The Gauleiter is to proceed with his measures on a basis of the
closest understanding with competent regional factory cells directors
[Gaubetriebszellenleiter].
The action in Berlin will be conducted by the Action Committee itself.
In the Reich the following will be occupied:
The directing offices of the unions;
The trade union houses and offices of the free trade unions, The Party
houses of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany insofar as trade
unions are involved there;
The branches and pay offices of the Bank for Workers, Employees and
officials, Inc.
The district committees of the General German Trade Union Federation
and of the General Independent Employees Federation.
The local committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and
of the General Independent Employees Federation.
The following are to be taken into protective custody:
All trade union chairmen [Verbandsvorsitzende];
The district Secretaries and the branch directors of the "Bank for
Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc."
The Chairmen of local committees as well as the employees of unions are
not to be taken into protective custody but are to be urged to continue
their work.
Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the Gauleiter.
The taking over of the independent trade unions must proceed in such a
fashion that the workers and employees will not be given the feeling
that this action is against them, but on the contrary, an action
against a superannuated system which is not directed in conformity with
the interests of the German nation.
The Provisional local direction of the General German Trade Union and
of the General Independent Employees' Federations is to be taken over
by a commissar of the National Socialist Factory Cells Organization
[NSBO].
The dealings with the authorities and other organizations are to be
handed over immediately to the newly installed commissars.
All funds and accounts of the independent trade unions are to be
blocked immediately and remain thus until Thursday afternoon 1800
hours. Insofar as incumbent cashiers are permitted to remain in office
they will be subject to the authority of the commissar. All payment
receipts must be countersigned by a commissar.
After raising the blocking of funds the usual payments for the support
of persons, etc. must be unconditionally assured in order not to create
a feeling of uneasiness among the members of the trade unions.
As soon as possible mass assemblies are to be arranged for the free
attendance by all trade union members. In these meetings the meaning of
the action is to be set forth and it is to be explained that the rights
of the workers and employees are being unequivocally guaranteed.
The following unions belong to the General German Trade Union
Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 28 unions].
The following unions belong to the General Independent Employees
Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 13 unions].
Up to the present time the following have been proposed for commissars:
[Here follows an enumeration of 17 names as commissars for the most
important arrangements of the General German Trade Union Federation].
For the rest, the newly installed commissars will be nominated by the
Gauleiters in close cooperation with the Regional Factory Cells Office.
[Gaubetriebszellenamt].
It is to be understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly
disciplined fashion. The Gauleiters are responsible in this respect;
they are to hold the direction of the action firmly in hand.
Heil Hitler!
/s/ Dr. Robert Ley
* * * * *
The NSBO (National Socialist Factory Cells Organization) took over not
only the administrative apparatus but the entire press of the "Free
Trade Unions." The papers and magazines which had a pronounced party
political [parteipolitisch] tendency had to stop their publication,
while the other special publications continued. By all these measures
Marxism was to be hit exclusively, but not the idea of trade unions
as such, in which the right and defense of the German workers were
embodied.
On 5 May 1933, the leader of the action committee reported to
Hitler the success of the ordered action. Then, in a public mass
demonstration, he reported about the events of 2 May to the workers
of Berlin; at the same time, he unfolded before them his future plans
which were to secure the maintenance of the financial efficiency of the
trade unions in the interest of the worker.
Following the crushing of the free trade unions, the danger came, of
course, that former functionaries would try to acquire money and other
property items for themselves in an illegal manner. This, however,
would have entailed damage to the members. To avoid these dangers on 12
May 1933, the Attorney General of the State confiscated the property
of the free trade unions and of all of their affiliated unions and
administrative agencies in order to secure an orderly disposition of
the property of the German workers. Dr. Robert Ley was assigned as
the attorney with the right to dispose of the confiscated property
[vefuegungsberechtigter Pfleger der beschlagnahmten Vermoegen].
While the free trade unions were smashed [zertruemmert] in the action
of 2 May, Dr. Ley granted the entire Union of the Christian Trade
Unions with further full liberty of movement. For this purpose, he told
it on the 6th of May 1933 that "nothing will be changed in the present
situation until the return of the Saar to the Reich and that they (the
Christian Trade Unions) should continue as before to represent and
carry on the idea of the Christian Trade Unions and of Germandom as
they see it". Therefore the Christian Trade Unions put on temporary
constraint in their attitude toward the social political events of 2
May and participated in the Saar in forming the "German Trade Union
Front" in order to help to secure the result of the Saar voting by
achieving a unity of the people.
The former free trade union leaders behaved differently. These, with
the assistance of their colleagues abroad and of the international
union of the trade unions, tried to oppose the measures of the German
government; this induced Dr. Ley to introduce the defense against
sabotage by the legal authorities.
The hostile activities reached their peak at the International Workers
Conference of Geneva which began on 8 June 1933. From the German side,
Dr. Ley also took part in it; representatives of the Reich Cabinet
and of the Christian Trade Unions were with him. The subjects for the
meeting were labor mediation, work conditions in certain branches of
industry, social insurance, provision for unemployed, and shortening
of the working time. The participating states were to enter the
basic rules, which were to be set up in an international agreement,
into their social legislations. The Germans represented voiced the
opinion that the situation of the working people could not be improved
by international agreement but by providing work and bread for the
workers. In spite of this opposite opinion, Germany took part at the
conference; in this way the German government wanted to prove that
it had no purpose whatever to smash the social achievements of the
German labor but that, on the contrary, she endeavored to retain them
and lead them further. However, she was not willing to approve of an
international agreement by which the further development of the German
social legislation could be hampered.
During the conference, a few foreign personalities opposed the German
representatives in such a way that Dr. Ley was induced to reject the
further participation of the German Delegation in the discussions.
The atmosphere of Geneva did not remain without influence upon the
representatives of the Christian Trade Unions. As already mentioned,
the Christian Trade Unions were first given opportunity to continue
their social work without interference. They began to exploit this
favor. Also formally they have asserted that they were subject to
all governmental measures which have been already taken or were to
be taken; but that they could not refrain in the course of time from
striving for a special position, which was to protect them from being
ideologically converted to the world of national socialistic ideas.
This attitude, which was contrary to the general interests and was
prone to bring again dissension in the ranks of labor, induced Dr. Ley
on 24 June 1933 to order the complete incorporation of the Christian
Trade Unions into the German Labor Front which had been founded in the
meantime. It was again the NSBO to which this task was assigned. At the
same time the leaders of the Christian Trade Unions lost their honorary
positions which were granted to them by Dr. Ley in the new social
order. Concerning this, Dr. Ley submitted the following statement:
I. With the formation of the German Labor Front the majority of
workers' and capitalists' organizations should have an opposite
orientation. Not only should the last refuge of Marxism be liquidated
by this means, but also it should be possible to remove the
unfortunate schism of the German laboring men. Petty and selfish
persons do not wish to recognize this great and revolutionary fact and
seek to weaken this work by imitations and self-help organizations. It
is the will of the Fuehrer that outside of the German Labor Front no
other organization (whether of worker or of employers) is to exist * * *
II. National Socialism is exercising the power in its strength most
generously, however this proceeding is being interpreted here and
there by its small opponents as weakness. This National Socialism
believed that it could be generous in dealing with the Christian
Trade Unions and other middle-class groups. This fact was answered
by ingratitude and disloyalty. It turns out that the afore-mentioned
unions have shown the greatest corruption in treasury matters and in
economic affairs. Because of this knowledge I offer the following: All
offices of the Christian Trade Unions and of employee unions are to be
occupied by National Socialists * * *
(Signed) Dr. Robert LEY
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 404-PS
MEIN KAMPF
Adolf Hitler
German Edition, 1935
[Pages 456 to 457]
It is precisely our German people, that today, broken down, lies
defenseless against the kicks of the rest of the world who need
that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. But this
_self-confidence has to be instilled_ into the young fellow-citizen
from childhood on. His entire education and development has to be
directed at giving him _the conviction of being absolutely superior to
others_. With this physical force and skill he has again to win the
belief in the invincibility of his entire nationality. For what once
led the German army to victory was the sum of the confidence which the
individual and all in common had in their leaders. The confidence in
_the possibility of regaining its freedom_ is what will restore the
German people. But this conviction must be the final product of the
same feeling of millions of individuals.
* * * * *
[Page 475]
The racial State will have to see to it that there will be a generation
which, by a suitable education, will be ready for the final and
ultimate decision on this globe. The nation which enters first on this
course will be the victorious one.
* * * * *
MEIN KAMPF
Adolf Hitler
41st Edition, 1933
Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger, GMm. b.H. Muenchen.
[Page 607, line 37 to page 608, complete]
For this reason alone, The SA of the NSDAP could have nothing in common
with a military organization. It was an instrument for defense and
education of the National Socialist movement and its tasks lay in an
entirely different province from that of the so-called combat leagues
[Wehrverbaende]. But it could also constitute no secret organization.
The aim of secret organizations can only be illegal. In this way, the
scope of such an organization is automatically limited. It is not
possible, especially in view of the talkativeness of the German people,
to build up an organization of any size and at the same time to keep
it outwardly secret or even to veil its aims. Any such intention would
be thwarted a thousand times. Not only that our police authorities
today have a staff of pimps and similar rabble at their disposal, who
will betray anything they can find for the Juda's payment of thirty
pieces of silver, and even invent things to betray, but the supporters
themselves can never be brought to the silence, that is necessary in
such a case. Only very small groups, by years of sifting, can assume
the character of real secret organizations. But the very smallness of
such organizations would remove their value for the National Socialist
movement. _What we needed and still need were and are not a hundred
or two hundred reckless conspirators, but hundreds of thousands of
fanatical fighters for our philosophy of life [Weltanschauung].
We should not work in secret conventicles, but in mighty mass
demonstrations, and it is not by dagger and poison or by pistol that
the road can be cleared for the movement, but by the conquest of the
streets. We must teach the Marxists that the future master of the
streets is National Socialism, just as it will some day be the master
of the state._
* * * * *
MEIN KAMPF
Adolf Hitler
Munich, 1933, 39th Edition.
[Page 675]
The trade union in national-socialist interpretation, has not the
mission to gradually transform into one class, through condensation,
all the various individuals among the people, thereby to take up the
fight against other similarly organized structures within the nation.
On the whole we cannot assign this mission to the trade union, rather
it was first conferred on it at the moment in which it became the
weapon of Marxism. It is not that the trade union is imbued with the
spirit of the class struggle, directly, on the contrary, Marxism has
made of it an instrument for its class war. It created the economic
weapon which the international world Jew uses for the ruination of
the economic basis of free, independent national states, for the
annihilation of their national industry and of their national commerce,
and thereby for the enslavement of free peoples in the service of
international world finance Jewry.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 405-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 285
Law concerning Trustees of Labor of 19 May 1933
The Reich Government has decided on the following law, which is hereby
promulgated.
Section 1
1. The Reich Chancellor appoints trustees of labor for the larger
economic areas upon the proposal of the competent provincial
governments and in agreement with them.
2. The Reich Labor Minister will assign the trustees either to the
participating provincial governments, if they agree, or to the
provincial authorities.
Section 2
1. Until a new revision of the social constitution, the trustees are
to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of labor contracts. This
practice is to be legally binding for all persons and replaces the
system founded on combinations of workers, of individual employers or
of combinations of employers. The regulations concerning the general
application (par 2 ff of the tariff accord decree in the publication of
1 March 1928, Reichsgesetzblatt I, p 47) remain unaffected.
2. Moreover, the trustees are also to look after the maintenance of the
labor peace.
3. Furthermore, they are to be convoked for their cooperation in the
preparation of a new social constitution.
Section 3
The trustees are empowered to request aid of the competent Reich and
provincial authorities for the execution of their regulations. They
should contact the provincial government or one of their designated
authorities before executing their measures, even though the danger of
delay exists.
Section 4
The trustees of labor are bound by the directives and decrees of the
Reich Government.
Section 5
The Reich Minister of Labor in agreement with the Reich Minister of
Economics issues the necessary regulations for the implementation.
Berlin 19 May 1933.
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Labor Minister
Franz Seldte
The Reich Economics Minister and Agriculture
Hugenberg
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Finance
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 406-PS
Contents
Memorandum
by Gauleiter
Party Member Julius Streicher
_Enclosure 1_: First memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member Karl
Holz, with postscriptum.
_Enclosure 2_: Second memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member
Karl Holz, with postscriptum.
_Appendix 1_: Case Sandreuter
_Appendix 2_: Case Ritter
_Appendix 3_: Case J.M. Lang
MEMORANDUM
BY GAULEITER
PARTY MEMBER JULIUS STREICHER
Action against the Jews on 9/10 November 1938.
I was no longer present at the traditional fellowship congregation in
the old town-hall in Munich on the evening of 9 November 1938 when a
speaker, who claimed to have higher authority, made it known that the
party was launching an action against the Jews during the night of
9/10 November 1938. I was informed of this fact by the party members
Obergruppenfuehrer von Obernitz and Obergruppenfuehrer Litzmann
around midnight of 9 November 1938. I declared to both these party
members that I myself did not approve of an action involving arson
of synagogues and destruction of goods but that I would raise no
objections, of course, if this action had been sanctioned by the party.
_Therefore, what was done to the Jews during the night of 9/10 November
1938 happened without my direct or indirect assistance._
The consequences arising from the action against the Jews.
The action against the Jews of November 1938 was _not a spontaneous
one_ emanating from the population, and therefore was incomprehensible
to many party members also as to its effects. Units of the components
of the Party had been ordered to carry out the action against the
Jews. If there is evidence now that in isolated cases party members
with immaculate police records have appropriated goods during this
action it should not be over-looked in judging such incidents that _the
appropriation was committed in an instant, where all goods were being
destroyed in accordance with the orders given_.
April 14, 1939
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS
Telegram
GBA 760/43 [in ink crossed out in red]
10 March 3.
To the Fuehrer
Fuehrer headquarters
_With the urgent request for immediate presentation to the Fuehrer in
person and decision._
_Subject_: Difficulties in recruiting of workers
[Arbeitsdienstverpflichtung] in the former Soviet territories.
My Fuehrer:
You can be assured that the Arbeitseinsatz is being carried out by me
with fanatical determination, but also with care and consideration
for the economical and technical, as well as human, necessities and
occurrences.
The replacement for soldiers who are to be freed and the reinforcement
of the armament program with newly needed workers can and will be
supplied, in spite of great difficulties, which had to be overcome in
the last two winter months. 258,000 foreign workers could be supplied
during January and February to war industry, although the transports in
the East were almost completely lacking. The commitment of German men
and women is in full force.
Now that the difficulties of the winter months are disappearing more
and more the transports from the East can be put into full operation
again on account of preparations arranged by me. Although the report
and commitment-results of German men and women is outstanding, in the
heavy industrial labor the commitment of productive foreigners who are
used to labor cannot be neglected.
Unfortunately, a few commanders in chief [Oberbefehlshaber] in the
East mobilized the recruiting of men and women in the conquered Soviet
territories, as I was told by Gauleiter Koch--for political reasons.
My Fuehrer! To fulfill my task I ask you to abolish these orders. I
think it impossible that the former Soviet people should experience a
better consideration than our own German people, on whom I was forced
to levy drastic measures. If the obligation for labor and the forced
recruiting of workers in the East is not possible anymore, then the
German war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the
full extent.
I myself have the opinion that our army leaders should not give
credence under any circumstances to the atrocity and propaganda
campaign of the Partisans. The generals themselves are greatly
interested that the support for the troops is made possible in time.
I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excellent
workers going into the field as soldiers now, cannot possibly be
substituted by German women, not used to work even if they are trying
to do their best. Therefore I have to use the people of the eastern
territories.
I myself report to you, that the workers belonging to all foreign
nations are treated humanely, correctly and cleanly, are fed and housed
well, and are even clothed. On the basis of my own services with
foreign nations, I go as far as to state, that never before in the
world were foreign workers treated as correctly as is now happening in
the hardest of all wars by the German people.
Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the
obligation of foreign workers for labor and to report to me kindly,
whether the concept of the mission presented here is still right.
I would ask to talk to you personally about different important points
of the Arbeitseinsatz at the beginning of next week, possibly Tuesday.
Yours, always thankful, sincere and obedient
Signed: Fritz Sauckel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V AND VI-PS
District Administration Thueringen of NSDAP
The Plenipotentiary for The Direction of Labour.
Weimar 15 April 1943
Nr. 435/43 10:25 o'clock
To the Fuehrer, Obersalzberg.
23 June 1943
[stamped]
My Fuehrer,
As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the
eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers
from the East for the German war economy in the coming months.
The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfillment
of the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas
too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.
Counting the manpower which comes into question from Poland and the
remaining areas, and which is in the neighborhood of about 150,000,
it will become possible again to place 5- to 600,000 workers at the
disposal of German agriculture and 1 million workers at the disposal of
the armaments industry and the rest of the war industries by the coming
summer months.
I beg you to agree that the new French labor forces can also come into
the Reich under conditions similar to those which applied to the last
group. I have kept in touch with the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Since the largest part of the Belgian civil workers and prisoners of
war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar
statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000
Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made
a very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has
repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you,
my Fuehrer.
1. After one year's activity as plenipotentiary for the direction of
labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were given to
the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this year.
As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances.
Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably
regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich
presents a shining example to the methods of the capitalist and
bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and
blunders occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with the
greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.
Besides the foreign civil workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war will be
employed in the German economy.
2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches
of the German war economy:
Armament 1,568,801
Mining industry 163,632
Building 218,707
Communications 199,074
Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544
Other economic branches 480,298
Besides the employment of foreign workers, 5 million German men and
women workers were transferred, inside the German economic structure,
to the German war economy proper by being switched from businesses
unimportant to the war effort to important ones, or by retraining.
All of these efforts were necessary in order to smooth out the natural
fluctuations, for example, through death, sickness, expirations or
breaches of contract, but especially through drafting into the Armed
Forces and the shifting of industries into other regions and to
facilitate the enlargement of the armament works, the establishment of
new factories and the fulfillment of new programs.
3. The result of the registration action for men and women up to the 7
April is as follows:
On the basis of the order of 27 January 1943, 3,249,743 men and women
have registered. The results are not yet final.
The number of men amounts to 553,415
that of women to 2,696,328
Up till now about 52% of these registrations (that is 1,851,771) have
been definitely fixed up by the Labor Bureaux.
Up till now only 32.5% of the men come into question for the direction
of labor as the majority do not fit in with the requirements as a
result of old age or sickness.
Employed up to the present moment are 66,008 men. Up to 7 April 732,489
women were put to work.
This result must be designated as outstanding. 44% of these women,
however, work less than 48 hours per week because of their domestic
circumstances. The basic armament industry has received from the women
and men employed
20,670 men
341,100 women
It was possible to make some 130,000 available to agriculture and the
rest to the Armed forces, postal service, railroads, etc.
4. The result of the shutting-down measures taken by the Reich Minister
for Economic Affairs includes 74,644 persons, of this group, mostly
over-age and consisting of 27,218 men, 47,426 women, only a third
could be directed to industry, 10,108 men, 17,929 women, of these the
armament industry received 5,258 men, 8,621 women.
The rest were distributed to the remaining industries of war importance
and to the Armed Forces.
5. The demands of the armaments industry for men and women workers and
the allocations of these from December 1942 until the end of March 1943
give the following result:
_Demand_ _Allocation_
December 1942 } 250,000
January 1943 } total 335,000 172,000
February 1943 } 235,000
-------
total-- 657,000
March 1943 225,000 450,000
replacements for those
drafted from the armaments
industry. 240,000
------- ---------
800,000 1,107,000
In the March figures 320,000 men and women are brought into account by
the registration-action.
* * * * *
Since I, my Fuehrer, shall be staying in the eastern provinces on the
20 April, I beg, already today, to be allowed to extend my most fervent
good wishes to you, along with those of my district and my family.
You can be assured that the district of Thueringen and I will serve you
and our dear people with the employment of all strength.
The warmest desire is that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the
best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete
satisfaction.
Your faithful and obedient,
[signed] Fritz Sauckel
Passed on: Puttig.
Received: Weismann Oberg.
Officially received: 1130 o'clock Heinstein pkz Munich for Section
Roem. 3.
The above telegram was also sent in letter form. [in ink]
WE 15 Apl.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-VIII-PS
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz
Berlin W8, Mohrenstr 65 (Thuringenhaus) 17 May 1943
Tel: 12 65 71
To the Telegraph Office of the Party Chancellery
Berlin W8
Gauleiter Sauckel requests that the following telegram be transmitted
to the Fuehrer and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich.
By direction
Heil Hitler!
[signature illegible]
* * * * *
_a._ To the Fuehrer, Fuehrer Headquarters
_b._ To the Reich Marshal for the Greater German Reich, Headquarters
to _a._ My Fuehrer!
to _b._ Most respected Reich Marshal!
In regard to the Arbeitseinsatz in connection with the Organization
Todt, I request that I be permitted to submit the following figures:
In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy by the
Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt was supplied
with new labor continually. The total number of laborers employed by
the OT amounted to 270,969 at the end of March 1942 and 696,003 at the
end of March 1943.
In this it is noteworthy that the Arbeitseinsatz has accelerated the OT
in the West for the purpose of completing the work on the Atlantic Wall
and has furnished laborers with utmost energy. This is all the more
remarkable because:
1. In France, Belgium and Holland the industries work for the German
war economy exclusively, and must always be supplied with labor in any
case;
2. Great numbers of workers must be placed at the disposal of the
German economy within the Reich itself.
In spite of the attendant difficulties the supply of the OT in the west
was raised from 66,701 at the end of March 1942 to 248,200 at the end
of March 1943.
Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the
completion of the Atlantic Wall.
to _a_ Heil Hitler!
Your obedient and faithful
Fritz Sauckel
to _b_ Your continually obliged
Fritz Saukel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz
Berlin W8, 3 June 1943
1751/43 [pencilled] ab 6/4/43
To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany
The Fuehrer's Hq
My Fuehrer!
I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the
Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943.
For the first time the following number of new foreign laborers and
Prisoners of War were employed in the German war industry:
January 1943 --120,085
February 1943 --138,354
March 1943 --257,382
April 1943 --160,535
May 1943 --170,155
--------
Total --846,511
I may remark that this number of 850,000 was reached only after
greatest difficulties were overcome which had not existed during the
previous year; all those who have worked for the Arbeitseinsatz,
particularly in the occupied territories, did so with the greatest
fanaticism and devotion.
Unfortunately quite a number of our officials and employees were
victims of murders and attacks by partisans.
Besides those labor forces recruited for work within the Reich, several
hundred thousand laborers were recruited in the occupied territories
through the agencies for the Arbeitseinsatz as well as through the OT
and the factories working in the East and the West for the German war
industry. Furthermore the Wehrmacht received a large number of laborers
as well as labor volunteers.
Moreover, because of the order dated 27 January 1943 requiring
everybody to register, the following numbers of men and women were made
available:
_Men_ _Women_ _Total_
February 14,594 163,012 177,606
March 45,606 494,931 540,537
April 19,315 269,374 288,689
May 11,405 186,683 198,168
------ --------- ---------
Total 91,000 1,114,000 1,205,000
Of these approximately 800,000 are available only for less than 48
hours of work per week.
Altogether, German war industry during the first 5 months of 1943
recruited more than 2,000,000 laborers.
Furthermore, negotiations resulted in agreements and regulations on the
following points: Wage control and increased production in the various
European territories especially in France, which enabled us to keep
wages in the occupied European territories on a reasonable level, to
stabilize living conditions of foreign laborers working for Germany in
spite of the difficult conditions of war, to increase production by
means of wage control in these territories. These measures were carried
out in agreement with industrial and farming authorities as well as
with the Commissioner of the Reich for the control of prices.
Heil!
Your obedient and faithful
Signed: Sauckel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 437-PS
[Extract from report of Hans Frank to Hitler re situation in Poland,
dated 19 June 1943--Pages 10 and 11.]
In the course of time, a series of measures or of consequences of the
German rule have led to a substantial _deterioration of the attitude_
of the entire Polish people in the General Gouvernment. These measures
have affected either individual professions or the entire population
and frequently also--often with crushing severity--the fate of
individuals.
Among these are in particular:
1. The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, mainly of
the working classes in the cities, whose majority is working for German
interests.
Until the war in 1939, its food supplies, though not varied, were
sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian surplus of the
former Polish state and in spite of the negligence on the part of their
former political leadership.
2. The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and the
expropriation without compensation and resettlement of Polish peasants
from manoeuvre areas and from German settlements.
3. Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in commerce and
trade and in the field of private property.
4. Mass arrests and mass shootings by the German police who applied the
system of collective responsibility.
5. The rigorous methods of recruiting workers.
6. The extensive paralyzation of cultural life.
7. The closing of high schools, junior colleges and universities.
8. The limitation, indeed the complete elimination of Polish influence
from all spheres of State administration.
9. Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, limiting its
extensive influence--an undoubtedly necessary move--and, in addition,
until quite recently, the closing and confiscation of monasteries,
schools and charitable institutions.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 440-PS
Berlin, 20 Nov. 1939
The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.k. Chefs. (Top Secret, Chief Matter)
Department L (I)
8 Copies, Copy
Chief matter
By officers only
TOP SECRET
Directive No. 8, for the conduct of the war.
1. The state of alert, to make the continuation of the initiated
concentration of troops possible at any moment, must be maintained, for
the time being. Only this will make it possible to exploit favorable
weather conditions immediately.
The various components of the Armed Forces will make arrangements
enabling them to stop the attack even if the order for such action is
received by the High Command as late as D-1 at 2300 hours. The keyword
"Rhein" (--start attack)
or
"Elbe" (--withhold attack)
will be passed on to the High Commands at the latest by this time.
The High Commands of the Army and the Air Forces are requested after
having determined the day for attack, to notify Department L of the
High Command of the Armed Forces immediately with regard to the
mutually agreed hour of the commencement of the attack.
2. Contrary to previous orders, all measures intended against the
Netherlands are to be carried out without special orders at the start
of the general attack.
The reaction of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be foreseen. The
entering of our troops will take the character of a friendly occupation
wherever no opposition is encountered.
3. The _Land-operations_ are to be carried out on the basis of the
assemble directive of 29 October. The following is added to complete
this directive:
_a._ All measures have to be taken to move the emphasis of the
operation quickly from Army Group B to Army Group A if greater and
quicker successes than at Army Group B should be obtained there as the
present disposition of enemy's forces that would indicate.
_b._ The Dutch area, including the coastal West-Frisian Islands,
without Texel for the time being, is to be seized as far as the
Grebbe-Haas Line, until further notice.
4. _The Navy_ is authorized to take blockage measures for submarines
against the Belgian and, contrary to previous orders, also against
Dutch harbors and waterways, in the night before the attack and from
the time of the start of the blockade activities and the time of the
land attack must also be kept as short as possible in the case of the
use of submarines.
Combat actions against Dutch naval forces are only authorized, if they
adopt a hostile attitude.
The Navy is charged with the coastal artillery defense of the coastal
regions to be occupied, against attacks from the sea. Preparations have
to be made accordingly.
5. The tasks of the _Air Force_ remain unchanged. They have been
supplemented by special orders, issued orally by the Fuehrer,
concerning the landing from the air and the support of the army by the
seizure of the bridges west of Maastricht.
The 7th _Air_-borne Division will only be committed for landing
activities from the air after the seizure of bridges across the Albert
Canal has been secured. The fastest means of transmission of this
message between the High Command of the Army and the High Command of
the Air Force must be guaranteed.
Localities, especially great open town, and the industries are not to
be attacked either in the Dutch or the Belgian-Luxembourg area, without
(urgent) military reasons.
6. _The closing of the frontiers._ _a._ The border and news traffic
across the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers is to be kept at
its present volume _until the beginning of the attack_ in the orders
to that effect to the military and civilian authorities are not to
participate in the preparations for the closing of the border until the
start of the attack.
_b._ The Reich-Border is to be _closed_ towards the Netherlands,
Belgium and Luxembourg for all non-military border and news traffic
_at the start of the attack_. The Commander-in-Chief issues the orders
to that effect to the military and civilian authorities concerned. The
Highest Reich Authorities concerned, will be informed by the OKW (High
Command of the Armed Forces) at the beginning of the attack that the
measures for the closing of the borders will be issued immediately by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, even for the Dutch Border outside
of the operational territory.
_c._ At first, restrictions in the border and news traffic will not
be ordered after the start of the attack on the other Reich-Borders
towards the neutral countries. Further prepared measures for the
surveillance of personal and news traffic will be taken, if necessary.
By order
Distribution: Signed: Keitel
High Command of the Army--1st Copy.
High Command of the Navy--2nd Copy.
R. d. L. [Reichs-Ministry of the Air] and the High Command of the Air
Force--3rd Copy.
attested: von Trotha [?]
Captain
_High Command of the Armed Forces:_
Chief WFA--4th Copy.
L--5-8th Copy.
_Distribution:_
_Copies_
K 1st Copy
IV 2nd Copy
II 2nd Copy for information
[in handwriting] Acknowledged 21 October [initials illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 442-PS
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
OKW/WFA/L No. 33 160/40 Top Secret
The Fuehrer's hq. 16 July 1940
7 copies, 4th copy
TOP SECRET
Transmit by officer courier only
General Order No. 16 on the preparation of a landing operation
against England.
Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation still shows
no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a
landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.
The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland as a
basis for the carrying on of the war against Germany, and if it should
become necessary to occupy it completely;
To this end I order the following:
1. The _Landing_ must be carried out in the form of a surprise crossing
on a broad front approximately from Ramsgate to the area west of
the Isle of Wight, in which air force units will take the roll of
artillery, and units of the navy the roll of the engineers. Whether it
is practical to undertake subordinate actions, such as the occupation
of the Isle of Wight or of County Cornwall, before the general landing
is to be determined from the standpoint of every branch of the armed
forces and the result is to be reported to me. I reserve the decision
for myself. The preparations for the entire operation must be completed
by _mid-August_.
2. To these preparations also belong the creation of those conditions
which make a landing in England possible.
_a._ The English air-force must morally and actually be so far
overcome, that it does not any longer show any considerable aggressive
force against the German attack.
_b._ Mine-free channels must be created.
_c._ By means of a closely concentrated mine-barrier the straight of
Dover on both _Flanks_ as well as the western entrance to the channel
in the approximate line Aldemey-Portland must be sealed off.
_d._ The area in front of the coast must be dominated and given
artillery protection by strong coastal artillery.
_e._ Tying down of the English naval forces in the North Sea as well as
in the Mediterranean (by the Italians) is desired, whereby it must now
be attempted that the English naval forces which are in the homeland be
damaged by air and torpedo attack in strength.
3. Organization of the leadership and of the preparations;
Under my command and according to my general directions the supreme
commanders will lead the forces to be used from their branches of
service. The command-staffs of the supreme commander of the army,
the supreme commander of the Navy, and the supreme commander of the
air-force must from 1 August on be located within a radius of at least
50 km. from my headquarters (Ziegenberg). Lodging the command staffs of
the supreme commanders of the army and navy together at Giessen appears
practical to me.
Hence for the leadership of the landing armies the supreme commander of
the army will have to employ an army group hq.
The project bears the code-name "Seeloewe" [Sea-lion].
In the preparation and carrying out of the undertaking the following
tasks fall to the various branches:
_a._ _Army_: will draw up the operational plan and the transport
plan for all units of the 1st wave to embark. The AA artillery to be
transported with the 1st wave will at the same time be attached to
the army (to the individual crossing groups) until such a time as a
division of tasks in support and protection of ground troops protection
of the ports of debarkation and protection of the aerial strong points
to be occupied can be carried out. The Army furthermore distributes the
means of transport to the individual crossing groups and establishes
the embarkation and landing points in agreement with the Navy.
_b._ _Navy_: will secure the means of transport and will bring
them corresponding to the desires of the Army and according to the
requirements of seamanship into the individual embarkation areas.
Insofar as possible ships of the defeated enemy states are to be
procured. For every ferrying point it will provide the necessary naval
staff for advice on matters of seamanship with escort vessels and
security forces. It will protect, along with the air forces employed to
guard the movement, the entire crossing of the channel on both flanks.
An order will follow on the regulation of the command relationship
during the crossing. It is further the task of the navy to regulate,
in a uniform manner, the building up of the coastal artillery, that
is, all batteries which can be used for firing against sea targets of
the Army as well as of the Navy, and to organize the fire control of
the whole. As great an amount of _very heavy artillery_ as possible
is to be employed as quickly as possible to secure the crossing and
to protect the flanks from enemy operations from the sea. For this
purpose, railway artillery (supplemented by all available captured
pieces) without the batteries (Ks and K12) provided for firing on
targets on the English mainland, is to be brought up and emplaced by
use of railway turntables.
Independent of this, the heaviest available platform batteries are to
be opposite the Straits of Dover, so emplaced under concrete that they
can withstand even the heaviest aerial attacks and thereby dominate the
Straits of Dover under any circumstances in the long run, within their
effective range.
The technical work is the responsibility of the Todt Organization.
_c._ _Mission of the Air Force is_: To hinder interference from the
enemy air force. To overcome coastal defenses which could do damage to
the landing positions, to break the first resistance of enemy troops
and to smash reserves which may be coming up. For this mission closest
cooperation of individual units of the air force with the crossing
units is necessary. Furthermore, to destroy important transportation
routes for the bringing up of enemy reserves, and to attack enemy naval
forces, which are coming up, while they are still far away from the
crossing points. I request proposals on the use of parachute and glider
troops. In this regard it is to be determined if it is worth-while here
to hold parachute and glider troops in readiness as a reserve to be
quickly committed in case of emergency.
4. The armed forces chief of signals will carry out the necessary
preparations for signal connections from France to the English
mainland. The installation of the remaining 80km East Prussian cables
is to be provided for in conjunction with the Navy.
5. I request the supreme commanders to submit to me as soon as possible:
_a._ The intentions of the Navy and Air Force for achieving the
necessary conditions for the crossing of the channel (see figure 2).
_b._ The construction of the coastal batteries in detail (Navy).
_c._ A survey of the tonnage to be employed and the methods of getting
it ready and fitting it out. Participation of civilian agencies? (Navy).
_d._ The organization of aerial protection in the assembly areas for
troops about to cross and the means of crossing (Air Force).
_e._ The crossing and operations plan of the army, composition and
equipment of the first crossing wave.
_f._ Organization and measures of the Navy and the Air Force for
carrying out of the crossing itself, security of the crossing, and
support of the landing.
_g._ Proposals for the committment of parachute and glider troops,
as well as for the attachment and command of anti-aircraft, after an
extensive gain of territory on English soil has been made (Air Force).
_h._ Proposal for the location of the command staffs of the supreme
commanders of the Army and of the Navy.
_i._ The position of army, navy, and air force on the question whether
and what subsidiary actions _before_ the general landing are considered
practical.
_k._ Proposal of army and navy on the overall command during the
crossing.
A. Hitler
[Initialled]
J [Jodl]
K [Keitel]
_Distribution_:
Supreme Cmdr of the Army--1st copy.
Supreme Cmdr of the Navy--2nd copy.
Supreme Cmdr of the Air Force--3rd copy.
Armed Forces Command Section [?]--4th copy.
(WFA)
Section L--5th and 7th copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K.Chefs
Only by officer
_Directive No. 18_
Fuehrer's Headquarters
12 November 40
2F/408
10 copies, 4th copy
55
The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution of the war
in the near future are to be made along the following lines:--
1. _Relations with France._ The aim of my policy towards France is to
cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future
prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will
have the role of a "non-belligerent power"--she will have to tolerate
German military measures on her territory, especially in the African
colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her
own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the
defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West
and Equatorial Africa) against England and the deGaulle movement. From
this initial task France's participation in the war against England can
develop fully.
For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my
meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on--apart from the
current work of the armistice commission--entirely by the foreign
office [Auswartiges Amt] in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces [OKW].
More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.
2. _Spain and Portugal._ Political steps to bring about an early
Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of _German_
intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to
drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:
_a._ Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
_b._ The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another
point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.
The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:
_Section I_
_a._ Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the
necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking
over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards
they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign
Intelligence.
_b._ Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over
the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the
Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and
against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.
_c._ The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness
away from the French-Spanish border and information will be withheld
from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a
warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the
Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations
regarding the Atlantic Islands).
With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will
detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways
are available for reinforcements.
_Section II_
_a._ Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras,
will, at a favorable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil
on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and
will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.
_b._ Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross
the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.
_Section III_
_a._ Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.
_b._ Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British
gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into
Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.
_Section IV_
Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the
Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.
As for the _strength_ of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the
following will apply:
_Army._ The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength
to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.
Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards
in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different
point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible
invasion of Portugal are to be predominately of a mobile nature.
_Air Force._ Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on
Gibraltar to guarantee substantial success.
For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the
support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be
transferred to Spain.
Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units,
and is also to be used to engage ground targets.
_Navy._ Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the
British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which
they are expected to do after the air raid.
To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations
are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of
_single_ coastal batteries.
An Italian participation is not envisaged.
As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the _Atlantic Islands_ (in
particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased
importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as
for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are
examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and
how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.
I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the
Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would
arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The
results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.
3. _Italian Offensive against Egypt._ If at all, the use of German
forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached
Morsa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered
mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for
this.
The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or
any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:
_Army._ Holding an armored division ready for use in North Africa
(composition as previously provided for).
_Navy._ Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as
are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible
forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.
_Air Force._ Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez
Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.
4. _Balkans._ The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make
preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea
in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible
the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern
Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are
threatening the Roumanian oil area.
In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in
check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten
divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of
deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading
through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.
So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will
be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania,
the extent of which must be submitted to me.
_The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force_ will make preparations for
the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for
aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance
with the intended ground operations.
The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the
extent proposed to me.
Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition)
are to be given favorable treatment.
5. _Russia._ Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of
clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the
results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have
already been verbally ordered will be continued.
Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the
army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.
6. _Landing in England._ Due to a change in the general situation it
may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seeloewe" in the
spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore
earnestly endeavor to improve conditions for such an operation in every
respect.
7. I shall expect _the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions_
of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give
orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the
individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff
will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations
in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.
Signed: Adolf Hitler
J [initialled: Jodl]
_Distribution_:
Ob.d.H (Op.Abt.)--1st Copy.
Ob.d.M (l.Skl.)--2nd Copy.
Ob.d.L. (LwFueSt.Ia)--3rd Copy.
O.K.W.
SFSt--4th Copy.
Abt. L.--5th-10th Copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS
The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs.
SECRET
The Fuehrer's Headquarters
18 December 40
(only through officer)
9 copies, 4th copy
_Directive Nr. 21_
_Case Barbarossa_
The German Armed Forces must be prepared _to crush Soviet Russia in
a quick campaign_ before the end of the war against England (case
Barbarossa).
For this purpose the _Army_ will have to employ all available units
with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be
safeguarded against surprise attacks.
For the Eastern campaign the _Airforce_ will have to free such strong
forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the
ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German
territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of
the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation:
That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain
sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks
on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to
break down.
Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally
against England also during an Eastern campaign.
If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action
against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of
operations.
Preparations requiring more time to start are--if this has not yet been
done--to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will
not be recognized.
The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following
basis:
I. _General Purpose_:
The mass of the Russian _Army_ in Western Russia is to be destroyed in
daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the
retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is
to be prevented.
In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian
Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The
first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from
the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last
industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the
Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will
quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.
Effective intervention by the Russian _Airforce_ is to be prevented
through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.
II. _Probable Allies and their tasks._
* * * * *
[_Page 4_, _par. II_]
2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces
concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in
addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.
* * * * *
[_Page 8_, _par. IV_]
IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the
commanders-in-chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are
_precautionary measures_, in case Russia should change her present
attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the
preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible.
Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only
as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise,
the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution
has not been fixed) will become known and thereby grave political and
military disadvantages would result.
V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their
further plans based on this letter of instructions.
The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be
reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.
[signed] Hitler
[initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.]
_Distribution_:
Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)--1. copy
Ob. d. M. (Skl.)--2. copy
Ob. d. L. (Lw.Fue.St.)--3. copy
_OKW_:
_WFSt_.--_4. copy_
Abt.--5-9. copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
TOP SECRET
Top Secret
Only thru officer
OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Section L (IV/Qu)
44125/41 Top Secret
Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
5 copies, 4th copy
_Subject_: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I)
#33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940
Directives for Special Areas to Order #21
(Case Barbarossa)
I. Area of operations and executive power
1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding
supply for an area of operations _within the armed forces_ shall be set
up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in _East Prussia_ and in the
_General Gouvernement_ at the latest four weeks before operations are
started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being
made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe
(Ob.d.L.) has been reached.
It is not contemplated to _declare_ East Prussia and the General
Gouvernement _an area of operations_. However, in accordance with
the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the
Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all
measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the
safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the
Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind
have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.
2. _The Russian territory_ which is to be occupied shall be divided up
into individual states with _governments of their own_, according to
special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this
the following is inferred:
_a._ _The area of operations_, created through the advance of the Army
beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to
be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the
Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and
may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army
Groups and Armies.
_b._ In the area of operations, the _Reichsfuehrer SS_ is, on behalf of
the Fuehrer, entrusted with _special tasks_ for the preparation of the
_political administration_, tasks which result from the struggle which
has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within
the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently
and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the
Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by
him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the
Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military
operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly
through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.
_c._ As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth,
it is to be _limited in the rear_. The newly occupied territory in
the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own _political_
administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to
its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into
_North_ (_Baltic countries_), _Center_ (_White Russia_) _and_ _South_
(_Ukraine_). In these territories _the political administration is
taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich_ who receive their orders
from the Fuehrer.
3. For the execution of all _military tasks_ within the areas under
the political administration in the rear of the area of operations,
_commanding officers_ who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
The commanding officer is the _supreme representative of the Armed
Forces_ in the respective areas and the bearer of the _military
sovereign rights_. He has _the tasks of a Territorial Commander_ and
the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this
capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
_a._ Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to
support him in his political task.
_b._ Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for
use by German industry (see par. 4).
_c._ Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according
to the needs of the OKH.
_d._ Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of
supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
_e._ Traffic regulations.
_f._ Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's
inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.
The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the _civilian_
agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the
military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the
commissioners of the Reich.
Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the
distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.
_The time for the assumption of command_ by the commanding officers
will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change
in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time,
the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to
the principles valid for the commanding officers.
4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of _the
administration of economy_ in the area of operations and in the
territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has
delegated the _Chief of the "Wi Rue Amt"_ with the execution of the
task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi Rue Amt.
5. The majority of the _Police Forces_ shall be under the jurisdiction
of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of
police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are
to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational
Staff/Section Defense.
6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of
the _military courts_ shall be separately regulated, and commanded.
II. _Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic_:
7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational
Staff for the measures necessary _before the beginning of operations_
for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to
Russia.
8. _As soon as operations begin_, the German-Soviet Russian frontier
and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations
will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with
the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the
Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of
these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may
for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of
liaison officers.
The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the
highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed
Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party
agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the
agencies under him shall decide on exceptions.
Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations
of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be
submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.
III. _Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland._
9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the
OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of
the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during
the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for
this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.
10. _Police measures_ for the protection of the troops are permitted,
independently from the granting of special rights. Further orders in
this shall be issued later.
11. _Special orders shall be issued at a later date_ for the
territories of these countries, on the following subjects:
Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise.
Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.
_Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW_
from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be
_submitted_ to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense
not later than 27 March 1941.
IV. _Directives regarding Sweden._
12. Since Sweden _can_ only become a transient-area for troops,
no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German
troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate
protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.
The Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces
Signed: KEITEL
_Distribution_:
OKH--1st copy.
OKM--2nd copy.
R.d.L.u.O.K.L.--3rd copy.
Armed Forces Operational Staff--4th copy.
Section L--5th copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 448-PS
Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
OKW/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs
F.H.Q. 11th Jan 44
TOP SECRET
13 copies, 4th copy.
Order No. 22
Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations.
The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for
strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance,
due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.
Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian
front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in
connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to
start an attack also from Albania.
I order therefore, the following:
1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army
which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies
in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored
divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately.
The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time
to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored
division and a motorized division to Tripoli (starting approximately 20
February).
2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most
important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces
and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranean.
Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of
temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and
supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give
immediate support to the Army group of Graziani.
The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between
Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" [Sperrgebiet]
in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air corps and to avoid
incidents against neutral ships.
3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of
one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are
to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain
Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is
received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime,
it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in
Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could
be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the
Italian Divisions.
The duty of the German forces will be:
_a._ To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an
emergency case, should new crises arise there;
_b._ To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking
with the aim:
To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a
far-reaching operation,
To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to
support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.
4. The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops
to be employed in North Africa and Albania and the restrictions which
are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by
the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.
5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far
as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be
provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports
of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to
be utilized.
Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the
German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to
Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary
for this purpose.
[signed] Adolf Hitler
Distribution:
OKH/Gen Staff of Army, operating--1st cy.
OKM/Skl--2nd cy.
Ob.d.L./Lw.F.St.I a--3rd cy.
OKW WFST--4th cy.
--------L--5th to 9th cy.
WNV--10th cy.
Foreign/Intelligence--11th cy.
Armed Forces, Transport Chief--12th cy.
German General with the Italian high command--13th cy.
* * * * *
F.H.Q. 29th Jan 41
High Command of the Armed Forces
WFST/Abt. L(I) Nr. 44018/41 g.K. Chefs II. Anz.
13 copies, 4th copy.
Ref: The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW
/WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V. 11th Jan. 41
The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code
names:
Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume"
Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen"
The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces.
By order
(Signed) Warlimont
Distribution:
OKH/general staff of Army, operations--1st cy.
OKM/SKL--2nd cy.
Ob. d. M./Lw Fuest--3rd cy.
_OKW_:
WFST--4th cy.
Section L--5th to 9th cy.
WNV--10th cy.
Foreign/Intelligence--11th cy.
Armed Forces, Transportation Ch.--12th cy.
German General with the Italian high command--13th cy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 498-PS
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer
No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt
Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942
12 copies, 12th copy.
1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods
which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially
brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who,
as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals
in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are
directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless
prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the
latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their
purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been
found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.
2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed
Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the
face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices,
will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly
mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.
3. I therefore order:
From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or
Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances
soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in
battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not
make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes
for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even
if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to
give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In
each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for
publication in the Report of the Military Forces.
4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs,
etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means,
through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to
be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military
guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even
if this is only intended for a short time.
5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers
who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive
actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in
open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy
soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers
trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.
6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out
this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their
duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this
order where it was to be executed.
[signed] Adolf Hitler
_Distribution_: Copy No.
O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army /
General Staff of the Army). 1
O.K.M. / Skl. (High Command of the Navy /
Naval War Staff). 2
Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fue.St. (C in C Air Force / Air
Force Operational Staff). 3
W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander,
Norway) 4
W.B.Sudeost (Armed Forces Commander,
Southeast) 5
Ob. West (C in C, West) 6
Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army) 7
Ob. Sued (C in C, South) 8
Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) 9
Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer
SS and Chief of the German Police). 10
OKW /WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces
/ Armed Forces Operational Staff). 11-12
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 501-PS
Field Post Office Kiev, 16 May 1942
No 32704
B Nr 40/42
TOP SECRET
To: SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff [Handwritten:]
Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8 pers.
R/29/5 Pradel n.R
b/R
[Handwritten:] Sinkkel [?] b.R, p 16/6
The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans
of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not
too bad, the vans of the second series (_Saurer_) _stop completely in
rainy weather_. If it has rained for instance for only one half hour,
the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be
used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the
van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the
van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good
weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the
highways and is difficult to access because of its location; in damp or
wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed
are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is
going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible.
There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to
drive them to the spot.
I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-trailers
by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van
and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on
farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not
only the authorities, but also the civilian population called the
van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my
opinion, the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even
camouflaged.
The Saurer-van which I transported from Simferopol to Taganrog suffered
damage to the brakes on the way. The Security Command [SK] in Mariupol
found the cuff of the combined oil-air brake broken at several points.
By persuading and bribing the H.K.P. [?] we managed to have a form
machined, on which the cuffs were cast. When I came to Stalino and
Gorlowka a few days later, the drivers of the vans complained about the
same faults. After having talked to the commandants of those commands
I went once more to Mariupol to have some more cuffs made for those
cars too. As agreed two cuffs will be made for each car, six cuffs
will stay in Mariupol as replacements for group D and six cuffs will
be sent to SS-Untersturmfuehrer Ernst in Kiev for the cars of group C.
The cuffs for the groups B and A could be made available from Berlin,
because transport from Mariupol to the north would be too complicated
and would take too long. Smaller damages on the cars will be repaired
by experts of the commands, that is of the groups in their own shops.
Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and highway
conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course of time. I
was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought to Berlin for
repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too expensive and would
demand too much fuel. In order to save those expenses I ordered them to
have smaller leaks soldered and if that should no longer be possible,
to notify Berlin immediately by radio, that Pol. Nr.------ is out of
order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all the
men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible, so they
should not suffer damage to their health by the gas which eventually
would escape. I should like to take this opportunity to bring the
following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading
after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to
the attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense
psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can
have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men
complained to me about head-aches which appeared after each unloading.
Nevertheless they don't want to change the orders, because they are
afraid prisoners called for that work, could use an opportune moment to
flee. To protect the men from these damages, I request orders be issued
accordingly.
The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to
come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator
to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer
death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My
directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers
death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted
faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer
noticed.
Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be reached
with further news.
Signed: Dr. Becker
SS Untersturmfuehrer
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office
Message Center
1900, 15 June 1942 [Handwritten:]
Riga E 2 II D 3a Maj Pradel
Message No 152452 R 16/6
Wiederhausen
Riga 7082--15-6-42--1855--BE
To Reichs Security Main Office--Roem. 2D3A--Berlin
TOP SECRET
_Subject_: S-Vans
A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, arrives
weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the
Security Service of White Ruthenia.
The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose.
I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I
request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2
Daimond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already.
The commandant of the Security Police and
the Security Service
"Ostland"
Roem IT-126/42 GRS
Stamp: Signed: Truehe, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer
No 240/42
II D 3a 16 June 42
Procedure: [handwritten]
1. When can we count on having another S-van ready?
2. Are gas-hoses on hand, ordered or when to be delivered?
3. Request answer.
R 16/6
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office
II D 3a B Nr 240/42 Berlin, 22 June 1945
TOP SECRET
Stamped:
Message Nr 107903
Sent by message center
2016, 22 June 42
1. FS [?]
To the Commandant of the Security Police and
Security Service Ostland
Riga
_Subject_: S-Van
The delivery of a 5-ton Saurer can be expected in the middle of next
month. The vehicle has been at the Reichs Security Main Office for
repairs and minor alterations up to this time. 100 meters of hose will
be supplied.
By order of
[signature as in heading]
2. Dissemination at once by II D 3a (9)
By direction
Rauff
* * * * *
Handwritten note:
Berlin, 13 July 1942
II D 3a (9)
_Nr I.Z. Widderhausen_ [?] for further action and attention to the
note of 13 July 1942 on back page of telegram from Belgrad. For the
reasons mentioned 5 sections of hose, each of 10 meters, can be
supplied me.
By direction
[signature illegible]
* * * * *
Reichs Security Main Office
Stamps: 1003 9 Jun 1942
handwritten:
After return
immediate repair
II D 3a No 964/42
10 June 1942
R 10/6
Notify about repair
ND. Nr 144702
Belgrad No. 3116 9.6.42 0950--SOM
To: Reichs Security Office, Amt Roem 2 D 3 KL. A--Z. HD. V. Major
Pradel--Berlin.
Subject: Special-van-Saurer
Preceding messages: None
The Drivers SS-Scharfuehrer Goetz and Meyer have fulfilled their
special mission and could be ordered back with the van mentioned above.
In consequence of a broken rear-axle-half, transportation cannot be
made by car.
Therefore I have ordered the vehicle loaded and shipped back to Berlin
by railroad.
Estimated arrival between 11th and 12th June 1942. The drivers Goetz
and Meyer will escort the vehicle.
The commandant of Security Police and Security Service
Belgrad--Roem I--BNR 3985/42.
Signed: Dr. Schaefer, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
* * * * *
[Handwritten note back page]
II D 3a (2)
T.O.S. a Dr. SUKKEL
Berlin, 11 June 1942
For further action and immediate start of repairs. I request to be
informed about arrival of vans.
By direction:
signed: Just
Berlin, 16 June 1942.
II D 3a (9)
_Note_
The vehicle arrived 16 June 1942 about 1300 h. After thorough cleaning
the repairs will start immediately.
By direction
signed: [?]
Berlin, 13 July 1942.
II D 3a 9
1. Note: The S-truck Pol 71463 is ready.
2. Sent to the _motor-pool management T.F. Niederhausen_ for its
information and further action.
By direction
signed: [?]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 502-PS
TOP SECRET
B 101
Enclosures 2
Berlin, 17 July 1941
Office IV
Regulations (directives) for the commandos of the Chief of the
Security Police and of the Security Service, which are to be activated
in Stalags.
The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with the
agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service
and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see
enclosure I). The commandos will work independently according to
special authorization and in consequence of the general regulations
given to them, in the limits of the camp organizations. Naturally,
the commandos will keep close contact with the camp commander and the
defense officers assigned to him.
The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of all
camp-inmates, the elimination and further "treatment"
_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way undesirable
elements among them.
_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the
occupied territories.
For the execution of their mission, no auxiliary means can be put
at the disposal of the commandos. The "Deutsche Fahndungsbuch",
the "Aufenthaltsermittlungsliste" and the "Sonderfahndungsbuch
UdSSR" will prove to be useful in only a small number of cases; the
"Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" is not sufficient, because it contains only
a small part of Soviet-Russians considered to be dangerous.
Therefore, the commandos must use their special knowledge and ability
and rely on their own findings and self-acquired knowledge. Therefore,
they will be able to start carrying out their mission only when they
have gathered together appropriate material.
The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at present
and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders which the
latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and
examinations of camp inmates.
Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out
among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless if there
are communists concerned or not, in order to use them for intelligence
purposes inside of the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied
territories also.
By use of such informers and by use of all other existing
possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the
prisoners, must succeed step by step at once. The commandos must learn
for themselves, in every case by means of short questioning of the
informers and eventual questioning of other prisoners.
The information of _one_ informer is not sufficient to designate a camp
inmate to be a suspect, without further proof; it must be confirmed in
some way if possible.
Above all, the following must be discovered:
All important functionaries of state and party, especially
Professional revolutionaries.
Functionaries of the Komintern.
All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow
organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district
committees.
All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies.
All former Political commissars in the Red Army.
Leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle
regions.
The leading personalities of the business world.
Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence.
All Jews.
All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists.
It is not less important, as mentioned already, to discover all those
persons who could be used for the reconstruction, administration and
management of the conquered Russian territories.
Finally, all such persons must be secured who are still needed for the
completion of further investigation, regardless if they are police
investigations or other investigations, and for explanations of
questions of general interest. Among them are all those especially,
who because of their position and their knowledge are able to give
information about measures and working methods of the Soviet-Russian
State, of the communist party or of the Komintern.
In the final analysis, consideration must be given to the nativity in
all decisions to be made. The leader of the Einsatz Kommando will give
every week a short report by telephone or an express-letter to the
Reichs-Security-Main-Office, containing:
1. _Short_ description of their activities in the past week.
2. Number of all definitely suspicious persons. (report of number
sufficient)
3. Individual names of all persons found to be functionaries of the
Komintern, leading functionaries of the party, Peoples-Commissars,
leading personalities and Political commissars.
4. Number of all persons found not to be suspicious informers, with a
short description of their position.
_A._ Prisoners-of-war.
_B._ Civilians.
On the basis of those activity reports the Reichs-Security-Main-Office
will issue immediately the further measures to be applied. For the
measures to be applied on the basis of this successive directive the
commandos are to demand the surrender of the prisoners involved from
the camp command.
The camp commandants have received orders from the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces, to approve such requests (see enclosure I).
Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity
of the camp. If the camps in the General-Government are in the
immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken
for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian
territory.
Should execution be necessary for reasons of camp discipline, then the
leader of the Einsatz Kommando must apply to the camp commander for it.
The commandos have to keep lists about the special treatments carried
out and must contain:
Current number.
Family name and first name.
Time and place of birth.
Military rank.
Profession.
Last residence.
Reason for special treatment.
Day and place of special treatment
(card file).
In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible
removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for
the Einsatz-group in the occupied territories, the leader of
the Einsatz-Kommando must make an agreement with the nearest
State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security
Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief of the
Einsatz-group concerned in the occupied territories.
Reports of that kind are to be transmitted for information to the
Reichs-Security-Main-Office, IV. A 1. Excellent behavior during
and after duty, the best cooperation with the camp-commanders, and
careful examinations are the duty of all leaders and members of the
Einsatz-Kommando.
The members of the Einsatz-Kommando must be constantly impressed with
the special importance of the missions entrusted to them.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS
Top Secret
High Command of the Armed Forces.
No 55 1781/42 g. K Chefs. W F St/Qu
F.H. Qu., 19 October 1942
Top Secret
By officer only 22 copies, 21st copy
Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage
troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942_) a
supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.
_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any
circumstances fall into enemy hands._
_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving
bureaus._
The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for
the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and
copies made thereof.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
By order of
Jodl
1 enclosure
(distribution list--over)
_Distribution list_:
General Staff of the Army--1st copy.
Chief of Ordnance and Commander of Replacement Army--2nd copy.
High Command of the Navy Sea Warfare Diary--3rd copy.
High Command of the Air Force command staff--4th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in Norway--5th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Netherlands--6th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the South-east--7th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Eastern Territory
(Ostland)--8th copy.
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the Ukraine--9th copy.
High Command West--10th copy.
High Command 20th Mountain army}--11th copy.
(GEB.) AOH 20) }
Commanding Officer of German }
troops in Denmark }--12th copy.
(Bfh. d. dt. Tr. in Denmark }
High Command South--13th copy.
Tank Army--Africa--14th copy.
German General in Headquarters of Italian Armed Forces--15th copy.
Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police and Main Bureau for
Security Police--16th and 17th copies.
High Command of the Armed Forces:
Foreign Counter Intelligence--18th copy.
Armed Forces legal section (WR)--19th copy.
Armed Forces propaganda section (PR)--20th copy.
_Armed Forces Command Staff, Quartermaster inclusive file copy_--_21st
copy_.
War Diary (KtC)--22nd copy.
* * * * *
Top Secret
By officer only
The Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
18 K
I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of
enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders
severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent
commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.
As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind
the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well
as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories
occupied by us has been developed in this war.
In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan warfare as
early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our fighting
strength and cost the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad
workers, members of the labor corps [Organization Todt], the labor
service, etc. It severely interfered with and sometimes delayed for
days, the performance of transportation necessary for the maintenance
of the fighting strength of the troops. By a successful continuation
or perhaps even intensification of this form of war, a grave crisis in
one or another place at the front might develop. Many measures against
these horrible, as well as wily, sabotage activities have failed,
simply because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of
the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual cases
did not act against these enemy groups as would have been necessary
in order to help the forward echelons of the front thereby the entire
conduct of the war.
It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organize special
units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to special SS
formations.
Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and
executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which eased the
position of the fighting front.
_In all eastern territories the war against the partisans is therefore
a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part._
As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common knowledge of
troops, they will regularly be able to cope with these occurrences in
short order; otherwise their efforts achieve no decisive results and
become purposeless.
Even though under a different name, England and America have decided
upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian attempts to put
partisan troops behind our front by land and only in exceptional cases
uses air transportation to land men and to drop supplies, England and
America use this method of warfare primarily by landing sabotage troops
from submarines or pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents.
Essentially, however, this form of warfare does not differ from the
activities of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops:
1. to build up a general espionage service with the assistance of
willing natives,
2. to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the necessary
weapons and explosives,
3. to undertake sabotage activities which by destruction of traffic
installations, not only continuously disrupt our communications, but
also, when things become serious, make troop movements absolutely
impossible and eliminate our communications system.
Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important
installations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out
program, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing whole
industries into idleness.
The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do
not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact
that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance,
can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby
eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed
in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the
Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.
Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary.
Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time
supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need,
appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders
to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in
their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in
their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can
immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically
fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no
doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva
agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals,
liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these
activities.
England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers
for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them
that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they
have to do is to successfully commit their attack on people, traffic
installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by
the enemy, to capitulate.
If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through
these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all
sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last
man.
This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under
no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite,
sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured,
expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It
must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.
The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique
will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or
destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.
I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to
them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity
of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy.
Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness
are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances--when there is
danger in delay--to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland
as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect
that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the
supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.
These are the reason for the issuance of this decree.
If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to
initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately
after interrogation.
(signed) A. Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 506-PS
Draft
WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)
Nr 006580/44 g.Kdos
Fuehrer Headquarters, 22 June 1944
TOP SECRET
2 copies--1st copy
Reference: WR 2 f 10.34 (III/10) Nr 158/44 g.Kdos.-119/44 V--of
17 June 1944
Subject: Enemy agents--Fuehrer order 003830/42 g.Kdos/OKW /WFSt of 18
October 42
To: W R
WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the Judge Advocate
of the Army group with the Supreme Commander South-west of 20 May 44
(Br. B Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if
the enemy employs only _one_ person for a task. Therefore, it does
not make any difference if several persons or a single person take
part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of
participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not
correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.
By direction
initialled: W
3 inclosures [Warlimont]
* * * * *
[Following is an attached handwritten note]
Qu 2 W
All questions connected to the commando order (18 Oct 42) are to be
handled according to a previous directive of Chef Qu at Qu 2 (W) page
2140, not at administration.
[initial illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS
TOP SECRET
WFSt/Op (L)
Fuehrer's Headquarters November 21, 1942
5 copies, 5th copy
Subject: Landing of British Freight Gliders in Norway. [Illegible
signature] 2/40/43
Note
Supplement to situation report OKW/WFSt/Op. 21 Nov. 42.
Air Force 5, G-2 Capt. S. Lilienskjold reports 21 Nov. by telephone to
inquiry:
1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British
freight glider at Hegers in the night of November 11:
_a._ No firing on the part of German defense.
_b._ The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching the
ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of
the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order
has been carried out.
2. In the same night a second freight glider landed East of Stavanger.
3 men of the crew were captured by the Norwegian police on November
21. They state that after it was detached the freight glider made a
crash-landing at the Lyse Fjord in the night of Nov. 20; it had a crew
of 16. Supposedly several dead and wounded. The landing occurred on
the North shore of the Fjord, opposite the electric plant of Floerly
(supplies Stavanger).
The plane has not yet been found. Each and every possible measure
to find it and also to seize the other members of the crew has been
initiated by the service district.
The towing plane has apparently returned to England. The radio
communication was monitored by Air Fleet #5.
[signed] W
Went out Nov. 11, 42
_Distribution_:
Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (previous telephone
report).
Asst. Chief (Ktb).
Operations (Army).
Operations (Navy).
Operations (Air Force).
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
F. Amt. Ausl./Abw
Ag Ausl. Nr. 1951/42 gKdos Ausl. Chef
F XVI, E 1/e
Berlin, 4 December, 1942
3 copies, 1st copy
To: WFSt
For: Information
From: Abw III.
Subject: Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42, about treatment of enemy
sabotage troops.
Attached copies of two teletype messages of the Norway counter
intelligence are hereby forwarded, referring to the order contained in
the last paragraph of the 2nd teletype order of the Military commander
of Norway.
It is asked that it should be examined how far this order is compatible
with the above discussed Fuehrer order.
By direction
[Illegible signature]
[Warlimont's initials] 8/12
* * * * *
Copy
TOP SECRET
1. Teletype to: O K W/Abw III F
_Subject_: Commando Raid.
On November 20, 1942, at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 km NE of
Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without
engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severely the others
slightly wounded.
All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore
following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skiis and radio, exact
number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns, and
machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the
battalion in Egersund.
A second plane has crashed 5 km East of Helleland. It had a 6-man crew
and is supposed to have towed the above glider.
The artillery officer of Stavanger is still at the scene of the
incident. Further exact report follows; new annexes attached. The
competent commander's staff (KDS) was immediately notified on the basis
of the Fuehrer order. Foreign agency Norway, Nov. 20, 42, No. 34304/42
* * * * *
TOP SECRET III F
2. Teletype to: OKW/Amt Ausl./Abw III F
_Reference_: Our No 3/304/42 g.Kdos III F of 20 Nov 42.
Subject: Commando Raid.
Foreign service (AST) reports to above teletype:
Besides the 17 member crew, extensive sabotage material and work
equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely
proved. The 280th inf. div. ordered the execution of the action
according to the Fuehrer's order. The execution was carried out toward
the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under
their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a
short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their
names, ranks, and serial numbers.
The salvage of the sabotage material was performed by the commander's
staff (Kds) of Stavanger. The 2nd aircraft mentioned in the above
report is a two-engine plane and was probably the towing plane. It
will be inspected. In the same night of the 19th to 20th Nov. a second
glider plane was landed at the Lysefjord, 20 km East of Stavanger, 8
km East of the electric plant of Floerly. Until now 3 men, presumably
English, were captured by the Norwegian police. The police are on the
way to conduct a search for the plane. Supposedly dead and wounded lie
around it. According to the statements of the prisoners, this freight
gilder is supposed to have a 16-man crew. It is possible that this
freight glider was towed by the same enemy plane which towed the glider
found 15 km North East of Egersund. The armed forces commander of
Norway was notified. Refer. at III Wi and Ag WNV/Fu, Oslo.
In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the
armed forces commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the
district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2 and
by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case
of no. 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed out to the
BDS.
Foreign agency (Ast) Norway, No. 3/304/42 III F. g.Kdos
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 509-PS
TOP SECRET
Telegraph Office: GWNOL
Date: 7 Nov. 1943
SSD WAQC 0183 7/11 1112 DGZ
To Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab/Roem I
c GKDOS (TOP SECRET).
Subject: British Commando--Operation in Northwest.
Pescara, 2 Nov. 43.
3 commandos--special treatment--remaining 9 men wounded, in hospital.
OB SUED F.A. ROEM Ic Nr 7595/43 TOP SECRET
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 512-PS
TOP SECRET
SSD HOSX 4041 13/12 1400--OKW/WFSt
According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October
(_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in
order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure
was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Two man torpedo Drontheim, and
glider plane stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable
knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the
saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore,
armed forces commander referred to above mentioned last sentence of the
Fuehrer order (liquidation only after short interrogation).
The Red Cross and the BDS protested after the immediate carrying out of
the Fuehrer order in the case of Egersund and intend for their part to
bring up the whole question as a matter of principle.
WBN ROEM One A number 5409/42 GKDOS
TOP SECRET
14 December 1942
SSD--Telegram
[illegible pencil remarks]
To: Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign Department.
For information: Commander Armed Forces Norway Supreme Command Armed
Forces Counter Intelligence Service.
Reference: AG Ausl. number 1951/42 Top Secret of 4 December 1942.
(Commander Armed Forces Norway I a number 5409/42 Top Secret of 13
December 1942).
Subject: Commando Operations.
It is reported that the armed forces commander Norway intends to
spare individual saboteurs for the time being in order to have them
interrogated. This intention corresponds to the last paragraph of the
order OKW/WFSt/QU. number 551781/42 top secret _CHEFS_ of 19th October
1942.
OKW/WFSt/Qu (III)
Number 004872/42 Top Secret
W [Initialled Warlimont]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 526-PS
_WFSt/Qu (III)_
Subject: Saboteurs, Toftefjord.
10. 5. 1943
TOP SECRET
Notice
On the 30. 3. 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was
sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10
prisoners.
Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.
_Armament_: 2 Colt--MG's, 2 mounted MG's, a small transmitter. In
addition there were supposed to have been 4 MG's, 6 sub-machine guns
and 1,000 kg of explosives on board.
_Captain of the Cutter_: Norwegian, Lt. Eskeland.
_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of
strongpoints, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.
_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.
Fuehrer order executed by S.D. [Security Service].
_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:
In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage-unit was engaged and destroyed on
approaching the coast.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 531-PS
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Qm (Adm. 1)
No. 006688/44 Top Secret
Fuehrer's Hq, 23 June 1944
TOP SECRET
3 copies--1st copy
Reference: Fuehrer Order No. 003832/42/OKW/WFSt of 18 Oct 42.
Subject: Treatment of Commando Men.
Conference memorandum
Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No 1750/44 Top Secret
of 23 June 44:
The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out
according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing
achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in
number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or
surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale
landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according
to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood
by the troops how far the concept "within the limits of normal combat
operations, etc." is to be extended. The view of the Supreme Command
West is as follows:
A. The commitment of air-borne troops and commandos effected in
Normandy falls clearly under number 5.
B. It is likewise not to be contested that paratroop units or groups
set down further to the rear are connected with the large-scale landing
operation effected, if they have the mission of breaking supply lines
or carrying out deceptive maneuvers etc. The German combat soldier will
not always be able, during battle, to decide whether it is a question
of sabotage groups parachuted down or larger air-borne operations in
closer or more distant connection with a landing from the sea already
carried out or still being carried out.
C. As a result of the large turn-over of troops in the area of the
Supreme Command West, especially recently, it is possible that a
considerable number of soldiers are ignorant of the order referred to,
which dates from more than 1-1/2 years ago. For Germans from foreign
countries (Volksdeutsche) and foreign nationalities the differentiation
in the treatment of prisoners will hardly be able to be made clear due
to language difficulties. A further reproduction of the order in the
present situation, where cases of losses must be considered, is held
by Supreme Command West to be a false course of action. Considerable
reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents
become known.
D. The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_
penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by
Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution. On
the other hand an order of the chief office for Reich security to the
commander of the SIPO (Security Police) and the SD (Security Service)
in Paris has decided that numbers 3 and 4 of the order referred to are
to be applied in the future the same as before in the case of uniformed
parachutists committed in groups. A conversation with representatives
of the higher SS and police fuehrers in France and of the commander
of the SIPO and SD in Paris gave the result that according to the
opinion of all concerned the difficulty lies in the determination of
the "limits of normal combat operations". As a solution it was agreed
to set a line (e.g. Seine from the mouth to Rouen-Argentan-Avranches)
North of which number 5, inland of which numbers 3 and 4 apply. This
solution also must be called incomplete, since the combat situation can
at any time bring the necessity of extending this line to other coastal
areas as well. In case of a large-scale aerial landing in the interior
such boundaries cannot be drawn anymore at all. _Supreme Command West
requests, therefore, that, in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS, the
decision be made, that, in view of the new situation, number 5 is to be
applied in the whole occupied Western area._
_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff:_
1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy
landing in the west.
2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the
order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform, who are
captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead
by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed
in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front
line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.
3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen
into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is
encumbent to determine whether the commando order is to be applied or
not.
4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in
its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order
concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct
42 along with the above explanation.
Proposal:
Attached teletype message.
signed: WARLIMONT
Distribution:
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces--1 copy through
Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.
Ktb, 2 copies.
Qu--Draft, 3 copies.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 532-PS
WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)
24 June 1944
TOP SECRET
5 copies, 1st copy
SSD--Telegram.
To 1. Supreme Command West.
By mail to 2. Chief of General Staff, Army.
By mail to 3. Supreme Command of the Air Force/Air Force Staff
Headquarters.
By mail to 4. Supreme Command Navy/1 Skl.
By mail to 5. Reichsfuehrer SS Command Staff.
By mail to 6. Military Commander, France.
By mail to 7. Supreme Command of Armed Forces/WR.
Authority: 1. Order of the Fuehrer no. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct
42/OKW/WFSt.
2. Telegram Supreme Command West no. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44.
Subject: Treatment of Commandos.
1. Standard operating procedure to (1) will be fully maintained.
2. Numeral (5) refers to enemy soldiers in uniform who are captured in
open combat by own troops stationed in the immediate combat zone of
the beachhead or who surrender. "Own troops stationed in the immediate
combat zone" applies in this sense to those of combat divisions on line
as well as reserves up to and including general staffs.
3. In cases of doubt enemy personnel falling into our hands alive will
be turned over to the SD, which will be responsible for the examination
as to whether the order concerning commandos is applicable or not.
4. Accordingly, the paratroop saboteurs dropped by the enemy over
Britanny will be treated as commando personnel, since this area is not
at present an immediate combat zone. It is immaterial in this case
whether the paratroopers dropped wear uniform or civilian clothes. The
number of paratroopers captured in Britanny will be included in the
daily report currently. In this respect an annex to the armed forces
report of 7 October 1942 has already been published to the effect that
such criminal elements should be massacred in combat.
(_Remark_: Enclosures of the order of the Fuehrer of 18 October 1942
as well as the further order regarding the treatment of Commando
personnel of 25 June 1944 are attached. The latter mentions also
paratroopers under number (2).)
_Distribution_: [signature illegible]
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces through Chief of the
WFSt Qu (Entw.).
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS
Draft
The Fuehrer's Headquarters, 30 July 1944
_The High Command of the Wehrmacht_
009074/44 g.k./WFSt/Qu.(Verw.1)
TOP SECRET
re: _Treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions", captured
together with partisans._
In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members
of foreign so-called "Military Missions" (anglo-American as well
as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against
partisans shall not receive the treatment as stipulated in the special
orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they
are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Fuehrer's
order the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942
(OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 g.Kdos).
This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the armed forces
via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed
after being read.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
KEITEL
_Distribution_:
High Comd S/E--1st copy.
High Comd S/W--2nd copy.
General Staff of the Army--3rd copy.
OKM/SKl.--4th copy.
OKL/Lw.Fu.Stb.--5th copy.
Reichsfuehrer--and Chief of the German Police--Staff RF--Attention
Major General and Major General of the Waffen SS Rhode, also for
RSH--6th copy.
OKW/AWA--7th copy.
/Chief PWs--8th copy.
WR--9th copy.
WFSt/W.Pr.--10th copy.
Op. (H-L-M)--11th copy.
Org.--12th copy.
Ktb.--13th copy.
Qu. (Draft)--14th copy.
Reserve--15-25 copies.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 551-PS
WFSt/Qu! (Verw. 1)
Chef OKW--[in pencil]
of
[initial] J
26 June 1944
TOP SECRET [Rubber Stamp]
5 copies--1st copy
Checked before Release }
Chef WFSt } [in pencil]
Remark 1 }
_OB._ _WFSt_ } [in pencil]
_KR_--_Teletype_
To 1. Supreme Commander West.
2. Chief of Army General Staff.
3. OKL/Lw Fu Stab.
4. OKM/1.Skl.
5. Reichsfuehrer SS--Command Staff.
6. Military Commander, France.
7. Military Commander, Belgium/Northern France.
8. Armed forces Commander, Netherlands.
9. OKW/WR.
10. Supreme Commander Southwest [in pencil].
_Reference_: 1. Fuehrer Order No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 1942
OKW/WFSt.
2. Teletype Supreme Commander West No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June
1944 (only to OKW/WFSt).
_Subject_: Treatment of Kommando Participants.
1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of
the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct
1942 remains fully in force.
Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the
bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most
forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the corps commands,
according to #5 of the basic order of 18 Oct 1942, remain exempted.
2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the
immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are
to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to
the SD.
3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are to be
informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units
briefly and succinctly according to the directives issued for it.
4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how many
saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially
also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to
be published daily in the armed forces communique to exercise a
frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous Kommando
undertakings in the same manner.
[Initial] W [Warlimont]
[signature] Keitel
_OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1)_
Nr. 006688/44 Top Secret
_Addition for Supreme Commander_ }
_Southwest_ }
Similar action is to be taken in the} [Written by hand]
Italian theater of war. }
[initial] J [Jodl]
_After forwarding_:
Qu (Verw. 1) Simultaneously teletype--1st copy.
Op (H)--2nd copy.
Op (M)/(L)/Ktb.--3rd copy.
VO Foreign--4th copy.
VO W Pr--5th copy.
Copy was sent on 18 Aug to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 553-PS
Memo secret 7/4
(Annex 2 to H.Dr.g.l
Page 7 current 1910.4)
High Command of the armed forces
WFSt. (Org.1) amt. AUSL.ABW/ABT ABW.III
Nr. 8725/7. 42 g. (IIIb 2) Berlin, 4 August 1942
SECRET
_Combatting of single parachutists_, 4 Aug. 1942.
Unaltered reprint 1943
Reference: OKW/WFSt/ABt.L (II) Nr. 1858 geh.v. 10.8.40
I. In case of enemy landings by air, a difference has to be made
between:
A. Parachute troops and airborne landing troops committed to fighting
activities.
B. _Single_ parachutists and small groups of parachutists who are
dropped in order to execute missions of sabotage, espionage, terror or
disruption.
to _a_ The combatting of enemy airborne forces is the exclusive
mission of the armed forces according to the reference orders.
to _b_ For combatting _single parachutists_. In alteration of fig. 7
v.a. the following is decreed:
1. In territories (Reich territories and occupied territories) the
combatting of _single parachutists_ is the mission of those agencies of
the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service [SD] designated
as executive; in this matter it is immaterial whether the parachutists
are in uniform or civilian clothes.
2. To what extent armed forces and agencies of the armed forces
should be committed for these missions is to be decided directly by
the district commanders [Wehrkreisbefehslhaber] or by territorial
commanders [territorialen Befehlshaber] endowed with the powers of
district commander with the competent agencies of security police and
SD.
3. So far as single parachutists are captured by members of the armed
forces, they are to be delivered to the nearest agency of the Chief
of the Security Police and SD, without delay; simultaneously reports
must be made to the competent intelligence agency. The same procedure
is also valid for combat action directed against parachute troops or
airborne-landing troops, in case the troops realize that they have
to do with saboteurs or spies. If it should be discovered that the
parachutists brought to security police by armed forces, or captured
directly by members of the police are soldiers, the SS Reich leader and
Chief of the German Police will take care that they will be transferred
to the competent air forces agencies after the completion of the
necessary inquiry.
4. Reports concerning confirmed single parachutists are to be submitted
without delay to the nearest agency of the Chief of Security Police and
of the SD, simultaneously informing the counter intelligence agency in
charge which immediately has to forward the report to district command
headquarters commander as well as the airforces command. Moreover, in
principle fig. 4 of the reference order is applicable.
5. In territories not mentioned in fig. 1, present regulations remain
valid (transfer to secret field police).
II. With regard to the use of objects captured or discarded, in the
case of parachutists, as far as these items are sabotage materials, or
radio equipment, a supplementary order to fig. 9 v. a. is decreed:
1. Captured sabotage material to be delivered to the nearest security
police agency and SD.
The army will dispose of sabotage material captured by troops in
the Eastern theater. With regard to further utilization of sabotage
material delivered or reverting to the Security Police, agreements made
between the Chief of Security Police and SD and foreign section of
counter intelligence remain valid.
2. Captured radio equipment, including the directions for operations,
code-material, voice material (Sprach-Material) in plain and in code
text, are to be delivered immediately via local counter intelligence
agencies to OKW (Ag WNV Fu III) for use. The agencies concerned will be
informed of results. After a completion of investigations the captured
radio equipment will again be at disposal, if needed. If further use of
captured radio equipment is considered by either counter intelligence
or Security Police, then the delivery of the equipment might be
omitted, upon agreement each time with Ag. WNV/Fu III, however, in this
case photostatic copies of the directions for use, the code keys, etc.,
as well as technical descriptions of the equipment are to be forwarded
quickly to Ag-WNV/Fu III.
The Chief of High Command of the Armed Forces
KEITEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-2-PS
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
Fuehrer Hq September 8, 1942
The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected
in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied
territory all available workers should be committed and should give the
fullest extent of their productive capacities. The previous allotment
of domestic workers is insufficient. In order to increase it, I order
the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing
the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the
occupied territories. Furthermore the distribution of food and clothing
ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future
depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to
accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the place of work without
the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal
of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA [Deputy General for
Arbeitseinsatz] in agreement with the military commander as well as the
Reich Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.
A Hitler
[initialled] K [Keitel]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-13-PS
Note for the files
1. On 4 January 1943 at 8 P.M. Minister Speer telephones from the
Fuehrer Headquarters and communicates that on the basis of the
Fuehrer's decision, it is no longer necessary to give special
consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of specialists
and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed with emphasis and
sharpened measures.
2. Commissar-General Schmidt with the Reich Commissar in Holland
just telephones on 5 January 1943 at 5:20 P.M. and explains that on
the basis of Armament Action 1943 he must achieve more recruiting in
Holland.
3. He has been criticized by the armament Commissions regarding the
endangering of German contracts in Holland proper due to labor shortage.
I told him that no attention would be paid these criticisms.
He has already taken the same attitude and in the future will take the
appropriate action.
For Information
(signed) SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 579-PS
Weimar, 5 January 1943
The District Commissar in Riga--Employment Office
Section [Fachgebiet] 2 (Commitment of work)
Riga, 6 July 1942
File note
_Subject_: Commitment of Jews.
here: cooperation with the administration offices of the armed forces.
For the last 10 days Jews have been picked up almost daily for
commitment in the peat industry by units of the armed forces. While
doing so, very considerable difficulties arose because the members of
the armed forces who get the Jews from the ghetto daily do not want to
comply with the regulations which are issued by the man responsible for
work commitment.
It is agreed that the soldiers take over the Jews in columns at
the exit of the ghetto. Actually, however, several soldiers enter
the fenced-in ghetto and pick up the Jews in question without any
permission. During the last week, government inspector Rottenberger and
the undersigned were present, at an early hour, during the dispatching
of the Jews. Some soldiers also did not follow the instructions of the
Reich German workers, entered the ghetto, and themselves got the men
who had worked so far for the units in question. It was pointed out to
them that manpower had to be committed for specially urgent measures.
These instructions were not followed by the soldiers, but they shouted
around in the presence of more than 1000 Jews, and simply took the men
away in spite of the order forbidding it. In one instance a soldier
arrived the next morning in a steel helmet and again did not follow the
instructions of the Reich-German manpower. A German police sergeant
was charged with banishing the soldiers from the ghetto. The sergeant
had hardly turned around when the soldier entered the ghetto again and
again got Jews whom he was not supposed to get, and took them away. In
another case, the undersigned was just in time to prevent a pfc. of the
air force from beating a Jewish policeman. The Jewish policeman beat a
Jew who did not want to report for a certain work. The Jewish police is
doing well with the daily commitment of about 4000 Jews. Therefore it
must be prevented that Germans attack Jewish policemen in the presence
of thousands of Jews.
As soon as German soldiers who pick up the Jewish manpower daily from
the ghetto, follow the instructions of the Reich-German manpower and,
above all, keep discipline, it will be possible to get the Jewish
manpower ready for work considerably faster every day. According to
my opinion it is at least necessary that one German policeman who can
prevent the illegal seizures by the German soldiers, be placed at the
entrance of the ghetto daily from 0530 to 0800 hours.
For information:
signed Lippmann.
* * * * *
The District Commissar in Riga
The Chief of The Employment Office
Riga Azsargu Iela 29/31
Riga, 10 February 1942
Department
File No.
To the Reich Commissar for the Baltic states
Work policies and social administration
_Riga_, _through_ the Commissar general in Riga.
_Subject_: Transport of Jews from Kauen.
_Ref._: Your letter of 6 February 1942.
The transport of Jews from Kauen arrived here on 8 February 1942.
However, instead of the requested 500 males only,
222 males and
137 females
were sent.
Due to the fact that there exists a considerable need of Jewish
manpower for transport and construction work, I am requesting an
additional 1000 Jewish males from Kauen.
I was informed by the transport leader that the Jews in Kauen, as
far as their commitment for work is concerned, are not under the
jurisdiction of the employment office, but that the Jewish manpower is
distributed by the German police.
For:
[signature illegible]
(Oberregierungsrat)
[ink note:]
To the Commissar General
[Initials illegible]
* * * * *
Command of Economic Affairs [Wirtschaftskommando] for the Territory of
the former Latvia Department of Work
Riga, 21 July 1941
_Subject_: Work commitment of _Jews_.
File note
According to the Group Agriculture there is a considerable shortage
of workers for farming in Latvia, which endangers especially the beet
harvest. According to my findings and also those of the economy office
North (Wi.-In. Nord) no prisoners of war are at present available for
farming. It should be examined, therefore, to which extent and under
which conditions other possibilities of commitment are available.
To clarify the possibility of committing Jews, a conference took place
today between the economy office North and the chief war administration
advisor (O.K.V.R.) Ellroth, from the department of work. Together with
Mr. Ellroth we went to the _SS_ and conferred with the leader of the
_SD_, Sturmbannfuehrer Batz, as well as his deputy, Hauptsturmfuehrer
Kirsten. Our proposal to earmark the Jews, to put them together in a
ghetto, then to establish a council for Jews, and to effect with it
the extensive commitment of Jews for work, was favorably accepted.
It was also agreed upon that the commitment of Jews for work should
be effected _only_ through the special offices for commitment to be
created by the employment office resp. offices, in order to make
sure of leadership according to the necessities for war and state
policies. The SS reserves only the right of the decision of political
problems and the execution of political tasks. The ear-marking of
the Jews and their collection in a ghetto is being done. It was
furthermore announced that conferences had already taken place
between the SS-SD on the one hand and the military administration
headquarters (Feldkommandatur) on the other hand, with the result that
a registration of the Jews at the police precincts, a daily report of
the Jews there, and the establishment of a special office should be
instituted for the execution of the commitment of Jews for work through
the military administration headquarters.
After that a conference with the war administration council
[Kriegsverwaltungsrat] Nachtigall took also place at the _military
administration headquarters_, which had the same result. The military
administration headquarters (Fk.) agrees also that the commitment of
Jews for work is done by the employment office after the registration
of the Jews. While registering, a special index card can be put aside
for this commitment of work.
The discussions at the Fk. resulted furthermore in the issuing by the
commander of the rear army district of a decree on _ceiling prices and
wages_, already last Wednesday, because it is his opinion that he alone
can issue official decrees with effective penalties. Furthermore, the
locally customary prices and wages are already established.
[signature illegible]
O.K.V.R.
Distribution:
Wi.-In. Nord, Dept. for work Commandant
SS.-SD.
Fk.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 614-PS
"DIE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE REVOLUTION 1933", compiled by Dr. Axel
Friedrichs (Berlin 1935, pages 151-3), [which is Volume I of the
documentary collection entitled "DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK",
published by the Director of the Hochschule fuer Politik.]
Proclamation of the Action Committee for the Protection of the German
Labor 2 May 1933
German workers and employees! Working people in the town and country!
The bells have tolled to honor work. The entire German people have sung
the high psalm about the working man with a strength and enthusiasm
which never before existed and thus has honored itself and the creative
spirit. The wheels stopped, the anvil did not more resound, the miner
came out of his mine: everywhere a holiday.
What trade unions of all shades, red and black, Christian and "free",
have not even come close to accomplishing, what has been only a shadow
even in the best years of Marxism, a puny miserable copy compared to
the gigantic thing of yesterday, NATIONAL SOCIALISM achieves in its
first effort.
It puts the worker and the peasant, the artisan and the employee,
briefly all working people, into the center of the State and renders
the grabbing and despotic ones harmless. Who was that servant of
capitalism, who was the reactionary who intended to oppress you and
bereave you of all rights? Those red criminals who have abused you,
well meaning, honest and decent German workers for decades, in order
to deprive you and thus the entire people of its rights and heritage,
or we, who amidst unutterable sacrifices and suffering, fought against
these insane and distorted ideas of devilish Jews and the associates of
the Jews? Already three months of National Socialistic government prove
to you: Adolf Hitler is your friend! Adolf Hitler struggles for your
liberty! Adolf Hitter gives you bread!
Today we are entering into the second chapter of the National
Socialistic Revolution. You may say, what else do you want, you have
the absolute power. True, we have the power, but we do not have the
whole people, we do not have you workers a hundred percent, and it is
you whom we want; we will not let you be until you stand with us in
complete, genuine acknowledgment. You shall also be freed of the last
Marxian manacles, so that you may find your way to your people.
For we know that without the German worker there is no German nation!
And before everything else we must protect you, so that your enemy
Marxism and its satellites cannot attack you from the back again.
Even though the Marxist Party such as the K.P.D. has been completely
destroyed, or find themselves in complete dissolution as the S.P.D.,
even if the party leaders have fled in miserable cowardice or have
deserted everything and everyone; and have forsaken you, workers,
cowardly and miserably as never before, we know that it is all
pretense. Marxism pretends to be dead in order to resurrect itself anew
with favorable opportunity and again to plunge the Judas dagger into
your back. Just as in 1914! Even at that time it sponsored the war
debts and spread itself internationally in order to betray you to the
imperialism of our enemies in 1918, and to sell you thereby to world
capital.
The sly fox doesn't deceive us. Rather we will give him one last fatal
shot so that we shall never again suffer with his resurrection. The
Leiperts and Grossmaenner may pretend ever so much fidelity to Hitler,
but it is better that they should be in protective custody. Therefore
we shall strike the main weapon out of the hands of the Marxist group
and thereby take from it its last possibility of renewed strengthening.
The devilish teaching of the Jew Mardochai shall be destroyed
wretchedly on the battlefield of the National Socialistic Revolution.
It is not as if we wanted to disrupt and destroy the unions. On the
contrary, we have never disturbed anything which has, in any way,
value for our people and we shall never do so in the future; that is
a National Socialistic rule. This certainly goes for the unions which
serve with hard work and were built up by the pennies taken from the
mouths of the worker. No workers--your institutions are sacred and
unimpeachable to us National Socialists. I myself am a poor peasant's
son and understand poverty. I myself was 7 years in one of the biggest
industries of Germany and I know the exploitation of anonymous capital,
and I know, above everything else, of its stingy commercial methods,
for, on account of my opinion I was fired from my occupation in 1928.
Workers, I swear to you we will not only keep everything which exists,
we will build up the protection and rights of the worker even further,
so that he can enter into the new National Socialistic State as a
completely worthwhile and respected member of the nation.
Workers and peasants on a broad front together with the free
occupations and skilled labor,--thus we shall build a new Reich of well
being, honor and freedom. Forward with Hitler for Germany.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 615-PS
The Bishop of Limburg Limburg/Lahn, Aug 13, 1941
To the Reich Minister of Justice _Berlin_
[Various stamps and pencilled remarks appear on original]
Regarding the report submitted on July 16 (Sub IV, pp 6-7) by the
Chairman of the Fulda Bishops' Conference, Cardinal Dr. Bertram, I
consider it my duty to present the following as a concrete illustration
of destruction of so-called "useless life."
About 8 kilometers from Limburg, in the little town of Hadamar, on
a hill overlooking the town, there is an institution which had
formerly served various purposes and of late had been used as a
nursing home; this institution was renovated and furnished as a place
in which, by consensus of opinion, the above mentioned euthanasia
has been systematically practiced for months--approximately since
February 1941. The fact has become known beyond the administrative
district of Wiesbaden, because death certificates from a Registry
Hadamar-Moenchberg are sent to the home communities. (Moenchberg is the
name of this institution because it was a Franciscan monastery prior to
its secularization in 1803.)
Several times a week buses arrive in Hadamar with a considerable number
of such victims. School children of the vicinity know this vehicle
and say: "There comes the murder-box again." After the arrival of
the vehicle, the citizens of Hadamar watch the smoke rise out of the
chimney and are tortured with the ever-present thought of the miserable
victims, especially when repulsive odors annoy them, depending on the
direction of the wind.
The effect of the principles at work here are: Children call each
other names and say, "You're crazy; you'll be sent to the baking oven
in Hadamar." Those who do not want to marry, or find no opportunity,
say, "Marry, never! Bring children into the world so they can be put
into the bottling machine!" You hear old folks say, "Don't send me to
a state hospital! After the feeble-minded have been finished off, the
next useless eaters whose turn will come are the old people."
All God-fearing men consider this destruction of helpless beings as
crass injustice. And if anybody says that Germany cannot win the war,
if there is yet a just God, these expressions are not the result of a
lack of love of fatherland but of a deep concern for our people. The
population cannot grasp that systematic actions are carried out which
in accordance with Par. 211 of the German criminal code are punishable
with death! High authority as a moral concept has suffered a severe
shock as a result of these happenings. The official notice that N.N.
had died of a contagious disease and that for that reason his body has
to be burned, no longer finds credence, and such official notices which
are no longer believed have further undermined the ethical value of the
concept of authority.
Officials of the Secret State Police, it is said, are trying to
suppress discussion of the Hadamar occurrences by means of severe
threats. In the interest of public peace, this may be well intended.
But the knowledge and the conviction and the indignation of the
population cannot be changed by it; the conviction will be increased
with the bitter realization that discussion is prohibited with threats
but that the actions themselves are not prosecuted under penal law.
Facta loquuntur.
I beg you most humbly, Herr Reich Minister, in the sense of the
report of the Episcopate of July 16 of this year, to prevent further
transgressions of the Fifth Commandment of God.
[Signed] Dr. Hilfrich
I am submitting copies of this letter to the Reich Minister of the
Interior and the Reich Minister for Church Affairs.
[initialled by the above]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 621-PS
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Berlin, W.8, 2 October 1940
Voss Street 6
SECRET REICH MATTER
_Rk. 665 B gRs_
To the Reichsminister of Justice, Dr. Guertner
Dear Dr. Guertner:
I herewith acknowledge your letters of 26 August and 25 September
forwarding to me further material about the death of inmates of nursing
homes. I forwarded the enclosed reports of the Chief Prosecutors to
Stuttgart and Naumburg to the Reichsminister of the Interior--Reichs
Health Leader--for further action.
Heil Hitler!
Sincerely yours
[signed] Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 630-PS
[On letterhead A. Hitler]
Berlin 1 Sept 1939
Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D.
are charged with the responsibility of enlarging the authority of
certain physicians to be designated by name in such a manner that
persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a
most careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a
mercy death.
signed: A. HITLER
[Handwritten note]
Given to me by Bouhler on 27 August 1940
signed: Dr. Guertner
III a 3/41 g Rs /
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 638-PS
Copy
M 5/42 SECRET
From the Reich Marshall's Plans of 24.9.42.
I. The Reich Marshall is looking for daring fellows, who will be
employed in the East as Sonderkommandos [Special Purpose] and who will
be able to carry out the task of creating confusion behind the lines.
They are to be formed into bands under leadership and with interpreters
allotted to them. For this purpose, the Reich Marshall is considering
convicts who are first offenders, who have committed not particularly
heinous offenses, for which there is human understanding.
The Reich Marshall first of all mentioned persons convicted of
poaching. He knew, of course, that the Reichsfuehrer SS had picked out
the so-called poachers and they were already in his hands. He requests,
however, that the question be reexamined. The only suitable men are
those with a passion for hunting, who have poached for love of the
trophy, not men who have laid snares and traps. The Reich Marshall
also mentioned fanatical members of smuggling gangs, who take part in
gun-battles on the frontiers and whose passion it is to outwit the
customs at the risk of their own lives, but not men who attempt to
bring articles over the frontier in an express train or by similar
means.
The Reich Marshall leaves it to us to consider whether still other
categories of convicts can be assigned to these bands or pursuit
commandos.
In the regions assigned for their operations, these bands, whose first
task should be to destroy the communications of the partisan groups,
could murder, burn and ravish; in Germany they would once again come
under strict supervision. * * *
(signed) Dr. Joel, 24.9.42
* * * * *
Berlin, 6 October 1942
Staff of MD IV, V
The attached extract from the minutes of Cabinet Councillor Dr. Joel
are submitted for the preparation of the report on Friday 9.10.
Copy to State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger for his attention.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 641-PS
File No. 927/33 Munich, 1 June 1933
District Attorney at the District Court Munich II
(Tel: Local 5791, Long Distance 57801)
to the
Public Prosecutor "Generalstaatsanwalt"
at the
State Supreme Court MUNICH
Subject: Death of the prisoner in protective custody Dr. Alfred
Strauss in the concentration camp Dachau
N-12432 in one copy submitted to the State Ministry of Justice Munich,
2 June 1933
The Public Prosecutor at the State Supreme Court
On May 24, 1933 the 30 year old, single attorney at law Dr. Alfred
Strauss from Munich who was in the concentration camp Dachau as a
prisoner under protective custody was killed by 2 pistol shots by SS
man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on a walk prescribed to him by
the camp doctor, outside of the fenced part of the camp.
Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to urinate;
Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke away towards the
shrub located at a distance of about 6 m from the line. When he noticed
it, he fired 2 shots at the fugitive from a distance of about 8 m,
whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.
On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the locality
took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge of the wood.
Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a sock on one foot, while
the other foot was bare, obviously because of an injury to this foot.
Subsequently an autopsy was performed. Two bullets had entered the
back of the head. Besides the body showed several black and blue spots
and also open wounds. Coroner's inquest was ordered; it took place on
26 May 1933. According to the expert's opinion death was caused by
cerebral paralysis due to one bullet penetrating and one bullet lodging
in the right portion of the cerebrum. Older scars were found at the
right hip and seat, as well as hemorrhages of the left abdominal wall.
The direction of the firing channels further revealed that the bullets
had been fired from low behind and upwards to the right. The distance
from which they were fired could not be established by the autopsy; for
this purpose chemical and microscopical examinations are necessary.
I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made
application for opening and execution of the judicial preliminary
investigation as well as for a warrant of arrest against him.
The District Court Public Prosecutor Attorney
WINTERSBERGER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 642-PS
File No: G 866/33 Munich, 1 June 1933
State Prosecution at the
State Court [Landgericht] Munich
Local Telephone: 5791 Long Distance: 57801.
To the Prosecutor General at The Supreme State Court
[Oberlandesgericht] Munich.
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody, Leonhard
Hausmann in the Dachau concentration camp.
No. 12431 with one copy submitted to the State Minister for Justice,
Munich, 2 June 1933
The Prosecutor General at the Supreme State Court.
[signature illegible]
On 17 May 1933, Leonhard Hausmann from Augsburg, 31 years old,
married, relief worker, who was kept in protective custody in the
Dachau concentration camp, was shot by SS staff sergeant Karl Ehmann.
According to the account of the latter, Hausmann was to dig out young
fir trees in the woods in the vicinity of the camp and pile them up
on a certain spot. He was supervised by Ehmann. Suddenly the latter
did not see him anymore. Therefore Ehmann looked after the prisoners
and saw him running away in a stooped position, Ehmann ran after him,
called "Halt" several times, once also "Stop", but in vain. Whereupon
Ehmann raised his pistol at the prisoner and fired without aiming;
Hausmann dropped dead. Ehmann asserts that he fired from a distance of
10 to 12 meters.
The corpse was inspected already on 17 May 33 with the assistance of
the state court physician. It was found that death was due to a shot
through the left side of the chest. According to the autopsy protocol,
the shot was fired from a distance less than 1 meter. Meanwhile the
legal-medical institute ascertained that the distance was less than 30
cm.
Today I have preferred public charges against Ehmann and have requested
to begin and to carry out a preliminary court investigation and to
issue an arrest warrant against him for danger of escape and of
prejudicing the course of justice.
I shall report about the course of the process.
The Supreme State Prosecutor
[signed] Wintersberger
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 644-PS
File No. G 851/33 Munich, 22 May 1933
(Postoffice 35)
Prosecution at the State Court Munich II
(Telephone: Local 5791
long distance 57801)
To the Prosecutor General of the State Court
[Oberlandesgericht]
Munich,
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody Louis Schloss
in the Dachau concentration camp.
_Annexes_:
1 copy of an autopsy protocol,
3 photos.
W.V. 28923/33
In the afternoon of 16 May 1933 the police station Dachau informed the
state prosecution that an inmate of the concentration camp Dachau, the
merchant Louis Schloss, from Nurnberg, widowed, born on 21 June 1880,
has hanged himself in solitary confinement. At the request of the state
prosecution, on the same day the legal inspection was performed with
the assistance of the state court physician with the state court Munich
II. As it was proven that the corpse exhibited numerous whip marks and
as the cause of death appeared doubtful, an autopsy was carried out on
17 May 33. According to a preliminary certificate of the participating
physicians, the autopsy did not prove death by hanging. The extensive
destruction of the adipose tissue found in the corpse was considered to
be adequate to cause death through autointoxication and fat embolism.
We refer to the attached copy of the autopsy protocol. 3 photographic
pictures of the corpse were taken before autopsy, of which prints are
enclosed.
The investigation has not yet been concluded.
No. 11374
Supreme State prosecution: 22 May 33
[Signed]: Wintersberger
Submitted with 1 annex and 3 photos
to the State Ministry for Justice
Munich, 22 May 1933
The Prosecutor General of the Supreme State Court
* * * * *
File No. G 851, 924 ff/33 Munich, 1 June 1933
(Post office 35)
Prosecution at the State Court Munich II
(Telephone: Local 5791
Long distance: 57801)
* * * * *
To the prosecutor general
with the Supreme State Court
Munich.
No. 12430 with 1 extra copy.
[Stamp]
Submitted to the State Ministry for Justice
Munich, 2 June 1933
The prosecutor general with the Supreme State Court
Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody Louis Schloss
in the Dachau concentration camp.
To my report of 22 May 1933.
In the above case I have today publicly indicted unknown culprits for
injuries leading to death and the commandant of the camp, Waeckerle,
the camp physician, Dr. Neurnbergk, as well as the first secretary
of the chancellery, Mutzbauer, as accessories after the facts, and I
requested that a preliminary court investigation should be started and
carried out, furthermore that a warrant of arrest should be issued
against above accused for danger of prejudicing the course of justice.
I shall report about the progress of the proceedings.
The State prosecutor
[Signed]: Wintersberger
* * * * *
Copy
Dachau, 17 May 1933
Protocol
_Subject_: Investigation and autopsy of Schloss, Louis, merchant from
Nurnberg, deceased here by hanging.
_Present_: Court Counsellor [Amtsgerichtsrat] Dr. Guntz,
State court physician [Landgerichtsarzt] Dr. Flamm,
Instructor [Privatdozent] Dr. Mueller,
Secretary of Justice Bruecklmeier.
Above court committee went today at 3 P.M. to the autopsy room in the
cemetery of the village of Dachau. There was the corpse of the widowed
merchant Louis Schloss, who was found hanged in the concentration camp
Dachau, Prittlbach community, on 16 May 1933 and whose corpse is
known to the state court physician [Landgerichtsarzt] Dr. Flamm from
the cadaver inspection which has taken place on 16 May 1933 in the
concentration camp.
The participating police sergeant Frey of the police station Pasing
took three photographs of the deceased and these will be explained
as part of this copy. The photographs will be sent directly from the
photographic office Pasing to the state prosecutor Munich II.
* * * * *
Preliminary opinion
I. The death through hanging could not be proven by autopsy.
II. Extensive blood suffusions and whipmarks were found, particularly
on the back, on the buttocks and on both arms, as well as on both legs,
abdomen and thorax to a minor extent. In the region of the buttocks
and the shoulders extensive destruction of adipose tissue was found
together with the blood suffusions. This is adequate to explain death
through autointoxication and fat embolism.
III. The proof has to be brought forth by microscopic examination of
the parts of organs.
IV. Following were preserved: the organs of the neck and thorax,
parts of the brain, the spleen, liver and kidneys, as well as
the strangulation mark on the neck and blood for bacteriological
examination.
Finished at 18.10 hours.
Signed Dr. Flamm Signed: Dr. P. Mueller.
The Court Commission of the Court Dachau
Signed: Dr. Guntz, Court Counsellor
Signed: Bruecklmeier, Secretary of Justice.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 645-PS
Reference Nr. G 928 ff/33 Munich, June 1, 1933
Office of the State Attorney of the Superior Court Munich II
(tel. local 5791
long distance 57801).
To: Attorney General of the Main Superior Court Munich.
SUBJECT: Death of prisoner Sebastian Nefzger in the Concentration Camp
Dachau.
[written in ink]
No. 12434 with 1 part and 6 photos
Presented to the State Ministry of Justice Munich, }
June 2, 1933 } [Stamps]
The Attorney General of the Main Superior Court }
Sotier [? signature]
On May 27, 1933, the following report was received by the lower court
Dachau:
"Concentration Camp Dachau, Political Division, May 27, 1933 to the
Lower Court Dachau. An inquest on the dead body of the prisoner
Nefzger, Sebastian, merchant in Munich, Schommerstrasse 17/0, born:
1/10/1900 in Munich, religion Catholic, marital status: married--showed
that death through the action of third persons must be excluded. Death
was indubitably caused by excessive bleeding resulting from an opened
artery of the left hand. Signed Dr. Nuernbergk, Camp Physician."
Neither the lower court Dachau nor the state attorney Munich II had up
to that time been informed of Nefzger's death reported in the letter
in spite of the fact that Nefzger had already died in the night of
the 25 to the 26th of May 1933. The lower court Dachau informed the
state attorney, Munich II of this letter. A coroner's inquest was
ordered, which took place as late as May 27, 1933. Since the physician
appointed by the superior court doubted that death had occurred due
to excessive bleeding and identified marks of strings on the victim's
neck, a judicial autopsy was arranged by the State Attorney on May 29,
1933. The resulting opinion of the expert is so far: I. the autopsy
discloses that excessive bleeding due to a cut on the left arm must be
excluded as a cause of death; II. the cut on the left wrist reveals
three incisions of the bone. Trial cuts are lacking. These findings
are contrary to the assumption that the wound has been self-inflicted;
III. It must be assumed that the cause of death was suffocation. As a
cause for suffocation, strangulation and throttling must be considered.
The characteristics of the marks left by the strings do not agree with
those otherwise observed in cases of death caused by hanging.
6 photos were made of the corpse before the autopsy; one print is
enclosed of each.
I have issued a public indictment, on the basis of murder, of the
unknown perpetrators, and of camp commander Waeckerly, camp physician
Dr. Nuernbergk, and chief secretary of the office Mutzbauer for having
aided in the crime; and I have ordered the opening and execution of
preliminary court proceedings, as well as the issuance of an arrest
warrant for the said accused.
I shall make reports about the developments of the process.
The Chief State Attorney
Wintersberger
_Deaths of the prisoners in protective custody_:
_Schloss, Louis_, merchant from Nurnberg (found hung on 5/16/1933).
_Hausmann, Leonhard_, unskilled worker from Augsburg, (shot by
Scharfuehrer _Karl Ehmann_ on 5/17/33).
_Dr. Strauss, Alfred_, lawyer from Munich, (shot on 5/24/33).
_Kantschuster, Johann_, SS man for murder.
_Nefzger, Sebastian_, merchant from Munich, (died 5/25 to 5/26/33).
Indictment of _unknown_ perpetrators for murder and of _Waeckerle_,
camp commander; Dr. _Nuernbergk_, camp physician; _Mutzbauer_, chief
secretary of the office, for aiding in the crime.
_Lehrburger, Karl_, merchant from Nurnberg, (shot on 5/25/33) by SS
man _Hans Steinbrenner_.
Z.d.A.: "Important Occurrences in the Concentration Camp Dachau."
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 647-PS
(100 [crossed out, on top of it] "ten" [in pencil] photo copies copy
[in ink])
Control number
_Enclosure to number 1164/38 top secret WFA/L II_
Draft of June 3rd with changes Reichsfuehrer SS of June 10, 1938 and
additions concerning signal corps unit.
[in ink] 1st Copy 3 copies 1st copy
TOP SECRET
The Fuehrer and Reich's Chancellor. Berlin, 17 August 1938
[in ink]
10
[Signature illegible]
By means of the nomination of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the
German police in the ministry of the interior on June 17th 1936
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 487), I have created the basis for the
unification and reorganization of the German police.
With this step, the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP which were under the
Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police even up to now, have
entered into close connection with the duties of the German police.
In order to regulate these tasks and in order to delineate the common
tasks of the SS and of the Wehrmacht, I hereby order the following
inclusively and basically:
[the above written in pencil]
I. General
1. Being a political organization of the NSDAP, the SS as such does not
need any military set-up and training for its political obligations. It
carries no weapons.
2. For special inner-political tasks for the Reichsfuehrer SS and
chief of the German police, tasks which I might have to assign to
him from time to time, or for the mobile use within the wartime army
(SS-Verfuegungstruppe). The following SS units which either already
exist, or will be set up in case of mobilization, are exempted from the
regulations of number 1:
The SS-Verfuegungstruppe.
The SS-Junkerschulen.
The SS-Totenkopfverbaende.
The SS-reinforcement Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement).
In peacetime they are under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the
German police, who, with the exception mentioned in paragraph II,
_alone_ has the responsibility for the organization, training, arming,
and full use in regard to inner-political tasks given him from me.
In peacetime, no organizational connection with the Wehrmacht exists in
this regard. (See orders in II and III for the case of mobilization.)
Arms, ammunition, tools, equipment, and military handbooks for the
armed SS units will be procured through the Wehrmacht, upon payment.
II. The armed units of the SS
A. _The SS-Verfuegungstruppe_
1. The SS Verfuegungstruppe is neither a part of the Wehrmacht nor a
part of the police. It is a standing armed unit, exclusively at my
disposal. As such, and as a unit of the NSDAP its members are to be
selected by the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the ideological and
political standards which I have ordered for the NSDAP and for the
Schutzstaffeln. Its members are to be trained and its ranks filled
with volunteers from those who are subject to serve in the army who
have finished their duties in the obligatory labor service. The
service period for volunteers is 4 years. It may be prolonged for
SS-Unterfuehrer. Special regulations are in force for SS leaders. The
regular compulsory military service (par. 8 of the law relating to
military service) is fulfilled by service of the same amount of time in
the SS Verfuegungstruppe.
The SS Verfuegungstruppe receives its financial resources through the
Ministry of the Interior. Its budget requires a check-up by the high
command of the Wehrmacht.
2. The SS Verfuegungstruppe falls into the following parts:
1 headquarters staff.
(Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler) motorized [in ink].
3 regiments
2 motorcycle battalions under a Standarte Staff.
1 engineer battalion motorized [in ink].
1 signal battalion motorized [in ink].
1 medical unit.
The complete strength, the organization, the arming, and the equipment
of the SS Verfuegungstruppe depend on the task allocated in peace time
and in case of mobilization.
In case of mobilization, the Standarten and independent Sturmbanne
are organized like the corresponding units of an infantry division
respectively of a motorized infantry division of the army [illegible
remark in ink].
The engineer unit is fully motorized.
The signal unit (motorized) is organized like an infantry division
signal unit (motorized).
The peacetime strength and equipment of the army are the pattern
for the strength and equipment of the staffs and units of the SS
Verfuegungstruppe. Personnel and material necessary above the peacetime
strength and the table of equipment will be determined in cooperation
with the high command of the Wehrmacht and the Reichsfuehrer SS and
chief of the German police.
For use in the interior, the Standarten are reinforced by the following
special formation:
(Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler)
reinforced by:
1 armored reconnaissance platoon.
[Panzerspaehzug; the word "zug" is added in ink].
1 motorcycle platoon.
1 motorized engineer platoon.
_the other Standarten_
by:
_each_
1 armored reconnaissance platoon.
1 light infantry motorcycle platoon.
and by additional telephone and radio units for the signal platoons.
_the non-motorized units_
by:
1 trucking platoon each.
The signal unit (motorized) with additional means of communication in
order to safeguard the communication system of the Reichsfuehrer SS and
chief of the German police. The necessary personnel and material will
be determined in cooperation with the high command of the Wehrmacht
and the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
The final aim is the complete mobilization of all Standarten and
independent units; in the case of mobilization, the skeleton
corps of the reinforcement units of the SS Totenkopfverbaende, to
whom in peacetime the short training of replacements for the SS
Totenkopfverbaende was entrusted, are to be devoted to the task of
insuring replacements for the SS Verfuegungstruppe (see C 2).
The supreme commander of the army prepares the SS Verfuegungstruppe
for their use within the wartime army. He issues the necessary orders,
regulates their working with reserve army authorities, supports the
training and makes inspections. He is authorized to transfer these
powers to lower echelon offices and to report to me about the state of
combat training, after prior consultation with the Reichsfuehrer SS and
chief of the German police.
A timely exchange of officers, respectively leaders between the army
and the SS Verfuegungstruppe is to be carried out in mutual agreement
as soon as the officer situation permits it.
Any changes in the organization, the strength and the arming of the SS
Verfuegungstruppe have to be approved by me.
3. _Orders for the case of mobilization._
A. The employment of the SS Verfuegungstruppe in case of mobilization
is a double one:
1. By the supreme commander of the army within the wartime army. In
that case, it comes completely under military laws and regulation, but
remains a unit of the NSDAP politically.
2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders. In that
case, it is under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
In case of mobilization, I myself will make the decision about
the time, strength and manner of the incorporation of the SS
Verfuegungstruppe into the wartime army; these things will depend on
the inner political situation at that time.
During the war, the skeleton corps of the reinforcement units of
the SS Totenkopfverbaende, to whom in peacetime the short training
of replacements for the SS Totenkopfverbaende was entrusted, are to
be devoted to the task of insuring a reserve which should meet the
ideologic and political spirit of the Verfuegungstruppe.
In case of mobilization, all members of the SS who did their compulsory
military duty in the SS Verfuegungstruppe are generally to be used
to reinforce the SS Verfuegungstruppe. Older classes of the SS
Verfuengungstruppe also may be used to fill up the ranks of the
reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende police reinforcement which
will be set-up in case of mobilization in so far as they are not needed
as replacements for the SS Verfuengungstruppe.
In case of mobilization, the replacements for the SS Verfuegungstruppe
also may be used to fill up the ranks of young, untrained draftees.
B. _The SS Junker Schools._
1. The SS Junker schools including the SS medical Junker school educate
the officer replacements for the armed parts of the SS and for the
German police.
2. The Junkers who have served at least one year of front line duty in
the SS Verfuegungstruppe and have completed the SS Junker schools and
subsequently the non-commissioned officer school successfully, and who
have accordingly served more than two years under arms (see par. 8 of
the military law), have fulfilled their compulsory military duty.
Leaders and leader aspirants who have successfully finished the
non-commissioned officer school in service that is incorporated into
the Wehrmacht, will be given a rank which corresponds to their rank, in
the armed parts of the SS, or in the police.
3. The budgets of the SS Verfuegungstruppe, the SS Totenkopfverbaende,
and the German police will bear the partial costs of the schools for
that number of Junkers which corresponds to their calculated need for
leaders.
4. These orders about the SS Junker schools are in force retroactive to
March 15, 1935.
C. _The SS Totenkopfverbaende._
1. The SS Totenkopfverbaende are neither a part of the army nor of the
police. They are a standing armed unit of the SS to clear up special
tasks of police nature. I reserve the right to assign duties from time
to time.
As such, as a unit of the NSDAP, they are to be selected and trained
according to the ideological and political directives which I have
issued for the NSDAP and for the Schutzstaffeln; they are to be
replaced by the use of volunteers _capable of serving the SS_, who as a
rule have served their compulsory military duty in the army. The army
must give its agreement for special cases of exception. These units
are under the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police who is
responsible to me for their organization, training, arming, and full
readiness for action.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police is entitled to
recruit suitable volunteers of the army before their discharge in
cooperation with the supreme command of the army.
The service period for non-commissioned officers and men is 12 years.
Service time in the army is to be counted. The necessary question of
the pension will be taken up at a later date.
The SS Totenkopfverbaende receive their financial means through the
ministry of the Interior.
Starting April 1st, 1938, the SS Totenkopfverbaende are organized as
follows:
Directorate staff with signal unit,
4 Standarten with 3 Sturmbanne each with 3 infantry companies (each
148 men strong).
1 machine gun company (150 men strong).
1 medical unit.
1 medical group necessary for the medical care of those camp prisoners
who work outside.
Besides, each Standarte:
1 motorcycle group (crossed out).
1 group with weapons suited for street fights to be set up in 1939
(crossed out).
1 trucking unit.
1 Signal platoon.
Besides 1 signal platoon for each Sturmbann to be set up in 1939
(crossed out).
2. Replacement units for the short time training for the reinforcement
of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement). Strength
corresponding to the reinforcement battalion of the army. All units of
the SS Totenkopferbaende are to be motorized temporarily with 3-ton
Opel-Blitz cars.
3. The strength and organization of the units will be determined by the
extent of their special tasks of police nature (see fig. 1) and will
be determined by me according to requirements upon suggestions of the
Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police.
4. The armament and equipment of the SS Totenkopfverbaende depends on
their special tasks (see fig. 1); both are to be suggested to me by the
Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police, after he has discussed
them with the supreme command of the army.
5. _Regulations for the case of the mobilization._
The SS Totenkopfverbaende form the skeleton corps for the reinforcement
of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement) and will be
replaced in the guarding of the concentration camps by members of the
General SS who are over 45 years of age and had military training.
The skeleton corps which, up to now, were units of the two replacement
units for the short time training of the reinforcement of the SS
Totenkopfverbaende will be transferred to the SS Verfuegungstruppe as
skeleton crews of the replacement units for that unit.
D. Reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende (police reinforcement).
1. The reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende is a police
unit which will be set up and armed automatically in the case of
mobilization, in an emergency, at my command.
2. The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police will decide its
strength within the total strength of all police units which I shall
determine for the territory of the Reich.
3. The organization, distribution of units, armament, and training of
the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende depend entirely on the
police tasks they will have to handle.
The responsibility for the full readiness for action in that respect
rests with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police who
will have to make suitable suggestions to me concerning armament and
equipment, after prior consultation with the supreme command of the
army.
4. The training of the reinforcements of the SS Totenkopfverbaende who
are provided for the use of war and are between 25 and 35 years of age
will be undertaken in peacetime by the replacement units of the SS
Totenkopfverbaende (compare with C 2).
5. The ministry of the interior will request the financial resources
for the training of the reinforcement of the SS Totenkopfverbaende from
the supreme command of the army, as R.V. special resources.
III. The General SS (Allgemeine SS)
All other members, not mentioned in I or II of the general SS
(Allgemeine SS) which is unarmed, are at the disposal of the army in
case of war (according to the regulations of the military law).
However, considering the special inner-political tasks which the SS
has to solve in close connection with the German police in case of
mobilization, I hereby order the following:
1. The staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS, the staffs of the three main
offices (SS, Sd, and RuS main officer, the SS Oberabschnittsstaebe and
SS Abschnittstaebe) remain in case of war for tasks of police nature.
The Reichsfuehrer SS regulates their strength which will be cut down to
a minimum size for that purpose, SS members provided for those staffs
are to be deferred from service in the army in case of war.
2. All clothing and equipment, motor cars, arms, ammunition and other
equipment owned by the SS are regulated by the legal orders in case of
mobilization; this, provided they are not necessary for the setting up
of the armed SS units and staffs mentioned under I and II.
IV. Decrees of execution
The supreme command of the army issues the decrees of execution
necessary to paragraph II in all questions concerning the army and the
case of mobilization in cooperation with the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief
of the German police.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police issues the decrees
of execution concerning the police and inner political measures in
cooperation with the supreme command of the army.
/s/ Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 651-PS
Reich Minister of Justice
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstrasse 65 31 January 1938
Telephone: 110044
_4611--I a [7=] 194/38_
To the Presidents of the High Courts.
Subject: Representation by Counsel of Inmates of Concentration Camps.
VERY CONFIDENTIAL
In preparing a decision of Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police
whether individual attorneys can be allowed in general to take over
the representation of inmates in Concentration Camps, I ask you to
scrutinize at once if and what attorneys in your district could be
considered for this purpose. Representation of inmates of Concentration
Camps requires a special measure of suitability and dependability.
Severe scrutiny is to be exercised in making the selection. Membership
in the NSDAP, in so far as it was not acquired until after January 30,
1933, will not of itself warrant the necessary dependability as a rule;
on the other hand this prerequisite is not to be denied because the
attorney is not a member of the Party. Consideration can only be given
attorneys whose attitude leaves no doubt that their views coincide
wholly with the political aspirations of the State and the ideology
aims of the movement. Moreover, it can be assumed that attorneys
whose field of activity does not extend to taking over the defense in
criminal affairs, will as a rule not accept representation of inmates
of Concentration Camps.
Attorneys suitable for representation of inmates of Concentration
Camps who should, if possible, reside in different localities of your
district, should be listed in sufficient number according to Offices of
the State Police. With reference to the necessity of very confidential
treatment, I beg therefore to consult as an expert the president of
the Chamber of Counsel about their qualifications. A consultation of
offices not within the Administration of Justice is to be avoided.
I ask that two copies of the list be presented after receiving the
advice of the President of the Chamber of Counsel. With regard to the
attorneys names, proof of personal and professional qualification
is to be submitted. Besides stating the attorney's characteristic
and political attitude and especially his manner of practicing his
profession as defense counsel in penal matters, it is also to be
investigated, if possible, if reason exists to assume that the attorney
has the confidence of the Office of State Police.
An eventual notice of non-compliance is required.
Deputy,
sig. Schlegelberger
[stamped:]
Reich Ministry of Justice
Office of the Ministry
Certified
sig. Schlichting
Secretary of the Office of the Ministry
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 654-PS
U I _b_
Discussion with Reich Fuehrer of SS Himmler on 18.9.42 in his Field
Headquarters in the presence of State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger, SS
Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Bender.
1. Correction [2 illegible pencilled words] by special treatment at
the hands of the police in cases where judicial sentences are not
severe enough. On the suggestion of Reichsleiter Bormann, the following
agreement was reached between the Reich Fuehrer of SS and myself:
_a._ In principle the Fuehrer's time is no longer to be burdened with
these matters.
_b._ The Reich Minister for Justice will decide whether and when
special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.
_c._ The Reich Fuehrer of SS will send the reports, which he sent
hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister for Justice.
_d._ If the views of the Reich Fuehrer of SS and those of the Reich
Minister for Justice agree, the final decision on the case will rest
with them.
_e._ If their views are not in agreement, the opinion of Reichsleiter
Bormann will be brought to bear on the case, and he will possibly
inform the Fuehrer.
_f._ In cases where the Fuehrer's decision on a mild sentence is
sought through other channels (such as by a letter from a Gauleiter)
Reichsleiter Bormann will forward the report to the Reich Minister for
Justice. The case will then be decided as already described by the
Reich Fuehrer of SS and the Reich Minister for Justice.
2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their
sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be worked to death. Persons
under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles
with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with more than
8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for
Justice. First of all the worst anti-social elements amongst those just
mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this
through Reichsleiter Bormann.
3. Administration of justice by the people. This is to be carried out
step by step as soon as possible, first of all in the villages and
the small towns of up to about 20,000 inhabitants. It is difficult to
carry it out in large towns. I shall rouse the Party particularly to
cooperate in this scheme by an article in the Hoheitstrager (NSDAP
publication). It is evident that jurisdiction may not lie in the hands
of the Party. [Marginal note in pencil: according to the permanency of
the courts (?)]
4. Orders regarding the police and justice are, in future, to be
tempered, for example, not prosecuting unmarried mothers if they
attempt to procure abortion.
5. The Reich Fuehrer of SS is agreed that the cancellation of sentence,
even for members of the police, will rest, as in Article 8 of the law
relating to the cancellation of sentence, with the Reich Minister for
Justice.
6. The Reich Fuehrer of SS has given full consent to the ruling I have
planned on the corporal punishment ordered by the Fuehrer.
7. I shall refer to the Common Law relating to Aliens and will give
notification of the claims of Justice, e.g. in the identification of
young people as anti-social elements and their arrest. Also, it seems
to me that the actual circumstances which serve to stamp a person as
anti-social are not laid down in the law with sufficient clarity. The
Reich Fuehrer of SS is waiting for our opinion, and until then will not
carry out the text of the law.
8. The Reich Fuehrer of SS has agreed to a clause for the Juvenile
Court Law, whereby the age of discretion can be reduced to 12 years
and the reduced age of discretion can be extended to over 18 years.
[Marginal note in pencil: "by which he has made clear that a reduction
in the age limit of full age of discretion is meant."]
9. SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Bender, of the Staff of the Reich Fuehrer
of SS, is appointed by the Reich Fuehrer of SS as liaison officer for
matters which appear to necessitate direct liaison with the Reich
Fuehrer of SS. He can be contacted any time by tele-printer in the
Field Headquarters of the Reich Fuehrer of SS, and will come once
every month to Berlin to report to me here. Hauptsturmfuehrer Wanniger
is appointed as liaison officer for other matters, and he will be at
Security Headquarters (Sicherheitsharuptamt).
10. The Reich Fuehrer of SS declared that, in the infliction of
punishment, special establishments should be set up, on the principle
that confirmed criminals should be confined separately and that those
capable of improvement should be separated according to the nature of
their crimes (e.g. impostors, thieves and those who have committed acts
of violence). This was recognized as correct.
11. The Reich Fuehrer of SS demands that the penal register should
be kept by the police. Arguments against this are to be examined
(cancellation and tightening up of the Penal Register Bill and
additions made to it). The question is to be further discussed with
Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach.
12. The Reich Fuehrer of SS pointed out as reliable
SS--Obersturmfuehrer Reichsgerichtsrat _Altstetter_, at present on
active service as a Major, and also Landgerichtspraesident _Stepp_; he
designated as unreliable Generalstaatstanwalt _Jung_ in Dresden.
13. Finally, the Reich Fuehrer of SS broached the subject of the Office
of the Public Prosecutor and its transfer to the police. I rejected it
flatly. There was no further discussion of this subject.
14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of the
Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in future Jews,
Poles, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no longer to be judged by
the ordinary courts, so far as punishable offenses are concerned, but
are to be dealt with by the Reich Fuehrer of SS. This does not apply to
civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are announced or entered in
the German Racial Lists.
Signed Th.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 656-PS
National Socialist German Workers' Party Party Chancellory
The Chief of the Party Chancellory
Fuehrer's Headquarters
SECRET
[Stamp]
Circular No. 12/43g.
SECRET
Subject: Law of Self-Defense against P.O.W.'s
I acknowledge the copy of the annexed order of the Supreme Command of
the Wehrmacht.
(s) M. BORMANN
F.d.R.
Hilegardt
_1 copy_
Distrb. Reichsleiter,
Gauleiter,
Verbaendefuehrer.
index cards: Prisoners of War/Guard Personnel/Self-Defense/ Physical
Punishment.
* * * * *
Copy
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht Berlin 29.1.1943
Az 2f 24.74 AWA/Prisoners of War. General (IA)
No. 3868 142g
SECRET
Subject: Self Defense against Prisoners of War.
Reference: None.
The question of the treatment of Prisoners of War is continually being
brought up and discussed by Wehrmacht and Party bureaus, namely that
the possibilities of punishment provided in the agreement of 1929
(M. Dr.-38/2) are not sufficient. Primarily neither the military
punishment law nor the discipline law, which has been eliminated for
German military personnel, offers a punishment which can be used with
satisfactory success in case of an insubordinate and provoking attitude
of Prisoners of War. The following is hereby fundamentally affirmed:
1. The M.Dr. 38/2 (Agreement 1929) article 46, states that Prisoners of
War cannot receive any other punishments than those meted out to German
military personnel. That applies to all Prisoners of War with the
exception of Soviet Prisoners of War. For Soviet Prisoners of War the
order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht 2 f 24.73 AWA/Prisoners
of War, General (IA) No. 389/42g of the 24.3.1942 Article A, fourth
paragraph is applicable.
2. Improper and provoking attitude of Prisoners of War toward German
guard personnel as well as toward German contractors and workers
forces and justifies this being enacted for the preservation of their
own dignity and of national esteem. German law has an application
for this; in the case of self-defense ST GB Art 53 is applicable.
According to the existing law, self-defense occurs not only in the case
of present actual attacks but also present attacks on one's honor, on
one's property, etc. The law of self-defense concerns not only the
party attacked, it applies also to the protection of a third party
from attack. Third, in the sense of the N Art 53 a.a. G, are not only
persons, but also the persons of the public and private law, as for
instance the State, the municipality, society etc. The party attacked
can use for protection any means that the situation requires and the
use of which does not contradict healthy national interest [Gesunden
Volksempfinden]. A _subsequent_ punishment of a prisoner of war for
an improper and provoking attitude of _physical chastisement_ is not
permissible since self-defense is no longer present.
3. In case of the diminishing of the effort to work only the guard and
the assistant guard (for example among the farmers there is very often
a personal union between assistant-guard and contractor) can interfere
as the military superior of the Prisoners of War. In this he is not
only authorized but also obliged by duty (see Order of the OKW A2 2f
2417a Chief of Prisoners of War/General (I)/Org (IIIb) No. 2916/42 of
the 26.6.1942). Should the prisoners of war not fulfill his order,
_then he has in the case of the most pressing need and danger,--the
right to force obedience with the weapon if he has no other means_.
He can use the weapon as much as is necessary to attain his goal. If
the assistant guard is not armed, then, he is authorized in forcing
obedience by other applicable means.
4. The military personnel, officials, and assisting guard personnel
who are charged with the duty of guarding prisoners of war are to be
instructed accordingly. It is to be made clear to them what means the
law puts at their disposal, in order that they may be able to combat
insubordinations, provocative attitudes and abatement of the will to
work on the part of the prisoners of war, and what also the limits are
to which they can go.
Distribution:
* * *
D.d.R.d.A.:
Weber
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
/s/ Reinecke
F.d.R.
/s/ v. Graevenitz
Majorgeneral.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 661-PS
[Secret Thesis from the Academy of German Law on Resettlement, January
1940]
Resettlement, mixed settlement, emigration, national biological power
[biologische Volkstumskraft]
Short consideration of the prerequisites for a political legal system
of the peoples. [Volkspolitische Rechtsgestaltung]
1 _a._ _Resettlement_ (pages 6-8).
For the carrying out of costly and long-term measures for the increase
of agricultural production, the Governmental-General can at the most
absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is already over-populated.
* * * By further absorption of 1.6 million resettlers, the 1925 Reich
census figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be reached,
which practically because of already existing rural over-population and
lack of industry would result in a double over-population.
This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice to transfer from the
Reich:
The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000), parts of the remaining
Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany proper, Austria,
Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether over 1 million).
The Polish intelligentsia who have been politically active in the past,
and potential political leaders.
The leading economic personalities, comprising owners of large estates,
industrialists and businessmen, etc.
The peasant population, so far as it has to be removed in order to
carry out by strips of German settlements the encirclement of Polish
territories in the East.
6 to 7 million Poles (not including the majority of the Wasserpolen,
Schlonsaken, Kaschuben) would therefore remain for an extended period
of time in the liberated East, and it will be possible to accept only
a small fraction of them into German folksdom. * * * A resettlement
of many millions can only be undertaken after victory and only in
connection with an overwhelming reorganization of the East, which would
create space for the surplus Poles, be it in Siberia, or be it in the
bordering territories, for example after the resettlement eastwards of
the White Russians. A resettlement of several million Jews, perhaps in
Madagascar, could also create space.
* * * * *
_c._ In regard to internal colonization of the East of the Reich,
it might be expedient to envisage the carrying out of a planned
encirclement of the districts with a Polish majority by wide strips of
German settlements. Also, a concentration of the remaining Poles in
order to create space can be considered.
_d._ In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the
Government-General as well as in the liberated East, one should remove
cheap labor temporarily by the hundreds of thousands, employ them for a
few years in the old Reich, and thereby hamper their native biological
propagation. (Their assimilation into the old Reich must be prevented.)
If 1.5 million people are to be transferred in short order (in
about 4 years, i.e., 1000 daily) from the East of the Reich and
are to be absorbed by the Government-General, if among them there
are barely 1 million Poles and the rest Jews, then 7 million Poles
would remain in the Reich, including Poles in Germany proper and
Austria, but not including prisoners of war, seasonal workers from the
Government-General and for the time being also Kaschuben, and of course
Masurians and other Slavic Germanic tribes. There would be 1 Pole for
every 12 Germans in the Reich excluding the Government-General.
The figure of 7 million comprises for example the following peoples:
Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians; it is double the number of
Sudeten-Germans in former Czechoslovakia.
It is terrifyingly high and cannot be decreased considerably by
emigration assimilation, or additional future transfer to the
Government-General.
This mass of Poles is a great inconvenience, an obstacle to the
Germanization of the country, and under certain circumstances a danger.
It can be reduced by enlarging the Government-General.
In renouncing an area with a population of 1 million, it would be
possible not only to get rid of this number of Poles but about 1.2
million, since the areas in question are sufficiently fertile to absorb
15 to 20% additional resettlers. For example, the territory of the
former district of Lodz (19,000 square kilometers) had a population of
2.86 million (1938). One could take 150,000 Germans from their area
and put over 3 million Poles into it. Or by giving up the Cracow Ural
district (Olkusz) and the Zickenau district one could get rid of about
1.5 million Poles, including additional settlers from the Reich. The
further deliberations presuppose that no areas of the Eastern districts
(Ostgaue) will be renounced in favor of the Government-General.
Therefore a major part of this Polish mass, which is much too large,
could emigrate only to areas East of the Government-General. A
prerequisite would be a thorough reorganization of the entire East
and many of its numerous peoples, under the determining influence of
the Reich (a memorandum is necessary). The total emigration of over
3 million Jews (possibly to Madagascar) would also create space for
Polish resettlement.
About 1 million Poles could be taken out of their settlements, but
not from the Reich, and used as agricultural and industrial itinerant
labor. This would doubtless result in considerable relief, particularly
from the biological viewpoint.
* * * * *
Strictest care is to be taken that secret circulars, memoranda and
official correspondence which contains instructions detrimental to the
Poles are kept steadily under lock and key so that they will not some
day fill the White Books printed in Paris or the USA.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 666-PS
SECRET
The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
DIRECTIVES
for the prosecution of offences against the Reich or against the
occupation authorities in the occupied territories.
7 December 1941
With the beginning of the Russian campaign, communist elements and
other anti-German circles increased their attacks on the Reich and the
occupation authorities in the occupied territories. The extent and the
danger of these activities compel to most severe measures against the
guilty for the purpose of intimidation.
For the time being the following directions shall be observed:
I
In regard to offences committed by non-German civilians in the occupied
territories against the Reich or the occupation authorities which
endanger their security or efficiency, the death sentence is adequate
as a matter of principle.
II
The offences referred to in section I are to be tried in the occupied
territories only if it is likely that the guilty persons, at least
the main offenders, will be sentenced to death and if the proceedings
and the execution of the death sentences can be carried out quickly.
Otherwise the offenders, at least the main offenders, are to be brought
to Germany.
III
Guilty persons who are brought to Germany are to be subject to
court-martial proceedings there only if specific military interests
make it necessary. German or foreign authorities making inquiries are
to be told that the guilty persons had been arrested and that the state
of the proceedings did not permit to give further information.
IV
The commanders in the occupied territories and the legal
representatives are personally responsible for the execution of this
decree within the framework of their competence.
VI
The chief of the high command of the armed forces determines in which
occupied territories this decree is to be applied. He is authorized
to explain, to make provisions for the execution of the decree and to
supplement it. The Reich minister of justice issues the provisions for
the execution of the law for his district.
The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
By order (I.A.) (signed) KEITEL
_DISTRIBUTION_:
Foreign Office
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Reich leader SS and Chief of the German police in the Reich Ministry
of Interior.
High Command of the Army (Chef H. Ruest u. BDE--HR) with 7 N.A.
High Command of the Navy (MR) with 1 N.A.
Reich Minister of Aviation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air force
(ZAR) with 1 N.A.
President of the Reich Court-Martial
Commander Southeast with 4 N.A.
Commander Norway
Commander Netherlands
Commander Eastland
Commander Ukraine
Plenipotentiary of the armed forces with the Reich Protector Bohemia
and Moravia
Armistice Commission Wiesbaden
High Command of the Armed Forces:
Chief West
Abt. L with 8 N.A.
W Pr
Amt Aus 1/Abw. (ZR)
Abt. Ausl.
Abw. III
AWA
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 668-PS
Copy
Chief of the Security Police and the SD--IV D 4--103/42 g--Berlin SW
11, Prinz-Albrecht Street 8, 24 June 1942
SECRET
To the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for the
attention of the Oberregierungsrat DOWALDT or his acting deputy.
Berlin W 35, at Tirpitzufer 72--76
_Subject_: Prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the
occupation forces in occupied territories.
_Reference_: Circular dated 16 April 1942--14 n 16.18 WR (I 3/4) Nr
242/42 g.
By virtue of the above-named edict a considerable number of persons
who were arrested in the occupied district of France have been
transferred to camp Hinzert at Trier, pending commencement of the main
proceedings before the competent special court in Cologne.
The 67-year old Frenchman, Louis Adolf Rousseau, died here recently of
a stroke.
Thus the question has arisen--which has not been settled until now--as
to what steps are to be taken in such cases of death.
It is the intent of the general directions of the Fuehrer and supreme
commander of the Wehrmacht concerning prosecution of punishable
offences against the Reich or the occupation forces in occupied
territories, dated 7 December 1941, to create, for deterrent purposes,
uncertainty about the fate of prisoners among their relatives and
acquaintances, through the deportation into Reich territory of persons
arrested in occupied areas on account of anti-German activity. This
goal would be forfeited if the relatives were to be notified in cases
of death. Surrender of the body for burial at home is inadvisable for
the same reason, and also because the place of burial could be misused
for demonstration purposes.
I therefore propose that the following general rule be decided upon for
cases of death:
_a._ Notification of relatives is not to take place.
_b._ The body is buried at the place of death, in the Reich.
_c._ The place of burial is not made known for the time being.
In the case of the deceased Frenchman Rousseau, I have given orders
which accord with the above proposal and I will do likewise in the
future pending a decision by you.
pp.
[signature illegible]
* * * * *
SECRET
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72--76, July 13, 1942
14 m 16.18 WR (I 3/4), No. 562/42 g
To the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service
Berlin SW11, Prinz Albrecht Str. 8
[Pencil alteration]
[Pencil note--]
E46 E8/46 38/42
Reich Ministry of Justice 16th July 1942
Section
By way of information to:
Supreme Command of the Army
Supreme Command of the Navy
Reich Minister of Air Transportation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Forces
President of the Reich Court Martial
Reich Minister of Justice
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Headquarters
_Subject_: Prosecution of punishable offences against the Reich or the
occupation forces in the occupied territories.
_Reference_:--IV D 4--103/42 g--of June 24, 1942. 1 enclosure.
The supreme command of the armed forces agrees to the suggested
treatment of cases of death. The decree of April 16, 1942, will in due
course be supplemented accordingly.
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
Per: Dr. Lehmann
[Handwritten note--largely undecipherable]
(Stamp of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces)
Checked: Bachmann,
Justizoberinspektor d.Lw.
IV a 863/42 g
[Handwritten note]
1. _Note_: Procedure in cases of death has already been laid down by
IX para. 5 of the draft of a second order for the carrying out of the
general directions * * * of decree of the OKW dated 16.4.42.--
In my opinion the case of death quoted in the letter of the
Reichfuehrer-SS dated 24.6.42 precludes the necessity of a supplement
to the draft, mentioned.
2. Submit to me 3.8.
RM 29.7.
Submitted to OBGK (?) Dr. V. Ammon 3.8.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 674-PS
_1st copy_
President of the High District Court and Chief Public Prosecutor
Kattowitz, 3 December 1941
Nikolai Str. 1, Entrance Wilhemsplatz Tel.: 34608 and 34610
VS 4 E-1. 51 secret
_file nr. 229_
[illegible notations]
"SECRET" only
To the Reich Minister of Justice, Attention: Chief Councillor to the
Government Stadermann or Representative in Office.
Berlin
_Re_: Executions by the Police and Expediting of Penal Procedure
Without Order.
Inclosure: 1 copy of report
About 3 weeks ago 6 chief agents (partially German) were hanged by the
police in connection with the destruction of a treasonable organization
of 350 members in Tarnowitz without notification of the ministry of
justice. Such execution of criminal agents in the Bielitz district
have already been made before also without the knowledge of the proper
authority for criminal persecution. On 2 December 1941 the head of the
state police at Kattowitz, chief councillor to the government Mildner,
reported orally to the undersigned that he had ordered as necessary
immediate action, with authority from the Reich-leader of the SS these
executions by public hanging at the place of the crime; and that
deterring measures would also have to be continued in the future until
the criminal and actively anti-German powers in the occupied Eastern
territories have been destroyed, or until other immediate actions,
perhaps also by the courts, would guarantee equal frightening effect.
Accordingly, 6 leaders of another Polish organization guilty of high
treason in the district in and around Sosnowitz were to be hanged
publicly today as an example.
About this procedure the undersigned expressed considerable doubts.
Besides the fact that such measures have been withdrawn from the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and are contradictory to the laws
not put out of effect, a justified emergency for the exceptional
proceedings by the police alone cannot, in our opinion, be lawfully
recognized.
The penal justice in our district within the limits of our jurisdiction
is quite capable of fulfilling its duty of immediate penal retribution
by means of a special form of special judicial activity (establishment
of a so-called rapid special court). Indictment and proceeding could
be speeded up in such a way that between turning the case over to the
public prosecutor and execution no more than 3 days would elapse if the
practice of pardoning is simplified and if the decision, if necessary,
can be obtained by long distance call. This was expressed yesterday to
the head of the state police at Kattowitz by the undersigned.
We cannot believe that execution by the police of criminals,
especially German criminals, can be considered more effective through
shattering the sense of justice of many German countrymen. In the long
run they might, in spite of public terrorizing, lead even more to
further brutality of minds, which is contrary to the intended purpose
of pacifying. These deliberations, however, do not apply to future
lawful competence of a drumhead court-martial for Poles and Jews.
According to a recent report of the head of the Kattowitz state police
to the district leader [Gauleiter] Bracht, the cases of 540 persons
accused of high treason from the Kattowitz district have already been
forwarded in December 1940 by the police to the board of arraignment
of the people's court in Berlin without any sentences having been
passed there as yet. This situation, which became known in the various
branches of interested party circles and administration departments,
injures the reputation of justice in general as well as the concept
of the effectiveness of justice in the occupied Eastern territories
especially because, with the exception of the court, the exclusive
competence of the people's court for the sentencing of matters of high
treason is not sufficiently known.
We are not informed as to how far the described situation of
non-settlement is true.
As far as the proceedings of treasonable cases by the chief Reich
prosecutor at the people's court in Berlin are concerned which were
forwarded for prosecution to the co-undersigned public prosecutor
(proceedings per par. 5 section 2 of the law about the competence of
criminal courts dated 21 Feb. 40--RGBl I, p. 405--in connection with
the AV of Reich justice ministry dated 7 June 45--German law, page 683)
we should like to point out the following:
From July 1941 until today, the cases of 235 accused were forwarded
by the chief Reich prosecutor; 122 of the accused have already been
sentenced, indicted, or proceedings were suspended or transferred.
The co-undersigned president of the supreme country court has taken
steps to expedite prosecution further by personally supplementing
the criminal court for high treason. If it should become necessary
in the future, a second court could be appointed for the prosecution
of matters of high treason by putting aside less important work.
All organizations charged with prosecuting and sentencing of high
treason and also with other severe crimes have been impressed by the
undersigned that a speedy treatment is essential for war and nation.
With these organizational measures intended and already partially
introduced by us of creating a "Rapid Special Court" which should also
be technically equipped with everything necessary, and with the likely
establishment at any time of a second court for matters of high treason
in Kattowitz, the executions by the police still remain necessary as
immediate actions against traitors, according to the chief councillor
to the government Mildner, for the anti-German treasonal activity is
supposed to have increased to such an extent that comparisons with
the situation in 1917 and 1918 are already permissible, and that the
criminals draw courage and power from the drawn-out legal trials of
the traitors. The situation in the Kattowitz district is supposed to
be especially difficult because there are 1-1/2 million Poles, 150,000
Czechs, and 7,000 Jews among the 3 million population whose anti-German
attitude is being joined in a remarkable way by more and more Germans
in the last months. A further worsening of the situation is to be
counted on if the war should last longer; for the Poles are said to be
fanatically convinced of the victory of the Western countries and of a
resurrection of their country, and, without inhibition, risk everything
which does not seem to be punishable by death. The terrorist activity
of the last few months does not appear to leave the Reich Germans in
the Eastern occupied districts unimperilled. The slightest military
set-back could result in immediate danger due to the growing and
immediate terrorist readiness of the anti-German organizations. These
are the reasons why the head of the state police considers as necessary
immediate measures also in the field of high treason. If such steps
could be taken by judicial means, this would seem also to him the best
solution since the state police is already overburdened and suffering
from considerable personnel shortage.
After this discourse we cannot help but have the impression that the
situation, especially with respect to high treason (terrorist) activity
has grown serious since the spring of 1941 and that special measures
have to be taken to subdue same effectively. We pointed out to the head
of the state police our insufficient competence in this field, but have
informed him that we would report this matter to the Reich minister of
justice.
In view of the great judicial importance of the mentioned problems
for the district of the Kattowitz high county court, we deem an
early personal discussion at Kattowitz necessary, and that the chief
councillor to the government Mildner and perhaps a representative of
the people's court and of the chief Reich prosecutor at the people's
court should be taken into consultation.
(signed) Dr. Heimer
[illegible notes showing that the conference had taken place]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 675-PS
SECRET
Nationalsocialist German Workers Party
Berlin--Wilhelm Str. 64
Munich, Brown House
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
To the Reichminister for Justice, Attn: Ministerial office director
Stadermann or his deputy
[Rubber stamp]
Reichministry for Justice
25 August 1938,
Dept V Gst a,
16 Aug 1938, III D--Es, 3315/0/31--3604 Secret
Berlin W 8 Wilhelmstrasse 65
_Subject_: Austrian Concordat
Your letter of 23 May 1938--Va 146/38 Secret
I have purposely not taken a hand in the letters, which I have
received from various Reichministers as well as from the Reichfuehrer
SS and the Chief of the German Police, since the Fuehrer's decision
on that was known to me already in connection with a lecture by the
Reichcommissioner for the incorporation of Austria into the Reich. I
therefore have refrained to take a standpoint again to the questions,
mentioned in your letter, and have requested the Reichminister and
Chief of the Reich Chancellory in a letter of 29 June 1938, to inform
you about the Fuehrer's decision. Therefore, the questions, as far as
they concern the validity of the Austrian Concordat, are taken care of
by the letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
of 12 July 1938--Rk 276 B Secret.
However, in order to be able to take into account the general political
considerations in the measures, probably planned for Austria for
the execution of this decision of the Fuehrer, and to keep to the
church-political line of the Fuehrer, I request from you, to get into
contact at the proper time before taking action in these measures
besides with the Reich Commissioner for the incorporation of Austria
into the Reich, also with the Reich Minister for church affairs and
with the Fuehrer's deputy.
Heil Hitler!
By order
/s/ BORMANN
(M. BORMANN)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 680-PS
SECRET
The Reich- and Prussian Minister of the Interior
Berlin, 5 May 1938
NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6
Phone: Dept Z, I, II, V, VIII 11 00 27, IV, VI, VII (Unter den Linden
70--72) 12 00 34
Cable address: Reichsinnenminister
Nr I 176/38, 1014 g
Urgent
To:
_a._ The Reich- and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs,
attention: Government Councillor [Regierungsrat] URLAUCH or his deputy
in office.
_b._ The Foreign Office, attention: Councillor [AMTS- and HOFRAT]
SCHIMPKE or his deputy in office.
_c._ The Reich Minister of Justice, attention: Ministerial Office
Director STADERMANN or his deputy in office.
_d._ The Reich Minister for Education, attention: Government
Councillor [Regierungsrat] JAEHNERT or his deputy in office.
_e._ The Deputy of the Fuehrer, attention: SS-Inspector KNOBLAUCH or
his deputy in office.
_f._ The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German Police attention: SS
2nd Lt, Government Councillor Dr. TANZMANN or his deputy in office.
SUBJECT: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
The question of further validity of the Austrian Concordat (Konkordat)
which has already been brought up by the Reich- and Prussian Minister
for Ecclesiastical Affairs in his letters to the Foreign Office of 22
March 1938--II 1563/38--and of 26 March 1938--G II 1596/38--, is one
of fundamental importance for a number of matters to be worked out by
the central office for the execution of the reunion of Austria with
the German Reich as well as other offices of the Reich and Austria
concerned with it. This question has to be brought to a conclusive
clarification immediately.
I deem the following conceptions possible:
The Concordat will not be considered as binding already for the reason
that it has not at all been reached _within the framework of the
constitution_.
The more detailed reasons for that are evident from the following:
1. The negotiations for conclusion of the Concordat had come to an end
already on 5 June 1933, on which day the Concordat had been initialed
in Vatican City.
Regardless of that, the Concordat was not submitted for further
constitutional processing by the federal government of Austria
for almost a whole year, because the National Council of Austria
was considered suspended in accordance with the so-called
"self-elimination" thesis represented by the federal government due
to the resignation of all its three presidents, and beyond that, the
acceptance of the Concordat could not be expected because of the
majority relationships as they existed at that time within the National
Council.
The constitutional processing, in accordance with article 50 of the
federal constitutional law as provided for in the version of 1929 (RGBl
Nr 1/1930), would have had to consist of the fact that the Concordat,
being a political and law-changing treaty of the State, would have to
be presented to the National Council for approval in order to attain
its validity, in which connection the respective decision regarding
the character of this State treaty, which simultaneously changes the
constitution, can only be made in the presence of at least half of the
members of the National Council with a majority of two thirds of the
votes cast; besides, the decision of the National Council would have
had to be submitted to further prescribed procedure (presentation to
the Federal Council).
The Concordat was processed further only in conjunction with the
development which led to the constitution of 1934, and that in the
following manner:
While, up to that date, the repeatedly uttered request for another
session of the National Council had always been opposed on the
ground that it was impossible to convoke it because of the so-called
"self-elimination program" and whilst, on the basis of this claim, one
had governed by means of the enabling act for war economy which had
originally been passed for certain exclusively economic purposes (RGBl.
No. 307/1917), now all of a sudden, also based on this act, by a decree
dated 24 April 1934 (RGBl. I No. 238/1934), the federal act concerning
the rules of procedure of the National Council was amended to the
effect that, although a president did not exist, the National Council
was in a position to reassemble.
This procedure was absolutely unconstitutional. The Federal Government
prevented through police power the attempt of the last-retired
president of the National Council to revive this body by summoning
the National Council anew in his capacity as the last president. On
the other hand, the Federal Government had also constantly refused to
use the possibility given by article 18, paragraph 3-5 of the Federal
constitutional Law of 1929, to set the National Council going again
through an emergency decree of the Federal president. Instead of this,
in the meantime, all possible legal measures were based upon the
enabling act for war economy, which was entirely contrary to the realm
of authorization of this law and entirely against the constitution. An
especially notorious abuse of the enabling act for war economy was the
employment of the enabling act for war economy for the issuance of the
aforementioned decree with which the rules of procedure of the National
Council were changed.
As it turned out, the National Council summoned on this basis no longer
had the composition with which it had emerged from the last elections;
on the contrary it was only a rump-parliament, because all mandates of
the Social Democratic Labor Party in the meantime were also declared
void by a decree of February 16, 1934 (RGBl. I Nr 100/1934) also based
upon the before-mentioned enabling act for war economy.
This rump-parliament assembled on 30 April 1934 for a conference in
which solemn declarations were made by the Gross Deutsche Volkspartei
and the Landbund--the two parties with outspoken National character--in
which the constitutional legality of the whole procedure was expressly
disputed, after which all delegates of the two named parties left the
conference, with the exception of one delegate of the Landbund who at
the same time was holding a public office, so that for the further
discussions and resolutions only the before-mentioned one delegate of
the Landbund and the delegates of the Christian-Social-Party and the
Heimatschutz remained who together comprised only 76 delegates.
These 76 delegates now passed the so called Federal Constitutional
Law concerning extraordinary measures within the jurisdiction of the
constitution (RGBl. I Nr. 255/1934). Through Art. I of which the
above mentioned decrees of Art. 50 of the Federal Constitutional
Law of 1929 concerning the co-operation of the National Council in
National treaties were cancelled. This constituted, in addition to the
unconstitutional manner of the summons, a further very substantial
violation of the constitution, in that--as has been mentioned already
in the beginning--according to Art. 44, section 1, of the Federal
Constitutional Law in the version of 1929, constitutional laws could
only be passed in the presence of at least one half of the members
of the National Council with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast,
but the National Council consisted, in accordance with paragraph 1 of
the election rules of 165 delegates and therefore the presence of at
least 83 delegates would have been required in order to pass upon a
resolution changing the constitution.
After the federal constitutional law of 30 April 1934 had also been
presented to the Federal Council which for the same reasons as the
National Council, held sessions as a rump body, and it had issued no
protest, it was announced yet on 30 April 1934, causing the day of its
taking effect to be 1 May 1934.
Already during the night of 30 April to 1 May 1934, the exchange of
ratifications prepared with the Papal Nuntio took place and already on
the 1 May 1934 the concordat was made public in the federal gazette.
From the preceding explanation it is evident, that the Concordat
between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria has been concluded
under circumstances which offer the possibility to represent, with
reasons which cannot be contradicted, the point of view that the
conclusion of the Concordat was completely in violation of the
constitution and therefore no legal validity can be attributed to the
Concordat. In this respect it has to be noted that the fact that the
Concordat was concluded in violation of the constitution was regarded
as a fact already at that time in all serious judicial circles in
Austria. (Compare in this respect particularly also the remarks
referring to the Concordat made in the work of Guerke on "The Austrian
Constitution of 1934" in the archive of public law, new edition, volume
25, page 178 pp.).
This point of view would open up the following additional path:
The Reich government declares to the Holy See on the basis of these
facts that, after examining the legal angle, it had come to the
conclusion that for the reason stated it could not recognize the
Concordat any longer and is combining with that also with the effect
"ex nunc" and with simultaneous legal settlement of the questions
remaining unclarified through the abrogation of the Concordat, the
abolition of the Austrian legal regulations referring to the Concordat
(Federal law RGBl II, Nr. 8/1934 in the version of RGBl Nr. 134/1935
and decree RGBl II Nr. 13/1934).
2. The Concordat has expired automatically, through the reunion
of Austria with the German Reich, because Austria has vanished as
independent state, has obtained the constitutional position of a German
state and therefore lost the position as a subject of international
law. This point of view which by reason of logic can surely only be
taken _retroactive to 13 March 1938_, would be based more exactly on
the following:
Within the international legal sphere there is no general legal
succession of the territorial successor into the rights and duties
of the territorial predecessor. It rather has to be scrutinized in
each case separately, whether a legal succession in accordance with
international law occurs. With the fall of the territorial predecessor,
the bilateral state treaties concluded by him are as a rule void.
However some exceptions to this principle are recognized: National
practice has shown that state treaties will be renewed tacitly by the
territorial successor simply by administering them further. But a new
state may also be forced, in order to obtain desired recognition,
to take over certain state treaties. A general _duty in accordance
with international law_ for the fulfillment of obligations resulting
from treaties made by the territorial predecessor, exists, however,
only in the following cases: As a rule, state treaties which concern
the territory of the state taken over as such, that is, so-called
"ratifizierte" treaties (border treaties, treaties on rivers and
roads of communication), will also fall to the territorial successor.
Furthermore, those Concordats which have in accordance with customary
law found recognition beyond the sphere of the partners of the treaty,
will also be valid for the territorial successor. Lastly, rules can
be established through a collective treaty which determines a certain
order for a group of states. Those norms also remain in effect in case
of territorial changes within that group and therefore also fall to the
territorial successor. (Compare Verdross, international law 1937, Page
71.)
The following additional consequences would be combined with the
conceptions mentioned above:
To 1: The establishment of the unconstitutional conclusion of the
Concordat would first of all represent a strong moral verdict against
the whole past system connected with the names Dollfuss and Schuschnigg
in Austria, which could be politically very desirable for various
reasons.
The attitude of the Reich government toward the other bilateral State
treaties signed by Austria would not be prejudiced as no other state
treaty of more importance was signed under the same circumstances
as the Concordat. One would prefer this procedure in the expected
discussions with other countries, some of which (Jugoslavia, Poland,
England) have already referred to their stipulated rights in Austria.
The declaration that the Concordat will not be acknowledged on the
grounds of unconstitutionality and the repeal of the connected Austrian
legal provisions with "ex nunc" effect would not influence the validity
of the legal acts based on the Concordat (especially on the field of
matrimonial law as to states rights). An express legalization of the
past is therefore not required.
Furthermore one could arrive at the point where the conception could
be maintained that former Austrian territory, in contrast to remaining
Reich territory, had become entirely free of the Concordat, an
interpretation which would be especially unwelcome to the Holy See for
various reasons, and would force open the entire question of the future
relationship between the Reich and the Holy See with all the resulting
consequences in favor of the Reich in eventual further conferences with
the Holy See.
To 2: On a former occasion the church adopted this point of view, as
the Reich- and Prussian Minister for church affairs has already pointed
out in his letter to the Foreign Office of 22 March 1938.
Thus in a statement to the secret consistory of 21 November 1921 Pope
Benedict XV discussed the question of the validity and tenure of the
Concordats, since retroactive effects had arisen from the changes in
state territories and organizations produced by the world war. Therein
the Pope distinguished between countries which were newly created,
countries with considerable territorial expansion, and countries which
have changed so completely that they could not be considered the same
"moral person". According to Pope Benedict XV opinion all these three
classes of countries have "lost their privileges granted in former
Concordats". It is quite evident, that Austria, after it became a part
of the German Reich since March 13, 1938, cannot be considered the
"same moral person" as before.
It has not yet been decided how the bilateral Austrian state Treaties
of noneconomical nature which have been listed in the letter of the
Foreign Office of April 6, 1938--R VII. 38 will be handled. One cannot
yet perceive whether the Reich will take over one or the other of these
treaties. This would no doubt be made use of by the Holy See to insist
on the succession of the Reich as to the Austrian Concordat. On the
other hand application of the theory of international law relating
to succession of states as discussed above may lead to unnecessary
suspicions in other cases, in which the Reich intends to bring about a
peaceful solution with the other partner to the agreement.
If one is of the opinion that the Austrian Concordat is abolished by
the actual reunion of Austria with the Reich then the question comes
up whether, on account of the same fact of territorial expansion, the
Concordat of the Reich logically would have to be regarded as applying
to Austria too.
The Reich Concordat was, as far as I know, not expressly extended to
the Saar-District, after the reembodiment of the latter into Germany;
there can be no doubt, however, that the Reich Concordat has formal
validity in the Saar-District today. Even though the Saar-District
unlike the Federal State of Austria--had not concluded a Concordat
of its own with the Holy See prior to its reembodiment, there can be
no doubt as to the former independent legal competence in accordance
with international law of the Saar-District. In view of a comparison
with the Saar-District and the possible conclusion to be drawn with
regard to Austria it seems advisable not to claim the expiration of the
Concordat on the grounds that the Austrian independent state has ceased
to exist.
The Austrian Concordat however, has established very incisive
regulations in the sphere of matrimonial law as pointed out by the
Reich Minister for Church Affairs, according to which the Canon
Law alone is competent for marriages of Catholics; this law has
the validity of a civil law; the publishing of bans and the laying
down of obstacles to matrimony are stipulated according to Canon
Law; Catholic Church authorities and law courts are competent for
matrimonial affairs; the parson is a registrar at the same time. Should
the Concordat therefore be considered as having expired as of March
13, 1938 a number of most complicated legal questions would arise; in
particular the question as to what legal validity should be given to
catholic matrimonies concluded in Austria after March 13, 1938 and
which other legal consequences are to be considered as connected with
such matrimonies. It would be regrettable should one have to draw
the conclusion that legal acts based on the expired Concordat had
subsequently to be sanctioned by the state.
On weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the two conceptions
both of which can be supported by good legal arguments I should like to
speak in favour of the conception explained under 1.
I shall be glad if you will inform me of your opinion about the
question raised by May 15, 1938. I am quite aware of the fact that in
view of its great political importance the decision can only be made by
the Fuehrer and Reich chancellor.
After receipt of your communication I reserve the right to summon a
conference.
Signed: Frick
* * * * *
SECRET
D. RM.d.J. Berlin, May 13, 1938
_Special Delivery_
To The REICH AND PRUSSIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
c/o Ministerialrat Dr. Hoche
_Subject_: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
_Re_: Communication of the 5th of this month
TO THE OFFICE May 14, 1938
signed: Templev(?)5/14/
Nr. 1-176/38 1014 g;
Despatched May 14, 1938
signed: Templev [?]
Not later than today
Your communication, as per description on the margin was received here
on the 9th of May. Considering the importance a proper handling of this
matter carries for the official business under my jurisdiction I shall
be unable to announce a final statement before the 15th of this month.
I therefore request that the time allotted me for a reply to the
communication be tacitly extended to May 25.
for the office 5/14/38, 10 o'clock I.V.
EK.
(S) [Illegible]
Final regulation of 5/23/38 with V a 146/38 g page 13
V a 138/38 g
* * * * *
V a 138/38 g
1. _Note_: Of the 4 spare copies which were procured I have given one
to Ministerialrat Ficker and at the same time one to KGR Kaulbach
because of the question of canonical law and at the same time for the
minister.
Ministerialrat Ruppert, who has already offered a preliminary opinion,
wants to express his conclusive opinion at a later date, since, he
will presumably not be present by the end of the week, because of his
vacation.
The report on the matter will probably be made to Secretary of State,
Dr. Schlegelberger's, on Saturday the 21st, the report to the
minister's on the 23rd of May. The matter should be fully prepared by
that time.
2. The office is requested to refer on Monday May 16 the occurrences,
including any opinions of the Ministries concerned to Min-Rat Dr.
Kriege who is handling the matter.
Berlin, May 14, 1938
Presented upon arrival from the Reich and Prussian Ministry for
Ecclesiastical Affairs on May 11, 1938.
The 4 duplicates have been placed in the file of papers to be destroyed.
* * * * *
To: Mr. Kriege, Counsellor of the Ministry of Interior, respectfully
submitted:
Mr. Thees has asked me to give my opinion on the letter of the Ministry
of Interior, dated 5.5, regarding the Austrian Concordat, insofar as
the letter pertains to my sphere.
With regard to the reform work in the field of matrimonial law and, in
close connection with it, the creation of a uniform matrimonial law for
Greater Germany, two points are of decisive importance:
_a._ The Concordat must not offer any impediment as soon as this
matrimonial law comes into force.
_b._ The legislation for the execution of the Concordat, namely the law
of 4.5.1934, has to remain in force until this time.
This result, decisive for any further action, cannot be achieved,
in my opinion, on the basis of the first proposal of the Ministry
of Interior. If the Concordat were null and void on account of
unconstitutionality, then the same would apply to the legislation for
its execution; the marriages based on the law of 4.5.1934 would be void
and would have to be sanctioned with retroactive force. It is not clear
to me how, on the basis of this reasoning, the Ministry of Interior can
achieve a non-retroactive result in the nullification (p. 5).
There remains, therefore, the second solution proposed by the Ministry
of Interior. If the Concordat excludes state succession, it seems to
me, nevertheless, that the expiration of the law of 4.5.1934 does
not result with effective date of 13.3.38. Even if an international
pact expires, it seems to me that the legislation for the execution
would bind the subjects until it was abrogated by an act of the state.
The statements on page 9 of the letter are inaccurate insofar as the
marriages which were contracted after 13.3 were not contracted by
virtue of the expired Concordat, but by virtue of the law of 4.5.1934.
Accordingly, it seems to me that continuing effect of the law of
4.5.1934 can be achieved in this way.
/S/ Ficker 18/5
* * * * *
SECRET
Reich and Prussian Ministry for Church Affairs
Berlin W.8., 3, Leipzigerstrasse, 11th May 1938
[stamp]
Reich Ministry of Justice, 13th May 1938.
Sect. V.
Re: Austrian Concordat.
Communication of the Reich Minister of the Interior, May 5, 1938
I 176/38 1014 g
Va 138/38g (Contents noted for the Minister)
The question whether the Austrian Concordat should be considered by
the Reich Government as having been illegal and invalid from the very
start, or as having been abolished by the revolution or whether it
should be expressly cancelled can not be decided from a legal point of
view but has to be decided from a political point of view.
This political decision can only be taken by the Fuehrer. Suggestions
to this effect will be made to him by the Ministers competent in
questions of foreign policy and of church affairs, i.e., by the Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Minister for Church Affairs,
who have already contacted each other for this purpose.
Also the question of the Reich Concordats to Austria (which, by the
way, is utterly unbearable) is not a legal but a political matter.
The question of the continuation of the Reich Concordat and of the
"state"--Concordats is connected with this problem. Here, too, the
decision rests with the Fuehrer.
With regard to the execution of the necessary laws in Austria, resp.
to the introduction of Reich laws in Austria the only decisive factor
is the political interest of the Reich, whereby the Austrian Concordat
will be considered as non-existent.
Signed: KERRL.
To:
_a._ The Reich Minister of the Interior
_b._ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
_c._ The Reich Minister of Justice
_d._ The Reich Minister of Education
_e._ The Deputy of the Fuehrer
_f._ The Reich Leader of SS troops and Chief of the German Police
_g._ The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery
(In connection with a 146/38g) Va- 139/38g
* * * * *
SECRET
The Reich and Prussian Minister of Education, etc.
Berlin W8, May 17, 1938
Z II a Nr. 10074 Geh/38 Reich Ministry of Justice
May 18, 1938
Dept. V Off. a
In reference to the communication of May 5, 1938--I 176/38, 1014 g,
V a 138/38 g, re: Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of
Austria.
I agree with your conception in the final analyses.
The Austrian concordat did not--according to your arguments--enter into
a due constitutional existence and is therefore without legal effect.
However, in contradistinction to your arguments, I believe it correct
to assume that the treaty was void from the beginning (ab initio) and
not from now on. Therefore all legal acts which have taken place up to
the day of establishment of invalidity of the Austrian concordat would
have to be sanctioned retroactively.
Looking at both possibilities, as presented by you, the Austrian
concordat is void ab initio, in the first case as represented by you
and also by me from the very beginning, in the second case from March
13, 1938 on. For legal considerations, in both cases, the subsequent
sanctioning of any legal acts, carried out meanwhile, is absolutely
required.
By registered mail.
1. Reich Minister and Prussian Minister of the Interior, Attention:
Min. Buerodirektor Stoppel or acting deputy.
2a. Reich Minister and Prussian Minister for Church Affairs, Attention
Regierungsrat Urlacher or acting deputy.
b. The Foreign Deputy Office, Attention Amts- and Hofrat Schimpke or
acting deputy.
c. Reich Minister of Justice, Attention Min. Buerodirektor Stadermann
or acting deputy.
d. Deputy of the Fuehrer, Attention SS-Oberfuehrer Knoblauch or acting
deputy.
e. Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Attention
SS-Untersturmfuehrer Reg.Rat Dr. Tanzmann or acting deputy.
to 2 Duplicate for taking note of.
[In long hand:] Dr. Kriege
V a 146/38/1 Encl. (2 dupl) Duplicate to file
E 26
* * * * *
The first possibility, the establishment of the legal invalidity of
the Austrian Concordat, has in its favor, as ably shown by you, that
a moral condemnation of the past system in Austria is brought about.
This system seized the power without a mandate of the Austrian people
and concluded the concordat without authorization on the part of the
Austrian people. Further, I don't think, that we have to fear the
effects upon the Saarland, which you indicated. However, it seems to
me of the utmost importance, that the treaties, concluded by Austria
with other states, have not been concluded under similar circumstances;
therefore these states do not have to fear similar consequences, a
fact, which should be pointed out at the time of the declaration of the
invalidity of the Austrian concordat.
However, I think it advisable, to refer while dealing with the Curia,
especially since this point of view was also advocated by Pope Benedict
XV in his statement of November 21, 1921, before the Secret Consistory
(Geheimkonsistorium).
I also take the position that Austria is without any concordat after
the establishment of the invalidity of the Austrian concordat. I do not
consider an extension of the Reich-concordat to Austria appropriate
from the point of view of my office.
By authority of the State Secretary.
Signed KUNISCH
Certified:
[signature illegible]
Verwaltungssekretaer
* * * * *
19 May 1938
1. Minister of Education, signed Kunisch, May 17, secret, sends copy of
his letter of May 17th to the Minister of the Interior, concerning the
Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria.
I agree with your concept as far as results are concerned.
The Austrian Concordat is devoid of legal validity, since it was
not concluded in an orderly fashion and in accordance with the
constitution, as apparent from your explanations. However, I shall have
to differ with you on the point that the contract is not merely invalid
"ex nunc" (from now on) but "ex tunc", i.e., from the very beginning.
The necessity arises therewith to sanction retroactively all legal acts
executed by reason of the Concordat till the date when invalidity of
the Austrian Concordat was proven.
Entering upon the two possibilities explained by you, the Austrian
Concordat would therefore be invalid "ex tunc", as far as your first
case and also mine is concerned from the very beginning, and in the
second case as of 13 March 1938. In both cases the need arises on the
basis of judicial-political considerations for retroactive sanction of
legal acts executed in the meantime.
The first possibility, the proof of the constitutional invalidity of
the Austrian Concordat, carries a moral condemnation of the former
system in Austria, as you have explained so fittingly: a system that
without the mandate of the Austrian people had usurped the power
of state and concluded a Concordat without the official approval
(legitimation) of the Austrian people. I should add, that I have no
fear of possible conclusions a posteriori concerning the Saar-District,
which you have mentioned. I consider it of highest importance that
other treaties concluded with other States by Austria were not made
under similar circumstances, thus those States had no reason to fear
similar repercussions for themselves, a fact which should be emphasized
immediately upon presentation of proof of the invalidity of the
Austrian Concordat.
However, I consider it correct procedure, that we should assist the
Curia (Kurie) by showing them the second possibility, specially that
this conception was advocated by Pope Benedictus XV in his declaration
of 21 November 1921 before the Secret Consistorium.
I also support the viewpoint that after proof has been presented of
the invalidity of the Austrian Concordat, Austria will be free of
concordats. An extension of the Reich Concordat to include Austria I
would not consider advisable or within the interest of my sphere of
competence.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 682-PS
DISCUSSION OF THIERACK WITH DR. GOEBBELS ON SEPT. 14, 1942 IN BERLIN
1--2.15 p.m.
2. With regard to the destruction of asocial life, Dr. Goebbels is of
the opinion that the following groups should be exterminated: Jews and
gypsies unconditionally, Poles who have to serve 3-4 years of penal
servitude, and Czechs and Germans who are sentenced to death or penal
servitude for life or to security custody [Sicherungsvorwahrung] for
life. The idea of exterminating them by labor is the best. For the rest
however, except in the aforementioned cases, every case has to be dealt
with individually. In this case, of course, Czechs and Germans have to
be differently judged. There may be cases where a German sentenced to
15 years of penal servitude is not to be considered asocial, but in
contrast to this a person sentenced to penal servitude up to 8 years
may be.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 686-PS
Copy to RK 26272 B
Decree of the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor to strengthen German
folkdom
Oct 7th 1939.
The consequences of the Versailles Treaty have been removed in Europe.
Now the Greater German Reich has the possibility of admitting into its
territory, Germans who had to live abroad, and to resettle them, and
to arrange the settlement of the groups of people, within her sphere
of interest, in a way that there will be better distinction between
them. I entrust the Reichsfuehrer SS with the execution of this task
according to the following regulations:
I
The Reichsfuehrer SS has the obligation in accordance with my
directives:
1. to bring back for final return into the Reich all German nationals
and racial Germans in the foreign countries;
2. to eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of the
population, which represent a danger to the Reich and German folk
community;
3. the forming of new German settlements by resettling and in
particular by settling of the returning German citizens and racial
Germans from abroad.
The Reichsfuehrer SS is authorized to take all necessary general and
administrative measures for the execution of this obligation.
The Reichsfuehrer SS can assign certain living areas to the parts of
the population in question in order to execute the tasks given to him
in Article I, No. 2.
II
In the occupied former Polish territories the Administration Chief of
the East [Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost] carries out the tasks assigned to
the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the latter's general orders. The
Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost and the subordinated chiefs of administration
of the military districts are responsible for the execution. Then
measures have to be adjusted to the requirements of the military
leadership.
Persons who are furnished special orders in execution of this task, are
not subject to military jurisdiction in that respect.
III
The tasks assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS, so far as the
reorganization of German farmers is concerned will be executed by the
Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture following the general
directives of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Otherwise the Reichsfuehrer SS will make use, within the territory
of the German Reich, for the execution of his task of the existing
authorities and institutions of the Reich, the states and the
communities as well as all other public institutions and the existing
settlement societies.
In case an agreement required by law and administrative organization
cannot be reached about a measure to be taken, between the
Reichsfuehrer SS and the competent higher Reichs-authority in the
operational territory of the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, my decision
has to be sought through the Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich
Chancellory.
IV
Negotiations with foreign governments and other authorities as well
as with racial Germans, as long as they are still abroad, will be
conducted in cooperation with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
[Reichsminister des Auswaertigen].
V
If land is required for the settlement within Germany of returning
German citizens and racial Germans the law on providing land for
purposes of the army of March 29th, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I page 467)
and its executive regulations will be applied to provide the necessary
land. The tasks of the Reich agency for providing land [Reichsstelle
fuer Landbeschaffung] will be taken over by the agency designated by
the Reichsfuehrer SS.
VI
The Reichsminister for Finance will provide the Reichsfuehrer SS with
the necessary means for the execution of the measures.
Berlin 7 October 1939
The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
signed: Adolf Hitler.
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers
for all Defenses of the Reich
signed: Goering
General Field Marshal
The Reich Minister and the Chief of the
Reich Chancellery
signed: Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
signed: Keitel.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 695-PS
SECRET
Copy
Berlin--Schoeneberg
Badensche Strasse 51, March 24, 1942
Armed forces high command
z 2f 24. 73 AWA/prisoners of war [general?] (Ia),
p. 389/428
Reference:
_a._ armed forces high command/prisoners of war No. 3058/41 g of
September 1941.
_b._ armed forces high command/prisoners of war No. 3624/41 g of
November 2, 1941.
1. Treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
The necessity of increased use of the labor of Soviet prisoners of
war necessitates a new regulation of their treatment. The statutes in
reference to this matter are repealed, and the following regulation is
in effect in the future for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war:
_A. Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War in General_
Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of National Socialist Germany. The
Soviet soldier must on principle be considered a carrier of Bolshevism.
Therefore it answers political necessity and the authority and dignity
of the German armed forces, for every German soldier to keep his
distance from the Soviet prisoners of war.
With cool and correct treatment, avoidance of violence and insults, and
protection from public curiosity, the work done by the Soviet prisoners
of war can be increased. It is forbidden to carry out retaliatory
measures against them.
On the other hand, any attempted fraternization is to be rejected.
Even the public must at all times be aware of the feeling of pride and
superiority of the German soldier detailed to guard Soviet prisoners of
war.
Ruthless and energetic action in cases of uncooperativeness, refusal to
work, and negligence in work, especially toward Bolshevist agitators,
is to be ordered; insubordination or active resistance must be
completely removed _immediately_ with a weapon (bayonet, gun-butt, or
firearm, no sticks). The decree concerning use of arms by the armed
forces is to be interpreted strictly. Whoever does not use his weapon
or does not use it energetically enough in seeing that an order is
carried out is liable to punishment (see [volume?] VI, 12). Notation:
also page 8).
2. _All traffic between the Soviet prisoners of war and the civilian
population is to be prevented._ Special attention is to be given to the
separation of the captured officers, which has in general already been
carried out by the field army, in the territory of the armed forces
commanders and in the Reich territory; especially since Soviet officers
for understandable reasons frequently pass themselves off as enlisted
men. Any communication between the Soviet officers and men, even by
signs, must be made impossible. (see [volume?] V).
3. A _camp police corps_ is to be formed within the camps and the
larger labor details of suitable Soviet prisoners of war. This police
corps will be appointed and supervised by commandants to keep order and
maintain discipline.
_B. Individual Instructions_
I. _Food and clothing_:
4. According to principle all prisoners of war receive equal treatment.
In regard to the feeding of Soviet prisoners of war, however, the rates
established in the armed forces high command statute Az. 62 f Va/AG V
III/V 3 (V d) of February 27, 1942, is in effect in the home war area.
If the food is prepared without loss of food value and if the
distribution times are sensibly spaced throughout the day, these
food rations are adequate to feed the prisoners of war. Points to
be especially considered in preparing food are contained in the
"Collection of orders No. 11".
Especially in winter, the food is to be served warm if possible and is
to be distributed as often as possible during the day. The contractors
should distribute warm food not only after work but also in pauses
in the work. The suitable feeding of the Soviet prisoners of war is
especially important, since their physical efficiency is low, partly
as a result of years of undernourishment, partly as a result of food
difficulties in the Soviet army and as a result of war events.
Since the prisoners of war recover more easily on individual fare
outside the camps than on mass feeding in the camps, it is recommended
that Soviet prisoners be put to work even if they are not yet
completely fit for work. Full achievement cannot, of course, be
expected in that case (compare army high command of 19 February 1942,
Az. 2f 24. 17 b prisoners of war Org. (III b) No. 678/42).
As far as possible, foreign _tobacco_ goods will be made available for
Soviet prisoners of war in the camps. German tobacco is not to be given
to Soviet prisoners of war.
The matter of _clothing_ was settled by decree army high command Az.
2f 24. 23a prisoners of war (II, 2) No. 5632/41 of 22 August 1941.
According to this, the clothing debit of the Soviets corresponds to
that of the other prisoners of war.
II. _Work_:
5. As a result of the general labor situation, the employment of
the Soviet prisoners of war, including officers, derives decisive
significance. In principle it is permitted everywhere, unless
there are objections for reasons of defense in individual cases.
(Compare enclosed statute Az. 2f 24. 17 b, chief of prisoners of war
[organization?] III b No. 1474/42 of 1 April 1942, and No. 1396/42 of 9
April 1942)
In general labor columns of at least 20 men are to be provided for. In
_industrial_ economy, however, it is permissible in cases of urgent
business necessity to use smaller labor details down to 5 men in
various departments of the * * * concern, even in "protected" concerns.
However, in such cases the employment of smaller groups requires the
special approval of the competent defense post and of the armament
command. A prerequisite is the presence of an adequate number of
reliable foremen who have been investigated in regard to defense as
"auxiliary guards".
The employment of officers requires the special approval of the army
high command in each case.
The responsibility for the orderly employment of the Soviet prisoners
of war in the Reich rests exclusively on the bureaus ordering their
employment:
_a._ Armed forces high command, chief of prisoners of war affairs;
_b._ Reich minister for armament and munitions;
_c._ General plenipotentiary for the labor supply in the four-year plan.
The borrowing of Soviet prisoners of war is regulated for the Reich
by statute Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II, 2) No. 6999/41 of 29
September 1941, and supplementary statutes:
Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II,2) No. 7645/41 of 23 October 1941
Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II,2) No. 8218/41 of 14 November 1941
Az. 2f 24. 27a prisoners of war (II,2) No. 9170/41 of 22 December 1941
Az. 2f 24. 17s prisoners of war (I,5) No. 8102/41 of 22 December 1941
Az. 2f 24. 17s prisoners of war [org.?] (III b) No. 512/42 of 18
February 1942
and for the territories of Ostland (Baltic countries and White Russia)
and the Ukraine by statute armed forces high command Az. 2f 24. 17s
prisoners of war [organization?]
(III b) No. 463/42 of 29 January 1942. For the rest of the eastern
territories and the Gouvernement General the following decrees are in
effect:
Army high command/general staff of the army/ general quarters/ IVa
(III,2) Az. 961/42 No. I/ 5784/42 of 12 January 1942
Army high command/ general staff of the army general quarters/ IVa
(III,2) Az. 961/42 No. I/ 5784/42 of 4 February 1942.
The employment and work of the Soviet prisoners of war are to be under
the strictest control. Strong measures are to be taken in any case of
refusal to work.
Poor or mediocre work not due to weak constitution, exhaustion,
physical condition, or a similar cause must immediately incur
appropriate punishment.
III. _Free time_:
6. Musical instruments can be obtained and distributed. Arts and crafts
in the sense of statute AZ. 2f 24. 72g prisoners of war Ch 2 No.
5671/41 of 9 August 1941 are to be encouraged.
They are not forbidden to organize religious services among themselves,
whether _by captured priests of the camp_ or by laymen. Spiritual
consolation for the dying as well as the presence of a captured priest
or lay-priest at burials are permitted. (see VIII).
It is forbidden to bring in members of the clergy who are not prisoners
of war. No religious writings may be distributed.
IV. _Treatment of minorities_:
7. Special orders are issued according to need regarding the majority
of the peoples among the Soviet prisoners of war; as far as such orders
have been issued, they remain fully in effect.
_For all members of the most important Soviet minorities_
_a._ The delivery of musical instruments (balalaika, etc.)
_b._ The supplying of well-heated rooms during the winter months;
_c._ The supplying of appropriate literature chosen in agreement with
armed forces high command/WFST/A Pr and armed forces high command/A
Qusl Abw/Abw are permitted. The camp funds which have been accumulated
by Soviet prisoners of war are available for necessary procurement.
The extent to which special food and a better tobacco supply are to be
granted is determined in special orders.
_d._ An available barracks room is if possible to be placed at the
disposal of the _Mohammedan_ prisoners of war, where half-hour prayer
sessions may be held several times a day.
_e._ In addition they are to be permitted to select a Mullah or Iman
(priest).
V. _Separation of prisoners of war and civilians of the Eastern
campaign_:
8. _Deserters_: The peculiar circumstances of the Eastern campaign in
many cases made it impossible to guarantee the special consideration in
captivity promised to deserters. The result of this fact on the Soviet
front has made itself felt in a most undesirable way, through Soviet
prisoners of war who have escaped and managed to reach their homes. The
German troops on the Eastern front have now been instructed, therefore,
to give every _deserter_ a certificate that he has surrendered
voluntarily and that special treatment in captivity was promised him.
For the most part, the deserters will be employed with the troops. When
they are sent to the armed forces commanders and to the Reich, however,
they are to retain their deserter certificates.
They are to be given preferential treatment in billeting in the camp,
in feeding, and in the assignment of work places. It is urgently
desired that they be kept together, segregated from the other Soviet
prisoners of war, in labor commands.
9. For the segregation of Soviet prisoners of war and the civilians
present in the camps, the following is in effect, besides the division
by nationalities in the prisoners of war camps, according to figure IV:
To be segregated:
_a._ Politically undesirable persons,
_b._ Officers,
_c._ Politically harmless persons,
_d._ Politically especially reliable persons (who can be used in the
reconstruction of the occupied territories).
10. While the first _separation_ according to figure 9 is undertaken,
as far as possible, by the camp organs themselves, the Reichsfuehrer
SS makes _special details of the security police and the security
service_ available to segregate the Soviet prisoners of war by their
political attitude. They are directly under the chief of the security
police and of the security service and have been especially trained for
their special task. They take their measures and make their inquiries
_before_ the Soviet prisoners of war are put to work within the
framework of the camp order, according to directives which they have
received from the chief of the security police and the security service.
The special details are instructed to work in the closest cooperation
with the commandants, and especially with their defense officers.
If the Soviet prisoners of war are put to work _without_ previous
examination in exceptional cases because of the necessity for hastened
commitment of labor the special details of the security police and
the security service will undertake the _segregation_ at the place of
the labor detail. The head of the labor detail and, if the occasion
arises, the contractor will be consulted before the segregation in
doubtful cases. The special details will then request of the prisoner
of war camps the surrender of those Soviet prisoners of war who are
then claimed. The approval of the chiefs of the security police and the
security service in Berlin is to be submitted to the camp commandants.
The request for surrender of the prisoners is then to be met.
Prisoners of war who are put to work after investigation are to be
constantly watched by the guards in regard to their sentiments. If in
time a Soviet prisoner of war proves himself to be unreliable, he is
first to be turned over to the prisoner of war camp which will take
care of turning him in to the security service if the occasion arises.
If on the basis of the decree armed forces high command Az. 2f 24.
17b prisoners of war [organisation?] (II b) No. 678/42 of 19 February
1942, Soviet prisoners of war who are not fully capable of working
are given special fare in order that they may gradually be made fully
capable of working, the contractor is to receive full compensation if
for political reasons it becomes necessary to turn them over to the
security service.
11. _Further treatment of the groups segregated under figure 9_:
_a. Military personnel_: Military personnel includes those soldiers
who were captured in civilian clothes. Concerning those segregated as
"politically undesirable elements" (see figure 9).
_Officers_ will not always but sometimes be subject to segregation as
"politically undesirable persons".
Should individuals first considered undesirable later prove to be
_trustworthy_, they will, as far as they had already been turned over,
be transferred to the labor details assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS or
to the nearest prisoner of war camp or officers camp.
_b. Civilians_: Concerning undesirable persons see figure 10. As far as
they are not politically dangerous, their prompt return to the occupied
territory is to be desired, except insofar as they do not volunteer
for further work in Germany as civilian workers. The competent armed
forces commander (or the commander of the army rear area) with the
approval of the competent bureau of the chiefs of the security police
and the security service, determines the time for possible return.
A prerequisite for return is a guarantee of work at home in labor
formations which are to be specially set up. The armed forces commander
(or the commander of the army rear area) is responsible for guarding
during the return journey. If possible the command posts are to supply
escort details.
_c. Politically especially reliable persons_ (_see 9d_) are to be
used for the segregation of politically undesirables and for work in
the camp administration. (Racial Germans are especially pointed out;
however, one must figure, that even among them there are elements, who
must be considered "politically undesirable".)
Since the Reichsfuehrer SS for his own purposes must rely in the
occupied territories on the conscription of natives, the conscription
command will request from the ranks of the Soviet prisoners of war
especially trustworthy persons for use and reconstruction in the
occupied territory. Such requests for release by the conscription
command of the security police and the SD are to be reported to the
supreme command armed forces.
VI. _Procedure in case of escapes or punishable acts_:
12. Escaping Soviet prisoners of war are to be shot immediately
_without previous warning_. Proclamation on the bulletin board and
during roll call is necessary. Contrary directives of H Dv 38/11, Page
13, etc., are rescinded thus far.
No warning shots are to be fired. On the other hand, arbitrary use of
firearms is forbidden. If a Soviet prisoner of war is shot by a guard,
for the purpose of keeping up discipline and to prevent unjustified
shooting, in every case a short description of the happening is to be
presented to the camp commandant with the following details:
_a._ Whether anything is to be done.
_b._ Whether action appears necessary for disciplinary reasons.
_c._ Whether a report of the facts will be submitted.
13. The following order, published in the armed forces regulation,
remains in force:
It is the duty of all soldiers to watch for every unguarded Soviet
prisoner of war, to arrest him, and to deliver him to the nearest
police station. If a prisoner of war camp is in the immediate vicinity,
the prisoner of war is to be delivered there.
OKW Az 2f 24. 19m AWA/prisoner of war (I, 6) of 29 Oct 1941.
Civilians, as well as prisoners of war of other nations, who return
escaping Soviet prisoners of war may be rewarded.
Compare:
OKW AZ 2f 24.20 PWs (II) No 4493/40 of 11 Dec. 40
OKW Az 2f 24.20a PWs (112) No 3572/41 of 26 May 41
OKW Az 2f 24.20a PWs (112) No. 8162/41 of 12 Nov 41
14. The recaptured Soviet prisoners of war, even if they were delivered
to police stations, must be turned over by them to the nearest prisoner
of war camp. Considering the danger of spotted fever, isolation is
necessary.
The camp commandant must find out in every individual case the cause
for escape. If the reason for the escape is only the longing for his
family or hunger, and if the PW has not committed any crimes during his
flight, then he is to be disciplined by the camp commandant and to be
returned to work.
15. If a Soviet prisoner of war commits in camp on another prisoner
of war murder, manslaughter or another crime, for which there is no
punitive regulation in the German criminal code, which however demands
the most severe punishment (for instance cannibalism, to bring about
incapability to work by self-mutilation), then the criminal is to be
turned over to the secret state police [Gestapo]. Also in the case of
other crimes by a Soviet prisoner of war (for instance during flight),
the camp commandant must turn over the criminal to the secret state
police unless he is convinced a disciplinary measure or the judicial
punishment which is to be expected after interview with the judge of
the competent army court is sufficient to retain the discipline of the
camp. Punishment for disobedience is only possible if the prisoner of
war disobeys a _distinct_ order, given to _him_ and understood by _him_.
16. In the case of every transfer to the secret state police the
prisoner of war is to be discharged from captivity, and the transfer is
to be reported to the armed forces information bureau if a registration
has already taken place.
VII. _Funerals_:
The following shall apply to funerals of deceased prisoners of war:
1. Funerals are to take place unobtrusively and in a simple manner.
Treatment in the press radio or motion pictures is prohibited.
2. A German military delegation will not be provided. Participation
by comrades of the deceased, who belong to the same prisoner of war
enclosure is permitted. Civilians may not participate.
3. Gun salute will not be given.
4. Wreaths of Soviet prisoners, may, if allowed, only carry black or
white ribbons; no wreath may be deposited by Germans.
5. Clergymen or their helpers may participate if they belong to the
camp itself; in the case of Mohammedans, religious servants may be
brought in if it is possible without special effort.
6. Coffins are prescribed; however each corpse (without clothes, if
those are still in any way usable) is to be wrapped in strong paper or
otherwise appropriate material.
In the mass graves, the corpses are to be placed next to each other
at a depth of the grave, usual at the locality, and they are to be
equipped with an identification tag as always, so that it can be
determined later on, with the aid of a card file, which corpses are
concerned.
7. In cemeteries, the graves are to be kept separate or at a proper
distance from other graves; in camp cemeteries, the sequence of graves
of other prisoners of war may not be disturbed.
8. If it is possible with special effort, cremation is permitted.
In this case also, the camp must keep lists. However, corpses of
Mohammedans must be interred in any case, and with the head facing
East, the face South.
9. On the "Interment of corpses of Soviet prisoners of war by the
communities", the decree IV e 10363/41, 3991 of 27 Oct 41 has been
forwarded to them by the Reichsminister of the Interior.
10. The regulation, OKW Az. 29k AWA/W Allg. (II) No. 4470/41 of 29 July
41 on "Funerals for enemy military personnel, deceased or killed in
action," will be synchronized in section D with the above regulation.
_Distribution_:
Armed Forces Command: I (21), II (21), III (22), IV (40), V (23), VI
(26), VII (16), VIII (31), IX (25), X (17), XI (13), XIII (15), XII
(18), XVII (13), XX (12), XXI (19),
with additional copies for:
officer prisoner of war camps
Base prisoner of war camps
Interment camps
Prisoner of war construction and work battalions
Reserve hospitals (Prisoner of War)
A S T E N (Branches?)
Service command doctors
Service command chaplains 345
Service Command administration with additional
copies for the finance officers 34
Reichsminister for air and Airforce Supreme
Commander/ LWEHR E with additional copies 40
Naval Supreme Command/N WEHR I with additional
copies. For camp navy stations and finance
officers 4
Armed forces commander OSTLAND, RIGA 1
Commander of prisoner of war with
the armed forces commander Ukraine, ROWNO 1
Military commander of the Government
General with 1 additional copy for each
the chief quartermaster and the administration 4
Commander of prisoners of war in the
Government General, Lublin 1
Armed forces commander, Norway Headquarters
OSLO 1
Armed Forces Commander Norway
Headquarters Finland 1
_By communications_:
Foreign office 1
Reichsminister for occupied Eastern territories 1
Inspector General for German roads 1
Inspector General for the Reich Capital 1
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German police 1
SS Regulations administration in the SS High
Command Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Kaiserallee 188 1
Plenipotentiary general for labor
allocation in the Four Year Plan 1
Reichsminister for labor 1
Reichsminister for nutrition and agriculture 1
Reichsministry for Economy 1
Reichsministry for Interior 1
Reichsminister for church affairs, Berlin W 8,
Leipziger Str. 3 1
The German General with the High Command of
the Rumanian armed forces 3
Army high Command/ General Staff of the army/
Quartermaster General 1
Army administrator 1
Chief of the Army armament and Commander of
the replacement army/VA
(V I, V 9) 3
(V II, V 6) 1
(V, II, V 2) 1
For Army:
officers (VII, V 10) 5
forestry (VII, V 3) 1
(V IV, V 4) 1
(V IV, V 7) 1
AHA/Staff 1
/AgEH/ Gr S 1
/Clothing 1
/S In 1
OKW/WFST/ Deputy Chief WFST 1
/Foreign 1
/C I II 1
/C I III 1
OKW/WR 1
/AWA/20 V Chief OKW 1
/Inspect of Prisoners of war 1
/T 1
/W Allg. 1
V A. OKW/Prisoners of War Major von Rosenberg,
Paris 1
AWA/Prisoner of War Organisation 1
Ing. course Base camps II D Stargar 1
Reserve 68
------
= 550
New Reserve (copies) 300
------
850
By order of the Chief,
Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW)
/s/ REINECKE
[Rubber stamp]: Certified v. Graevenitz Generalmajor
[in ink]
Certifying above copy
Koerner (?)
Captain
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 699-PS
Berlin W 8, August 25 39
Unter den Linden 13
Reich Minister Walter Funk
MY FUEHRER!
Let me thank you sincerely from the bottom of my heart for the good
wishes you sent me for my birthday in such a friendly and kind manner.
How happy and thankful we have to be to you that we are allowed to
see these overwhelmingly great and world-shaking times and be able to
cooperate in the mighty events of these days.
The information transmitted to me by Field Marshal Goering that you, my
Fuehrer, have in principal approved last night the measures prepared
by me for the financing of the war and for the shaping of wage and
price conditions, and of the carrying out of an emergency sacrifice
has made me extremely happy. Herewith I report most obediently that by
the careful forethought of the last few months I succeeded in making
the German Reichsbank so strong internally, so unassailable from the
outside, that even the heaviest shocks of the international finance
and credit system cannot touch us in any way. Meanwhile, I have quite
inconspicuously transferred into gold all assets in any way available
of the Reich Bank and the whole Germany economy abroad. Through the
suggestions I have worked out to keep down ruthlessly any non-vital
consumption and any public expenses and tasks of no importance to the
war. We will be in a position to satisfy all demands to be made on the
finances and economy without any serious shocks.
As the plenipotentiary general for economical affairs, called upon
by you, my Fuehrer, I thought it my duty in this hour to submit this
report and this vow.
Heil my Fuehrer
WALTHER FUNK
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 701-PS
The Reich Minister of Justice 4410 b-Vs 1 379/43 g
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstrasse 65 1 April 1943
Telephone 11 00 44
Long Distance 11 65 16
To The Public Prosecutors of the Courts of Appeal,
To the Commissioner of the Reich Minister of Justice for the penal
camps in Emsland.
_PAPENBURG_ (_Ems_)
Regarding: Poles and Jews who are released from the penal institutions
of the Department of Justice.
Instructions for the independent penal institutions.
1. With reference to the new guiding principles for the application
of Article 1, Section _2_ of the decree of 11 June 1940 (Reich Legal
Gazette I S. 877)--attachment I of the decree (RV) of 27 January
1943--9133/2 enclosure I-III a_2_ 2629--the Reich Chief Security Office
has directed by the decree of 11 March 1943--II A 2 number 100/43--176:
_a._ Jews, who in accordance with number VI of the guiding principles,
are released from a penal institution, are to be taken by the
State Police (Chief) Office competent for the district in which
the penal institution is located, for the rest of their lives to
the concentration camps Auschwitz or Lublin in accordance with the
regulations for protective custody that have been issued.
The same applies to Jews who in the future are released from a penal
institution after serving a sentence of confinement.
_b._ Poles, who in accordance with number VI of the guiding principles
are released from a penal institution, are to be taken by the State
Police (Chief) Office competent for the district in which the penal
institution is located, for the duration of the war to a concentration
camp in accordance with the regulations on protective custody that have
been issued.
The same applies in the future to Poles who, after serving a term of
imprisonment of more than 6 months, are to be discharged by a penal
institution.
Conforming to the request of the Chief Office for Reich Security, I ask
that in the future,
_a._ All Jews to be discharged,
_b._ All Poles to be discharged,
Who have served a sentence of more than 6 months be designated for
further confinement to the State Police (Chief) Office competent for
the district and are to be placed promptly at its disposal, before the
end of sentence for conveyance.
2. This ruling replaces the hitherto ordered return of all Polish
prisoners undergoing imprisonment in the Old Reich condemned in annexed
Eastern territories. The decree (RV) of 28 July 1942--4410 _b_ Vs _1_
1731--has lost its meaning. Imprisonment up to 6 months imposed within
the incorporated Eastern territories, excluding exceptions, is to be
carried out in these territories, and not in the Old Reich.
By order of
Dr. Eichler
[Stamp: Reichministry of Justice, Office of the Ministry]
Certified:
[signed] Freyer
Clerk of Justice
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 705-PS
The Reichsfuehrer SS Berlin-Grunewald 1. Feb 1943
SS Hauptamt, Office VI Hagenstrasse 45
VI/1--Ni--
VS--Tagbuch No 704/43 geh.
VI-Tagbuch No 214/43 geh.
SECRET
[Stamped:]
000579 * 5 Feb 1943
Akt Z . . . G/S/23
To SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers
Ahnenerbe Office
Berlin--Dahlem
Puecklerstr 16
By order of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg, Office VI--German
Leitstelle--sends in the enclosed the minutes of the conference on the
12 Jan 1943 of the SS-Committee for General Labor in the German zone,
with a request for acknowledgement.
By direction
BERGER [?]
(SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer)
* * * * *
The Reichsfuehrer-SS Bln-Wilmersdorf 1, 20 Jan 1943
SS-Hauptamt, Office VI Hohenzollerndamm 31
VI/1--Dr. Schm/Ni.--
VS--Tgb Nr 704/43 geh.
VI--Tgb Nr 214/43 geh.
SECRET
Minutes of the conference on the 12 Jan 1943 at 1200 of the
SS-Committee for General Labor in the German zone, took place at the
SS-Hauptamt
The following participated in the conference:
1. SS-Brigadefuehrer SS-Fuehrungshauptamt, Kommando
Bauer Allgemeine-SS.
2. SS-Oberfuehrer Kommandeur der SS-Mannschaftshaeuser
Ellersieck
3. SS-Standartenfuehrer SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs-hauptamt
Loerner
4. SS-Standartenfuehrer Fuersorge- u. Versorgungsamt
Schmidt Ausland
5. SS-Standartenfuehrer
Sievers Amt Ahnenerbe
6. SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
Dr Riedweg SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI
7. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
Dr Stier Stabshauptamt of the Reich
Commissioner for the consolidation
of the German nationality
8. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
Paulus SS-Personal-Hauptamt
9. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer
Dr Tesch Amt Lebensborn
10. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer
Dr Sichelschmidt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
11. SS-Obersturmfuehrer
Harderer Race and Settlement Hauptamt
12. SS-Obersturmfuehrer
Dr Schneider Amt Ahnenerbe
13. SS-Obersturmfuehrer
Dr Schmidt SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI
14. SS-Obersturmfuehrer
Ulrich SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI
As introduction SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg delivered a report
on conditions in the German territories.
During the period covered by the report, hostile circles in the German
territories have made themselves more actively noticeable. Various
measures have had an aggravating effect on the political developments,
primarily the compulsory labor and service conscription in Flanders and
the Netherlands.
The development of the conscription situation makes it necessary to
have larger procurement programs organized even in Germanic regions.
All Germans--with the exception of the Flemish--are collected in one
German association. The Flemish remain in the "Langemarck" regiment.
Meanwhile, the "Prinz Eugen" division has been transferred to Croatia.
Furthermore a Croatian legion is to be activated here, which is to be
under the command of SS-Gruppenfuehrer Phleps.
Of great importance is the fact that the Fuehrer has assented to the
activation of an SS-Standart of French volunteers, which is to be
called the "Karl der Grosse" standart.
_Norway_: Meanwhile in Norway Minister Fuglesang has succeeded the
late Minister Lunde after the latter's unfortunate demise. In spite
of promises made by the Quisling Party, one cannot count on Norway
supplying a contingent of appreciable size.
_Denmark_: In Denmark the situation is especially favorable since
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr Best has taken over the control. One can be sure
that here SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr Best will offer a good example of
national Reich politics.
The situation in regard to Parteifuehrer Clausen has had unfavorable
developments recently. Clausen agreed to the plan of activating a
combat corps as introduction to the German Schutzstaffel in Denmark
only on the supposition that membership in this corps would exclude
membership in the Party. Negotiations for this very necessary
collecting organization of the combat corps go on apace. The
monopolistic position of the Party is not tenable; all recruits must be
brought in, even if Clausen himself--however without his clique--is to
stand in the foreground.
_Netherlands_: Meanwhile Reich Commissioner Dr. Seyss-Inquart has
proclaimed Mussert leader of the Netherland people. This measure has
had an extremely disturbing effect on the other Germanic countries,
especially in Flanders. The decisive role devolves again on the General
Commissariat, whose principle of using Mussert too much, in order to
disregard him, must be rejected on the part of German Reich policy in
the sense of the Schutzstaffel.
_Flanders_: In Flanders the recent developments of the VNV have
become even more unfavorable. Even the very clever policy of the new
VNV-leader, Dr Elias, has been a disappointment; Dr Elias, moreover,
once stated the opinion that Germany was ready for concessions in the
natural political sphere, only when matters were going very badly for
her.
Recently the Walloon question has been particularly accentuated. Leon
Degrelle, who was a lieutenant in the Walloon Legion and earned there
the Iron Cross First Class, is at present in Belgium and uses this
time in testing the political barometer in all quarters. Degrelle's
intention of founding a Wallonian Allgemeine SS has been rejected.
Judging by the connection between religion and politics, it appears in
Degrelle's case that he is a Frenchman in his thinking.
A favorable development has occurred in the case of the Flemish
Arbeitsdienst. The negotiations carried out by the Reichsarbeitsfuehrer
and especially by Oberstarbeitsfuehrer Mueller-Brandenburg with the
assent of the Reichsfuehrer SS have had as a result that on the 1 April
1943 labor duty becomes obligatory in Belgium, both in the Flemish and
Wallonian sectors. To bridge the gap students and apprentice officials
were inducted into the Labor Service on the 15 Jan 43.
_Finland_: In Finland Field Marshal Mannerheim has been proposed as
successor to the national presidency.
In correspondence with General Talvela particular discretion is
suggested.
Just now wounded Finns (Officers, NCO's, men and Lottas) are in Germany
as guests of the Reichsfuehrer-SS. This caring for the wounded has
proved itself quite essential.
_Southeast_: Meanwhile in the southwest all volunteers from the Germans
residing outside the Reich have been assigned to the SS.
In Hungary, as has been previously stated, there are difficulties in
regard to the procuring of the necessary bills of exchange for the
maintenance of the families of inducted volunteers. The suggestions of
the Hungarian government are always only patch-work.
In general a strong violence manifests itself in the southeast as
a consequence of the general military situation, and doubtless one
must count on the existence of a certain sympathy with hostile powers
through the Vatican.
After the order of the 12 August 42 by Reichsleiter Bormann regarding
the competence of the Reichsfuehrer-SS in all German matters and
the strict supervision of all Party units had been issued, a similar
decree was prepared by Reich Minister Dr Lammers for the sphere of the
State, which is soon to be issued. The new formulation demands even
in sectors of the state the right of the Reichsfuehrer SS to a joint
stipulation in fundamental national questions, that is to say, the
Reich commissioners are to consult with the Reichsfuehrer SS in all
actually fundamental questions regarding the nation.
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg reports again on questions of
terminology which had been mentioned in the internal labor conference
of the German Leitstelle in Copenhagen. Principally this terminology
concerns the conceptions "Reich", "Nation", "Volk" and "Stamm", as well
as "nordisch" and "germanisch".
In agreement with the Ahnenerbe office it was determined that the
concept "Reich" is to remain reserved for the whole Reich of all German
races and people. For Germany the official expression "Deutsches Reich"
is to be used.
"Nation", being a concept stamped predominantly by liberalism, is no
longer to be applied to the German peoples.
Difficulties arise also in differentiating between the concept "Stamm"
and "Volk". The expression "Volk" is whenever possible to include the
whole German area.
The word "Stamm", where it applies, is to be used for countries.
In regard to the definition of the term "nordisch" and "germanisch",
the first expression must be used less and less. With the expression
"nordisch", too high a position has been granted Norway, Sweden and
Denmark at the expense of the west Germans.
SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers of the Ahnenerbe office states again the
importance of the December conference of Office VI and reports on the
conference of the scientific committee, which has been concluded there.
A conference on the German historical work took place in the RSHA.
SS-Standartenfuehrer Loerner reports on an inventory of finances and
affirms that a new agreement has been reached between the Reichs
Treasurer and the Economic Administrative Office.
SS-Standartenfuehrer Schmidt still wishes a condensation of the
bureaus on Flanders for the simplification of the work, in particular
shifting the Antwerp bureau to Brussels. In addition he reports on the
continuous difficulties in the work of family maintenance especially in
Hungary.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 707-PS
SECRET!
The Fuehrer of the Reich
Head of the main office
VS-diary, number 507/44 secret
CdSSHA/Be/We. Adjtr-diary, number 253/44 secret
Please by way of reply give reference and date indicated above
Berlin--Wilmersdorf 1, Hohenzollerndamm 31
Post office box 58
now: Berlin-Grunewald, 8 February 1944
Douglasstrasse, 7/11
001518 Feb. 14, 1944
Document Z G. IR 131
To the "Ancestral Heritage" leader of the SS Sievers
Waischenfeld, Oberfranken
Dear comrade Sievers!
Enclosed herewith I transmit to you the attitude of the main leader
of the SS group Jankuhn in regard to the evacuation of the museum of
Charkow.
I have looked over the report hurriedly, I have not read it. It is
superfluous to discuss it.
Heil Hitler
W.G. Buegel
SS leader
[Pencil note:]
It is a cheap method to do away with my report, which is supported
by facts, by referring to matters that are not dealt with in the
report because these matters do not pertain to the functions of the
Sonderkommando Jahnkuhn, and were not within Jahnkuhn's jurisdiction.
Transport space and transport facilities were not supplied by the
Waffen SS but by the German Reich-Railroad. This opportunity was
available to the opposing side, but was not utilized by them.
* * * * *
SECRET
The Ancestor's Heritage
The Secretary for the Reich Organization
[Der Reichsgeschaeftsfuehrer]
Berlin-Dahlem, 30 Oct 42
Diary # G/h/7 Wo/Bg
To Dozent Dr. Franz Hancar!
Wien III/40, Hiessgasse 4
_Subject_: Commitment in Russia [Russland-Einsatz]
Dear Dr Hancar!
In order to secure the possessions of important museums and discoveries
in the combat zone in the East, the Reichsfuehrer SS has ordered the
creation of a special unit under Captain of the SS, Professor Dr.
Herbert Jankuhn which has been operating together with an SS division
very successfully for quite some time.
In the course of the execution of the order, the collections from
Maikop, Pjatigorsk and Woroschilowsk have already been secured, besides
other important scientific collections from the four important museums
in Northern Caucasia. Work may already be done in these museums, and
Professor Dr. Jankuhn proposes to set up a complete registration, by
way of drawings and photography, of all prehistoric findings.
I am following a suggestion of Professor Dr. Herbert Jankuhn in
asking you whether you would be willing to take over this job, mainly
regarding Eastern European prehistoric problems, which ought to be of
particular interest to you. In case you would accept, I would like you
to let me know when you could start working, and what should have to be
done in order to secure your leave.
SS-Captain Professor Dr. Herbert Jankuhn shall return to Germany by
the beginning of December. Therefore it will be possible without
difficulties to discuss then all pertinent questions during a personal
meeting.
Heil Hitler!
signed: Sievers
Lt Col of the SS
* * * * *
Leader of the Staff
Entered Jan. 20, 1944/185
Berlin, Jan. 14, 1944
H.A. II-Dr. Z/Do.
File note for the Leader of the Staff.
Subject: Reply with regard to the letters of the captain in the SS
Jankuhn to the Personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS Office for
the Ancestral Heritage, dates August 12, 13, and 22, 1943, respecting
the evacuation and destruction of the Charkow Museum.
The criticism, which the captain in the SS delivers against the Special
Purpose Staff for very evident reasons, can readily be answered,
because he states things without any closer investigation, that should
disparage the work of the Special Purpose Staff and the Office devoted
to pre- and early historic research, because this latter work is
apparently inconvenient to him.
In his letter of 13 August 1943, J. had forgotten to mention that the
captain who had rebuilt the museum for prehistoric art was in fact a
deputy of the Special Purpose Staff, namely, First Lieutenant Mueller,
who by means of truly untiring and objective work during his free time
had set up the museum to such an extent that it could again be opened
to the public. The museum was visited by numerous officers and men,
also by units of the Armed SS and the police. A thorough inventory had
been taken, also many photographic copies were on hand. Thus First
Lieutenant Mueller had performed a gratifying task in time of war which
was generally recognized by the leaders of the units stationed in
Charkow. The report of Jankuhn does not make any reference at all to
this work of the Special Purpose Staff.
On 6 February 1943, the command was given for the first evacuation of
the city. The Special Purpose Staff had then through untiring effort
brought out the most valuable prizes of the museum; on 9 February
it was necessary for the last members of the office to leave the
city, which already had been almost abandoned by German troops. It
was impossible at that time to bring out all the material, because
the transportation situation did not permit this. It was not really
necessary for SS leader Jahnkuhn to point out that these objects were
important and worthy of being brought to safety. On the other hand,
however, one must also consider the transportation problems that
arise at the time of the evacuation of a city. It is evident that at
such a time military transports receive unqualified priority, that
even the most valuable possessions of culture cannot take precedence
over them. Yet the Special Purpose Staff was able to salvage the most
important articles of the museum. The remainder was entrusted to the
care of the former curator of the museum, Professor Rudenski. Of this
balance, again the most valuable was walled up within the enclosures of
a bomb-proof cellar. For several days Professor Rudenski succeeded in
saving the building from being blown up as intended. Finally, however,
on the evening of February 14, 1943, as related by Professor Rudenski,
by an oversight of a command of the Waffen SS, a fire broke out in
the building and it burned down to the ground. Yet, later on, a large
portion of the valuables from the cellar was salvaged again. However,
a Gothic sword was missing. Now, as alleged by Jankuhn, it turns out
that this sword was preserved by a unit of the Waffen SS.
Captain of the SS J. could have easily learned of these facts, if he
had taken the trouble to contact the competent labor group Ukraine of
the Special Purpose Staff and not Prof. Hornung, who had been installed
in an entirely different district and who knew nothing about the
developments in Charkow. At least he would not have exposed himself to
the charge that he frivolously and without closer examination of the
circumstances had claimed "that the Special Purpose Staff had not done
the least for the preservation of the things that were found." The
contrary is true.
After the recapture of the city, the valuables were reclaimed from the
wreckage and the museum was opened again to the public on July 19,
1943. Thus it was proved anew that the Special Purpose Staff had done
everything in the way of securing possessions of great cultural value
and preserving them in the interests of the German administration.
Unfortunately, the second loss of Charkow in August 1943 rendered
the work of restoration null and void. On August 6 the working staff
received an evacuation summons with the order to leave Charkow
immediately and without delay. Conditions affecting transportation were
the same as in spring. If, indeed, valuable military installations had
to remain behind, it is clear that, above all, objects from a museum
had to remain behind. If the SS command had trucks at its disposal
and could use the transportation facilities without consideration of
military needs for the objects of the museum, then this is certainly
a matter of very great appreciation. On the other hand, however, it
cannot be charged to the Special Purpose Staff that it did not possess
adequate transportation facilities. Nevertheless, the co-workers of the
working staff have done what they could in order to preserve the most
important part of the picture collection. In two days, already under
hostile action, a large portion of museum collections was examined for
the purpose of qualifying for transportation and then the selected
assortment of 300 pictures of Western-European masters and Ukrainian
painters and twenty-five costly Ukrainian carpets was packed and
shipped. As already at an earlier date the most important collections
of the museum, dealing with prehistoric art, had been carried off, the
special command Jankuhn could only preserve third and fourth grade
pieces of which several could be found in Kiev and other places.
The Special Purpose Staff under these circumstances sees no occasion
for making any reproaches against the Special Command Jankuhn. If
one was able to have at one's disposal transportation facilities and
manpower in a more liberal manner, then it was easy to carry off
larger collections. That the Special Command J. had done this is
gratefully acknowledged by the Special Purpose Command; since it is
being taken for granted that the collection was saved for the owner,
namely, the Reichminister of the occupied Eastern districts and that
correspondingly it is handed over to the Special Purpose Staff as
the deputy of civil affairs. The Special Purpose Staff asks for the
necessary action.
The staff command cannot rid itself of the impression that the Captain
in the SS Jankuhn submitted his report frivolously on the basis of
one-sided information. If he had made inquiries at the proper places
without doubt he would have arrived at a different conclusion. At this
juncture it is necessary to take a firm stand for the protection of the
co-workers of the Special Purpose Staff and to ward off strongly every
attack of a bureau that does not clearly understand the conditions.
Moreover, it could have been expected that Captain in the SS J.
would have used the opportunity to get acquainted with the bureaus
of the Special Purpose Staff and effected some cooperation. With the
cooperation of both certainly more material could have been salvaged
than had been done regardless (of the handicaps).
signed: Utikal
* * * * *
SS "Ancestral Heritage"
_Research Organization_
Waischenfeld/Oberfranken, October 6, 1943
To the Chief of the SS Central Bureau
SS Leader Berger, Berlin
Dear SS Leader!
Already on July * * * of this year the need arose to inform you about
frictions that developed between co-workers of the SS "Ancestral
Heritage" Research Organization and the Special Purpose Staff R.R. in
Dnjepropetrowsk. In this connection I did not neglect to mention that
Reichminister Rosenberg complained that we had removed prehistoric
discoveries from the Caukasus.
In order to complete the picture, I am turning over to you as
supplement two reports from Captain in the SS (F) Jankuhn. They refer
to the Museum in Charkow and they reveal with full clarity that the
men of the Special Purpose Staff R.R.--insofar as we have met them
heretofore--lack the simple prerequisites for the work in the East,
namely, an unobjectionable, manly behavior.
I am summarizing the two reports and, briefly, I am able to conclude:
1. When the evacuation of Charkow became necessary in the winter of
1942, the Special Purpose Staff R.R. left the city without having done
anything for the salvage of the museum.
2. On August 8, 1943 it became known that the possibility of a
surrender of Charkow existed. On August 11 at nine in the morning the
last man of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. left Charkow. Before August
15 no one considered any evacuation possible. In reality, Charkow was
not evacuated until August 24. Not the least had been done for the
salvaging of the collections of the museum, even though the care for
the museum is in the hands of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. There were
even documents on the desks, which leads one to believe that the men
concerned abandoned their work as quickly as possible. Captain in the
SS Jankuhn thereupon packed up the treasures and ordered them to be
shipped.
This behavior of the men of the Special Service Staff R.R. could
obviously be described by the most appropriate terms, and we are not at
all surprised, if just these people "take a shot at" the men of the SS
Reichsfuehrer, who really do nothing but fulfill the duties neglected
by the former.
Heil Hitler!
SS Leader
* * * * *
Copy
To the personal staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Command Post Division
Std., September 25, 1943
Concerning the evacuation of the museum of Poltawa
When it became known that the evacuation of the city of Poltawa by
September 21, 1943, was anticipated, I intended to examine personally
the condition of the museum there and to order the necessary measures
for preserving them, should the need arise.
Since the 03 of the division, SS Leader Daltweiler, had learned during
a stay in P. that the salvaging of the museum through a specialist
officer of the armed forces on the basis of a command from the O.B.,
already had begun, a trip to Poltawa was abandoned.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: H. Jankuhn
Captain in the SS (F)
For the correctness of this copy:
SS Leader
* * * * *
Copy III
Special Command, Fp. 16284
Command Post Division, Std., August 22, 1943
To the personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Regarding the destruction of the museum in Charkow.
On August 21, upon my suggestion, Sergeant in the SS, Dr. Zarp, from
KB unit 5, visited the museum in Charkow. He found that the museum
building had been burned down completely.
Since the more valuable pieces had been salvaged--as was pointed out in
the report of December 8, 1943--no loss of more important objects of
culture was sustained through the destruction of the museum.
Signed: H. Jankuhn
Captain in the SS
For the correctness of this copy
SS Leader
* * * * *
Copy I
Special Command Jankuhn, 16284
Command Post Division, Std., August 13, 1943
To the personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Regarding the destruction of the museum in Charkow in the spring of
1943.
Through the interrogation of Prof. Hornung, the curator of the museum
in Dnjipropetrowsk, chosen by the Special Purpose Staff and on the
basis of information that was supplied by the commander of the F.K.V.
of the secret police and of the security service, the following could
be brought to light concerning the fate of the museum of prehistoric
art in Charkow in the spring of 1943.
In 1941/42 the museum of prehistoric art in Charkow was re-established
anew in the main street of the city, the Sumskaja, by a captain, who
for this purpose had been given a furlough. The exhibition is said to
have been good and well arranged. Besides collections of prehistoric
character there were to be found in the museum articles referring to
folklore. When, during the winter campaigns of the months of February
and March, the Special Service Staff R.R. left the city without having
done the least for the saving of the collections. Merely a Gothic sword
and a gold-plated handle are said to have been taken along by one SS
unit. Since the salvaging of the piece was not effected through the
Security Service Command in Charkow, it must be assumed that a unit of
the II SS armored corps took this gorgeous weapon along.
After the retreat of the German troops, the museum was destroyed,
apparently by explosion of fire. The Ukrainian collections stored there
were destroyed almost completely.
Recent excavations undertaken in the ruins of the building have yielded
only insignificant pieces of the material formerly stored there.
Thus one of the most important museums of Russia with collections of
great cultural value was given over to destruction through the agencies
of the German civil administration.
Signed: Jankuhn
Captain in the SS
For the correctness of this copy
SS Leader
* * * * *
IIa
Exhibit i
To the report of 12 August 1943
This Institute of Culture is confiscated by the Charkow garrison!
It is secured for the Special Command R.R. and is placed under its
professional supervision.
Outside of the rules for visit and use, it is forbidden to enter the
institute, the taking of material is considered looting and will be
punished as such.
Special permits through the Special Command R.R. Charkow, Sumskaja 48.
In the field, June 20, 1943
For the Commander of the garrison
O.K.V.Rat
[Handwritten draft]
Copy 5 times
Special Command Jankuhn 16284 II
Command Post Division, August 12, 1943
* * * * *
SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
034482 x-Oct. 9, 1943, Copy Z B/4r/r22
To the personal Staff of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
Office of the SS "Ancestral Heritage" Research Organization, Berlin
Subject: Evacuation of the museum in Charkow.
On August 8, '43 in the evening it became known that the possibility
of an evacuation of Charkow until August 14 existed. On August 10,
1943, I went in the company of an interpreter, SS Sergeant Jacobsen to
Charkow. In the afternoon I reported to the commander of the D.K._V_.
of the SIPO and the SD, Major Krauebitter, and informed him that I
was entrusted by the Reichfuehrer SS with the salvage of the museum
in the field of operations of the Waffen SS on the Southern front.
In this connection I learned of the fate of the museum in Charkow
during the evacuation of Charkow in the beginning of 1943; a separate
report on that subject is being prepared. At the same time Major
Krauebitter informed me that the KVR with the garrison of Charkow, who
was responsible for the museums had already left the city days ago. A
further inquiry in the buildings of the bureau of the Special Purpose
Staff R.R. revealed that this bureau already had left Charkow on the
morning of August 10. A survey of the museum in the company of Major
Krauebitter revealed the following picture:
The Museum contains a small prehistoric department after the really
prehistoric museum had been destroyed in the winter after failure of
evacuation. Moreover, it contained a good collection of Ukrainian
art of folklore character, small objects of ecclesiastical art,
particularly, however, mostly paintings of Ukrainian painters, as the
pictures of central- and west-European masters had been transported to
Germany by the SD in 1942. The storehouse of the museum contains still
numerous pictures. The key to the museum was given to the Ukrainian
lady superintendent by the Special Purpose Staff R.R., who also related
that at eight o'clock in the morning on October 8 a gentleman of the
Special Purpose Staff R.R. had been in the museum and with several
pictures had quickly departed at 8:30 o'clock. As a matter of fact,
some pictures of the collection were missing, approximately 1%.
After no one had taken steps toward any real preservation of the
museum, neither among the garrison nor among the Special Purpose Staff
R.R., which according to the poster, referred to as Exhibit I, was
responsible for the care of the collection, the packing was begun.
The prehistoric findings--almost exclusively ceramics of the bronze
age--were packed in two wooden boxes and shipped by a truck of the EKV;
they were to be sent from Kiev to Berlin.
The exhibit of Ukrainian popular art contained textiles, ceramics,
glass, costumes, and objects of wood. The greater part is packed in two
large wooden boxes and was shipped with the evacuation material of the
EKV by rail to Dnjepropetrowsk. Among it was a large tapestry, which on
account of its size could not be packed.
From the collection of paintings the most valuable pictures were
selected and shipped by rail in the direction of Dnjepropetrowsk.
The documents that remained lying on the desk of the Special Purpose
Staff R.R.--a work plan of the Special Purpose Staff R.R. signed by a
section chief Schmidt and a report on Ukrainian art--were saved and
turned over to the EKV of the SIPO and the SD.
Signed: Jankuhn
Captain in the SS
For the correctness of this copy
SS Leader
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 710-PS
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense
Berlin, 31 July 1941
To: The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service;
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich
Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939,
which dealt with the carrying out of emigration and evacuation, a
solution of the Jewish problem, as advantageous as possible, I
hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to
organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete
solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in
Europe.
Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to
cooperate with you.
I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an overall plan
concerning the organizational, factual and material measures necessary
for the accomplishment of the desired solution of the Jewish question.
signed: GOERING
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 728-PS
Copy
SECRET
DRAFT
Ambassador RITTER No. 444, SALZBURG, 20 June 1944
1. To Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces With reference
to your correspondence of 15 June 1944, Nr.
WFSt/Qu. (Verw.) Nr. 771793/44 gKChefs. II. Ang., concerning the
treatment of enemy terror-aviators.
In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international law and
foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the
proposed measures.
In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must be made
between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the
S.D. [Security Service].
I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the
circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of the
communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German
authorities are not directly responsible, since death had occurred,
before a German official became concerned with the case. Furthermore,
the accompanying circumstances will be such, that it will not be
difficult to depict the case in an appropriate manner upon publication.
Hence, in cases of lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly
to handle the individual case upon publication.
II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D. including
subsequent publication, would be tenable, only if Germany, on this
occasion simultaneously would openly repudiate the commitment of
International Law, presently in force and still recognized by Germany.
When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police, and is
delivered to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has
received, by this very fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war.
The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite rules
on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War, and the
execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death
sentences may be carried out only three months after the protective
power has been notified of the sentence; in Article 63: a prisoner of
war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure
as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific,
that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by
clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the
other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a
formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty.
An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from ever
attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that immediately
upon seizure they be told that they are not considered Prisoners
of War but criminals, that they would not be turned over to the
agencies having jurisdiction over Prisoners of War; hence not to go
to a Prisoner of War Camp; but that they would be delivered to the
authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts and that
they would be tried in a summary proceeding. If the evidence at the
trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to
a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given
the status of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.)
Reception Camp Oberursel. Naturally, not even this expedient will
prevent the possibility that Germany will be accused of the violation
of existing treaties and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals
upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable
us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the necessity
of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of
having to use excuses, which no one would believe, upon the publication
of each individual case.
Of the acts deemed crimes listed under 1-4 by the letter of 15 June, we
note that those listed under 1 and 4 are legally unobjectionable. Those
under 2 and 3 are not. The Foreign Office, however, would be willing
to disregard this. Perhaps it would be preferable to combine Nos.
1, 3, and 4 to the effect that all strafing attacks on the civilian
population by an aviator will be dealt with as crimes. The various
facts under 1, 3 and 4 would then be significant only as especially
outstanding examples. The Foreign Office sees no reason why such
attacks should not be expiated, when they are directed against the
civilian population in ordinary dwelling houses, in automobiles, on
riverboats, etc.
The Foreign Office bases its opinion on the fact that it is altogether
forbidden to German fliers to strafe the civilian population during
their attacks in England. According to information received by the
Foreign Office, such an order was issued some time ago by the Supreme
Commander of the Air Forces. In case of general publication, the
existence of such an order could be pointed out.
III. It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action will
have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be carried out
to such an extent that the purpose, to wit: "the deterrence of enemy
aviators" is actually achieved, which goal is favored by the Foreign
Office, then the strafing attacks by enemy fliers upon the civilian
populations must be stressed in a completely different propagandist
manner than heretofore; if not in the publicity for home consumption,
then certainly in the propaganda directed to foreign countries. The
pertinent German local departments, most likely the police, would
have to be informed immediately to submit a short, truthful report to
a central depository in Berlin giving particulars as to place, time,
number of dead and wounded.
This central depository would at once forward these reports to the
Foreign Office for exploitation. Since similar strafing attacks upon
civilian populations have occurred in other countries, for example, in
France, Belgium, Croatia and Rumania, the pertinent German departments
or the governments in these countries are to be directed to collect
the instances of such strafing attacks against the civilian population
in the same manner and to exploit them propagandistically in foreign
countries, in collaboration with German offices.
IV. In the letter of 15 June the intention was communicated that
until further notice, an understanding with the Foreign Office would
have to be reached prior to any publication. The Foreign Office
attaches particular value to this point and also to the fact that this
understanding be reached, not only until further notice, but for the
entire duration of the campaign.
By order
(signed) RITTER [crossed out]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 729-PS
[Handwritten note:]
20 June
Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces (Chef/OKW)
K [Keitel]
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Nr.771793/44 gKChefs.II.Ang., WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1)
Fuehrer's Headquarters, 14 June 1944
Secret
2 Copies, Copy No. 2
Top Secret
By Officer Courier only
Subject: Treatment of enemy terror aviators [hand written note: mailed
17 June]
To the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, Attention: Col. of the
General Staff von Brauchitsch
1. On the basis of preliminary discussions and after consultation with
the Foreign Minister and with the Chief of the Security Police and of
the Security Service, the following activities are to be considered
the acts of terror, which are to be taken into consideration upon the
publication of an instance of lynching and which will justify the
transfer of enemy aviators from the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp
Oberursel to the S.D. [Security Service] for special treatment:
1. Low-level aerial attacks upon the civilian population--upon
individuals as well as upon groups.
2. The shooting of our own downed (German) air crews, while
parachuting to earth.
3. Low-level aerial attacks upon passenger trains engaged in public
(civilian) transportation.
4. Low-level aerial attacks upon Army and Civilian Hospitals and upon
hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the Red Cross:
It is requested to secure the approval of the Reichsmarshall for this
draft of prohibited acts, and if he does approve, orally to instruct
the commandant of the Air Force (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel to
proceed accordingly.
It is further requested that the approval of the Reichsmarshall be
obtained, for the method intended to be used in the procedure of
publication as expressed in the enclosed communication to the Foreign
Secretary.
A written confirmation is requested, if feasible, by the 18th of this
month.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
[initialed] K [Keitel] 16 June
1 Enclosure
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 730-PS
MOST SECRET
Draft
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Fuehrer Hq, 15/6/1944
WFSt/Qu. (Verw.1) No. 77193/44 Most Secret S.O. only II.Ang.
3 Copies, 2nd Copy
_Subject_: Treatment of enemy terror aviators
S.O. only
access only through officer
Pencil note: dispatched 17/6 =1030.
To Foreign Office, for the attention of Ambassador Ritter, Salzburg.
For the announcement of such cases as have led to lynch justice being
taken by the population or--in the case of capture by the armed
forces or the police--to special treatment by the SD, it is necessary
to determine clearly what facts should be regarded as evidence of a
criminal action in this sense.
In agreement with the Commander in Chief of the air force, I intend
to establish the following formula. It may also serve as instruction
to the commandants of the reception Camp for Aviators at Oberursel in
these cases, where investigation in that camp shows that it would be
appropriate to segregate the offender owing to confirmation of the
suspicion or to hand turnover to the SD.
1. Attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, whether
on individuals or crowds;
2. Firing on our own (German) air crews while suspended by parachute
after having been shot down;
3. Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains, if the public
service.
4. Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals and
hospital trains which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.
Prior to any announcement of a case in the press, over the wireless,
etc., it must be assured that name, unit, place of occurrence and
other relevant particulars form a convincing picture, by whose
publication the intended deterrent effect to further acts of murder
could be achieved. In drafting the publications, it will have to be
borne in mind that protests on the part of the enemy are to be expected
from all quarters. It is therefore intended, in agreement with the
Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and with the Commander in
Chief of the Air Force, that, prior to each publication, until further
notice, agreement should be reached between the Supreme Command of the
air force, the armed forces Ops Staff, the Foreign Office and the SD.,
to determine the facts, time and form of the announcement.
I would ask you to confirm, if possible by the 18th of this month,
that you are in agreement with the above formula and with the intended
procedure for the announcements.
3/96 K [initialled by Keitel]
16/6
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 731-PS
Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces
Chef WFSt
Please direct drafting of order
W [Warlimont-?] K [Keitel] 21 May
Deputy Chief of Command Staff of the Armed Forces.
[note apparently written by Keitel]
Must * * * go to the Reichsfuehrer SS
After a report of the Reichsmarshall [Goering] General Korten makes the
following statement:
[Note: All the above remarks are handwritten.]
Memorandum
The Fuehrer has rendered the following decision in regard to measures
to be taken against Anglo-American air crews, in _special instances_;
downed enemy airmen are to be shot without court martial proceedings in
the following instances:
1. In the event of the shooting of our _own_ (German) downed air crews
while they are parachuting to earth;
2. In the event of aerial attacks upon German planes, which have made
emergency landings, and whose crews are in the immediate vicinity;
3. In the event of attacks upon railway trains engaged in public
(civilian) transportation;
4. In the event of low-level aerial attacks upon individual civilians
(farmers, workers, single vehicles, etc.). [Note--this paragraph
was amended to read: In the event of low-level aerial attacks upon
civilian population, single civilian vehicles, etc. The words "civilian
population" are in Jodl's handwriting.]
[Note on bottom of page referring to item 2: "I consider this point
dangerous. For, to attack an airplane which has made an emergency
landing, can not be classified as Gangster Method but is in complete
agreement with the strictest standards of civilized warfare."]
J. [Jodl]
[Note on left margin: The order should be preceded by a preamble in
which the disregard of the most primitive laws--civilization--(balance
unintelligible).]
J. [Jodl] 22 May
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 732-PS
The Reichsmarshall of Germany Adjutant's Office
Berlin W8 the Leipziger Str. 3
Teleph 120044 Headquarters June 19, 1944
_Adj. Nr. 1605/44 secret_
_Concerns_: Treatment of the Enemy Terror Aviators.
_Reference_: Letter Nr. 771793/44 top secret II Ang. WFST/Qu. Command
Staff of the Armed Forces/Supply. (Verw. 1) June 15, 1944.
2 copies, Copy No. 1
To The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
Generalfieldmarshall Keitel.
Mr. Reichsmarshall remarked to the above letter: "We cannot control
the reaction of the population any way. Adequate _precaution_ has to
be taken that the populace does not react in the same manner against
_other enemy aviators_ not belonging to the category mentioned above.
In my opinion facts of the above cases can be handled any time _by
a court_, the acts being _murder_, forbidden by the enemy to its
aviators."
Feske
Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff
3/91
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 733-PS
WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1)
Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces; Supply Section
26 June 1944
Subject: Treatment of Terror-aviators
Telephone Memorandum
Telephone call by Captain Breuer from the Adjutant's Office of the
Reichsmarshall:
The Reichsmarshall agrees with the communicated wording of the
definition of terror-aviators and with the proposed procedure. He asks
that he be instructed today about the measures taken.
[signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-PS
TOP SECRET
Access only through officer
Fuehrer Headquarters 6.6.1944
_Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff_
No. 771793/44 Top Secret, S.O. only
_Subject_: Treatment of enemy terror aviators
Minutes of a meeting
1. Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy Chief of
WFSt in Klessheim on the afternoon of 6.6, that a conference on this
question had been held shortly before between the Reich Marshall,
the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsfuehrer SS. Contrary to the
original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister who wished to
include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population,
that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above
conference that merely those attacks carried out with A/C armament,
aimed directly at the civilian population and their property, should
be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this
sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there
has been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to the
police.
2. Deputy Chief of WFSt stated the following:
a. First and foremost, following the lines of the generally distributed
declaration made by Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels and numerous press
notices written in the same vein, it is essential to announce any
definitely established incident of this kind giving the names and
units of the aviators, the place the incident occurred and any other
relevant facts. The purpose of this would be to make clear the serious
intentions of the Germans in the face of disbelieving enemy propaganda
and especially to discourage effectively any further murderous action
against our civilian population. Therefore the question is whether the
SD knows of such a case or whether the necessary proof is available
from which to construct a case like this with the required statements.
Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner replied to both in the negative.
b. Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that, apart from Lynch law, a
procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy aviators, who
are suspected of criminal action of this kind, until they are received
into the Reception Camp for aviators at Oberursel; if the suspicion was
confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD for special treatment.
For this purpose the WFSt would cooperate with the Supreme Command of
the Air Force to set out the necessary regulations for the use of the
head of the camp at Oberursel.
Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner expressed his complete agreement with
this view and that the SD take charge of those aviators segregated.
c. On the question of making announcements, it is settled that, for the
present, agreement should be reached in every case between OKW/WFSt,
OKL, and the Reichsfuehrer SS to decide the form that the announcement
should take.
The participation of the Foreign office is to be assured by the WFSt.
3. At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Air Force) on
6.6, it was settled that the following actions were to be regarded as
terror-action, justifying Lynch law.
a. Low level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population,
single persons as well as crowds.
b. Shooting on our own (German) air crews in the air who have bailed
out.
c. Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the public
service.
d. Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals and
hospital-trains which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.
The head of the Reception camp for aviators at Oberursel will be
informed of these facts given in Section 3 above. If the facts of any
case of this kind are established on examination, the prisoners are to
be handed over to the SD. Colonel von Brauchitsch declared, at the
end, that another report to the Reich Marshall on this subject would be
superfluous.
sgd. Warlimont
_Distribution_:
Chief OKW via Chief WFSt--1st copy
Deputy Chief WFSt/Ktb.--2nd copy
Qu (rough copy)--3rd copy
* * * * *
_Remarks by the Chief of OKW on_ the agenda dated 6.6.44 No. 771793/44
Top Secret S.O. only.
If one allows the people to carry out Lynch law, it is difficult to
enforce rules!
K
Min. Dir. Berndt got out and then shot the enemy aviators on the road.
I am against _legal_ procedure! It doesn't work out!
[sgd.] K. [Keitel]
* * * * *
_Remarks by Chief of WFSt_:
To 3. This conference is insufficient. The following points must be
decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:
1. What do we consider as murder?
Is _RR_ in agreement with point 3b?
2. How should the procedure be carried out?
_a._ by the people?
_b._ by the authorities?
3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out
against other enemy aviators?
4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?
[sgd.] J. [Jodl]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 737-PS
WFst/ Qu. (Verw. 1)
No. 771761/44 Top Secret [initial] W. [Warlimont] 4 June
4 June 1944
Top Secret
2 Copies, Copy No. 1
Top Secret
Only by Officer
Subject: Treatment of the enemy terror aviators
Conference Notes
I. Pursuant to the order of the Chief of the Staff of the Armed Forces
and Deputy Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces the following
is decreed:
1. It is to be ascertained from the Reichfuehrer SS through SS Major
Grothmann whether and in what form the information given by the Fuehrer
to the Reichfuehrer SS, that in one or more instances fliers, who had
been shot down during strafing attacks on the population, had been
lynched by the latter, has meanwhile gone out. If the answer should be
"no", in what manner does the Reichfuehrer intend to proceed in the
near future.
2. From the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces (Colonel von
Brauchitsch) it is to be ascertained what specific acts of enemy fliers
are to be considered and handled as deserving death according to the
opinion of the Reichsmarshall. Reference to this: The 4 points of the
memorandum [731-PS] by the Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed
Forces (Chef, WFst.) of 20-22 May based on the information of General
Korten after report of the Reichsmarshall. [L-166, par. 20] * * *
3. After the clarification of point 2, the preparation of a directive
to the Commandant of the camp at Oberursel stating in what cases
the prisoners are to be turned over to the SD, specifying in a more
detailed manner the cases which are to be treated as deserving
of death, and the points of view which are to be followed in the
subsequent procedure. Reference relative to this: Statement of Colonel
von Brauchitsch according to the notes of 26 May.
This directive is to be prepared only in two copies and, after
consultation with Colonel von Brauchitsch, it is to be forwarded to
the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces with the instructions to
communicate it to the commandant of the camp at Oberursel orally only.
4. It is to be ascertained from the Chief of the Armed Forces
Propaganda whether he has any information concerning any new steps
taken in this matter by the Reichfuehrer SS.
5. In accordance with the instructions issued in the evening of 3 June,
by the Chief of the Command Staff of the Armed Forces, the Foreign
Office is to be informed of the situation in the evening with the
following purposes in view:
a. That the formulation of the notices of the Reich Fuehrer SS and the
other measures should be undertaken in an appropriate manner and in
accord with the Foreign Office; and
b. To be prepared in advance against protests by the enemy powers, so
as to be in a position to answer them immediately, and thus to prevent
occurrences such as those which took place in connection with the
escape of the Anglo-American aviators from camp Sagan.
Ambassador Ritter has been already notified accordingly by the Chief of
the Command Staff of the Armed Forces.
II. It was impossible to clarify points 1 and 2 (in this connection
point 3 as well) until 23 hours since neither Colonel von Brauchitsch
nor an SS officer on the Command Staff Bergwald could be contacted. A
telephone conference with Major Grothmann has been agreed upon for 4
June at 10:00 o'clock.
Distribution:
Deputy Chief of the
Command Staff of
the Armed Forces Copy No. 1 [pencilled notation]
Qu. (Draft) Copy No. 2 destroyed according to--
[initials] 18 August [illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 740-PS
Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces (Verw.1)
No. 006988/44 Secret
30 June 1944
Secret
3 Copies, Copy No. 1
Subject: Treatment of enemy terror-aviators
[Marginal note: "We must really do something about this now. What is
still necessary?"]
[initialed] W.
[Warlimont]
[Initialed] K [Keitel] 30/6
Agenda
I. Enclosed I submit the _draft_ of a reply of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, which has been passed to the Armed Forces Ops Staff (WFSt)
through Ambassador Ritter.
Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the
Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft, but that he has
ordered Envoy Sonnleitner to present the attitude of the Foreign Office
to the Fuehrer, _before_ the letter is sent to the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces. The letter is to be forwarded to the Chief
of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces only after the approval by
the Fuehrer of the principles established by the Foreign Office.
II. The Reichsmarshall agrees with the precise wording of the
definition of the term "terror-aviators" as given by the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces and with the proposed procedure.
/s/ WARLIMONT
Distribution:
Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces via
Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops. Staff Copy #1
KTB (War Diary) Copy #2
Qu (Verw.1) Copy #3
[pencil note illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 741-PS
Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces/G-4
5 July 1944
SECRET
Memorandum with reference to Terror-Aviators
In his midday report of 4 July the Fuehrer has issued the following
directive:
According to press reports the Anglo-Americans intend to subject to air
attack small localities without any war-economic or military value,
as a reprisal against V-1. In the event this report proves true, the
Fuehrer orders that notice be served via radio and the press that every
enemy aviator who is shot down while participating in such an attack
is not entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war but that he will be
treated as a murderer as soon as he falls into German hands. This rule
shall apply to all attacks on small localities which constitute neither
military targets, nor communication targets nor armament targets, etc.,
and are therefore of no military significance.
Nothing is to be done at the moment; on the contrary, measures of this
sort are only to be discussed with the Armed Forces Legal Section (WR)
and with the Foreign Office.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 743-PS
_WFSt/Qu. 2 (Ost)_
SSD [stamped]
_SSD_--_teletype_
[illegible pencil marks]
September 8th, 1944.
[illegible pencil marks]
Secret [stamped]
To
1. Gen. St.d.H./Gen.Qu./Chefgr. (Anna)
2. Gen. St.d.H./Gen.Qu./K.Verw. (Anna-Bu)
3. Ob. Heeresgruppe Nord HM1X [in pencil]
4. Ob. Heeresgruppe Mitte
5. Wi Stab Ost
6. Wehrkreiskommando I.
With addresses
Subject: Utilization of the soil in parts of the Reichskommissariat
Ostland.
1. The Fuehrer has ordered the district leader (Gauleiter) Koch
to carry out the utilization of the soil in the parts of the
Reichskommissariat Ostland which are occupied by the Army Group
Middle. Further, the Fuehrer has ordered that all German and local
administrative authorities are bound by the directives of Gauleiter
Koch. Concerning the exploitation of natural resources and other
products, Gauleiter Koch has to keep in touch with the competent
supreme authorities of the Reich.
2. All quarters of the Armed Forces are to give Gauleiter Koch their
utmost support in the execution of this order.
3. The order of September 5th, 1944, concerning the full powers given
by the Fuehrer to Gauleiter Koch is hereby cancelled.
[illegible pencil remark]
(signed) Keitel.
_OKW/WFSt/Qu.2 (East)_ number 0 6891/44 secret [in pencil]
5031 [in pencil] [illegible pencil remarks]
BOC--OKW--1620 [in pencil]
_Further Distribution_:
Head of the Party Chancellery
Minister of the Reich and Head of the Reich Chancellery
Gauleiter Koch, Koenigsberg
General Staff of the Army Gen.St.d.H./Gen.Qu./K. Verw.
(Anna)
[pencil note on the right side]; ab 9/9.44 [initials]
(2 stamps)
* * * * *
SECRET [stamped]
_Teletype_
SSD [in red pencil]
Fuehrer Headquarters, 5.9.44.
Secret [in red pencil]
12F [in pencil]
To:
1. Gen. St. d. H./Gen. Qu.
2. Ob. Heeresgruppe Nord
3. O.B. Heeresgruppe Mitte [in pencil]
4. Wi Stab Ost
5. Wehrkreiskommando I.
The Fuehrer will intrust Gauleiter Koch, East Russia, with the economic
evacuation of the Ostland occupied by us and will give him all full
powers necessary for that purpose. Apart from bringing food-stuffs back
we mean to seize useful products, machines etc.
All quarters of the armed forces have to support Gauleiter Koch as far
as possible.
The Chef OKW
Certified copy [signed] Keitel [in pencil]
Schlossmann
Army Major.
[stamped]
_SSD_ FS _WNOF_ Number _4563_ arrived _September 5th, 1944_
_2240_ o'clock forwarded on......o'clock to.....
by................
[illegible pencil remarks]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 744-PS
[Illegible pencil notes]
8 July 1943
SECRET
Chief of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW)
_Armed Forces General Staff (WFST)_
_Organization (II) No. 02938/43 Secret_ _2235_
Ref. 2105
Subject: Manpower for Coal Mining
For the execution of the enlarged iron and steel program, the Fuehrer
has ordered on 7 July the absolute guarantee of the necessary _coal
production_, and for that purpose he has ordered to cover the
requirements for manpower with prisoners of war.
_The Fuehrer demands_ that the measures described below will be used to
add 300,000 additional workers to the coal mining industry finally.
1. Of the _Soviet prisoners of war in our hands_--with the exception of
those of Finland, Norway and those who are employed in T/O positions
by the troops, 200,000 prisoners of war fit for coal mining are to be
transferred immediately as the first installment by 1 Sept 43 by the
plenipotentiary general for labor allocation with the consent of the
chief, supreme command armed forces (AWA/chief prisoner of war affairs)
trainload by trainload. As far as necessary the GBA (plenipotentiary
for manpower) will provide substitutes.
2. In case of the _receipt of new Soviet prisoners of war_, the
requirements of the coal mining industry have absolute priority over
all other demands until further notice.
All prisoners of war, captured since 5 July 43 in the East, are to
be sent to camps of the supreme command armed forces, and from there
they are to be made available immediately or by exchange with other
consumers to the plenipotentiary for labor allocation for use in the
coal mining industry; the chairman of the national coal association has
the immediate right of choice already in the prisoner of war camps of
the supreme command armed forces area with the aid of his agencies.
3. Soviet professional coal miners are to be sent without exception
from all prisoners of war allocation points according to their
vocational training to the plenipotentiary for labor allocation against
replacements for use in mining.
4. All male prisoners, from 16 to 55 years age, captured in _guerilla
fighting_ in the operational area, the army area, the Eastern
commissariats, the Government General and the Balkans, will in the
future be considered prisoners of war. The same applies to those males
in the newly conquered territories of the East. They are to be sent
to prisoner of war camps, and are to be brought from there for labor
allocation in the Reich.
The chief of the army general staff and the Reichsfuehrer SS after
consultation will issue within their jurisdiction the necessary
directives on the conscription and further treatment of family members.
For presentation to the Fuehrer, the chief of the affairs of prisoners
of war reports to me _every ten days_ on the development of the action,
T. _for the first time of 25 July 43_ as of 20 July 43.
Keitel [signed in ink]
_Distribution_:
Army General Staff
Supreme Commander Airforce
Airforce General Staff
Chief of army armament and Commander of the replacement army
General armed forces operation office (AWA) chief of prisoner of war
affairs
Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of German Police
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, attention State Secretary
Koerner
Reichminister for armament and nutritions
Chairman of the Reich coal association [Reichsvereinigung Kohle] State
councillor Pleiger.
The necessary information of further agencies, who are also concerned
will be given by AWA with the consent of the plenipotentiary for labor
allocation (GBA).
* * * * *
The Reichsfuehrer SS Field Headquarters
5 Aug 1943
Adjutant Journal No. 891/43 secret
_Subject_: Manpower for coal mining industry.
_Reference_: Letter of the command staff of the Reichsfuehrer
SS--journal No. Ia/1909/43 secret.
Secret
1. Chief of the personal staff of Reichsfuehrer SS
2. SS main office
3. Reich security main office [RSHA]
4. Race and resettlement main office--SS
5. Main office, ordinary police
6. SS economic administrative main office
7. SS personal main office
8. Main office SS court
9. SS Supreme command--Headquarters of the Waffen SS
10. Staff Headquarters of the Reich commissar for the consolidation of
Germanism
11. Main office center for Racial Germans [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle]
12. Office of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer
13. Chief of the guerilla-fighting units
14. Higher SS and Police Leader Ostland
15. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-Center
16. Higher SS and Police Leader Russia-South
17. Higher SS and Police Leader Northeast
18. Higher SS and Police Leader East
19. Higher SS and Police Leader Alpine territory
20. Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia
21. Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Croatia.
To figure 4. of the above mentioned order, I order that all young
female prisoners, capable of work, are to be sent to Germany for work
through the agency of Reich Commissioner Sauckel.
Children, old women and men are to be collected and employed in the
women's and children's camps, established by me, on estates as well as
on the border of the evacuated area.
/s/ H. Himmler
For the Reichfuehrer
Grothmann [in ink]
SS Sturmbannfuehrer [Major]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 745-PS
Security Service of the Reich Fuehrer of SS
(SS) Security Service, Section Koblenz
111 .4 B No. 11/44 gKs-S/fd
Koblenz, June 12, 1944
3 copies
3rd copy Top Secret
To the Inspector of Security Police and of SD SS-Colonel Bomann
Wiesbaden.
_For information_:
To the Director of the State Police Office Koblenz SS Major Dr.
Christiann
_Koblenz._
Concerns: Enemy aviators who have been shot down
Reference: Your letter--IV 2a (new) 43/44 gKs--of 21.4.1944
With reference to your letter and to the preceding oral consultations,
it is announced that the OKW issued a similarly worded decree which was
read to the company leaders. The appropriate wording of the decree was
that German soldiers cannot be expected to give their protection to
murderers of German people. Further confidential information was that
the company commanders informed their companies accordingly and gave
them to understand that value is no longer placed on imprisoned enemy
aviators.
The decree of the OKW which was read as a top secret military document,
was presented on 3.6.1944.
Acknowledgement is requested.
The head of the SD Section Koblenz
(SS) Lieutenant-Colonel
[sig. illegible]
Wiesbaden, 21 April 1944
Top Secret
9 copies
9th copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 754-PS
WFSt/Op (Army Command Staff) [Wehrmachts Fuehrungstab]
TOP SECRET
[pencilled notes illegible]
28 Oct 1944
6 copies
5th Copy
_KR--Teletype_
1. Geb [?] AOK (Army Supreme Command) 20 2. For information: (WB)
Armed Forces Commander in Chief, Norway 3. For information: Reich
Commissioner for the Occupied Norwegian Territories 4. OKM (Supreme
Command, Navy) /1. Skl. (Koralle)
Because of the unwillingness of the north Norwegian population to
voluntarily evacuate, the Fuehrer has agreed to the proposals of the
commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, and has ordered,
that the entire Norwegian population east of fjord of Lyngen be
evacuated _by force_ in the interest of their own security, and _that
all homes are to be burned down or destroyed_.
The supreme commander, Northern Finland, is responsible, that the
Fuehrer's order is carried out without consideration. Only by this
method can it be prevented, that the Russians with strong forces, aided
by these homes and the people, familiar with the terrain, follow our
withdrawal operations during this winter and shortly appear in front
of our position in Lyngen. This is not the place for sympathy for the
civilian population.
* * * * *
[Pencilled note bottom page 1: BDC--OKW 1612.]
[Stamped:] 13/184
* * * * *
It must be made clear to the troops, engaged in this action, that the
Norwegians will be thankful in a few months that they were saved from
Bolshevism, and that the barbarian methods of the air war against our
German country and her cultural shrines have brought a thousand times
more misery to our people if compared with the humane evacuation and
destruction of homes in Northern Norway, which is necessary for our war
effort, and which, if it is not done, must be paid for with blood of
German soldiers.
The population--whose livelihood is fishing--in Northern Norway,
furthermore has enough shipping space at its disposal to be able to
get out of the way en mass across the water. A large part of the small
Norwegian ships which are kept hidden at present can be used for this
and can later also be used for our own transportation needs.
The danger of the formation of guerilla bands on the part of the
Norwegians appears to be negligible since they can no longer use the
houses during the winter.
I.A. [By order]
signed: JODL
Supreme Command Armed Forces/Armed Forces Command St/
Army Operations/North/No 0012887/44 top secret
Distribution:
Chief Armed Forces Command St (1st copy)
Deputy Chief/Ktb (2nd copy)
Operations (Army) operations (Navy) (1 each 3rd & 4th copies)
Quartermaster and G-2 (1 each 5th & 6th copies)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 765-PS
Copy
Teletype Message Munich 47 767 10 November 1938--0120--
To all State Police Main Offices and Field Offices
To all SD--Main Sectors and to SD--Sub-Sectors
SECRET
Flash Urgent to be submitted at once. Urgent--to be submitted
immediately to the Chief or his deputy.
_Regards_: Measures against Jews to-night.
Because of the attempt on the life of von Rath, Legation Secretary in
Paris, demonstrations against the Jews are to be expected in the entire
Reich in the course of this night--from the 9th to the 10th of November
1938. For the handling of these actions the following directions are
issued:
1. The chiefs of the State Police Offices or their deputies will
immediately after receipt of this teletype message establish telephone
contact with the political leadership offices--Gau Directorate or
Kreis Directorate--within their region and arrange a conference about
the handling of the demonstrations. The respective inspectors and
commanders of the Order Police are to participate in the conference.
In this conference the political leadership offices are to be informed
that the German police have received the following directives from
the Reichsfuehrer of the SS and Chief of the German Police, which
directives are to be conformed to by the political leadership offices
in an appropriate manner:
_a._ Only such measures may be taken which do not jeopardize German
life or property (for instance, burning of synagogues only if there is
no danger of fires for the neighborhood).
_b._ Business establishments and homes of Jews may be destroyed but not
looted. The police have been instructed to supervise the execution of
these directives and to arrest looters.
_c._ In business streets special case is to be taken that non-Jewish
establishments will be safeguarded at all cost against damage.
_d._ Subjects of foreign countries may not be molested even if they are
Jews.
2. Under the provision that the directives given under No. 1 are being
complied with, the demonstrations are not to be prevented but merely
supervised regarding compliance with the directives.
3. Immediately after receipt of this teletype the archives of the
Jewish communities are to be confiscated by the police, so that they
will not be destroyed in the course of the demonstrations. Important in
this respect is historically valuable material, not recent tax lists,
etc. The archives are to be delivered to the respective SD Office.
4. The direction of the measures of the Safety Police regarding the
demonstrations against Jews is in the hands of the State Police
Offices, in as much as the inspectors of the Safety Police do not issue
different directives. For the performance of the measures of the Safety
Police, officers of the criminal police as well as members of the SD,
the special troops and the SS, may be used.
5. As soon as the events of this night permit the use of the designated
officers, as many Jews, particularly wealthy ones, as the local jails
will hold, are to be arrested in all districts. Initially only healthy
male Jews, not too old, are to be arrested. After the arrests have
been carried out the appropriate concentration camp is to be contacted
immediately with a view to a quick transfer of the Jews to the camps.
Special care is to be taken that Jews arrested on the basis of this
directive will not be mistreated.
6. The content of this order is to be communicated to the respective
inspectors and commanders of the Order Police and to the SD Chief
Sectors and the SD Sub-Sectors with the notification that these police
measures have been issued by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS and the Chief
of the German Police. The Chief of the Order Police issues appropriate
orders to the Fire Department Police. The Safety Police and the Order
Police are to work in closest coordination in the execution of these
measures.
The receipt of this teletype is to be confirmed by the State Police
Director or a deputy via teletype to the Secret State Police Office
into the hands of SS Colonel [Standartenfuehrer] Muller.
Signed: HEYDRICH
SS General [Gruppenfuehrer]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 775-PS
[Memorandum of Minister of Interior concerning
the Clarification of Police Matters, 1935]
As chief of the department of police in the Reich and Prussian ministry
of the interior, I have noticed lately an ever increasing internal
political tension which makes a clarification of authority both as
regards the general police and more especially the political police,
evidently urgently necessary.
1. Fight against the Church
The Reich minister of the interior is the competent authority for
general rules on confessional policy. Therefore, the leaders of the
diverse confessional groups address their petitions to our office.
Lately, half of the political police reports concerned clerical
matters. We have untold petitions from all kinds of cardinals, bishops,
and dignitaries of the church. Most of these complaints concern matters
under the jurisdiction of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, although
the respective rules were not decreed by it. It happens very often that
we have in our capacity as a court of appeal to settle incidents, about
which sometimes we know nothing at all until we receive the complaint.
There does not seem to be any unity any longer between our principles
as regards political, ecclesiastical matters and the executives thereof
in the states. It is an inexcusable state of affairs to give directions
to complainants and make promises to ecclesiastical leaders, if there
is no reliability of their being carried out in the states. Therefore,
I deem it an absolute necessity that full clarification be given
on this controversial philosophical matter not only as regards the
_principles but also the execution thereof_.
I would like to point out that, in my opinion, these principles should
be both considered and executed not only from an internal political,
but also from the foreign political viewpoint. I enclose an encyclical
of the Pope that was submitted to me today. The question arises for
instance as to whether the manner of treatment of returning Catholic
young people in front of Swiss customs guards has something to do with
the unfavorable foreign political commentaries which have been evoked
by this action by the political police.
This concerns not only the political police; the whole police force
as such will be implicated by the consequences resulting from the
religious struggle. Instances of gross disturbance of congregations are
mounting terribly fast lately, often necessitating intervention of the
emergency squad. In the long run I cannot carry the responsibility,
for officials will become involved and be forced to support one party
or the other. The struggle [Kampfzeit] is so recent that we know from
our own experience that in the end the police official will be blamed
quite often for everything by both warring parties. After discarding
the rubber truncheon, the idea of exposing executive officials to
situations in which, during gross interruption of meetings, they may be
forced to use cold steel, is unbearable.
It is my opinion that everything must be done to prevent the wearing
out of the police force as well as the state authority in general with
an untimely religious struggle. Should this philosophical conflict
continue I would be forced,--incidentally this was proposed to me in a
letter from the chief of the Gestapo, to give lectures to the police
officials on Christian religions or the particular importance of the
religious movement and the attitude of the party to these.
Neither do I believe that it is desirable if the lower grade police
authorities carry out the handling and reporting of these religious
matters in a certain one-sided manner.
2. Lately, there has been a marked increase of cases of protective
custody. I demand urgently that in this matter also, final directives
be given concerning _methods_, _proof_, _length of time_ and manner of
_execution_. The decree on protective custody by the Reich Ministry
of the Interior has been made invalid long ago by the actions of the
political police. It is almost impossible to receive an adequate report
on a case of protective custody. The petitions, addressed to us in this
matter, all stress the same point which I also regard as important.
The parties concerned and their relatives accept protective custody
as a matter of fact, but not the complete uncertainty as regards the
manner and principles by which it may or may not be imposed. This
unquestionable _lawlessness_ fosters unrest and antagonism. It is
intolerable for the Reich Ministry of the Interior, when there is a
different interpretation and application of the law in the respective
states, thereby obstructing a uniform execution of the law. The
question must also be settled whether as approved by the judicial
association N.S., in agreement with the Reichminister of Justice, in
cases of protective custody a person is allowed a lawyer, or as is
actually practised by the secret state police this is refused. I refer
in this connection to the case of lawyer Puender. He was confined to
protective custody with his colleagues for bringing an action, being
forced to do this by a Reich law, after duly informing the Reich
Ministry of Justice and our ministry. This complaint could not involve
any complications, as it could immediately be legally restrained by us.
3. For _official political reasons_ I must object on principle to
the fact that lately once more and without previous knowledge of
the superior authorities, officials have been taken into protective
custody or what is sometimes even more, they have been subjected to
state police investigations. I cite here only the case of my teacher
and Kreisleiter at Esterwegen, who was kept in protective custody for
8 days, because he had sent a correct report, as proved afterwards,
to his district councillor on abuses by the SS. I remember the
investigations by criminal assistants of the Gestapo in Kottbus,
lasting two weeks, on the chief of police in that phase, by the way an
SS Brigadefuehrer. Likewise I have already presented today a complaint
by the Oberpraesident Lohse, concerning the order to an official of
the gendarmerie for espionage on superior officials by officers of the
political police.
It is intolerable from the point of view of the national socialist
authoritarian form of state leadership that subordinate offices
procure information on officials in this manner over the heads of
their superior office. This will create a great deal of trouble quite
apart from the fact that information obtained in this manner must be
prejudiced and very often even actually false.
4. Abductions by officers of the political police on _foreign
sovereign territory_ have lately created severe disturbances in
the field of foreign politics. I cite the cases of Berthold Jakob
(Switzerland), Gutzeit (Holland) and the latest incident at the Czech
frontier. It is my opinion that in consideration of the foreign
political complications, the police office should receive orders for
such measures from the responsible Reich officer only, and not from
subordinate offices.
5. Several times the Reich ministry of economics has pointed out to
me the disturbing effect on the economic organization which must
result from the various political incidents caused by the police,
the atmosphere of insecurity caused by cases of protective custody
(particularly in the case of economic leaders) and also in the latest
cases of boycott of the Jews (Cologne, Duesseldorf).
6. I can only undertake the creation of the Fuehrer protection in my
police department if I am completely responsible for the officials
working there, their service, capabilities and their co-operation with
the other departments of the criminal police.
7. I propose that it be settled once and for all, not only who is to
bear the responsibilities for the directives but also who shall bear
the responsibility for the carrying out of these directives in all
matters appertaining to the political police.
_Either_: This responsibility rests with the Reichminister of the
interior. Then he has to be vested with altogether different powers to
give orders in political matters concerning the police.
_Or_: This responsibility with all its consequences is borne by the
Reichfuehrer SS, who is already actually claiming the management of
the political police in the Reich. In this case, I would propose that
the law, laid down for Prussia by SS, Himmler, becomes Reich law
immediately, elevating the office of the secret state police to the
status of a ministry and the chief of the office of the secret state
police undertakes the tasks which he--as is already stated in the draft
of the law, "determines".
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 778-PS
Copy.
Concentration Camp _Dachau_ 1.10.1933.
Commander's Office
Disciplinary and Punitive Regulations
for the Internment Camp.
Introduction.
The following regulations, concerning punishment, for the maintenance
of discipline and order within the limits of the Concentration Camp
Dachau are released as part of the existing camp regulations.
Subject to these regulations are all internees of the Concentration
Camp Dachau from the time of their imprisonment to the hour of their
release.
Authority for ordering punishments lies in the hands of the camp
commander, who is personally responsible to the political police
commander for the execution of the issued camp regulations.
Tolerance means weakness. In the light of this conception, punishment
will be mercilessly handed out whenever the interests of the fatherland
warrant it. The fellow countryman who is decent but misled will never
be affected by these regulations. But let it be a warning to the
agitating politicians and intellectual provocators--regardless of which
kind--: be on guard not to be caught, for otherwise it will be your
neck and you will be shut up according to your own methods.
* * * * *
Article 6
The following are punishable with _8 days of close confinement_, and
_25 thrashings_ to be administered before and after the serving of the
sentence:
1. anyone making depreciatory or ironical remarks to a member of the
SS, deliberately omitting the prescribed marks of respect, or in any
other way demonstrating unwillingness to submit himself to measures of
disciplinary order.
2. prisoner-sergeants and prisoner squad leaders or foremen who exceed
their authority as orderlies, assume the privileges of a superior
over other prisoners, accord likeminded prisoners special privileges
in work or in any other way, tyrannize fellow prisoners who have
political views different from their own, make false reports on them,
or prejudice them in any other way.
Article 7
The following are punishable with _two weeks' close confinement_:
1. anyone exchanging by his own will the quarters to which he is
assigned without being authorized by the company commander or
instigating or inducing his fellow prisoners to do so;
2. anyone enclosing or hiding forbidden articles or articles produced
in the camp in outgoing laundry bundles, or sewing them into pieces of
laundry, etc.;
3. anyone entering or leaving barracks, shelters, or other buildings by
other than authorized entrances, or creeping through window or other
openings;
4. anyone smoking in shelters, toilets and places which are fire
hazards, or keeping or depositing inflammable objects on such places.
Should a fire result from neglect of this prohibition, then it will be
considered as an act of sabotage.
Article 8
The following are punishable with _2 weeks of close confinement_ and
_25 thrashings_ to be administered before and after the serving of the
sentence:
1. anyone leaving or entering the internment camp without an escort or
who joins an outgoing work detail without proper authority;
2. anyone making depreciatory remarks in letters or other documents
about national socialistic leaders, the State and Government,
authorities and institutions, glorifying marxist or liberal leaders or
November Parties (November Parteien), or reporting on occurrences in
the concentration camp;
3. anyone safe-keeping forbidden articles, tools, slashing and
thrusting weapons in his quarters or in paillasses.
Article 9
The following are punishable with _3 weeks close confinement_: Anyone
removing government property regardless of what kind, from its assigned
place; deliberately damaging, destroying, wasting, transforming,
or using same for purposes other than prescribed. Aside from the
punishment the individual or the entire company of prisoners, depending
on the circumstances, will be held responsible for the damage caused.
Article 10
The following are punishable with _6 weeks close confinement_ or an
_indefinite term of solitary confinement_:
1. anyone making money collections inside of the camps, financing
illegal activities, within or outside of the limits of the camp,
or bribing fellow-prisoners into submission or putting them under
obligation to keep quiet;
2. anyone receiving financial aid derived from illegal collections of
the red aid funds, or distributing such money among fellow prisoners;
3. anyone making communications to a clergyman other than of problems
pertaining to the soul, giving him secretly letters or communications
for delivery, or attempting to win the clergyman's cooperation for
illegal purpose;
4. anyone disparaging, slandering or slighting in any other way the
symbols of the national socialistic state or its representatives.
Article 11
By virtue of the law on revolutionaries, the following offenders,
considered as _agitators, will be hung_.
Anyone who, for the purpose of agitating, does the following in the
camp, at work, in the quarters, in the kitchens and workshops, toilets
and places of rest: politicizes, holds inciting speeches and meetings,
forms cliques, loiters around with others; who for the purpose of
supplying the propaganda of the opposition with atrocity stories,
collects true or false information about the concentration camp and
its institution; receives such information, buries it, talks about
it to others, smuggles it out of the camp into the hands of foreign
visitors or others by means of clandestine or other methods, passes
it on in writing or orally to released prisoners or prisoners who
are placed above them, conceals it in clothing or other articles,
throws stones and other objects over the camp wall containing such
informations; or produces secret documents; who, for the purpose of
agitating, climbs on barracks' roofs and trees, seeks contact with the
outside by giving light or other signals, or induces others to escape
or commit a crime, gives them advices to that effect or supports such
undertakings in any way whatsoever.
Article 12
The following offenders, considered as _mutineers, will be shot on the
spot_ or later hung:
Anyone attacking physically a guard or an SS man, refusing to obey
or to work while on detail, asking or inducing others to join him in
such acts of mutiny, leaving a marching column or a place of work as
a mutineer or asking others to do likewise, or bowling, shouting,
inciting or holding speeches while marching or at work.
Article 13
The following offenders, considered as _saboteurs_, will _be punished
by death_:
Anyone deliberately causing a fire, an explosion, or any kind of damage
such as by water in the camp, in the quarters, in the workshops,
in the places of work, in the kitchens, store rooms, etc; also
anyone manipulating contrary to given instructions with barbed wire
installations, high voltage circuits, switch boards, telegraph or water
lines, the camp wall or other security installations, heating and
boiler installations, machines or motor vehicles. Should the act have
occurred because of negligence, then the guilty person will be kept in
solitary confinement. In cases of doubt, however, it will be considered
as an act of sabotage.
* * * * *
Article 19
Confinement will be executed in a cell, with a hard rest, with water
and bread. The prisoner receives warm food every four days. Punitive
work consists of severe physical or particularly dirty work, performed
under close supervision. Incidental punishments are: drilling,
thrashings, foreclosure of mail and food, hard rest, tying to stakes,
reprimands and warnings.
All punishments are being recorded in files.
Confinement and punitive labor prolong the term of internment by at
least 8 weeks, an imposed incidental punishment by 4 weeks. Prisoners
in solitary confinement will not be released within a measurable space
of time.
The Commander of the Concentration Camp (L.S.)
[signed] EICKE
SS-Oberfuehrer
* * * * *
Concentration Camp _Dachau_ 10.1.1933
Commanders Office
Service Regulations for Prisoner
Escorts and Guards
_Guard Deputy._
Anyone letting a prisoner escape will be arrested and handed over
to the Bavarian Political Police for liberating prisoners out of
negligence.
If a prisoner attempts to escape, he is to be _shot without warning_.
The guard who has shot an escaping prisoner in the line of his duty
will not be punished.
In case of attack on a guard by a prisoner, the former is to resist the
attack not by physical force but by the use of his weapons. A guard
disregarding this regulation must expect his immediate discharge.
Anyone keeping his back covered, will anyway seldom have to expect an
attack.
If a prisoner unit mutinizes or revolts, it is to be shot at by all
supervising guards. Warning shots are principally prohibited.
The time of work is determined by the camp commander. A prisoner escort
who brings his prisoners back too early, is guilty of having badly
failed to do his duty and can be discharged.
In case a work detachment must stop its work prematurely for some
reason or other, then the work detachment leader must have the reason
certified on the back of the work service slip [Arbeitsdienst Zettel]
by either the construction division or the requisitioning office.
The Commander of the Concentration Camp
L.S. EICKE
SS-Oberfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 779-PS
[Directive by Wilhelm Frick Regulating "Protective Custody," 12 April
1934]
[Pencilled noted on top of page:]
(1) 3F _4_ 487
To reduce the abuses in connection with the infliction of _protective_
custody, the Reichminister of the Interior has decided in his directive
on the infliction and execution of protective custody of 12 April 1934,
directed to the state governments and the Reichsstatthalter, that
orders for protective custody can only be issued. a) for the personal
protection of the arrestee b) if the arrestee immediately endangers
public safety and order by his behaviour, especially by activity,
inimical to the state.
If therefore, as far as these prerequisites do not prevail a sentence
of protective custody is not permitted especially a) against persons
who only insist on the use of their civic or public rights (for
instance report, complaint, grievance); b) against lawyers because of
representation of their client's interests; c) because of personal
affair (for instance libel); d) because of any economic measures
(question of salaries, dismissal of employees and similar cases).
Protective custody furthermore is not permitted for the punishment
of criminal acts, for the courts are competent for that. It cannot
be applied only for the reason, that a person behaves asocially
or otherwise in an obnoxious manner, unless the People has become
aggravated by that, and this protective custody becomes necessary for
the arrestee's own protection.
(2)
Regulations of Official Agencies--Regulations on Measures of Protective
Custody in Prussia (taken for the administrative gazette of the Reich
[Reichsverwaltungsblatt] No. 9 of 2 March 1935.) The _Prussian Prime
Minister_. Secret State Police Insp. 946/11 March 1934 _Berlin, 11
March_.
Subject: Order for measures of protective custody.
1. The previous executory regulations, applying to measures of
protective custody are rescinded. In the future, limitations of
personal freedom, according to article 1 of the decree for the
protection of people and state of 28 Feb. 1933, may be ordered by the
Secret State Police office, effective in the whole state, and by the
governors and cabinet presidents in Berlin and by the state police
offices for their local jurisdiction.
The present competency of the district police authorities
[Kreispolizeibehoerden], namely the state counsellors [Land-rate], is
no longer applicable for such measures. The measures previously ordered
by them, become void after 31 March unless a prolongation has been
ordered before then by the State [Landes] police authorities.
2. If protective custody has been ordered as a provisional measure
because of suspicion of a criminal act, the decision of the court
must be obtained immediately for infliction of legal detention for
investigation, and in the case of a refusal of a legal warrant for
arrest, the police measure is also to be rescinded, unless their
continuation in exceptional cases appears justified for other reasons.
3. Limitations of personal freedom, which are ordered by the Ober--and
Regierungspraesidenten, by the president of the police in Berlin and
by the state police offices, become automatically void on the 8th day
after the end of the day, on which the order for protective custody has
been executed, unless the continuation of the protective custody has
been ordered specifically by me upon appropriate request.
4. Every case of protective custody, ordered by the Ober and
Regierungspraesidenten, by the president of police in Berlin and
by the state police offices, is to be reported to me personally
(address Berlin W 9, Leipziger Platz 11a) by Telegram within 24 hours,
mentioning exactly: name, age, occupation, political standpoint: of the
one affected, as well as the cause of the measure; also if necessary,
the necessity for apparently appropriate limitation of freedom beyond 7
days must be justified.
5. Arrests, which do not fall under the designation "protective
custody", may only be made by the authorities, legally appointed for
them. But in this case, a legal warrant for arrest must be obtained
under all conditions within 24 hours. If such a warrant for arrest is
refused by the competent judge, or if it cannot be obtained within 24
hours, the affected one is to be released immediately or, if the arrest
is to remain in effect, action has to be taken according to #3 and 4
(report by telegram within 24 hours to the prime minister).
6. In the future, I will punish the abusive use of the arrest
mercilessly.
Agencies of the party and the associations may not make arrests. In
case of disregard of this order, the competent authorities must take
actions against it immediately, and must report to me at once.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 781-PS
1. From a letter to Brigadefuehrer (Maj Gen) WOLFF (Secret State
Police).
RJM Berlin, 23 March 1936.
OBERREGIERUNGSRAT von DOHNANYI
To: BRIGADEFUEHRER (Maj Gen) WOLFF
_BERLIN S W 11_
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Dear Mr Wolff,
As you doubtless know, the Reichsfuehrer, using the Hoppe case
(shooting) in the concentration camp Columbia as an illustration,
discussed on the 2 March the question of the use of arms by guard
personnel of concentration camps with my minister. The Reichsfuehrer,
according to the notes on the conversation made by the minister, on
this occasion considered the idea of issuing a decree on use of arms by
officials under his jurisdiction favorably. Could you possibly inform
me at your convenience how far this matter has progressed with you?
* * * * *
With many regards and Heil Hitler
your very obedient
[signed] Dr. von Dohnanyi
* * * * *
2. After 2 weeks.
1. Notation:
On the 2nd of this month using the Hoppe case as an illustration,
I discussed the question of use of arms by the guard personnel of
the concentration camp with the Reichsfuehrer SS. I suggested to
Himmler that he issue an order on the use of arms for the officials
subordinated to him. * * * Himmler has promised me that such a decree
will be issued and will grant us participation in the preliminary work.
Initiative with Himmler.
2. To Secretary of state Dr. Freisler for acknowledgement.
3. After 2 weeks.
Berlin, 9 March 1936.
seen 9/3 illegible. [signature illegible]
To Mr. von Donanyi with the request to remind the secret state police
(Wolf) at his convenience.
17/3
[signed illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 783-PS
Copy For The Minister
Reich and Prussian Minister of Justice
2 F.g10 1696/34 Berlin, W.8, 18 January
Wilhelmstrasse 65
Subject: Charges against members of camp personnel of Protective
custody Camp Hohnstein.
To the communication of 19 December 1934.
--ST. S.I.2593/34--
Most honored Reich Deputy [Reichstatthalter]!
In regard to your courteous communication of 19 December 1934, I
inform you respectfully that, on the basis of the decree of the Reich
president relative to exercise of the right of nolle prosse of 21 March
1934 (RGBl, I, page 211) in connection with Article 2, paragraph 1 of
the first law for transfer of administration of justice to the Reich of
10 February 1934 (RGB1, I, page 91) the right to nolle prosse pending
criminal cases wherein the deed was committed after 20 March 1934,
belongs no longer to the Reich Deputy but exclusively to the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor. Under the circumstances I consider myself not in
a position to go to the extent of proposing a nolle prosse of the case
to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
TO the Reich Deputy in Saxony in Dresden A1.
Insofar as the deeds were committed before 2 March 1934 and therefore
the right of nolle prosse in the case belongs to you, most honored
Reich Deputy, I allow myself to express the greatest scruples
against the intended nolle prosse. The nature of the mistreatments,
particularly the use of the drip-apparatus, is evidence of a coarseness
and brutality in the perpetrators which is completely alien to German
sensibility and feeling. Such atrocities, reminders of oriental sadism,
can find no explanation or excuse even in the greatest bitterness of
combat. Crimes of this sort must find their lawful expiation for the
very sake of the cleanness and respect of the movement. In view of
experiences in other cases, of similar aspect in a certain sense, I am
also unable to share the fear that execution of the legal proceedings
would be detrimental to the movement. This is all the more true since
the main proceedings can take place with complete exclusion of the
public.
Heil Hitler!
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 784-PS
Copy
The Reichminister of Justice
Z.F.g 10 1696.34
Berlin, June 5, 1935
1. A message to the deputy of the Fuehrer Reichminister Hess.
Confidential
Personal
Regarding: penal proceedings against the merchant and SA leader Lt.
Colonel [Obersturmbannfuehrer] Jaehnichen and 22 companions on account
of inflicting bodily injury on duty (protective custody Camp Hohenstein
in Saxony).
Dear colleague!
With inference to the bill of indictment sent by me under my
communication of March 20, 1935 regarding the penal proceedings
mentioned above, I beg to inform you of the following:
After a main trial, lasting about six weeks, the assistant prosecutor
Staatsanwalt Dr. Walther, proposed the following sentences on May 3,
1935:
Against Jaehnichen
(Camp Commandant) 5 years penetentiary
Against Zikera--1 year, 6 months prison
Against Heinz Meier--3 years prison
Against Herbert Meier--3 years, 2 months prison
Against Tuerke--3 years prison
Against Volkmar--2 years, 3 months penetentiary
Against Leuschner--2 years, 3 months prison
Against Romkopf--2 years, 6 months prison
Against Karche--1 year, 8 months prison
Against Hausch--1 year, 4 months prison
Against Lehmann--3 years, 3 months prison
Against Kuehnel--1 year prison
Against Stachowski--1 year prison
Against Ude--1 year prison
Against Friedrich--1 year, 3 months prison
Against Schmeling (Police)--1 year prison
Against Konitz--1 year prison
Against Uhlmann--1 year prison
Against Sturzkober--10 months prison
Against Schupp--1 year, 6 months prison
Against Hensel--2 years, 3 months prison
Against Heinicker--1 year, 6 months prison
Against Putzler--3 years, 9 months penetentiary
Against Liebscher--7 months prison
Against Heger--Suspension on account of amnesty.
On May 15, 1935 the Criminal division number 12 of the Supreme Court in
Dresden pronounced the verdict, by which on account of offences against
Art. 340 of the Penal Code the following were sentenced:
Jaehnichen--to 6 years prison
Zikera--to 1 year, 6 months prison
Heinz Meier--to 3 years prison
Herbert Meier--to 3 years prison
Tuerke--to 3 years prison
Volkmar--to 2 years, 3 months prison
Leuschner--to 2 years, 6 months prison
Romkopf--to 2 years, 6 months prison
Karche--to 1 year, 8 months prison
Hausch--to 1 year, 4 months prison
Lehmann--to 3 years prison
Kuehnel--to 1 year prison
Stachowski--to 1 year, 6 months prison
Ude--to 1 year prison
Friedrich--to 1 year, 3 months prison
Schmeling--to 1 year prison
Konitz--to 1 year prison
Uhlmann--to 1 year prison
Sturzkober--to 10 months prison
Schupp--to 1 year, 6 months prison
Hensel--to 2 years prison
Heinicker--to 1 year, 6 months prison
Putzler--to 3 years, 9 months prison
Against Liebscher and Heger suspension was authorized
on the basis of the law governing amnesty.
After the proposal of the sentence, however, still before the
announcement of the verdict, the chairman of the Criminal division
number 12 received the following letter from the Reich governor
[Reichsstatthalter] of Saxony:
"Official Seal
The Reich Governor [Reichsstatthalter] of Saxony II 84/35
Dresden-A.1, May 8, 1935
Mailbox 78 Telephone 24 371.
To the president of the Supreme Court Dr. Roth
[Landgerichtsdirektor]
Dresden
Pillnitzer Street 41
The President of the Supreme Court:
Sir:
As I was informed, it is proposed to impose a punishment of 3-1/2 years
of penal servitude upon the accused Standartenfuehrer Jaehnichen.
Without wanting to interfere in the proceedings or intending to
influence you as Judge in any way before the verdict is announced,
I should nevertheless like to once more call your attention to the
fact that the circumstances, as they had been brought about by the
revolution of 1933 and as they, without doubt were still taking effect
up to the beginning of 1934, cannot be overlooked, when pronouncing
sentence.
A further point appears to me to be worth taking into consideration,
namely, the fact that one cannot accuse Jaehnichen of having a low
character and that, above all, in Hohenstein the scum of humanity had
to be attended to. In consideration of this fact I should like to leave
it to you to consider whether the lapses call for such a severe degree
of punishment or rather whether a pardon could not be considered.
As Gauleiter of NSDAP I regard it as my duty to call attention again to
the unusual circumstances.
Heil Hitler
Signed: Martin Mutschmann."
Moreover the information has come to hand that the two magistrates
(Schoeffen), who functioned as judges in the principal trial, namely,
Regierungsamtmann Helbig and the merchant Pesler, had been expelled
from the NSDAP after the announcement of the verdict. I do not know by
whom this expulsion was ordered.
Finally it has been put to the assistant prosecutor, Staatsanwalt Dr.
Walther, who is a storm trooper, after the pronouncing of the verdict
on his Obersturmbannfuehrer, that he should resign from the SA.
The fact that these measures were taken at the same time as the verdict
referred to above was pronounced, gives rise to the assumption that
here also there is something below the surface. However, this would
represent an extremely serious and highly undesirable conclusion to
the legal and fully binding penal proceedings. If the letter from
the Reich governor reproduced here gave the impression that his
judicial decisions should be influenced from higher up, then this
would certainly influence to an even greater extent any later measures
instituted against the 2 magistrates. That kind of procedure against
lay judges after the verdict had been pronounced would naturally and
necessarily arouse the feeling that, when they are functioning as
judges, they are responsible to a certain office for their work. Hereby
the judicial unpartiality, which is the foundation of every orderly
administration of criminal law becomes null and void. Moreover, the
lay judge, who upon entering service, must swear an oath, that he will
discharge his duties conscientiously and to the best of his ability,
would find himself forced to battle with his conscience. No less
serious would be the consequences of such measures for the assistant
public prosecutor. This official would also have to battle with his
conscience, while carrying out his duties. Thereby the orderly official
work of the authorities for the administration of criminal law would be
so seriously endangered that I would find myself obliged to consider
the question whether in the face of such a state of affairs public
prosecutors and judges could still be functionaries of the party or
members of the SA at all.
Hence it appears to be necessary----
1. in the case in question to remove the confusion, resulting from the
measures indicated above, by suitable countermeasures
2. to take steps that such occurrences altogether incompatible with
the administration of criminal law and the public security guaranteed
by the state are avoided.
I would respectfully request your comments and information with regard
to any action in this direction. Considering the importance of this
case, I would be obliged if you would reply as early as possible.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: Dr. Guertner.
2. A letter to the Chief of Staff of the SA of the NSDAP with a copy of
the following accusation enclosed.
* * * * *
In regard to:
--to enter on page 1-- Confidential
Enclosed 1 loose leaf Personal
Chief of Staff:
Sir:
In the penal case, indicated above, which involved serious maltreatment
of prisoners in the protective custody camp at Hohenstein in Saxony,
the main trial was held in Dresden from 20th March to the middle of May
1935 before the 12th Criminal Division of the Supreme Court. In regard
to the details of the incidents, may I refer to the enclosed copy of
the Bill of indictment of October 1934 and particularly may I call
attention to page 21 of the results of the inquiry. On May 3, 1935 the
assistant prosecutor Staatsanwalt Dr. Walther imposed the following
punishment:
* * * * *
Here has been received that it has been put to the assistant prosecutor
Staatsanwalt Dr. Walther, who is a storm trooper, after pronouncing of
the verdict on his Obersturmbannfuehrer, that he should resign from the
SA. The fact that this measure was undertaken at the same time as the
verdict referred to above was pronounced, gives rise to the assumption
that here also then is something below the surface. However this would
represent an extremely serious and highly undesirable conclusion to
the legal & fully binding penal proceedings. The officials would have
to battle with their conscience when carrying out their duties, if
such procedure was in force. In this way the orderly official work of
the authorities for the administration of criminal law would be so
seriously endangered, that I would find myself obliged to consider the
question whether in the face of such a state of affairs Staatsanwaelte
could still be members of the SA at all.
Hence it appears to be necessary:
1. In the case in question to remove the confusion resulting from the
measures indicated above, by suitable counter-measures.
2. To take steps that such occurrences altogether incompatible with
the administration of criminal law and the public security guaranteed
by the State, are avoided.
I would respectfully request your comments and information with regard
to my action in this direction. Considering the importance of this
case, I would be obliged if you would reply as early as possible.
3. to the Minister, confidential
4. 2 weeks.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: Dr. Guertner.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 785-PS
Z Stg. 10-9-35
_Subject_: Suit against Rudolf Jaehnichen and others for Mistreatment
of Inmates of the Hohnstein Concentration Camp.
A further investigation which was ordered as well as a new verification
of already known facts showed that the mistreatment of inmates
which has led to the conviction of the accused were not carried
out for any political purposes (to obtain a confession, to punish
disciplinary infractions, etc.) or in response to previously suffered
wrongs inflicted by Communists but were merely malicious torture or
expressions of sadistic brutality.
A few cases of mistreatment occurred, however, where enemies of the
State were involved. The Court in its sentence, however, considered
that mistreatments in such cases to a certain extent were justified
or at least understandable. But it expressly stated further that
the mistreatments which occurred during interrogations had taken on
proportions which were in no accord with the desired objective and that
the defendants not only attempted to wring confessions from the inmates
but that they acted in sheer lust for torture. (Compare Page 100 of the
Sentence Document.)
The overwhelming majority of Cases, however, over which sentences were
pronounced, represent mistreatments which occurred when the inmates
first entered the institution, when they received their prison
clothing, or during drill hours. These mistreatments were carried out
without rhyme or reason. The fact that the defendants in these cases
were motivated neither by political purposes nor by personal revenge
against outrages suffered formerly can be learned from the following
circumstances.
1. Amongst the mistreated persons there were quite a number that never
belonged to any parties of the left. Some of them were even old members
of the movement. The following cases are proof of that:
2. _Case Prueger_
On 6.3.1934 the Kreisleiter of the German Labor Front for the food
industry, member of the Nazi Party, was brought in for offending the
Kreisleiter and two other persons. When being brought in, Turke beat
his face with his fist and subsequently, in a small room, he was
heavily beaten with sticks, whips and other instruments. * * *
* * * 2. The methods as well as the detailed circumstances of
mistreatment show that lust for torture was the only motivation in
a great number of cases. The following case illustrates that fact
especially well.
The defendant Schupp frequently had to supervise the drill of inmates.
On 5 or 6 March 1935 he called the inmate Lindner out of formation
without any apparent reason and asked him for his name and domicile.
Then he pressed, without any cause, his burning cigarette upon the end
of Lindner's nose with the result that the latter received a burn for
which he later required medical treatment. The court in this case, as
in several others, expressly maintains that Schupp only acted out of
sheer lust of torture. * * *
* * * Furthermore, may I state as far as the question of further
mitigation of sentences are concerned that the court in pronouncing
sentence has already weighed to the fullest extent all possible
mitigating circumstances, the awful consequences of cruel mistreatment
of human beings should otherwise result in a far more severe judicial
expiation. Also it must not be over-looked that altogether only those
members of the concentration camp staff were brought into court
who took an especially active and cruel part in the mistreatments.
Furthermore, the sentence was not aggravated by the fact that the
Court affirmed, for purely judicial reasons, that the defendants
were officials and sentenced them for committing bodily harm while
carrying out a public office. The sentence expressly states that the
court did not stress the fact that the accused SA men were officials
in determining the punishment because they had not received proper
training as officials and they probably do not wish to be referred to
as such. (Compare page 144 of the Sentence). In these circumstances the
mitigation of sentences already granted in the decree of 31 October
1935 seem an extensive favor. If, nevertheless, I suggest subsequently
a further reduction of sentence, based upon new evidence of some of
the defendants, I can only justify my action because I believe that,
according to circumstances, the defendants in one or the other case of
mistreatment may have partly acted out of revolutionary motives.
As to what parts the individual defendants played in these criminal
acts I refer to the last two columns in the table handed over with the
report of 28 August 1935. The following statements as to the individual
defendants may be made.
1. _Jaehnichen_:
Sentence: 6 years imprisonment.
Reduction of Sentence: to be released on probation after 4 years 6
months.
Jaehnichen is an old member of the S.A. who through his bad example
has fostered the increase of excesses, but at first he was motivated
undoubtedly by a certain revolutionary anger and by the fact that
he wanted to maintain exemplary discipline amongst the inmates. A
further mitigating fact is that his participation in the unusually
serious mistreatment of the Jew Ambross, who later committed suicide,
was inspired by the belief that he was dealing in this case with a
despoiler of German girls. With these facts, being what they are, a
further reduction in sentence, amounting to one year, seems justifiable.
2. _Putzler_:
Sentence: 3 years 9 months imprisonment.
Reduction of Sentence: to be released on probation after 2 years 6
months.
His sentence is based essentially on the especially cruel mistreatments
during questionings of inmates. Even though his acts in this connection
seem to be pure vindictive torture, as for example the use of the
dripping device, one may, nevertheless, say that at least at first he
was motivated by the desire to obtain truthful statements. On the other
hand, Putzler participated in serious excesses also during times other
than the questioning periods and played a leading part in them. To give
an example, he tore out inmate Ricke's beard. A further reduction of
the sentence by 6 months seems under these circumstances a far going
favor * * *
* * * I want to remark, in conclusion, that the defendants as well as
the defense, believe since 29.11.1935 that all defendants had been
finally pardoned by the decision of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
It is further to be learned from remarks by defendants not in custody
that in case of a complete pardon those still in custody would leave
prison under the accompaniment of a band or would be solemnly received
by a band on return to their home town.
Appendix
Upon application of the Reich Minister of Justice I hereby grant in
the case against Rudolp Jaehnichen and others, for mistreatment of
persons committed to protective custody in Hohnstein Concentration Camp
(16. St. A. 3431 34 Dresden prosecutor) the following mitigation of
sentences as enumerated in Column 6:
---+---------------+-----------+-------------------+----------------------+
| | | of Sentence | of the Reichs |
| | | granted thus | Minister of |
| | |far. To be released| Justice. To be |
| |Sentence | conditionally |Released Conditionally|
| |Prison Term| after | after |
| +------+----+---------+---------+---------+------------+
# | Name |Yrs. |Mos. | Yrs. | Mos. | Yrs. | Mos. |
---+---------------+-----+-----+---------+---------+---------+------------+
1 | Jaehnichen | 6 | | 4 | 6 | 3 | 6 |
| | | | | | | |
2 | Putzler | 3 | 9 | 3 | | 2 | 6 |
| | | | | | | |
3 | Hanz Meier | 3 | | 2 | 6 | 2 | |
| | | | | | | |
4 | Herbert Meier | 3 | 3 | 2 | 6 | No further reduct. |
5 | Tuerke | 3 | | 2 | 6 | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
6 | Lehman | 3 | | 2 | 6 | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
7 | Leuschner | 2 | 6 | 2 | | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | |
8 | Rohmkopf | 2 | 6 | 2 | | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
10 | Haensel | 2 | 6 | 1 | 6 | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
11 | Karge | 1 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 1 | |
| | | | | | | |
12 | Sikora | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 28 days |
| | | | | | | |
13 | Stachowski | 1 | 6 | No reduction | No reduction |
| | | | | | | |
14 | Schupp | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
15 | Heinicker | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | | 9 |
| | | | | | | |
16 | Hausch | 1 | 4 | | 8 | | 6 |
| | | | | | | |
17 | Kuehnel | 1 | | | 9 | | 6 |
| | | | | | | |
20 | Schmeling | 1 | | | 9 | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
21 | Kahnis | 1 | | | 9 | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
22 | Uhleman | 1 | | | 6 | No further reduct. |
| | | | | | | |
23 | Stuerzkober | | 10 | | 6 | No further reduct. |
---+---------------+-----+-----+---------+---------+---------+------------+
Berlin December 1935
THE FUEHRER AND CHANCELLOR
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 786-PS
Note
1. Just now, at 1030, State Secretary Dr. Meissner telephoned and asked
me to deliver the following message to the Minister, whom he had been
unable to contact:
Concerning the pardon of those sentenced in connection with the
maltreatment in the Hohnstein Concentration Camp, Herr Bouhler informed
him yesterday that he had reported to the Fuehrer on the result of the
fresh inquiries, which he and Reich Governor Mutschmann had instituted.
The Fuehrer has now decided to remit all other sentences remaining.
State Secretary Meissner wished to inform the Ministry of Justice of
this, so that it might be made the subject of corresponding decrees.
He, State Secretary Meissner, mentioned that the Minister of Justice
had likewise been commissioned by the Fuehrer to carry out special
inquiries, to determine in which cases the motives for maltreatment
had been sadistic and therefore a pardon would be out of place.
The Minister of Justice would have to be given the opportunity of
reporting to the Fuehrer his ideas, based on his still inconclusive
investigations. Herr Bouhler also stated that the Minister of Justice
was still at liberty to do so. The Fuehrer merely desired that his
inquiries be hastened as much as possible so that the statement could
be made within the next few weeks and that, in any case, he submit a
decree granting full pardon.
State Secretary Meissner, when finally summing up, therefore requested
that, should the Minister not approve of a total pardon, a double
decree be submitted.
2. The Minister for his favourable consideration.
Berlin, 29th November 1935
[Signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 787-PS
Berlin, 18 June, 1935
The Reich Ministry of Justice
_Z.F. g 10 390/35_
1. Communication to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor with addition of a
certified copy of B1. 9-10 d.A., thus far
Subject: Motion of the Reich deputy in Saxony concerning the
nolle-prossing of the criminal procedure against Oberregierungsrat
Vogel in Dresden on account of bodily injury while in office.
16 St.A 107/34 (StA.Dresden)
Inclosure: 1 loose sheet.
The prosecuting authority in Dresden has indicated Oberregierungsrat
Erich Vogel in Dresden (case designation 16 STA. 4 107/34) on account
of bodily injury while in office. The following subject matter is the
basis of the case:
Vogel belongs to the Gestapo office of the province of Saxony since its
foundation and is chief of Main section II, which formerly bore the
title Zub [Zentralstelle fuer Umsturzbekaempfung] (Central office for
combatting revolt). In the process of combatting efforts inimical to
the State Vogel carried out several so called borderland actions in the
year 1933 in which a large number of politically unreliable persons and
persons who had become political prisoners in the border territories
were taken into protective custody [Schutzhaft] and brought to the
Hohnstein protective custody camp. In the camp serious mistreatment
of the prisoners has been going on at least since summer of 1933. The
prisoners were not only, as in protective custody camp Bredow near
Stettin, beaten into a state of unconsciousness for no reason, with
whips and other tools but were also tortured in other ways, as for
instance with a drip-apparatus especially constructed for the purpose,
under which the prisoners had to stand so long that they came away with
serious purulent wounds of the scalp. The guilty SA-leaders and SA-men
were sentenced to punishments of 6 years to 9 months of imprisonment
by the main criminal court of the provincial court in Dresden of 15
May 1935 (16 StA. 3431.34). Vogel, whose duties frequently brought him
to the camp, took part in this mistreatment, insofar as it happened
in the reception room of the camp during completion of the reception
formalities, and in the supply room, during issuing of the blankets. In
this respect it should be pointed out that Vogel was generally known
to the personnel of the camp--exactly because of his function as head
of the Zub--and his conduct became at least partly a standard for the
above-named conduct of the SA-leaders and men.
One of the border actions took place on 3 August 1935. Vogel had
ordered the arrest of the persons who were brought to the camp at that
time, and therefore also had responsibilities relative to their proper
treatment. On account of the large number of those who were brought
in, a pay office of the administration building in the lower castle
yard was adapted as a makeshift reception room to help dispose of the
formalities. The reception was being taken care of by Truppfuehrer
[T/Sgt] Felix Sikora. He hit every incoming person without cause
violently across the face with a steel ruler, so that it resounded
loudly. In addition the prisoners, when brought in, were spoken to
roughly and at the same time beaten, partly even literally pushed into
the room. Vogel stayed in the reception room a long time and watched
these proceedings without doing anything about them. In his presence,
for instance, the SA-man Mutze dealt such blows to one man, without
provocation, that he turned around on himself. As already stated, Vogel
not only took no steps against this treatment of the prisoners, but he
even made jokes about it and stated that it amused him the way things
were popping here.
In the supply room Vogel himself took a hand in the beating amid the
general severe mistreatment. The SA-man there employed whips and other
articles and beat the prisoners in such a manner that serious injuries
were produced, the prisoners partly became unconscious and had to lie
in the dispensary a long time. Vogel was often present in the supply
room during the mistreatment. At least in the following cases he
personally laid violent hands upon prisoners.
a. On the occasion of the borderland action of 3 August 1933 Vogel was
in the chamber in the rear portion of the area, where the prisoners
as a rule do not enter. At first Vogel observed from there the severe
mistreatment which was administered to the prisoners at the counter
where the blankets were issued. Then he had a prisoner brought to the
rear chamber and swung several blows of his fist at his head.
b. On 12 November 1933 Vogel arrived at the camp together with
Regierungsrat Dr. Wolf from Leipzig and again entered the chamber.
On this day several prisoners were brought in. Vogel pointed out one
of the prisoners to the SA-men present in the room, among whom were
Sturmmann Walter Rohmkopf, Truppfuehrer Herbert Meier, and Truppfuehrer
Georg Lehmann, and declared, in effect, that this man "should get his
ass particularly full". He also stated that the prisoner had offended
or threatened one of his people. Upon this invitation the prisoner was
laid across the counter in the usual manner, held fast by the head
and arms, and then beaten for a considerable time by the SA men with
whips and other articles. Along with this Vogel himself took part in
the beating for a time, and after this mistreatment slapped him again,
so that the prisoner appeared green and blue in the face. The prisoner
is the tinsmith Hans Kuehitz, who bore the nickname Johnny. Upon his
departure Vogel gave the head of the supply room, Truppenfuehrer
Meier from 5 to 6 reichsmarks with the stated reason that the SA men
"had sweated so". The money was then distributed by Meier to those
SA-comrades who had taken part in the mistreatment.
Under the date of 20 May 1935 the Reich Deputy in Saxony forwarded to
me with a recommendation Vogel's petition for nolle prossing dated 10
May, 1935, which was addressed to him, and a copy of which is attached.
I do not wish to approve this petition. The mistreatments which
took place in the camp of Hohnstein are more numerous and in their
fashion more serious than the cases of mistreatment in the well-known
protective custody camp Bredow, near Stettin. As in the case of Bredow
an authoritative official of the State Secret Police, in like manner
as SS-Sturmfuehrer Dr. Hoffmann, shot on 30 June, 1934, knowing
of the mistreatment and for the most part instigating it himself,
Oberregierungsrat Vogel, as an authoritative member of the supervisory
agency of the camp for the State Secret Police of Saxony, knew of the
mistreatment and to an extent even took part in it. By his actions
he supported the convicted SA-leaders and men in their deeds and
thereby bears the largest part of responsibility for the criminal acts
committed there. It would not be right to let this participant, who
in view of his training, his position of leadership, and his office,
must have recognized the objectionability of the proceedings in the
camp with particular clarity, go unpunished while the SA-leaders
and men received considerable sentences--even if not very severe in
comparison with their deeds. A nolle prossing of the case against Vogel
would represent unearned granting of favors to a more highly placed
participant, and therefore one endowed with more responsibility, and
would be considered as such by all persons involved. It would stand in
starkest irreconcilable contradiction to the treatment of the Stettin
cases.
Signed: Dr. Guertner
2. To the Minister, respectfully
3. 1 month.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 788-PS
The Secretary of the State and Chief of the Office of the President.
Berlin W8, 25 June 1935
Voss-Strasse 1
RP 3/52/35
_Your Nr. Z.F. g 10 398/35 of 18 June 1935_
Subject: Nolle-Prosse of Criminal Proceeding against Oberregierungsrat
Vogel for committing bodily injury while in Office.
Before making a decision, the Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor wants to
discuss personally with the Reich-Governor of Saxony the complaints
brought forward against Oberregierungsrat Vogel and the events
connected with them. Therefore I shall withhold further information
and request that until then further action on this procedure be also
withheld.--
/s/ Dr. Meissner.
To the Reich Minister of Justice, Berlin W 8.
* * * * *
The Secretary of the State and Chief of the Office of the President
Berlin W8, 9 Sept 1935
Voss-Strasse 1
_RP 3125/35 Your Nr. Z.F. g 10 398/35 of 18 June 1935_
Subject: Nolle-prosse of Criminal Proceedings against Oberregierungsrat
Vogel for committing bodily injury while in Office.
With reference to my letter of 25 June 1935--RP 3152/35--I am able
to inform you that the Fuehrer and Reichs-Chancellor has decided for
annulment of the criminal proceedings against Oberregierungsrat Vogel
for his having committed bodily injury.
On the Fuehrer's behalf I request presentation of the draft of the
decree for annulment.--
/s/ Dr. Meissner
To the Reich Minister of Justice, Berlin.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
[Penciled note:] Duplicate
Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all
Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:
The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the world of
my thoughts, which governs me in the face of future events, and to tell
you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible
in connection with the ideological [weltanschaulich] education of the
German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919,
my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation
of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their
occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs
which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has
had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a
clear recognition of the probable course of historical events, and the
firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when
I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the
struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I
had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First
of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a
minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I
arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs.
When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle
lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had
to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and
extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior,
abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education
to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second
task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular
characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of
Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard
decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to
the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers
was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly
behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for
rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted
misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of
compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland,
again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of
people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the
fortification of the whole country especially in the west.
One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful.
It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next
step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible
to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification
had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one
effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be
satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial
solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed
the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time
whether I should start first against the east and then in the west
or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time.
Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One
might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see
the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not
want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger
living space [Lebensraum]. My goal was to create a logical relation
between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The
struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution
of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is
taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then
adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration.
In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space,
by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and
weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course
all their weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to the force of the
outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child.
This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss
of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space
to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state
has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population
potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That
means the greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this
responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people.
That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to
bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available
space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of
any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce
the strength to fight must withdraw. Struggles are different than
those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we
fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the
peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence
of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence
was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her
task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870
England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that
there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was
of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war.
To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization.
German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness
of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the
offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were
missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by
attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military
leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there
came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these
problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For
the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have
a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and
considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first
time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is
at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I
have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and
then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in
order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier
or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided
that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so
quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most
glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men
and material. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions.
It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the
situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his
fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him.
The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia
is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today.
Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as
long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only
so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck
thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia
has far-reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in
the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West.
Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans
and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our
foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her.
At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she
renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see
into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army
is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation
will remain.
Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter
everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire.
Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The
court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can
be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her
imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it
should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in
the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into
Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with
Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not
attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as
the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to
us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have
experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one
will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy
maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared.
Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of
Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences,
but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its
neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America is still
not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet
certain whether she will join against England.
Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now;
in 6 months it might not be so anymore.
As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty:
irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace
me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the
powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by
the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently
is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is
a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but
can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the
relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sterness
against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the
Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a
superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents
disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the
construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large
to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions:
Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of
the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The
new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war
England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana Sea. At Malta,
Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a
renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of
divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for
the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before
next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has
only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first
phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from
the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at
6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to
two years [1-2 Jahren], I have the greatest experience in rearmament
and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.
After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of
military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the
French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army
deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced
her demands.
In summary:
1. The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2. Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3. Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4. Tank corps.
5. Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914
machine guns.
6. German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7. French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.
Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier
is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear
the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as
it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one
should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the
soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the
opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every
German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhilaration of
patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only
advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case.
I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only
better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the
present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in
1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing
like this in the campaign in Poland.
Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance
if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I
can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything
lies in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the
German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy
in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small
navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.
We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire
living space of the Germans.
The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West
it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.
Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy
numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armament
industry of the world.
I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English.
The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt
that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in
six to eight months.
We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on
the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium
and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That
could lead to the paralyzing of the German power of resistance. Every
hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not
the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate
Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts.
Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany
when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring
Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and
Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the
incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a
Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The
Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up.
This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not
even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to
motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order
to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One
more thing. U-boats, mines, and Luftwaffe (also for mines) can strike
England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight
to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be
carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance
for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall
sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine
warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England
cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent
sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees.
However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland.
It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have
achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the
German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now.
I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory
or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the first
Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even
there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything
depended on Frederick the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in
1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall
attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment.
Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No
one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the
breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not
break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack
the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to
end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether
the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends
upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A
prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of
fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the
leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.
Individual acknowledgments: The enemy must be beaten only by attack.
Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918.
Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men,
reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that
which is not ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means
the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not
just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.
I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons.
1. The decision is irrevocable.
2. The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are
determined.
The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate
demands from us no more than from the great men of German history.
As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I
shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to
me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unshamed if I
have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German
people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with
destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced
many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the
prophecy.
If we come through this struggle victoriously--and we shall come
through victoriously--our time will enter into the history of our
people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive
the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no
revolution from the interior forces.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 795-PS
CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KEITEL
on 17 August 1939
[Identified by General Keitel as a memorandum of Admiral Canaris]
I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he would not
pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had not informed him
and had only let him know that we were to furnish Heydrich with Polish
uniforms. He agreed that I instruct the General Staff. He says that he
does not think much of actions of this kind. However, there is nothing
else to be done if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could
not ask the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special
action. In regard to Dirschau he has decided that this action would be
executed only by the army.
I then reported my conference with Roatta. He told me that he thought
it very good if Mussolini would tell the Fuehrer in definite terms
that he would not enter the war. He personally is of the opinion that
Mussolini would join anyhow. I answered him that I believed this
improbable by reason of the conference between Ciano and Ribbentrop
which I reported to him once more in detail. He says that the Fuehrer
had told him contrarywise. Based on my reports he had to conclude
that the Fuehrer does not tell him--Keitel--everything. Furthermore, I
told him that I had learned from Count Marogna that the King of Italy
had told King Alfonse a few days ago that he would not sign under any
circumstances if Mussolini should present the order for mobilization.
In connection with this Keitel expresses the opinion that it is quite
interesting to note that even a country like Italy which is governed
by a dictatorship does not think much of war. How much more so must it
be in the democratic countries? He is confident that the English would
not interfere. I tried to contradict his views and say that the English
would certainly at once institute a blockade and would destroy our
merchant shipping. Keitel believes this to be of no great importance
as we would receive oil from Rumania. I answered that this is not the
deciding factor and that we could not resist a blockade for a long time
and that England would fight against this with all their means if we
should use force against the Poles and if it were to come to bloodshed.
I told him that the English would have acted in precisely the same
manner, had any bloodshed occurred when we marched into Czechoslovakia.
I tried to explain to Keitel the consequences of economic warfare for
Germany and tell him that we have only very few means to counteract
it. Just a short while ago I had heard that we could only send 10
submarines into the Atlantic Ocean. Keitel thinks that it should be
easy to force Rumania to surrender her oil after the conquest of
Poland. I called his attention to the actions of the English in the
Balkans and tried to explain to him that the English would certainly
have everything prepared in the Balkans for such an eventuality.
Bulgaria would not be useful to us as an ally as it would be attacked
at once by Rumania and Turkey.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 798-PS
The Fuehrer's speech to the Commanders in Chief on 22 August 1939
I have called you together to give you a picture of the political
situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual
elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to
strengthen your confidence.
After this we will discuss military details.
It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner
or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought
that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only
afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One
cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted
to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight
first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could
not be executed, since essential points have changed. It became clear
to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the
West. Poland wants access to the sea. The further development became
obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear
to me that under circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an
inopportune moment. I enumerate as reasons for this reflection:
1. First of all two personal constitutions:
My own personality and that of Mussolini.
Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my political
activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again
have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will
probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I
have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be
eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.
The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive.
If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no
longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian court is against
the Duce. Above all, the court sees in the expansion of the empire a
burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only benevolent
neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco's personality. He
guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in
Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet
have a Fascist party of our internal unity.
On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities
are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.
For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can
only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions,
that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm
this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents risk much
and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably
great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No
masters, no men of action.
Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for
us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England, in
the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.
The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened.
From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between
England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent.
Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger.
Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only
with concern.
France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the
Mediterranean.
Further favorable factors for us are these:
Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal
situation.
Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable.
She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey
has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.
All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3
years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better
now.
The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically,
but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a
bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military.
If at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving
individual tasks.
The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto
was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland
(Danzig corridor) were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland
changed her tone toward us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass
to the others. This moment is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An
attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our
disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with
cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change
our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in
the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now
the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We
must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept
a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to
strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.
Reference to previous risks.
I would have been stoned if I had not carried my point. The most
dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week
before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great
risk in the conviction that it may succeed.
Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.
The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France
are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual
rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that
many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the solution
of the Czech question: The Fuehrer carried his point because you lost
your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present
propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element
of this war of nerves to present the increase of armament. But how is
British rearmament in actual fact? The construction program of the Navy
for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve
fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the
Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.
Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of
3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force,
but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages.
At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been
ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire
directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This
can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has
only 130,000 men, France 72,000 men, Poland 15,000 men. England does
not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.
The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from
England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to
make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver.
This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She
does not risk 8 millions pounds in Poland, although she put half a
billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious.
She will not accept any risks.
France lacks men (decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for
rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter
on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against
us:
1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarchy and
because we have sources of aid in the east.
2. Attack from the west from the Maginot line: I consider this
impossible.
Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss
neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as
Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means.
England and France will not violate the neutrality of those countries.
Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy.
A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a
longer war. If Mr. von Brauchitsch had told me that I would need 4
years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it cannot be done.
It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.
We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland.
We must be conscious of our great production. It is much bigger than in
1914-1918.
The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after
the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of
resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.
I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer.
Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it
is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of
a war victoriously or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I
brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with
the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of
a non-aggression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four
days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia
answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract
with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will
conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted
her.
We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with
grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands
great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some
Schweinhund [literally, swineherd's dog; figuratively, filthy person]
will make a proposal for mediation.
The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the
destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier,
after I have made the political preparations.
Today's publication of the non-aggression pact with Russia hit like a
shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that
this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland
will be tremendous.
Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the
armed forces will do their duty.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 812-PS
[Seal] Salzburg, 22 Aug. 1939
The Gauleiter Chiemsee
_Personal!_
_Only direct delivery!_
To the Reich Minister Dr. Arthur SEYSS-INQUART,
VIENNA I Ballhausplatz 2
Dear Dr. Seyss:
I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you asked me to
inform you what I know of those matters, which among others, are the
subject of your correspondence with Buerckel.
I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that has been brought to
my notice in the course of time by different people. I wish to clarify
essentially my own attitude.
On the 5th of July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich
Commissioner Gauleader Buerckel if I was in possession of the
memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him that I
do not have this memorandum and that I never possessed a single part of
it, that I furthermore did not then participate in the matter and do
not know its content. Because of official requests by Buerckel I have
entrusted him with a report accompanied by a letter written on the 6th
July.
If Buerckel now writes to you that certain statements were confirmed
by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each of my copies
of those two documents, which were only written in single originals.
I shall specially inform Buerckel of this. I connect this with
the declaration, that I have given--apart from those written
explanations--no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms whatsoever
regarding you and your attitude and that I have authorized nobody to
refer to any statements of mine.
Since the beginning of our collaboration I have always expressed and
represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself and my opinion of
your personality. This conception of mine was the very basis of our
collaboration. The events of February and March have not changed this,
especially since I considered the political success of the 11th March
merely as a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have
equally induced both of us to collaborate.
As far as Globus is concerned you are fully aware of his species which
I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe
that you already talked to Globus about the occurrences between the
11th of March 1938 and today; and I am convinced that he will tell you
everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this
matter, as is your intention.
With the best regards and
HEIL HITLER!
Yours
_2 enclosures._ [signed] Friedl Rainer
* * * * *
Copy.
Salzburg, 6 July 1939
To the Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel
_Vienna I_
Parliament
Dear Party Member Buerckel!
Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I flew
to Berlin to report to Hitler's deputy, Hess, about the events which
led to our taking over the government. We did this because we had the
impression that the general opinion, perhaps also Hitler's own, was
that the liberation depended more on Austrian matters of state rather
than the party. To be more exact. Hitler especially mentioned Dr.
Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit for the
change and thus believed him to have played the sole leading role.
This conception does not, however, correspond to the true proportions
of powers and to the conditions of leadership which were completely
clear until 12 March 1938. At that time I gave a short report in
Klausner's behalf to the deputy of Hitler and also submitted a short
summary of the developments since 1934. I made no single copy of this.
I did not take part in further actions of this kind since they seemed
to me to be too much connected with personal feelings. I think the
main reason for the fact that the person of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed
to Hitler and to public opinion to have stepped in the limelight in
those March days, was that no position existed in the party from which
one might have presented oneself to the public; and that there was no
man who had the guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason
was that the party leadership had to remain secret during the whole
illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German public. He who wanted
to direct correctly the political battle of the Austrian nazism had
to forego public fame. Leopold did not want to forego that and made
such decisive political mistakes that his recall became necessary.
The person of Klausner never longed for fame and was therefore not
suitable to appear gloriously after the taking over of power. The
two powers behind Klausner--I consider the dynamic part of Globocnik
and the political part of myself--were bound from the beginning, as
collaborators of Klausner's, to put him to the fore.
We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual
leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not
be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was
an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped
especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler and also for
the public the role of the party during the events preceding 12 March
1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration
to party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from
the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity
about the fight of the party. I did not undertake steps to give just
credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed
to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart; and I would not do that, primarily
because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore because I believe
that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. I am also convinced
that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore that
Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special
preference of his person, but that he is attracted to him personally.
It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person was
more or less meritorious, in this sector of the great fight of the
movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the greatest part is
to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as
the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept
existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the
party.
If I should be asked to describe--without personal interest--the role
of the party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at
any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a
short summary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of
this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.
Heil Hitler!
Rainer e.h.
1 Enclosure
* * * * *
COPY.
Report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria since the beginning of
the last stage of battle until the seizure of power on the 11th March
1938.
In 1933 the Party fought a parliamentary battle. By the seizure of
power in the Reich it gained considerably in numbers. It started to
try to enforce new elections in order to gain admission into the
government. By these means it should have taken over the government.
The enemies recognized this fact, and the Government Dollfuss preceded,
while tolerating the reds, to force the NSDAP from its legal plane in
order to render it innocuous. In this the government used legal tricks,
thereby practically doing away progressively with the democratic
constitution. The first attempts of the government were answered by the
Party with an increase of pressure; and the government's breaches of
constitution were answered by arbitrary acts with the assumption that
it might thus be able to overthrow the government. This assumption was
wrong; at that time the government had the backing of all anti-German
foreign countries, and it felt sufficiently strong to prohibit the
NSDAP, and confession of adherence to the NSDAP, and subsequently to
treat as high treason the confession in favor of the "Anschluss".
Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July
rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, and the
execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction
of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through
imprisonment or flight into the "Alt-Reich"; and with regard to the
political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgement
of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government.
With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal
relationships between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the
first stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration
was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich was
dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own resources.
There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in Austria. New
leaderships were forming in the mine Gaus. The process was again and
again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no
liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three
or more rival leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of
almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer Reinthaller (already
appointed Landesbauernfuehrer [leader of the country's farmers]
by Hess). He endeavoured to bring about a political appeasement
by negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving
the N.S.D.A.P. legal status again, thus permitting its political
activities. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the reconstruction of
the illegal political organization, at the head of which he had placed
engineer Neubacher.
The first attempt to create a legal political organization which was
to negotiate with the Government while a secret illegal organization
existed, did not succeed; it brought about quarrels in almost all
Gaus and ended with pressure of the illegal branch against the policy
of appeasement of Reinthaller, and with the latter's retirement as
Landesleiter [country leader]. The successor, Neubacher, head of the
illegal organization, was not recognized by all the Gaus, because
meanwhile the former Gauleader of Lower Austria, Captain Leopold,
was released; and he claimed the country leadership because of his
seniority in the party. In Carinthia at about that time, Klausner
with his collaborators Globocnik, Rainer, Longhin and Pawlowski had
reconstructed and readied the Gau Carinthia. The Gau Carinthia kept
away from the quarrels of the leaders, and arbitrated the differences
between Leopold and Neubacher, and finally effected a solution in
such a way that Neubacher and his adherents recognized Leopold as the
country leader; and Leopold appointed Neubacher to be his deputy. The
points of friction between those two groups were not yet eliminated.
Those differences did not remain concealed from the police; and the
police got hold of a polemic by the group of Leopold against the group
of Neubacher, on the strength of this material they arrested Leopold
and Neubacher.
At that time the success of the calm attitude of the Gau Carinthia was
crowned by the fact that after these arrests the representatives of all
the Gaus came to Carinthia to offer Klausner the country leadership.
By order of Klausner Dr. Rainer reported at these conferences the
political referendum and developed the political conception as adopted
by the Gau Carinthia on the basis of which, as a matter of fact, an
agreement was reached. In July 1935 Klausner became the head of the
movement without, however adopting the title of country leader because
he considered it wrong as long as the country leader Leopold was
imprisoned, but he looked upon himself as the speaker of the college
of Gauleaders. With the consent of the representatives of all the
Gaus, Klausner at that time appointed Globocnik as co-worker for the
organizational part, and Rainer as co-worker for the political part of
his task.
In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were,
apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh
then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned
Leopold, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by
engineer Raffelsberger had at this time also established connections
with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German
Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political
motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria.
In Spring of 1936 Schattenfroh was arrested; he had named party member
Hinterleitner of Linz as his successor as managerial country leader.
In March Klausner was arrested in connection with the arrest of about
60 leading Nazis, whereas Dr. Rainer was released. Hinterleitner again
followed those directives which were set down at the conferences at
Carinthia in the Spring of 1935; and in May 1936 he appointed Rainer,
Globocnik and engineer Hiedler to the country leadership in the
following spheres of influence:
Rainer to be chief of the political staff; Hiedler as chief of the
organization; and Globocnik as liaison officer with the Reich and as
organizer of all the auxiliary bases outside of Austria.
The principles of the construction of the organization were: The
organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the
idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without
compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be
available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides
this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people
and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the
illegal organization. Therefore, co-operation between the illegal party
organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of
the party leadership. All connections with the party in Germany were
kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuehrer. These said
that the German state should officially be omitted from the creation of
an Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press,
refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in the foreign countries
bordering Austria.
Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had
connection with Dr. Wachter which originated from Seyss-Inquart's
support of the July uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had
a good position in the legal field and especially well-established
relations with Christian-Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came
from the ranks of the "Styrian Heimatschutz" and became a party
member when the entire "Styrian Heimatschutz" was incorporated into
the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal
field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The
agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of
these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Fuehrer as
being a trusted person.
At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the party
in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian
National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleiter was arrested,
and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party.
On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the
"Obersalzburg" where they received a clear explanation of the situation
and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters
met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from
Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions
for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiters
received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler.
Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen.
[Gruppenfuehrer] Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was
appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July 1936, to
supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time
Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer for the party in
Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate
with Leopold, he worked together with Dr. Rainer, Globocnik,
Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner as leader of the
SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader of the Austrian party, as well as
with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.
Regarding internal conditions, it was clear that full recognition
of the party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart. He was also in
permanent contact with Capt. Leopold, and there were never any serious
conflicts between them. But he also acknowledged the correctness of Dr.
Rainer's political interpretations, and the actual leadership of Dr.
Rainer in all political actions. The situation was much the same with
Glaise-Horstenau who was whole-heartedly for Rainer and Globocnik but
always carefully guarded the legal party position of Leopold.
Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group leader
Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the activities of
other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to obtain the appointment
of Seyss-Inquart as "Staatsrat" (councillor of state) in July 1937.
Due to the same facts, the Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to
take a new so-called "satisfactory action". Through all this a new
and stronger political position was won in the Austrian system. The
National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the political
field and became a partner with whom one had to negotiate, even when
it was not officially incorporated into internal Austrian political
developments. This complicated political maneuver, accompanied by the
steadily increasing pressure from the Reich, led to the talks between
the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppenfuehrer
Keppler presented the concrete political demands of the fighting
underground movement, which he estimated according to his personal
experiences and the information he received. The results of these talks
were the right of a free acknowledgment of the National Socialist
movement on the one hand and the recognition of an independent Austrian
state on the other hand, as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart
as Minister of Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will
guarantee to both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements.
In this way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the
center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the government
was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis of the "system
apparatus" (Schuschnigg government) at a time when a revolution needed
to be carried out. Through this, the basis for a new attack on the
Schuschnigg government was won.
Another result of the agreement was the appointment by the Fuehrer of
Leopold as a member of the Staff of Hess. After a long, personal talk
with Klausner, the Fuehrer appointed him as leader of the Austrian
National Socialists, upon recommendation of Keppler. The relationship
between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner was as follows: Seyss-Inquart
acknowledged unconditionally the party leadership and actions taken by
it; and he also acknowledged Klausner as the leader of the party. As a
party member he was under the command of Klausner and received orders
from him. But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the
statement the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit in Berlin,
Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer and directly
responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines
of his political sphere. Seyss-Inquart also acknowledged the free
political initiative of the party leader of Austria.
The "Landesleitung" received word about the planned plebiscite through
illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session
which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that
he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not
talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this
subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal
information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new
situation, he had been cooperating with the "Landesleitung" from the
very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart
were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it
was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately;
secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to
him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart
to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the
government until clear instructions and orders were received from
the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to
Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by
Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.
Negotiations with the government were not successful. Therefore they
were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he
received from the Fuehrer. On the 10th March all preparations for
future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary
orders given to all units leaders. During the night of the 10th to
11th, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that
the Fuehrer gave the party freedom of action and that he would back
it in everything it did. Rainer then gave the final instruction for
Friday, the 11th of March, and explained that three situations might
develop within the following days:
1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a great
demonstration must be held.
2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was
ordered in taking over the government power.
3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party
leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means
to capture the position of power.
Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.
On Friday, 11 March, the minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna
after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he
went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the "Landesleitung" had a
meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart,
Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and Muehlmann participated. Dr.
Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had
ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.
In regard to Rainer's proposal, von Klausner ordered that the
government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours,
signed by legal political, "Front" men, including both ministers and
also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a
voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance
with the constitution.
On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought
with him a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram
to the Fuehrer calling for help, were prepared.
Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in
the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of
all ministers for 2:00 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that
Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to
the population at 3:00 p.m. and at the same time he would start all
necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from
the session of the ministers' council before that time. During this
time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30, Seyss-Inquart 'phoned
Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the
pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to
call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures
for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had
resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered "No." Rainer informed the
"Reichskanzlei" through the German Embassy, and received an answer from
Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will not consent to
partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was
informed of this by Globocnik and Muehlmann; talks were had between
Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg: Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart
asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer's answer:
Reestablishment of the government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the
party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police
force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but
very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened
by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the German
Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government
under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of
the party, and permission for the legion to return, all within the
specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the
border at 8:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by
Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand.
Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a
government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and
proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter
rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by
himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak
and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated
with Zernette. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt,
Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General
Muffe, and the "Gruppenfuehrer" Keppler, who had arrived in the
meantime, were also negotiating. At 7:00 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the
negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas
to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of
a German invasion.
Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an
urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The
situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared
that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the
entire party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and
seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of
the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried
out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p.m.
the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all
important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. Rainer, with
the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take
over power in all eight "gaus" of Austria, with the help of the SS and
SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to
resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor
Seyss-Inquart.
With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete
occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all
important posts by the party. * * *
The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the
Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart
in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over
of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of
power by the party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr.
Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be
considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March
1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the
orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer.
6.7.1939 Rainer e. h.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 829-PS
TOP SECRET
Copy
The Chief of the OKW
WFST. / Abt. L (IV/Qu)
Nr. 002060/41 g. Kdos.
F.H. Qu., 16 September 1941
40 copies, 32nd copy
_Subject_: Communist insurrection in the occupied territories.
1. Since the campaign against Soviet Russia started there have been
communist insurrections everywhere in the territories occupied by
Germany. The actions range from propaganda and assaults against single
members of the armed forces to open revolt and spreading guerilla
warfare.
It should be noted that this is a _mass movement which is centrally
directed from Moscow_ and to which also the single and seemingly
trifling incidents are to be ascribed occurring in areas which have
been quiet so far.
Due to the manifold political and economic tensions in the occupied
territories we must also expect _nationalistic and other groups_ to
take advantage of the situation and to instigate difficulties for the
German occupation troops by joining the communist insurrection.
This way an increasing _danger for the German conduct of the war_
arises which becomes apparent first by generally unsafe conditions for
the occupation troops and already has led to troops being detached to
the main centers of the unrest.
2. Previous measures to counteract this general communist insurrection
have proved inadequate.
The Fuehrer has now ordered that _everywhere the most drastic means_
are to be employed in order to quench the movement within the shortest
time possible.
Only in this manner which has always been employed successfully by
great nations in the history of their conquests quiet can be restored.
3. The following _directives_ are to be observed:
_a._ In each case of _revolt_ against the German occupation force
_Communist sources_ are to be suspected regardless of what the
individual circumstances are.
_b._ To nip the plots in the bud the most drastic means are to be
employed immediately at the first provocation in order to make the
authority of the occupation force prevail and to prevent further
spreading. Attention should be paid to the fact that a human life
in the countries concerned often means nothing and only by unusual
severity can a deterrent effect be achieved. In these cases the life
of one German soldier must be atoned for by the death sentence for 50
to 100 communists, as a rule. The manner of execution shall further
increase the deterrent effect.
The opposite procedure to use relatively mild punishment first and
to do with the threat of more severe action as a deterrent is not in
accordance with these principles and therefore should not be employed.
_c._ The _political relationships_ between Germany and the respective
country in question are irrelevant for the attitude of the military
occupation authorities.
To the contrary, it is to be considered and emphasized by propaganda
that striking with energy will also liberate the native populations
from communist criminals and result to their benefit.
Clever propaganda of this kind consequently will not cause undesirable
reactions of the friendly parts of the population on account of the
severe measures against the communists.
_d._ _Native men_ will generally be a failure in the execution of such
measures of force. Their strengthening brings an increased danger for
our own troops and therefore must not be allowed.
However, prizes and rewards should be lavishly offered to the
population in order to ensure its cooperation in a suitable way.
_e._ If as an exception _court martial_ is to be opened in connection
with communist revolts or other offenses against the German occupation
force, the most drastic penalties are to be imposed.
In such cases the death penalty only can be an actual means having
deterrent effect. Particularly acts of espionage and sabotage and
attempts to join a foreign army are, as a rule, to be punished with
death. Also in cases of bearing arms without permission the death
sentence is to be imposed in general.
4. The _commanders in the occupied territories_ see to it that these
principles are made known to all military offices without delay which
have to deal with communist acts of revolt.
Certified /s/ Keitel
[signature illegible]
M.V.J.
_Distribution_:
Commander of Armed Forces South-East
[W. Bfh. Suedost] 1st copy
with additional copies for Commander
Serbia 2nd copy
with additional copies for Commander
Salonika-Aegean Sea 3rd copy
with additional copies for Commander
Southern Greece 4th copy
with additional copies for Commander
Crete 5th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Norway 6th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Netherlands 7th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Eastern Territory 8th copy
Commander of Armed Forces Ukraine 9th copy
Plenipotentiary for the Armed Force with the Reich
Protector in Bohemia and Moravia 10th copy
High Command of the Army--OKH (operational
sec.) 11th copy
[O.Qu.IV] 12th copy
(Gen. Qu.) with additional copy for 13th copy
Mil Cdr. France 14th copy
Mil. Cdr. Belgium and Northern France 15th copy
Mil. Cdr. in the Gouv. Gen. 16th copy
Chief of Armament and Cdr. of Reserve 17th copy
with add. copy for Cdr. German Troops in Denmark 18th copy
Chief of Air Force (General Staff) 19th copy
Chief of Navy [OKM] Chief of naval operations
[SKL] 20th copy
Armistice Commission [W.St.K.] Wiesbaden 21st copy
Foreign Office, attention ambassador [?] Ritter 22nd copy
Verfuegungsstab Frankfurt/Oder } via L II 23rd copy
Verfuegungsstab Breslau } 24th copy
_OKW_:
Operational Staff of the Armed Forces [WFST] 25th copy
Abt. L 26-32nd copy
WPr. 33rd copy
Office Ausl./Abw. 34th copy
Counterintelligence Abw. III 35th copy
Foreign department Abt. Ausl. 36th copy
Economic Armament office 37th copy
AWA 38th copy
WR 39th copy
Liaison-office [V.O.] at Gen. Gouv. Cracow 40th copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 833-PS
SECRET
High Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 2 February 1942.
_Foreign office/Intelligence/Intell. Dept. III No. 570/1.42 g (ZR/ III
C 2_
Subject: Prosecution of crimes against the Reich or the occupying
forces in the occupied territories
Wehrm. High Command
7 Feb. 1942
_No. 221 / 42 g_
_further_:
to: 149/10 10
_Reference_: None
_Inclosures_: 3
In the enclosure are transmitted
1. a decree of the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
of 7.12.41
2. an executory decree of the same day
3. a circular of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command of 12.12.41
The decree carries a basic innovation. The Fuehrer and commander in
chief of the armed forces commands that crimes of the specified sort
committed by civilians of the occupied territories are to be punished
by the pertinent courts martial in the occupied territories _only_ when
(_a_) The sentence calls for the death penalty
_and_ (_b_) the sentence is pronounced within 8 days after the arrest.
Only when both conditions are met does the Fuehrer and commander in
chief of the armed forces hope for the desired deterrent effect from
the conduct of punitive proceedings in the occupied territories.
In other cases in the future the accused are to be secretly brought
to Germany and the further conduct of the trial carried on here. The
deterrent effect of these measures lies
(_a_) in allowing the disappearance of the accused without a trace,
(_b_) therein, that no information whatsoever may be given about their
whereabouts and their fate.
This decree brings only insignificant changes of their activity to the
intelligence [Abwehr] agencies. Now as before the intelligence agencies
determine the time for the arrest of the espionage and sabotage
suspect. However, in conjunction with establishment of the time it
must however be considered now that previous to the arrest evidence
fully sufficient for the conviction of the perpetrator must if possible
be on hand, for further investigation hardly comes into question after
the seizure, since a sentence must take place within 8 days, or on the
other hand further investigation _on the spot_ by confrontation is made
impossible by the evacuation of the prisoners to Germany. Therefore
contact should be made with the pertinent military court previous to
the arrest in order to check on the question as to whether or not the
collected evidence suffices.
When in the opinion of the pertinent court martial and/or the military
commander an immediate conviction on the spot is not possible,
and the perpetrators are therefore to be evacuated to Germany,
the intelligence agencies will inform Reich security headquarters
[Reichssicherheitshauptamt] in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrecht-Str. 8,
attention of Herr Kriminaldirektor Fischer, directly, with a statement
of the exact number of prisoners and the groups that belong together
according to the circumstances of the individual case. Insofar as in
individual cases the superior commander has an urgent interest in the
conviction by a Wehrmacht court, this will be brought to the attention
of Reich security headquarters. A copy of the whole report to Reich
security headquarters is to be sent to the Foreign Office/Intelligence,
Intelligence Department III.
The Reich security headquarters will determine a state police office,
depending on accommodation possibilities, which will take over the
prisoners. This state police office makes contact with the proper
intelligence office and arranges the details of the evacuation,
particularly if it will be handled by the secret military police,
military police, or by the Gestapo itself, as well as manner and place
of transfer of subjects.
The decree of the Fuehrer is to be applied, to begin with, only in
the occupied western territories (Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, and
Northern France, France).
The intelligence agencies must make report to the chief of staff on the
above regulations decreed by the foreign office intelligencer.
For the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command
Signature: CANARIS
_Distribution_:
To (Intelligence III) 127
_For information_:
West (Armed Forces Operational staff.) 1
WR 15
Foreign Office Intelligence Z, ZR 2
Foreign Department 1
Intelligence III
W, H, M, Air
FPdW, F, C, C1, C2, each 1 9
Wi 1
U 2
Reich Security Headquarters,
Department IV E,
attention of Kriminaldirektor Fischer 1
Original 1
Supply 40
----
200
====
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 835-PS
SECRET
High Command of the Armed Forces
_14 n 16.18 WR_(_1/3_)
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 2 September 1944
Telephone Local 218191
Long distance 218091
Refer to file number date and content.
To the German Armistice Commission re letter of 10.8.44 Az. 630/44.
_For information to: OKW/WFSt/Qu/Verw.1_, WFSt/Foreign Office Group.
_Concerns_: Status of Political Prisoners.
_Reference_: Fuehrer decree of 30.7.44 (OKW/WFSt/Qu 2/Verw.1 Nr.
009169 g.K.) and decree OKW of 18.2.44 (_WFSt/Qu 2/Verw.1 Nr. 009169
g.K._) WR 1/3 Nr. 79/44 g.K.
Conforming to the decrees, all non-German civilians in occupied
territory who have endangered the security and readiness for action of
the occupying power by acts of terror and sabotage or in other ways are
to be surrendered to the security police and to the security service
(SD). Only those prisoners are excepted who were legally sentenced
to death or were serving a sentence of confinement prior to the
announcement of these decrees. Included in the punishable acts which
endanger the security or readiness of action of the garrison power are
also those of a political nature. The declaration of the senior office
of the SS [Protection Corps] and Police with the Military Commander
of France that he cannot answer questions about political prisoners
during Anglo-American operations, includes therefore all political
prisoners in the occupied French territories seized recently or to be
seized in the near future.
The treatment of prisoners who are condemned according to the decree of
the Fuehrer of December 7, 1941 OKW/WR (I/3/4 14 n 16 Nr. 165/41 g) and
who have no communication with the outer world, will soon be discussed
with all interested officers.
By order
Sig. Dr. Lehmann
For correctness
BDC--OKW--1643 [Signature illegible.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 837-PS
SECRET
National Socialist German Labour Party
Fuehrer's Deputy.
The Brown House,
Munich-33, February 3rd 1939
SECRET
_Order No. 5/39 g_
(Not for Publication)
Subject: National league of Germans abroad [Volksbund fuer das
Deutschtum in Ausland] and the German Eastern League [Bund Deutscher
Osten]
The Director of the Agency for Racial Germans [Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle] SS-Gruppenfuehrer Lorenz, has instigated on my behalf the
following new ruling for questions affecting racial work and work in
the border country.
1. The National League of Germans abroad [VDA] is the association
responsible for national work beyond the frontiers. At the head of
the association, the new statutes of the VDA provide for a League
Directorate consisting for the most part of leading party members
in place of an independent League Director, whose office has been
cancelled. Professor Karl Haushofer (Gen. ret.) has taken over the
chairmanship of this Directorate. Party member Paul Meike is business
manager of the League Directorate of the VDA and in this capacity
he combines membership of the department of the Agency for Racial
Germans with managing the VDA on lines which are in accordance with
the instructions of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans.
Thus the VDA can no longer take action on its own which affects the
whole association. The VDA is organized into State Associations
[Landesverbaende], which correspond in area to the Gaue of the NSDAP.
2. The German Eastern League [BDO] is the association responsible
for work on the border country. SS-Oberfuehrer Dr. Behrends, the
deputy of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans, is charged,
until further notice, with its direction. Party Member Hoffmeyer is
the responsible manager of the German Eastern League. He directs its
business affairs according to the instructions of the Director of the
Agency for Racial Germans, and is a member of the staff of the Agency
for Racial Germans. The BDO is organized into State Groups, whose
regional borders correspond to those of the "Gaue" of the NSDAP.
3. All other associations for racial work and work in the border
country (Patriotic Associations) [Heimattreue Verdaende] etc., are
alternately transferred, according to their activities, to the
associations mentioned under 1 and 2. The managers of VDA and BDO are
commissioned to take the necessary measures for the incorporating of
these associations.
4. The VDA is solely responsible for racial work beyond the frontiers.
I herewith forbid the Party, its organizations and affiliated
associations from all racial work abroad. The only competent body
for this task is the Agency for Racial Germans, and the VDA as its
camouflaged tool. Within the Reich the VDA, generally speaking, is
responsible only for providing the means for racial work beyond the
frontiers. The VDA must be supported in this in every way by the Party
offices. Any outward appearance of a connection with the Party is,
however to be avoided.
5. The BDO is at the disposal of the Gauleiters of the frontier "Gaue"
for political duties on the frontiers. In addition, the establishment
of a frontier territory bureau [Granzlandamt] for the following "Gaue"
has been agreed to, in cases where such a bureau is not already in
existence:
East Prussia,
Pomerania,
Mark Brandenburg,
Silesia,
Sudetenland,
Bavarian Ostmark,
Upper Danube,
Lower Danube.
In all other "Gaue," special frontier territory bureaux or
representatives would be superfluous and are therefore not to be
established. Should they already exist, they are to be dissolved.
The activity of the BDO and the VDA is to be supported in every way
by the Party offices. The National Socialist leadership of both
associations will ensure energetic cooperation on their part in all
tasks assigned to them by the NSDAP. Their nature is determined by
considerations of foreign policy, and the associations must bear this
in mind when representing them in public.
Signed: R. HESS
Certified
[signed] Witt
(WITT)
_Distribution_: II d
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 838-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
The Brown House, Munich 33, 3 June 1939
Stabsleiter
Circular No. 122139
Subject: Adherents to Christian Science who are members of the Party
In decree No. 51/1939, dated 6 March 1939 the deputy of the Fuehrer has
forbidden that members of the Party be followers of Christian Science
due to the outspoken international connections of Christian Science and
he decreed that wherever double-membership exists it will have to be
annulled immediately.
I request that the leaders of the organizations of the Party issue
the necessary decree within the realm of their jurisdiction and also
make sure that no double-membership of Christian Science and of party
organizations exist.
I also request of the leaders of the affiliated organizations to make
sure by issuing decrees that within their realm of jurisdiction members
of the Christian Science will not hold official positions. I have no
objection for members of the affiliated organizations to be members of
the Christian Science.
Signed: M. Bormann
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 840-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Brown House, Munich 33, 14 July 1939
Regulation No. 140/39
Subject: Admission of Clergymen and Students of Theology into the NSDAP
In my regulation No. 24/37 dated 9 February 1937 I have decreed that in
order to avoid the penetration of contrasts of ecclesiastical-political
nature into the movement and to avoid the suspicion of a one-sided
attitude for or against an existing denomination, the admission of
members of the clergy into the Party is to be avoided. It turned out
that the nonadmission of members of the clergy into the Party is not
sufficient for the purpose in question.
In his regulation No. 34/39 on the lifting of the restriction of
memberships dated 10 May 1939 the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP has done
justice to this experience by decreeing that clergymen, _as well as
other fellow Germans who are also closely connected with the church_,
cannot be admitted into the Party.
_In addition to this I decree that in the future Party members who
enter the clergy_ or who turn to the study of Theology have to
leave the Party. This decree does not affect those students who are
matriculated mainly in other factors and, not intending to become
clergymen later attend only some lectures of the theological faculties.
Signed: for
BORMANN
Attested:
[Signature illegible]
_Distribution_: IV b
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 841-PS
SECRET
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY
Fuehrer's Deputy Chief of the Staff
Brown House, MUNICH 33, the 17 Jan. 1939
ORDER NO 1/39 SECRET
Subject: _Jews_.
Upon proposal of Field-Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer has made some basic
decisions concerning the Jewish problem. I make these decisions known
to you in the enclosure and request that you observe to take these
directives under all circumstances.
Signed: M. BORMANN
_1 Enclosure_
_Distribution_: III b
Certified
Signed: [illegible]
* * * * *
SECRET
PRIME MINISTER FIELD-MARSHALL
GOERING
Commissioner for four year plan
Berlin, 28. Dec. 1938
Upon my proposal, the Fuehrer made the following decisions concerning
the Jewish problem:
A
_I. Housing of Jews_
1. _a._ The tenant protective law, as a rule, is not to be abrogated
for the Jews. On the contrary, it is desired, if possible, to proceed
in particular cases in such a way that the Jews are quartered together
in separate houses insofar as the housing conditions allow that.
_b._ For this reason the aryanizing of the house ownership _is to be
postponed until the end of the total aryanization_, that is to say, for
the present the aryanizing of houses has to be carried out only where
in individual cases urgent reasons exist. The aryanizing of industries,
businesses, agricultural estates, forests, etc., is to be considered as
urgent.
2. Use of sleeping and dining cars is to be forbidden to the Jews. At
the same time, no special Jewish compartments to be established. As
well, the use of trains, street cars, suburban railways, underground
railways, busses, and ships can not be prohibited to the Jews.
3. Only the use of some public establishments, etc., is to be
prohibited to the Jews. In this category belong the hotels and
restaurants visited especially by party-members (for instance: Hotel
Kaiserhof--Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten--Munich; Hotel Deutscher
Hof--Nurnberg; Hotel Drei Mohren--Augsburg, etc.). The use of bathing
establishments, some public places, bathing resorts, etc. can be
prohibited to the Jews; also medicine baths, so far as they are
prescribed in particular cases by physicians, may be used by Jews, but
only in such ways that no offense is created.
II. Jews who were officials and have been pensioned are not to be
denied their pensions. Investigations though have to be made as to
whether these Jews can get along with a reduced allowance.
III. The Jewish welfare organizations are not to be aryanized or
abolished so that the Jews do not become a public charge, but may be
supported by Jewish welfare organizations.
IV. Jewish patents are property, and as such have to be aryanized. (A
similar procedure toward Germany was carried out by U.S.A. and other
countries during World War I).
B
_Mixed Marriages._
I. 1. _With children_ (part Jews 1st class)
_a._ If the father is a German and the mother a Jewess, this family
may stay in the future in its present lodging. The regulations for
exclusion of Jews are not to be applied to such families as far as
their housing is concerned.
In these cases, the property of the Jewish mother can be transferred to
the German husband, or to the mixed children.
_b._ If the father is a Jew and the mother a German, such families
also, are not to be moved for the present into Jewish quarters, because
the children (part Jews 1st class) in the future, must serve in the
labor service and the armed forces, and must not be exposed to Jewish
propaganda. Concerning the property, one must for the present proceed
in such a way that it can be completely or partly transferred to the
children.
2. _Without children._
_a._ If the husband is a German and wife a Jewess, the provisions of
1_a_ are valid accordingly.
_b._ If the husband is a Jew, and the wife a German, these childless
couples are to be proceeded against as if they were full-blooded Jews.
The husband's property can not be transferred to the wife. Both,
husband and wife can be moved into the Jewish houses or Jewish quarters.
Especially in case of emigration such married couples are to be treated
as Jews, as soon as an increased emigration is gotten under way.
II. If a German wife divorces a Jew, she reenters the German racial
community and all disadvantages for her discontinue.
Signed: GOERING
Certified copy
[Signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 842-PS
THE KREISLEITER
To The Area Staff Leaders [Gaustabsamtsleiter]
Party member SELLMER, NURNBERG
LAUF (PEGNITZ), December 30, 1940
In addition to my last report on the situation, I report the following:
The district physician of Hersbruck, Dr. Loeffler, informs me that in
Schupf near Kainsback (formerly Kreis Hersbruck) a young farmer, by
the name of Koch, was turned over to an institution for sterilization,
because of epileptic attacks.
A few weeks ago he wrote to his mother that he was feeling fine, and
that she should send him some smoking tobacco. His mother wrote him
in return that he should come back soon, as he is badly needed on the
farm. It is remarked here that the young Koch was of great help to the
mother Koch, a farmer's widow, as he managed the farm practically all
by himself.
A week later the widow was informed that her son had suddenly died, and
that she could obtain the urn containing the ashes.
As the young Koch had been known also in his neighborhood for his
industry, it is natural that this "violent death" has caused great
indignation.
When I proposed to district physician Loeffler to send a master mason
from Osternohe for a few weeks to the institution in Ausbach for
observation of his mental condition, he declared he could not take
this responsibility as he did not know if same would return alive. The
doctor informed me also that it was known that the commission consisted
of an SS-physician with several subordinate physicians and that the
"patients" were not even being examined, but judged solely by the
patient's existing records. As far as he knew families refuse to send
their sick members to the institutions as they do not know whether they
would see them again alive.
The district physician in Nurnberg had informed him of two cases in
the city of Nurnberg, where charges of murder have been preferred by
relations of such patients.
The Party has up to now received neither such complaints nor
accusations.
Heil Hitler!
Signed: Walz
Kreisleiter
_Pencil and ink notes_:
"investigate"
"Dr. Guesbert" [?]
"The staff reports: No case is known. The authorities have been
instructed how to act. 1-7-41."
"Party member Walz has been informed; Party member Dr. Hummel has been
informed; Party member Dr. Breilig [?] has been informed."
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 847-PS
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, July 5, 1942
at present Fuehrer's Headquarters
All postal communication must be sent to the
Berlin address without exception.
RK. 9495 B
Please use the above chiffre in further communications.
To the Highest Authorities in the Reich, and to all departments
directly subordinate to the Fuehrer
The Fuehrer has charged Reichleader Rosenberg in his capacity as
delegate of the Fuehrer with the supervision of the entire spiritual
and political education and schooling of the NSDAP, with the spiritual
fight against the Jews and Freemasons as well as against all allied
with them in their doctrinal opposition to National Socialism, as
the instigators of the present war. For this purpose the Fuehrer
has ordered that the staff of the Reichsleader Rosenberg shall have
the right, in occupied territories under Military Government and in
occupied Eastern territories under civil administration (this does not
include the General Government) to search libraries, archives, lodges,
and other political and cultural institutions of all kinds for suitable
material for the fulfillment of his task, and to ask the competent
army and police offices to confiscate the material thus procured for
the implementation of the world doctrinal tasks of the NSDAP, and for
later scientific research work of the university, whereby the police
political files will remain with the police, all other documents
however to be turned over to the staff of the Reichleader Rosenberg.
The same request to be made by this staff in regard to all cultural
goods which are the property or in the possession of Jews which do not
belong to anyone, or whose owners cannot be determined. The measures
on procedure about the collaboration with the Wehrmacht will be
issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in accordance
with Reichleader Rosenberg. The necessary measures within the Eastern
territories under German administration will be taken by Reichleader
Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern
territories.
I am giving notice of this, the Fuehrer's order, and request to support
Reichleader Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his task.
Signed: Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
SECRET
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
_Rk. 507 A g_
Please use this chiffre in all further communications
Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, July 16, 1942
Present field quarters. All mail to be sent
to the Berlin address without exception.
II 1C
II 1 C 791/42g, rec. 20 July 42
encl 1
To the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories
_Berlin W35_
Kurfuerstenstrasse 134
(Notes illegible)
_Concerning_: Fuehrer decree of March 1, 1942
To the letter of July 10, 1942-II 1 C 705/42g
The regulations of which you wish to be informed are contained in
enclosed circular letter to the highest Reich authorities of July 5,
1942--Rk. 9495 B--which was also sent to you. A further copy of this
circular is enclosed for your use.
Deputy
[signature illegible]
1. There is nothing to be done from here.
2. Mr. R.R. Guilleaume to be informed after his return (7 Aug).
[signature illegible]
[name illegible]
Please ask in the Registrar's Office
of the Reich Chancellery if the
Fuehrer's decree of 1 March 42 exists.
Apparently we have only been sent the
measures of procedure.
(initials illegible) 3 July
The Fuehrer's decree of 1 March is
enclosed. PR. 4 August.
The Reich Chancellery has received
the Fuehrer decree of 1 March 42,
as a copy from the Reichsleitung
Rosenberg. I asked for it there.
Pr. 31/7
Give first to Ministerialdirector
Dr. Runte with a request for his
acknowledgment.
LABS, 5 August
[illegible marks]
* * * * *
FUEHRER DECREE
Jews, Freemasons, and those allied with them in their world doctrinal
conceptions are opponents of National Socialism and are the instigators
of the present war directed against the Reich. The planned spiritual
fight against these powers is a necessary war measure.
I have therefore, charged Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg to carry
out this task in accord with the Chief of the High Command of the
Wehrmacht. His staff for the occupied territories has the right to
search libraries, archives, lodges, and other world doctrinal and
cultural institutions of all kinds for pertinent material and to have
it confiscated for the world doctrinal task of the NSDAP and the later
research work of the university cultural values which are the property
or are in the possession of Jews, which do not belong to an owner, or
whose owners cannot be determined, are subject to the same regulation.
The measures on procedure about the collaboration with the Wehrmacht
will be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in
accord with Reichleader Rosenberg.
The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under German
administration will be taken care of by Reichleader Rosenberg in his
capacity as Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories.
Fuehrer Headquarters, March 1, 1942
To all administrative departments of the Wehrmacht, the Party, and the
State.
Signed: Adolf Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 848-PS
GESTAPO
NURNBERG-FUERTH OFFICE
TELETYPE SECTION
Teletype No. 12309
Received 24 July 1938, 1515 hours from WF via GM
Dr. Berlin Nue 167 262 24 July 1938 1500 to Stapo Nurnberg--
Urgent--Transmit at once.
Subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll in Rottenburg
Reference: None
I request that the following text of a teletype just received here from
Stuttgart be transmitted _at once by special messenger to Bayreuth_,
Villa Wahnfried, to SS Brigadefuehrer Schaub, attention of SS
Untersturmfuehrer Wuensche:
In connection with my report (special delivery of 23 July 1938)
subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll of Rottenburg, I further communicate that
the following teletype from the Gestapo office in Stuttgart just came
in here:
"The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third
demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about 2,500-3,000
were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The Rottenburg populace
again did not participate in the demonstration. This town took rather
a hostile attitude to the demonstrations. The action got completely
out of hand of the Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators
stormed the palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200
people forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw
files out of the windows, and rummaged through the beds in the rooms
of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to the other
objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the flaming bed
could be thrown from the window and the fire extinguished. The Bishop
was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg and the ladies and gentleman
of his menage in the chapel at prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed
into this chapel and molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken
for Bishop Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and
forth. Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not
the one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the
building. After the evacuation of the palace by the demonstrators I
had an interview with Archbishop Groeber who left Rottenburg in the
night. Groeber wants to turn to the Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the
Interior Dr. Frick anew. On the course of the action, the damage done
as well as the homage of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for
the Bishop I shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in
the act of suppressing counter mass meetings.
Gestapo Office Stuttgart."
In case the Fuehrer has instructions to give in this matter, I request
that these be transmitted most quickly, best by telephone to Gestapo
Office, telephone Berlin 12 00 40, attention of Regierung Assistant
Freytag, so that corresponding instructions can be forwarded to
Stuttgart.
Gestapo Office Berlin,
By direction,
Signed: DR. BEST
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 849-PS
Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs
GII 3990/38
Berlin W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3, 23 July 1938
Tel. 11 66 51
[Stamp]
Praesidium Chancellery
Entered 24 July 1938
RP 6575/38
Subject: Catholic Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg (wttbg.)
Ref: Letter of 22 July 1938
No. Er 41/38 III
3 enclosures
To the Minister of State and Chief of the Praesidium Chancellery in
Berlin
The Catholic Bishop Dr. Sproll, as the only citizen of the city of
Rottenburg and, as far as is known, as the only German bishop, did
not take part in the plebiscite of 10 April. The absence from the
plebiscite has evoked great and justified anger among the population.
Apparently the bishop himself had a bad conscience and left town on
the evening before the plebiscite for an unknown destination. Even on
10 and 11 April there were demonstrations at the bishop's residence
in Rottenburg against the absent bishop. On 21 April Sproll returned
to Rottenburg and on the same day there were renewed demonstrations
in front of the bishop's palace. On 22 April Dr. Sproll again left
Rottenburg in order to go to a Bavarian monastery.
As the bishop, since Hitler's rise to power, became prominent through
a series of damaging sermons, the Governor of Wuerttemberg now came
to the conclusion that Dr. Sproll, in the interest of preserving
the state's authority and in the interest of quiet and order, could
no longer remain in office. The Reich Governor had explained to the
ecclesiastical board,
that he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll as Head of the Diocese
of Rottenburg on account of his refraining from the election in the
office;
that he desired Bishop Sproll to leave the Gau area
Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, because he could assume no guarantee for
his personal safety; that in the case of the return of the bishop
to Rottenburg he would see to it that all personal and official
intercourse with him on the part of state offices as well as Party
offices and the Armed Forces would be denied.
Moved by the reports from Wuerttemberg my Deputy, in my absence,
directed the letter attached in copy G II 2277/38 2030 dated 5 May to
the Foreign Office. In accordance with that the Foreign Office on 18
May turned to the German Embassy at the Vatican with the instruction
that it should be urged on the Holy See to persuade Bishop Sproll that
he should resign his Bishopric.
The bishop sojourning outside of his diocese had already received the
instruction to return to his diocese. On 18 May Sproll quietly returned
to Wuerttemberg and retired to St. Mary's Hospital in Stuttgart.
Since no answer to the instruction of 18 May had been received from the
Embassy at the Holy See, on 1 July the settlement of the affair was
again brought up in Rome. On 18 July the letter of the Foreign Office
attached in copy--Pol III 1886 of 11 July--was received. Whether the
affair has again been discussed with the Cardinal Secretary of State,
as planned, is unknown to me.
In the intervening two months Bishop Sproll quietly resided in
Stuttgart. On 15 July he returned to the Episcopal residence and on 16
July conducted a ceremonial divine service. On the evening of the same
day there occurred among the population, aroused over the return of
the bishop, great demonstrations before the ecclesiastical buildings
of Rottenburg. On 18 July there were more even greater demonstrations.
A report of the Reich Governor of 20 July is attached in copy. It is
to be expected that on Saturday, 23 July, even greater mass meetings
against continued remaining of the Bishop will be put on, so that
Cardinal Bertram was impelled to send his telegram of 21 July to the
Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
The content and tenor of this telegram are such that I cannot recommend
a favorable consideration of it. Not the demonstrating people aroused
over the subversive attitude of the Bishop are turning against the
State, but the Bishop by his incredible behavior against the State and
folk-community has turned against the State. In my estimation measures
are not sufficient here, which merely produce the condition prior to
10 April. I could only recommend a cessation of further demonstrations
if the action of the German Embassy initiated at the Holy See is
accompanied by success. If it is unsuccessful, the Bishop would have to
be exiled from the land, or there would have to be a complete boycott
of the Bishop by the authorities, as the Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg
at that time announced to the ecclesiastical officials.
I would notify Cardinal Bertram correspondingly, in case the Fuehrer
does not reserve the notification for himself.
signed: KERRL
* * * * *
Copy
Berlin W8, 5 May 1938
Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs
GII 2277/38
Subject: Catholic Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg, Wuerttemberg
The Catholic Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg (Wuerttemberg) on 10 April
1938, as the only non-voter of the Rottenburg District, aroused
the greatest resentment of all racial Germans and especially gave
to Catholic circles the worst example for their civic behavior. By
his absence from the plebiscite, which is to be evaluated only as a
demonstration, he moreover has violated the sense of the Episcopal oath
of loyalty prescribed in Article 16 of the Reichconcordat.
The Bishop felt impelled to evade the just anger of the people and to
leave his diocese. It is to be feared that upon his possible return
and a possible appearance in public, even at church functions, renewed
disorders and demonstrations would occur. It cannot be expected of the
German police that they would protect a man who has not perceived his
most primitive duties to people and Fuehrer, from the crowds of people
who, in righteous wrath, are turning against this man. Also, it cannot
be expected of the German authorities that they will carry on official
business with a Bishop who in this manner has excluded himself from
the folk-community. It is not to be expected that this Bishop can ever
accomplish any more fruitful work in his diocese.
I therefore recommend that it be urged on the Holy See via the
Apostolic Nuncio or via the German Embassy at the Vatican, to influence
Bishop Sproll that he resign his Bishopric as soon as possible.
By direction
Signed: DR. MUHS
To the Foreign Office in Berlin
* * * * *
Copy
Copy (indicated)
Berlin, 11 July 1938
Foreign Office, Pol III 1886
_a._ Reference to the letter of 11 June--Pol III 1679
_b._ Reference to letter of 27 May 1938--II B 1-- / 574/38
The German Ambassador at the Vatican has discussed the matter of
recalling Bishop Sproll with the Cardinal-Secretary of State. The
Cardinal, who acted in a very reserved manner according to all
appearance, did not approve the procedure of the Bishop, but remarked
that according to reports he had received the participation in the
plebiscite would be a voluntary act, nevertheless an offense against
legal duties did not exist. The German Embassy reports, in addition,
that in spiritual circles the behavior of the Bishop is designated as
very inapt.
The German Embassy at the Holy See has been instructed to discuss the
matter again with the Cardinal-Secretary of State.
Further information is reserved for the present.
By direction
Signed: Bismarck
To: _a._ Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg Gauleiter Murr, Stuttgart
_b._ Chief of the Security Police Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8
* * * * *
Copy
Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg
Stuttgart, 20 July 1938
Subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll
Enclosures: None
As I am informed, Monday evening a demonstration again occurred in
front of the Episcopal Ordinariat. Several thousand people gathered
in front of the Episcopal Ordinariat and chanting in unison gave
expression to their resentment about the absence of the Bishop. There
were no further excesses of any sort.
I am reporting on this incident with the request that everything be
attempted to get a recall or transfer of the Bishop, for it is not to
be assumed that tranquility will return to the people--even in the more
remote area around Rottenburg--as long as Dr. Sproll officiates as
Bishop.
To the Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Berlin W 8,
Leipziger Str. 3.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 862-PS
TOP SECRET
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in
Bohemia and Moravia.
No. 22/40 top secret; Prague, 15 October 1940.
TOP SECRET
(through officers only)
Re: Basic political principles in the Protectorate
4 copies, 1st copy
TOP SECRET
(through officers only)
1 Annex
[Pencil marks]:
K [Keitel] 21/X
J [Jodl] Chief OKW
through Chief WFSt
W [Warlimont] 18/10
On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector held an
official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. General K.H. Frank
spoke about the following:
Since creation of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, party
agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central
authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the solution of the
Czech problem.
After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his view about
the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three ways of solution were
indicated:
_a._ German infiltration of Moravia and _reduction of the Czech
nationality to a residual Bohemia_.
This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech
problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.
_b._ Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical
solution, namely the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore the
memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within
a reasonable space of time.
_c._ _Assimilation of the Czechs_, i.e. absorption of about half of
the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of importance
by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint [blut-und sonst
wertmaessig Bedentunghat]. This will take place among other things,
also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich
territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border district),
in other words by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.
The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power,
eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods.
This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the
major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be
converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly
making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus
interfering with a rapid assimilation.
Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled
roughly and should be eliminated.
The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of
Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.
After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution c (assimilation)
as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that,
while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the
Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the
office of the Reich Protectorate for years to come.
From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed forces.
This is the direction which has always been represented from here. In
this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief
of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file
number 6/39, top secret, entitled: "The Czech Problem." (Attached as
annex).
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in
Bohemia and Moravia.
Signed: FRIDERICI
Infantry Lt. General
_Distribution_:
OKW-L--1st Copy
OKH-O Qu V--2nd Copy
Chief H Ruest and Bd E-Ic.--3rd Copy
Draft--4th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 864-PS
TOP SECRET
L IV Berlin, 20 October 1939
Only copy
Written by officer 20 Oct.
[illegible initials]
Conference between the Fuehrer and Chief OKW
on the future shape of Polish relations
with Germany
(Evening of 17 October 1939)
1. The Armed Forces will welcome it if they can dispose of
administrative questions in Poland.
On principle there cannot be 2 administrations.
2. Poland is to be made independent. She will neither be part of the
German Reich nor a district administered by the Reich.
3. It is not the task of the Administration to make Poland into a
model province or a model state of the German order or to put her
economically or financially on a sound basis.
The Polish intelligensia must be prevented from forming a ruling
class. The standard of living in the country is to remain low; we only
want to draw labor forces from there. Poles are also to be used for
the administration of the country. However, the forming of national
political groups may not be allowed.
4. The administration has to work on its own responsibility and must
not be dependent on Berlin. We don't want to do there what we do in
the Reich. The responsibility does not rest with the Berlin Ministries
since there is no German administrative unit concerned.
The accomplishment of this task will involve a hard racial struggle
[Volkstumskampf] which will not allow any legal restrictions. The
methods will be incompatible with the principles otherwise adhered to
by us.
The Governor General is to give the Polish nation only bare living
conditions and is to maintain the basis for military security.
5. In Cracow German officers have visited the Bishops. Prince Radziwill
is owner of his huge estates [Latifundien].
These problems cannot be solved socially.
6. _Our interests lie as follows_: Precautions are to be taken that
the territory is important to us from a military point of view
as an advanced jumping-off point and can be used for strategic
concentration of troops. To that end the _railroads_, _roads_, and the
_communications channels_ are to be kept in order and utilized for our
purposes.
Any tendencies towards the consolidation of conditions in Poland are
to be suppressed. The "Polish muddle" [polnische Wirtschaft] must
be allowed to develop. The government of the territory must make it
possible for us to purify the _Reich territory_ from Jews and Polacks,
too. Collaboration with new Reich provinces [Posen and West Prussia]
only for _resettlements_ (Compare Mission Himmler).
_Purpose_: Shrewdness and severity must be the maxims in this racial
struggle in order to spare us from going to battle on account of this
country again.
[illegible initials] 20 Oct.
W.
[initialed by General Warlimont]
20 Oct.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 865-PS
I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the central
control of questions connected with the East-European Region.
An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is
at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the
duties thereby entrusted to him.
The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich
Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.
Fuehrer's Headquarters 20th April 1941.
The Fuehrer
Signed: Adolf Hitler
Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery
Signed: Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery
Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, 21st April 1941
At present Fuehrer Headquarters.
Mail, without exception, to be sent to the Berlin address.
To: the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General
Field Marshal Keitel
Personal. By courier.
My dear General Field Marshal.
Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the
Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for
the central control connected with the East-European Region. In this
capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations
for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that
Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest
cooperation of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from
them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities
to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the
commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only,
those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose
cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: the
Commissioner for the Four-year Plan, the Reich Minister of Economies,
and you yourself.
Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes, to
place your cooperation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in
carrying out of the task imposed upon him.
It is recommended, in the interests of secrecy, that you name a
representative in your office with whom the office of the Reichsleiter
can communicate and who in addition to your usual deputy should be the
only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.
I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.
Heil Hitler
Yours very sincerely
Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
25 April 1941
By courier.
To The Head of the Reich Chancellery, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
Personal.
Dear Reich Minister,
I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the
Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner
for the central control of questions connected with the East-European
Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed
Forces Operational Staff, as my permanent Deputy and Major General
Warlimont as his Deputy.
Heil Hitler
Yours very sincerely
K.
25/4.
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
25th April 1941.
By courier
To Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Personal
Dear Reichsleiter,
The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's
Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central
control of questions connected with the East-European Region. I have
charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces
Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with solving
these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to
deal with him only.
Heil Hitler
Yours very sincerely
K.
25/4.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 870-PS
[Stamp:]
TOP SECRET
_Copy to Rk. 1952 German Secret Reich matter._
Information for the Fuehrer
I report the following, concerning the sabotage plot, through which at
the two largest Oslo dockyards 23500 was sunk and 25800 tonnage was
damaged:
I. _Backgrounds._
1. The personnel of both dockyards had the reputation of being
extremely radical marxistic before the war. Both dockyards strikes were
declared in September 1941. At the second day of the strike I have
taken measures so harsh and decisive that starting there and then, and
until this plot happened, peace and order prevailed at both enterprises.
2. In connection with the withdrawal of the 20th (mountain) Army,
England has given out the following order to the personnel of the
dockyards: "Either you blow up the ships or we shall be forced to shell
town and port." The efficiency of that order of the day is confirmed
not only by the plot itself but also by statements. Therefore it is
clear that the saboteurs do not only have active helpers or groups
of helpers amongst the personnel, but that they also enjoy passive
support respectively protection by the rest of the crowd.
II. _Countermeasures._
1. My old method is entirely out of question. Countersabotage in Norway
is useless on account of lack of objects. Counter terror in this
instance would bypass its goal and in addition would lead to the most
disadvantageous consequences, according to the opinion, shared by Reich
Leader of SS Himmler and chief of the Security Police Kaltenbrunner.
2. A permanent and sufficient boarding of the ships by military guards
must fail because, on account of lack of forces. Navy and army state
that they cannot furnish additional units. Guarding by police is
impossible, because only six under strength battalions of about 400 men
are at my disposal in the entire country. [Pencilled note of Keitel:
No, the Armed Forces can guard its ships itself?]
3. As much as a stronger and permanent military guarding of every ship
is desirable, this measure would in no way exclude the possibility
of further attacks, because such guards are not able to judge if the
Norwegian specialists handle their jobs right or wrong. [Pencilled note
of Keitel: But the Marines can do that.]
4. Just now I received a cable of Field Marshall General Keitel, in
which the issue of a decree is demanded according to which members of
the personnel and if the occasions arises their next of kin (liability
of next of kin) are collectively kept responsible for cases of sabotage
occurring in their departments.
This demand makes only sense and promises success only, if I am
actually allowed to perform executions by firing squad. [Pencilled note
of Keitel: Yes, that is the best.] If this is not possible, such a
decree would cause exactly the opposite reaction.
_a._ The Norwegian expects German defeat within a very short time. An
arrest therefore, does not only frighten him, but gives him security
on the one hand, and on the other hand an alibi with the Emigrant
Government.
_b._ This decree would only add fuel to the fire of the Swedish
agitators and would not be crowned by success. But such shootings by
firing squads are prohibited by the Fuehrer decree. On the other hand,
if I could get renewal liberty of action in this regard, and if I could
use my old methods again, without considering Sweden, then such a
decree would gain the necessary weight and, with that doubtlessly lead
to success.
III. _Suggestion._
1. A military guard is ordered for every ship. The main dockyard
committee has to submit specific suggestions regarding the respective
strength and the methods of duty patroling.
2. So many workers, foremen, technicians, and engineers are to be taken
from German dockyards that we are able to plant amongst personnel of
the most important Norwegian dockyards at least 10 percent of German
specialists. The dockyard main committee can also order the method of
planting only if, on account of this--at the worst--the production
capacity German dockyards decrease accordingly, one should consider
that by such measures the tenfold of this waste will be secured on
the Norwegian side, [Pencilled note of Keitel: I regard this measure
as expedient, if decrees 3 and 4 should be declined. K.] For, only by
employing these Norwegian Specialists forces it will be possible to
keep the Norwegian experts under such constant control at their work,
that it is made quite impossible for them to commit acts of sabotage.
3. Establishing of the three-shift system, in order that at any day or
night time Norwegian personnel is on board and, in case, is also blown
into the air. It is up to the dockyard main committee to decide if and
to which extent this system is workable.
4. In this connection the dockyard main committee should be charged
in principle with the central responsibility for the security in the
dockyards: for the main committee in its competence has at its disposal
the decisive prerogatives, which can warrant that security. Thereby it
goes without saying, that it has at its disposal the Security Police
with all its facilities and that the Armed Forces put at the disposal
of the guards to the ordered extent.
5. While accomplishing these measures one has to take into account the
possibility of a strike. As I possess only limited liberty of action,
at present this would be more than unpleasant. In spite of this I am
of the opinion that taking the danger into the bargain, the measures
suggested should be ordered.
Signed: Terboven
Reich Commissioner
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 871-PS
Top Secret
WFSt/Qu.2 (North) 6 December 1944
2 copies, 1st copy
KR--Teletype to Reichminister and Head of Reich Chancellery,
Reichminister Dr. Lammers.
Sir:
In the matter of checking sabotage in Norway, I agree with the view of
the Reich Commissioner for Occupied Norwegian territory, to the extent
that I expect results from reprisals only if they are carried out
ruthlessly and if Reich Commissioner Terboven is authorized to carry
out shootings.
Should the Fuehrer not grant this authorization, I consider the
proposal of Reich Commissioner Terboven (No. III of his communication)
as adequate to the purpose.
I note moreover that the mentioned 10% of German specialists
[Fachraefte] would require from 800-1,000 persons. For guard duty it
is possible to supply supplementary personnel from the Wehrmacht, to a
limited extent.
In contrast to the view of Reich Commissioner Terboven, I anticipate a
certain success from this procedure at least to the extent that Marines
will be used.
For your information, there is going forward to you simultaneously
a teletype addressed to the Wehrmacht Commandant (W. Bhf) Norway,
through which the report of the Reich Commissioner, transmitted to me,
evidently released.
Heil Hitler
yours
Signed: Keitel
OKW/WFST/Qu. 2 (North) Nr. 0014371/44g.K.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 872-PS
TOP SECRET
Armed Forces Ops Staff 3.2.41.
S.O. only 5 Copies, 5th Copy
Access only through officer
44089/41 Top Secret S.O. only
Conference of "Fall Barbarossa" and "Sonnenblume"
The following persons attended:
The Fuehrer
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
C-in-C Army
Chief of the Army General Staff
Chief of Army Op. section
Colonel Schmundt
Major Christian
Major Engel
_Chief of Army General Staff_--1. Enemy strength approximately 100
Infantry divisions, 25 Cavalry divisions, approximately 30 mechanized
divisions. _Our own strength about the same, far superior in quality._
In estimating the leading personalities, Timoshenko is the only
outstanding figure. The only one, that is, according to Gen. Koestring.
Details of the strength and organization of the Russian divisions
are _important only_ in that even the Infantry Divisions include a
comparatively large number of tanks, though the material is bad and
merely thrown together.
In the case of mechanized divisions, we have superiority with regard to
tanks, weapons [Schuetzen] and artillery. The Russians are superior in
numbers, we in quality.
The Russians are normally equipped in artillery. Materials likewise
inferior. The Command of the Artillery is insufficient. The Russian
operational intentions are unknown. Strong forces are at the frontier.
Any retreat could be only on a small scale since the Baltic States and
Ukraine are vital to the Russians for supply reasons. Fortification
work is in progress especially on the North and Southern flanks.
There is no fresh information on the communications system.
Directives to Army Groups so given that the Russian front will be
split into 2 sections and a Russian retreat on the Dnjeper-Duena Line
prevented.
The Army Group North and Center ordered to press forward across the
Duena in a north-easterly direction with concentrated armored forces in
3 armored groups (the strongest in the South).
The most northerly group is to press on up to the region of Lake
Peipus, then advance further to the East in cooperation with other two
armored groups, who will be attacking Smolensk.
The Army Group South is to advance across the Dnieper in a
south-easterly direction. Army Group North and Center is to carry out
operations North of the Pripet Marshes. Army Group South will be to the
South, that is, separate and independent. The main sector lies in the
North; army reserves are massed there.
6 armored divisions are required from the "Marita" operation; of
these the 2 training divisions are for the 1st line, a further 2 from
Roumania itself for the Southern Group, the last 2 divisions are
reserves for the Northern Group. It all depends on the Balkan situation
(Turkey's attitude).
_Fuehrer_--When the die has been cast, the Turks will not make any
further moves. No special protection of the Balkans is therefore
necessary. One dangerous moment will be if North Africa is cleared
by the British, thus enabling the British to operate in Syria with
unhampered forces.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--_Northern Group_ 50}
divs, 13 armored divs, 9 motorized divs. Southern } Attack Forces
Group 30 divs, 5 armored divs, 3 motorized divs. }
In addition: Supreme Command of the Army Reserves.
Assignment of Pioneers is not entirely satisfactory. This is made good
by additional bridge-building units [Brueckenmaterial].
_Fuehrer_--agreed with the large dispositions.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--It is proposed to isolate a large
number of Russian troops in various places at the time the split is
effected. The early use of reserves is necessary for this purpose.
_Note_: the Pripet Marshes are not definitely _taboo_.
_Fuehrer_--mentioned the Russians tactics of flank attacks.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--The cavalry divisions are particularly
dangerous in this respect.
_Orders issued to date_:
Orders for Army Group are binding.
Orders for Armies set out the targets.
Orders for Units leave possibility for changes.
He expounded on _the orders issued to Army groups, etc., up to the
present_.
_Fuehrer_--mentioned that the operational areas were enormous,
that the enemy troops could be successfully encircled, only if the
encirclement were _complete_ (Cavalry divisions). (At the moment,
there is a very biased play on in Moscow about Suwarow). The immediate
surrender of the Baltic States, including Leningrad and the Ukraine,
cannot be expected at once. It is, however, possible that after the
initial defeat, the Russians, knowing our operational aims, will
retreat on large scale and prepare for defense further East behind
some barrier.
In this case, the North, regardless of the Russians in the East, will
be cleared. From there (a favorable supply-base) a thrust in the rear
of the Russians without a frontal attack. It is essential to wipe out
large sections of the enemy and not to put them to flight. This will
be accomplished if we occupy the flanking areas with the strongest
possible forces. Then, with the enemy held in the center, he can be
maneuvered out of it from the flanks.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--The Falkenhorst army can advance on
Petsamo with 1-1/2 divisions, by using Swedish railways, with a
further 1-1/2 divisions (including 1 SS Brigade). The aim is the
protection of the Finnish northern industrial area, trapping and
cutting off the Murmansk forces.
The Finns will probably make a strategic concentration in the South
with 4 Army Corps [Aks] of which an attacking group of 5 divisions will
advance in the direction of Leningrad, with 3 divisions against Lake
Onegin, 2 divisions against Hango, they need strong support. There are
15 Russian divisions on the Finnish front, approximately 1 division in
Murmansk.
_Fuehrer_--assumed that Sweden would join with us at a price. The
price: the Aaland Islands (not our possessions). There is no question
of a union between Finland and Sweden as this would not suit the
European New Order.
Norway must be under protection; no repercussions are desired from that
quarter. Artillery reinforcements are required.
_In the South_: The most important task is the protection of the oil
fields, therefore speedy action from Roumania is necessary.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--Position of Hungary. If Hungary is
not to participate, we must withdraw from Hungary. The destination
of the march will be given as Roumania. At the last minute the
direction will change towards the Russian frontier. Hungary will
permit anything so long as she is given the corresponding political
assurances. Agreements with all states taking part (with the exception
of Roumania) can be made only at the eleventh hour. With Roumania it
is a matter of life and death.
_Chief of Army General Staff_--Armored reconnaissance forces are still
scarce.
_Flak question_ is still unsettled, it depends on the conditions of the
roads (to follow in writing).
The Air Force commands 30 Flak battalions, in addition 30 batteries set
up by the Army.
_The Navy_ must hasten the opening of supply routes to the Baltic.
_Supply_ is a road transport problem as the gauge has to be changed on
the railroads here. A system of long-distance trucks, which can bring
supplies to supply bases.
Agreement with the Air Force that all transport is to be used to the
full.
Supply areas, shifted to the region of East Poland, are at present
being developed. (Possibilities in Roumania are still being explored).
_In connection with Marita_, the difficulties of transporting back
those forces urgently needed for Barbarossa were stressed.
_The intended time period_ was discussed with a plan. 1st Deployment
Staffel [Aufmarschstaffel] transfer now, Front-Germany-East. 2nd
Deployment Staffel [Aufmarschstaffel] from the middle of March will
give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army
High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already
considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on,
Attila can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic
is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary
will be approached about the march through. 3 deployment staffels from
the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part
of the artillery is being entrained.
_In industry_ the full capacity time table is in force. No more
camouflage.
From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from
the West. (Seeloewe can no longer be carried out). The strategic
concentration in the East is quite recognizable.
The full capacity time table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the
picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.
_C-in-C Army_--requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control
divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for
commanders in the West.
_Fuehrer_--When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath
and make no comment.
_Chief of the Air Force General Staff_--joined the conferences.
_Fuehrer_--discussed the Italian situation in the Mediterranean.
He stated that the loss of North Africa could be withstood in the
military sense but must have a strong psychological effect on Italy.
Britain can hold a pistol to Italy's head and force her either to make
peace and retain everything or after the loss of North Africa to be
bombarded. This would be to our disadvantage. British forces in the
Mediterranean area will not be tied down. We ourselves have a weak base
there through Southern France. The British have the free use of a dozen
divisions and can employ them most dangerously, i.e. in Syria.
We must make every effort to prevent this. Italy must be given support.
We are already doing this in Marita. We must, however, attempt to
render effective assistance in North Africa.
The Italians are of the opinion that they can put up a defense now
only at Tripoli. This is not feasible. The Air Force cannot operate
there. Therefore the position cannot be held. There must be some larger
protection zone. Our blocking units can also be effective only in
larger protection zones.
He discussed the connection between successes, even defensive successes
there and Balkan events, possibly a peaceful settlement in the Balkans.
_What can be done?_
Land units will arrive late even if not too late. Graziani must receive
some kind of support. Therefore the Air Force must be employed, if
possible with Stuka groups, with jumping-off bases and homefields in
Lybia.
If this can bring the British advance to a standstill, the intended
blocking unit is still insufficient and must be reinforced by a mobile
unit (strong armored division).
The British personnel and material must have been exhausted during
the advance. If the British encounter fresh and well-equipped German
forces, the situation will soon alter.
Query from C-in-C Army. Can we spare an armored division for this?
_C-in-C Army_--unwillingly from Marita.
_Fuehrer_--out of the question.
_C-in-C Army_--If it comes to that, Barbarossa is also in need.
_Fuehrer_--
If we send help to North Africa, we must do so at once before the
Italians. (We have made the offer to the Italians).
The primary consideration is: Can the Air Force intervene now.
The time required for the transport of Air Force supplies, blocking
unit, and armored divisions must be established at once.
Then, what are the climatic conditions?
_C-in-C Army_--It is important that British supplies by land and sea
are stopped. This can be done only by the German Air Force.
_Fuehrer_--The Italians must be asked how long they can allow for the
transport of the above-mentioned German troops.
If necessary, transport groups must be employed.
Proposal: General Jeschonek III/KG for special duties, from
Foggia.
_C-in-C Army_--proposed that the blocking unit should first be
reinforced by 1 armored regiment. The rest to follow. The Fuehrer
agreed.
_Chief of Air Force General Staff_--spoke of the position of the
ground-organization in North Africa. Only in Benghazi are Stuka-Forces
ready within range for operations.
Fighter forces will naturally be sent there also, or Italian fighters
be placed under German orders.
It is most important that the air base of Malta be subdued.
_Fuehrer_--agreed. The Italians are to withdraw Italian fighters from
the Channel coast. (He will speak to the Duce.)
_The Air Force_ must test immediately, the possibilities of intervening
in North Africa. The Army is to see to the transport for the blocking
unit.
The transport must be speeded up. Reinforcement by an armored regiment,
further reinforcement up to an armored division, will be withdrawn from
Marita. Flak forces on ahead.
_C-in-C Army_--proposed a united command of all mobile forces under
1st General Headquarters. Cooperation with the Air Force which also
commands the Italian naval air forces.
_Conclusions_:
1. _Barbarossa._
_a._ The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational
plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the
_main aim_ is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
_b._ The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the
disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
_c._ Agreements with neighboring states, who are taking part, may not
be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The
exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldau.
_d._ It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary
measure).
_e._ The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as
a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita.
2. _Sonnenblume._
_a._ The Air Force must intervene as soon as possible with Stuka
and Fighter forces. Bases and jumping-off bases in accordance with
decisions made in North Africa. It is desired that the Italian fighter
forces be placed under German orders.
_b._ The 10th Flieger Korps is to take over the task of protecting the
transports to East Africa, in the closest cooperation with the Italian
Air Force and Naval Commander in Catania.
_c._ The 10th Flieger Korps is to strike a strong blow against the
British troops in Cyrenaica as soon as possible (with the use of the
heaviest bombs).
The main task is to disrupt British supplies by land and sea; next, to
combat the British fleet.
First of all, attempts must be made to subdue the air base of Malta.
_d._ The _Army_ is to continue the transport of the blocking unit. This
is, however, to be reinforced at once with armor. Preparations for
adding one Armored Division (II Staffel from Marita). Flank forces on
ahead. 1st General Headquarters to be established immediately. United
German Supreme Command over all mobile forces will be proposed to the
Italians.
Certified
_Distribution_: [signature illegible]
Chef L Captain
I H
I K
I L
IV
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 873-PS
TOP SECRET
L IV/Qu
Fuehrer's Hq., 1 May 1941
For senior Officers only
Only by officer
1 original copy
Conference with Chief "L" on the 30 April 1941
1. _Timetable Barbarossa_:
The Fuehrer has decided: _Action Barbarossa_ begin 22 June. From 23
May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of
operations the OKH reserves have not yet reached the appointed areas.
2. _Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa_:
_Sector North_: German and Russian forces approximately of the same
strength.
_Sector Middle_: Great German superiority.
_Sector South_: Russian superiority.
3. _Russian strategic concentration_:
Continued movements of strong forces to the German-Russian boundary.
4. _Estimate by the Supreme Commander of the Army of course Barbarossa
will take._
Presumably violent battles of the frontiers, duration up to 4 weeks. In
course of the following development weaker resistance may be expected.
_Opinion of Russian soldiers_: A Russian will fight, on appointed spot,
up to the last breath.
5. _Conversations with Finland_ are approved by the Fuehrer according
to the OKW WFST part II Op. 44594/41 g.K. Chefs of the 28 April 1941.
6. _Conversations with Hungary_ are only possible in the last third of
May. The Fuehrer believes the Hungarians will be prepared to carry out
defensive operations on the Russian border, but they will not allow any
German attack from Hungary.
7. _Conversations with Roumania_ will be possible only at a very
advanced date.
8. _Concealment of conversations_ with friendly countries: projected
German assault in the West, hence Eastern Front must be covered.
Participation of friendly countries only as a purely defensive measure.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 874-PS
TOP SECRET
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Hq. of the Fuehrer, 9 March 41
DRAFT
Honorable Reich Minister (TODT)
For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in
the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend
and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.
The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for
the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the
Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for
the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the
actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as
a diversionary maneuver to divert from plans which are being pursued
for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these
measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also
followed on the part of the organization Todt.
[initials] K. J. W. [Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 876-PS
MOST SECRET
Fuehrer's Headquarters, 12 May 1941
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Section L (I Op)
No. 44699/41 most secret, S.O. only
S.O. only; access only through officer 18 copies, 12th copy
_Subject_: Deception of the enemy _Reference_: OKW/WFSt/Section L (I
Op.) No. 44277/41 most secret, S.O. only, dated 12,3,41
1. The second phase of the deception of the enemy commences with the
introduction on 22.5. of the full capacity timetable. The efforts
of the Supreme Commands and of any other authorities concerned must
be aimed, more and more, at making the strategic concentration
"Barbarossa" appear as a large-scale maneuver and also to continue
the preparations for the attack on England with special energy. The
following is the principle to be applied: the nearer the day of attack
approaches, the more intensive methods can be employed (also in the
communications service) for deception purposes.
2. All efforts will be in vain if our own units are aware of the
approaching attack and spread news of it at home. On the contrary, the
rumor of the "rear cover against Russia" and of the "feint assembly
of forces in the East" must be circulated, and/or the troops on the
Channel coast must believe in actual preparations. In this connection,
dead-lines and the extent of army postal restrictions are important.
They are to be regulated for the whole Armed Forces by the Supreme
Command of the Army (in cooperation with the other branches of the
Armed Forces and Ausl./Abw). It will be advantageous to issue orders
for transport to the West to as many Eastern units as possible and
thereby to give rise to a new wave of rumors.
3. If the occasion arise, Operation _Merkur_ is to be utilized in the
communications service by the preparation of the slogan: "Crete was the
general try-out for the landing in Britain!"
4. OKW (WFSt/Section L) will shortly increase the deception by
having several ministries concerned with preparations for Britain.
This is to be utilized by Ausl./Abw. in the communications service
(counterespionage).
5. _Political steps_ for the deception of Soviet Russia have been taken
and are further being considered.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
[signed] KEITEL.
Certified a true copy
[signature illegible]
Captain.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 878-PS
SECRET [Stamp]
Draft Copy
Fuehrer Headquarters, the 12th Sept. 1941.
Armed Forces High Command
Armed Forces Operational Staff/Dept L (_IV/Gu_)
Nr. 02041/41 geh.
_Reference_: Jews in the newly occupied Eastern territories.
Isolated incidents render it necessary to refer to the directives
issued for the conduct of troops in the USSR (Armed Forces High
Command/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Dept L (IV/Gu) Nr. 44560/41, top
Secret of 19 March 1941).
The fight against Bolshevism necessitates indiscriminate and energetic
accomplishment of this task, especially also against the Jews, the main
carriers of Bolshevism.
For such reasons, any cooperation of the Armed Forces with the Jewish
population, who are openly or secretly anti-German in their attitude,
as well as the use of single Jew in any preferred auxiliary position,
will have to cease. Legitimations, which certify the use of Jews for
purpose of the Armed Forces, may under no circumstances be issued by
military offices. Exceptions are solely the use of Jews in especially
combined labor units [Arbeitskolonnen], who may be employed under
German supervision only.
It is requested, to inform the troops of this order.
The Chief of The Armed Forces High Command.
[Signed] Keitel
Certified
[signature not legible]
Lt. Colonel d. G.
_Distribution_: * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 886-PS
SECRET
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Enclosure to 32/41 g.Kdos. Chefs. WR.
1st Copy.
Fuehrer headquarters, 13 May 1941
[Initialed] "J 10/5"
TOP SECRET
Decree for the conduct of courts-martial in the district
"BARBAROSSA" and for special measures of the troop
[written in ink]
The armed forces court-martial serves primarily the purpose of
maintaining discipline.
The great expanse of the Eastern theatre of operations, the kind of
warfare necessitated on that account, and the peculiarity of the
opponent present tasks to the armed forces courts-martial which they
can accomplish during the course of the war and until the first
pacification of the conquered territory--being short staffed--only if
the court-martial is limited to its main task.
This is only possible if the troop itself defends itself ruthlessly
against any threat by the enemy civil population.
Accordingly, the following is decreed for the territory "Barbarossa"
(theater of operation, rear army area and area of the political
administration):
I
_Treatment of punishable offenses of enemy civilians_
1. Punishable offenses committed by enemy civilians do not, until
further notice, come any more under the jurisdiction of the
courts-martial and the summary courts-martial.
2. Guerillas are to be killed ruthlessly by the troops in battle or
during pursuit.
3. Also all other attacks of enemy civilians against the Wehrmacht,
its members and employees are to be fought by the troops at the place
of the attack with the most extreme means until annihilation of the
attacker.
4. In cases where measures of this kind were neglected or not
immediately possible, elements suspected of offense will be brought at
once before an officer. He decides whether they are to be shot.
Against villages from which the Wehrmacht was insidiously and
maliciously attacked, collective punitive measures by force will be
carried out immediately under command of an officer with the rank of
at least a battalion commander, if the circumstances do not permit an
immediate identification of individual perpetrators.
5. It is expressly prohibited to hold suspected perpetrators in order
to transfer them to the courts upon reinstitution of their jurisdiction
over civilians.
6. The commanders in chief of the army groups can, in conjunction
with the competent commanders of the air force and the navy, restore
the Wehrmacht jurisdiction over civilians in districts which are
sufficiently pacified.
For the area of the political administration this decree is issued
through the chief of the high command of the Wehrmacht [marginal ink
correction inked out: C-n-C of army in agreement with C-i-C of other
branches.]
II
_Treatment of punishable offenses of members of the Wehrmacht and its
employees against the native population_
1. For offenses committed by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees
against enemy civilians, prosecution is not compulsory, not even if the
offense is at the same time a military crime or violation.
2. While judging offenses of this kind, it should be considered in
every case, that the break-down in 1918, the time of suffering of the
German people after that, and the numerous blood sacrifices of the
movement in the battle against national socialism were decidedly due to
the Bolshevist influence, and that no German has forgotten this.
3. The judge examines therefore whether in such cases disciplinary
action is justified or whether it is necessary to take legal steps.
The judge orders the prosecution of offenses against civilians through
court-martial only if it is considered necessary for the maintenance of
discipline or the security of the troops. This applies, for instance,
to cases of serious offenses which are based on sexual acts without
restraint, which derive from a criminal tendency, or which are a
sign that the troop threatens to mutiny. The punishable offenses of
destroying senselessly quarters as well as supplies or other captured
goods to the disadvantage of the own troop should, as a rule, be judged
as more leniently.
The order of the inquiry proceedings requires in every individual case
the signature of the judge.
Extreme care must be exercised when judging the authenticity of the
statements of enemy civilians.
III
_Responsibility of the troop commanders_
The troop commanders are, within the sphere of their competence,
_personally_ responsible for the following:
1. that all officers of the units subordinated to them are very
thoroughly and promptly instructed about the fundamentals of I,
2. that their legal advisors be _promptly_ informed about these
instructions and _about the verbal statements with which the
political intentions of the leadership had been explained to the
commanders-in-chief_,
3. that only such sentences will be confirmed which are in accord with
the political intentions of the leadership.
IV
_Protection of secret_
After end of camouflage the decree is to be considered only as secret.
For the chief of the high command of the Wehrmacht--
Signed: KEITEL
Note [in pencil]: This should, if possible, not be passed on before 1
June 41.
Certified
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 910-PS
SECRET
Government of the Governor General
Chief Department
Administration of the Interior
1. During his presence, the Reichsfuehrer SS explained his plans for
the transplantation of the population of the East to the Governor
General in my presence. He declared that he was very anxious
a. that the historic German town center of Lublin should be completely
renovated as soon as possible and be placed at the disposal of the
German functionaries.
b. that the same should be done to the market-place of Zamose. Here
too, the residential buildings should be put into a state appropriate
for the reception of German families and be placed at the disposal of
German functionaries and other German families present.
c. soon German peasant families from Transnistria should be settled
in Zamose County. In order not to alarm the domestic population,
particularly the peasant population, and hereby to impair the result
of the harvest, those German peasant families should be placed only
on the country estates and the big holdings. Insofar as peasants from
Transnistria do not come into consideration, the transplanting of small
but suitable landowners from the German parts near Petrikan (Pietrikow)
into Zamose County should also be considered. As in that county already
some villages exist the inhabitants of which are doubtlessly of German
origin, that way a German bulwark could be created in Zamose County.
If it is possible in some way these three measures Lublin, Zamose rural
area and Zamose town district should be achieved even this year.
Cracow, 3.27.1942
Dr. S.H.
218,005
* * * * *
Government of the Governor General
Chief Department:
Administration of the Interior
CONFIDENTIAL
1. The Reichsfuehrer-SS spoke at the time of his presence on March 13
and 14 in Cracow in detail about the plans of settlement for the next
few years and about the planned Germanization. Among other things, he
took the view the Gorales, Lemkes and Hutzules whose Germanic origin,
or at least Germanic mixture is indubitable, in his opinion should
be Germanized in the course of time. To this purpose he recommended
to begin in the schools of the territory in question by establishing
the number of blond and blue-eyed pupils in proportion to the total
number of pupils. Then, one should begin to grant them gradually more
favorable living conditions, however on the condition that they have
their children learn the German language and get acquainted with the
German cultural values. Eventually, one can settle still other Germans
in the territory of these three peoples later on.
In this connection it is thought that sometime the Germans from
Zips in Slovakia should move over into the Government General. The
Reichsfuehrer-SS developed further trains of ideas to the effect that
in the first five-year plan for resettlement after the war, the new
German Eastern territories should first be filled; afterwards it is
intended to provide at this time the Crimea and the Baltic countries
with a German upperclass at least. Into the Government General,
perhaps further German island settlement should be newly transplanted
from European nations. An exact decision in this regard, however,
has not been issued. In any case it is wished that at first a heavy
colonization along the San and the Brig be achieved so that the parts
of Poland are encircled with alien populations. Hitherto, it has been
always proved that this kind of encirclement leads most quickly to the
desired nationalization.
Cracow, March 30, 1942
Dr. S/H
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 957-PS
Copy
24. 2. 1940
Reich-Minister von Ribbentrop,
Berlin.
Foreign Office.
Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop,
Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report
to Privy Councillor von Grundherr who will address you on this
subject. We agreed the other day that 2-300,000 RM would be made
immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that
Privy Councillor Grundherr states that the second installment [Rate]
can be made available only after 8 days. But as it is necessary for
Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible
that this second installment is given to him at once. With a longer
absence of Reichsamtsleiter P.M. Scheidt also the connection with your
representatives would be broken up, which just now, under certain
circumstances, could be very unfavourable.
Therefore I trust that it is in everybody's interest, if P.M. Scheidt
goes back immediately.
Heil Hitler
/s/ Rosenberg
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 997-PS
TOP SECRET
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
RK 504B top secret
Berlin W 8 Voss-Strasse 6
2 August 1940
[stamp]
at present Headquarters of the Fuehrer
all mail is to be sent to the Berlin address
[stamp]
Rosenberg office Rec. No. 2133, 5 Aug 40
To Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Foreign political office of the NSDAP
Berlin W 35
Margarethenstrasse 17
Re: Report about Holland
Dear Party Member Rosenberg:
I have presented the report of July 19 of this year, given to me by
Stabsleiter Schickedanz on July 23 of this year, to the Fuehrer,
together with the report delivered by Reich Commissioner Dr.
Seyss-Inquart about the period from May 29 to July 19, 1940.
I am enclosing a copy of this last-mentioned report for your
_confidential_ information and submit an opinion on it.
Heil Hitler
Yours very respectfully
Signed: Dr. Lammers
* * * * *
TOP SECRET
1. Report about the situation and developments in the
occupied territories of the Netherlands
Period covered by this report: 29 May to 19 July, 1940.
_Commission and task._
With the nomination as Reich Commissioner the commission is given * * *
in serving the interests of the Reich to secure public order and public
life. * * * and the task is connected * * * to bind the Netherlands,
which have to remain independent for the purpose of the preservation of
Dutch Indies territory, as much as possible to the Reich economically,
apart from military security measures.
This task is to be solved if we succeed in bringing about a political
attitude which would make it possible for the economic ties of the
Netherlands to the Reich to appear to be the emanation of the will of
the Dutch people.
It will not be possible in every individual case to combine fulfillment
of the given commission with the solution of the assigned task, for
the interest of the occupation power demands the extensive suppression
of all possible public activities, while in order to create and lead
a formation of a political will it would be necessary to grant such
freedoms as would for the Dutch, make the final result their own
decision.
[Page 2]
_Situation._
The situation at the time the decree of the Fuehrer went into effect
(29 May 1940) is characterized by the position of the Commander in
Chief of the Dutch Army and Navy (General Winkelmann). He exercised all
power in the administration of the country, under the powers he had
received in consideration of the state of siege and beyond that from
the government and the queen who had fled, and he was considered by the
people as a sort of viceroy. He issued orders, the Dutch Secretaries
General (offices corresponding to our State Secretaries) executed
their orders in the name of Winkelmann within administrative machinery
unchanged in personnel and functioning perfectly.
Wherever Winkelmann appeared in public he received ovations.
The Dutch Army was in only slightly reduced mobilization strength under
the command of their own officers (Winkelmann's Staff) in the barracks
and camps. The occupation force was not seen often.
The behavior of the Dutch population--glad that the war is over,
pleasantly surprised by the conduct of the German troops, though
at first the circles hostile to the Germans kept themselves
reserved--concealed the real attitude of the Dutch toward the Germans.
The Dutch population for many years, especially since 1933, were
stirred up by the emigrants, who were tolerated here as in no other
country, against the Reich and National Socialism. The ability of
forming their own political opinion is limited for the majority.
Politics and administration are in the hands of a [page 3] small group
(ruling families), whose ideas and attitude are liberal and influenced
materially and ideologically by the west.
The real wages of the employed population are generally higher than
in the Reich. About 500,000 unemployed from about 2,000,000 people
capable of working in non-independent industry, trade, or business are
being carried along with unemployment compensation up to 70% of simple
wages, thanks to the riches of the Dutch Indies possessions, just as
agriculture, struggling with sales and price difficulties, is supported
almost entirely by state subsidies.
The Dutch people are caught in political stagnation as well as in
economic immobility. In spite of a good external impression (racial
appearance, cleanliness of the buildings and gardens, etc.) one can
observe extensive biological and even moral damage, such as unexpected
uncleanliness among the unemployed and the country population in
the Calvinistic districts, poor physical constitution, exclusive
interest in material matters, and so on. The people are widely split
confessionally and within the confessional groups bound and influenced
by all kinds of activities (from political organizations to chess
clubs).
The Royal House of Orange lives on the prestige won in the battles for
freedom and is considered by the group oriented materially as in the
west [page 4] (big businessmen, financiers, industrialists, higher
officials, and court nobility) as a guarantee for their political
predominance and economic positions. Additional motives, based on
national conviction, for bourgeois the devotion of the Dutch people
to the royal family which is more a matter of habit, cannot be found,
unless they think by clinging to the royal family to banish the fear of
being overwhelmed by the Reich.
There was no real opposition against the system among the
representative bodies of the parliament. In the second chamber there
were 4 NSB men among 100 Deputies; Fascist and National Socialist
ideas, especially the latter--are tabooed, are considered evidence of
being uneducated, and are now branded as the sentiments of traitors.
There are concrete indications that NSB were in the uniform of Dutch
soldiers intervened in support of the invading troops of the Reich.
In Dutch political life there are almost no personalities of any
importance. Somewhat outstanding from the average is the 71 year old
Colijn--although his basic character is domineering and energetic,
he is completely bound up with western-liberal views and as a
decided Calvinist he cannot be won for any National Socialist ideas.
Noteworthy is his desire for importance, which might induce him to
make a political deal with the occupation power, in which he might be
conceited enough to think that he could outwit us and keep a distance
from the Reich with the help of the House of Orange.
[Page 5]
The system parties--that is, the Catholic State Party, the Christian
People's Party (reformed), the Anti-Revolutionists (Calvinists,
descendants of the revolutionary Gueux), the Social Democrats, the
Democrats, etc., were entirely undisturbed as far as their party
organizations, trade unions, press, etc., were concerned, and their
activities were only partly restricted by the state of siege. Apart
from a strong horror propaganda against the NSB people, the political
factors and the greater part of the population were just biding their
time.
The Rightist Parties, especially the NSB, were numerically an
unimportant minority, against whom as a matter of course an arrogant
rejection prevailed among the intellectuals, the capitalists, and
also among the greater part of the officers' corps. This attitude,
strengthened by the charge of treason, was carried over to the rest of
the population. Of leading men among the Rightists the following are to
be mentioned within the framework of the NSB:
Mussert: A liberal nationalist attempting to use Fascist methods,
who is in the end afraid of the greater German Reich. His political
qualities are not as great as those of an average Gauleiter in the
Reich. In the Netherlands he plays a not inconsiderable role with them.
Rost van Tonningen: Ideologically perfectly adequate, adjusted to the
Germanic idea and National Socialism, a temperamental and effective
speaker yearning [page 6] for activity, does not find his strength in
himself but tries to get support and steadiness from third persons.
Count Ansembourg: No outspoken personality, positively valuable in
spite of his obligation of creed (Catholic), he is more a tactician
and diplomatic mediator.
Geikerken: The representative of Mussert, with strong Walloon mixture,
he is certainly a determined opponent of the system with reservations
toward the Greater German Reich.
Woudenberg: Representing labor in the NSB, he is the type of a
union man without special initiative but with common sense and
confidence-inspiring simplicity.
Some younger men, such as Feldmeyer, Zondervan, and others, are--even
according to the standards of the party within the Reich--types of
absolutely good leaders of the rank and file. Special attention is due
Arnold Meijer, the leader of the Black Front, a Catholic Fascist group,
who has his followers in the southern parts, Brabant and Limburg, is
without doubt bound to Catholism but strictly opposed to the liberal
democratic course and is above all opposed to the political influence
of the representatives of the Protestant North (Colijn, etc.).
The economic situation was nowhere threatening; supplies of all kinds
available in abundance, only the traffic has been largely interrupted
by the blowing up of bridges and the consequent shifting of the canals,
which handle 70% of the total traffic; sea traffic has been stopped
entirely. The [page 7] agricultural improvement economy, dependent on
the import of disproportionately large quantities of fodder, possesses
supplies sufficient until the gathering of the next harvest.
It is the almost unanimous opinion of the Dutch that they were unjustly
attacked by the Germans. The charges of violation of neutrality as
reported by the communique of the High Command of the Armed Forces are
not known to the population or if known are rejected as justification.
A certain impression is made by pointing out that on the soil of the
Netherlands, with the cooperation of high Dutch officials, an attack on
the life of the Fuehrer was prepared. It is also admitted that it was
at least unwise and probably unjust, too, that the emigrants from the
Reich in the Netherlands and the Dutch press were allowed to give news
to their fury against the Reich and the National Socialist in such an
unqualified form.
_Measures._
In view of this state of affairs it was necessary first to remove
Winkelmann's influence. This was done by expressly advising the
Secretaries General that they now have to accept orders only from the
Reich commissioner, which they accepted explicitly. The institution
of the Secretaries General as well as the persons themselves were
retained, since it had to be considered improbable in case of their
resignation to find Dutchmen--among the Rightists there are almost no
suitable persons at all--who would have taken over the administration.
It seemed politically necessary, however, that some measures,
especially economic ones [page 8] but indirectly also police ones, had
to be taken, carrying the signatures of the Netherlands Secretaries
General, for the Dutch people. The attempt of one of the Secretaries
General to call on Winkelmann as authority--in the question of the
continuation of the work in armament plants for the German Armed
Forces--was answered with the immediate dismissal of that Secretary
General. Winkelmann had to admit in a public declaration that he had
only to execute the demobilization under the command of the Commander
of the Armed Forces, but that otherwise he had nothing to say. This
acknowledgment as well as the fact that he publicly dropped a Secretary
General reduced Winkelmann's influence considerably. Finally he could
be quietly made a prisoner of war in connection with the known events
of June 29.
In order to execute the given commission, an administrative body
as small as possible was set up, divided into four working fields
of the commissioners-general. The individual specialists of these
commissioners-general, as for instance the ones for finance, justice,
etc., are sitting as liaison men in the respective Dutch ministries.
Importance was attached to an immediate and clear distribution of
competences and determination of the performance of the work, because
of the Dutch people, being very formal and casuistic by nature, need
such a determination. This distribution has proved its worth so far, as
there has been no friction either within the administrative machinery
or with the Dutch authorities for reasons of organization.
[Page 9]
Commissioners are provided for the provinces, which have extensive
autonomy. We hesitated to create this office, as it was necessary
first to investigate conditions. Now it is seen that for this office
politically experienced men were needed rather than administration
officials. Therefore, through Reich Office Director Schmidt we
requested from Reichsleiter Bormann (Hess staff) some men who, almost
entirely members of the party, are on their way here and can be put
into office in the provinces in a few days.
It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a large number
of economic but also police measures had to be taken, the first ones
of which had the purpose of reducing the consumption of the population
in order to get supplies for the Reich, on the one hand, and to secure
a just distribution of the remaining supplies, on the other hand. In
consideration of the assigned task, we had to endeavor to see to it
that all these measures carried the signature of Dutchmen. The Reich
Commissioner therefore authorized the Secretaries-General to take all
the necessary measures by means of ordinances.
As a matter of fact, up to today almost all orders concerning the
seizure of supplies and their distribution to the population and
decrees about restrictions in the formation of public opinion have been
issued but also agreements concerning the transport of extraordinarily
large supplies to the Reich have [page 10] been made, all of which
bear the signatures of the Dutch Secretaries General or the competent
economic leaders, so that all of these measures have the character of
being voluntary. It should be mentioned in this connection that the
Secretaries General were told in the first conversation that loyal
cooperation was expected of them, but it would be their privilege to
resign if something should be ordered which they felt they could not
endorse. Up to date none of the Secretaries General has made use of
this privilege, so that one may reasonably conclude that they have
complied with all requests of their own free will.
Almost the entire seizure and distribution of food supplies and
textiles have been executed, at least all the respective orders have
been issued and are being executed.
A series of instructions concerning the reorientation of agriculture
have been issued and are being executed; essentially it is a question
of seeing to it that the available fodder is used in such a way that
as large a stock as possible of horned cattle is carried over into the
next farming period, about 80% at the expense of the over-dimensional
stock of chickens and hogs. Rules and restrictions have been introduced
in the organization of traffic and the principles for the regulation of
gasoline as in the Reich were carried out here.
Restricting the right to quit jobs as well as to cancel leases have
been issued in order to check the liberal-capitalistic customs of
the Dutch employers [page 11] and to avoid unrest. In the same way,
the period for repayment of debts have been extended under certain
conditions.
Ordinances concerning news service, radio, etc., prohibit listening to
foreign radio stations and introduce all other restrictions necessary
in this field for defense reasons. The ordinance about registration and
control of enemy property as well as about confiscation of the property
of persons who act hostile to the Reich and to Germans were in this
case issued in the name of the Reich commissioner. On the basis of this
ordinance an administrator for the property of the royal family has
already been appointed.
The supplies of raw materials have been seized and, with the consent
of the General Field Marshal, distributed according to this system:
the Dutch keep enough raw materials to maintain their economy for
half a year, whereby they receive the same distribution quotas as in
the Reich. The same principle of equal treatment is being used in the
supply of food, etc. This enabled us to secure considerable supplies of
raw materials for the Reich, as for instance 70,000 tons of industrial
fats, which is about half of the amount which the Reich lacks.
The bank moratorium could be canceled, bank deposits are increasing,
the stock exchange has been reopened to a limited extent. Bills
concerning the control of foreign currencies have been introduced
according to the standards in the Reich.
Finally it was achieved that the Dutch state makes available in
sufficient quantities all means needed by the Reich, including the
German administration so that these expenses do not burden the Reich
budget in any way.
[Page 12]
A sum of guilders has been liquidated to redeem the fiduciary monetary
tender to the amount of about 36 million, further 100 million for
the purposes of the occupation army, especially the extension of the
airports; further 50 million for raising the raw materials to be
shipped to the Reich, insofar as they are not booty; further for
unrestricted transfer to guarantee the remittance of the savings of
the Dutch workers brought into the Reich to their families, etc.
Finally the rate of exchange of the fiduciary monetary tender, set at
first by the army high command in the proportion of 1 guilder to 1.50
Reichsmark, has been reduced to the correct proportion of 1 guilder to
1.33 RM.
Above all, however, it was possible to get the consent of the president
of the bank of the Netherlands, Trip, to a measure suggested by
Commissioner General Fischboeck and approved by the General Field
Marshal, namely the unrestricted mutual obligation of accepting each
other's currencies, that means that the Bank of the Netherlands is
bound to take over any amount of Marks offered to it by the Reich Bank
and in return to make available Dutch guilders at the rate of 1.33,
that is, 1 RM is 75 cents. Only the Reich bank has control over this,
not the Bank of the Netherlands, which will be notified only about the
individual transactions. This ruling goes far beyond all pertinent
rulings made hitherto with the political economies of neighboring
countries, including the Protectorate, and actually represents the
first step toward a currency union.
In consideration of this significance of the agreements, which already
touches the independence of the Dutch State, it is of special weight
that the [page 13] president of the Bank, Trip, who is unusually
well-known in western banking and financial circles, signed this
agreement of his own free will in the above sense.
Furthermore, military jurisdiction was introduced, and at present
German criminal jurisdiction is being set up; for special cases not
only the Special Court but also SS and Police jurisdiction have been
provided for as substitutes for court-martial jurisdiction, which
was not introduced. Subject to German criminal jurisdiction are: all
citizens of the Reich or the Protectorate without restriction and all
Dutch citizens and aliens in cases of crimes against the honor and
security of the Reich, the Armed Forces, etc.
The experiences with the Dutch officials show that these people, like
all Dutchmen, are basically difficult. One has to negotiate with them
very much; if they say no, it does not mean definitely no, if they say
yes they still think the matter over for a long time, but in the end
they will do as one wants them to. Besides, they want someone else to
carry the responsibility; since the Dutch still do not really believe
that England, which for centuries was the overwhelming power in Europe,
is finally eliminated from the continent, in many cases they want a
direct order which they then obey, so that one day they will be able to
refer to this pressure. In general, however, one cannot complain about
the behavior of the officials in the execution of the administration.
One cannot say that the officials are delaying any vital work. For
instance, in restoring traffic routes, especially in clearing canals,
the respective ministry worked extremely to the purpose and fast. In
the fields, however, entirely liberal methods and principles prevail.
The Police itself is much split and is subordinated in the most
important parts to the ministry of justice and not to the ministry of
the Interior. The special troops, the motorized and mounted units, are
relatively good, the Marechaussee, a sort of troop gendarmerie, is very
good. Among the latter we have already won some agents in the higher
ranks which makes probable a further extension in a sense favorable to
us.
The Marechaussee will therefore be brought to a correspondingly high
standard by selected non-commissioned officers of the army and will be
the backbone of the executive.
The dismissal of two mayors (in the Hague and in the provincial capital
of Zwolle) had an extraordinary effect. The moment will come when
it will be possible to exchange some of the Secretaries General and
possibly also other officials, but in any case mayors.
Concerning the right of assembly and association, we introduced the
obligation of giving notice. The interdiction comes from the public
prosecutors of the court of appeals (Subordination of the Police to
the Justice) who are working almost without complaint under the Higher
SS and Police Fuehrer. The states-general were eliminated from public
representative bodies; the provincial states and the town councils
were kept for the time being, but they are under the supervision of
the provincial commissioner. Politics in these is not tolerated for
the present. The reconstruction of the country--except in Rotterdam,
Middelburg, and Rehnen the devastation is not very extensive--was
placed in the foreground of a visit to Middelburg the importance of the
preservation of historic monuments as an expression of the will for
formation of a people has been emphasized, and the social side of such
action stressed by raising a fund for reconstruction. In the handling
of this reconstruction fund the reactionary spirit of the Dutch
administration is especially evident.
It is necessary to give special attention to the reconstruction of
Rotterdam. Rotterdam, thanks to its position at the mouth of the
Rhine, the possibility for sea-going vessels to sail far inland,
and the harbor conditions, which are in every respect favorable, is
doubtless a place which disposes of the best natural port facilities
in Central Europe, which can even be increased by the completion
of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, as its sphere of action will reach
from Rotterdam to Constanta. With regard to developments in the more
distant future one must consider whether one should not exercise
influence on the reconstruction of Rotterdam in such a way that the
city with this unique opportunity for construction should receive the
imprint of a big sea-port of the Germanic area. The demobilization of
the Dutch Army, which has now finally been accomplished, was carried
out without complaints. The officers and men not taken over into
other occupations were transferred, with the exception of the higher
ranks, to construction service. This is to be the basis for a future
Labor Service. It is led by the Dutch Major Breunesse, who has long
been in contact with the men of the Reich Labor Service in the Reich
(Mueller-Brandenburg) and has always taken the part of the Reich. The
impression this man makes is an excellent one, at present decidedly
non-political, as is usual among officers, [page 16] ideologically
all right. It is assumed that within three to six months the present
construction service can be liquidated, that is, the men will be
inducted into economic operations and there will be a basis for a real
Labor Service. The organization is already being built up with the
co-operation of the head of the Reich Labor Service, Hierl.
The extremely ramified and numerous Dutch press has not been submitted
to a preliminary censorship, as that would have destroyed all press
life immediately. By holding press conferences under the supervision
of Schmidt the big press is managed well and successfully. The danger
of some slips, becoming more and more rare, was accepted in view of
the necessity of keeping the press alive. Circulation is falling off,
however--a not unusual phenomenon, which has the advantage, though,
that the newspapers get into difficulties and can therefore be folded
up or taken out of the hands of the present owners. The NSB press is
already completely available, there is a personal influence at the
Telegraph and within the next few days the entire S.D.P. Press is
going to be taken over in connection with a corresponding political
action which is already underway. The German newspaper has reached a
circulation of 30,000. About half of the subscribers are Dutch. A quite
extensive press front is therefore available.
From the point of view of the occupation power the present development
can be considered satisfactory. The supplies for the occupation army
are being delivered, the work, etc., is being done in order, and
there are almost no cases of sabotage. There is [page 17] no need at
all to fear active resistance by the population. There are, however,
signs of rather extensive espionage, at any rate there is contact with
England, probably by short-wave radio. In this respect there is close
cooperation between the Counter-Intelligence posts of the Armed Forces
and the Security Police posts, since it seems necessary to ascertain
such cases as soon as possible and to punish them exemplarily (death
sentences).
Concerning the political developments in regard to the assigned task,
I have the following to say: The Dutch have stepped out of their
political reserve. Disregarding the continued or rather increased
animosity among the circles which heretofore formed political interest
for the Reich is increasing. It is noteworthy in this connection that
the former opponents, insofar as they are beginning to change their
opinion, want to establish contact not with the N.S.B. but rather
directly with the N.S.D.A.P. and the Reich. A conversation with Colijn,
who thereupon wrote a pamphlet, did much to help overcome the reserve.
The main points of this pamphlet are summarized in the statement
that in Continental Europe, England has doubtless been eliminated by
the Reich and that the Reich will lead this continental Europe. The
Netherlands must adjust itself to that fact if they hope, in closest
economic cooperation with the Reich, to retain their independence in
clinging to the House of Orange. This attitude of Colijn has had a very
great effect, as it was the cue for Protestant and especially Calvinist
circles to discuss the new situation, whereby Colijn's statement on the
importance of the Reich was considered as an authoritative declaration,
but his [page 18] conclusions were subjected to lively criticism.
Colijn later in his newspaper (Standard) questioned the correctness of
a document of the last White Book. The Standard was thereupon banned
for 8 weeks and Colijn got a warning. At the moment he is designated
not only by the N.S.B. but also by the group of Arnold Meijers as a
worn-out politician who himself has to take the blame for developments,
and he is holding back. His importance is not actual but potential.
At the moment many efforts toward concentration are to be noted, which
make it their task to appear as partners in a contract with the Reich.
The attempt of the system parties to regain influence through Colijn
has been, at least for the moment, rejected by the public. His place
was taken by a group of the commissioners of the province of Groningen
Lindhorst-Homann and of the Catholic politician De Quai. They presented
a proclamation to Reichsamtsleiter Schmidt. He refused to authorize it
and pointed out that a profession of loyalty to the House of Orange
could not be tolerated by the occupation power. This group was confused
thereby and lost much of its prestige among the people, which had not
been too great, anyway.
Right now a political action against the K.P. (Communist party) and
the S.D.P. (Social Democrat Party) is in progress. The K.P. does not
exercise any activity, the S.D.P. has its main support in the free
trade unions. The heads of these free unions have now been dismissed
and the above-mentioned Woudenberg has been appointed provisional head.
This reorganization took place--as far as we can see--[page 19] without
complaint and the former functionaries offered their cooperation
willingly. In direct connection with this action the political
organizations of the Communist and Social Democrat parties are being
subordinated to Rost Van Tonningen as liquidation commissioner, who has
orders to liquidate the K.P. entirely and to transfer its funds to the
assets of the S.D.P., which are administered by him. By taking over the
leadership of the free unions and the SDP organizations, especially its
press, we gained a broad basis political influence on the Dutch people,
for this party represented 20 to 22% of the Dutch population.
Arrangements have been made with the N.S.B., according to which the
organizations corresponding to the SA and the SS, as well as the youth
organization will be built up. It will be of special importance that
through the disciplined marching of these organizations an appropriate
impression is made, especially on the working classes but also on the
rest of the Dutch population.
Aside from these arrangements in the political field we have now begun
gathering together pro-German and obliging circles in the field of
economy especially agriculture, culture, art, and science, first in a
loose social form in order to create a circle of friends of the new
Germany or the new Europe, who will gradually become the carriers of
opinion and will in the corresponding fields. The first step has been
taken successfully in the field of the press. Under the leadership of
Prof. De Gudewagen a sort of press committee has been formed, to which
the right-thinking press people belong. After initial reluctance,
today all the journalists of the Netherlands are aspiring to this
association, in which the press people hostile in the past [page
20] toward the Reich are not accepted even if they are considered
especially leading.
The attempt is made to establish contact with the Dutch Indies. There
are daily radio broadcasts on the regular wave length, bringing reports
from the homeland, even news about individual persons and families, so
that we can assume that in time the Dutch people in the Dutch Indies
will tune their radios to this wave length.
It can already be said today with some confidence that it is only
a question of time until the Dutch people can be won also in their
political formation of will for a program of a close connection of the
independent Netherlands and the Dutch Indies with the Reich (union of
currency and economy). The decision boils down to the question of the
monarchy. In that question it has gone so far that some leading people
already realize that Queen Wilhelmina is opposed to this development
and that Crown Princess Juliana is also rather out of the question on
account of her marriage with Biesterfeld. The royalists therefore now
speak only of holding to the house of Orange, and individual voices are
already heard advocating the appointment of a regent to take care of
affairs until the question of the monarchy is ripe for a final decision.
Any manifestations for the Queen or for the House of Orange, which
is represented only by Crown Princess Juliana, who is married to
Biesterfeld, will no longer be tolerated, with the explanation that
the Queen persistently remains in the ranks of the enemy and does not
oppose the British air-raids on the Netherlands. From the view point of
the occupation power a manifestation for the Queen must be considered
in the same light as a manifestation for Churchill, for example. [Page
21] This point of view will be enforced with increasing severity. Since
the Queen apparently hopes to be supported by Dutch Indies circles,
there is danger that this legitimistic attitude could lead to a break
between the Netherlands and the Dutch Indies. The Dutch people show
increasing understanding for these arguments, and there is really no
longer any doubt that the Dutch, at least in Europe, are ready to
renounce the Queen and probably also the crown princess, if the Reich
could offer them a guarantee that the Dutch Indies will be kept by the
Dutch even against possible endeavors of the United States or Japan.
In this connection the possibility should be discussed of transferring
the province of Zeeland to a new territorial formation around Antwerp
and the province of Limburg to a new Gau-division. In this regard it
must be mentioned that such a transfer at this moment would probably
destroy all prospects of a political solution. That is certainly
true of Zeeland. The people living here are really of Frisian origin
and have nothing in common with the population around Antwerp. In
the post-war period of 1918-20 they were strongly opposed to an
incorporation into Belgium. It could even be used as a pressure on
the Netherlands to reach a currency and economy union if we demand
the cession of Zeeland as the economic passage area for the port
of Antwerp. The Dutch people will certainly be ready to agree to a
far-reaching economic union if in return they can retain politically
the province of Zeeland.
[Page 22]
_Statements._
In conclusion it is stated that--
1. Order and security are perfectly secured.
2. The administration is at present sufficiently and for the future
increasingly under the direction and control of the German authorities.
3. Economy and traffic have been set going and converted to war
conditions, plans for a large-scale transformation to continental
economy have been started, the preparation for it is almost universal,
the supplies of the country have been conducted into the war economy of
the Reich, the financial sources for it have been widely opened up and
joined with the management of the Reich, all on the basis of extensive
cooperation of the Dutch.
4. The necessity of deviating from the democratic party system is
becoming more and more the general opinion. The endeavor to get into
a close friendly relationship with the Reich is increasing. That
the question of the House of Orange arises in this connection is
becoming more and more evident. The fate of the Dutch Indies is more
significant, however.
If we succeed in retaining the people belonging to the free trade
unions and to the SDP organizations, and if the NSB makes a further
progress, one-fourth to one-third of the Dutch people will in
well-organized form be going the same road as the Reich, whereas the
other groups will be split and undecided. Moreover, the workers and
farmers--the latter, if the worst comes to the worst [Page 23] by the
suggestion of the idea of agrarian reform, for almost half of the
farmland is divided into small tenant farms--will only gain from a
union with the Reich. The labor service is being used for ideological
training, and the intellectual circles are being used in social form as
needed. The question, in what way the political opinion which is being
formed can be used, remains open. The answer depends partly on the
conditions of the moment.
Signed: SEYSS-INQUART
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 998-PS
GERMAN CRIMES AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Czechoslovak Official Report for the Prosecution and Trial of the
German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal,
established according to the Agreement of the Four Great Powers of
August 8th, 1945. London, September, 1945. Excerpts from pages 9 to 18.
* * * * *
The Criminal Plan
(4) _The Chief Instrument: The Sudeten-German Henlein Movement_
(a) _Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter Partei_ (DNSAP).
Fundamental parts of the national socialist ideology derived from the
Czechoslovak Germans Knirsch, Krebs and Jung who, in Bohemia in May
1918, had reconstituted the German National Socialist Workers' Party
(Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter Partei--DNSAP). Hitler's
party to come was the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei
NSDAP.
In permanent contact with the National Socialists of the Reich, the
German National Socialists in Czechoslovakia founded an organization
called "Volksport" (People's Sport) for youth over 21, modeled exactly
on the Storm Troops (S.A.) of the Reich.
Headstrong youths of the "Volksport" sailed nearest the wind. In 1932,
its student ringleaders were charged with planning armed rebellion
on behalf of a foreign power and sentenced for conspiring against
the Republic, for having openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's
programme, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a
Great German State.
This incident was greatly exploited against the so-called Activists
(German parties cooperating with the Czechs), who were accused of
complacence to the Czechs and failure to vindicate German rights. It
coincided with Hitler's accession to power.
Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia
forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of
its chiefs escaped across the frontier. This caused in German press and
radio an outburst of violent threats against Czechoslovakia.
For a year the Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia was continued but
underground.
(b) _Deutsche Heimatfront._
On October 1st, 1934, Konrad Henlein, the "unpolitical" gymnastic
instructor of the German Gymnastic Federation [Turnverband] of the
Republic, established the "German Home Front" [Deutsche Heimatfront].
He denied any relation to the late German National Socialist Party in
Czechoslovakia and any connection of the "German Home Front" with the
Nazi Party in Germany as well. He even refused to organize the German
Home Front on party lines, although he built it up on the basis of the
Nazi "Fuehrerprinzip" (principle of leadership), and himself became
the "Fuehrer" of the "Heimatfront." But he attempted a camouflage:
he rejected pan-Germanism, he insisted that Fascism and Nazism alike
lost their natural "raison d'etre" at the Czechoslovak frontiers;
he declared himself against the revision of the Versailles Treaty,
he professed the unconditional respect for individual rights and
liberties, he argued with great fervour that loyalty of the "Sudeten
Germans" to the German nation and at the same time to the Czechoslovak
State were not mutually exclusive.
(c) _The "Sudetendeutsche Partei"_ (SDP).
The Czechoslovak election system is based on Party representation.
Henlein, therefore, changed the German Home Front into the
"Sudetendeutsche Partei" (Sudeten Germans' Party), for the purpose of
participation in the General Elections of May 1935 for the National
Assembly.
Economic distress owing to the trade crisis increased the
susceptibility of the German population in Czechoslovakia for the new
German Messiah and Henlein won a resounding victory over all other
German parties.
When the election results were made known--the Henleinists won 44 seats
in the Chamber of Deputies to the National Assembly--Henlein sent a
loyalty telegram to President Masaryk.
(5) _The Policy and Tactics of the "Sudetendeutsche Partei."_
(a) _1935-1936: Still "for Democracy."_
Henlein continued to present himself as a friend of democracy
especially in London where he lectured in 1935 at Chatham House in
the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He stated there that he
refused the totalitarian principle and that he was in favor of "an
honest democracy." "We want a democracy such as is recommended by
Masaryk," he emphasized. He denied "Nazism" or "Hitlerism" to be a
doctrine "suitable for exportation," he rejected anti-Semitism.
(b) _1937: For complete Autonomy of Sudeten Germans but still within
the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic._
In 1937 Henlein struck a somewhat shriller note than before demanding,
without defining "complete Sudeten autonomy." The "Sudetendeutsche
Partei" laid draft proposals before Parliament amounting to little
short of creating a state within a state. The whole document, though
moderately worded, was already based on totalitarian principles.
(c) _1938: For Nazism and for Incorporation of the Sudeten Areas into
the German Reich._
After the occupation of Austria (March 1938) the Henleinists openly
jubilated. Nearly all German "Activist parties" were now stampeded
into the Henlein camp leaving the fight against the "Sudentendeutsche
Partei" only to the German Social Democrats and Communists. The
terrorism of the Henleinists increased. They intensified their campaign
against "Bolshevism." Open anti-Semitic propaganda started in the
Henlein press.
On April 24th, 1938, Henlein came into the open with his "Karlsbad
Programme," set forth in his speech made to the Party Congress in
Karlovy Vary. In every line of it could be heard not so much Herr
Henlein himself as his master's voice. In the Karlsbad Programme among
others the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess "German political
philosophy" in other words, National Socialism, was claimed.
In May 1938, Henlein visited Hitler in Berlin and after obtaining his
master's instructions was back in London at his old game of intriguing
against the Czechoslovak Republic.
The Local Government elections in May 1938--well prepared by the
Henleinists by vast propaganda, opened terrorism, unscrupulous using of
money, bribery of electors, etc.,--showed 80-90% of votes for Henlein.
So almost the whole German population stood behind Henlein.
The Czech Government continued to negotiate with Henlein, but on
September 14th,--two days before Hitler fulminated in his Nurnberg
speech against "this Benes" and accused him of "torturing" and planning
the "extermination" of the Sudeten Germans--he threw off his mask, fled
to the Reich declaring on the wireless: "We want to go home to the
Reich," and denouncing "the Hussite Bolshevik criminals of Prague."
K.H. Frank, interrogated by Colonel Dr. B. Ecer on May 30th, 1945, at
Wiesbaden, stated that the slogan "Heim ins Reich" (Homewards to the
Reich) was backed by 90% of the Sudeten Germans.
Few people knew before that Henlein went on Hitler's pay roll already
in 1933.
(d) _"Sudetendeutsche Partei" changed into a Nazi Party._
After Munich the "Sudetendeutsche Partei," in the areas ceded to
Germany, entered as a whole into the Reich's Nazi Party. In the not
yet occupied parts of the Republic, the "Sudetendeutsche Partei"
constituted itself as "Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiter-Partei
in der Tschechoslovakei" (German Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia).
After the total occupation (March 15th, 1939) of Bohemia and Moravia
this party too became part of the Reich Nazi Party. (About their
activity after Munich see Section 7.)
(e) _Henlein's Admission._
In a speech made on March 4th, 1941, in Vienna, published in official
Nazi papers, Henlein stated: "In order to protect ourselves against
Czech interference, we were compelled to lie and to deny our allegiance
to the National Socialist cause. We should have preferred advocating
National Socialism openly. However, it is doubtful whether in doing
so, we would have been able to perform the task of destroying
Czechoslovakia."
(6) _System and Methods of Nazi Pre-War Infiltration._
(a) _Seeds of Discord._
The Nazi Party's study and research groups had long been instructed
not only to establish close cooperation with the German minority in
the Czechoslovak Republic, but also to win over adherents from the
Slovak autonomist opposition. Long before the Austrian Anschluss in
March 1938, Nazi circles were not only in close contact with Slovak
traitors living in exile (most of whom were directly employed by the
Hungarian irredentists), but also tried to establish contacts in the
organizational machinery of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples' Party (the Slovak
Catholic Peoples' Party of the late Monsignor Andrew Hlinka). When the
traitor Bela Tuka (later to become Prime Minister of "independent"
Slovakia) was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence
established the Nazi connections with him.
The Nazi Party had paid agents among the higher staff of the Hlinka
Party. Their task was to render impossible any understanding between
the Slovak autonomists and the slovak parties in the Government of
Prague.
K.H. Frank, interrogated by Col. Dr. B. Ecer on May 30th, 1945, at
Wiesbaden, confirmed the close cooperation between the "Sudetendeutsche
Partei" (Sudeten German Party, headed by Konrad Henlein; details see
Sections 4 and 5) with the Slovakian Peoples' Party.
(b) _Espionage._
Military espionage was conducted by members of the German minority
on behalf of Germany. The Republic had to amend in 1936 the "Act for
Protection of the Republic" of 1923 to cope with the widespread treason
activity of the Henleinists and of the Reich Germans from beyond the
frontier.
Plans of Henleinists discovered by the police showed that the Henlein
Nazis had, in every district, compiled lists of all German democrats,
socialists and communists as well as of Czechs of all parties, and were
planning to round up and arrest them on the anticipated arrival of the
Reichswehr.
(c) _Murder, terrorism, anti-Semitism._
The Nazis from the Reich sent directly to Czechoslovakia their
terrorists and murderers; thus the anti-Nazis, Professor Theodor
Lessing and Ing. Formis who escaped after 1933 from Germany and were
given refuge in Czechoslovakia, were murdered in Czechoslovakia by
Nazi agents, Lessing in 1933 and Formis in 1935. The Nazis from the
Reich sent their Gestapo into the border districts to drag Czechoslovak
citizens across the border to Germany. They also sent money and arms
to the Henleinists who time and again provoked incidents in order just
to keep permanent unrest. They attacked gendarmes, customs officers
and other State officials who time and again suffered casualties. The
Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population and in several cases
murdered political foes.
Anti-semitic propaganda was carried through in the Henlein press and
boycott set in against Jewish lawyers, doctors, tradesmen, shops, etc.
(d) _Propaganda._
Disruptive propaganda came from Germany especially through the
German broadcasts. Dr. Goebbels launched "The-Nest-of-Bolshevism"
campaign against Czechoslovakia and the lie of
"Russian-troops-and-airplanes-in-Prague," etc. The Nazis from the
Reich directed the whispering propaganda of the Henleinists, thus
maintaining a permanent state of high tension in the war of nerves.
The Henleinists spread more or less openly the Nazi ideology among the
German population through their press and publications and smuggled
illegal Nazi literature into the border regions from Germany.
(e) _Headquarters in Germany._
The Nazis entertained in Stuttgart the "Ausland-Organisation der NSDAP"
for German propaganda in other countries in cooperation with the
German population of those countries. This organization was headed by
Gauleiter Bohle, who had the task of administering the "Gau Ausland"
(district: foreign countries). A comprehensive system with scientific
methods of penetration was worked out. In Czechoslovakia the tool of
German infiltration through Fifth Columns was the "Sudetendeutsche
Partei" (see Sections 4 and 5).
(f) _Nazification of German Institutions in the Czechoslovak Republic._
The Henleinists penetrated systematically step by step into the whole
life of the German population of Czechoslovakia.
All institutions underwent gradually "Gleichschaltung," i.e., the
prevailing domination of all Associations, social and cultural
centres, etc., by the Henleinists. Sport societies, football, light
athletics, rowing clubs, etc., were "conquered," just as associations
of ex-service men, choral societies or associations for diet reform.
Nearly all theatres in German parts of Czechoslovakia were "conquered"
by the Nazis, and all German orchestras as well.
It goes without saying that the Henleinists were greatly interested in
penetrating into as many economic institutions as possible and to bring
over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors
of factories, commercial firms, etc. In cases of Jewish owners or
directors they tried to secure the cooperation of possibly the whole
clerical and technical staff of the respective institutions.
(g) _Orders from Berlin._
The Henleinists entertained permanent contact with their German masters.
Attendance of Sudeten Germans at Reich German celebrations,
Saengerfeste (Choral Festivals), Gymnastic Shows and Assemblies, the
Leipzig Fair, etc., were often the pretext for organized meetings to
instruct the native Fifth Columnists and to inspire their activity.
Whenever Hitler, in his War of Nerves against Czechoslovakia, needed
incidents, the Henleinists supplied them promptly.
As one instance of many we quote Sir Nevile Henderson who reports in
his book "Failure of a Mission," London, April 1940, the meeting of
Chamberlain and Hitler in Berchtesgaden on September 15th, 1938:
* * * there was a constant influx of German Press telegrams about
incidents in the Sudeten lands. One, I remember, reported that
forty Germans had been killed in a clash somewhere with Czech
gendarmes. A British observer, of whom there were already a number in
Czechoslovakia, and who was immediately sent to verify the facts of
the case, subsequently ascertained that there had, in fact, been one
death.
Henderson adds that it was a typical example of the method of
exaggeration and actual falsification of news.
(7) _Intensified Activity of the Henlein Nazis after Munich._
After Munich Henlein's deputy Kundt became the leader of the German
minority still left inside the mutilated Republic and created
unscrupulously as many artificial "focal points of German culture"
as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany
were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German
University in Prague, and to make it a centre of aggressive Nazism. The
post-Munich government had to allow the German minority in Prague and
other Czech parts of the country "to develop freely in conformity with
the Nazi theories and not to prohibit its political activity."
It goes without saying that that "political activity" pursued only
the aim to undermine and to weaken the Czechs' resistance against the
commands from Germany.
The Henleinists cooperated with the Gestapo from the Reich infiltrating
into the Republic.
The press was, via facti, subjected to censorship exercised by Germans.
German civil servants who, before Munich, had become members of the
SDP, attained dominating influence in their positions and assisted the
Nazi infiltration into Czechoslovak public and private institutions.
(8) _Conclusion._
The separation of "Sudetengebiet" was the death blow for the economic
independence of Czechoslovakia. The frontiers imposed on her by the
Agreement of Munich and Vienna cut her railway lines at many places,
thus making impossible any strategic defence of the mutilated country,
which soon fell a victim to the German aggression.
Henlein's Fifth Columns in Czechoslovakia as described above, had their
big part in assisting Hitler to achieve his aim.
As Henlein put it (see Section 5, (e)): "We should have preferred
advocating National Socialism openly. However, it is doubtful whether
in doing so we would have been able to perform the task of destroying
Czechoslovakia."
* * * * *
II. DESTRUCTION OF CZECH CULTURAL LIFE
Par. 5. Religious Persecution.
(c) _Protestant Churches._
[Page 62]
Reference to Hus, Zizka, and the Hussites and their achievements as
well as to Masaryk and his Legions were strictly prohibited, even the
religious text books were changed. Church leaders were especially
persecuted, scores of ministers were imprisoned in concentration camps,
among them the General Secretary of the Students' Christian Movement in
Czechoslovakia. One of the vice-Presidents was executed.
Protestant Institutions such as the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. were
suppressed throughout the country.
Among the murdered Czech ministers was a pastor of the Czech Brethren
Evangelical Church, who was killed with his wife among the hostages
executed for the assassination of Heydrich.
The leading Theological School for all Evangelical denominations,
Hus Faculty in Prague and all other Protestant training schools for
the ministry were closed down in November 1939, with the other Czech
universities and colleges.
(d) _Czech Orthodox Church._
The hardest blow was directed against the Czech Orthodox Church.
The Orthodox churches in Czechoslovakia were ordered by the Berlin
Ministry of Church Affairs to leave the Pontificat of Belgrade and
Constantinople respectively and to become subordinate to the Berlin
Bishop. The Czech Bishop Gorazd was executed together with two other
priests of the Orthodox Church. By a special order of the Protector
Daluege, issued in September 1942, the Orthodox Church of Serbian
Constantinople jurisdiction was completely dissolved in the Czech
lands, its religious activity forbidden and its property confiscated.
All Evangelical education was handed over to the civil authorities and
many Evangelical teachers lost their employment; moreover the State
grant to salaries of many Evangelical priests was taken away.
(e) _Jews._
The racial persecution of the Jews is dealt with separately (Section
IV).
In connection with religious persecutions, we may mention the statement
of K.H. Frank, made on June 11, 1945 when interrogated by Col. Dr. Ecer
at Wiesbaden. Frank stated that in November 1938 the Jewish places of
worship in the "Sudeten" province were torn down by express order of
the Party, i.e. the Party Chancellery of Munich at the head of which at
that time was Rudolf Hess, and in the autumn of 1941 it was Heydrich
who ordered all synagogues to be closed, because "they had served as
meeting places for aggressive Jewish elements." Many synagogues were
demolished, others transformed into marketing halls or into auction
halls for the sale of confiscated Jewish furniture and household goods.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1012-PS
Copy
SSD--TELEGRAM
Anna 4873 3 February 42 1650
SECRET
To the Military Commander of France
Attention of Infantry General Von Stuelpnagel, Paris.
Reference: Telegram of 1 Jan. 1942.
General Field Marshal _Keitel_, after a conference with the Fuehrer,
refuses to consider the plan of sole judging and arbitrary final
decision for measures in cases of assault and acts of violence with
explosives which was proposed from there as long as the measures which
are proposed from there do not take into consideration in their type
and magnitude the fundamental attitude of the Fuehrer for assaults and
violent acts with explosives which have been reported since Jan. 15,
and which have not yet been clarified but are on the increase. Sharp
and deterring punishment must be instituted by shooting a large number
of arrested Communists and/or Jews and persons who have previously
committed assault and by arresting at least one thousand Communists,
and/or Jews for shipment. Field Marshal Keitel awaits corresponding
instructions for submission to the Fuehrer.
OKW Gen QU (V) Nr. II 1887/42 SECRET
1830 1 B 0 M HRRXMV
France
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1014-PS
SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUEHRER ON 22 AUG 1939
It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One
cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier not on
blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination
on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a
point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the
Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every
war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all
superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the
past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would
not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything.
Manly bearing.. It is not machines that fight each other. We have the
better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp
has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental
prerequisites were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final
success only through his mental power.
Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of
living forces, not the arrival at a certain line: Even if war should
break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary
objective. Quick decision because of the season.
I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war--never mind
whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later
on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not
the Right is what matters but Victory.
Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80 million people shall get what is
their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the
Right. Greatest severity.
Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German soldier. A
crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.
First aim; advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority
will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force
shall again be broken at once. Constant war of attrition.
New German frontier according to healthy principles. Possibly a
protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced
by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military
aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.
Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The
start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1015-B-PS
SPECIAL STAFF FOR PICTORIAL ART
Report of work during the period from October 1940 to July 1944
On the basis of the decree of the Fuehrer of 17 September 1940 relative
to the seizure of ownerless works of art formerly possessed by Jews in
the occupied Western territories, the special staff for pictorial art
commenced at the beginning of October 1940 in Paris with the seizure
of the works of art abandoned by the internationally known Jewish
Rothschild family, which was also famous as the possessor of great art
collections. It was not possible for the various members of the Jewish
Rothschild family, nor for many other rich French Jews, to take any
considerable part of their part possessions to England and America in
their precipitous flight before the German occupation. The staff has
not only seized very great parts of the art treasures abandoned in
the Paris City Palaces of the Rothschilds, but it also systematically
searched the country-seats of the individual members of the Rothschild
family, such as the famous Loire castle, for art treasures and thereby
safeguarded for the Reich very important parts of the world famous
Rothschild art collection. The art possessions of the Rothschild's were
traced not only to cleverly hidden places in the individual castles but
also to depots and warehouses, as for example in Bordeaux and other
coastal cities, where these art treasures had already been packed for
transport to America. In this same manner the art possessions of other
French Jews famous as art collectors such as Kann, David-Wlil, Levy
de Benzion and Seligmann were traced by the staff and seized in their
entirety.
After the seizure of the most famous Jewish art collections in Paris,
all abandoned dwellings of the wealthy Parisian Jews, as well as the
warehouses of all shipping firms and many other art depots of emigrated
Jews, which were very often camouflaged by French gentiles, were
systematically searched by the special staff for pictorial art and
very considerable art treasures found in this manner. These seizures
were carried out on the basis of preliminary exhaustive investigations
into the address lists of the French police authorities, on the basis
of Jewish handbooks, warehouse inventories and order books for French
shipping firms as well as on the basis of French art and collection
catalogs. The clearly established Jewish origin of the individual
owners was proved in each case in cooperation with the French police
authorities and the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), as well as on
the basis of the political secure material of the staff itself.
According to the same system, the seizure of ownerless Jewish works
of art was gradually extended over the whole French territory. The
investigations of the special staff for pictorial art were often made
extraordinarily difficult by proven sabotage by French authorities,
as well as by camouflaging of Jewish possessions by trusteeship of
French gentiles covering up for the Jews. In spite of this, Jewish art
possessions in the occupied French territories was seized to such an
extent as to justify the assumption that, in spite of all opposition
and camouflaging, the most important part of the art possessions which
had been in the hands of Jews in France, insofar as these had not
already been removed before the occupation, was safeguarded by the
staff. _The wholesale removal of irreplaceable European art values was
thereby prevented and the highest artistic products of all European
nations assured for Europe._
In the course of this art seizure by the staff in the occupied Western
territories, the following were seized from 203 locations (collections).
21903 art objects of all types, as counted and inventoried up to now.
A seizure record was made for each location, recording the origin of
the objects with exact individual data. All seized art treasures were
first taken to a collection warehouse at the former Jeau de Paume
Museum and then to rooms of the Louvre which had been placed at their
disposal. They were scientifically inventoried and photographed by
scientific art workers of the special staff for pictorial art and
carefully packed there by experts for transport to the Reich. These
jobs were especially difficult, since the majority of the collections
and individual art objects were taken over without any inventories or
indications of origin, and the scientific cataloguing had to be carried
out by the scientific art workers of the staff.
Since the beginning of 1943, art seizures of the staff have been
extended to include also furniture seizures of the East Ministry,
whereby a great number of individual valuable art works could be seized
from individual dwellings and warehouses.
During the period from March 1941 to July 1944, the special staff for
pictorial art brought into the Reich: _29 large shipments_ including
_137 freight cars with 4174 cases of art works_.
These shipments were taken to 6 shelters in the Reich, unpacked
and stored with observation of all conservation, air raid and fire
protection precautions. At the shelters the inventories, which had
served in Paris only for indentification were supplemented according to
scientific view-points, and the results of the scientific cataloguing
were recorded on inventory lists and thoroughly indexed. With this
scientific inventory of a material unique in its scope and importance
and of a value hitherto unknown to art research, the special staff
for pictorial art has conducted a work important to the entire field
of art. _This inventory work will form the basis of an all-inclusive
scientific catalog, in which should be recorded history, scope and
scientific and political significance of this historically unique art
seizure._
A restoration work shop equipped with all technical aids was
established by the special staff at one of the shelters, and has been
occupied with the care and restoration of seized articles of artistic
value as well as with their permanent observation at the shelters.
Several hundreds of the works of art that had been neglected by their
Jewish owners or had earlier been inexpertly restored were restored in
this workshop and their preservation assured.
In addition, all seized articles of artistic value were photographed
by the photography workshop of the special staff and included in a
film library. Thereby not only the identity of each individual art
work was recorded, but also material of permanent value for study and
publication in the field of art was created.
Up to 15 July 1944 the following had been scientifically inventoried:
_21,903 art works_
_5,281 paintings, pastels, water-colors, drawings._
_684 miniatures, glass and enamel paintings, books and manuscripts._
_583 plastics, terra-cottas, medallions and plaques._
_2,477 articles of furniture of value to art history._
_583 textiles_ (Gobelins, rugs, embroideries, Coptic materials).
_5,825 hand-made art works_ (porcelains, bronze, faiences,
majolica, ceramics, jewelry, coins, art objects
made with precious stones).
_1,286 East Asiatic art works_ (bronzes, plastics, porcelains,
paintings, folding screens, weapons).
_259 art works of antiquity_ (sculptures, bronzes, vases,
jewelry, bowls, cut stones, terra-cottas).
These figures will be increased, since seizures in the West are not yet
completed, and it has not been possible to make a scientific inventory
of part of the seized objects because of the lack of experts.
The extraordinary artistic and material value of the seized art works
cannot be expressed in figures. The paintings, period furniture of the
17th and 18th centuries, the Gobelins, the antiques and renaissance
jewelry of the Rothschilds are objects of such a unique character that
their evaluation is impossible, since no comparable values have so far
appeared on the art market.
A short report, moreover, can only hint at the artistic worth of the
collection. Among the seized paintings, pastels and drawings there are
several hundred works of the first quality, masterpieces of European
art, which could take first place in any museum. Included therein are
absolutely authenticated signed works of Rembrandt van Rijn, Rubens,
Frans Hals, Vermeer van Delft, Velasquez, Murilio, Goya, Sebastiano del
Piombo, Palma Vecchio, etc.
Of first importance among the seized paintings are the works of the
famous French painters of the 18th century, with masterpieces of
Boucher, Watteau, Algaud, Largielliere, Kattier, Fragonard, Pater, D
Nloux and de Trcy.
This collection can compare with those of the best European museums.
It includes many works of the foremost French masters, who up to now
have been only inadequately represented in the best German museums.
Very important also is the representation of masterpieces of the
Dutch painters of the 17th and 18th centuries. First of all should be
mentioned the works of van Dyck, Salomon and Jacob Ruisdar Wouvermann,
Terborch, jan Weenix, Gabriel Metsu, Adrian van Ostade, David Teniers,
Pieter de Hooch, Willem van der Velde, etc.
Of foremost importance also are the represented works of English
paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, with masterpieces of
Reynolds, Romney and Gainsborough. Cranach and Amberger, among the
German masters, should be mentioned.
The collection of French furniture of the 17th and 18th centuries is
perhaps even more highly to be evaluated. This contains hundreds of the
best preserved and, for the most part, signed works of the best known
cabinet-makers from the period between Louis XIV to Louis XVI. Since
German cabinet-makers played an important part in this golden age of
French cabinetry, now recognized for the first time in the field of
art, this collection is of paramount importance.
The collection of Gobelins and Persian tapestries contains numerous
world famous objects. The collection of handicraft works and the
Rothschild collection of renaissance jewelry is valuable beyond
comparison.
Very many works of art were seized by the staff from the luggage of
Jewish emigrants in Holland as well as in the occupied territories of
France and Belgium.
_Work in the Eastern territories._
The activity of the special staff for pictorial art was limited in the
occupied Eastern territories to a scientific and photographic recording
of public collection and their safeguarding and care in cooperation
with the military and civil services. In the course of the evacuation
of the territory several hundred most valuable Russian Ikons, several
hundred Russian paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, individual
articles of furniture and furniture from castles were saved in
cooperation with the individual army groups, and brought to a shelter
in the Reich.
A collection of degenerate Bolshevist art, as well as a collection of
degenerate Western art, was also made for political study purposes. In
addition, a rich collection of material concerning Soviet architecture
was made.
25 portfolios of pictures with the most valuable works of the art
collections seized in the West were presented to the Fuehrer on 20
April 1943, together with three volumes of a provisional catalog of
paintings and an interim progress report. Additional portfolios of
pictures are in preparation.
Robert SCHOLZ
Bereichsleiter
Chief of the Special Staff for Pictorial Art
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1015-I-PS
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Berlin W8, 30 May 1942
Leipziger Str. 3
Dear Party member Rosenberg:
Your Einsatzstab for the seizure of cultural goods in Paris, I believe,
has been wrongly reported to you as if it were dealing in works of
art itself. I know the task of the Einsatzstab very well and must
assert that there is no agency to which I am able to express such
unrestricted praise for its continued work and readiness as to this
agency proper with all its collaborators. Presumably I have given cause
for the reputation of dealing in works of art because I have asked some
especially experienced gentlemen if anywhere during their stay in Paris
or France they should hear of any pictures or other art objects to be
sold by art dealers or private individuals to look at those objects
and to inform me if there should be anything of interest for me. Since
the latter was often the case, I have then again asked the gentlemen
to do me the favor to acquire the objects for me for which purpose I
have kept a depot ready for them. If thus some gentlemen got very busy
to make contacts with art dealers it was exclusively a personal favor
which was done for me for the benefit of building up my collection.
Since very many prospective buyers endeavor to seize art objects in the
occupied territory, I can well imagine that perhaps out of ignorance of
the circumstances, but perhaps also out of envy they have caused the
gentlemen of your Einsatzstab to be suspected wrongly.
I feel it my duty to give you this information and to ask you that it
may remain this way. On the other hand I also support personally the
work of your Einsatzstab wherever I can do so, and a great part of the
seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to assist
the Einsatzstab by my organization.
With best regards and Heil Hitler!
Yours
Signed: Hermann Goering
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1015-GG-PS
Statement of art objects counted and inventoried
I. _Paintings_
Oil paintings 3,027
Water-colors 766
Drawings 1,332
Pastels 156
Engravings 1 4,525
Miniatures--portraits 442
Miniatures--parchments--initial letters 51
Persian miniatures 49
Glass paintings 19
Porcelain--enamels--paintings 455
Books and manuscripts 55
Reproductions 13
------
10,890
II. _Plastics_
Bronze and other metals including statuettes 129
Marble and other stones 110
Wood 65
Terra-cotta, clay and porcelain 74
Reliefs 52
Medallions and plaques 121
Ivory 3
Wax 3
Plaster 26
---
583
III. _Furniture_
Chests of drawers 241
Clothes-presses 33
Writing tables 86
Secretaries 69
Sewing tables 11
Tables 255
Sideboards 5
Kitchen tables 26
Cupboards 155
Chairs and sofas 979
Clocks of various types 115
Chandeliers, etc. 277
Miscellaneous 143
Mirrors 21
Consoles 61
-----
2,477
IV. _Textiles_
Gobelins 66
Carpets 291
Cloths 104
Coptic cloths 36
Embroidery, weavings (Including fragments) 86
----
583
V. _Hand-made art objects_
Porcelain (cups, plates, vases) 335
Ceramics (cups, bowls) 252
Faeence, Majolika 324
Glass 140
Porcelain figures 92
Bronze and other metals 371
Objects of rare metals 189
Articles of daily use 308
Jewelry 243
Coins 844
Weapons 206
Orientalia and exotica 388
Objects of rare gems 74
Other art works 2 2,059
-----
5,825
VI. _East-Asiatic_
Plastics 48
Bronzes to 1500 and later 26
Porcelains and stone-ware before 1644 472
Porcelains and stone-ware after 1644 101
Clay-ware 19
Semi-precious gems and ivories 92
Netsuka (Japanese art objects) 68
Paintings 72
Wood-carvings 183
Lacquers 27
Folding screens 6
Weapons 31
Miscellaneous 141
-----
1,286
VII. _Antiquities_
A. Greek
Sculptures, including reliefs 3
Bronzes, including statuettes 6
Terra-cottas and other clays 14
Vases, bowls, pitchers 6
Jewelry, about 40
Miscellaneous 6
B. Roman
Sculptures, including portraits 15
Bronzes, including statuettes 19
Clay 1
Jewelry, about 83
Miscellaneous 15
C. Egyptian
Sculptures, including reliefs 20
Bronzes, including statuettes 11
Cut stones 5
Miscellaneous 10
D. Asia-Minor
Reliefs 1
Clay 1
Cut stones 3
---
259
Total 21,903
Remarks:
1. In enumerating engravings in portfolios, the sheets were counted
individually. In bound volumes the engravings were considered as one
number.
2. Among the other art works are also included antique and East-Asiatic
miniatures from the Kann Collection, which up to now have received no
exact classification.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1017-PS
Copy
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
[Handwritten note] 1. Memorandum
2.4.41
_Subject: The USSR._
Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia, is a
conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has come
into being through the annexation of states of a related or even of an
essentially alien character.
A military conflict with the USSR will result in an extraordinarily
rapid occupation of an important and large section of the USSR. It
is very probable that military action on our part will very soon be
followed by the military collapse of the USSR. The occupation of these
areas would then present not so many military as administrative and
economic difficulties. Thus arises the first question:
Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or economic
needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a future
organization of the area also a factor in determining how far the
occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to fix
the _political_ goal which is to be obtained, for it will, without
doubt, also have an effect on military operations.
If the political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak condition
it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military operations, one
may conclude that:
1. The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions;
2. From the very beginning, the treatment of individual sections of
territory should, as regards administration, as well as economics and
ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are striving to attain;
3. Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas, such as,
in particular, the assurance of essential supplies for the continuation
of the war against England, the maintenance of production which this
necessitates and the general directives for the completely separate
areas, had best be dealt with all in one.
It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the arguments
which follow of course only hold good once the supplies from the
area to be occupied, which are essential to Greater Germany for the
continuation of the war, has been assured.
Anyone who knows the East, sees on a map of Russia's population the
following national or geographical units:
a. Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre.
b. White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital.
c. Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
d. The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre.
e. The Don area with Rostov as its capital.
f. The area of the Caucasus.
g. Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.
_A. Greater Russia_
After the rule of the Tartars, the Russian Empire, Czarist in
character developed out of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. This nucleus
area possesses even today the greatest driving power. The political
aim of operations against the USSR, therefore, would be the permanent
weakening of this area, in order to secure possibilities of expansion
for the other areas. By means of a temporary occupation of this area,
this weakening could be brought about in a way comprising the three
following measures:
1. The total destruction of the Jewish Bolshevik state administration,
without helping to set up a new and comprehensive state system;
2. very extensive utilization of economic resources such as the
removal of all non-essential stocks, mechanical installations, and, in
particular, of any available means of transport, small river craft,
etc.;
3. the allocation of considerable sections of this Russian nucleus
territory to the fresh administrative units which are to be formed, as,
in particular, to White Russia, the Ukraine, and the Don territory.
In this way all other areas would be offered at the same time the
possibility of making extensive use of that part of Russia controlled
by Moscow as a dumping ground for undesirable elements of the
population.
_B. White Russia._
White Russia comprises a part of the USSR which is very backward
culturally as well as economically. At the same time it contains the
second largest Jewish community in the USSR, with towns which are
completely Jewish, such as Bialystok, Minsk, Polodzk, Vitebsk, and
others.
The awakening of an independent life, and the setting up of a living
state system must be considered as an extremely tedious and difficult
undertaking. White Russia is far more backward in culture than, for
instance, Lithuania, and more exploited by the Jews than Poland.
Nevertheless, having regard to the necessity of weakening the Russian
nucleus area, such an attempt should be advocated.
The USSR has confined White Russia to the area between the Polish
North-West frontier and approximately as far as the Pronja. But
the real capital of the whole area would be Smolensk. The half
administrative district of the same name and also a section of the
administrative district of Kalinin (formerly Twer) could count,
by population, as belonging to it, or could be added to it for
administration purposes. In this way the frontier of White Russia
would be moved forward to within about 250 kilometres of Moscow.
If the creation of independent political life is considered desirable,
it would not be advisable to carve up this area to the benefit of the
General-government of Poland.
_C. Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania._
In the case of these areas the question arises, whether they should be
allotted the special task of becoming a German settlement area of the
future, the racially most suitable elements being assimilated.
If this is set up as an aim, the areas also require very special
treatment in the general task.
The necessary removal of considerable sections of the intelligentsia
particularly _Latvian_ ones--to the Russian nucleus area would have
to be organized. The settlement of a German rural population in
considerable quantities would have to be started--possibly a large
contingent of German settlers suitable for this purpose could be taken
from among the Volga Germans, after the undesirable elements have been
eliminated. There might also be the possibility of the settlements
of Danes, Norwegians, Dutch and--after the war has been brought to a
victorious end--of Englishmen too, so that, in the course of one or two
generations, this area can be joined up with the German nucleus area as
a new Germanised country.
In this case we should also not have to neglect to deport considerable
groups of racially inferior sections of the population from Lithuania.
_D. The Ukraine (Border territory)._
Kiev became the main centre of the Varangian state with its
superimposed Scandinavian character. But even after the rule of the
Tartars Kiev was for a long time diametrically opposed to Moscow. Its
independent national life is based, contrary to the assertions of
Muscovite historians, whose ideas also dominated the whole of European
learning, on a tradition which is really almost unbroken.
As far as this area is concerned, the political task would be the
encouragement of independent national life until, possibly, an
independent state could be created, with the object, alone or in
conjunction with the Don area and the Caucasus as a _Black Sea Union_,
of holding Moscow constantly in check and ensuring Lebensraum for
Greater Germany to the East. In the economic field, however, this area
would at the same time, have the task of forming a powerful base for
raw materials and a supplementary nutrition centre for the Greater
German Reich.
Strips of border territory from the Russian nucleus area, too, would
have to be added to that part which is regarded by the USSR as purely
Ukrainian--as has already been mentioned--in order to weaken this
nucleus area and at the same time to keep alive constant opposition to
it. In this matter, parts of the administrative districts of Kursk and
Voronesch might be possibilities.
The administrative and economic handling of the whole area would then
have to be directed towards the attainment of the political aim.
_E. The Don Area._
It is inhabited by the Don Cossacks. As a nation they are far less
independent than the Ukrainians, culturally they are saturated with
Moscow ideology, and politically they tend chiefly towards Moscow, but
are more developed than the White Russians. The task in this area would
be similar to that in White Russia.
Similarly, it would be desirable to extend this area northwards up
to the Administrative Districts of Szaratow in order to link up its
administration with that of the territory of the Volga Germans.
_F. The Caucasus._
The Caucasus is inhabited by sections of the population which are,
racially, entirely different, and also by national units. The river
plain of the Kuban and Terek, and the present Administrative Districts
of Krasnodar and Ordschjonokidze are inhabited by Cossacks, the
majority of whom consider themselves to be Ukrainians. The most
advanced nation as regards culture is the Georgians, between the
Great and Lesser Caucasus, who can point to a centuries old cultural
tradition and independence of their own. Then comes Aserbeidschan,
peopled by Mussulmen of Ugrotatarian origin, with its centre at Baku.
The Armenians live in adjacent territory to the South, while the
northern mountain slopes are inhabited by quite a number of mountain
peoples of the most varied origins.
The area is Russia's oil centre. The material output, and indeed the
existence of the other mainly agricultural areas of the USSR, such
as the Ukraine, the Don-Kuban, and the Terek district, and also to a
certain extent the Russian nucleus area, largely depend on keeping this
area in production. Owing to the introduction of the Bolshevik system
of running villages on communal lines without individual ownership, and
of Kolchoses (collective farms), with mechanical cultivation of the
soil, the production of grain and food depends on the regular supplying
of the necessary fuel. As a result of the sharp drop in the number of
draught cattle, and the fact that these are, numerically, very unevenly
distributed, any strangulation of the oil supply--quite apart from the
maintenance of the motor repair depots and the availability of the
necessary servicing personnel for this--tends to famine.
_G. Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan._
We can assume that, after the military collapse of the Soviets in
Europe, very small forces would be needed to dispose of the Moscow
tyranny in Central Asia. This area too, is inhabited by peoples of
very different types, mainly Turano-Mongoloid, and who are followers
of Mohammed. They feel themselves to be in long-standing racial
and religious opposition to the Soviets, and at the same time to
the Russian people too, without being able, for the time being, to
throw off the Russian yoke by their own efforts. This should not be
considered too difficult to carry out, however, with German help, and
in view of the confusion which would arise among the Soviets.
The area is Russia's cotton store, with an annual production, according
to Bolshevik figures, of 400,000-500,000 tons of cotton.
The entry of Germans into Central Asia would mean powerful rear support
for Iran and Afghanistan. It is a matter for conjecture whether these
states would not possibly be impelled by this means to undertake more
active operations against India--if there is any such intention--in
the event of Turkey too, having altered her attitude by that time. The
threat to the British lines of communication to India thus acquires
real significance, and will, without doubt, compel Britain to deploy
greater forces in this area, which she would have to take from Europe
or elsewhere.
_General Questions of Economy from the Legal Angle._
The acquisition of oil, mainly in the Caucasus, immediately brings with
it the question of its transport, in order to maintain agricultural
production in the occupied areas. The question of transport, however,
which is of decisive importance to the cultivation of the soil, is
bound up again with settling the coal problem. At the same time, the
question of finance in these areas appears of primary importance.
A question which likewise affects all areas is that of the almost
complete abolition, under the Soviet system, of private property. It
is not improbable that this question will have practical consequences
immediately the area is occupied. Spontaneous action taken by a
completely uneducated rural population, if and when they dissolve the
Kolchoses by their own efforts, could result in untold material harm.
For this reason these problems require to be settled, not regionally,
but as extraordinary matters for all areas, and local variations, and
perhaps also differing tactical action could easily be combined with
this.
_Summary._
The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from the points
briefly outlined here:
1. the creation of a central department for the occupied areas of the
USSR, to be confined more or less to wartime.
Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it
would be the task of this department--
a. to issue binding political instructions to the separate
administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at the time
and the goal which is to be achieved.
b. to secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from all the
occupied areas.
c. to make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out, in main
outline, of the primarily important questions for all areas, as for
instance, those of finance and funds, transport, and the production of
oil, coal and food;
2. the carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the separate
administration areas, grouped together by race or by reason of
political economy, for the carrying out of the totally dissimilar tasks
assigned to them.
_As against this, an administrative department, regulating matters
in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic basis, as is at
present envisaged, might very soon prove to be inadequate, and fail in
its purpose._ Such a central office would be compelled to carry out a
common policy for all areas, dictated only by economic considerations,
and this might impede the carrying out of the _political_ task and, in
view of its being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even
prevent it.
The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have been
set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be taken
into consideration from the very beginning when organising the
administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view
of the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration which arise
from that alone, and also in view of the living conditions created by
Bolshevism, which are totally different from those of Western Europe,
the whole question of the USSR would require different treatment from
that which has been applied in the individual countries of Western
Europe.
2.4.41
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1019-PS
Appendix to Memorandum No. 2
Recommendations as to the personnel for the Reich Commissariats in the
East and for the Political Central Office in Berlin
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
Surveying the requirements in regard to personnel as a whole, the
following considerations must be taken into account. On psychological
and historical grounds it would not appear politic to put the immediate
political direction of the Baltic Provinces into the hands of the
Balts. Although it must be admitted that they know the conditions best
and also know the languages, so many historical memories and complexes
are involved, that it would appear inexpedient if we are to attain our
final political goal to allow people who formerly had dealings with the
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians once more to appear politically
in positions of authority. On the other hand, it is necessary to
send people to these parts who are intimately acquainted with the
problems of the East and North and are also able, from the point of
view of temperament to bring a particular understanding to bear on
the situation there. When, in addition, there are still interests in
connection with Scandinavia and Finland, indeed altogether a Hanseatic
trend, then in the opinion of the undersigned, such persons would be
most suited for the political direction of the Eastern Provinces. On
these grounds the undersigned suggests the following to the Fuehrer: As
Reich Commissar for the Baltic Provinces and White Russia: Gauleiter
Hinrich Lohse, Kiel. Headquarters: _Riga_.
Further positions to be filled: a Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine,
a Reich Commissariat for the Caucasus and a Reich Commissariat for the
Don and Volga Areas. Here also it would appear necessary to entrust
this task to people who already have a previous knowledge of the
Russian, Ukrainian and Caucasus problems, who have been in contact
with the country and people, and if it is at all possible, who speak
Russian, the language with which one can make oneself generally
understood there. The undersigned suggests to the Fuehrer as Reich
Commissar for the Ukraine and Caucasus, as they may be suitable:
Secretary of State Backe and Stabsleiter Arno Schickedanz. Party
member Backe himself comes from the Caucasus and will quickly be
able to acquaint himself with the conditions, speaks fluent Russian
and has never quite broken off his connections with the Caucasus.
Pg. Schickedanz has been working in the Russian sphere for 20 years,
formerly with Dr. Scheubner-Richter and then with the undersigned. He
helped the latter with politically cautious advice, particularly in
connection with Norway. He knows many of the people concerned with
Russia, the Ukraine and the Caucasus so that he appears suitable
for one of these posts, in order to survey the political situation
correctly and serve the political aims for which we are to strive. If
the undersigned could make a choice for this recommendation, he would
name Backe for the Caucasus and Schickedanz for the Ukraine. As second
in command to the Reich Commissar in the Caucasus, the Commissioner for
the 4 year plan would have to name someone to lead an authoritative Oil
Commission. For the Ukraine an agricultural department of particularly
capable men would have to be established. Headquarters of the Reich
Commissariats would be _Kijew_ and _Tiflis_.
Prime Minister D. Klagges is recommended as Reich Commissar for the
Don-Volga Area. As a result of his initiative in connection with the
establishment of the Hermann-Goering Works in Salzgitter he knows the
problems of mining and as Prime Minister of Brunswick he has collected
all the administrative experience. At the moment the undersigned can
call to mind no one else who speaks _Russian_. Headquarters of the
Reich Commissar: _Rostov_ on Don.
In addition, it will eventually become necessary to occupy with troops
not only Petersburg, but also Moscow. This occupation will definitely
differ considerably from that in the Baltic provinces, in the Ukraine
and in the Caucasus. It will be accomplished by suppressing any Russian
and Bolshevik resistance and will necessitate an absolutely ruthless
person, both as regards the military representation and also the
_eventual_ political direction. The problems arising from this need
not be detailed here. If it is not intended to maintain a permanent
military administration, the undersigned would recommend the Gauleiter
of East Prussia, Erich Koch as Reich Commissar in _Moscow_.
A consideration of the problems as a whole shows that in order to
overcome them a _Central_ Office to direct the work of the various
Reich Commissariats is urgently necessary. First of all in order to
relieve the Fuehrer, so that he does not have to deal continuously with
four or five Administrative Offices in the East, and secondly since
it is necessary, from an authoritative and political point of view,
for all these areas to be surveyed and supervised by _one_ office, and
for the tasks allotted to be carried out in the manner desired by the
Fuehrer by means of directives to the personalities in charge. The
Fuehrer instructed the undersigned, on 2nd April 1941, to establish a
central political office to deal with work in the East in anticipation
of the eventuality mentioned in the introduction to this memorandum.
Bearing in mind the political aims described above, the most important
task of such a central political office, immediately subordinate to
the Fuehrer, would be the adaptation or actual preparation of suitable
leaflets, as the first proclamation of the Military Commander. It
would then have to take care that all proclamations and decrees
issued later by the political directors of the Occupied Territories
conform to the varied aims, that measures resulting from this central
attitude, both cultural and economic, are in agreement with these,
that mistakes which do not correspond to the political intention are,
if possible, avoided or, if they have already occurred, remedied
in a sensible manner. Furthermore the office would have the task
of writing and editing the necessary enlightening articles on the
history and relations with Germany of the various territories, or of
finding collaborators who can write them. It would also be a good
thing to have translations made of those articles and speeches which
can be shown to have expressed a German-Ukrainian solution in the
course of the national-socialist struggle. Scientific literature on
this subject has been in preparation by colleagues of the undersigned
for a considerable time. A basic work has been published ("Um die
Neugestalt Europas"--"The Changed Face of Europe," Central Party
Publishers), a new book is in preparation and extensive research on
the whole continental European question is well under way. In addition
speeches must be composed in German, Ukrainian, Georgian etc., to be
made into gramophone records. A large number of loudspeaker cars must
be available in view of the widespread illiteracy still existing. In
addition this Central Office would already have to have such authority,
that the most efficient of the top-ranking Reich Authorities concerned,
of the O.K.W. as well as the authorities controlling the 4 year Plan
would be at the disposal of its chief, so that all future measures
necessary for the realization of our political goals, political,
economic, cultural, scientific and propaganda, may be instituted even
now in such a way as to further these central ideas. Only by such a
central direction of _basic_, decisive orders will it be possible
to avoid confusion later on and will the enormous difficulties and
misunderstandings unavoidably connected with the occupation of almost
devastated areas be reduced to the minimum. The undersigned therefore
makes the suggestion to the Fuehrer that _when the eventuality arises_
this Central _Office_, which is fully empowered and is to be set up,
should be changed into a component authority immediately subordinate to
the Fuehrer, i.e.--in order to avoid a repetition of existing official
designations--into a General Protectorate for the occupied Eastern
territories with its seat in Berlin. The Head of this Protectorate
could then obtain the official designation of "The Protector-General
of the German Reich for the Occupied Eastern Territories." (The name
Commissar-General is already in use, e.g. as the subordinate of the
Reich Commissar in Holland.) The Fuehrer would then nominate and recall
the Reich Commissar for the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, Caucasia
and the Don-Volga area (eventually Moscow and Turkestan) on the
recommendation of the Protector-General. The official communications
of all top-ranking Reich Authorities to the Reich Commissariats in the
occupied territories would go through the Protectorate-General, whereby
all technical, economic, etc., directions would be issued entirely
authoritatively by the top-ranking Reich officials in question. It is
therefore _not_ necessary to found a new large Reich Office, but rather
a political _centre_ for the East provided with all necessary powers,
in combination with an Inspectorate and State Secretariat to control
all questions concerning the connection between the Protector-General
and the Reich Commissariats and top-ranking Reich Authorities. Should
the Fuehrer agree to the proposal to alter the political central
office, which is to be established shortly and with whose direction
the undersigned is charged, when the eventuality arises into a General
protectorate under the same direction, then the undersigned recommends
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer of Munster as Secretary of State. Dr. Meyer is an
old national-socialist fighter who sees the political problems clearly
and from a national-socialist point of view. He has occupied himself so
exhaustively in the last few years with State Law and administrative
measures, that he can also carry out this work in addition to his
burdensome work as Gauleiter. It is clear that from Dr. Meyer
extraordinary service would be asked, but on the other hand he would
certainly consider such an appointment a particular honour.
The Fuehrer has already granted to the undersigned the budget for a
central office. If the Fuehrer approves the above trains of thought and
proposals, as they are or in modified form, they could be set in motion
immediately.
Berlin, the 7th April, 1941
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1024-PS
29 April 1941
General organization and tasks of our office for the general handling
of problems in the Eastern territories
The Chief of this office under whom a personal expert plus the
necessary office staff is to be placed, is to be assisted in
all general problems of the office by his permanently assigned
representative (Gauleiter Dr. Meyer). The permanent representative
heads a main office which organizes the whole interior service as well
as a number of departments which have to work on special problems.
1. _Political department._
This department is charged with the task of further working out the
staked-out political goals in the several projected _five areas_, and
to sum up the historical reasons for the new partitioning of the whole
east European area. It must result from this work, that the proposed
district shall not be of a haphazard nature, but are due rather to the
historical and national developments, and thus represent a political
necessity for the future. The substantial treatment of those problems
is closely connected with the history and nature of the several
_nationalities_ in the East, which also will have to be treated. To
this is to be added the appraisal of the individualisms of these
nationalities which live within or out of Europe for the purpose of a
later outside commitment in the projected administrative districts.
A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for which a
temporary solution will have to be determined (forced labor for the
Jews, creation of Ghettos, etc.) The church problems of the whole East
are of a varying nature (character) and require an intensive treatment
in relation to the past, to the now existing laws and to the interested
future relationship.
While the work itself is being done, there will arise a great number
of special problems out of the whole of the general problems. With
the present state of the work, one should not anticipate the special
problems.
Rank of the Chief and his representative: Ministerialdirector
and Ministerialdirigent. Proposed as the Chief of this office:
Reichsamtleiter Dr. Georg Leibbrandt. His representative: Consul
general Dr. Brautigam.
2. _Economic-Political Coordination._
Until further final decisions have been reached about the substantial
treatment of economy, technics, traffic, postal service, highway
dept., labor service, this dept. has no immediate pertinent tasks
to solve, such as the political dept. The main task of the dept. of
economic-political coordination will consist rather of coordinating
the different above mentioned territories in their demands and their
utilization so that the known political goal can be attained as quickly
as possible in the five large districts by the use of the psychological
possibilities.
The top priority of the demands of the occupational force is the
assured supplying of the Germans with raw materials and food. In the
long run in certain districts this goal may be attained with less
force, through an understanding, special treatment of the individual
nationalities rather than by this national and political situation, the
solution of this problem is forced by means of the military or police
strength.
The Chief of this dept. of economic-political coordination will have
the task to coordinate the orders of the plenipotentiary of the Four
Year Plan with the wishes of the economical and financial resources by
cooperation with the representatives of the highway dept. and labor
dept. in order to assure the utmost safety and by using the existing
files of the people who know Russia to secure the biggest possible
assistance in all these economic-political necessities. Connected with
this is the contingency of all the desired amounts of raw materials and
food, namely in this respect that those districts, in which a political
autonomy and a lasting cooperation is projected are to be considered
more than other ones for which such a possibility does not seem
indicated for the future. One must proceed in the same way to solve the
currency question. After a certain period of transition, it must be
decided where national currency issuing banks will have to be created
in connection with the overall, political solution, and where this is
not deemed necessary. The same holds true for postage stamps and other
questions, which will arise in concrete forms, in connection with the
course of this work.
According to the decisions of the Reichsmarshall, the economy is to
be coordinated under the authority of one person. Consequently, the
representatives of the brands for food, the currency and financial
questions, the industrial economy and the question of utilization of
labor are subordinated to the plenipotentiary for the whole economy.
Therefore, the Deputy of the Four-year plan represents all of the
economic branch in discussion about economic-political coordination,
while the representatives of the other mentioned depts. will enter
the conferences under his direction. In other words the head of the
department of economic-political coordination has to bring about a
combination [Gesamtheit] with the political goal of
1. Safeguarding of the German War Effort and supplies.
2. Attaining of political goals in the East.
The conferences will take place, if necessary, under the leadership of
the permanent representative of the Chief, or in the form of a round
table discussion of the participants under the presidency of the head
of the economic-political coordination dept.
Position (Rank): Ministerialdirector. Representative:
Ministerialdirigent.
Proposed as the head of the Dept. for economical-political
coordination: Reichsamtleiter Walter Malletke. Representative
Reichshamptstellenleiter Hermann Freiherr von Harder. In addition,
a small number of permanent assistants and the necessary office are
envisaged.
The supreme headquarters of the Armed Forces has appointed as
representative to the director of this office the Chief of the
Armed Forces operational staff [Wehrmachts fuehrungstab] General
of the Artillery Jodl, and as his representative Brigadier General
Warlimont. General Jodl or Brig. Gen. Warlimont are to be included in
conferences of the political dept. and the dept. of economic-political
coordination, held under the chairmanship of the director or his
representative, during which military matters are being discussed.
3. _Legal Dept._
It is the task of the Legal Dept. to prepare those drafts for
laws which are deemed necessary for the governing of the Eastern
territories, with due consideration to general directives of the
director or his representative. If called for, a representative of the
Legal Dept. is to sit in on the conferences of the Political Dept. and
the dept. of economic-political-coordination in order to keep abreast
with the problem arising from this subject matter and accordingly to
make the draft for the necessary decrees or, otherwise, to formulate
the presented drafts of the various depts. in accordance with the
general goals and future constitutional demands. The ordinances for
the execution of the decrees of the director of the office are to
be agreed upon in advance with the head of the Legal Dept; these
(decrees) are to be brought before the representative of the director
in case no argument can be reached. Rank of the head of the dept:
Ministerialdirector. Representative: Ministerialdirigent. Proposed
for the job; proposal is asked of the Reichsminister and Chief of the
Chancellory. Experts of the constitutional conditions in the East
should be consulted as advisors, first of all Staatsrat Freiherr von
Freitagh Lorringhoven (other proposal: Regierungspresident Dr. Runte
from Brusberg.)
4. _Dept. for Culture and Science._
The work of this dept. does not seem as pressing as the political,
economic-political and legal-political problems. However, now is the
time to project the installation of these cultural and educational
institutions for those territories that are in need of special care
on the part of Germany. The task would be to further those national
sciences and history of literature and universities which conform
with the political goal. Rank of the director: Ministerialdirector.
Representative: Ministerialdirigent. The director has not been proposed
as yet.
5. _Enlightenment and Press._
It is the task of this dept. in an active manner, to publicize the
substantially worked out decision of the several depts. for all of
those circles for which these decisions are meant. Furthermore, to
maintain the entire connections with the Reichs ministry for the
Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda and to employ the facilities
of this ministry in the fields of radio, public address systems, films,
etc., in order to obtain the political goals in the Eastern European
area. Furthermore, the enlightenment of the whole German people and the
army is to be promoted in such a way as is deemed necessary by the hand
of this office. During press conferences, the representative of the
dept. for enlightenment and press has to acquaint Germany's newspapers
and magazines with the necessary instructions, and to make statements
for the foreign press, if deemed necessary. This task to be carried
out in agreement with the Chief of the German press. It is furthermore
the task of the head of this dept. to establish the fastest possible
connection for communication between the main office and the future
administrative offices of the Eastern European area. The additional
influence upon the foreign nationalities should be the presentation
of the aims of National Socialist Germany, given in the individual
languages of the various people.
Rank of the head of the dept.: Ministerial-director. Representative:
Ministerialdirigent. A number of necessary officials and expert and
usual staff. Proposed; General commissioner Fritz Schmidt den Haag.
Experts Dr. Karl Neuscheler, at the present in Meuskan, and Dr. Gamber,
at present in Belgrad (DNB). At present further necessities cannot
be foreseen and if necessary an enlargement upon the work will be
contemplated with new demands.
The representative of the Fuehrer is to be contacted (asked) whether
or not he desires to be represented at the director of the dept.,
or his representative. Furthermore, it is deemed necessary that the
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German police appoints a permanent
representative to this office with whom administrative decrees
concerning safeguarding by police forces are to be discussed. The
representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
can be consulted in all conferences pertaining to the security of the
Eastern territories.
The Reichs commissioner for the solidification of the Germanic National
Characteristic will also appoint his representative, who, at the
proper time, will take over the task on orders of the head of the
administrative district, the tasks in those administrative districts
where this employment is deemed necessary.
_Communications to the Administrative districts in the East_
Each administrative district in the Eastern European area will
establish a representative in Berlin, which is to be immediately
subordinated to the permanent representative of the director of the
office. These representatives have the task to regulate all questions
of entering and knowing their respective areas and to receive and work
out all wishes of the various Reichs Offices of party and state, which
pertain to the represented administrative areas.
The directives to the heads of the administrative districts will
originate only from the head of the office. This representative will
tend all the other pending negotiations.
The administrative districts in the East European areas will be
organized according to the needs of the main office, so that in
general, one section of the office in Berlin corresponds to an office
in the administrative districts. This is a process through which will
require a much higher specialization.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1028-PS
[Memorandum from Rosenberg file, 7 May 1941]
[Translation of Only Typewritten Material]
After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the Jewish
question will have to have a decisive solution, through the institution
of Ghettos. Insofar as the Jews have not been driven out by the
Ukrainians themselves, the small communities must be lodged in large
camps, in order to be kept busy by means of forced labor, in the same
way as it has already been the practice in Letzmanorstadt (Lodz).
[Translation of paragraph, excluding all crossed out words.]
After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the
Jewish question will have to undergo a decisive solution through the
institution of ghettos or labor battalions. Forced labor is to be
introduced.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1029-PS
Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White
Russia [Ostland]
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
All the regions between Narwa and Tilsit have constantly been in close
relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old history has moulded
the inner sympathies of the majority of the races living there in a
European direction, and has added this region to the living space of
Greater Germany.
The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and White
Russia [last two words added in pencil] must be to strive to achieve
the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform the region into
part of the Greater German Reich by germanising racially possible
elements, colonising Germanic races and banishing undesirable elements.
The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship
of Greater Germany.
For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region was a land of
surplus, and the Reich Commissar must endeavor to make this surplus
once more available to the German people, and, if possible, to
increase it. With regard to the process of germanising or resettling,
the Esthonian people are strongly germanised to the extent of 50%
by Danish, German and Swedish blood and can be considered as a
kindred nation. In Latvia, the section capable of being assimilated
is considerably smaller than in Esthonia. In this country, stronger
resistance will have to be reckoned with, and banishment on a larger
scale will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to
be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the emigration of racial
Germans is called for in order to promote very intensive Germanisation
(on the East Prussian border).
White Russia is directly joined to these three territories. For a long
time, White Russia had a strong Separatist movement, but presumably
Bolshevist has succeeded in suppressing it. In any case, White Russia
will first of all have the difficult task of admitting some of those
elements who are expelled from Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania and from
the Polish section of the Warthe territory. It seems expedient not to
accommodate the Poles in the General gouvernement but in the East of
White Russia (Smolensk District) and to form there a buffer against
Russianism. In addition, the Commissar-General in White Russia would
have the task of rousing this country, which cannot be considered as a
land of surplus, to productive activity by employment of labour on a
vast scale. [Marginal note in pencil: Every autonomous White Russian
awareness against Russia is to be encouraged.]
The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office in Riga will
therefore largely be an extraordinarily _positive_ one. A country
which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights, built up by the
Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx of German blood,
together with Swedish elements, was a predominantly Germanised land,
is to be established as a mighty German borderland. The preliminary
cultural conditions are available everywhere, and the German Reich will
be able to guarantee the right to a later emigration to all those who
have distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of those
who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who fought in the
Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of
despair and delivered Baltic civilisation from Bolshevism.
For the rest, the solution of the colonisation problem is not a Baltic
question, but one which concerns Greater Germany, and it must be
settled on these lines.
The Reich Commissar, together with the other Reich Commissars, must
strive to introduce the improvement of water-way communication between
the Black Sea and the Baltic, i.e., start the construction of the
Duena-Dnieper Canal. In this way the circulation of a great European
economic system can be completed, which will guarantee the future
exchange of goods, and render it independent of any overseas blockade.
Thus the Reich Commissar in the Baltic lands will have great problems
to solve in the realm of economics, and particularly in the domain of
racial politics.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1030-PS
8th May 41
General Instructions for all Reichcommisars in the occupied Eastern
Territories
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
The contingency, that the German Reich may find herself confronted by
Soviet Russian policy of aggression and of anti-German alliances, makes
it obligatory to have a clear conception about the political aims of a
German counterblow.
* * * * *
The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the
German Reich from Pan-Slavic [Grossrussisch] pressure for centuries to
come. This does not only correspond with German interests, but also
with historical justice, for Russian Imperialism was in a position to
accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression almost unopposed,
whilst it threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German
Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a
historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great Russian
Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all historical
struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg
have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today.
This has been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to
correspond to the Leader's political testament as laid down in his
book, that now the military and political threat, from the East shall
be eliminated forever.
Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical
and racial conditions into Reichs-Commissariats, each of which bears
within itself a different political aim. The Reich Commissariat
Eastland including White-Ruthenia will have the task, to prepare, by
way of development into a Germanized Protectorate, a progressively
closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent
state in alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous
Northern Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary.
Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. These
general viewpoints are explained in the following instructions for
each Reich Commissar. Beyond that there are still a few general
considerations which possess validity for all Reich Commissars.
* * * * *
As far as currency policy is concerned, a transitional state similar
to that in other occupied territories shall be provided for, but with
an early beginning of a new orientation, which has to correspond to
the political goal to be achieved. In the Reich Commissariat Eastland,
we will have to introduce as currency German marks, in the Reich
Commissariat Ukraine a national "Karbowanez" currency (Ukrainian
National bank), in the Reich Commissariat Caucasia a national currency
too for the future Federal State.
The German people have achieved, in course of centuries, tremendous
accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly its entire real
estate property was confiscated without indemnification, hundreds of
thousands (in the South, on the Volga) starved or were deported or,
like in the Baltic territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their
cultural work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have
to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the Eastern
Territories, the former German assets have become property of the
people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former
individual proprietors where the German Reich may reserve the right
(assuming that it has not already been done during resettlement) to
arrange a just settlement. The manner of compensation and restitution
of this national property, will be subject to different treatment by
each Reich Commissariat.
The moment for declarations of this kind will be determined by the
Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern territories. [This sentence was
added in pencil]
From the point of view of cultural policy, the German Reich is in a
position to promote and direct national culture and science in many
fields. It will be necessary, that in some territories an uprooting and
resettlement of various racial stocks will have to be effected.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1034-PS
SECRET
Rosenberg Chancellery
Received 22nd June 1941 No. 059
Construction and Administration
Minutes of a discussion with Reichsleiter Rosenberg on Saturday 21st
June 1941 from 1100-1200 hours.
Present: Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer (at the beginning of the discussion)
Landeshauptmann Kolbow
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht
Brigadefuehrer Girgenson
Burgkommandant Gohdes
Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt
Landespraesident Dreier
Reichsleiter Rosenberg asked how many men in all had so far been
made available for employment in the East--Brigadefuehrer Girgenson
and Party Member Gohdes stated that the German Labour Front was
willing to provide 261 Regional Commissioners and the Storm Troops
144. Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht informed him that the Reich
Minister of the Interior would provide about 450 officials as Regional
Commissioners--that would still leave 200 positions as Regional
Commissioners to be filled, and these should, as far as possible, be
occupied by personnel from the Schubert staff.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg expressed his willingness to take over
politically suitable individuals from the ranks of these specialists.
Therefore immediate contact should be made with General Schubert
and the Quartermaster General. An order to this effect was given to
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht--Burgkommandant Gohdes wished to ensure
that considerable reserves of men in a state of operational readiness
should be held at our disposal in the Reich, to provide for unavoidable
changes in the theatre of operations.
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer thereupon declared that most of the personnel
just mentioned would only be made available gradually, since most of
them would first have to be released from the Armed Forces. It was
important that lists of the individuals actually available should be
made immediately, and that these persons should be placed together in
Special Purpose Staffs. Then the question was cleared up as to who was
to be responsible to the Reichsleiter for the concentration of the
Staffs. Decision: Burgkommandant Gohdes, S.A.--Brigadefuehrer Girgenson
and Oberregierungsrat Dr. Albrecht, each of whom made personal
suggestions for his own section, would have to deliberate together
on the persons who were to form the different Staffs and submit the
result of their deliberations to Landespraesident Dreier, who was
responsible for this. The political section (Dr. Leibbrandt) would
advise Landespraesident Dreier on the subject. It was clear, that
Landespraesident Dreier was the Head of the Department in whose hands
lay the sole and final responsibility for the composition of the Staffs.
Burgkommandant Gohdes undertook to arm the men to be appointed, and to
give them the firing instruction which might be necessary.
With regard to the question of putting the commissioners to be
employed into uniform, Dr. Rosenberg stated that the organizations
did not wish to give up their own (field-grey) uniforms and badges.
The general opinion was that it was impossible for German government
officials to enter the Eastern territories in different uniforms;
also, the field-grey colour, in which the Armed Forces in the East
would have provoked awe and respect for the German people, was held to
be indispensable for the successful carrying-out of their government
functions. Party Member Gohdes said that Reichsorganisationsleiter
Dr. Ley recommended the creation of a new unitary uniform for the
Commissioners serving in the East. The Armed Forces were willing to set
aside dark-brown cloth for 5,000 uniforms. Reichsleiter Rosenberg took
it upon himself personally to submit the question of supplying uniform
to the decision of the Fuehrer.
Arising from the question of supplying uniform, it was then discussed
whether a special "Ostfuehrers Corps" as an organization of the
National-Socialist Party should be created. An organization of this
kind would then not only have the right to wear a unitary uniform, but
it would imbue its members with the esprit de corps which was necessary
for the fulfillment of the tasks which were to be carried out in the
East. If the German was to enter the Eastern territory as master, he
must be moulded as a unit both inwardly and outwardly. This inner
regimental training could exert a certain positive counter-effect above
all against the moral danger of "Space-Experience" and the depressing
effect of foreign nationality. When this subject had been further
discussed, it seemed more urgent than ever to achieve the purpose of
creating an Ostfuehrer-Corps of this kind which would be a unit in
itself.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1039-PS
Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich
offices regarding the Fuehrer's decree of 20.4. 1941 a conference
with the chief of the OKW (armed forces high command) took place.
After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed
Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the
East, the chief of the OKW explained that a deferment [UK-stellung]
would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be
carried out best by direct cancellation [Abkommandierung] by command
of the chief of the OKW Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. Then issued
an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming
requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and
Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative
to all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the
gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office. A
conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the
given confidential circumstances my office could in no way deal with
any representatives of the people of the East-European area. I asked
him to do this insofar as the military intelligence required it, and
then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities
over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their
eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my
wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants would
be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance
with my indications.
Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and
Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions
of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint
a representative of my office to the Supreme commander of the Army,
respectively to the chief quartermaster and to the army groups for
questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW.
In the meantime this has been done.
Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy
[Reichswirtschaftsminister] Funk, who appointed as his permanent
deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences
were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic
intentions of the Economic Operational Staff [Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab]
East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas,
State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner, State Secretary Backe,
Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others. Far-reaching
agreement was reached in the Eastern questions as regards direct
technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the
relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan
are still open and will be subject, after submission, to a decision
of the Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I in no way intended to
found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be
handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and the
persons appointed by him, however the two responsible department heads,
namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial economics
and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economics, would be placed
in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political
aims with the economic necessities, in a department which would have
to unite yet other persons for such coordinating work, depending on
later and for work (political leadership of labor unions, construction
etc.) After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter
appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office.
For the requested representation in the political department of my
office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt) the foreign ministry
released General Counsel Dr. Braeutigam, who is known to me for many
years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations
which if necessary will be placed before the Fuehrer are under way
with the foreign office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its
representatives to the future Reich commissioners.
The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as
permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to
the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays,
speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great
number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and
the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry would be modified
here if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will
undisputedly be subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment
and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the propaganda
ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department
"Enlightenment and Press" [Aufklaerung und Presse] and in addition
appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been
going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office
in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place
continually every day.
Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge
concerning future transmission of communication and setting up
of all technical necessities in future occupied territories;
with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with
Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on
the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commissariats.
According to the present estimate there will be four Reichs
Kommisariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall propose to the
Fuehrer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number
of General Commissariats (24), Main Commissariats (about 80) and
Regional [Gebiet] Commissariats (over 900). A General Commissariat
would correspond to a former Generalgouvernment, a Main Commissariat to
a Main-Government. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts
[Kreise]. In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which
appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration.
A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of
the above named command of the Chief of the OKW.
In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich
Physicians Leader [Reichsaerztefuehrer] Dr. Conti, the Inspector of the
Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists belonging thereto. The
difficulties of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly discussed
and the measures were previewed, in order to insure well-prepared
employment of the forces mentioned after the end of the operations.
A conference with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment
first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon
Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership the
whole Construction Service.
Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of staff
Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German newspapers in the
Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers
in the prospective native tongues were considered. According to the
latest information the technical forces, for this work are already at
the border and may be committed at any time to determine whether the
prerequisites for printing shops are present.
Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader Huehnlein and with the
Reich youth leadership to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization.
Intensive talks also took place with the Chief of Staff [Stabschef] of
the SA. He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable
SA leaders for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The
personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be submitted
to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached with the Reich
organizational leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter], who has instructed
the commander of Kroessinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling
channelling of requested persons, to admit them into Kroessinsee for
schooling and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in
the best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member
Marrenbach was then employed in order to take over already now the
leadership of Russian labor unions in conjunction with the Wehrmacht.
That appeared as an eminently important problem, particularly also
in connection with the economic leadership, because the labor unions
undoubtedly have been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially
have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under
certain conditions.
Lengthy discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to the
new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed changes
thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order
by Gruppenfuehrer (SS Lt Gen) Heydrich which do not appear supportable
to me for the complete authority of the German Reich government in the
East. Also the documents of this problem will have to be laid before
the Fuehrer for decision.
Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible deputies of
the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador
Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe
OKW, and others. Without going into details of political objectives I
instructed the above-named persons in confidence about the necessary
attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the
press, without issuing any statements.
The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question prepared
long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to the propaganda
deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may
later be turned over to the press for development, deal with the whole
structure and organization of the USSR, the economic possibilities of
the East, agriculture, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of
the Komintern since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933,
statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the
history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan. Extensive works
are in preparation for the foundation of legal administration: German
law in the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine, influence of the German
language on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint
of the Germans. In addition a number of articles are being prepared
in Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening the people
of the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These articles
are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles in the newly
occupied territories. Finally, after extensive work, an ethnological
map of the East based on the most recent statistical reports has been
printed in great number and made available to all offices. This map
can be used as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the north
as well as in the south, and offers points of departure for fixing the
boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats.
As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part by
myself, continuous consultation and organizational preparation is under
way through my office and through those of the liaison men delegated
from the other offices of the Party and the State.
I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at all possible under
present condition, is in full swing. Aside from the General and Chief
commissariats more than 900 Regional Commissariats are planned, which
must all be manned by political leaders, representatives of the
department and officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The
work in the East differs basically from the conditions in the West.
Whereas we can count on every technical installation and a cultured
population here in the big cities, that is not the case in the East.
There literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along,
additionally for the gigantic spaces--not only an auto park but a
great number of typewriters, office material, above all medical
supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does not appear
possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14 days, therefore
all these arrangements had to be set in full motion already now on my
responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer's decree.
The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as follows
in carrying out the Fuehrer's order. I have requested Gauleiter and
Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has
negotiated personally and thoroughly, through the whole time with
all pertinent offices, in order to develop all aspects down to the
details. A political department has been founded for the execution of
the substantial work, under my co-worker of many years Dr. Leibbrandt
(deputy General Consul Dr. Braeutigam), who prepares the various books
and pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets
have been composed by him which will then have been scattered over
the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also for a
specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed directly
to the individual races. I do not care to decide on this date for
myself, and will lay these originals before the Fuehrer at the first
opportunity with the request to check the contents and determine the
time of the eventually approved appeals. The political department
is also undertaking a thorough investigation of all these, with the
exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as advisers for the
administration of the various nationalities. Continuous discussions
about this subject are under way with representatives of the OKW, the
propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic-political
cooperation has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter
Malletke. Department of "Law, Finance, and Administration" has been
taken over by Regierungspraesident Runte. A department for Culture
and Science is as yet unoccupied since the development of this
question does not appear urgent. Also the department "Enlightenment
and Press." It is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz,
deputy Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who command
the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich
Press Chief [Reichspressechef] for setting up one press chief for each
Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide them in that
sense if possible.
Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the military
action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I shall be
able to report to the Fuehrer for reaching preparations, up to those
points of special and personal nature which the Fuehrer alone can
decide.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1056-PS
First Section: The Organization of the Administration of Occupied
Eastern Territories
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]
A. _Construction._
I. _Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories._
The newly occupied Eastern Territories are subordinated to the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. By directions of the
Fuehrer he establishes a civil administration there upon withdrawal
of the military administration. He heads and supervises the entire
administration of this area and represents the sovereignty of the Reich
in the occupied Eastern Territories.
The Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern Territories is organized
into the following main departments and departments under the permanent
and general deputy of the Reich Minister:
_Main Department I: Central Administration_.
_Main Department II: Policies:_
Department II a : Policies,
Department II b : Enlightenment and Press,
Department II c : Labor and Tax Policies.
_Main Department III: Administration:_
Department III a : General Administration,
Department III b : Health System,
Department III c : Veterinary System,
Department III d : Law,
Department III e : Finance,
Department III f : Science and Culture.
_Main Department IV: Economic-political and Technical Cooperation:_
Department IV a : Industrial Economy,
Department IV b : Food and Farming,
Department IV c : Forest and Lumber Economy,
Department IV d : Price-fixing and Price-control,
Department IV e : Labor,
Department IV f : Technology,
Department IV g : Transportation.
To the Reich Ministry is assigned a deputy of the Reich Leader SS and
Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
II. _General Territorial Organization._
The Occupied Eastern Territories are organized into Reich Commissariats.
The Reich Commissariat "Ostland" is subdivided into _General Districts_
[Generalbezirke] which are in turn subdivided into _Main Districts_
[Hauptbezirke] and _Circuit Districts_ [Kreisgebiete].
The boundaries of the Reich Commissariats will be established according
to political, ethnic, economic and commercial-political aspects.
The boundaries of the areas of command of the Wehrmacht commanders
correspond to those of the Reich Commissariats.
III. _Subordinate Offices._
_1. Reich Commissars._
In the Reich Commissariats, Reich Commissars are responsible for
the entire civil administration under the supreme authority of
the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. According
to the instructions of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories the Reich Commissar, as a functionary of the Reich
heads and supervises, within his precincts, the entire civil
administration. Within the scope of these instructions he acts on his
own responsibility.
Subordinate offices of the Reich Commissar are:
General Commissariats,
Main Commissariats,
District Commissariats.
The boundaries of the General Districts are established by the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories upon proposal
by the Reich Commissar. The boundaries of the Circuit Territories
are determined by the Reich Commissar upon proposal by the pertinent
General Commissar, in as far as the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories has not reserved this right for himself in
individual cases. Furthermore the Reich Commissar determines--with
approval of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories--the sphere of the Main Commissars.
An administrative staff is subordinated to the Reich Commissar in his
Administrative grade. It is organized into:
I. Main Department: Central Administration.
II. Main Department: Policies:
Department II a : Policies,
Department II b : Labor and Tax Policies,
Department II c : Administration,
Department II d : Health system,
Department II e : Law,
Department II f : Finance,
Department II g : Science and Culture.
III. Main Department: Economy:
Department III a : Industrial Economy,
Department III b : Food and Farming,
Department III c : Forestry and Hunting,
Department III d : Price-fixing and Price-control.
IV. Main Department: Technology, Transportation, Labor:
Department IV a : Technology,
Department IV b : Transportation,
Department IV c : Commitment of Labor.
The heads of the Main Departments have the rank of General Commissars.
Furthermore a Higher SS- and Police Leader is subordinated directly
and personally to the Reich Commissar. In addition one official of the
Reich Railways and one of the Reich Post Office are assigned to the
Reich Commissar who are at the same time liaison officials with the
transport and communications offices of the Wehrmacht commander.
Main Department Heads, Department Heads, and Consultants are appointed
and dismissed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories upon proposal by the Reich Commissar. The Reich Commissar
appoints one of the Main Department Heads to be his chief of staff.
He has the task of assuring the smooth coordination of the individual
departments and is responsible for the internal affairs of the office.
For this purpose he is entitled to have himself constantly informed
about their sphere of activity by the Main Department Heads.
The Higher SS- and Police Leader is directly subordinated to the Reich
Commissar. However the chief of staff has the general right to secure
information from him also. His official title is:
"The Reich Commissar for the Eastern Territory
The Higher SS- and Police Leader."
Great stress is to be placed on close cooperation between him, the
Chief of Staff, and the other Main Department Heads of the office of
the Reich Commissar, particularly with the one for Policies.
Insofar as the Reich Commissar is prevented from performing his duties
for a prolonged period of time, a deputy will be provided by the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories upon his proposal. This
deputy signs with the notation: "for the Reich Commissar." The Main
Department Heads and Department Heads sign, insofar as the Reich
Commissar has not reserved the final signature for himself, or in case
it is not a matter of so much importance that it must be signed by the
Reich Commissar, with the notation: "By order" [Im Auftrag]. The Main
Department Heads regulate the manner of signing for their department
and consultant heads. These must likewise always sign with "by order."
2. _General Commissars._
The General Commissar forms the administrative office of intermediate
appeal. Within his jurisdiction he heads the administration according
to the general directives of the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories and the prescriptions of the Reich Commissar.
His office is organized like that of the Reich Commissar, except that
in the place of Main Departments, there are Departments whose spheres
of work in turn are organized into Consulting Offices which are
collected into Groups according to necessity. The General Commissar
appoints one of the Department heads as Chief of Staff who has the
corresponding position and corresponding rights of the Reich Chiefs of
Staff of the Reich Commissars.
For purposes of representation of the General Commissar in cases of
prolonged incapacity, the same provisions apply as for representation
of the Reich Commissar.
The SS- and Police Leader assigned to the General Commissar is directly
subordinated to him; however the Chief of Staff has the general right
of requiring information from him. The SS- and Police Leader employs
the following official designation:
"The General Commissar . . . .
The SS- and Police Leader."
Department Heads, Group Heads and Consultants sign with the remark: "By
order." The Department Heads regulate the manner of signing for their
consultants.
3. _Regional Commissars._
The Regional Commissar heads the entire administration of the lower
administration office in the Circuit District in accordance with the
instructions of the General Commissar and the superior offices. With
him therefore lies the main weight of the total administrative set-up.
The officials to whom the Regional Commissar has granted the right of
signing sign with the notation "By order." The leader of the police
unit assigned to him is directly subordinated to him.
4. _Main Commissars._
Upon recommendation by the Reich Commissar the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories appoints Main Commissars for Main
Districts formed by the consolidation of several Circuit Districts.
They are to take care of coordination of administration of the
Circuit Districts placed under him by order of the General Commissar.
They can have themselves informed concerning all matters by the
District Commissars subordinated to them in all decisive points of
view of the administration and in urgent cases provide them with
instructions. Cautious use is to be made of this right to instruct,
as the Main Commissars are not to interpose themselves as a special
authority between the District and General Commissars. In every case
of instruction to a District Commissar the General Commissar is to
be notified in conjunction with an account of the reasons. The Main
Commissars are to keep themselves informed of all important matters
within the sphere of their authority, by means of numerous conferences,
and to inform the General Commissars of important observations.
Conduct of business between the General Commissar and the District
Commissar takes place directly. General Commissars inform the Main
Commissars involved in writing about their orders issued to District
Commissars. The same is to take place with bulletins of the District
Commissars. The affairs of the Main Commissars are to be elaborated in
bulletins.
The responsible office of the Main Commissar requires an understanding
of the political and economic-political needs of the region to be
supervised, by an exact knowledge of the existing circumstances. The
Main Commissar, as representative of the General Commissar, is called
upon in his sphere of office to keep Regional and City Commissars
spatially in touch with the General Commissar through constant and
close liaison with them, and to contribute to the speeding up of
necessary decisions, namely such as go beyond the boundaries of the
territory. The activity of a Main Commissar, rightly conceived and
purposefully conducted, shall and must contribute, to give District
and City Commissars increased certainty in their decision, to give
the latter a materially and spatially strengthened effect, and to
relieve the General Commissar of part of the burden of supervising
his subordinated administration. The office of the Main Commissar is
politically of special significance. It includes the task of leadership
in the official realm subordinated to it.
IV. _Relationship of Superiors in the Service._
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories is the service
superior of the Reich Commissar and the officials and the employees
subordinate to them. The Reich Commissar is the superior of all
officials and employees of his office and of the offices subordinate
to him. The General Commissar is the superior of the officials and
employees of his office and of the officials and employees of the
offices of the Main and Regional Commissars. The Main Commissar and the
Regional Commissar are superior of the officials and employees of their
offices.
B. _Jurisdictions._
The Reich Commissars, General Commissars, Main Commissars and Regional
Commissars (City Commissars) are--aside from the military agencies--the
only Reich authorities in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Other Reich
authorities may not be established alongside them. They handle all
questions of administration of the area which is subordinate to their
sovereignty and all affairs which concern the organization and activity
of the administration including those of the police in the supervision
of the native agencies and organizations, and of the population.
The Reich Minister governs the occupied Eastern Territories by order of
the Fuehrer. He can make the law for all the territories.
The Reich Commissar directs and supervises the entire German
civil administration as well as the existing and reestablished
native administration in his Reich Commissariat. He can decree law
(ordinances) for his territory, insofar as the law has not been or will
not be decreed by the Reich Minister.
The General Commissar directs the administration of his district and
supervises the Main and Regional Commissars as well as the native
administration.
The Regional Commissar directs the administration of his territory as a
subordinate administrative office and supervises the native offices in
the lowest and county echelons.
The following are particularly important administrative tasks:
_a._ Police measures,
_b._ Making the economic forces of the territory available for the
maintenance of the occupation troops and the purposes of the German war
economy,
_c._ Caring for the population,
_d._ Securing of supplies and installations of all kinds which are
important for life and for war,
_e._ Collaboration with the maintenance as well as reestablishment of
inland water communications of rail and postal communications,
_f._ Supervision of the civil population, collaboration with the
counter intelligence [Abwehr], interesting the population in rendering
service,
_g._ Dissolution of enemy organizations which might still exist.
The Armed Forces Commanders exercise the rights of military sovereignty
and the territorial power of command in their areas of jurisdiction.
Their demands will be carried out in the civilian sphere by the Reich
Commissars and their subordinate agencies. The military agencies are
neither superior nor subordinate to the agencies of the civilian
administration. The Armed Forces Commanders can provide even civilian
agencies with directives in urgent cases, however, in accordance with
the Fuehrer's decree of 5 June 1941. All agencies of the civilian
administration are obligated to inform the military agencies of all
affairs which might affect the sphere of their assignments.
Considerable value is to be laid upon a frictionless collaboration. The
Commissars are to have themselves thoroughly informed by the Armed
Forces Commanders, respectively by the agencies subordinated to them
about their observations, experiences, and the measures already taken
after taking over the administration. The laws decreed by them and the
administrative orders given by them remain in effect insofar as the
decrees and ordinances are not abrogated.
The Fuehrer has entrusted Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, as
Commissioner for the Four-year Plan, with the supervision of the
tasks of the war economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories. The
economic inspectorates and economic commands are active there as his
representatives (see green folio). These economic inspectorates and
economic commands will be substantially absorbed in the agencies
of the civil administration after the establishment of the civil
administration.
If basic differences of opinion should arise between the agencies of
the civil administration and the military agencies or, insofar as
they still exist, the economic inspectorates and economic commands,
and these cannot be settled in direct conversations, then it is to be
reported to the superior civil authority immediately so that the latter
can, in cooperation with the superior military agency, bring about an
amicable unification.
C. _Business Communications._
After taking over the businesses, the current state of affairs is to
be reported briefly to the next superior agency, in particular the
taking over of the administration from the hands of the agencies of the
military administration as well about the state of the population and
the capacity for work of any existing native authorities. It is further
to be reported which office buildings have been occupied and which
lines of communication are available. The Reich and General Commissars
will determine the periods at which the subordinate agencies are to
report regularly about the general situation without prejudice to the
duty to provide individual reports and special delivery reports (at
first, at short intervals which can be later lengthened). At first the
Reich Commissars will give the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories a comprehensive report on the situation in brief form twice
a month, on the first and fifteenth of each month. The Reich Minister
is to be given a report by the Reich Commissar immediately about
incidents of an especially important nature. The General Commissars
and Regional Commissars must report directly to the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories by the quickest means particularly
important incidents, as, for example, widespread unrest, more
important acts of sabotage and strikes, great natural catastrophes and
the like, and at the same time report them to the next superior agency.
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories will publish an
official gazette under the title
"Official Gazette of the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories" (VBldRM Ost),
in which all the decrees of the Reich Minister will be published. At
first the official gazette will only appear when necessary. In addition
there will appear the "Reich Ministerial Gazette of the Reich Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories (RMBl. dRM Ost)," in which all
executive decrees and other administrative directives of general
validity will be published.
The Reich Commissars will publish the decree of the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories, as well as their own decrees and
decrees of general interest, in two or more languages according to need
in official gazette (Gazette of the Reich Commissar for......).
The General Commissars will publish official papers, likewise in two
or more languages, in which they will publish their ordinances and
orders of general interest as also the police orders of the Regional
Commissars without prejudice to other means of publishing in individual
instances.
The title of these official papers will read:
"Official paper of the General Commissar in....."
In cases of doubt the _German_ text of the ordinances, decrees, and
orders is valid.
Moreover, all publications of German agencies are to be made known in
otherwise usual form, e.g. by publishing in the press which has already
been allowed, by placard, public reading, loudspeaker and the like.
The Official Gazette of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories is to be kept by all the agencies within the Occupied
Eastern territories. The same applies for the gazettes of the Reich
Commissars and the official papers of the General Commissars within
their official spheres.
"The operation procedure for the Reich Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories" will be valid for the internal conduct of business
of the agencies of the Reich Commissars; for communications with secret
matters "The directives for secret matters for all administrative
authorities."
The last is valid until suitable safes are obtained, with the provision
that secret documents may be kept in strong and well locked wooden
chests, which are to be kept in rooms which are to be kept locked.
All incoming documents are to be opened by an especially trustworthy
official of the Central Administration and/or of the main office and
then introduced into the prescribed order of business.
Further orders about the internal operating procedure are to be decreed
by the director of the office.
Second Section: Working directives for the Civil Administration
I. _General._
The first task of the Civil Administration in the occupied Eastern
territories is to represent the interests of the Reich. This
highest fundamental is to be considered first of all measures and
deliberations. It is time the occupied Eastern territories are to be
able to lead a certain life of their own in the more distant future in
this or that not yet determined form. They remain however parts of the
Greater German sphere and are always to be governed from the viewpoint
of this main thought.
The regulations of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare which deal with the
administration of a country occupied by a foreign armed power are not
valid since the USSR is dissolved and the Reich, as a result, has the
duty of exercising all the powers of government and the other usual
powers of sovereignty in the interest of the inhabitants. All measures
therefore, which the German administration deems necessary and suitable
for the execution of this comprehensive task are permissible.
II. _Political Directives._
(Are being worked on by the political department. See next page).
III. _Administration, Law, Finances._
1. _Administration._
_a._ The specially assigned administration of the country will already
be broken up upon the beginning of the Civil Administration. Its
representatives will have fled or have been removed by the Soviets.
Village Soviets will exist only in individual cases. These are to be
dissolved immediately as a rule.
_b._ The Reich Commissars are to make sparing use of the authority
to decree laws above all at first, so that the administration is not
choked by red tape. The exact knowledge of the territory and its
inhabitants, which naturally is not available at present, is essential
for an extensive legislation. Likewise the fewest possible binding
ordinances are to be decreed. The higher authorities must rather take
the path of work directives which will give the subordinate authorities
sufficient leeway for the consideration of the local conditions.
_c._ As far as the boundaries of the Regional Commissariat are
concerned, at first the boundaries of the corresponding Soviet
administrative regions are to be the basis, since the population is
accustomed to these and bases for any other determination of boundaries
are lacking. As soon as another determination of boundaries appears
more to the purpose, in the course of time, it can be done later.
_d._ The handling of cases of sabotage is the concern of the Senior
SS- and police leader, of the SS- and Police leader and/or the police
leaders of the lower echelon. Insofar, however, as collective measures
against the population of a definite region appear appropriate, the
decision about them rests with the competent Commissar on the proposal
of the Police leader. The calling of the population for the tasks of
guarding can be ordered by the Regional Commissar.
The assessment of fines of money or goods, as well as the ordering
of the seizure of hostages and the shooting of inhabitants of the
territory in which the acts of sabotage have taken place, can only be
done by the General Commissar, insofar as the Reich Commissar himself
does not intervene. The most sparing use of the seizing of hostages
is to be made. Above all it is only to be ordered when the desired
result can be forced by this measure and when the case is such that if
necessary, in the case of negative results, the consequences of the
seizure can be neutralized.
_e._ In cities, villages, worker settlements, city settlements, etc.,
the interest of reliable persons is to be acquired as soon as possible.
From the ranks of these reliable persons a local commissioner (similar
to our Buergermeister) and confidential councillors can later be
appointed, so that in this way the local life will be set in motion
again and the Regional Commissar will have organs under him who will
carry out his orders. Insofar as such commissioners and confidential
councillors have already been set up by the military administration,
they are to be taken over by the Civil Administration at first. In
case financial means are necessary for the fulfillment of urgent tasks
within individual communities, they are to be supplied by means of
credits. The credits are to be charged to the banking institutions of
the country, or, in case this is not possible, to the Reich credit bank.
_f._ Where an urgent need of the population for provision goods exists,
this is to be satisfied within the range of possibility so that
famines can be avoided. It may be desired to grant assistance in money
and in goods to urgently needy persons (unemployed and the like).
_g._ With the dissolution of the USSR which accompanied the defeat
of this state there is no longer any state structure in the Eastern
Regions and consequently no state citizenship for the inhabitants.
However, for practical reasons with respect to citizenship the further
existence of a common state must be assumed for the time being, so
that the inhabitants should not be considered as stateless, which
is undesirable for various reasons. The final question of state
citizenship can only be decided later since it depends on the state
development in the East. Since this problem can only be solved for the
whole Eastern Territory, the subordinate authorities must refrain from
every independent ruling. At a given time the Reich Minister for the
Eastern territories will issue appropriate decrees.
The racial Germans present in the Eastern territories do not become
German Reich citizens automatically with the dissolution of the USSR,
but rather they are, for the present, placed on a par with the other
inhabitants as regards citizenship. Petitions from racial Germans
for naturalization are not to be accepted at first, since a general
regulation will be executed. Independent of this is that racial
Germans, confirmed as such without objection, should already enjoy
privileges which are generally granted only to Reich citizens.
_h._ The prohibition of entering or leaving the occupied Eastern
territories which was issued by the Supreme Commander of the
Army remains effective even after the withdrawal of the military
administration. Exceptions to this prohibition of entering and leaving
will be granted by the Permit Office attached to the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories and Permit Offices attached to the
Reich Commissars and if necessary to other authorities of the occupied
Eastern territories. Entering and leaving may only be allowed on urgent
political, economical or other service reasons.
The following are not affected by the prohibition of entering and
leaving:
(1) Members of the Armed Forces and members of the Armed Forces
personnel with proper identification and travel orders.
(2) Members of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories
and of the authorities subordinated to it with valid official
identification.
No application need be made to the Permit Office or Permit Branch
Offices for minor frontier traffic. By "minor frontier traffic" is
meant those journeys which have to be made on account of economic
contacts over the frontier with the neighbouring countries on either
side and are merely to some place lying not more than 50 km. from the
frontier. Only the lower-ranking administrative authorities, that is
the Regional Commissars, can give permission for frontier traffic.
Permits and frontier traffic passes can be issued for single or several
journeys over the frontier. In every case, their validity is limited to
a definite period.
The examination of claims, for the issue of permits, is made from
political, security police and economic points of view. In cases of
doubt, therefore, the Permit Branch Offices attached to the Reich
Commissars must obtain the approval of the appropriate department of
the Reich Commissars before the permit is issued.
The Permit Branch Offices issue permits merely for journeys from the
former territory of the USSR. For journeys into the Occupied Eastern
Territories, the Permit Office attached to the Reich Minister is, for
the present, the only competent office.
The question, whether a ban on journeys from one Reich Commissariat
to another is to be decreed, cannot yet be decided. Only the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories has the authority to make
the decision.
_i._ The attitude of the German authorities to the native population
is determined, on the one hand, by the political and economic aims,
and, on the other, by the attitude of the inhabitants to the Germans.
Unprovoked severe measures against the population of the country are
not desired and must therefore not be taken.
For reasons of security, it may be necessary, especially in towns and
cities, to establish a curfew-hour, which means that, after that hour
the population may no longer walk the public thoroughfares and squares.
As the time of the curfew can be decided only in accordance with
local requirements, the Regional Commissar must be made responsible
for imposing it on the instructions of the Reich Commissar and/or the
General Commissar.
The same applies to the police closing-time, i.e. the time after which
taverns may no longer be opened and no guests may remain in the tavern
rooms. The establishing of the curfew and of the police closing-time is
to be effected by Police Decree and/or Police Order with appropriate
threat of punishment. Apart from this, breaking the curfew order is
punishable under the Decree concerning the liability for registration
and limitation of sojourn.
2. _Health._
It is of great importance that the health and veterinary services be
reestablished as quickly as possible. Doctors, veterinary surgeons or
medical personnel on the spot are to be instructed to continue with
their work or start it again. In times of emergency, especially in
the case of epidemics, a request that doctors, veterinary surgeons
and medical supplies be made available is to be sent to the Military
Authorities, should it be impossible to overcome the emergency in any
other way.
3. _Law._
The Reich Commissars are responsible for controlling the Special Courts
set up and attached to the Reich Commissars. These are also Senior
Officials of the Prosecuting Authorities attached to these Courts. The
SS Executive and Police Officers and Senior SS Executive and Police
Officers are in charge of the Courts Martial.
It is desirable (in the Eastern regions first of all) that the
country's own jurisdiction be reestablished, formed of reliable persons
where they can be found. This is all the more necessary in that the
German Courts, on account of the scarcity of personnel, can pass
judgment only on offences which are punishable under German Laws and
the punishment of which is of urgent German interest. The punishment
of other criminals, however, can only remain in abeyance for a short
period. The concerns of the civil administration of justice can remain
in the background for the time being and some honorary Courts of
Justice may suffice at first. Wherever the country's own jurisdiction
is still intact, which may be the case in the East, it is to be
instructed to continue its work immediately after unreliable elements
have been removed.
Those arrested by the Soviet Legal Authorities on account of sentence
which has been passed may only be released after each individual case
has been examined.
This examination is to be carried out with the greatest speed in regard
to convicted nationalists and other political prisoners. In cases of
doubt the opinion of the Political Department attached to the Reich
Commissar or the General Commissar or the Executive SS and Police
Officer should be obtained.
The District Commissar is responsible for the supervision of all
prisons, insofar as the Reich Commissar does not decree otherwise.
As it is impossible at the moment to produce a comprehensive new
Penal Code, the Soviet Penal Law (in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
the pre-Soviet Laws) are for the time being still applicable to the
country's own courts, nevertheless without those regulations which
apply to political offences. This also applies with regard to the Civil
Law, the right of voluntary jurisdiction and to the right of procedure.
4. _Finance._
It is intended to draw up a unified General Budget for the complete
Administration of the Eastern Territories, in other words from the
Reich Minister downwards to the District Commissar. Whether there
is any point in separating this plan into separate budgets for the
various Reich Commissariats, or whether credit accounts will simply
be established for the subordinate administrative bodies, can only
be decided after the whole Administration has been set up. The basic
principle of this General Budget must be that the cost of the whole
administration shall be borne by the country itself. Until such a
budget has been drawn up and further regulations have been issued
regarding the use of the income derived from taxes and from balances
from the State undertakings, the Reich will use credits to cover
public expenditure. These credits which will be allotted to the Reich
Commissars and from there on to the subordinate offices by the Reich
Commissar for the Occupied Eastern Territories are to be administered
in accordance with the directives as per printed Appendix.
Until further notice taxes are to continue to be paid by the
inhabitants in accordance with the existing Soviet taxation system (in
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in accordance with the taxation system
of the pre-Soviet era) if nothing is decided to contrary. The taxation
officials in question who are still capable of working are to take up
their duties immediately and/or continue them. The same applies to the
utilization of the balances from the State undertakings.
The country's own authorities are forbidden to dispose of the amounts
collected without the permission of the German authorities (for the
time being Reich Commissars).
5. _Learning and Education._
Schooling will, in most parts of the country, have ceased due to the
military events. There is in general no particular need for schooling
to be put into operation again quickly, as long as there are other
urgent tasks to carry out. In the East the resumption of schooling in
the near future should be aimed at, insofar as there are suitable and
reliable teachers to hand. For the time being further directives from
the Reich Minister should be awaited with regard to Universities and
other Academic Institutions and with regard to cultural establishments.
IV. _Economic Administration._
As the Reich Marshall in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the
Four-year Plan has been charged by the Fuehrer with the supreme
coordination of the Economy of the whole Eastern Region, his directives
are applicable to the economic measures which are laid down in the
printed collective folder attached. When carrying out these directives
the general political aim as laid down in figure 2. of this section
should be minutely observed. If in individual cases, the aims of
economic policy conflict, in the opinion of the German department
dealing with the matter, with this general political goal, the Reich
Commissar should be informed, where a matter of principle is involved,
and his decision requested.
V. _Engineering and Communications._
With regard to urgent constructional measures, particularly the
repairing and improving of highways, the necessary directives are
likewise given in the "Green file," published by the Reichsmarschall.
The departments of the Civil Administration should most emphatically
support the carrying out of these directives.
The Reich Railways and the Reich Post Office are under the control of
the military departments for the duration of the war. Thus the Reich
Commissars and the authorities under their orders have no power to
issue instructions to the Reich Railways and the Reich Post Office.
Each Reich Commissar, however, is allotted a delegate of the Reich
Railways and the Reich Post Office who will hear the wishes of the
Civil Administration and submit them to his administration.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1058-PS
Extract from a speech of Reichsleiter Rosenberg before the closest
participants in the problem of the East, on 20 June, 1941.
The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a
doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and
here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have
to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see
absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the
Russian people with the products of that surplus-territory. We know
that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive
evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that
the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later
decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still
be maintained there (wagon factories etc.). The consideration and
execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German
Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as
might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation
in consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East
is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this
decision will also be approved by a _coming_ Russian later, not in 30
but maybe in a 100 years. For the Russian soul has been torn in the
struggle of the last 200 years. The original Russians are excellent
artistic craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary
talents, but these talents are different from those of the Western
people. The fight between Turgnjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the
nation. The Russian soul found no outlet either way. If we now close
the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of their own
inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they belong. A historian
will maybe see this decision in a different light, in hundreds of years
than it might appear to a Russian today.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1060-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGES 249-250, of 16 March 1938
Supplementary Ordinance to the Law concerning the reunion of Austria
with the German Reich, of 16 March 1938
On the basis of the law of 13 March 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I. p. 237)
concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, I order:
Paragraph 1
1. The Reichsminister of the Interior is the central office for the
accomplishment of the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich.
2. He can delegate his authority to a deputy, whose office is in Vienna
and who holds the official title of "Reichs deputy for Austria."
Paragraph 2
The deputy for the four-year plan can delegate authority to the Reichs
deputy for Austria.
Paragraph 3
The Reichs deputy for Austria is therefore appointed jointly by the
Reichs minister of the interior and the deputy for the four-year plan.
Munich, 16 March 1938
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Deputy for the Four-year Plan
Goering
General Field Marshal
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1061-PS
THE WARSAW GHETTO IS NO MORE
For the Fuehrer and their country the following fell in the battle for
the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former Ghetto of Warsaw:
[follow 15 names]
Furthermore, the Polish Police Sergeant Julian Zielinski, born 13
November 1891, 8th Commissariat * * * fell on 19 April 1943 while
fulfilling his duty. * * * They gave their utmost, their life. We shall
never forget them. The following were wounded:
[follow the names of--
60 Waffen SS personnel.
11 "Watchmen" from Training Camps, probably Lithuanians, to judge by
their names.
12 Security Police Officers in SS Units.
5 men of the Polish Police
2 regular Army personnel engineers]
|_Average number
| of personnel
_Units used in the action_ | used per day_
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
SS Staff & Police Leader | 6/5
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
_Waffen SS_: |
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
SS Panzer Grenadier Training and Reserve Battalion|
3, Warsaw | 4/440
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
SS Cav. Training and Res Bat. Warsaw | 5/381
SS Staff & Police Leader | 6/5
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
_Police_: |
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
SS Police Regiment 22 I. Bat. | 3/94
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
III. Bat. | 3/134
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
Engineering Emergency Service | 1/6
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
Polish Police | 4/363
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
Polish Fire Brigade | 166
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
_Security Police_: |
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
Wehrmacht |
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
Light AA Alarm Battery III 8 Warsaw | 2/22
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
Engineers Det. of Railway Armored Trains | 2/42
Res. Bat. Rembertow |
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
Res. Eng. 14 Gora-Kalwaria | 1/34
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
_Foreign Racial Watchmen_: |
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
1 Bat. "Trawniki" men | 2/335
------------------------------------------------------+-----------------
| Total: 36/2054
[Translator's note: This obviously means, 36 officers, 2054 men]
The creation of special areas to be inhabited by Jews, and the
restriction of the Jews with regard to residence and trading is nothing
new in the history of the East. Such measures were first taken far back
in the Middle Ages; they could be observed as recently as during the
last few centuries. These restrictions were imposed with the intention
of protecting the aryan population against the Jews.
Identical considerations led us as early as February, 1940 to conceive
the project of creating a Jewish residential district in Warsaw. The
initial intention was to establish as the Ghetto that part of the City
of Warsaw which has the Vistula as its Eastern frontier. The particular
situation on prevailing in Warsaw seemed at first to frustrate this
plan. It was moreover opposed by several authorities particularly by
the City Administration. They pointed in particular that disturbances
in industry and trade would ensue if a Ghetto were founded in Warsaw,
and that it would be impossible to provide the Jews with food if they
were assembled in a closed area.
At a conference held in March 1940, it was decided to postpone the plan
of creating a Ghetto for the time being, owing to the above objections.
At the same time a plan was considered to declare the District of
Lublin the collecting area for all Jews within the Government General,
especially for the evacuated or fugitive Jews arriving from the Reich.
But as early as April 1940, the Higher SS and Police Leader, East,
Cracow, issued a declaration that there was no intention of assembling
the Jews within the Lublin District. In the meantime, the Jews had
increasingly taken to crossing the frontiers without permission and
illegally. This noted especially at the limits of the Districts of
Lowicz and Skierniewice. Conditions in the town of Lowicz became
dangerous from the point of view of hygiene as well as from that of
the Security Police, owing to these illegal migrations of Jews. The
District President of Lowicz therefore, began to install Ghettos in his
district in order to avoid these dangers.
The experiences in the district of Lowicz, after Ghettos had been
installed, showed that this method is the only one suitable for
dispelling the dangers which emanate repeatedly from the Jews.
The necessity of erecting a Ghetto in the City of Warsaw as well became
more and more urgent in the summer of 1940, since more and more troops
were being assembled in the district of Warsaw after termination of
the French campaign. At that time the Department for Hygiene urged
the speedy erection of a Ghetto in the interest of preserving the
health of the German Forces and of the native population as well. The
original plan of establishing the Ghetto in the suburb of Praga as
intended in February 1940, would have taken at least 4 to 5 months,
since almost 600,000 persons had to be moved. But since experience
showed that greater outbreaks of epidemics might be expected in the
winter months and since for this reason the District Medical Officer
urged that the resettling action ought to be completed by 15 November
1940 at the latest, the plan of establishing a suburban ghetto in
Praga was dropped; and instead, the area which hitherto had been
used as a quarantine area for epidemics was selected for use as a
Jewish residential area. In October 1940, the Governor ordered the
Commissioner of the District, President for the City of Warsaw, to
complete the resettlement necessary for establishing the Ghetto within
the City of Warsaw by 15 November 1940.
The Ghetto thus established in Warsaw was inhabited by about 400,000
Jews. It contained 27,000 apartments with an average of 2-1/2 rooms
each. It was separated from the rest of the city by partition and other
walls and by walling-up of thoroughfares, windows, doors, open spaces,
etc.
It was administered by the Jewish Board of Elders, who received
their instructions from the Commissioner for the Ghetto, who was
immediately subordinated to the Governor. The Jews were granted
self-administration in which the German supervising authorities
intervened only where German interests were touched. In order to enable
the Jewish Board of Elders to execute its orders, a Jewish Police force
was set up, identified by special armbands and a special beret and
armed with rubber truncheons. This Jewish Police force was charged with
maintaining order and security within the Ghetto and was subordinated
to the German and Polish Police.
II
It soon became clear, however, that not all dangers had been removed by
this confining the Jews to one place. Security considerations required
removing the Jews from the city of Warsaw altogether. The first large
resettlement action took place in the period from 22 July to 3 October
1942. In this action 310,322 Jews were removed. In January 1943 a
second resettlement action was carried out by which altogether 6,500
Jews were affected.
When the Reichsfuehrer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943 he ordered
the SS and Police Leader for the District of Warsaw to _transfer
to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises of military
importance which were installed within the Ghetto including their
personnel and machines_. The execution of this transfer order proved
to be very difficult, since the managers as well as the Jews resisted
in every possible way. The SS and Police Leader thereupon decided to
enforce the transfer of the enterprises in a large-scale action which
he intended to carry out in three days. The necessary preparations had
been taken by my predecessor, who also had given the order to start the
large-scale action. I myself arrived in Warsaw on 17 April 1943 and
took over the command of the action on 19 April 1943, 0800 hours, the
action itself having started the same day at 0600 hours.
Before the large-scale action began, the limits of the former Ghetto
had been blocked by an external barricade in order to prevent the Jews
from breaking out. This barricade was maintained from the start to the
end of the action and was especially reinforced at night.
When we invaded the Ghetto for the first time, the Jews and the Polish
bandits succeeded in repelling the participating units, including tanks
and armored cars, by a well-prepared concentration of fire. When I
ordered a second attack, about 0800 hours, I distributed the units,
separated from each other by indicated lines, and charged them with
combing out the whole of the Ghetto, each unit for a certain part.
Although firing commenced again, we now succeeded in combing out the
blocks according to plan. The enemy was forced to retire from the roofs
and elevated bases to the basements, dug-outs, and sewers. In order to
prevent their escaping into the sewers, the sewerage system was dammed
up below the Ghetto and filled with water, but the Jews frustrated this
plan to a great extent by blowing up the turning off valves. Late the
first day we encountered rather heavy resistance, but it was quickly
broken by a special raiding party. In the course of further operations
we succeeded in expelling the Jews from their prepared resistance
bases, sniper holes, and the like, and in occupying during the 20 and
21 April the greater part of the so-called remainder of the Ghetto to
such a degree that the resistance continued within these blocks could
no longer be called considerable.
The main Jewish battle group, mixed with Polish bandits, had already
retired during the first and second day to the so-called Muranowski
Square. There, it was reinforced by a considerable number of Polish
bandits. Its plan was to hold the Ghetto by every means in order to
prevent us from invading it. The Jewish and Polish standards were
hoisted at the top of a concrete building as a challenge to us. These
two standards, however, were captured on the second day of the action
by a special raiding party. SS Untersturmfuehrer Dehmke fell in this
skirmish with the bandits; he was holding in his hand a hand-grenade
which was hit by the enemy and exploded, injuring him fatally. After
only a few days I realized that the original plan had no prospect
of success, unless the armament factories and other enterprises of
military importance distributed throughout the Ghetto were dissolved.
It was therefore necessary to approach these firms and to give them
appropriate time for being evacuated and immediately transferred.
Thus one of these firms after the other was dealt with, and we very
soon deprived the Jews and bandits of their chance to take refuge
time and again in these enterprises, which were under the supervision
of the Armed Forces. In order to decide how much time was necessary
to evacuate these enterprises thorough inspections were necessary.
The conditions discovered there are indescribable. I cannot imagine
a greater chaos than in the Ghetto of Warsaw. The Jews had control
of everything, from the chemical substances used in manufacturing
explosives to clothing and equipment for the Armed Forces. The managers
knew so little of their own shops that the Jews were in a position
to produce inside these shops arms of every kind, especially hand
grenades, Molotov cocktails, and the like.
Moreover, the Jews had succeeded in fortifying some of these factories
as centers of resistance. Such a center of resistance in an Army
accommodation office had to be attacked as early as the second day
of the action by an Engineer's Unit equipped with flame throwers and
by artillery. The Jews were so firmly established in this shop that
it proved to be impossible to induce them to leave it voluntarily; I
therefore resolved to destroy this shop the next day by fire.
The managers of these enterprises, which were generally also supervised
by an officer of the Armed Forces, could in most cases make no
specified statements on their stocks and the whereabouts of these
stocks. The statements which they made on the number of Jews employed
by them were in every case incorrect. Over and over again we discovered
that these labyrinths of edifices belonging to the armament concerns as
residential blocks, contained rich Jews who had succeeded in finding
accommodations for themselves and their families under the name of
"armament workers" and were leading marvelous lives there. Despite all
our orders to the managers to make the Jews leave those enterprises,
we found out in several cases that managers simply concealed the Jews
by shutting them in, because they expected that the action would
be finished within a few days and that they then would be able to
continue working with the remaining Jews. According to the statements
of arrested Jews, women also seem to have played a prominent part.
The Jews are said to have endeavored to keep up good relations with
officers and men of the armed forces. Carousing is said to have been
frequent, during the course of which business deals are said to have
been concluded between Jews and Germans.
The number of Jews forcibly taken out of the buildings and arrested
was relatively small during the first few days. It transpired that
the Jews had taken to hiding in the sewers and in specially erected
dug-outs. Whereas we had assumed during the first days that there were
only scattered dug-outs, we learned in the course of the large-scale
action that the whole Ghetto was systematically equipped with cellars,
dug-outs, and passages. In every case these passages and dug-outs were
connected with the sewer system. Thus, the Jews were able to maintain
undisturbed subterranean traffic. They also used this sewer network for
escaping subterraneously into the Aryan part of the city of Warsaw.
Continuously, we received reports of attempts of Jews to escape through
the sewer holes. While pretending to build air-raid shelters they
had been erecting dug-outs within the former Ghetto ever since the
autumn of 1942. These were intended to conceal every Jew during the
new evacuation action, which they had expected for quite a time, and
to enable them to resist the invaders in a concerted action. Through
posters, handbills, and whisper propaganda, the communistic resistance
movement actually brought it about that the Jews entered the dug-outs
as soon as the new large-scale operation started. How far their
precautions went can be seen from the fact that many of the dug-outs
had been skilfully equipped with furnishings sufficient for entire
families, washing and bathing facilities, toilets, arms and munition
supplies, and food supplies sufficient for several months. There were
differently equipped dug-outs for rich and for poor Jews. To discover
the individual dug-outs was difficult for the units, as they had been
efficiently camouflaged. In many cases, it was possible only through
betrayal on the part of the Jews.
When only a few days had passed, it became apparent that the Jews no
longer had any intention to resettle voluntarily, but were determined
to resist evacuation with all their force and by using all the weapons
at their disposal. So-called battle groups had been formed, led by
Polish-Bolshevists; they were armed and paid any price asked for
available arms.
During the large-scale action we succeeded in catching some Jews who
had already been evacuated and resettled in Lublin or Troolinka, but
had broken out from there and returned to the Ghetto, equipped with
arms and ammunition. Time and again Polish bandits found refuge in the
Ghetto and remained there undisturbed, since we had no forces at our
disposal to comb out this maze. Whereas it had been possible during
the first days to catch considerable numbers of Jews, who are cowards
by nature, it became more and more difficult during the second half
of the action to capture the bandits and Jews. Over and over again
new battle groups consisting of 20 to 30 or more Jewish fellows, 18
to 25 years of age, accompanied by a corresponding number of women
kindled new resistance. These battle groups were under orders to put
up armed resistance to the last and if necessary to escape arrest by
committing suicide. One such battle group succeeded in mounting a truck
by ascending from a sewer in the so-called Prosta, and in escaping with
it (about 30 to 35 bandits). One bandit who had arrived with this truck
exploded 2 hand grenades, which was the agreed signal for the bandits
waiting in the sewer to climb out of it. The bandits and Jews--there
were Polish bandits among these gangs armed with carbines, small arms,
and in one case a light machine gun, mounted the truck and drove away
in an unknown direction. The last member of this gang, who was on guard
in the sewer and was detailed to close the lid of the sewer hole, was
captured. It was he who gave the above information. The search for the
truck was unfortunately without result.
During this armed resistance the women belonging to the battle groups
were equipped the same as the men; some were members of the Chaluzim
movement. Not infrequently, these women fired pistols with both hands.
It happened time and again that these women had pistols or hand
grenades (Polish "pineapple" hand grenades) concealed in their bloomers
up to the last moment to use against the men of the Waffen SS, Police,
or Wehrmacht.
The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken only
by relentlessly using all our force and energy by day and night. _On
23 April 1943 the Reichs Fuehrer SS issued through the higher SS and
Police Fuehrer East at Cracow his order to complete the combing out of
the Warsaw Ghetto with the greatest severity and relentless tenacity._
I therefore decided to destroy the entire Jewish residential area
by setting every block on fire, including the blocks of residential
buildings near the armament works. One concern after the other was
systematically evacuated and subsequently destroyed by fire. The Jews
then emerged from their hiding places and dug-outs in almost every
case. Not infrequently, the Jews stayed in the burning buildings until,
because of the heat and the fear of being burned alive they preferred
to jump down from the upper stories after having thrown mattresses and
other upholstered articles into the street from the burning buildings.
With their bones broken, they still tried to crawl across the street
into blocks of buildings which had not yet been set on fire or were
only partly in flames. Often Jews changed their hiding places during
the night, by moving into the ruins of burnt-out buildings, taking
refuge there until they were found by our patrols. Their stay in the
sewers also ceased to be pleasant after the first week. Frequently from
the street, we could hear loud voices coming through the sewer shafts.
Then the men of the Waffen SS, the Police or the Wehrmacht Engineers
courageously climbed down the shafts to bring out the Jews and not
infrequently they then stumbled over Jews already dead, or were shot
at. It was always necessary to use smoke candles to drive out the Jews.
Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes and at a fixed time
lowered smoke candles into them, with the result that the bandits fled
from what they believed to be gas to the center of the former Ghetto,
where they could then be pulled out of the sewer holes there. A great
number of Jews, who could not be counted, were exterminated by blowing
up sewers and dug-outs.
The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS,
Police, and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably
in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples
of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until
late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their
feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not
infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for
supplementing their stores from abandoned dug-outs and for contacting
neighboring groups or exchanging news with them.
Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-SS had
only been trained for three to four weeks before being assigned to
this action, high credit should be given for the pluck, courage,
and devotion to duty which they showed. It must be stated that the
Wehrmacht Engineers, too, executed the blowing up of dug-outs, sewers,
and concrete buildings with indefatigability and great devotion to
duty. Officers and men of the Police, a large part of whom had already
been at the front, again excelled by their dashing spirit.
Only through the continuous and untiring work of all involved did we
succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose extermination can be
proved. To this should be added the number of Jews who lost their lives
in explosions or fires but whose numbers could not be ascertained.
During the large-scale operation the Aryan population was informed
by posters that it was strictly forbidden to enter the former Jewish
Ghetto and that anybody caught within the former Ghetto without valid
pass would be shot. At the same time these posters informed the Aryan
population again that the death penalty would be imposed on anybody who
intentionally gave refuge to a Jew, especially lodged, supported, or
concealed a Jew outside the Jewish residential area.
Permission was granted to the Polish police to pay to any Polish
policeman who arrested a Jew within the Aryan part of Warsaw one third
of the cash in the Jew's possession. This measure has already produced
results.
The Polish population for the most part approved the measures taken
against the Jews. Shortly before the end of the large-scale operation,
the Governor issued a special proclamation which he submitted to the
undersigned for approval before publication, to the Polish population;
in it he informed them of the reasons for destroying the former Jewish
Ghetto by mentioning the assassinations carried out lately in the
Warsaw area and the mass graves found in Catyn; at the same time they
were asked to assist us in our fight against Communist agents and Jews
(see enclosed poster).
The large-scale action was terminated on 16 May 1943 with the blowing
up of the Warsaw synagogue at 2015 hours.
Now, there are no more factories in the former Ghetto. All the goods,
raw materials, and machines there have been moved and stored somewhere
else. All buildings etc., have been destroyed. The only exception is
the so-called Dzielna Prison of the Security Police, which was exempted
from destruction.
III
Although the large-scale operation has been completed, we have to
reckon with the possibility that a few Jews are still living in the
ruins of the former Ghetto; therefore, this area must be firmly shut
off from the Aryan residential area and be guarded. Police Battalion
III/23 has been charged with this duty. This Police Battalion has
instructions to watch the former Ghetto, particularly to prevent
anybody from entering the former Ghetto, and to shoot immediately
anybody found inside the Ghetto without authority. The Commander of
the Police Battalion will continue to receive further direct orders
from the SS and Police Fuehrer. In this way, it should be possible to
keep the small remainder of Jews there, if any, under constant pressure
and to exterminate them eventually. The remaining Jews and bandits
must be deprived of any chance of survival by destroying all remaining
buildings and refuges and cutting off the water supply.
It is proposed to change the Dzielna Prison into a concentration camp
and to use the inmates to remove, collect and hand over for reuse the
millions of bricks, the scrap-iron, and other materials.
IV
Of the total of 56,065 Jews caught, about 7,000 were exterminated
within the former Ghetto in the course of the large-scale action,
and 6,929 by transporting them to T.II, which means 14,000 Jews were
exterminated altogether. Beyond the number of 56,065 Jews an estimated
number of 5,000 to 6,000 were killed by explosions or in fires.
The number of destroyed dug-outs amounts to 631.
_Booty_:
7 Polish rifles, 1 Russian rifle, 1 German rifle
59 pistols of various calibers
Several hundred hand grenades, including Polish and home-made ones
Several hundred incendiary bottles
Home-made explosives
Infernal machines with fuses
A large amount of explosives, ammunition for weapons of all calibers,
including some machine-gun ammunition.
Regarding the booty of arms, it must be taken into consideration that
the arms themselves could in most cases not be captured, as the bandits
and Jews would, before being arrested, throw them into hiding places or
holes which could not be ascertained or discovered. The smoking out of
the dug-out by our men, also often made the search for arms impossible.
As the dug-outs had to be blown up at once, a search later on was out
of the question.
The captured hand grenades, ammunition, and incendiary bottles were at
once reused by us against the bandits.
_Further booty_:
1,240 used military tunics (part of them with medal ribbons--Iron
Cross and East Medal)
600 pairs of used trousers
Other equipment and German steel helmets
108 horses, 4 of them still in the former Ghetto (hearse)
Up to 23 May 1943 we had counted:
4.4 million Zloty; furthermore about 5 to 6 million Zloty not yet
counted, a great amount of foreign currency, e.g. $14,300 in paper and
$9,200 in gold, moreover valuables (rings, chains, watches, etc.) in
great quantities.
State of the Ghetto at the termination of the large-scale operation:
Apart from 8 buildings (Police Barracks, hospital, and accommodations
for housing working-parties) the former Ghetto is completely destroyed.
Only the dividing walls are left standing where no explosions were
carried out. But the ruins still contain a vast amount of stones and
scrap material which could be used.
Warsaw, 16 May, 1943.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
* * * * *
Copy
Warsaw, 20 April 1943.
Journal No. 516/43 secret.
(Daily reports)
SS Service Teletype message
_From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw_
Ref. No.: I ab/St/Gr--16 07
Re: Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, Cracow
Progress of Ghetto Operation on 19 April 1943:
Closing of Ghetto commenced 0300 hrs. At 0600 order to Waffen-SS
(strength: 16/850) to comb out the remainder of the Ghetto. Hardly
had the units fallen in, strong concerted fire-concentration by the
Jews and bandits. The tank used in this action and the two heavy
armored cars pelted with Molotov cocktails (incendiary bottles). Tank
twice set on fire. Owing to this enemy counterattack, we had at first
to take the units back. Losses in first attack: 12 men (6 SS-men, 6
Trawniki-men). About 800 hrs. second attack by the units, under the
command of the undersigned. Although the counterattack was reported,
this time we succeeded in combing out the blocks of buildings according
to plan. We caused the enemy to retire from the roofs and elevated
prepared positions into the cellars or dug-outs and sewers. During
this combing-out we caught only about 200 Jews. Immediately afterwards
raiding parties were directed to dug-outs known to us with the order
to pull out the Jews and to destroy the dug-outs. About 380 Jews
captured. We found out that the Jews had taken to the sewers. Sewers
were completely inundated, to make staying there impossible. About 1730
hrs. we encountered very strong resistance from one block of buildings
including machine-gun fire. A special raiding party invaded that block
and defeated the enemy, but could not catch the resisters. The Jews and
criminals resisted from base to base, and escaped at the last moment
across lofts or through subterranean passages. About 2030 hrs. the
external barricade was reinforced. All units were withdrawn from the
Ghetto and dismissed to their barracks. Reinforcement of the barricade
by 250 Waffen-SS men. Continuation of operation on 20 April 1943.
_Units at my disposal_:
SS-Panzer-Gren. Res. Batl. 6/400
SS-Cav. Res. Batl. 10/450
Police 6/165
Security Service 2/48
Trawniki-men 1/150
Wehrmacht:
1 10-cm-Howitzer 1/7
1 Flame thrower 1
Engineers 2/16
Medical detachments 1/1
3 2.28-cm A.A. Guns 2/24
1 French tank of the Waffen-SS
2 heavy armored cars of the Waffen-SS
--------
Total: 31/1262
I put Major of Police _Sternagel_ in command of today's operations
subject to my further instructions if necessary.
At 0700 hrs. 9 raiding parties were formed, each 1/36 strong,
consisting of mixed units, to comb out and to search the remainder of
the Ghetto intensively. This search is still in progress; its first
objective will be completed by 1100 hrs. In the meantime it has been
ascertained that part of the Ghetto which is no longer inhabited but
not yet released and which contains several armament factories and the
like, there are several centers of resistance, which were so strong
that the tank could not go through. 2 raiding parties defeated these
centers of resistance and made a passage for the tank men. In this
operation we already had two wounded (Waffen-SS).
Enemy is much more cautious than yesterday, since he has of course
learned of the heavy arms at our disposal.
My intention is first to comb out completely the remainder of the
Ghetto and then to clean out in the same manner the so-called
uninhabited Ghetto, which so far has not been released. It had been
ascertained in the meantime that the latter part of the Ghetto contains
at least 10 to 12 dug-outs, some of which are even in armament
factories. The whole operation is made more difficult because there
are still factories in the Ghetto which must be protected against
bombardment and fire, because they contain machines and tools.
A further report will follow tonight.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw.
/s/ Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 20 April 1943.
Ref. No. I ab St/Gr 16 07--Journal No. 517/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation.
To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Supplementing my teletype message of 20 April 1943--Ref. St/Gr 16 07,
re Ghetto Operation--I beg to report as follows:
The resistance centers ascertained with the uninhabited but not yet
released part of the Ghetto were crushed by a battle group of the
Wehrmacht--Engineers and flame throwers. The Wehrmacht had one wounded
in this operation, shot through the lungs. Nine raiding parties broke
through as far as the northern limit of the Ghetto. 9 dug-outs were
found, their inmates crushed when they resisted, and the dug-outs blown
up. What losses the enemy suffered cannot be ascertained accurately.
Altogether the 9 raiding parties caught 505 Jews today; those among
them who are able-bodied were kept ready for transport to Poniatowo.
At about 1500 hrs. I managed to arrange that the block of buildings
occupied by the Army Accommodation Office said to be occupied by 4,000
Jews is to be evacuated at once. The German manager was asked to call
upon the Jewish workers to leave the block voluntarily. Only 28 Jews
obeyed this order. Thereupon I resolved either to evacuate the block by
force or to blow it up. The A.A. Artillery--3 2-cm. guns used for this
operation had two men killed. The 10-cm howitzer, which also was used,
expelled the gangs from their strong fortifications and also inflicted
losses on them, as far as we were able to ascertain. This action had to
be broken off owing to the fall of darkness. On 21 April 1943 we shall
attack this resistance center again, as far as possible it will remain
blocked off during the night.
In today's action we caught, apart from the Jews reported above,
considerable stores of incendiary bottles, hand grenades, ammunition,
military tunics, and equipment.
_Losses_:
2 dead (Wehrmacht)
7 wounded (6 Waffen SS, 1 Trawniki-man)
In one case the bandits had laid pressure mines. I have succeeded in
causing the firms W.C. Toebens, Schultz and Co., and Hoffman to be
ready for evacuation with their entire personnel on 21 April 1943 at
0600 hrs. In this way, I hope to get the way free at last for cleaning
out the Ghetto. The Trustees Toebens has pledged himself to induce the
Jews, numbering about 4,000 to 5,000, to follow him voluntarily to
the assembling point for being resettled. In case this has as little
success as was attained in the case of the Army Accommodation Office,
I am going to clean out this part of the Ghetto as well by force. I
beg to acknowledge receipt of the order which the Obergruppenfuehrer
communicated to me by telephone today, and of the powers granted to me.
Next report on 21 April 1943 at noon.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 21 April 1943.
_Ref. Nr._ I ab/St/Gr--16 07 --Journal Nr. 527/43.
Re: Ghetto Operation.
To the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police, _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of Ghetto Operation on 21 April 1943.
Supplementing the report which I made today about 1400 hrs. by
telephone, I beg to report:
Forces at my disposal as of 20 April 1943.
Start of operation: 0700 hrs. The whole of the Ghetto has continued to
be cordoned off since the start of the operations on 19 April 1943.
Inasmuch as the special operation concerning the block of buildings
occupied by the Army Accommodation Office had to be interrupted
yesterday because of darkness, one battle group reinforced by Engineers
and heavy artillery was again sent into the block of buildings, which
was found to contain an enormous quantity of dug-outs and subterranean
passages firing from time to time. I resolved therefore to blow up
these passages which we had discovered and subsequently to set the
entire block on fire. Not until the building was well aflame did
screaming Jews make their appearance, and they were evacuated at once.
We had no losses in this operation. Precautionary measures were taken
in order to ensure that the conflagration remained localized.
The main body of our forces was detailed to cleanse the so-called
uninhabited, but not yet released, part of the Ghetto by proceeding
from South to North. Before we started this action, we caught 5,200
Jews who had been employed in enterprises under the supervision of the
Commissioner for Armament [Ru Ko-Betrieben] and transported them under
armed guard to the Railway Station which had been chosen for use in the
resettlement. I formed 3 search-parties to which were attached special
raiding parties who had the duty to attack or blow up the dug-outs
which were known to us. This operation had to be interrupted when
darkness set in, after one half of the area mentioned had been combed
out.
Continued on 22 April 1943, 0700 hrs.
Apart from the Jews who were to be evacuated, 150 Jews or bandits were
killed in battle and about 80 bandits were killed when their dug-outs
were blown up. The enemy today used the same arms as on the previous
day, particularly home-made explosives. Samples have been kept by the
SS and Police Fuehrer. For the first time we observed the participation
of members of the Jewish Women's Battle Association (Chaluzim
Movement). We captured rifles, pistols, hand grenades, explosives,
horses, and parts of SS uniforms.
Own losses: 2 policemen, 2 SS-men, 1 Trawniki-man.
(light wounds)
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 22 April 1943.
_Ref._ No. I ab St/Gr 16 07--Journal Nr. 530/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation. (supplement to par. 1 of letter of 21 April
1943).
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the course of the
night that those Jews whom we had not been able to find despite all our
search operations left their hideouts under the roofs, in the cellars,
and elsewhere, and appeared at the outside of the buildings, trying
to escape the flames. Masses of them--entire families--were already
aflame and jumped from the windows or endeavored to let themselves down
by means of sheets tied together or the like. Steps had been taken so
that these Jews as well as the remaining ones were liquidated at once.
During the whole night there were shots from buildings which were
supposed to be evacuated. We had no losses in our cordoning forces.
5,300 Jews were caught for the evacuation and removed.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 22 April 1943.
_Ref_. Nr. I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 531/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of the Ghetto Operation on 22 April 1943 up to 1200 hrs.
One raiding party was dispatched to invade once more the block of
buildings which for the greater part had burned out or was still
aflame, in order to catch those Jews who were still inside. When
shooting again started from one block against the men of the Waffen-SS,
this block also was set on fire, with the result that a considerable
number of bandits were scared from their hideouts and shot while trying
to escape. Apart for those, we caught about 180 Jews in the yards of
the buildings. The main body of our units continued the cleansing
action from the line where we terminated this action yesterday.
This operation is still in progress. As on the preceding days local
resistance was broken and the dug-outs we discovered were blown up.
Unfortunately there is no way of preventing part of the Jews and
bandits from taking refuge in the sewers below the Ghetto, where we
can hardly catch them since they have stopped the flooding. The city
administration is not in a position to frustrate this nuisance. Neither
did the use of smoke candles or the introduction of creosote into the
water have the desired result. Cooperation with the Wehrmacht splendid.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 22 April 1943.
_Ref._ Nr.: ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 532/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation.
The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation of 22 April 1943. Report on action up to 1200
hrs. has already been submitted by my message of today. Continuing, I
beg to report:
When the special raiding party searched the remainder of the blocks as
already reported, they met with resistance at some places; they had the
following success: 1,100 Jews caught for evacuation, 203 bandits and
Jews killed, 15 dug-outs blown up. They captured 80 incendiary bottles
and other booty. Units at my disposal: as reported by teletype message
on 20 April 1943. Journal No. 516/43 secret.
_Our losses_: SS-Untersturmfuehrer Dehmke (dead); enemy hit a hand
grenade which he carried. (SS-Cav.Res. Batl.)
1 Sergeant of Police (shot through the lungs)
When the Engineers blew up the dug-outs, a considerable number of Jews
and bandits were buried under the ruins. In a number of cases it was
found necessary to start fires in order to smoke the gangs out.
I must add that since yesterday some of the units have been shot at
time and again from outside the Ghetto, that is, from the Aryan part
of Warsaw. Raiding parties at once entered the area in question and
in one case succeeded in capturing 35 Polish bandits, Communists, who
were liquidated at once. Today it happened repeatedly when we found it
necessary to execute some bandits, that they collapsed shouting "Long
live Poland," "Long live Moscow."
The operation will be continued on 23 April 1943, 0700 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Maj. Gen. of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From the SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 23 April 1943.
Ref. No.: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 538/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of Ghetto Operation on 23 April 1943. Start: 0700 hours.
The whole of the former Ghetto had been divided for the purposes of
today's combing-out operations into 24 districts. One reinforced
searching party was detailed to each district with special orders.
These assignments had to be carried out by 1600 hours.
Result of this action: 600 Jews and bandits ferreted out and captured,
about 200 Jews and bandits killed, 48 dug-outs, some of them of a quite
elaborate character, blown up. We captured apart from valuables and
money--some gas masks.
The units had been informed that we intended to terminate the operation
today. In the morning the Jews had already become aware of this
instruction. This is why a renewed search by the searching parties was
undertaken after an interval of 1 to 1-1/2 hours. The result was, as
always, that again Jews and bandits were discovered to be in various
blocks. From one block shots were even fired against the cordoning
units. An attack by a special battle group was ordered and in order to
smoke the bandits out, every building was now set on fire. The Jews
and bandits held out, every building was now set on fire. The Jews and
bandits held their fire up to the last moment and then concerted their
fire against the units. They even used carbines. A number of bandits
who were shooting from balconies were hit by our men and crashed down.
Furthermore, today we discovered a place said to have been the
headquarters of the "P PR"; we found it unoccupied and destroyed it.
It was on this 5th day of operations that obviously we found the worst
of the terrorists and activists, who so far had always found ways and
means to dodge every searching or evacuation action.
A racial German reported that again some Jews had escaped through the
sewers into the Aryan part of the city. We learned from a traitor that
there were some Jews in a certain house. A special motorized raiding
party invaded the building and caught 3 Jews, 2 of them females. During
this operation their motor-car was pelted with one incendiary bottle
and one explosive; 2 policemen were wounded.
The whole operation is rendered more difficult by the cunning way in
which the Jews and bandits act; for instance, we discover that the
hearses which were used to collect the corpses lying around at the
same time bring living Jews to the Jewish cemetery, and thus they are
enabled to escape from the Ghetto. Now this way of escape also is
barred by continuous control of the hearses.
At the termination of today's operation about 2200 hours, we discovered
that again about 30 bandits had passed into a so-called armaments
factory, where they had found refuge. Since the forces are storing
goods of great value in this enterprise, this factory was requested
to evacuate the building by noon on 24 April; this will enable us to
cleanse that labyrinth of a building tomorrow.
Today 3,500 Jews were caught who are to be evacuated from the
factories. A total of 19,450 Jews have been caught for resettlement or
already evacuated up to today. Of these about 2,500 Jews are still to
be loaded. The next train will start on 24 April 1943.
Strength as of 22 April 1943, without 150 Trawniki men; these
have already been put at the disposal of the Eastern Command as
reinforcement for another assignment.
_Our losses_:
2 Police corporals ("SB") wounded
1 Trawniki man wounded.
The operation will be continued on 24 April 1943, 1000 hours. This hour
was chosen so that Jews who may still be in the Ghetto will believe
that the operation was actually terminated today.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major general of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 24 April 1943.
Ref. Nr.: I ab/St/Wdt--16 07--Journal No. 545/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation.
The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
general of the Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 24 April 1943, start 1000 hours.
Contrary to the preceding days, the 24 searching parties which had
again been formed did not start at one end of the Ghetto, but proceeded
from all sides at the same time. Apparently the Jews still in the
Ghetto were deceived by the fact that the operation did not start until
1000 hours into believing that the action really had been terminated
yesterday. The search action, therefore, had especially satisfactory
results today. This success is furthermore due to the fact that the
noncommissioned officers and men have meanwhile become accustomed to
the cunning fighting, methods and tricks used by the Jews and bandits
and that they have acquired great skill in tracking down the dug-outs
which are found in such great number. The raiding parties having
returned, we set about to clean a certain block of buildings, situated
in the north-eastern part of the former Ghetto. In this labyrinth of
buildings there was a so-called armaments firm which reportedly had
goods worth millions for manufacture and storage. I had notified the
Wehrmacht of my intentions on 23 April 1943 about 2100 hours, and had
requested them to remove their goods by 1200 hours. Since the Wehrmacht
did not start this evacuation until 1000 hours I felt obliged to
extend the term until 1800 hours. At 1815 hours a search party entered
the premises, the building having been cordoned off, and found that
a great number of Jews were within the building. Since some of these
Jews resisted, I ordered the building to be set on fire. Not until all
the buildings along the street and the back premises on either side
were well aflame did the Jews, some of them on fire, emerge from these
blocks, some of them endeavored to save their life by jumping into
the street from windows and balconies, after having thrown down beds,
blankets, and the like. Over and over again we observed that Jews and
bandits, despite the danger of being burned alive, preferred to return
into the flames rather than risk being caught by us. Over and over
again the Jews kept up their firing almost to the end of the action;
thus the engineers had to be protected by a machine gun when toward
nightfall they had to enter forcibly a concrete building which had been
very strongly fortified. Termination of today's operation; on 25 April
1943 at 0145 hours. 1,660 Jews were caught for evacuation, 1,814 pulled
out of dug-outs, about 330 shot. Innumerable Jews were destroyed by the
flames or perished when the dug-outs were blown up. 26 dug-outs were
blown up and an amount of paper money, especially dollars was captured;
this money has not yet been counted.
Our forces: as on the preceding day, minus 50 men of the Waffen-SS.
Our losses: 2 SS men and 1 Trawniki man wounded.
Altogether there have now been caught in this action 25,500 Jews who
lived in the former Ghetto. Since there are only vague estimates
available of the actual number of inhabitants I assume that now only
very small numbers of Jews and bandits still remain within the Ghetto.
Operation will be continued on 25 April 1943, 1300 hours.
I beg to acknowledge receipt of teletype messages Nos. 1222 and 1223
of 24 April 1943. As far as can be predicted, the present large-scale
operation will last until Easter Monday inclusive.
Today large posters were affixed to the walls surrounding the Ghetto,
announcing that everybody who enters the former Ghetto without being
able to prove his identity will be shot.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 25 April 1943
Ref. No. I ab/St/Wdt--16 07--Journal No. 549/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 25 April 1943, start 1300 hours.
For today 7 search parties were formed, strength 1/70 each, each
allotted to a certain block of buildings.
Their order was: "Every building is to be combed out once more;
dug-outs have to be discovered and blown up, and the Jews have to
be caught. If any resistance is encountered or if dug-outs cannot
be reached, the buildings are to be burnt down." Apart from the
operations undertaken by these 7 search parties, a special operation
was undertaken against a center of bandits, situated outside the wall
surrounding the former Ghetto and inhabited exclusively by Poles.
Today's operations of the search parties ended almost everywhere in
the starting of enormous conflagrations. In this manner the Jews were
forced to leave their hideouts and refuges. A total of 1,960 Jews
were caught alive. The Jews informed us that among them were certain
parachutists who were dropped here and bandits who had been equipped
with arms from some unknown source. 274 Jews were killed. As in the
preceding days, uncounted Jews were buried in blown up dug-outs and, as
can be observed time and again, burned with this bag of Jews today. We
have, in my opinion, caught a very considerable part of the bandits and
lowest elements of the Ghetto. Intervening darkness prevented immediate
liquidation. I am going to try to obtain a train for T II tomorrow.
Otherwise liquidation will be carried out tomorrow. Today also, some
armed resistance was encountered; in a dug-out three pistols and some
explosives were captured. Furthermore, considerable amounts of paper
money, foreign currency, gold coins, and jewelry were seized today.
The Jews still have considerable property. While last night a glare
of fire could be seen above the former Ghetto, today one can observe
a giant sea of flames. Since we continue to discover great numbers of
Jews whenever we search and comb out, the operation will be continued
on 26 April 1943. Start: 1000 hours.
Including today, a total of 27,464 Jews of the former Warsaw Ghetto,
have been captured.
Our forces: as on the previous day.
Our losses: 3 members of the Waffen-SS and one member of the Security
Police wounded.
_Total losses up to date_:
Waffen SS 27 Wounded
Police 9 Wounded
Security Police 4 Wounded
Wehrmacht 1 Wounded
Trawniki men 9 Wounded
-----------
50 Wounded
and 5 dead:
Waffen SS 2 Dead
Wehrmacht 2 Dead
Trawniki men 1 Dead
--------
5 Dead
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 26 April 1943.
Ref. No.: I ab/St/Wdt--16 07--Journal Nr. 550/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation--supplementary report.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
1. The operation on 25 April 1943, was terminated at 2200 hrs.
2. General effects of the execution of this operation.
The Poles resident in Warsaw are much impressed by the toughness of our
operations in the former Ghetto. As can be seen from the daily reports,
the general situation has greatly calmed down since the beginning of
that operation within the city area of Warsaw. From this fact one may
conclude that the bandits and saboteurs resided in the former Ghetto,
and that now all of them have been destroyed.
In this connection the fact may be of some interest, that an illegal
ammunition store was seen to explode when we burned down a certain
building in the dwelling area on which we were working at the time.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified Copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 26 April 1943.
Ref. Nr.: I ab/St/Wdt--16 07 Journal Nr. 551/43 secret.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Start of operation: 1000 hrs.
The whole of the former Ghetto was once more combed through today by
the same search parties, each of them allotted to the same district as
before. In this way I tried to bring about that the leaders of these
parties work in thoroughfares, blocks of buildings, and courtyards
which they know already and that thus they are able to penetrate deeper
and deeper into the maze of dug-outs and subterranean passages. Almost
every search party reported resistance, which however they broke either
by returning fire or by blowing up the dug-outs. It becomes clearer
and clearer that it is now the turn of the toughest and strongest
among the Jews and bandits. Several times dug-outs have been forcibly
broken open, the inmates of which had not come to the surface during
the whole of this operation. In a number of cases the inmates of the
dug-outs were hardly in a condition, when the dug-out had been blown
up, to crawl to the surface. The captured Jews report that many of the
inmates of the dug-outs became insane from the heat, the smoke, and
the explosions. Several Jews were arrested who had kept close liaison
with the group of Polish terrorists and collaborated with it. Outside
the former Ghetto we arrested 29 Jews. During today's operation several
blocks of buildings were burned down. This is the only and final method
which forces this trash and subhumanity to the surface. We again
captured arms, incendiary bottles, explosive charges and considerable
amounts of cash and foreign currency. Today I also arranged that
several so-called armament and defense enterprises will evacuate their
stores from the buildings at once, so that these buildings in which the
Jews now have taken refuge, under the protection of the army of the
German Wehrmacht and police, can be combed out. In one case we again
discovered, as previously, that in a building which had been said to
contain a giant enterprise there existed in fact almost no stores or
goods. One factory was closed without further ado, and the Jews were
evacuated.
Result of today's operation:
30 Jews evacuated, 1,330 Jews pulled out of dug-outs and immediately
destroyed, 362 Jews killed in battle. Caught today altogether: 1,722
Jews. This brings the total of Jews caught to 29,186. Moreover, it is
very probable that numerous Jews have perished in the 13 dug-outs blown
up today and in the conflagrations.
At the time of writing not one of the Jews caught still remains within
Warsaw. The scheduled transport to T. II had no success. [Note of
translator: This probably means that no Jews were available for regular
transport to the extermination camp.]
Strength: as on preceding day.
Our losses: none.
End of today's operation at 2145 hrs. Will be continued on 27 April
1943 at 0900 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in
the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 27 April 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 555/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation
To: the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 27 April 1943. Start: 0900 hrs.
For today's operation I formed 24 raiding parties with the same task as
on several days of last week; they had to search the former Ghetto in
smaller groups. These search parties pulled 780 Jews out of dug-outs
and shot 115 Jews who resisted. This operation was terminated about
1500 hrs.; some of the parties had to continue to operate because they
had found more dug-outs.
At 1600 hrs. a special battle group, 320 officers and men strong,
started cleansing a large block of buildings situated on both sides
of the so-called Niska Street in the Northeastern part of the former
Ghetto. After the search the entire block was set on fire, after having
been completely cordoned off. In this action a considerable number of
Jews were caught. As before, they remained in the dug-outs, which were
either below the ground or in the lofts of the buildings until the end.
They fired their arms to the last moment, and then jumped down into the
street, sometimes from as far up as the fourth floor, having previously
thrown down beds, mattresses, etc., but not until the flames made any
other escape impossible. A total of 2,560 Jews were caught today within
the former Ghetto, of whom 547 were shot. Moreover, Jews in a not
ascertainable number perished when dug-outs were blown up, or in the
flames. The sum total of Jews, formerly residing in the Ghetto caught
in this action, now amounts to 31,746.
We learned from an anonymous letter that there were a considerable
number of Jews in a block of buildings adjoining the Northeastern
part of the Ghetto, but outside of it. A special raiding party under
the command of 1st. Lt. of Police Diehl was dispatched to attack
these buildings. The raiding party discovered a gang of about 120
men, strongly armed with pistols, rifles, hand grenades, and light
machine guns, who resisted. They succeeded in destroying 24 bandits
in battle and arresting 52 bandits. The remainder could not be caught
or destroyed, since darkness intervened. The buildings, however, were
surrounded at once, so that an escape will hardly be possible. This
cleansing action will be continued tomorrow. Moreover, we arrested
17 Poles, among whom 2 Polish Policemen, who should have been aware,
among other things, of the existence of this gang. In this operation we
captured 3 rifles, 12 pistols, partly of heavier caliber, 100 Polish
"pineapple" hand grenades, 27 German steel helmets, quite a number
of German uniforms, tunics and coats which were even furnished with
ribbon of the East medal, some reserve magazines for machine guns,
300 rounds of ammunition, etc. The leader of the raiding party had a
difficult task because the bandits were disguised in German uniform,
but despite this fact, he did his duty with great efficiency. Among the
bandits who were caught or killed, there were some Polish terrorists
who were identified with certainty. Today we succeeded furthermore in
discovering and liquidating one of the founders and leaders of the
Jewish-Polish resistance movement. The external appearance of the Jews
whom we are catching now shows that it is now the turn of those Jews
who were the leaders of the entire resistance movement. They jumped
from the burning windows and balconies, abusing Germany and the Fuehrer
and cursing the German soldiers.
SS-men who descended into the sewers discovered that a great number of
corpses of perished Jews are being washed away by the water.
_Our strength_:
288 German Police }
200 Trawniki-men }
From 0700 to 1900 hrs. 140 Polish Police } Cordoning
From 1900 to 0700 hrs. 288 German Police } forces.
250 Waffen-SS }
140 Polish Police }
_Strength in the operation_:
3/115 German Police
4/400 Waffen-SS
1/6 Engineering Serv.
2/30 Security Police
2/21 Engineers.
_Our losses_:
3 wounded:
2 Waffen-SS
1 Trawniki-man
Termination of operation: 2300 hrs. Will be continued on 28 April 1943
at 1000 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Maj. Gen. of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 28 April 1943.
Ref. Nr. I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 562/43 secret.
Re: Ghetto operation
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 28 April 1943. Start 1000 hrs.
Today, 10 raiding parties were formed for combing out the whole of
the Ghetto. These raiding parties again discovered proceeding step by
step, a number of dug-outs, which were found to have been prepared as
far ago as the middle of last year for use in the resistance of the
Jews. A total of 335 Jews were forcibly pulled out of these dug-outs.
Apart from these operations, we continued to cleanse the resistance
center used by the Jewish military organization, situated at the
borders of the Ghetto. We succeeded in shooting 10 more bandits, and
in arresting 9, beyond those caught yesterday, and in capturing more
arms, ammunition, and military equipment. In the afternoon a battle
group again was directed against a block of buildings which had already
been combed out; the block was set on fire during this operation. As
on previous days, masses of Jews emerged, forced out by the flames and
the enormous clouds of smoke. At another point an Engineer officer,
attached by the Wehrmacht to the units with great trouble opened a
dug-out situated about 3 meters below ground. From this dug-out, which
had been ready since October of last year and was equipped with running
water, toilet, and electric light, we pulled out 274 of the richest
and most influential Jews. Today again we encountered very strong
resistance in many places and broke it. It becomes clearer every day
that we are now encountering the real terrorists and activists, because
of the duration of the operation.
Result of today: 1,655 Jews caught for evacuation, of whom 110 were
killed in battle.
Many more Jews were killed by the flames; moreover, Jews in an
unascertainable number were destroyed by the dug-outs being blown up.
By the results of today the number of Jews caught or destroyed rises
to 33,401 altogether. This number does not include the Jews who were
killed by fire or destroyed in the dug-outs.
Our strength: as on the previous day.
Our losses: 3 wounded (1 Police, 2 Waffen-SS)
Termination of operation: 2200 hrs. Will be continued on 29 April 1943.
1000 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 29 April 1943.
_Ref. Nr._ I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 566/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation of 29 April 1943. Start 1000 hrs.
As on the previous day I formed search parties, who had the special
task of searching those blocks of buildings which had been recently
separated. A larger raiding party was detailed to clean a certain block
of buildings (formerly the Hallmann concern) and to burn this block
down. 36 more dug-outs used for habitation were discovered altogether,
and from them and other hideouts and from the burning buildings, 2,359
Jews were caught, of whom 106 were killed in battle.
Captured are 2 rifles, 10 pistols, 10 kilograms of explosives, and
ammunition of various types.
When a large dug-out was blown up, the entire building collapsed
and everyone of the bandits perished. In the ensuing conflagration
loud detonations and darting flames showed that the building must
have contained large stores of ammunition and explosives. Some sewer
entrances were blown up. Two exits discovered outside the Ghetto were
also made unusable by blowing them up or walling them up.
The depositions of some of the inmates of the dug-outs are to the
effect that these Jews have been unable to leave the dug-outs for the
last 10 days and that their food, etc., is now beginning to grow short
because the large-scale operation has lasted so long. Furthermore, the
Jews testify that bandits appeared at night who were Jews or sometimes
Poles, wearing black masks, who walled the dug-outs up from the outside
and admonished them not to give any signs of life, so that they could
continue to live in the Ghetto when the action was finished. Some of
the armaments factories are being evacuated very slowly. In several
cases one gains the impression that this is done intentionally. Thus I
discovered with regard to one firm, Schulz and Co., which I had visited
on Easter Monday and then instructed to start evacuation at once and to
have it completed within 3 days, that up till today, Thursday, nothing
had been done.
_Our strength_: as on the previous day.
_Our losses_: none.
Termination of operation at 2100 hrs. Will be continued on 30 April
1943, 0900 hrs.
Total caught or destroyed: 35,760.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 30 April 1943.
_Ref No._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 579/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 30 April 1943. Start 0900 hrs.
Combing out by search parties was continued. Although some giant blocks
of buildings now are completely burned out, the Jews continue to stay
in the dug-outs 2 to 3 meters below ground. In many cases we are not
able to discover those dug-outs unless some Jew, whom we have already
caught, gives us a hint as to their whereabouts. Repeatedly, during
the last few days, Jews have testified that some armed Jews emerge at
night from some hideouts or dug-outs and threaten the other Jews with
shooting if they give any signs of life. We were able to ascertain
beyond all doubt that several dug-outs had been closed from the outside
by these bandits, who tried in this manner to prove that they meant
business. Altogether, 30 dug-outs were discovered, evacuated, and blown
up today. Again we caught a great number of bandits and subhumans.
Apart from the bombing-out operations effected by small parties, two
larger battle groups were occupied with bombing out and destroying by
fire several inter-connected blocks of buildings.
A total of 1599 Jews were caught today, of whom 179 were killed in
battle. The sum total of Jews caught up to date thereby rises to
37,359. 3,855 Jews were loaded today. The number of Jews in possession
of arms was much higher than before among the Jews caught during the
last few days. Today, we again captured arms and particularly parts
of German uniforms from them. The operation against Fort Traugutta
did not have any positive results. So far as we were able to discover
subterranean exits, we either occupied them or blew them up. In
attacking one of the blocks we had to use a gun today.
Our strength:
Used in the operation:
Police 5/133
Security Police 3/36
Waffen SS 6/432
Engineer 2/40
Staff 3/7
Cordoning forces:
Waffen SS 3/318
German Police 2/89
Trawniki men 200
moreover some Polish Police
Our losses: 1 wounded (Police)
Termination of today's large scale action: 2100 hours. Will be
continued on 1 May 1943, 0900 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, May 1, 1943.
_Ref_: Nr.: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 583/43 secret.
Re: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large scale operation on 1 May 1943. Start 0900 hrs.
10 searching parties were detailed, moreover a larger battle group
was detailed to comb out a certain block of buildings, with the added
instruction to burn that block down. Within this block of buildings
there existed a so-called armament factory which had not yet been
entirely evacuated, although it had had enough time to do so. It was
not exempted from the operation. Today's operation a total of 1,026
Jews were caught, of whom 245 were killed, either in battle or while
resisting. Moreover, a considerable number of bandits and ringleaders
were also caught. In one case a Jew who had already been made ready
for transport fired three shots against a 1st Lieutenant of Police,
but missed his mark. All the Jews caught today were forcibly pulled
out of dug-outs. Not a single one gave himself up voluntarily, after
his dug-out had been opened. A considerable part of the Jews caught
were pulled out of the sewers. We continued systematically blowing up
or blocking up the sewer entrances. In one case the Engineers laid a
strong concentrated charge and had to proceed to an adjoining entrance
where they had something to do. In the meantime a Jew emerged from the
sewer, removed the fuse from the concentrated charge, and appropriated
the charge. In the further course of this operation we succeeded in
catching the Jew, still in possession of the concentrated charge.
In order to ascertain the movements of the Jews during the night, today
I used for the first time 5 scouting parties, each 1/9 strong, at
irregular intervals during the night. In general, it has to be stated
that our men need extraordinary diligence and energy to discover the
Jews who are still in so-called dug-outs, caves, and in the sewerage
system. It can be expected that the remainder of the Jews who formerly
inhabited the Ghetto will now be caught. The sum total of Jews caught
so far has risen to 38,385. Not included in this figure are those
who died in the flames or in the dug-outs. One patrol discovered an
unascertainable number of corpses floating in a main sewer under the
Ghetto. Outside of the Ghetto, in the immediate vicinity of Warsaw, the
gendarmerie has shot a total of 150 Jews who could be proved to have
escaped from Warsaw.
Again we captured pistols and explosives.
_Our strength, used in operation_:
Police (German) 4/102
Waffen SS 7/350
Engineers (Wehrmacht) 2/38
Engineering Emergency Service 1/6
Security Police 2/1
_Cordoning units_:
Waffen SS 300
German Police 1/71
Trawniki 250
_Our losses_: 1 policeman--wounded yesterday, died from wounds.
Termination of today's large-scale action: 2200 hours. Will be
continued on 2 May 1943, 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 2 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 584/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 2 May 1943, start 1000 hrs.
9 raiding parties combed out the whole area of the former Ghetto;
moreover a larger detachment was detailed to clean out or destroy
one block of buildings grouped around the two armament enterprises
Transavia and Wischniewski. To find more dug-outs, the raiding parties
took along with them some Jews caught on the previous day to act as
guides. In these operations the raiding parties pulled out 944 Jews
from dug-outs; 235 more Jews were shot on this occasion. When the block
of buildings mentioned above was destroyed, 120 Jews were caught and
numerous Jews were destroyed when they jumped from the attics to the
inner courtyards, trying to escape the flames. Many more Jews perished
in the flames or were destroyed when the dug-outs and sewer entrances
were blown up. The Jews were removed from two armaments concerns and
the managers were requested to evacuate within a short time.
Altogether we caught today: 1,852 Jews. The sum total of Jews caught
thereby rises to 40,237 Jews. 27 dug-outs were discovered, forcibly
opened and destroyed, arms and ammunition captured. When the external
barricade was shot at and when some Jews who broke out from a sewer
entrance outside the Ghetto made an attack, we suffered 7 losses, 4
Policemen and 3 Polish Policemen. The scouting parties used during
the night encountered armed resistance from some Jews who under
the protection of darkness ventured to emerge from their holes and
dug-outs. We did not suffer losses thereby. On the other hand, a
considerable number of Jews were killed or wounded in this operation.
_Our strength, used in operation_:
German Police 3/98
Engineering Em Service 1/6
Security Police 3/12
Engineers (Wehrmacht) 2/37
SS-Gren 11/409
SS-Cav. 3/7
_Cordoning forces_:
German Police 2/9
SS-Gren. 1/300
Trawniki 200
_Our losses_:
4 Policemen wounded
3 Polish policemen wounded
Present at today's large-scale operation was the Higher SS and Police
Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police Krueger.
Termination of operation: 2030 hours. Will be continued on 3 May 1943,
0900 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 3 May 1943.
_Ref. Nr._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 597/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 3 May 1943, start 0900 hrs. In
the combing-out operation of the former Jewish Ghetto today 19 more
dug-outs were discovered and the result was as follows:
Pulled out of dug-outs 1,392 Jews
Shot 95
Evacuated from former armament factories 177
The sum total of Jews caught thereby rises to 41,806 Jews. In most
cases the Jews offered armed resistance before they left the dug-outs.
We had two casualties (wounded). Some of the Jews and bandits fired
pistols from both hands. Since we discovered several times today, that
Jewesses had pistols concealed in their bloomers, every Jew and bandit
will be ordered from today on, to strip completely for the search. We
captured among other things, one German rifle, model 98, two 08 pistols
and other calibers, also home-made hand grenades. The Jews cannot be
induced to leave their dug-outs until several smoke candles have been
burned. According to depositions made yesterday and today, the Jews
were asked during the second half of 1942 to erect air-raid shelters.
At that time under the camouflage of erecting air-raid shelters, they
began to build the dug-outs which they are now inhabiting, in order to
use them for an anti-Jewish operation. Some of the scouting parties
used in the Ghetto were shot at last night. One casualty (wounded).
These scouting parties reported that groups of armed bandits marched
through the Ghetto.
Strength: as on the previous day.
Losses: 3 SS-men wounded.
Termination of today's operation: 2100 hrs. Will be continued on 4 May
1943. 0900 hrs.
3,019 Jews were loaded.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 4 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 603/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 4 May 1943, start 0900 hrs.
For mopping up the dug-outs a raiding party was used, 1/60 strong and
reinforced by an Engineers' detachment provided by the Wehrmacht. This
raiding party pulled 550 Jews out of dug-outs and killed in battle 188
Jews. Discovering the dug-outs becomes more and more difficult. Often
they can only be discovered by betrayal through other Jews. If the Jews
are requested to leave their dug-out voluntarily, they hardly ever
obey; they can only be forced to do so by the use of smoke-candles.
The main forces were detailed about 1100 hours to comb out, mop up,
and destroy two large blocks of buildings, containing the former
firms Toebbens, Schulz and Co., and others. After these blocks had
been completely cordoned off, we requested the Jews who were still
within the buildings to come forward voluntarily. By this measure,
we caught 456 Jews for evacuation. Not until the blocks of buildings
were well aflame and were about to collapse did a further considerable
number of Jews emerge, forced to do so by the flames and the smoke.
Time and again the Jews try to escape even through burning buildings.
Innumerable Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the conflagration
perished in the flames. Others emerged from the upper stories in the
last possible moment and were only able to escape death in the flames
by jumping down. Today we caught a total of 2,283 Jews, of whom 204
were shot and innumerable Jews were destroyed in dug-outs and in the
flames. The sum total of Jews caught rises to 44,089.
As is learned from depositions made by the Jews, today we caught
part of the governing body of the so-called "Party." One member of
the committee which leads the gang will be used tomorrow for mopping
up some more fortified dug-outs with armed Jews inside. When the
armament enterprises were evacuated, we again observed that the goods
carted away were by no means valuable military equipment, as had been
pretended, but trifles, like used furniture and other requisitioned
items. We took appropriate measures against this at once.
The scouting parties who patrolled during the night in the former
Ghetto again reported movements of the Jews in the burned out and
destroyed streets and courtyards. In order to be better able to take
the Jews by surprise, the scouting parties at night tie rags and other
stuff round their shoes. In skirmishes between the scouting parties and
Jews, 30 Jews were shot.
We captured 1 carbine, 3 pistols, and some ammunition. During the
conflagration a considerable amount of stored ammunition exploded.
_Our strength, used in operation_:
German Police 4/101
Engineering Em. Service 1/6
Security Police 2/14
Engineers 2/41
Waffen SS 11/407
_Cordoning forces:_
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 2/87 1/11
Waffen SS 25 1/300
Trawniki 200
Polish Police 1/180 1/180
_Our losses_: None.
Termination of operation: 2330 hours. Will be continued on 5 May 1943,
1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in
the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
_From:_ The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 5 May 1943.
_Ref. Nr._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 607/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 5 May 1943. Start 1000 hrs. In
the beginning of today's operations the raiding parties seemed to have
less results than on the preceding days. When the operation terminated,
however, quite a number of dug-outs had again been discovered, owing to
the tracking ability of the men and to betrayal; 40 of these dug-outs
were destroyed. As far as possible, the Jews in these dug-outs were
caught (1,070 altogether). The combing out patrols shot about 126
Jews. Today again the Jews resisted in several places until they were
captured. In several cases the entrances (hatches) of the dug-outs were
forcibly held or bolted from the inside, so that only by using a strong
explosive charge could we force them open and destroy the inmates.
Today, we again captured arms and ammunition, including one pistol.
From one enterprise still in existence (so-called Prosta) 2,850 Jews
were caught for evacuation. This figure was included in the sum total
reported earlier, so that only 1,070 have to be added; the present sum
total therefore is 45,159.
Our strength: as on the preceding day.
Our losses: 1 SS man wounded, 1 Policeman wounded.
Sum total of losses to date: 8 dead, 55 wounded.
Termination of operation: 2200 hrs. Will be continued on 6 May 1943,
0900 hrs.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop.
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 6 May 1943.
_Ref. Nov_: ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 614/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto large-scale operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 6 May 1943, start 0930 hrs.
Today we combed especially those blocks of buildings which were
destroyed by fire on 4 May 1943. Although it was hardly to be expected
that any living person could still exist in those blocks, we discovered
quite a number of dug-outs in which a burning heat had developed. From
these dug-outs and from other dug-outs which we discovered in other
parts of the Ghetto, we pulled out 1,553 Jews. While resisting, and in
a skirmish, 356 Jews were shot. In this skirmish the Jews fired from 08
pistols and other calibers and threw Polish "pineapple" hand grenades.
One SS Unterscharfuehrer was wounded and a total of 47 dug-outs were
destroyed.
2 men of the external cordoning forces were wounded. The Jews who had
broken out from the Ghetto seem to be returning now with the intention
of assisting the Ghetto Jews by force or liberating them. One Jew who
had escaped from Lublin was caught just outside of the Ghetto wall. He
was armed as follows: 1 08 pistol, ample reserve ammunition, 2 Polish
"pineapple" hand grenades. It could not be reliably ascertained so far
whether the so-called "Party Directorate" of the Jews ("PPR") have
been caught or destroyed. We are on their traces. It is to be hoped
that tomorrow we shall succeed in tracing down this so-called Party
Directorate. In order to enable us to intercept more effectively the
Jews and bandits who approach the Ghetto, covering detachments of
the external barricade were shifted farther inside the Aryan part.
The former miniature Ghetto "Prosta" was searched by raiding parties
today. We caught some Jews who had stayed behind. The firm Toebbens was
requested to evacuate, this miniature Ghetto by noon on 10 May 1943.
The so-called library, situated outside the Ghetto, was put at their
disposal for temporary storage of their raw materials, etc.
The sum total of Jews caught so far rises to 47,068. The Polish Police
take pains to deliver to my office every Jew who turns up within the
city, because they are eager to win such premiums as have been paid in
earlier cases. The undersigned received some anonymous letters in which
he was notified of the fact that some Jews are staying in the Aryan
part of the city. One anonymous letter draws a parallel between Katyn
and the large-scale action within the Ghetto.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/101
Engineering Em. Service 1/6
Security Police 2/14
Engineers 3/72
Waffen SS 10/500
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 2/87 1/11
Waffen SS 25 1/300
Trawniki 200 --
Polish Police 1/180 1/180
Our losses:
1 Policeman dead
1 Policeman seriously wounded
1 SS Unterscharfuehrer less seriously wounded
Termination of operation: 2100 hours. Will be continued on 7 May 1943,
0930 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 7 May 1943.
_Ref. Nr._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal Nr. 616/43 secret
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
_To_: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 7 May 1943, start 1000 hrs.
The combing-out parties today obtained the following results: 49
dug-outs discovered. Part of the Jews were caught. A considerable, not
ascertainable, number of Jews who refused to leave the dug-outs and
offered armed resistance were destroyed when the dug-outs were blown
up. Altogether 1,019 Jews were caught alive today, 255 shot. The sum
total of Jews caught so far rises to 48,342. Today we again encountered
armed resistance in several cases, whereby we lost 1 SS man (wounded).
We captured 4 pistols of various calibers and some stores of ammunition.
The location of the dug-out used by the so-called select "Party
Directorate" is now known. It is to be forced open tomorrow. The
Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air, since it is
unbearable to stay permanently within the dug-outs owing to the long
duration of the operation. On the average the raiding parties shoot
30 to 50 Jews each night. From these statements it was to be inferred
that a considerable number of Jews are still underground in the Ghetto.
Today we blew up a concrete building which we had not been able to
destroy by fire. In this operation we learned that the blowing up of
a building is a very lengthy process and takes an enormous amount of
explosives. The best and only method for destroying the Jews therefore
still remains the setting of fires.
Our strength: as on the preceding day.
Our losses: 1 Waffen-SS man wounded.
Termination of operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 8 May 1943
1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy;
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 8 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 624/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of operation on 8 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
The whole former Ghetto was searched today by raiding parties for
the remaining dug-outs and Jews. As reported some days a number of
subhumans, bandits, and terrorists still remain in the dug-outs, where
heat has become intolerable by reason of the fires. These creatures
know only too well that their only choice is between remaining in
hiding as long as possible or coming to the surface and trying to wound
or kill off the men of the Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht who keep up
the pressure against them.
We continued today the operation against the dug-out of the so-called
select "Party Directorate" which we had discovered yesterday, as
reported in my teletype message yesterday. We succeeded in forcing
open the dug-out of the Party Directorate and in catching about 60
heavily armed bandits. We succeeded in catching and liquidating Deputy
Leader of the Jewish Military Organization "ZWZ" and his so-called
Chief of Staff. There were about 200 Jews in this dug-out, of whom
60 were caught and 140 were destroyed, partly owing to the strong
effect of smoke-candles, and partly owing to heavy explosive charges
which were laid in several places. The Jews whom we caught had already
reported that innumerable Jews had been killed by the effect of the
smoke-candles. The fight of the first six days was hard, but now we are
able to state that we are catching those Jews and Jewesses who were
the ringleaders in those days. Every time a dug-out is forced open,
the Jews in it offer resistance with the arms at their disposal, light
machine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. Today we again caught quite
a number of Jewesses who carried loaded pistols in their bloomers,
with the safety catch released. Some depositions speak of 3 to 4,000
Jews who still remain in underground holes, sewers, and dug-outs. The
undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale operation
until the last Jew has been destroyed.
A total of 1,091 Jews were caught today in dug-outs; about 280 Jews
were shot in battle, innumerable Jews were destroyed in the 43
dug-outs which were blown up. The sum total of Jews caught has risen to
49,712. Those buildings which had not yet been destroyed by fire, were
set on fire today and we discovered that a few Jews were still hiding
somewhere within the walls or in the staircases.
Our strength:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/101
Engineering Em Service 1/6
Security Police 2/14
Engineers 3/69
Waffen SS 13/527
Cordoning forces:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 1/87 1/36
Waffen SS ---- 1/300
Trawniki 160 ----
Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses:
2 Waffen SS dead
2 Waffen SS wounded
1 Engineer wounded
A policeman wounded on 7 May 1943 died today from wounds. We captured
about 15 to 20 pistols of various calibers, considerable stores of
ammunition for pistols and rifles, moreover a number of hand grenades,
made in the former armament factories.
Termination of action: 2130 hours, will be continued on 9 May 1943 1000
hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 9 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr 1607 Journal No. 625/43.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 9 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
The operation carried out today had the following result: The raiding
parties at work today discovered 42 dug-outs. From these dug-outs we
pulled out alive 1,037 Jews and bandits. In battle 319 bandits and
Jews were shot, moreover an uncertain number were destroyed when the
dug-outs were blown up. The block of buildings which formerly contained
the "Transavia" concern was destroyed by fire; in this operation we
again caught a number of Jews, although this block had been combed
through several times.
Again we captured some pistols and hand grenades.
Our strength:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/103
Security Police 2/12
Engineers 3/67
Waffen SS 13/547
Cordoning Forces:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 1/87 1/36
Waffen SS ---- 1/300
Trawniki 160 ----
Polish Police 1/160 1/160
_Our losses_: None.
The total of Jews caught up to date has risen to 51,313. Outside the
former Ghetto 254 Jews and bandits were shot.
Termination of operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 10 May 1943,
1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw,
Warsaw, 10 May, 1943.
_Ref. Nr._ I ab St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 627/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale action on 10 May 1943 start 1000 hrs.
Today raiding parties again combed out the area of the former Ghetto.
As on preceding days we again pulled out of the dug-outs, against all
expectations, a considerable number of Jews. The resistance offered by
the Jews had not weakened today. In contrast to the previous days, it
seems that those members of the main body of the Jewish battle group
who are still in existence and have not been destroyed have retired
into the ruins still within their reach, with the intention of firing
from there against our men and inflicting casualties.
Today we caught a total of 1,183 Jews alive, 187 bandits and Jews
were shot. Again a not ascertainable number of Jews and bandits were
destroyed in the blown-up dug-outs. The total of Jews caught up to date
has risen to 52,693.
Today at 0900 hours a truck drove up to a certain sewer in the
so-called Prosta. Someone in the truck exploded two hand grenades,
which was the signal for the bandits who were standing ready in the
sewer to climb out of it. The bandits and Jews--there are always
some Polish bandits among them--armed with carbines, small arms, and
one machine gun, climbed into the truck and drove away in an unknown
direction. The last man of the gang, who stood sentry in the sewer
and had the duty of closing the sewer lid, was captured. It is he who
gave the above information. He testified that most of the members
of the gang, which had been divided into several battle groups, had
either been killed in battle or had committed suicide because they
had realized the futility of continuing the fight. The search for the
truck, which was ordered at once, had no results. The bandits testified
further that the Prosta is now the refuge for the still existing Jews
because the Ghetto has become too hot for them. For this reason, I
resolved to deal with the Prosta in the same manner as with the Ghetto,
and to destroy this miniature Ghetto.
Today, we again captured small arms and some ammunition. The Security
Police yesterday succeeded in capturing a workshop outside the Ghetto
which manufactured 10,000 to 11,000 explosive charges and other
ammunition.
Our strength: as on the preceding day.
Our losses: 3 SS men wounded.
Owing to the excellent understanding between us and the Wehrmacht, the
detachment of Engineers was reinforced. Moreover, a considerable amount
of explosives was put at our disposal.
Termination of operation: 2200 hours. Will be continued on 11 May 1943,
0930 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 11 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07 Journal No. 629/43 secret.
_Re_: Ghetto large-scale Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 11 May 1943, start 0930 hours.
The scouting parties sent out last night again reported that there must
still be some Jews within the dug-outs, since some Jews were seen in
the ruined streets. The scouting parties shot 12 Jews. On the basis of
these reports, today I again formed raiding parties who in combing-out
operations discovered, captured, and destroyed a total of 47 dug-outs.
Today again we caught some Jews who had taken refuge in ruins which
were still protected by a roof. The Jews and bandits are still seeking
this new refuge, because staying in the dug-outs has become unbearable.
One dug-out was discovered which contained about 12 rooms equipped with
plumbing, running water, and separate bathrooms for men and women.
Considerable amounts of food were captured or secured, in order to make
it more and more difficult for them to get necessary food.
A total of 931 Jews and bandits were caught. 53 bandits were shot. More
of them perished when dug-outs were blown up and when a small block of
buildings was destroyed by fire. The total of Jews caught up to date
has risen to 53,667. We captured several pistols, hand grenades, and
ammunition.
We have not been able to smoke out the sewers systematically once more,
since we are short of smoke-candles. "OFK" is ready to provide new
smoke-candles.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German Police 6/126
Engineering Em. Service 1/6
Security Police 2/14
Engineers 4/76
Waffen SS 12/308
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 1/112 1/86
Waffen SS ---- 1/130
Trawniki 160 ----
Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses: 1 SS man wounded.
Total of losses up to date: 71 wounded, 12 dead.
Termination of today's operation: 2145 hours, will be continued on 12
May 1943, 0930 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 12 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr--16 07--Journal No. 637/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 12 May 1943, start 0930 hours.
When the raiding parties combed out the area for remaining dug-outs in
which Jews were hiding, they succeeded in discovering 30 dug-outs. 663
Jews were pulled out of them and 133 Jews were shot. The sum total of
Jews caught has arisen to 54,463.
Furthermore today the units cordoning off the miniature Ghetto were
reinforced and destroyed by fire. Probably a considerable number of
Jews perished in the flames, no accurate information in this regard
could be obtained since the fire was still burning when darkness set
in. One concrete building in the Prosta, from which Jews had been
removed, was heavily damaged by blowing-up operations in order to make
it impossible for the bandits to use it as a base later.
It is noteworthy that the Poles, without having been warned, took
appropriate measures for protecting their window-panes, etc., before
the blowing-up started.
The transports of Jews leaving here will be directed to T.II beginning
today.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German police 5/126
Engineering Em. Service 1/6
Security Police 2/14
Engineers 4/74
Waffen SS 12/508
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 1/112 1/86
Waffen SS ---- 1/300
Trawniki 160 ----
Polish Police 1/160 1/160
_Our losses_: 1 Waffen SS man wounded.
Termination of today's operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 13
May 1943, 1000 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 13 May, 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/ St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 641/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 13 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
In combing out the Ghetto and the miniature Ghetto (Prosta) today we
found 234 Jews. 155 Jews were shot in battle. Today it became clear
that the Jews and bandits whom we are catching now belong to the
so-called battle groups. All of them are young fellows and females
between 18 and 25 years of age. When we captured one, a real skirmish
took place, in which the Jews not only fired from 08 pistols and Polish
Vis pistols, but also threw Polish "pineapple" hand grenades at the
Waffen-SS men. After part of the inmates of the dug-out had been caught
and were about to be searched, one of the females as quick as lightning
put her hand under her shirt, as many others had done, and fetched from
her bloomers a "pineapple" hand grenade, drew the safety-catch, threw
the grenade among the men who were searching her, and jumped quickly
to cover. It is only thanks to the presence of mind of the men that no
casualties ensued.
The few Jews and criminals still staying in the Ghetto have for the
last few days been using the hideouts they can still find among the
ruins, retiring at night into the dug-outs whose location is known to
them, to eat and get provisions for the next day. Lately we have been
unable to extract information on the whereabouts of further dug-outs
from the captured Jews. The remainder of the inmates of that dug-out
where the skirmish took place were destroyed by using heavier explosive
charges. From a Wehrmacht concern we evacuated 327 Jews today. The Jews
we catch now are sent to T.II.
The total of Jews caught has risen to 55,179.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German police 4/182
Engineering Em. Service 1/6
Security Police 2/14
Engineers 4/74
Waffen SS 12/517
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 2/137 1/87
Waffen SS ---- 1/300
Trawniki 270 ----
Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses: 2 Waffen SS dead
3 Waffen SS wounded
1 Policeman wounded.
The 2 Waffen SS men lost their lives in the air attack against the
Ghetto.
33 dug-outs were discovered and destroyed. Booty: 6 pistols, 2 hand
grenades, and some explosive charges.
Termination of today's operation: 2100 hours, will be continued on 14
May 1943, 1000 hours.
My intention is to terminate the large-scale operation on 16 May 1943
and to turn all further measures over to Police battalion III/23.
Unless ordered otherwise, I am going to submit to the conference of SS
and Policefuehrers a detailed report of the operation, including an
appendix containing photos.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 14 May 1943.
_Ref. No._ I ab/St/G 16 07 Journal No. 646/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 14 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
The raiding parties formed today went to work within the areas allotted
to each of them under orders to force open further dwelling dug-outs
and to catch the Jews. In this way a considerable number of bandits
and Jews were caught, especially as some traces had been discovered
during the night which were now followed up with good results. The
night patrols clashed with armed bandits several times. These bandits
fired a machine gun and small arms. In this operation we had four
casualties--3 Waffen-SS men and 1 Policeman. Repeatedly, shots were
fired from the Aryan part against the external barricade. In the
skirmishes about 30 bandits were shot and 9 Jews and bandits, members
of an armed gang, were captured. One dug-out was taken during the
night, the Jews captured, and some pistols, among them one of 12-mm
caliber, were captured. In one dug-out inhabited by 100 persons, we
were able to capture 2 rifles, 16 pistols, some hand grenades and
incendiary appliances. Of the bandits who resisted, some again wore
German military uniform, German steel helmets and "knobeloecher." Apart
from the carbines, we captured 60 rounds of German rifle ammunition.
One raiding party had a skirmish with a gang, 10 to 14 strong, on the
roofs of a block of buildings at the border of the Ghetto (Aryan part).
The bandits were destroyed; we suffered no losses.
The captured bandits repeatedly testify that still not all persons in
the Ghetto have been caught. They confidently expect that the action
will soon be over, and that they will then be able to continue to
live in the Ghetto. Several bandits stated that they had long been in
a position to kill off the leader of the action, the "General," as
they call him, but that they would not do so, since they had orders
to that effect to avoid the risk of a further intensification of the
anti-Jewish measures.
Today again some concrete buildings in which the bandits find refuge
time and again were blown up by the engineers.
In order to force the bandits in the sewers to come to the surface,
183 sewer entrances were opened at 1500 hours, and smoke-candles were
lowered into them at an ordered x-time, thereupon the bandits, seeking
escape from what they supposed to be poison gas, crowded together in
the center of the former Ghetto, and we were able to pull them out of
the sewer entrances there.
I shall come to a decision after tomorrow's operations regarding
termination of the action.
Today SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of Waffen-SS von Horff
was present during the operations.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/184
Engineering Em. Serv. 1/6
Security Police 2/16
Engineers 4/73
Waffen-SS 12/510
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 2/138 1/87
Waffen SS ---- 1/300
Trawniki 270 ----
Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses: 5 wounded, 4 Waffen SS, 1 Police
A total of 398 Jews were caught today, furthermore 154 Jews and bandits
were shot in battle. The total of the Jews caught has risen to 55,731.
Booty: rifles, pistols, and ammunition. Further, a number of
incendiary bottles (Molotov cocktails).
Termination of action: 2155 hours, will be continued on 15 May 1943
0900 hours.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, May 15th 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab/St/Gr 16 07 Journal No. 648/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 15 April 1943. Start 0900 hours.
The 5 scouting parties who patrolled the Ghetto last night reported
that they encountered Jews only sporadically. In contrast to the
preceding nights, they were able to shoot 6 or 7 Jews. The combing-out
actions today also had little result. 29 more dug-outs were discovered,
but part of them were no longer inhabited. A total of 87 Jews were
caught today and 67 bandits and Jews were shot in battle. In a skirmish
which developed around noon, and in which the bandits again resisted
by using Molotov cocktails, pistols, and home-made hand grenades,
the gang was destroyed; but subsequently a policeman was wounded by
a shot through the right thigh. A special unit once more searched
the last block of buildings which was still intact in the Ghetto, and
subsequently destroyed it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all
other buildings on the Jewish cemetery were blown up or destroyed by
fire.
The sum total of Jews caught has risen to 55,885.
_Our strength_:
Used in operation:
German Police 4/184
Engineering Em. S. 1/6
Security Police 2/16
Engineers 4/74
Waffen-SS 12/510
_Cordoning forces_:
_Day_ _Night_
German Police 2/138 1/87
Waffen-SS ---- 1/300
Trawniki 270 ----
Polish Police 1/160 1/160
Our losses: 1 Policeman wounded.
We captured 4 pistols of larger calibers, 1 infernal machine with fuse,
10 kilograms of explosives, and a considerable amount of ammunition.
Termination of operation: 2130 hours. Will be continued on 16 May 1943,
1000 hours.
I will terminate the large-scale operation on 16 May 1943 at dusk, by
blowing up the Synagogue, which we did not succeed in accomplishing
today, and will subsequently charge Police Battalion III/23 with
continuing and completing the measures which are still necessary.
The SS and Police Fuehrer
in the District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, May 16th, 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 652/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
Progress of large-scale operation on 16 May 1943, start 1000 hours.
180 Jews, bandits, and subhumans were destroyed. The former Jewish
quarter of Warsaw is no longer in existence. The large-scale action was
terminated at 2015 hours by blowing up the Warsaw Synagogue.
The measures to be taken with regard to the established banned areas
were handed over to the commander of police battalion III/23, whom I
instructed carefully.
Total number of Jews dealt with 56,065, including both Jews caught and
Jews whose extermination can be proved.
No losses today.
I will submit a final report to the Conference of SS Police Fuehrer on
18 May 1943.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigade Fuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
Copy
Teletype message
From: The SS and Police Fuehrer in the District of Warsaw
Warsaw, 24 May 1943.
_Ref. No._: I ab-St/Gr 16 07 Journal Nr. 663/43 secret.
_Re_: Large-scale Ghetto Operation.
_Ref_: Your teletype message Nr. 946 of 21 May 1943.
To: The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and
General of Police _Krueger_--or deputy.
_Cracow_
I beg to reply to the above teletype message:
_No. 1_:
Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in the former
Ghetto during large-scale operation. 6,929 Jews were destroyed by
transporting them to T.II; the sum total of Jews destroyed is therefore
13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065 an estimated number of 5 to 6,000
Jews were destroyed by being blown up or by perishing in the flames.
_No. 2_:
A total of 631 dug-outs were destroyed.
_No. 3_ (_booty_):
7 Polish rifles, 1 Russian rifle, 1 German rifle.
59 pistols of various calibers.
Several 100 hand grenades, including Polish and home-made ones.
A few 100 incendiary bottles.
Home-made explosive charges.
Infernal machines with fuses.
Large amounts of explosives, ammunition for all calibers, including
machine-gun ammunition.
With regard to the bag of arms one must take into consideration that
in most cases we were not able to capture the arms themselves, since
the Jews and bandits before they were captured threw them away into
hideouts and holes which we could not discover or find. The smoke
which we had developed in the dug-outs also prevented our men from
discovering and capturing the arms. Since we had to blow up the
dug-outs at once we were not in a position to search for the arms later
on.
The hand grenades, explosive charges, and incendiary bottles captured
were used at once against the bandits.
Furthermore, we captured:
1,240 used uniform tunics (partly equipped with medal ribbons, Iron
Cross, and East Medal).
600 pairs of used trousers.
Pieces of equipment, and German steel helmets.
103 horses, 4 of them in the former Ghetto (hearse).
We counted up to 23 May 1943:
4.4 million Zloty. We captured moreover about 5 to 6 million Zloty,
not yet counted, a considerable amount of foreign currency, including--
$14,300 in paper.
$9,200 in gold.
Large amounts of valuables (rings, chains, watches etc.)
_No. 4_:
With the exception of 8 buildings (police barracks, hospital and
accommodations for working parties) the former Ghetto has been
completely destroyed. Where blowing-up was not carried out, only
partition walls are still standing. But the ruins still contain
enormous amounts of bricks and scrap material which could be used.
The SS and Police Fuehrer in the
District of Warsaw.
Signed: Stroop
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Majorgeneral of Police.
Certified copy:
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
* * * * *
_Pictorial report_
[Translator's note: captions of photos follow in order]
1. The building of the former Jewish Council.
2. Out of the factories.
3. Discussion of the evacuation of a factory.
4. The Jewish section chiefs of the armament factory Brauer.
5. Brauer Company!
6. Column marching to the railway station.
7. On the way to the transhipping place.
8. Search and interrogation.
9. Jewish Rabbis.
10. Jewish Rabbis.
11. A patrol.
12. Dregs of humanity.
13. Forcibly pulled out of dug-outs.
14. Just pulled out of a dug-out.
15. Just pulled out of a dug-out.
16. These bandits resisted by force of arms.
17. Bandits destroyed in battle.
18. A dug-out is opened.
19. Jewish traitors.
20. Bandits!
21. Smoking-out of the Jews and bandits.
22. A place which had been prepared for escape and jumping down.
23. Destruction of a block of buildings [2 photos].
24. Destruction of a block of buildings.
25. [no caption]
26. On the way to the transhipping place.
27. Jews are marched away.
28. On the way to the transhipping place.
29. Photos showing parts of so-called dwelling dug-outs.
30-33. [no caption]
34. Measures for covering a street.
35. They were found in underground dug-outs.
36. (1) These bandits are avoiding arrest by jumping down.
(2) Bandits after having jumped down.
37. The radio car of the command post.
38. Ascaris who were used in the operation.
39. The C.O. of the large-scale action.
40. This is how the former Ghetto looks after having been destroyed.
41-48. [no caption]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-A-PS
SECRET
Berlin 2 Jan 1941
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service
State Police Headquarters, Duesseldorf
15 Jan 1941
_IV C2 general Nr. 4685/40 g_ [rubber stamp]
To:
a. Reichs security headquarters (Distributor B).
b. All State police headquarters.
c. All commandants of the security police and security service.
_For the information of_:
d. All inspectors of the security police and security service.
e. The inspectors of the concentration camps (with 15 copies for the
camp commandants).
f. The commanders of the security police and security service in
Krakow and Prague.
_Subject_: Classification of the concentration camps.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German police has given his
approval to classify the concentration camps into various categories
which take into account the personality of the prisoner as well as the
degree of his danger to the State. Accordingly, the concentration camps
will be classified into the following categories:
_Category I_: For all prisoners with only little accusation and
definitely qualified for correction, also for special cases and
solitary confinement, the camps:
Dachau
Sachsenhausen
Auschwitz I
(The latter also applies in part to category II)
_Category Ia_: For all old prisoners and conditionally qualified for
work, who can still be used in the medicinal herb gardens, the camp:
Dachau
_Category II_: For prisoners with heavy accusations, but still
qualified for reeducation and correction, the camps:
Buchenwald
Flossenbuerg
Auschwitz II
_Category III_: For the heavily accused prisoners, at the same time
also for those who have been previously convicted for criminal
offences, for social prisoners that is to say, those who can hardly be
corrected, the camp: Mauthausen.
Not to be included in category Ia are old prisoners not qualified for
work and in need of medical treatment. They are therefore to remain in
the specifically provided sections for this purpose of the respective
concentration camp. More serious cases are to be transferred to the
hospital section of the concentration camp Sachsenhausen.
A regrouping of the prisoners within the camps according to the new
classification cannot be undertaken right now in view of the current
measures for the execution of the prisoner commitment. New dispositions
will be made, however, in accordance with the classification.
I ask therefore, that in the future, with the arrest warrant and
the transfer to a concentration camp, suggestions be made as to the
category of the prisoner with regard to his personality as well as the
degree of his danger to the State.
I therefore order that a complete record of the political life,
previous convictions for criminal offences and conduct of the prisoner
since the taking over of the power be established, and that request for
assignment into category III be specifically and carefully motivated.
This decree does not apply to the district and local police authorities.
[seal of the secret state police]
/s/ HEYDRICH
certified correct
/s/ BLEECK
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-B-PS
Headquarters of the Reichs Security Service
II C 3 Nr 5028/43-273-2 (General)
Berlin 26 July 1943
To the higher SS and Police Chiefs
the commanders of the security police and the security service
the inspectors of the security police and the security service
the deputy of the chiefs of the secret police and the security service
within the territory of the military commander in Belgium and northern
France in Brussels
the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppe B and D
For the information of:
the state police headquarters
the commandants of the security police and the security service
Reich's security main office--office IV
[seal]
State Police Hq Duesseldorf
16 Aug 1943
Subject: Organization of labor reformatory camps
The Reichsfuehrer SS has given his consent that besides concentration
camps, which come under the jurisdiction of the SS economical
administration main office, further labor reformatory camps may be
created for which the security police alone is competent. These labor
reformatory camps are dependent on the authorization of the Reichs
security main office, which can only be granted in case of emergency
(great number of foreign workers, etc.).
At the same time, the Reichsfuehrer SS has forbidden that prison camps
of all sorts (among others, enlarged police prisons, labor reformatory
camps, transient camps) be placed under the immediate jurisdiction of
the higher SS and police chiefs or the commanders and inspectors of the
security police and of the security service. He has ordered that those
camps come for administration and command under the jurisdiction of the
state police headquarters, commandants of the security police and the
security service or the immigration and transient agencies. Thus the
general supervision of the superior offices remains undisturbed by this
affiliation.
The decrees of 28.5.1941 and 12.12.1941 concerning the organization
of labor reformatory camps remain also in effect. For the General
Government and the occupied territories, reference is made to the
decree from 29.3.1943 II c 3 Nr. 5028/43273-2.
[seal of the Reichsleiter]
SS and chief /s/ Dr KALTENBRUNNER
of the German police Certified correct
in the Reichministry /s/ Riemer
of the Interior
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-D-PS
SECRET
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service
B. Nr. IV* 656/42 SECRET
Berlin 17 Dec 1942
_Secret To_:
All commanders of the security police and the security service
All inspectors of the security police and the security service
All commandants of the security police and the security service
All chiefs of the State police headquarters
_For the information of_:
The chief of the SS economic and administration headquarters, SS Lt
Gen Pohl
All higher SS and police chiefs
The inspectors of the concentration camps
For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here, the
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 14 December 1942,
has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at least 35,000
prisoners qualified for work, are to be sent to the concentration camps.
In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:
1. As of now (so far until 1 Feb. 1943) all eastern workers or such
foreign workers who have been fugitives, or who have broken contracts,
and who do not belong to allied, friendly or neutral States are to be
brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps. For
this, the most necessary formalities, as listed under N. 3 must be
observed.
In order to eliminate and to avoid complaints, each and every one of
these measures in the individual cases must be presented to third
authorities, by giving careful reasons, as being irremissible security
police measures.
2. The commanders and the commandants of the security police and the
security service, and the chiefs of the State police headquarters will
check immediately on the basis of a close and strict ruling.
_a._ the prisons.
_b._ the labor reformatory camps.
All prisoners qualified for work, if it is essentially and humanly
possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration
camp, according to the following instructions, for instance also if
penal procedures were to be established in the near future. Only such
prisoners who in the interest of investigation procedures are to remain
absolutely in solitary confinement can be left there.
_Every single laborer counts!_
The checking must be taken up at once. All withholding of prisoners
qualified for work is prohibited. My approval is required for
exceptions.
3. The prisoners who are committed to concentration camps till the
1 Feb 1943 will be seized under reference to this decree, solely
according to a list (present number, first and second name, place of
birth and date, residence, reason for arrest with short commentary).
One list will be sent to the Reichs security headquarters as a
collective request for both protective custody as well as for
commitment to a concentration camp, for which the confirmation can be
assumed.
In regards to eastern workers, that is to say for such workers who have
to wear the insignia "EAST", it is sufficient to give the total number
of the arrested.
One copy goes with the transport to the commander of the concentration
camp, and another copy remains with the authorities who are making the
commitment.
In order to facilitate the necessary exploitation, the lists are to be
made up on single pages and in such a way that enough space be left
between the data of the individual prisoners, so that the lists can be
cut out.
The lists are to be sent to the Reichs security headquarters, Referat
IV c 2.
By direction
signed: MUELLER
certified correct
[seal of the secret state police]
signed: HILLMUTH
Chief Secretary of Police
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-E-PS
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD)
_IV-C-2 General No. 656/42 g_
[Initials] B.R.
[Stamp] Bureau of State Police, Duesseldorf
Berlin, 25 June 1943
TO:
_a._ All commanders of the security police and the security service
_b._ All inspectors
_c._ All commandants
_d._ All chiefs of the directing office of the state police
_e._ All groups and sub-divisions [Referate] of Bureau IV of the
Reichs Central Office of Security
_For information purposes to_:
_f._ The chief of the SS central administrative office of economy, SS
Obergruppenfuehrer (Lt Gen) POHL
_g._ All higher SS and police chiefs
_h._ SS central administrative office of economy, office group
D--Concentration Camp--in Oraninburg (with 30 copies for the camps)
_i._ Referate II C3
Subject: Increased shipments to concentration camps.
Reference: My decrees of 17 Dec 1942--IV 656/42 g and of 23 March
1943--IV C 2, Gen No 656/42 g
The regulations for exceptions contained in the above mentioned
decrees, which achieved their intended goal, are hereby revoked
immediately.
The given directives have not been observed everywhere during the
execution of those shipments to concentration camps. Subjects of
allied, friendly or neutral states, as well as minors, have, for
instance in several cases, been committed to concentration camps in
spite of the strictest orders to the contrary. Their re-transfer will
lead to difficulties and cause an unnecessary, supplemental effort.
In order to prevent justified complaints, especially of a diplomatic
nature, I request to _check_ the shipments which have been carried out
_immediately_. Commitments contrary to the regulations must immediately
be reported, since the cases have already been classified according to
the general rules of protective custody, in every single case, and the
release or other dispositions of such prisoners effectuated as quickly
as possible.
This decree does not concern district and local police authorities.
By direction
signed: MUELLER
Stamp: Reichsfuehrer SS and
Chief of the German Police.
The Reichs Ministry of the
Interior
[Pencil note:] Duesseldorf
Certified:
signed: BLEECK [?]
Employee of the Chancellery
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1099-PS
The Commissar General for White Ruthenia
Minsk, 29 September 1941
To: The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Berlin W 35
Rauchstrasse 17/18
_Personal_
My dear Party Comrade Reichsleiter Rosenberg!
Only today, after extensive investigations, was I able to locate the
rest of the art treasures in Minsk and store them away in a safe place.
Minsk had a large, in part very valuable, collection of art treasures
and paintings which were removed almost in their entirety. On an order
of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Reichsleiter Heinrich Himmler, most of the
paintings, some still during my term of office, were packed by the SS
and shipped to the Reich. They are worth several millions of marks
and were all taken from the general district of White Ruthenia. The
paintings were supposedly sent to Linz and to Koenigsberg in East
Prussia. I beg to have these valuable collections, insofar as they are
not needed in the Reich, again placed at the disposal of the general
district of White Ruthenia, in any case, however, to have the money
value secured for the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
According to the report made by a Major of the 707th Division who today
handed the remaining treasures over to me, the SS has left the rest of
the paintings and works of art to the Wehrmacht for further pillaging,
including very valuable paintings and furniture from the 18th and 19th
centuries, vases, marble objects, clocks, etc. General Stubenrauch
has taken a valuable part from Minsk with him up to the front.
"Sonderfuehrer" whose names have not yet been reported to me, have
carried away furniture, paintings and art objects * * * in 3 trucks,
without giving a receipt. I shall ascertain which unit it was, in order
to carry out the punishment of those who have made themselves guilty
of looting. From the material that was left, local authorities of the
Wehrmacht and of the SS took away more art treasures and paintings
without my permission; those, however, may still be found in Minsk.
I request that the national socialist painter, Willi Springer, Berlin
SW 29, Hasenheide 94, be sent here to restore those paintings which
were in part thoughtlessly damaged by knife slashings, so that under
his supervision whatever can still be salvaged, should be salvaged.
Unfortunately, many valuable vases, china, cupboards, and period
furniture from the 18th and 19th centuries were also badly damaged
or destroyed. Altogether it is a question of irreplaceable valuables
worth millions of marks. I request that for the future the Ministry
for Eastern Affairs take action with the competent authorities of the
Wehrmacht so that such vandalism be stopped and that those responsible
to be threatened with the heaviest possible punishment and that such
punishment be inflicted if necessary.
The prehistoric museum also is in a completely devastated state.
Valuable precious and semiprecious stones were stolen from the
geological section. At the university, instruments worth hundreds
of thousands of marks were thoughtlessly destroyed or stolen. May I
suggest, my dear Reichsleiter, that you report these events to the
Fuehrer? White Ruthenia, already rather poor, has suffered a heavy loss
through these actions. I hope that specialists will be employed in
Leningrad, and in Moscow, as well as in the old cultural cities in the
Ukraine, to prevent occurrences of this kind; otherwise the civilian
administration shall find everywhere the same devastation as was found
here.
Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully,
(signed) Wilhelm KUBE
Commissar General for White Ruthenia
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1104-PS
The Personal Reviewer of the Permanent Deputy of the Minister of the
Reich
Berlin, 21 November 1941
_Bi/T Nr 58 A/41 Secret_
_To Dr. Marquart_
Enclosed herewith I transmit to you the copy of an incident regarding
the measures against the Jews in the general-district of Minsk, with
the request to submit the same to the Minister of the Reich.
On order of the Gauleiter I have sent one copy to Lieutenant General of
the SS, Heydrich, with the request for investigation of the incident.
signed: BIGENWALD
3 enclosures
* * * * *
Copy /T
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
Dept Gauleiter/Ka
Minsk, 1 November 1941
To the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories, Gauleiter
Hinrich Lohse, Riga
Today, money, valuables and other objects were deposited at the cashier
of my office against receipt, in the presence of Government Councillor
Dr. Idelberger of the Police Battalion 11. These matters were from
Sluzk and other regions which the Police Battalion 11 had included
in its action without my order and without my knowledge. All objects
and the money have been safely deposited by officials of Commissariat
General with the Reich Credit Institute [Reichskreditanstalt] and
are held at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner. Reserve officer
1st Lieutenant of the Police Brodeck attempted in the course of this
incident to purchase gold for private purposes in order to use it for a
personal affair, as witnessed by Government Councillor Dr. Idelberger,
my adjutant, SS-2nd Lt Wildenstein and myself.
I have immediately reported the case to the responsible field command
post at Minsk and requested the arrest of the police officer. 1st Lt
Brodeck was immediately set free by the investigating court martial
officer as the court martial officer did not find any basis for charges
in this incident. This is contrary to the legal conception of my
office. Any private dealing in gold is prohibited in the German Reich.
Aggravating in this case is furthermore the fact that an officer of the
same unit is involved which has effected the liquidation of the former
possessors of gold.
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
signed: KUBE
* * * * *
SECRET
Copy / T
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
Dept Gauleiter/Ka
Minsk, 1 November 1941
_Personal_
To the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories Gauleiter
Hinrich LOHSE Riga
Enclosed I submit a report of the Commissioner for the territory of
Sluzk, party member Carl, with the request not to let this matter rest.
Herewith I propose to prosecute the guilty officers commencing with the
battalion commander of the security police to the last lieutenant.
For about the last three weeks, I have discussed the Sluzk action
against the Jews with the responsible SS-Brigadier General and
Brigadier-General of the Protection Police, Zenner, Member of the
Reichstag, and I have pointed out that the tradesmen should be spared
by all means and that the commissioner responsible for the territory
should be contacted prior to the action. Above all, any act lowering
the prestige of the German Reich and its organizations in the eyes of
the White Ruthenian population should be avoided.
The police battalion No 11 from Kauen has as a unit, directly
subordinate to the armed forces, taken independent action without
informing me, the SS-Brigadier-General or any other office of the
Commissariat General, thereby impairing most seriously the prestige of
the German nation. I request to have the commissioner of the territory
Carl and all his officials and collaborators from Riga questioned under
oath and to record the hearing. Then, in order to set an example, I
request to grant my motion to prosecute the entire staff of officers of
the police battalion 11.
I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be
forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained
in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury seriously wounded
people alive who worked their way out of their graves again, is such
a base and filthy act that this incident as such should be reported
to the Fuehrer and Reich Marshal. The civil administration of White
Ruthenia makes very strenuous efforts to win the population over to
Germany in accordance with the instructions of the Fuehrer. These
efforts cannot be brought in harmony with the methods described herein.
The Commissioner General
for White Ruthenia
signed: KUBE
Enclosures
* * * * *
Riga 11 November 1941
_Original_ with two enclosures to the Reich minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories Berlin with the request for consideration. It is
deemed necessary that higher authority take immediate steps.
By order of
The Reich Commissioner for
the Eastern Territories
signed: WICHMANN
* * * * *
Copy/T of the copy
The Commissioner of the Territory of Sluzk
Sluzk, 30 October 1941
SECRET
To the Commissioner General Minsk
_Subject_: Action against Jews
Referring to the report made by phone on 27 October 1941 I now beg to
inform you in writing of the following:
On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o'clock a first lieutenant
of the police battalion No 11 from Kauen (Lithuania) appeared and
introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of
the security police. The first lieutenant explained that the police
battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of
all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. The battalion
commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of
which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here
and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first
lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the
commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in
Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion
commander took place according to my request. I first explained to
the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the
action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to
work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would
have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested
him to postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this with
the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all
towns and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these
two days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means.
I immediately protested violently against it, pointing out that a
liquidation of Jews must not be allowed to take place in an arbitrary
manner. I explained that a large part of the Jews still living in
the towns were tradesmen and families of tradesmen respectively. But
these Jewish tradesmen were not simply expendable because they were
indispensable for maintaining the economic life. Furthermore, I pointed
out that White Ruthenian tradesmen are so to say non-existent, that
therefore all vital plants had to be shut down all at once, if all Jews
would be liquidated. At the end of our conference, I mentioned that
all tradesmen and specialists, inasmuch as they were indispensable,
had papers of identification and that these should not be pulled out
of the factories. Furthermore, it was agreed that all Jews still
living in the town should first be brought into the ghetto in order to
segregate them, especially with regard to the families of tradesmen
which I did not want to have liquidated either. Two of my officials
should be assigned to segregate them. The commander did not in any
way contradict my idea and I had therefore the firm belief that the
action would be carried out accordingly. However, a few hours after the
beginning of the action the greatest difficulties already developed. I
noticed that the commander had not at all abided by our agreement. All
Jews without exception were taken out of the factories and shops and
deported in spite of our agreement. It is true that part of the Jews
was moved by way of the ghetto where many of them were processed and
still segregated by me, but a large part was loaded directly on trucks
and liquidated without further delay outside of the town. Shortly after
noon complaints came already from all sides that the factories could
not function any more because all Jewish tradesmen had been removed. As
the commander had proceeded on his way to Baranowitschi I got in touch
with the deputy commander, a captain, after searching a long time,
and demanded to stop the action immediately because my instructions
had been disregarded and the damage done so far with respect to the
economic life could not be repaired any more. The captain was greatly
surprised at my idea and stated that he had received orders from the
commander to clear the whole town of Jews without exception in the
same manner as they had done in other towns. This mopping up had to be
executed on political considerations and economic reasons had never
played a role anywhere. However, due to my energetic intervention, he
finally halted the action toward evening.
For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point
out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already on sadism.
The town itself offered a picture of horror during the action. With
indescribable brutality on the part of both the German police officers
and particularly the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, but
also among them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings
and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard
and in different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The
White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves from the
encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish people, among whom
were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a terribly barbarous way in the
face of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves
were also worked over with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no
question of an action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like
a revolution. I myself with all my officials have been in it without
interruption all day long in order to save what could yet be saved. In
several instances I literally had to expel with drawn pistol the German
police officials as well as the Lithuanian partisans from the shops.
My own police was employed for the same mission but had often to leave
the streets on account of the wild shooting in order to avoid being
shot themselves. The whole picture was generally more than ghastly. In
the afternoon a great number of abandoned Panje carriages with horses
were standing in the streets so that I had to instruct the municipal
administration to take care of the vehicles immediately. Afterwards it
was ascertained that they were Jewish vehicles ordered by the armed
forces to move ammunition. The drivers had simply been taken off the
carriages and led away, and nobody had worried in the least about the
vehicles.
I was not present at the shooting before the town. Therefore I cannot
make a statement on its brutality. But it should suffice, if I point
out that persons shot have worked themselves out of their graves
some time after they had been covered. Regarding the economic damage
I want to state that the tannery has been affected worst of all. 26
experts worked there. Of them, fifteen of the best specialists alone
have been shot. Four more jumped from the truck during the transport
and escaped, while seven others were not apprehended after they fled.
The plant barely continues to operate today. Five wheelwrights worked
in the wheelwright shop. Four of them have been shot and the shop has
to keep going now with one wheelwright. Additional tradesmen such as
carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. are still missing. Up till now it was
impossible for me to obtain an exact survey. I have mentioned already
in the beginning, that the families of tradesmen should be spared too.
But now it seems that almost in all families some persons are missing.
Reports come in from all over, making it clear that in one family
the tradesman himself, in another family the wife and in the next
one again the children are missing. In that way, almost all families
have been broken up. It seems to be very doubtful whether under these
circumstances the remaining tradesmen will show any interest in their
work and produce accordingly, particularly as even today they are
running around with bloody and bruised faces due to the brutality. The
White Ruthenian people who had full confidence in us, are dumbfounded.
Though they are intimidated and don't dare to utter their free opinion,
one has already heard that they take the viewpoint that this day does
not add to the glory of Germany and that it will not be forgotten. I am
of the opinion that much has been destroyed through this action which
we have achieved during the last months and that it will take a long
time until we shall regain the confidence of the population which we
have lost.
In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out that the police
battalion has looted in an unheard of manner during the action, and
that not only in Jewish houses but just the same in those of the White
Ruthenians. Anything of use such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and
other valuables, has been taken away. On the basis of statements of
members of the armed forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in
public, on the street, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the
most brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a
Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles
to have her father released. This girl is said to have actually gone
everywhere in order to obtain the money.
Also within the ghetto, the different barracks which had been
nailed up by the civil administration and were furnished with Jewish
furniture, have been broken open and robbed. Even from the barracks
in which the unit was quartered, window frames and doors have been
forcibly removed and used for campfires. Although I had a discussion
with the adjutant of the commander on Tuesday morning concerning the
looting and he promised in the course of the discussion that none of
the policemen would enter the town any more, yet I was forced several
hours later to arrest two fully armed Lithuanian partisans because they
were apprehended looting. During the night from Tuesday to Wednesday
the battalion left the town in the direction of Baranowitschi.
Evidently, the people were only too glad when this report circulated in
the town.
So far the report. I shall come to Minsk in the immediate future, in
order to discuss the affair personally once again. At the present time,
I am not in a position to continue with the action against the Jews.
First, order has to be established again. I hope that I shall be able
to restore order as soon as possible and also to revive the economic
life despite the difficulties. Only, I beg you to grant me one request:
"In the future, keep this police battalion away from me by all means."
signed: CARL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1107-PS
SECRET
The Leader of Directorate Group, Cultural Missions
_P / 551a/44g_
Expert: Goepel
Berlin, 17 May 1944.
To the Chief of Operational Staff Politic [Fuehrungestabes Politik]
Inter-office Memorandum.
Subject: Bringing of Museum Objects and Works of Art from the Occupied
Eastern Territories into the Reich.
Information received concerning the bringing back of museum objects
and other works of art now public property in the occupied Eastern
Territories into the Reich has shown that the interests of the ministry
of the East, i.e., of the Reich in this matter are not being presented
with sufficient stress. There is no reason for leaving these museum
stocks, some of which are extremely valuable, in the hands of various
offices and authorities without establishing unmistakably the claim
of possession, i.e., the right of disposal of the Reich. The atrocity
propaganda of the enemy side has taken up this question at large and
has retained with it evident success in the incitement against Germany
in this and foreign countries.
Besides the department of archives in the Reich Ministry, the following
have brought back works of art from the occupied Eastern Districts
(place of deposit Troppau):
Reich Commissioner for Ukraine.
(East and West European Museum--place of deposit Kiew in the district
Reichau (Wehlau)).
(Museum Charkow--place of deposit Wildenhof near Zinten. Various
museums of the Ukraine--place of deposit--Troppau)
Reich Commissioner for the East.
(Stock of Museum Minsk--place of deposit Koenigsberg and Castle
Hochstedt/Donau)
Einsatzstab Rosenberg.
(Museum objects from the Ukraine--place of deposit Krakau)
Armed forces from various places.
(places of deposit unknown)
For political reasons I consider it important that the rights of
possession of the evacuated museums be kept up fully, respectively in
all cases where no owner is known, the right of possession of the Reich
is to be clarified. I, therefore, ask for approval of the following
measures:
1. A decree is to go to all offices involved according to which all
works of art of public property which have been brought back should be
put under direct control of the ministry of the East.
2. Action should be taken to inventory all returned objects of art and
have their art and material values determined.
3. The places of deposit of these objects of art seized in this way
are to be examined by experts and, if necessary the required measures
taken to secure these objects from air damage or other destruction. A
checking at regular intervals of the conditions and intactness of the
stocks should be made as is done at the places of deposit of the German
museums.
MS 18/5
[v.d. Milwe-Schroeden]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1109-PS
Draft Copy
Z.f.O.
Berlin, 17 June 1944.
SECRET
_Note_ for the Director of Operational Group [Fuehrungsgruppe] P-4,
Herrn v.d. Milwe-Schroeden, in the building
Concerning: Bolshevic Atrocity Propaganda. Case: Memoranda of the
Special Staff RR dated 15 April 1944.
1. _Evacuation of the Population._ The undersigned was in Kiev during
the whole of October 1943 until the beginning of November, shortly
before the occupation of the city by Soviet Russia. At the beginning
of October a part of the population had been evacuated especially in
the parts of the town by the Dnieper and the areas in question were
declared "battle zones". During October the population of the city
was further evacuated quarter by quarter. This evacuation took place
by order of the military authorities; it was, however, carried out by
the civil administration [Stadtkommandantur]. The trolley line and the
railway trains had already been put in readiness by the German civil
administration. Nonetheless, the greater proportion of the inhabitants
listened to the Soviet counter-propaganda, with the result that
they did not wish to abandon the city; they sought accommodation in
quarters still untouched by the evacuation or went off on foot to the
neighboring areas of the city. There was an uninterrupted stream of
homeless people wandering through the streets, with a few belongings.
Hardship was unavoidable as a result of the evacuation, but it was
still further increased by the passive resistance of the population.
Protection could not be set up in the evacuated sections of the city,
so there were very soon no locked doors. It was probably mainly
members of the local bands dressed in field gray, who are to be held
responsible for the plundering of empty dwellings, etc. At this time
much property belonging to museums and institutions was destroyed.
2. _The Removal of Cultural Property._ A great deal of material from
museums, archives, institutions and other cultural institutions was
taken out of and away from Kiev in the autumn of 1943, in the proper
way. These actions to safeguard the material were carried out by
the Special Purpose Staff RR as well as by the individual institute
directors etc. at the instigation of the Reich Commissar. At the
beginning a great deal of the evacuated property was taken only to the
rear areas; later on this material was forwarded to the Reich. When
the undersigned, towards the end of September, received the mission
from the cultural division of the Reich Commissar to take out of Kiev
the remaining cultural effects, the most worthwhile materials from the
cultural point of view had already been removed. During October some
40 carloads of cultural effects were sent to the Reich. In this case
it was chiefly a question of valuables which belonged to the research
institutions of the national Research Centre of the Ukraine. These
institutions are continuing their work at the present time in the Reich
and are being directed in such a manner that at a given moment they
can be brought back into the Ukraine. The cultural valuables which
could not be promptly safeguarded, were plundered. In this case, it was
always a question, however, of less valuable material, as the principal
valuables were taken away in accordance with orders.
In October 1943 factory, workshop etc. plants were taken out of Kiev
by order of the Reich Commissar. To what place they were removed I do
not know. At the time of the entry of Soviet Russia there was nothing
valuable in this respect left in the city.
[Signature] Dr. Ulmann
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1113-PS
Higher SS- and Police Leader for the East
2000/42 g
11 Jacobstr, Riga, November 6, 1942
SECRET
* * * * *
Final Report "Marshfever"
9. _Miciajewicze (p. 2479)_
9 Feb--9 Mar 1942
By motorized Gendarmery--patrols and a company from the 15th Latvian
Police Battalion. Seventy bandits shot. By carrying out these actions
the following successes were obtained:
_a._--49 bandit camps, pill-boxes and strong points, as well as several
villages in the swamp-areas which were used as hideouts were smoked out
and destroyed.
_b._--389 armed bandits shot in combat.
1274 suspicious persons sentenced and shot.
8350 Jews executed.
_c._--1217 persons evacuated.
_d._--3 anti-tank guns,
2 heavy machine guns,
3 light machine guns,
1 radio set (sender and receiver),
some radio equipment, rifles and small arms,
large amount of explosives and ammunition, hand grenades, Teller
mines, pieces of equipment and other material, as well as
1 truck, 1 passenger car,
80 panji-carts (peasant carts),
42 bicycles,
62 horses,
5 cows as well as food supplies have been captured.
Besides the above stated objects the enclosed 14 sketches were
found during actions against bands in the territory of Smolewicze
north-eastward of Minsk in a camp abandoned shortly before the two
bandits whose portraits are enclosed were recognized by comparison with
captured bandits and shot. One of them is the leader of the bandits, a
Bolshevist commissar.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1117-PS
The Reichs Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Headquarters, 1, May 1941
The battle against Jews, Freemasons and other affiliated forces of
opposite "Weltanschauung" is a foremost task of National Socialism
during the war.
I therefore welcome the decision of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to form
staffs in all occupied territories for the purpose of safeguarding all
research material and cultural goods of the above-mentioned groups, and
transporting them to Germany.
All party, State and Wehrmacht Services are therefore requested to
give all possible support and assistance to the Chief of Staff of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg's staffs, Reichshauptstellenleiter Party Comrade
Utikal, and his deputy DRK-Feldfuehrer Party Comrade von Beer, in the
discharge of their duties. The above-mentioned persons are requested to
report to us on their work, particularly on any difficulties that might
arise.
signed: GOERING.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1118-PS
To the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3
18 June 1942
U/Sz 1073/42 i
Dear Reich Marshal:
From your letter of 30 May 1942, I see that Oberfeldfuehrer von Behr
of the German Red Cross informed you of certain matters on which he
has not been able to report to me yet. I am pleased by the appreciation
which you express for my Einsatzstab for the occupied territories.
It is, for me, self-evident that the members of my Einsatzstab will
continue to be at your disposal as much as is at all possible.
Since the new M-action to secure Jewish house furnishings for the
establishment of the administration in the East, which is purely a
state measure, has been added to the former tasks of my Einsatzstab,
it has been necessary to undertake an organizational separation of
duty fields according to my party and state bureaus. In order that the
interests of the Einsatzstab may be protected within the framework of
the M-action, I have appointed Oberfeldfuehrer von Behr of the German
Red Cross, head of the bureau West of the Reich Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, while the party bureau of the Einsatzstab
Paris will be restaffed.
In consideration of the importance of the work of the Einsatzstab in
history and in order to relieve my fellow workers, I have directed
that in the interest of a correct documentary grasp of the securing of
art objects hitherto undertaken, all evidence on this subject will be
checked. This work is at present in progress.
Since in certain circles, as you write, the conjecture was expressed
that one of my bureaus would deal in art objects, I have ordered this
check. I have entrusted it to the head of my office for plastic art,
Bereichsleiter Scholz, and Abschnittsleiter von Ingram who wears the
Knight's Cross. Furthermore some time ago I explicitly approved the
measures of the chief of staff of my Einsatzstab, Stabsfuehrer party
member Utikal, that party member Dr. Lohse of the office of formative
art is at your disposal for your personal wishes. This will be managed
in the same way in the future. I should like to emphasize explicitly
that the new arrangement made in my bureaus in the West will in no way
prejudice your wishes, but that the gentlemen of my Einsatzstab are
at your disposal in the same way as before. I may ask you however, to
continue to further the work of my Einsatzstab in the same way as you
have done hitherto, which is so worthy of thanks. I ask you especially
to continue to give the chief of staff of my Einsatzstab, Reich office
leader [Reichsamtsleiter] Utikal, the opportunity to report to you
in especially important cases on the total work of the Einsatzstab.
I have instructed party member Utikal to give you a report on the
difficulties which have arisen in connection with the Fuehrer edict of
1 March 1942. It is so grotesque that difficulties should arise for my
Einsatzstab from this liberal Fuehrer edict, you should know about it
for curiosity's sake alone. If you could intercede for my Einsatzstab
in this connection, I would be very grateful to you in the interest of
the cause.
Since you have already deposited sums in a special account for the art
objects which you have acquired, I would be grateful for information as
to what use you had intended for the funds of this account. Please do
not take this question amiss or misinterpret it. I believe, however,
that we agree that the tasks of my Einsatzstab could and can be
carried out only on the basis of the fight of the NSDAP. Moreover, the
Reich Treasurer has liberally made available the means for carrying
out these tasks. Therefore I believe that we also agree that the art
objects secured from Jewish possessions must be considered sequestered
for the benefit of the NSDAP. In regard to the research material the
Fuehrer has already decided that the supply secured by the Einsatzstab
be dedicated to the Hohe Schule. It would be no more than right for
the great values of the secured art treasures to be transferred to
the NSDAP some day. Of course it remains up to the Fuehrer himself to
dispose of this matter. Since the NSDAP has financed the 20 year battle
against Jewry, however, such a settlement would no doubt be admissible.
I would be grateful to you if you could let me know your opinion on
this question some time, so that the corresponding suggestions can be
made to the Fuehrer at the proper time. Since the Reich Treasurer is
continually making considerable means available for my Einsatzstab, you
can understand that I am interested in clearing up this question.
As I have been informed there are good working connections with
various offices of your jurisdiction, especially in the work of the
Einsatzstab in the East. In the future I shall continue to see to it
that everything of importance for your field of activity reaches you.
I am enclosing a document from the work of my Einsatzstab in the East,
which may interest you, the personally written biography of the Russian
parachutist K. Kaitanow.
Heil Hitler
[no signature]
* * * * *
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Berlin W8, Leipziger Str. 3, 30 May 1942
[stamped] Ministerial Office, received
4 June 1942, No 01141
[partly illegible notation] * * * 4 June * * *
GR (2?) Utikal * * *
Dear party member Rosenberg:
Your Einsatzstab for the seizure of cultural goods in Paris has, I
believe, received the false repute of dealing in art goods itself. I
know the work of the Einsatzstab very well and must say that there
is no bureau which I can praise so unreservedly for its continued
work and initiative as this bureau with all its staff. I presumably
gave occasion for the repute of dealing in art goods, because I asked
several gentlemen who are especially well versed in the field, if
during their stay in Paris or France they should hear anywhere that
pictures or other art objects are to be put on the market by art
dealers or private individuals, to look at these things and let me
know whether there is anything of interest for me among them. Since
the latter has often been the case, I then asked the gentlemen to do
me a favor and acquire the things for me, for which purpose I placed a
warehouse at their disposal. Therefore, if some gentlemen were eager
to establish contact with art dealers, it was exclusively a personal
favor which was being done for me and which benefits the expansion
of my collection. Since many would-be purchasers are looking for art
objects in the occupied territory, I can imagine that they, perhaps
in ignorance of the situation, or perhaps out of jealousy, falsely
suspected the gentlemen of your Einsatzstab.
I feel obligated to offer you this explanation and to ask you that this
procedure may continue. On the other hand, I do support the work of
your Einsatzstab personally, wherever I can, and the fact that I was
able to aid the Einsatzstab through my agencies is responsible for a
large part of the seized cultural goods.
Greetings and Heil Hitler,
Your
[signed]: HERMANN GOERING
* * * * *
To the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich,
Prime Minister Hermann Goering
Berlin W9, Leipziger Platz 7
11 January 1943
Charlottenburg 2
Bismarckstrasse 1
Dear Party member Goering:
My most cordial congratulations on your 50th birthday.
On this occasion I think back to the first fighting years of our
movement, when I met you as a German officer at Adolf Hitler's. I think
of your unqualified efforts for the Fuehrer and the long years of
battle, which finally led our movement to victory. Please be assured
how well I believe I understand what you have accomplished for the
people and the Fuehrer, and I wish you further determined, unbroken
strength to hold on to the victorious conclusion of this decisive
battle for the Reich for the coming years.
I take the liberty of giving you, as a friend of the plastic art, a
Dutch painting as a little remembrance for your museum. It was painted
by Jacob Adriaensz Bellevois, comes from the 17th century, and is
called "Seascape".
Tomorrow I shall offer you my personal congratulations on your
anniversary.
Heil Hitler,
Yours respectfully,
[No signature]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1130-PS
Col. i.G. v. Altenstadt
OKH/Gen Qu Department War Administration
II/2120/43 secret
11 April 1943
Main Department I
Tgb No. I 784/43 secret Received 6 May 1943 Encl. 1
Dear Mr. Braeutigam:
Enclosed I am sending you for your personal information a report of a
speech which Gauleiter Reichkommissar Koch made in Kiev on 5 March
1943. May I ask you to regard this report as solely meant for yourself.
With best regards,
Heil Hitler!
Sincerely yours,
Altenstadt [signature]
N.R.
Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kinkelein [initialed] 8 May
The speech is known, isn't it? Yes.
[initials illegible]
1 enclosure.
File Koch.
* * * * *
Copy
High Command Army, Group B
O.Qu./VII (Mil. Govt.) B.B.Nr.83/43 secret.
Headquarters, 1 April 1943
SECRET
To the OKH/Gen Staff Army/Gen Qu Dept. War Administration (Admin.)
_Subject_: Treatment of the civilian population in the Ukraine.
Reference: OKW/Gen St d H/Gen Qu Obt.Kr.Verw(Qu 4) Nr. II/1736/43
secret of 23 March 1943.
Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Claassen participated in the meeting
of the NSDAP in Kiev on March 5, 1943 and gave a verbal report on
the contents of the Reich Commissar's speech. Other documents on the
contents of the speech are not available here.
I. On the _treatment of the population_ the Reich Commissar remarked in
the course of his speech in several places as follows:
1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just * * *
2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come to
spread bliss, I have come to help the Fuehrer. The population must
work, work, and work again * * * for some people are getting excited,
that the population may not get enough to eat. The population cannot
demand that. One has only to remember what our heroes were deprived of
in Stalingrad * * * We definitely did not come here to give out manna,
we have come here to create the basis for victory.
3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German
worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than
the population here * * *
II. Furthermore, the speech was primarily an appeal to all party
members stationed in the Reich Commissariat of the Ukraine, to conduct
themselves perfectly in every respect and in any situation. In this
connection the Reich Commissar said the following among other things:
1. * * * In the days of the crisis, one could differentiate between
three groups of people:
1. The group of those, that went about asking where one might be able
to buy another suitcase;
2. The group of slogan manufacturers with the main slogan: "One has to
wait and see."
3. The group of real National Socialists, who said: "Now of all times
we will not move an inch from here!"
With this third group we say: Whoever wallows in defeatism, who gripes,
will have trouble with this National Socialist community, gathered
here; he will get a slap in the face * * * We owe such conduct to the
front, which we would prefer to join if the Fuehrer would give us
permission * * * There is not a single place at the front, at which the
Russians could have forced us to retreat. The Russian has not been able
to force his will upon us * * *
* * * * *
2. * * * Nowdays, one often hears: "Had we," or "Were we." I only tell
these people one thing: Had one had more faith in Adolf Hitler and
had one taken a firmer grip at the sword, everything would have been
different * * *
3. * * * We have brought you, my fellow party members to the Ukraine as
personalities but not for the purpose that you should write your papers
as in a paper war. I have no objection if you want to get yourselves a
rubber stamp, say "Not important for the war." This stamp you can then
apply to those files which you consider superfluous or unnecessary for
these times. If your superiors do not understand this, tell them so. It
is not the question to build up staffs, but to decrease them. I have
reduced mine in Rowno from 800 to 250 staff members.
For the High Command of the Army Group B
Chief Quartermaster
Faehndrich
For correctness of copy:
[signature illegible]
Lt.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1138-PS
SECRET
(II 1 d 3000)
THE REICH COMMISSAR FOR EASTLAND
RIGA Riga, 13 August 1941
TO: The Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin W 35.
I beg to enclose an account of planned provisional directives for
treatment of Jews in the Reichskommissariat Ostland. [Translator's
note: Baltic States and White Russia.]
[Signed] BANSE [?]
To Department [Hauptabteilung] II with request for opinion.
(By order)
(Habs, 24 August)
(Gauleiter has taken cognizance)
(return to Dr. Runte)
(19 August 1941)
Enclosure:
(III a/13/ ei Grh)
[Translator's note: All lines enclosed in parentheses were added to the
original typewritten document in pencil or ink. There is also a slip
attached to the document, initialed by Dr. Runte, Gauleiter M. and R.]
* * * * *
Reich commissar for Eastland
Kommissariat Ostland, 13 Aug. 41
Habs 4 Sept.
SECRET!
Provisional directives on the treatment of Jews in the area of the
Reichs-Kommissariat Ostland.
My instructions in my address of 27 July 1941 in Kowno determine
the final settlement of the Jewish question in the area of the
Reichskommissariat Ostland.
Insofar as further measures are taken, especially by the Security
Police (SIPO), to carry out my oral instructions, they will not be
affected by the following _preliminary_ directives. It is merely the
job of these preliminary directives to assure these, and for such
length of time, minimum measures by the General or Regional Commissars,
where and for as long as further measures are not possible in the
direction of the final solution of the Jewish question.
I. _a._ For the time being only those Jews will be subject to these
directives who are citizens of the German Reich, the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia, of the former Republics of Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, of the USSR or of its component states, or stateless
Jews.
_b._ Other Jews of foreign nationality, others of mixed blood
and spouses of Jews who are not ready to share the fate of their
Jewish spouses are to be denied permission to leave the area of the
Reichskommissariat Ostland because it is a military area. They are
to be watched. In addition they can be subjected to the following
measures, among others: obligation to report daily, prohibition of
moving, or assignment to specific dwelling, prohibition of leaving the
municipal area limitations on circulation. In case of necessity they
are to be taken into police custody until further decisions can be made.
II. A Jew is, whoever descends from at least 3 grandparents who were
full Jews by race.
A Jew is also whoever descends from one or two grandparents who were
full Jews by race, if he
_a._ belongs or belonged to the Jewish denomination, or
_b._ on 20 June 1941 or later was _married_ to, or living in common-law
marriage with, a person who is Jewish within the purview of these
directives, or who now or in future enters into such a relationship.
III. In cases of doubt, the district (or municipal) Commissar decides,
according to his best judgment, who is a Jew within the purview of
these directives.
IV. General Commissars will immediately order the following measures,
as soon as or insofar as civil administration has been introduced in
their areas:
_a._ The Jews are to be listed, through imposition of the duty to
report, by name, sex, age, and address. Furthermore the rosters of
Jewish congregations, and the statements of trustworthy natives, will
serve as bases for their listing.
_b._ It will be decreed that Jews distinctively mark themselves by
prominently visible yellow hexagonal stars of at least 10 cm. in
diameter worn on the left side of the breast and in the center of the
back.
_c._ Jews are prohibited from:
1. Changing of their home town and their homes without permission of
the area (municipal) Commissar.
2. Use of sidewalks, public means of transportation (i.e., railroad,
streetcars, bus, steamer, horse-drawn taxis) and automobiles.
3. Use of public facilities and institutions serving the population
(resorts and bathing facilities, parks, meadows, playgrounds, and
athletic fields).
4. Attendance at theatres, movies, libraries, museums.
5. Attendance at schools of any type.
6. The possession of automobiles and radio sets.
7. Kosher slaughtering.
_d._ Jewish doctors and dentists may treat or advise only Jewish
patients. If Ghettos or camps are erected, they are to be distributed
among them for the care of their inmates. Jewish druggists are to be
permitted practice of their profession according to need, but only in
Ghettos or camps. Drug stores previously managed by Jews are to be
transferred to trusteeship of Aryan druggists.
Practice of their profession is prohibited to Jewish veterinarians.
_e._ Jews are to be forbidden exercise of the professions and
activities designated below:
1. Activity as attorney, notary-public or legal adviser.
2. Operation of banks, money-changing offices and pawn shops.
3. Activity as representative, agent, and intermediary.
4. Trade in real estate.
5. Migratory trade.
_f._ The following will be decreed for the handling of Jewish property:
1. _General._ The property of the Jewish population is to be
confiscated and secured. The previous Jewish legal owner, from the
moment of confiscation, is no longer authorized to dispose of his
property. Legal transactions which violate this prohibition are null
and void.
2. _Duty to report._ The entire property of the Jewish population
is to be reported. The deadline for reporting is determined by the
General or area Commissars. It is mandatory for anyone who owns or
stores Jewish property and anyone who, without being owner, proprietor
or custodian, legally or actually disposes of, or can dispose of,
Jewish property, to report it.
The duty to report not only applies to the legal Jewish owner, but
also to anyone who, for example, administers Jewish property, who has
taken it into safe-keeping or obtained it in any other manner.
The reporting must be done on a form according to the attached model.
The General Commissars regulate reporting procedure with regard to
local conditions and determine the officials to whom the reports are
to be submitted. The reports should be submitted, if possible, to the
area commissars. The area commissars are, however, empowered also
to be in charge of the giving out and the receiving of forms; this
applies also to government offices which are not supplied or equipped
by the civil administration. These offices are to forward the forms
handed in to the area Commissars.
3. _The duty of delivery._ Jewish property is to be delivered on
special demand. The demand can take place by general proclamation or
by order to definite individuals. The General Commissars order through
proclamation immediate delivery of the following articles:
_a._ Domestic and foreign currency.
_b._ Securities and financial records of every sort, (i.e., stocks,
promissory notes, exchange, debt records, bank and savings-bank books).
_c._ All articles of value (coined and uncoined gold and silver, other
precious metals, jewelry, precious stones, etc.).
Articles turned in are to be entered in a serially numbered receipt
book in two copies (carbon) according to the attached model. The
entries are to be signed for by the person delivering the article
and by the receiving office. The carbon copy of the entry is to be
transmitted immediately by the receiving office to the area Commissar.
The delivered articles are to be transmitted to the fund of the area
Commissar and to be safeguarded by the latter. A special order will be
issued on their utilization.
4. _On the Question of Subsistence_: The Jewish population is left with
the following:
_a._ that portion of their household articles necessary for scanty
subsistence (furniture, clothing and linen)
_b._ A daily amount of money 0.20 RM (2 Rubles) for each Jewish member
of the household, the amount of money for a month to be released in
advance.
V. The following further measures are to be emphatically striven for,
with due consideration for local and especially economic conditions:
_a._ Jews are to be cleaned out from the countryside.
_b._ The Jews are to be removed from all trade, especially from trade
with agricultural products and other food-stuffs.
_c._ The Jews are to be forbidden residence in resorts and spas, and
in localities that are economically, militarily, or spiritually of
importance.
_d._ Jews are to be concentrated, as much as feasible, in cities or in
sections of large cities, whose population is already predominantly
Jewish. Ghettos are to be established there, and the Jews are to be
prohibited from leaving these Ghettos. In the Ghettos they are to be
given only as much food as the rest of the population can do without,
but no more than suffices for scanty nourishment of the Ghetto inmates.
The same applies to supply with other consumer goods. The inmates of
the Ghetto regulate their internal conditions by self-administration
which is supervised respectively by the city, area Commissar or his
deputy. Jews can be assigned as police for internal order. They are
to be equipped with rubber truncheons or sticks at most and are to be
distinguished by the wearing of the white arm bands, with the yellow
Jewish Star on the right upper arm. For the external hermetic sealing
of the Ghettos, auxiliary police from among the natives are to be used
as much as is feasible. Permission from the area Commissar must be
obtained before anyone may enter the Ghetto.
_e._ Jews, capable of working, are to be drafted for forced labor
according to the need for work. The economic interests of natives
worthy of assistance must not be interfered with by Jewish forced
labor. Forced labor can be performed in working parties outside the
Ghettos or in the Ghettos, or, where Ghettos are not yet established;
also individually outside (i.e., in the work-shop of the Jew). Pay
need not correspond to work done; it need only correspond to the need
for scanty subsistance for the forced laborer and the non-employable
members of his family, taking due consideration to his present cash
holdings. (cf. IV f 4 b) Those private establishments and persons, for
whose account the forced labor is done, pay an appropriate fee to the
pay office of the area Commissar which, in turn, disburses pay to the
forced laborers. A special order will be issued for the accounting on
amounts of money received.
6. It is left up to the General Commissars to order measures mentioned
in par. 5 uniformly for their area or to turn over their promulgation
in detail to the Area Commissars. Likewise the General Commissars are
authorized to issue more detailed orders within the framework of this
policy or to authorize their area Commissars to do it.
DISTRIBUTION:
Reichskommissariat 12
Higher SS and Police leaders 20
General Commissar:
Estonia 10
Lithuania 10
Latvia 10
White Ruthenia 60
Surplus supply 28
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1141-PS
Copy
THE REICHMINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE REICH CHANCELLERY.
Rk 25018B BERLIN 17 September 1939.
TO: the President of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich [Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung] General Field Marshal
Goering. Through the Director of the Ministry, Marotzke.
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, through the Director in the Ministry,
Somler.
The Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration [Generalbevollmaechtigten
fuer die Reichsverwaltung] through State Secretary Stukkart.
The Plenipotentiary for Economy [Generalbevollmaechtigten fuer die
Wirtschaft] through the Director in the Ministry Sarnow.
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommandos
der Wehrmacht] through Colonel Gause.
Subject: Handling of matters submitted to the Council of ministers for
the Reich Defense.
Matters submitted to the Council of ministers for the Reich Defense
have heretofore been distributed only to the members of the Council. I
have been requested by some of the Reichministers who are not permanent
members of the Council to inform them of the drafts of decrees which
are being submitted to the Council, so as to enable them to check these
drafts from the point of view of their respective offices. I shall
follow this request so that all the Reichministers will in the future
be informed of the drafts of decrees which are to be acted upon by the
Council for the Reich Defense. I therefore request to add forty-five
additional copies of the drafts, as well as of the letters which
usually contain the arguments for the drafts, to the folders submitted
to the Council.
DR. LAMMERS.
* * * * *
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery.
Rk 25018B
BERLIN W 8, Voss St. 6, 17 September 1939
To the Reichsministers.
Following a request of the Reichsministers who are not permanent
members of the Council for the Reich Defense, I shall in the future
notify all Reichsministers of the drafts of decrees submitted here for
the decision of the Council for the Reich Defense. I therefore request
the Reichsministers who are not associated with the Plenipotentiary for
Reich Administration, the Plenipotentiary for Economy, or the Chief
of the High Command of the Armed Forces, and who therefore submit
their proposals directly to the Council for the Reich Defense, to add
forty-five copies to all papers directed to the Council, drafts as well
letters which usually contain arguments for the draft.
SIGNED: DR. LAMMERS.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1143-PS
VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER
Editor: Adolf Hitler
Central Organ of the National-Socialistic
German Labor-Party
Berlin Editor
Berlin W.9, Linkstrasse.
20 Oct. 32
Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, M.d.R.
_Munich 13._
Dear Alfred:
I am sending you enclosed a communication from the R.W.M. forwarded
to me by our confidential man [Vertrauensmann] which indeed is very
interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the
matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm.
This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not
inform even our own long friend. I am enclosing an additional copy for
Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess, by messenger, as I
do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read
somewhere.
With best regards.
Yours Amo.
* * * * *
AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION
Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to provide
for the case of the armament of the air force.
Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to
Colonel von Willberg (at present Commander of Breslau) who, retaining
his position in the Reichwehr, is going on leave of absence.
A. Organizing the pilots of civilian airlines in such a way as to
enable their transfer to the air force organization.
B. Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be
done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm
which is being turned over to Colonel Haenel, retired, all existing
organizations for sport flying are to be used for military flying.
Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by the
Stahlhelm directorate.
The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots MK 50 per hour
flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself
carries out the flight.
They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane between
flight organization proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10 to 20
to 20.
Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40).
We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying
associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be
achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the RWM, also the
NSDAP organizations.
My own note: Hereby the entire organization of military flying is being
turned over to the Stahlhelm.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1151-P-PS
TOP SECRET
Copy
SS Main Management and Administrative Office [WVHA]
Department D--Concentration Camp--
D I/1/ AZ: 14 f 13/Ot./U.
Secret Nr. 177/42
Oranienburg, 26 March 1942
[Stamp]
Concentration Camp Gross-Rosen
Entered 28 March 1942
_Subject_: Special Treatment 14 f 13
_Reference_: None
_Annex_: None
To the Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camps, Da., Sar., Bu.,
Mau., Flo., Neu., Aw., Gr.-Ro., Nie., Rav.,
It became known through a report of a Camp Commandant that 42 prisoners
out of 51 which were mustered out for the special treatment 14 f 13
"again became capable of work" after a period of time and therefore do
not have to be directed to the special treatment. From this it appears
that the selection of the prisoners will not be handled according to
given directives. Only those prisoners are allowed to be directed to
the examination commission who fulfill the given stipulations and who,
above all, are no longer capable of work.
In order to be able to fulfill the designated missions of the
concentration camps, the working capabilities of every prisoner must be
retained for the camp. The camp commandants of the concentration camps
are requested to especially make this their aim.
The Chief of the Central Office
Liebehenschel
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1156-PS
Appendix 6 21 March W
Chief of the Office for War Mobilization of Economy
[Wi Rue Amt]
Berlin, 20 March 1941
TOP SECRET
6 Copies 3rd Copy
Report
to Reich Marshall Goering on 19 March 1941
The following points were reported:
1. _Organization Barbarossa._ The Reich Marshall fully agrees to the
proposed organization.
The following to join the Ops. Staff: Koerner, Backe, Hanneken, Alpers
and Thomas.
Its management will be with the Office for War Mobilization of Economy.
The Reich Marshall attaches importance to the creation of a unified
organization. He agrees to direction of offices by officers, in
individual instances, particularly in the case of General Schubert.
_The Reich Marshall will talk personally to the Directors of the
Economy Inspectorates._ Hanneken is to name the best personnel in
Economy.
2. The directives worked out by the Wi for destructive measures to be
undertaken by the Luftwaffe in the "Fall Barbarossa" were agreed to by
the Reich Marshall. One copy was handed to Captain von Brauchitsch to
be forwarded to the General Staff of the Luftwaffe.
3. _Report on the India-rubber situation._ The Reich Marshall agrees
that from now on transportation of India-rubber shall be carried out
by ship using blockade runners, also utilizing the Japanese for these
purposes.
4. _Report on storage of fuels_ in Holland and security measures
against bombing attacks.
[in pencil] BDC--GOTHA--Old I
5. Report on the demands of the Ministry for Economy re the securing of
personnel for the main industry [Grundindustrie].
[Marginal notes in blue pencil: IV. Armament (Rue)]
The Reich Marshall is of the opinion that the most important people in
the factories stay and less important people must go to the front.
6. Report on differences between the Navy [Kriegsmarine] and Ministry
for Labor concerning the wage increase in Naval dockyards.
The Reich Marshall wishes that the measures proposed by Reichtrustee
should be carried out, will however still call a meeting on the problem
personally. [IV. Armament (Rue)]
7. The organizing of additional fire-guards because of increasing
danger from the air to factories important to war economy
[Wehrwirtschaftsbetriebe] is authorized. [Armament (Rue) III]
8. The Reich Marshall has already given his directives to the
Luftwaffe in the exports sphere [Auslandslieferungen] concerning the
Finnish deliveries. He wishes _delivery of a number of anti-aircraft
gun-batteries and some airplanes_. [Armament (Rue) II]
The Hungarian demands for search lights and listening devices shall be
negotiated once more with General [Generaloberst] Udet. [Economy (WI)]
9. The Reich Marshall is informed that a large number of foreigners
are still working in the fuel-production [Treibstoffbetriebe]. [III
Armament (Rue)]
He wishes that Poles, French and Russians disappear from the fuel and
buna factories and be replaced by other people. The Reich Minister for
Labor is to institute further action. [--enclosure--finished 21 March]
10. Report on the demands of Governor General Frank concerning Armed
Forces Factories [Wehrmachtsbetriebe] in Poland.
The Reich Marshall decides that purely Armed Forces Factories are to
belong to the Sections of the Armed Forces concerned, the factories
for raw material to the Reichworks. Appropriate directive shall be
submitted to him. [II Armament (Rue)]
11. Orientation of the Reich Marshall on the negotiations between
France and America with regard to fuel supplies to North Africa.
He is of the opinion that it is important to get the fuel to Africa, it
is unimportant which ships are used.
Colonel Spalcke informs the Reich Marshall of the orders which General
Antonescu has given to Germany, of the capacities of Rumania and of the
collaboration as regards fuel.
The Reich Marshall's opinion is that Rumania should supply at the most
20 divisions and that the point must be reached where supplies for
the Rumanian Army in Rumania should eventually be provided by Rumania
herself.
At the same time, Rumania must be fully utilized to provide means of
transportation and for the establishing of repair shops on a large
scale.
Concerning the collaboration as regards fuel with the Neubacher Office,
agreement must be reached first of all between the Four Year Plan, the
Ministry of Economy and the Office for War Mobilization of Economy.
The Reich Marshall was then further informed by me of the purchase
of trucks from France and of the negotiations in regard to the
India-rubber contract.
The Reichmarshall then demanded the following himself:
1. He wants to know if the dockyards in Rumania could be used for the
building of submarines. [Armament II (Rue)]
2. He wishes a report on the negotiations of the Ministry
for Communications [Verkehrsministerium] with regard to the
transit-difficulties with Russia. [Economy (Wi)]
Who has been the negotiator?
3. He wishes a report on how the whale-oil transports are forwarded
from Bordeaux and whose responsibility it is and furthermore, who is
responsible for the forwarding of fuel-transports, which are being
brought in as prizes by the Navy. [Food Ministry (Ern. Min.) Ro.]
1 Copy Office Chief
2 Copy Economy
_3 Copy Armament_
4 Copy Ro
5 Copy Colonel Jansen
6 Copy Draft
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1157-PS
TOP SECRET
Rue. I c. [Handwritten note:]
2nd Copy Kapitaen Zdd [?] has come back.
3rd destroyed 12 May [initials]
4th Copy to Maj. Gaedke. 16 May Ha.
4 Copies, 1st copy
[illegible notations]
_Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces
at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941_
I.
_Welcome_
Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational structure of the
economic sector of the action.
_Barbarossa--Oldenburg._
As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has
ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of
_all_ economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with
the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of
operations and in the areas under political administration.
The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general
staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office
[Chef Wi Rue Amt].
Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme
central authority in the area of the drive itself is the _Economic
Staff Oldenburg for special duties_ under the command of Major General
[Generalleutnant] Schubert.
His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:
5 economic inspectorates
23 economic commands and
12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within
the area of the economic commands.
These offices are used in the _military rear area_; the idea is that
in the territory of each Army Group, an economic inspectorate is to be
established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and
that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the
territory.
A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one
hand and the _battle area_ proper and the _rear area of the army_ on
the other hand. In the last two, economic matters are dealt with by the
IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison
officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command
of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the _battle
area_, he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and
recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery,
in particular tractors and means of production.
In the territory between the battle and the military rear area,
the _rear area of the Army_, group IV Econs at the various field
commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the
industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarter
commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the
country's resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic
exploitation.
While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates,
economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the
locality.
The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the
Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with military
industry, but comprises the _entire_ economic field. Consequently,
all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military
industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates,
economic commands etc.
This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual
offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to the economic
commands, requires a standard sub-division into three large groups, i.e.
_Group M_ dealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial
transport organization
_Group L_ which concerns itself with all questions of food and
agriculture, and
_Group W_ which is in charge of the entire field of trade and
industry, including raw materials and suppliers, further questions of
forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange
of commodities and manpower allocation.
Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and
Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field
of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken.
Before giving further details of the particulars of organization and
staffing of Group M, of which we have to take charge, here is a short
summary on the plans.
II.
_Local Sub-Division_
(Map already handed over) may entries explain code-names?
Of the 5 inspectorates, 4 have been established from the outset, while
the 5th remains in reserve for an assignment temporarily undecided.
{ Vilna
1. _Leningrad_ (_Holstein_) { Riga
with economic commands at { Reval
{ Leningrad
{ Murmansk
and sub-offices at { Wologda
{ Archangel
{ Minsk
2. _Moscow_ (_Saxony_) { Moscow
with economic commands at { Tula
{ Gorki
{ Briansk
and sub-offices at { Jaroslawl
{ Rybinsk
{ Lddz
{ Kiev
{ Kishinev
3. _Kiev_ (_Baden_) { Odessa
with economic commands at { Charkov
{ Knjepropetrovsk
{ Stalino
{ Rostov
{ Stalingrad
{ Sevastopol
and sub-offices at { Kerch
{ Voronesh
{ Kursk
Finally
4. _Baku_ (_Westphalia_) { Krasnodar
with economic commands at { Grozny
{ Tiflis
{ Baku
and a sub-office at Batum.
Besides the 5th inspectorate, with the code-name of Hesse, an economic
command (Borkum) and 2 sub-offices are held in reserve.
III.
The question is now how best to take into account local and technical
requirements in staffing the individual offices.
In the Economic Staff Oldenburg and in the economic inspectorates,
which in all essentials have the same organization, a differentiation
according to geographical points of view appears unnecessary, as in
each of the gigantic fields of activity every type of question arises
and therefore all departments must be staffed.
The gentlemen will therefore find in the strength reports, which are in
their hands, both in the Economic Staff Oldenburg and in all economic
inspectorates, after each C.O. and his personal assistant a _staff
group_, which in accordance with the scheme submitted to you contains:
the adjutants's office,
the office for the establishment of the authorities,
counter-intelligence,
signals and communications,
command of the staff quartermaster,
messing officer, and
interpreter.
In the same manner, _Group M_ is to be staffed uniformly with all
branches of the armed forces (army, navy, air, administration) and the
transport, technical, general and military supplies divisions. It is
impossible to effect any economics here.
_Economic commands_ also start from the common denominator of a normal
strength which is likewise submitted to you. It is however neither
necessary, nor desirable to fill it in all economic commands to the
full extent or in an equal measure; the decisive factors here are the
individual peculiarities of the various regions.
In all economic commands, the posts in the staff group, transport,
technical and general offices will have to be filled. But whether
the individual _branches of the armed forces_ wish to be represented
in the respective economic command will depend essentially on whether
the branch of the armed forces in question has any interests of any
significance to look after in the territory.
It must be borne in mind that the whole organization requires a
gigantic staff apparatus and that, in view of the general lack of
qualified personnel, only such posts can be filled as are justified by
practical necessity.
The branches of the armed forces will therefore have to decide in which
of the 23 economic commands they wish to be represented. To fill all 4
offices of army, navy, air and administration will be necessary only
in a few centrally situated spots. If on the other hand in some cases
_all_ branches of the armed forces require no representation, we would
substitute for the planned division into 4 parts, a joint office for
armament industry and staff it from the Office of Industrial Armament.
In the interests of speed--the establishment has to be completed by
the 15th May--we have to request the branches of the armed forces to
communicate their decision to the Office of Industrial Armament by
Friday 2nd May.
In order to prepare to a large extent and to facilitate this decision,
Captain (Cav.) Jonas, who has a profound knowledge in this field, has
compiled a list, on which after the name of each economic command he
has indicated by means of the initial of the branch of the armed forces
in question which of these branches is in his opinion likely * * *
represent * * * by an office.
The material has been submitted to you in the form of the lengthy
treatise R., in particular in the form of the economic map and the
list showing all firms which are important from the point of view of
industrial armaments. In order, however, to assist the gentlemen to
form their own opinion in the short time at our disposal, Captain (Cav)
Jonas will now illustrate the peculiarities of the different areas in
the field of industrial armament by means of a short lecture.
_Lecture Captain (Cav.) Jonas._
_Further Points to be discussed_
_a._ In the interests of staff economy, we want to staff some of the
above-mentioned authorities by enlisting personnel from authorities
already existing in occupied territories, e.g. the _Moscow Economic
Inspectorate_ is to be staffed by the armament industry office (Rue In
A) to be withdrawn from France.
_Murmansk Economic Command_ is to be staffed from _Norway_
_Moscow Economic Command_ by _Troppau Armament Command_
_Lodz Economic Command_ by _Radom Armament Command_
_Sevastopol Sub-Office_ by _Aarhus Sub-Office_.
Even though these units will have to be brought up to the required
strength and supplemented, their employment at least creates a basis
and thus effects a considerable economy in staff.
_b._ Which members of branches of the armed forces are already
earmarked for Rue VI?
_c._ In which economic commands are the commander or for instance the
head of the transport office to be appointed from the members of a
branch of the armed forces which has an overriding interest?
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1161-PS
Defense Economics--and--Armament Office [Wehrwirtschafts--und
Ruestungsamt]
Az. Stab I a Nr. 1134/40
Berlin, 31 May 1940
To Gen Qu (General Headquarters) through VO Major Dr. Just
I. In the enclosure is forwarded a map on which are marked the
boundaries for the economic teams anticipated in France. The
territorial distribution of economic teams has followed the same
principles as were used in the creation of the teams for Belgium and
Holland. The boundaries are established according to the economic
structure of the districts. In them are located individual industrial
concentrations which will be the main fields of work for the teams.
Since the whole area without exception had to be divided up the working
areas of the individual teams appear relatively large, however the
working power of the teams will not be visibly influenced thereby,
since only a few additions lie outside the industrial centers.
The boundaries are and must be established for the above named
reasons without regard to later commitment of main field commands
[Oberfeldkommandanturen] and/or sections of the AOK (Army High Command).
II. It is requested that the economic teams be instructed to send
their reports directly to Gen Qu and at the same time to Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht Wirtschaft Ruestungsamt. The purpose of the commitment
of the economic teams is the most rapid instruction of the OKW/Wi Rue
Amt concerning existing raw materials which must be brought--trainload
after trainload--to finishing plants in the occupied territories and
in the Reich, according to the requirements of manufacturing programs.
The experiences of the last three weeks have shown that the channels
prescribed for this purpose have entirely failed. So far, except for
a single message which reached the OKW directly, the OKW has received
no report from the economic teams. This situation must be changed as
quickly as possible by the forwards administrative posts, without
consideration of possible questions of competence but from the purest
material viewpoint, all the more as the life expectancy of the military
government in Belgium, as also that of Holland, may be of short
duration.
I.A.
signature
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1162-PS
ORDER
BY ORDER of the German Wehrmacht all men from 17 up to and including 40
years old must register for the Labour Service.
Immediately on receipt of this order ALL men within this age-group must
appear in the street with the required equipment.
All other inhabitants, women and children included, must stay in their
houses until the operation is completed. Men of the age mentioned above
who are found in their houses when they are searched, will be punished,
and their private possessions will be confiscated.
Identification cards from civilian or military authorities must be
brought along for inspection.
Those, who are in possession of such identification cards must also
appear in the street.
Warm clothing, strong shoes, blankets protection against rain,
eating-utensils, knife, fork and drinking cup and bread for one day
must be taken along. Persons who bring along their bicycles, which they
take with them, will be allowed to keep them.
THE DAILY COMPENSATION CONSISTS OF GOOD FOOD, TOBACCO AND FIVE GUILDERS.
THE RELATIVES LEFT BEHIND WILL BE LOOKED AFTER.
ALL INHABITANTS OF THE MUNICIPALITY ARE FORBIDDEN TO LEAVE THEIR
RESIDENCE.
THOSE WHO TRY TO ESCAPE OR TO RESIST WILL BE SHOT.
* * * * *
ANNOUNCEMENT
All male persons between the ages of 17 and 50, resident in the
township of Apeldoorn, must report on the 2nd October, 1944 at 9 a.m.
in the market place at Apeldoorn, in order to work for several days in
the Province of Gelderland.
They must bring with them a shovel or spade, also eating utensils,
spoon, fork, and a blanket.
Zutphen, 1st October, 1944.
The Plenipotentiary of the Reichs-Commissioner
for the Province of Gelderland.
Dr. SCHNEIDER.
* * * * *
OFFICIAL NOTICE
By order of the German Wehrmacht all men of the town of Amersfo between
the ages of 17 and 50 years must report today at 9 o'clock at the
Infantry Barracks for digging operations.
Release certificates from civil or military places of employment are to
be brought for scrutiny. They are not a release from the duty to report.
Return after the period of employment can be definitely guaranteed.
Men must bring: warm clothing, strong footwear, blankets, covering
against rain, eating utensils with spoon, knife and fork as well as
spades or shovels. Bicycles brought remain in the possession of the
owners.
Good food, smokes and 5 Gulden daily will be given!
Leaving the town is forbidden on principle.
The Delegate of the Reich Commissioner
for the Province of Utrecht:
MUELLER-REINERT.
* * * * *
NOTICE
By virtue of Section 1 of Order No. 42/1941 regarding conscription and
regarding the limitation of change in places of work within the scope
of Order No. 48/1942, and by virtue of special authorization, it is
decreed:
All male Dutch nationals and those without nationality born within the
years 1915 to 1928 inclusive, who have their domicile or permanent
residence in the Provinces of North Holland, South Holland and Utrecht,
are under labour obligation. The calling-up for labour duties will be
effected by special proclamation.
Until the calling-up for labour duties the above-mentioned persons
are obliged, without prejudice to the existing regulations regarding
change of place of work, to remain at their present place of work
and in their dwelling place or their present permanent domicile. All
labour necessary for the maintenance of public administration, as
well as for the continuance of installations and agricultural and
industrial undertakings, in which vital tasks are to be accomplished
or commissions of military importance are to be carried out, will
be reserved and not called-up for conscripted labour elsewhere. All
persons thus reserved will receive a generally valid reservation
certificate. It will render invalid all other reservation certificates
hitherto issued as such. When called-up for work, the maintenance of
those called-up as well as of their dependents will be provided for in
sufficient measure.
Whoever acts contrary to the stipulations of this Notice or of the
regulations issued for its execution, or tries to circumvent them will
be punished by imprisonment as per Section 4 of Order No. 42/ in as
much as a heavier punishment is not incurred in accordance with other
stipulations. Accessories before the fact, collaborators and assistants
incur the same punishment as the perpetrators themselves. Security
Police measures are held in reserve. Houses and places in which a
called-up man hides, will be sequestrated, together with their contents.
The regulations of this Notice come into force immediately.
The Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories.
The Plenipotentiary for total war effort.
LIESE.
The Hague, 14th December, 1944.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1163-PS
NOTICE!
I consider all inhabitants responsible for destruction or damage to
railroad installations, waterways with their installations, telephone
cables and Post Offices occurring within their districts.
The population of such communities may therefore expect reprisals in
the form of seizure of property and destruction of houses or groups of
houses.
I advise the communities to arrange for adequate protection of the
means of transportation and of communication in their districts, by
patrols or other effective means.
The Hague, 24 September 1944.
(Sd.) SEYSS-INQUART
The Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Netherlands Territories.
* * * * *
NOTICE.
The Superior SS and Police Chief gives notice that on 20 Nov 1944
Schutzgruppenmann Janssen and on 13 Dec 1944 the Senior Officer
Candidate Guse were shot in the back by criminal Netherlands elements.
Both were robbed of their pistols.
Independent of further investigation of the perpetrators, two houses
were blasted and 12 Netherlanders were executed at the place of one of
the crimes as reprisals.
The Hague, 16 Dec 1944
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1164-PS
SS Economic Administration Office
Official Group Chief D
Concentration Camp
DI/1/az.:14c9/Ot./U.
Secret Diary _63_/1942
Oranienburg, 21 April 1942
[Stamp]
Concentration Camp Gross-Rosen Kommandantur
Entered: 22 April 1942
SECRET
Secret Diary No. 243/42
Subject: Labor mobilization of clergy.
Reference: SS Economic Administration Office Ch.Po/IIa.
Enclosures: None
To: Camp Commandants of Concentration Camps Da., Sah., Bn., Man.,
Flo., Neu., Au. Gr.-Ros., Natz., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., PW Camp
Lublin.
Copy to: Chief of Office D II here.
The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered, that
the Polish and Lithuanian priests are to work fully, i.e., may be
summoned for all work. The German, Dutch, Norwegian Clergymen, etc.
are to be employed in future as previously only in the medicinal herb
gardens.
The execution of this order is to be reported here.
By direction
(signed) Liebenhenschell
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1165-PS
SECRET
Concentration Camp Gross Rosen
Office of the Commandant
Gro.Ro./Az.: KL.14f I/10.41/Su/Wa
Geh.Tgb.Nr. 117/41
Gross Rosen, 23 October 1941
Subject: Execution of Russian PWs
Reference: Oral conference with SS Major General Mueller, Gestapo,
Berlin
Annexes:--1--
To: Major General Mueller Berlin, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse
The commandant's office of the concentration camp Gross Rosen submits
in the annex a list of the Russian PWs who were executed on 22 October
1941 from 1700-1800 and who were subsequently cremated. The inspector
of the concentration camp Oranienburg was separately notified from this
station.
The Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camp Gross Rosen
[initials illegible]
SS Lt Colonel
* * * * *
LIST
Gross Rosen
List of the PWs who are to report on 22 October 1941 for transportation
from the "S" Camp.
---------+--------+----------------------+----------
Current | Stalag | |
No. | No. | |
---------+--------+----------------------+----------
1 | 45860 | Nikolai Troitzki | 1/2/21
2 | 45861 | Konstantin Marfenkow | 6/5/22
3 | 45862 | Wassili Mainko | 23/3/20
4 | 45863 | Wladimir Warnaschin | 24/7/19
5 | 45864 | Nikolai Pankratow | 23/8/20
6 | 45865 | Pietr Gorelow | 8/6/21
7 | 45866 | Jefgeni Pianitzki | 18/3/19
8 | 45867 | Georgi Koschuchowski | 10/7/16
9 | 45868 | Alexander Konowalow | 3/9/20
10 | 45869 | Alexander Ibriganow | 1/4/07
11 | 45870 | Michael Ignatow | 20/9/09
12 | 45871 | Jakow Jakolow | 21/7/16
13 | 45872 | Jakow Barsukow | 22/11/05
14 | 45873 | Georg Wirkejenke | 19/4/13
15 | 45874 | Nioklai Ibrielow | 3/5/15
16 | 45875 | Wladimir Aleschkow | 19/4/20
17 | 45876 | Iwan Korolow | 14/6/11
18 | 45877 | Apolon Dimentzow | 18/3/18
19 | 45878 | Wassili Kirisanow | 14/1/10
20 | 45879 | Alexi Merkulow | 11/4/15
---------+--------+----------------------+----------
Neuhammer, 22 October 1941
True copy
signed: THIELE
* * * * *
The Chief of the SIPO and the SD B Nr 2009 B/41g - IV A I c
Berlin, 9 November 1941
SECRET
SPECIAL DELIVERY
Subject: Transportation of the Russian PWs, destined for execution,
into the concentration camps
Previous correspondence: None
Annexes: * * * Annexes
The commandants of the concentration camps are complaining that 5 to
10% of the Soviet Russians destined for execution are arriving in the
camps dead or half dead. Therefore the impression has arisen that the
Stalags are getting rid of such prisoners in this way.
It was particularly noted that, when marching, for example from the
railroad station to the camp, a rather large number of PWs collapsed on
the way from exhaustion, either dead or half dead, and had to be picked
up by a truck following the convoy.
It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of these
occurrences.
Even if the transportation to the camps is generally taken care of by
the Wehrmacht, the population will still attribute this situation to
the SS.
In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the future,
I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet Russians,
declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by death (for example
with typhus) and who therefore would not be able to withstand the
exertions of even a short march on foot, shall in the future, as a
matter of basic principle, be excluded from the transport into the
concentration camps for execution.
I request that the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos be correspondingly
informed of this decision without delay.
_Distribution_:
All offices of the State Police
To the CO of the SIPO and the SD Metz
To the CO of the SIPO and the SD Strassburg
_For the information of_:
The Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German police
The Chief of the SIPO and the SD
The Chiefs of Departments I to VII
Gruppenleiter IVD SS Lt Col Dr Weinmann
The higher SS and Police Chiefs--except in the Hague
The Inspectors of the SIPO and the SD
The Commanders in Chief of the SIPO and the SD--except
in Metz and Strassburg
The Commanders of the SIPO and the SD
The Inspectors of the concentration camps
All commandants of the concentration camps
For:
signed: MUELLER
Certified:
signed: L. WOLFERT
Office Girl
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1166-PS
TOP SECRET
Oranienburg, 15 August 1944
SS--Economic--Administration Department
Section D--Concentration Camps--
DIV--189--8.44--Ru./Schm.
_Diary No. 199/44 Secret_
_Subject_: Report of the number of prisoners and Survey of prisoners
clothing type "G" and "Z" and the supply of "G" available.
_Reference_: Telephone call by SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Waschkau on 15.8.44.
To: Chief of Section B, SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant-General of
the Waffen-SS Loerner
_Berlin--Lichterfelde/West Unter den Eichen 126-135_
With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am sending
herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners for 1.8.1944 and of
the new arrivals already announced, as well as the clothing report for
15.8.44.
(1) The actual number on 1.8.44, consisted of:
_a._ male prisoners 379 167
_b._ female prisoners 145 119
In addition, there are the following new arrivals:
1. from the Hungary program (anti-Jewish action) 90 000
2. from Litzmannstadt (Police prison and Ghetto) 60 000
3. Poles from the General Government 15 000
4. Convicts from the Eastern Territories 10 000
5. former Polish officers 17 000
6. from Warsaw (Poles) 400 000
7. continued arrivals from France approx. 15000 20 000
Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be received into
the Concentration Camps within the next few days.
(2) Survey of clothing for male prisoners in the possession of the
prisoners or the Concentration Camp.
-----------------------------+------------+------------+------------------
| | |Supply of clothing
| | |held by Section D
|a. |b. |in Sachsenhausen
|"G" clothing|"Z" clothing|and Buchenwald
-----------------------------+------------+------------+------------------
Cloth jackets | 232 024 | 168 987 | 70 509
Cloth trousers | 184 338 | 121 581 | 72 220
Cloth coats | 162 809 | 102 657 | 19 990
Cloth caps | 257 509 | 65 669 | 27 610
Drill jackets | 229 840 | - | 2 930
Drill trousers | 243 366 | - | 6 865
Shirts | 358 871 | 331 467 | 5 500
Underpants | 457 232 | 167 022 | 1 000
Woolen waistcoats | 169 462 | 19 605 | 32 501
Material waistcoats | - | 38 847 | -
Socks | 328 041 | 9 517 | 174 186
Foot-bandages | 96 615 | - | 30 240
Short socks | 82 739 | - | 2 200
Ear protectors | 97 567 | 9 640 | 440
Balaclava helmets | | |
(Teufelshauben) | 47 845 | 12 000 | 206 220
Handkerchiefs | 20 941 | 77 205 | 17 000
Mittens | 74 570 | - | 145 400
Gloves | - | 9 177 | -
Knap-sacks--paper | 48 386 | - | -
Knap-sacks--material | 89 396 | - | -
Aprons | 6 267 | 4 796 | -
Working jackets | - | 2 602 | -
Working trousers | - | 2 594 | -
Working suits | - | 4 998 | -
Lace-shoes--leather | 47 406 | 16 979 | -
Lace-shoes with wooden soles | 243 128 | - | 977
Lace-shoes with buckles | | |
and wooden soles | 10 041 | - | 3 539
Wooden clogs | 119 259 | - | -
Boots, high (leather) | 2 192 | 3 233 | -
Hollaender | 13 520 | - | -
Body-belts | 9 788 | - | -
Woolen shawl | - | 9 770 | -
Boots with wooden soles | 389 | - | -
Half-shoes--leather | 1 635 | - | -
Bags for effects | 21 992 | - | -
-----------------------------+------------+------------+------------------
(3) Survey of the clothing for female prisoners in the possession of
the prisoners or the Concentration Camp.
----------------------------+------------+------------+-------------------
| | |Supply of clothing
| a. |b. |held by Section D
|"G" clothing|"Z" clothing|in Ravensbrueck
----------------------------+------------+------------+-------------------
Winter dresses |38 064 | - | 2 220
Summer dresses |55 638 | - | -
Dresses "Z" | - | 41 963 | -
Skirts "Z" | - | 34 796 | -
Blouses "Z" | - | 36 262 | -
Winter jackets |42 183 | - | 4 840
Coats "Z" | - | 32 802 | -
Shirts |35 418 |210 808 | 14 680
Night-dresses | 9 194 | 4 940 | -
Winter trousers |48 246 | - | 14 010
Summer trousers |35 781 | - | 6 690
Knickers | - | 79 687 | -
Petticoats |36 878 | 938 | 3 490
Women's jackets "Z" | - | 8 041 | -
Women's stockings |41 677 | 58 711 | 6 199
Suspender belts |13 676 | 3 322 | 2 622
Head scarves |32 270 | 60 643 | -
Woolen waistcoats | 2 066 | 74 808 | 13 290
Brassieres | - | 7620 | -
Bandages--paper |33 400 | - | 186 798
Bandages--material |64 041 | - | 9 755
Bandage-belts |23 826 | - | 807
Handkerchiefs |38 553 | 14 562 | 152 100
Aprons | 4 436 | 13 636 | -
Women's caps | 9 488 | - | 5 600
Mittens | 9 294 | - | -
Gloves "Z" | - | 5 931 | -
Lace-shoes--leather | 2 392 | 4 348 | -
Half-shoes--leather |20 442 | - | -
Lace-shoes with wooden soles|33 967 | - | -
Clogs |40 092 | - | -
Hollaender | 7 272 | - | -
Bags for effects |19 963 | - | -
----------------------------+------------+------------+-------------------
(4) Owing to a total at the time of 524,286 prisoners and to the new
batch of 612,000[3] prisoners already announced and on the way, it is
impossible for me to undertake to clothe completely all the unexpected
new arrivals, in spite of the latest assignment of special allotments
of yarn and textiles for the Hungary program through the Reich Ministry
of Economics.
I would also like to mention that the civilian clothing previously
received from the Hungary program has all been distributed and precious
little can be expected from other useful articles received from the
Poland action (Warsaw).
The civilian clothing already distributed, particularly under-clothes
and shoes, have to be replaced very soon owing to their inferior
quality. Their durability, in comparison with new articles is very
limited.
Further it must be kept in mind that the employment of prisoners in
special measures [Sondermassnahmen] A and B is a great strain on
clothes and footwear and the expected durability must be decreased.
For the above-mentioned reasons, I would ask you, Gruppenfuehrer, to
be so kind as to request that Reich Ministry of Economics to take the
necessary steps so that further special allotments of yarn and leather
may be assigned to meet the exceedingly great need for prisoners'
clothing. Mention might also be made to the Reich Ministry of Economics
that, up to the present, enormous quantities of rags of unusable
civilian clothes, from the various actions, have been sent for disposal
from Auschwitz and other camps to the Reich Ministry of Economics, and
more are to follow.
Head of Administration
[initial illegible]
SS Sturmbannfuehrer
[Burger]
[Footnote 3: including approx. 387,000 men and 225,000 women.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1168-PS
Memorandum from SCHACHT to HITLER, [Identified by SCHACHT on 16
October 1945]
May 3, 1935
_Financing of Armament_
The following explanations are based upon the thought, that the
accomplishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity
is the problem of German politics, that everything else therefore
should be subordinated to this purpose, as long as the main purpose
is not imperilled by neglecting all other questions. Even after March
16, 1935 the difficulty remains, that one cannot undertake the open
propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of armament
without endangering our position internationally (without loss to our
foreign trade). The already nearly impossible financing of the armament
program is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult.
Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press can be
used only for the financing of armament to such a degree, as permitted
by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation increases the
prices of foreign raw materials and increases the domestic prices, is
therefore like a snail biting its own tail. The circumstance that our
armament had to be camouflaged completely till March 16, 1935 and even
since this date the camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent,
making it necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already
at the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have
been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final point of
financing. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are segregated notes (for
this purpose: armament) of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether
4,641 millions, out of which the armament notes amount to RM 2,374
millions (Status of April 30, 1935). The Reichsbank has invested the
amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners
in * * * notes of armament. Our armaments are also financed partly
with the credits of our political opponents. Furthermore 500 million
Reichsmarks were used for financing of armament, which originated out
of Reichsanleihe [Federal loans] placed with savings banks. In the
regular budget the following amounts were provided. For the budget
period 1933/34 RM 750 millions, for the budget period 1934/35 RM 1,100
millions, and for the budget period 1935/36 RM 2,500 millions.
The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after the
budget 1935/36 to 5-6 millions RM. This total deficit is already
financed at the present time by short term credits of the money market.
It therefore reduces in advance the possibilities of utilization of
the public market for the armament. The Minister of Finance correctly
points out at the defense of the budget: As a permanent yearly deficit
* * * is an impossibility; as we cannot figure with security with
increased tax revenues in amount balancing the deficit and any other
previous debits, as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only
secure basis for the impending great task of military policy, for all
these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious
budget policy which solves the problem of armament financing by
organic and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the
point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, e.g., by
saving.
How urgent this question is, can be deducted from the following, that
a large amount of task has been started by the state and party and
which is now in process, all of which are not covered by the budget,
but from contributions and credits, which have to be raised by industry
in addition to the regular taxes. The existing of various budgets
side by side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest
impediment for gaining a clear view over the possibilities of financing
the armaments. A whole number of ministries and various branches of the
party have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities
of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of finance of
the state, but not subject to the control of the Minister of Finance
and therefore also not subject to the control of the cabinet. Just
as on the sphere of politics the much too far reaching delegation of
legislative powers to individuals brought about various states within
the states, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches
of state and party, working side by side and against each other, has
a devastating effect on the possibility of financing. If on this
territory concentration and unified control is not introduced very
soon, the solution of the already impossible task of armament financing
is endangered.
We have the following tasks:
(1) A deputy is entrusted finding all sources and revenues, which have
its origin in contributions to the Federal government, to the state and
party and in profits of public and party enterprises.
(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to examine, how
these amounts were used and which of these amounts can in the future be
withdrawn from their previous purpose.
(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all public and
party organizations, to which extent this property can be used for the
purpose of armament financing.
(4) The federal ministry of finances is to be entrusted to examine the
possibilities of increased revenues by way of new taxes or increasing
of existing taxes.
The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under existing
political conditions was a necessity and the political success proved
the correctness of this action. The other possibilities of armament
financing have to be started now under any circumstances. For this
purpose all absolutely non-essential expenditures for other purposes
have not to take place and the total financial strength of Germany,
limited as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of
armament financing. Whether the problem of financing, as outlined in
program, succeeds, remains to be seen, but without such concentration
it will fail with absolute certainty.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1183-PS
COPY
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Department Arbeitseinsatz
Berlin SW 11, Saarlandstr. 96, 29 Jan 1942
V a 552/27
Express Letter!
To:--
The Government of the Government-General
Main Labor Division, _Cracow_:
The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories,
Labor and Social Division, _Oslo_
via the bureau of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian
territories.
The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories, _The Hague_;
The Military Administrator for Belgium and Northern France,
Economic Division, Group VII (Arbeitseinsatz), _Brussels_.
The Military Administrator in France,
Administrative Staff, Economic Division, _Paris_;
The Plenipotentiary for Economics in Serbia
Command Officer, _Semlin near Belgrade_;
The Chief of the Civilian Administration in _Luxemburg_;
The Chief of the Civilian Administration in Lorraine, _Metz_;
and
The Chief of the Civilian Administration in Alsace, _Straszburg_.
Subject: Increased mobilization of man-power for the German Reich from
the occupied territories and preparations for mobilization by force.
On the one hand, the labor shortage which was rendered more acute by
the draft for the Wehrmacht, and on the other hand, the increased
scope of the armament problem in the German Reich, render it necessary
that man-power for service in the Reich be recruited from the occupied
territories to a much greater extent than heretofore, in order to
relieve the shortage of labor. Therefore, any and all methods must be
adopted which make possible the transportation, without exception and
delay, for employment in the German Reich, of man-power in the occupied
territories which is unemployed or which can be released for use in
Germany after most careful screening.
To the High Command of the Armed Forces
Wi Rue Amt Berlin W 35
[Page 2]
This mobilization shall first of all, as heretofore, be carried out
on a voluntary basis. For this reason, the recruiting effort for
employment in the German Reich must be strengthened considerably. But
if satisfactory results are to be obtained, the German authorities,
who are functioning in the occupied territories, must be able to exert
any pressure necessary to support the voluntary recruiting of labor
for employment in Germany. Accordingly, to the extent that may be
necessary, the regulations in force in the occupied territories in
regard to shift in employment and withdrawal of support upon refusal
to work, must be tightened. Supplementary regulations concerning shift
in employment must above all ensure that older personnel who are
freed must be exchanged for younger personnel to make up for it, so
that the latter may be made available for the Reich. A far-reaching
decrease in the amount of relief granted by Public Welfare must also
be effected in order to induce laborers to accept employment in the
Reich. Unemployment relief must be set so low that the amount in
comparison with the average wages in the Reich and the possibilities
there for sending remittances home may serve as an inducement to accept
employment in the Reich. When refusal to accept work in the Reich is
not justified, the compensation must be reduced to an amount barely
enough for subsistence, or even be cancelled. In this connection,
partial withdrawal of ration cards and assignment to particularly heavy
obligatory labor may be considered.
However, all misgivings must give way before the necessity of supplying
the deficit in man-power caused by excessive draft calls into the Armed
Forces, in order to avoid detriment to the armament industry. For
this purpose the forcible mobilization of workers from the occupied
territories cannot be disregarded, in case the voluntary recruiting is
unsuccessful. The mere possibility of mobilization by force will, in
many cases, make recruiting easier.
[Page 3]
Therefore, I ask you immediately to take any measures in your district
which will promote the employment of workers in the German Reich on
a voluntary basis. I herewith request you to prepare for publication
regulations applying to forced mobilization of laborers from your
territory for Germany, so that they may be decreed at once, in case
recruiting on a voluntary basis will not have the desired result, that
is relief of the man-power shortage in the Reich. I request you to
inform me of the measures taken by you.
Copy for cognizance. Signed: Dr. Mansfeld
Attested by: [signature illegible]
_employee_
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1188-PS
20 May 1941
Decree of the Fuehrer
Concerning the Economy in the Newly Occupied
Eastern Territories
(1) In the newly occupied eastern territories Reichsmarshall Hermann
Goering as the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan shall issue all
orders concerning matters within his jurisdiction which are essential
to the highest utilization of existing stocks, to the highest increase
of the industrial capacity, and to the further building up of all
economic resources that can be utilized for the German war economy.
(2) In order to accomplish his task, he may also give orders to
Wehrmacht agencies.
(3) This decree becomes effective to-day. It may only be published
after special authorization.
Fuehrer's Headquarters
The Fuehrer,
The Chief of the German High Command
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
* * * * *
Remarks
Reichsleiter Rosenberg wants to see no limitations applied to the
principle that civil agencies of the newly occupied eastern territories
should get orders and directives from nobody else but him. He therefore
desires that within these territories he should also be authorized to
give orders concerning measures with regard to the Four Year Plan.
He is willing, however, to follow those directives which the Reich
Marshall, in his capacity as a delegate for the Four Year Plan, has
given personally. Rosenberg, therefore, suggested that the delegate
for the Four Year Plan should use the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories as his Plenipotentiary General for carrying out his
tasks in the newly occupied eastern territories. The latter should then
receive orders from him (Goering) for that purpose. The Reich Marshall
turned down such an arrangement.
In the event that Reichsleiter Rosenberg's suggestion is disapproved
by the Fuehrer, Rosenberg at least wants to be able to coordinate
measures taken by him as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories with those measures taken by the delegate of the Four Year
Plan. In order to make sure of that he desires to insert after the word
"jurisdiction" [Befugnisse] in Paragraph 1 the words "via the Reich
Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories".
Reichsleiter Rosenberg, furthermore, has misgivings relative to the
publication of this decree, since it left no doubt that Germany was
only interested in the occupied eastern territories for purposes
of extreme economic exploitation. If that became known in these
territories the political reaction there will be disastrous.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1189-PS
in the field 4/11/1941
Wi Stab Ost Fue/Ia, Az.B.NR. 6730/41
Special Instructions No. 44
Feeding of Civilian Population in the occupied Eastern Territories
Weekly Maximum in Grams
a. _For population which does no work worth mentioning._
Meat and meat products none
Fat 70
Bread 1500
Potatoes 2000
* * * * *
d. _Children under 14 years old and Jews_:
Half of the maximum according to a.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1193-PS
SECRET
The Reich Marshall of the Greater German Reich
Deputy for the Four Year Plan
_The State Secretary_
Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3, 14 November 1941
V.P. 19008/2 Secret.
In the annexes I submit, in three copies, a note on the result of a
conference which was held on 7 November 1941 by the Reich Marshall and
which concerned the
Employment of Soviet Russians
Meanwhile the Reich Marshall has ordered (cf. V of the note) that
the utilization of those Russians who are not under the armed forces
(prisoners of war and free workers) should be centrally directed in the
Reich, including the protectorate and the General Government, as well
as in the Reich Commissariats by his agency Arbeitseinsatz. To perform
its functions, it will avail itself of the general administration
of the Arbeitseinsatz, and in the occupied Eastern territories of
the organization for the Arbeitseinsatz which is at the disposal of
the Economic Staff East, respectively the Reich commissar, general
commissar, etc.
The Reich Marshall has made the agency Arbeitseinsatz responsible for a
rapid and appropriate solution of all problems which are connected with
the utilization of the Russians in the civilian domain. He requests
that the responsible agencies should acknowledge the importance of
this matter by fullest cooperation and should help in eliminating the
existing difficulties to the best of their abilities.
The Reich Marshall expects to receive on 15 December 1941 the first
report of the agency Arbeitseinsatz as to what extent the directives
issued by him on 7 November have been set into practice.
Signed: Koerner
Authenticated: Schwingle
Ministry Registrar
* * * * *
Conference of 7 November 1941 about the
Employment of Soviet Russians
The Reich Marshall gave the following directives for the Arbeitseinsatz
of the Soviet Russians:
I. _The stronger labor reserves in the zone of the interior are also
decisive for the war._
The Russian workers have proved their productive capacity during the
development of the huge Russian industry. Therefore it must be made
available to the Reich from now on. Objections against this order of
the Fuehrer are of the secondary nature. The disadvantages which can be
created by the Arbeitseinsatz have to be reduced to a minimum: the task
especially of counter-intelligence and security police.
II. _The Russian in the zone of operations._
He is to be employed particularly in building roads and railroads,
in clearing work, clearing of mines, and in building airports. The
German construction battalions have to be dissolved to a great extent
(Example: Air Forces!); the German skilled workers belong to the war
industry; it is not their task to shovel and to break stones, the
Russian is there for that.
III. _The Russian in the territories of the Reich Commissar and of the
General Government._
The same principles apply as in II. Furthermore, stronger utilization
in agriculture; if machines are lacking, human hands have to produce
what the Reich has to request from the agricultural sector in the
East. Furthermore, sufficient native labor has to be provided for the
ruthless exploitation of Russian coal mines.
IV. _The Russian in the Reich territory including the Protectorate._
The number of the employed depends on the requirement. By determining
the requirement, it is to be considered that workers of other states
who produce little and eat much are to be shipped out of the Reich
and that in the future the German woman should come less into the
foreground in the labor process. Beside the Russian prisoners of war,
free Russian workers should also be used.
A. _The Russian prisoner of war._
1. The _selection_ has to take place already in the collecting camps,
beyond the Reich border. The profession and physical condition are
decisive. At the same time screening as to nationality and according to
the requirements of the security police and counter-intelligence must
take place.
2. The _transportation_ has to be organized just as the selection
and not improvised. The prisoners are to be forwarded rapidly. Their
feeding should be orderly and their guarding unconditionally secured.
3. _Officers_ are to be excluded from the work as much as possible,
_commissars_ as a matter of principle.
4. The Russian belongs in first line to the following _work places_ (in
order of priorities):
Mining.
Railroad maintenance (including repair shops and construction of
vehicles).
War industry (tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts).
Agriculture.
Building industry.
Large scale work shops (shoe shops!).
Special units for urgent, occasional and emergency work.
5. The following apply to the method of employment: Principally
closed group employment (at least 20). Exceptions only with express
permission. In the agriculture in first place the great enterprises
come into consideration; besides rotating employment of closed units in
small farms day after day. In industry including mining establishments
of "Russian enterprises" as an ideal condition (exclusively Russian
workers under German supervision) to be striven for.
6. _Housing_: In closed camps (barracks).
7. _Guards_: During work, members of the armed forces, but also
German workers who have to perform auxiliary police functions. The
strictest and fastest activity is decisive for security measures. In
general, there are no further steps in the scale of punishment between
restriction of food and execution according to martial law.
8. _Clothing_: Creating of a standardized work suit is to the point.
The first clothing is secured according to the High Command of the
Armed Forces. Wooden shoes are the rule. Underwear is scarcely known to
or customary to the Russians.
9. _Rations_: The Russian is easily satisfied. Therefore he should be
fed lightly and without serious infractions upon our food balance. He
should not be spoiled or accustomed to the German food, but he should
be satisfied and kept in the productive capacity which corresponds to
his assignment.
B. _The free Russian worker._
_Employment and treatment_ will not be handled in practice differently
than for Russian prisoners of war. In both categories, particularly
good production can be acknowledged by a limited distribution of luxury
items. Sufficient, adequate nourishment is also the main thing for the
free workers.
As to the _working conditions_ of the free Russian, the following is to
be considered.
1. He can receive a _small allowance_.
2. _His relatives should be provided for._
3. Since his productive power is placed at the disposal of the employer
at a cheap price, _a financial compensation with the employer_ is to be
taken into consideration.
4. _Subjects of the Baltic State_ who are old residents can receive
privileges. At the most their cash allowance can be made equal to
the wages which are provided for the Poles who are in the Reich. The
general wage standard in the East has to be taken into consideration in
this matter.
5. _Ukrainians_ have no special privileges. The Fuehrer has ordered
that in the future they should not be released from war captivity.
6. The Russian employment should under no conditions create a prejudice
in the East as to the problem of salaries. Every financial measure
taken in this field has to originate from the consideration that the
lowest wages in the East, according to a directive of the Fuehrer,
are prerequisites for the settlement of the cost of war and for the
clearing of the war debts of the Reich after the end of the war.
Infractions will be punished with strictest measures.
This logically applies for every furthering of "social aspirations" in
the Russian colonial territory.
7. The Russian free workers obtain a _badge_ which makes them
recognizable as such.
V. The Reich Marshall reserves for himself a special decree about the
_organization of the Russian Arbeitseinsatz_, number and obligatory
membership, obligatory registration. All recruiting and every shipment
which are not conducted through the organization are prohibited.
Recruiting and employment of prisoners of war are to be conducted in a
unified way and are organizationally to be coupled with one another.
Signed: von Normann
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1195-PS
Copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
W.F.St./Abt.L (IV/Qu) Nr. 00630/41 Top Secret.
Fuehrer's H.Q., 12.4.1941
_Reference_: OKW/L (IV/Qu) Nr.4434/41 Top Secret of 3 April 1941.
I. Provisional Directions for the Partitioning of Yugoslavia
The Fuehrer has issued the following directions for the partition of
Yugoslavia:
1. _Former territory of Steiermark and Krain._
The territory of the former _Steiermark_ enlarged towards the South by
a strip of about 90 Kilometer breadth and 10-15 Kilometer depth will go
to Gau Steiermark.
The Northern part of _Krain_, with a border line which runs in the
south only as far as the river Sava but north of Laibach according to
attached map OKH/GEN Qu, will belong to Kaernten.
_The territory occupied by German troops will be handed over_ district
by district by the Army High Command to the Gauleiters concerned as
soon as the pacification of the country permits.
_The handing over of the territory occupied by the Italians_ will
be prepared by letter from the Fuehrer to the Duce and carried out
according to a more detailed direction of the Foreign Office. Until
that time no measures whatever are to be taken from the German end.
(Telegram OKH-Gen Qu/Abt. Kr. Verw. A. Ob. Kdo. 2 I Nr.801/41 g. Kdos,
is hereby dealt with).
2. _The territory beyond the river Mur_ [_Ubermur-Gebiet_]:
The territory beyond the river Mur goes as a whole to Hungary
conforming with the historic boundary. A later transfer of the German
population in the north-eastern part of this territory has been
taken into consideration. The handing over of this territory to the
Hungarians will be regulated by the Army High Command.
3. _Banat_:
The territory from the point where the river Orava cuts the Hungarian
national boundary to the entry of the river Tisa in the Danube goes to
Hungary.
The territory east of the river Tisa will be at first
under German protection as will the territory south of the
Danube and east of the general line: mouth of the river
Morava-Danube-Pozarevac-Petrovac-Boljavac-Kugarevac-Kalina. This
territory comprises the Boz copper territory and the adjoining coal
district in the south-east. The above line is to be considered as the
basis [Anhalt] and provisional demarcation line. At first Military
Government under the Army High Command is to be established.
4. _Southern Serbia_:
The territory inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians, in conformity with
the ethnographical boundary goes to Bulgaria.
Preliminary delimitation from the military view point will be carried
out by the Army High Command which will prepare the handing over to
Bulgaria.
5. _Former Serbia_ [_Alt-Serbien_]:
The territory of former Serbia will be placed under German military
administration of the Army High Command.
6. _Croatia_:
Croatia becomes an independent state within its ethnographical
boundaries. There will be no interference on the part of Germany with
its home policy.
7. _Remaining territories including Bosnia and Montenegro_:
The political shaping of these territories will be left to Italy. Here
also the restoration of an independent state of Montenegro can be
considered.
II. The drawing up of boundaries
1. If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in the above
part I it will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office, the plenipotentiary for
the Four Year Plan and the Reich-Minister of the Interior.
The Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (L IV/Qu) is the authority
which will prepare the drawing up of the boundaries for the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.
2. The Army High Command will forward as soon as possible to the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces W.F. St., its military requirements
in this regard--where not already laid down by the Fuehrer--and with
the exception of the territory under protection south of the Danube.
3. The OKW/Branch Economy and Armament [OKW Wi Rue Amt] will forward
as soon as possible to the Operational Staff (Section L) its demands
regarding the boundaries of the territory under protection south of the
Danube (Part I. para 3).
4. As far as the Italians are concerned, tactical boundaries between
the armies are valid for the present.
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
/s/ Keitel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1199-PS
Rue IV d 4 July, 1941
MEMORANDUM on discussion held at the Wi Rue Amt on 4 July 1941 on the
subject of mobilization of labor [Arbeitseinsatz] and utilization of
the Russian P.W.'s
Chairman of the discussion: Lt. Col. Dr. Krull.
Participants: (see enclosed record of attendance) Representatives of
the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, of the Reich Labor Ministry,
of the Reich Food Ministry, of the Rosenberg Bureau, of the AWA/P.W.
and of the WI Rue Amt, Arb. Amtsdir. Panse, Dr. Bergan and Reg. Rt.
Dr. Kloeden.
After an introduction by Lt. Col. Dr. Krull, Lt. Col. Breyer of
the P.W. department explained that actually there was in effect a
prohibition by the Fuehrer against bringing Russian PWs into the
Reich for mobilization of labor; but that one might count on this
prohibition being relaxed a little. For the time being the prisoners
are to be retained in camps in the occupied territories and in the
Government-general; as soon as conditions become overcrowded, they are
to be transported to large camps in the Reich. In case Arbeitseinsatz
should be permitted in the Reich, certain racial groups would be
exempted (White Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Esthonians, Finns,
etc.). PWs of Asiatic origin (such as Mongolians) are by no means
to be transported to the Reich for Arbeitseinsatz. Moreover, only
Russian-speaking prisoners will be utilized for the Arbeitseinsatz,
because of the possibility of Bolshevist propaganda. Only
Arbeitseinsatz as units (Organization Todt, construction battalions),
under guard will be permitted.
Representatives of the various departments (including the
representatives of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan and of the
Reich Labor Ministry) unanimously agreed that Labor Mobilization of the
Russians was unqualifiedly necessary. Approximately 500,000 prisoners
are needed (also to make up for the 50,000-100,000 French who are to
be released)--400,000 in agriculture, 80,000 in construction, 10,000
in mining (especially lignite). The need for an additional 70,000
prisoners in the munitions industry cannot be filled under existing
stipulations and at most may be accomplished only by exchange. These
figures, which were presented by the representative of the Reich
Labor ministry, were mentioned only from the viewpoint of a possible
slight increase in number of PWs. It must be taken into consideration,
moreover, that 25% are absorbed by losses and by the camps themselves.
The chairman summarized the results of the discussion as indicating
that all the interested bureaus unqualifiedly advocated and supported
the demand for utilization of PWs because of manpower needs
[Arbeitseinsatz] in the Reich. The Wi Rue Amt will approach the
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan with a request for relaxation of
the restrictive regulations and express to the WFS/I its point of view,
accordingly.
[signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1206-PS
TOP SECRET
Draft
Rue (IV) Berlin, November 11 1941
_6 Copies_, 6th Copy
NOTES
on outlines layed down by the Reichsmarschall in the meeting of 7
November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air (RLM)
SUBJECT: Employment of laborers in war industries.
The Fuehrer's point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war
industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 million prisoners
of war--employed so far 2 million.
Directives for employment:
Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into armament industry
[Rue-wirtschaft]
Serbs: Preferably agriculture
Poles: If feasible no individual employment achievement of Russian
armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly line-work, a
great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled workers.
Readiness of Russians in the operational area to work is strong. In the
Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as
free labor. In Krivoy Rog, large numbers of workers are available due
to the destruction of the factories.
EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN PWs
As a rule, employment in groups [geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz] no
individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not
only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time
proper. As a rule soldiers in the camp.
_Employment in_:
1. Operational area
2. Reich Commissariats (occupied territories in the east)
3. General Government
4. Interior and Protectorate is to be differentiated.
For 1: In the _operational area_ take preferable into consideration:
a. Railroads.
b. Highway construction.
Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with increased
speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PWs.
c. Clearing work.
d. Agriculture.
The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the feeding
of the German people. If feasible, also Frenchmen and Belgians are to
be used for directing the Russian farm-workers in the eastern area. If
farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of workers. Transplantation
of German farmers only where actual success can be expected.
e. Railroad-repair-factories, etc.
Best supervision: "Field kitchen." Quick evacuation from operational
area are necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (escaping and
joining with partisan and robber bands).
Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East
Prussia desirable.)
Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible.
From construction battalions 69,000 workers have been transferred to
the armament industry: replacement by prisoner of war battalions.
Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction
battalions (fraisiers etc). Investigation by army desirable. Express
will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is used in the proper
place. If necessary, repeated checking should be instituted.
For 2: The same applies to employment in _Reich Commissariats_.
For 3: The above is also applicable to the _Government General_.
Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of
machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the Gouvernement
is not fully utilized, and, on the other hand, the machinery cannot be
made use of for a long time in other places.
For 4: In the _Interior and the Protectorate_. It would be ideal if
entire factories could be manned by Russian PWs except the employees
necessary for direction. For employment in the Interior and the
Protectorate the following are to have priority:
a. At the top _coal mining industry_.
Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for
employment of Russians. At times manning the entire plant with Russian
laborers.
b. _Transportation_ (construction of locomotives and cars, repair-shops)
Railroad-repair and industry workers are to be sought out from the
PWs. Railroad is most important means of transportation in the East.
c. _Armament industries._
Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also construction of
parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete sections of factories
to be manned exclusively by Russians. For the remainder employment
in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm
tractors, generators, etc.
In emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional
workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes.
(Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities).
OKW/AWA is competent for _transporting_ Russian PWs, employment through
"_Planning Board for Employment of all PWs_." If necessary, offices of
Reich Commissariats.
No employment where _danger to men_ or their supply exists, i.e.
factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No
contact with German population, especially no "solidarity." German
worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.
_Food_ is a matter of Four Years' Plan. Supply their own food (cats,
horses, etc.)
_Clothes_, _billeting_, _messing_ somewhat better than at home where
part of the people live in caverns.
_Supply of shoes_ for Russians as a rule wooden shoes, if necessary
Russian shoe repair shops.
Examination of _physical fitness_, in order to avoid importation of
diseases.
_Clearing of mines_ as a rule by Russians if possible by selected
Russian engineers.
Employment offices for _civilian workers_ to be kept separate from
those for PWs. In this respect the wage-problem is to be considered.
Furthermore families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule
employment in closed groups [geschlossener Einsatz].
_Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz_
Rather employ PWs than _unsuitable foreign workers_. Seize Poles,
Dutchmen, etc., if necessary as PWs and employ them as such, if work
through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action.
General employment of all _German women_ repudiated by the Fuehrer.
Where Russians can be employed, _labor service_ is not to be used.
Labor service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the
principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War
situation to be taken into consideration.
_As a matter of principle central interests precede local interests_,
therefore no resistance from Reich commissaries and other local
authorities against Arbeitseinsatz in the homeland.
_Savings in wages_ are to be made up by compensatory contributions of
the business.
_Express order by the Fuehrer._ Under no circumstances may the _wage
level in the East_ be raised or assimulated to the wages in western
Germany. Strong action is imperative against solicitors who offer high
wages.
It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of _wages for
foreign workers_.
_Foreigners not to be treated like German workers_, on the other hand
do not provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.
The _welfare installations_ of the Labor Front [DAF] are _under no
circumstance_ to be used for PWs or Eastern workers.
All agencies are to promote maximum _utilization of Russian manpower_.
Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly
organized in the operational area. _Speed_ is necessary, as the mass of
manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).
Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of _escaping
prisoners_. Especially in and around Berlin strictest guard necessary.
[illegible initials]
_Distribution_:
Chief Rue--1st Copy
Sect. Ro--2nd Copy
Rue II--3rd Copy
Rue IIIa--4th Copy
Rue VI-IIIa--5th Copy
Draft (Rue IVd)--6th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1208-PS
SECRET
1938
Reich Justice Ministry
[various numbers and notes]
The Commissioner of the Four Year Plan
[various illegible notations]
Reich Justice Ministry, 14 Dec 1938
To:
The Highest Reich authorities,
The leaders and heads of branches of the party and the affiliated
organizations,
The district leaders,
The Reich governors,
The state governments,
The Chief Presidents and Presidents of the governments,
The Reich commissars for the Saar territory
for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich
for the Sudeten German districts.
_To message_: to the Reich leaders of the NSDAP.
In agreement with the representatives of the leader I hereby order the
following:
I
1. The elimination of Jews from the German economic life is the task of
the state and therefore is exclusively the duty of the authorities and
agencies expressly designated for that.
2. As far as special installations have been created for this purpose,
they require the approval of the Reich minister of economy or they are
to be dissolved.
II
The taking over of Jewish businesses and other fortunes from Jewish
possession has to be affected only on a strictly lawful basis according
to the directives issued for this purpose. Transactions which were made
since 1 Nov 1938 contradictory thereto, will be cancelled.
III
Only the Reich is entitled to the benefit from the elimination of the
Jews from the German economic life.
Persons and agencies which have illegally benefited from the transfer
of Jewish businesses or other fortunes from Jewish possession, may
therefore be ordered to pay a compensation tax in favor of the Reich.
Berlin, 10 December 1938
The Commissar for the Four Year Plan
Signed: GOERING
General Fieldmarshall
----------------------------------------------
To be circulated Dept. IV
Messrs: Read
[DR. VOLKMAR[lined out]
ANZ Initialed 10/1
DR. BECKER Initialed 11/1
BRAUNS Initialed 14/1
DR. BREITHAUPT Initialed
EPPING Initialed 11/9
FECHNER Initialed 12/9
DR. FICKER Initialed 14/1
[DR. HESSE [lined out]
HENSSLER Vacation 18/1
HOFFMANN Initialed 11/1
HORNIG Initialed 11/1
[DR. JONAS[lined out]
DR. KOEHLER Initialed 13/1
DR. KRAMER, AGR Initialed 11/1
KUEHNEMANN Initialed 11/1
[LAUTERBACH[lined out]
LENTZ Initialed, date illegible
MASSFELLER Initialed 13/1
DR. MERTEN Initialed 11/1
[DR. PAETZOLD[lined out]
[DR. POHLE[lined out]
[DR. PRITSCH[lined out]
REINECK Initialed 14/1
REINECKE Initialed 13/1
REXROTH Initialed 11/1
DR. SAAGE Initialed 11/1
SEBODE (since 9.1.39) Initialed 16/1
DR. VON SPRECKELSEN Initialed 11/1
DR. SCHAEFFER, GAss. Initialed 11/1
DR. SCHULTZE Initialed 11/1
STAUD Initialed 12/1
[STEMMLER[lined out]
DR. VOGELS Initialed 13/1
DR. WAITNAUER Initialed 11/1
ZIEGERT Initialed 11/1
to V a 445/38 Secret
----------------------------------------------
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1216-PS
Concentration Camp Dachau
special orders (Camporganization)--Service regulations
Notes on Death Penalty--Conference
Re: "Important Incidents in Concentration Camp Dachau"
Subject: Concentration Camp Dachau
Memorandum
On 29 May 1933 p.m., Dr. Wintersberger, the chief prosecutor
[Oberstaatsanwalt] of the State Court [Landgericht] Munich II, has
handed me his report of 29 May 1933 with two copies of the "special
regulations" concerning inmates of the concentration-camp Dachau
(Camp Organization) and stated orally that several deaths have been
reported from the concentration camp Dachau during the last few
days showing that the report of the camp commandant and the camp
physician as to the causes of death is hardly in conformity with the
findings of the coroner's inquest and autopsy, so that the evidence
obtained by the inquiry so far would justify the suspicion of crimes
committed. The essential contents of his oral report on the single
cases is incorporated in the memorandum of 30 May 1933 drafted by
the prosecuting authority [Staatsanwaltschaft] of the district Court
[Landgericht] Munich II, which is referred to.
The same day, on 29 May 1933, I reported on this subject to the State
Minister of Justice in the presence of Amtsgerichtsdirektor Sprick. The
Minister of Justice called the Prime Minister by telephone and obtained
his consent that the subject "Execution of protective custody" should
be made an item on the agenda of the meeting of ministers on 31 May
1933; he commissioned me to submit the matter to the State Minister of
the Interior together with Amtsgerichtsdirektor Sprick and to take all
further steps which might become necessary.
Accordingly, on 30 May 1933 a.m., accompanied by AGDirektor Sprick,
I made my report first to Ministerialdirektor Gareis, secretary for
police matters [Polizeireferent] in the Ministry of the Interior and
then in the presence of the latter to the State Minister Wagner himself
stating the facts as they had been reported to me by Dr. Wintersberger,
the chief prosecutor [OStA]. I restated the official findings in the
cases of Schloss, Hausmann, Strauss and Nefzger, pointed out that in
accordance with Article 346 of the Penal Code (StGB) it is mandatory to
make an inquiry which, by the way, would also serve the true interests
of the state; discussed the legal aspects of the camp regulations
[Lagerordnung] and duly communicated that the Prime Minister, on
request by the Minister of Justice, had put the subject on the agenda
of the meeting of ministers of 31 May 1933.
State Minister Wagner declared that the pacts are not yet cleared
sufficiently to allow the matter to become a subject of discussion
in the meeting of ministers, and that the commandant of the Bavarian
political police who was sick at the time, should be heard first as
well as the camp commandant.
He asked the Prime Minister by telephone to delete this item from
the agenda and gave orders to Ministerialdirektor Gareis to open a
discussion of the matter without delay. From the sphere of the Ministry
of the Interior the following are to participate in the discussion:
Ministerialdirektor Gareis, the commandant of the political police,
Himmler, as well as the camp commandant and the camp physician of
the concentration camp Dachau; from the sphere of the State Minister
of Justice: Amtsgerichtdirektor Sprick, Chief Prosecutor [OStA],
Dr. Wintersberger, Dr. Flamm, physician of the District Court
(Landgerichtsarzt) and the undersigned reporter in this matter.
I have reported the result of my audience with the State Minister
Wagner to Ministerialdirektor Degen and Staatsrat Spangenberger on 30
May 1933 and in the presence of the latter to the State Minister of
Justice on 31 May 1933. I was requested to emphasize at the proposed
meeting that Article 346 of the Penal Code (StGB) makes an inquiry by
prosecution and police mandatory.
On the afternoon of 31 May 1933 I was told by Min. Dir. Gareis over the
telephone that in accordance with orders from State Minister Wagner the
proposed discussion would not take place, because he wished to avoid
any sign of intervention in a pending matter, that the chief prosecutor
[OStA] of the District Court [LG] Munich II should contact Himmler,
the commandant of the political police, as had been suggested in the
case of Schloss by letter of the Ministry of Justice of 29 May 1933 No.
II 28923, and that the State Ministry of the Interior would take the
necessary steps as far as its own sphere was concerned in this matter.
A.G.Dir. Sprick was asked to make this known to the Minister of Justice
who was just participating in a meeting of ministers [interlineary note
in ink:--on 31 May--] (OStA) Dr. Wintersberger was orally requested
to contact Himmler, commandant of the political police, as soon as
possible, and to report on the result.
Munich, 1 June 1933
(s) DOEBIG
2 June 1933 (Friday)
At 5:15 parley on the matter with Reichsstatthalter von Epp.
The papers on Schloss, Hausmann, Strauss and Nefzger were available at
this parley on informal request.
Result of the parley:
The files of the prosecution Munich II on these 4 cases are submitted
to the State Minister of the Interior in order to get his view first.
In the camp Dachau a change of personnel shall take place.
DOEBIG.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1229-PS
TOP SECRET
[Stamped] [illegible pencil mark]
Supreme command of the Armed Forces
Armed forces Fuehrer Staff (WFST) /department L number 33 264/4C top
secret, for general officers only.
[stamped]
Fuehrer headquarters, September 6, 1940.
73 [in pencil] [illegible pencil mark]
_7 copies_
_4th_ copy
[in pencil]
SUBJECT: Material for the intelligence service
SUBJECT: _Counter intelligence (Abw.) III number 398/40 top secret
of August 26 1940._ OKH General Staff of the Army (Gen. St.d.H.)
operational department Ia number 150231/40 top secret of September 2,
1940.
TO: _Counter intelligence service abroad_ (Ausl./Abw.)
The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By
the end of October the Status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to
be reached.
These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are
preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will
realise that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in
the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protektorat;
she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our
interests--espec. on the Balkan--with strong forces against Russian
seizure.
For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer
to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following
directives apply:
1. The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to
be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of
the army units there. This change is to be explained by movements into
training camps, regroupings.
2. The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of
troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement, in the Protektorat
and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively
unimportant.
3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, espec. of the
armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.
4. By suitable news the impression is to be created that the
_anti-aircraft protection_ in the East has been increased considerably
after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be
increased with captured French material on all important targets.
5. Concerning improvements on _railroads_, _roads_, _airdromes_ _etc._
it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is
needed for the improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and
serves primarily economical traffic.
The supreme command of the Army [OKH] decides to what extent correct
details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons etc. will be
made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage.
The chief of the supreme command
of the armed forces
by order of
Signed: JODL
A certified copy
F.M. [in pencil]
Captain
_Distribution_:
Counter intelligence service abroad 1st copy (with map)
Supreme command of the Army (Operational department) 2nd copy
Supreme command of the Airforce (Fuehrer department) 3rd copy
_Supreme command of the armed forces_
Armed forces Fuehrer staff [WFST] 4th copy
Department L, Ref, IH, IL 5th-7th copies
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1233-PS
Secured Objects of Art in the Government-General [Poland]
Introductory page:
By reason of the decree of 16 December 1939 by the Governor General of
the occupied Polish territories, the special commissioner for securing
objects of art and culture was able to seize within six months almost
all the art objects of the country, with one exception: A series of
Flemish Gobelins of the Castle of Cracow. According to the latest
information these are now in France, so that subsequent seizure will be
possible.
Scientific treatment of the objects of art took place simultaneously
with the salvage activities. The result is shown in the catalog with
pictorial supplement, which clearly proves the penetration of the East
by the German will for culture.
It is superfluous to speak of an independent Polish development of
art in the historic epochs of style. There are creations of German
impressions and Dutch or Flemish works which according to their spirit
and character, equally do not express anything but German spirit and
German culture. French and Italian works are in the minority.
The state of preservation of the secured objects of art was generally
poor. The Poles' hasty salvage efforts prior to the out-break of
hostilities and neglect over a considerable time have caused damage of
all sorts which required immediate remedy. For this reason, our own
shops for restoring purposes, were established in Cracow and Warsaw, so
that these works of art could receive care corresponding to their value.
The catalog contains a qualitative selection corresponding to the
standards of leading German museums. German art and everything having a
rank within the entire European development of art was given preference.
Art objects excluded by this qualitative selection were also
scientifically treated, catalogued, and protected against loss or
damage.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1249-PS
Copy
1 June 1942
The Chief President of the Province of Upper Silesia.
1. I b 2
_Subject_: Police Courts-martial.
Enclosure: Decree dated 1 June 1942.
In agreement with the Reichminister of the Interior and the
Reichminister of Justice I am hereby establishing a police
courts-martial at Kattowitz for the annexed Eastern territories of my
province, effective immediately.
The administrative competence of the police courts-martial is seen from
the enclosed decree.
In the sense of paragraph 1 of the decree, severe excesses of Poles and
Jews as well as other criminal acts by Poles and Jews which endanger
seriously the German reconstruction are:
1. High treason [Hochverrat].
2. High treason [Landesverrat].
3. Sedition.
4. Crime and Attacks against public order.
5. Forgery.
6. Sexual crimes against Germans.
7. Crimes against the life of Germans.
8. Assault and battery against Germans.
9. Crime and violation against the personal freedom of Germans.
10. Theft and embezzlement against Germans.
11. Robbery and extortion against Germans.
12. Receiving and concealing of stolen property of Germans.
13. Fraud and treachery against Germans.
14. Wilful destruction of property of Germans and the Reich.
15. Crimes and violations dangerous to the commonwealth of the Germans
and the Reich.
16. Crimes and violations in the sense of the law against malice.
17. Crimes and violations in the sense of the decree of extraordinary
radio measures of 1 September 1939.
18. Crimes against war economy.
19. Violations of the law for controlling venereal diseases dated 18
February 1927, as far as the violation is committed against Germans.
20. Crimes and violations in the sense of the law against criminal and
publicly dangerous use of explosives.
21. Violations of the law against possession of arms.
The police courts-martial is competent for all punishable acts
according to paragraph 1 of the decree dated 1 June 1942, which are
committed by Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories of the
province of Upper Silesia. The courts-martial can also try punishable
acts committed by Poles and Jews in the other Reich territory or in the
occupied territories, if the perpetration live in the annexed Eastern
territories of the province of Upper Silesia.
I request to instruct the county [Kreis] and local police authorities,
competent for preliminary proceedings for punishable acts, and to
submit those proceedings which come under the jurisdiction of the
police court-martial immediately to the court-martial section of the
state police administration, office Kattowitz, at Kattowitz, street of
the SA No. 49.
Before submitting the case to the court-martial section, I request that
the nationality of the accused be established beyond a doubt.
The report forms to the criminal police administration office at
Kattowitz are not affected by this decree.
_Distribution_:
1. To the president of the district at Kattowitz.
2. To the president of the district at Oppeln.
3. To the secret state police--state police administration office at
Kattowitz.
4. To the state police administration office at Oppeln.
5. To the criminal police administration office Kattowitz.
6. _For information._
To the inspector of the security police and of the security service at
Breslau.
* * * * *
2. I b 2 1 June 1942
To the Reich Minister of the Interior, _in Berlin_.
_Subject_: Administration of law in the annexed Eastern territories.
_Ref._: My report of 30 January 1942--I b 2--and decree there Pol. S
II A 2 No. 113/42--176 from 22 May 1942.
_Enclosure_: Decree dated 1 June 1942.
Enclosed I am forwarding to you the decree about the establishment of
courts-martial in the annexed Eastern territories of the province of
Upper Silesia.
The decree has been put into effect on 1 June 1942.
Forwarded for your information.
* * * * *
3. I b 2. 1 June 1942
To the District headquarters [Gauleitung] Upper-Silesia, _at
Kattowitz_.
_Subject_: Establishment of a police courts-martial for the annexed
Eastern territories at Kattowitz.
_Enclosure_: Decree dated 1 June 1942.
In agreement with the Reichminister of the Interior and the
Reichminister of Justice, I have established, effective immediately, a
courts-martial for the annexed Eastern territories of my province.
The local and administrative competence of the courts-martial is
defined in the enclosed decree.
Forwarded for your information.
4. Copy of 3, with enclosure: to
a. The district leaders [Kreisleiter] of the districts Kattowitz,
Jarnowitz, Warthenau, Beuthen, Bendsburg, Krenau, Pless, Rybnik,
Teschen, Bielitz and Saybusch;
b. The general command VIII sector command Breslau, Gabitzstr.;
c. The public prosecutor at Kattowitz;
d. The president of the superior court at Kattowitz;
e. The leader of the security service administrative sector
[SD-Leitabschnitt] Kattowitz, attention: SS battalion Podlich;
f. The Reich commissar for the strengthening of German nationalism
attention: SS battalion leader Dr. Arlt, at Kattowitz.
5. To the files at I b 2.
* * * * *
Kattowitz, 1 June 1942
The Chief President of the Province of Upper Silesia
I b 2
Decree for the establishment of courts-martial in the annexed Eastern
territories of the province of Upper Silesia dated 1 June 1942
On the basis of number 13 of the decree of the cabinet council for the
Reich defense, for the administration of criminal jurisdiction against
Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories and the district of
the previous Free City of Danzig, dated 4 December 1941 (RGBl. I, p.
759), the following is decreed in agreement with the Reichminister of
the Interior and the Reichminister of Justice:
Par. 1.
1. Severe violations of Poles and Jews against Germans, as well as
other criminal acts by Poles and Jews which seriously endanger the
German reconstruction work, can be sentenced by courts-martial, until
further notice.
I reserve for myself the decision as to whether or not the criminal act
is a crime in the sense of paragraph 1.
Par. 2.
The courts-martial pass sentence of death, transfer to the secret state
police acquittal.
Par. 3.
1. Courts-martial will be established for the district of a state
police administration office. They consist of one president and two
members.
2. President is the leader of the state police administrative office or
his permanent deputy. The members will be appointed by the leader of
the state police administration office.
Par. 4.
1. During the trial the _court_ must do officially everything that is
necessary to discover the truth. If necessary, the accused is to be
tried with the assistance of an interpreter.
2. The names of the judges and of the accused, the evidences on which
the sentence is based, furthermore the crime, the sentence including
a brief justification, as well as the day of the sentencing are to be
recorded.
3. Otherwise the courts-martial determines its proceeding according to
its dutiful judgment.
Par. 5.
1. The decisions of the courts-martial are not legally contestable.
2. The sentences of the courts-martial are subject to a reexamination
which leads to confirmation or voiding.
3. The confirmation makes the sentence lawful and executable.
Par. 6.
The right of confirmation or voiding of the courts-martial sentences is
mine and, on my orders, that of the higher SS and police officer.
Par. 7.
The courts-martial can, for special reasons, forego a penalty or
transfer the case to another court.
Par. 8.
This decree becomes effective on the day of its publication.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1276-PS
MOST SECRET
The Chief of the Security Police and the SD
_IV A 2 a - Bk. No. 502/42 Most Secret_
In written communications, please give this reference No., the date
and subject.
Berlin SW 11, 17 June 1944
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Local tel. no. 120040 Trunks 126421
Reichsbank Clearance Account: 1/146.
Post Office Transfer Account: Berlin
2336.
Express Letter Security Section III
Recd: 20 June 1944
No. 20/44 Most Secret
Annexes: Nil 94
To:
Supreme Command Armed Forces
Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces
I C III general security
For the attention of Colonel of the General Staff Martini not
represented in the department
_Berlin W 35_,
Tirpitzufer 74/76.
Subject: Commando operations. Fuehrer's order of 18.10.1942
Reference: Communication of Counter Intelligence Bureau Defense
Section III 527/2. 44g (C 2) of 21.3.1944.
The C-in-C of the Security Police and the SD in Paris reports the
arrest of isolated parachutists of _French nationality_ in English
uniform near Plumelec/Morbihan. It is evident from interrogation that
_members of the De Gaulle Army_, after reporting voluntarily to the
"Service Air Special," were taking part in a 14-days special training
camp, in which were 300 Frenchmen and 300 Englishmen. Apparently only
Frenchmen are used for operations in France. The parachute-jump is made
in groups of ten, each consisting of:
1 Lieutenant
2 wireless operators
7 sabotage experts.
Armament: each man
1 sub-machine gun
1 pistol
1 carbine
1 stabbing weapon.
Equipment: Sabotage and radio apparatus,
including Eureka gear i.e.
D/F beacons.
(therefore arrested by the SD? [marginal note in pencil])
The group which was arrested had orders to carry out railway sabotage
in the district around Rennes. The acts of sabotage were obviously to
be carried out by the group as a body. In addition, the group was to
await further orders in some hiding-place.
Apparently they were not ordered to link up with the local resistance
organisations. The arrested men had no civilian identity cards on them.
The employment of such groups is for the most part obviously planned
for regions where, due to the action of the Security Police, there
are no more local resistance or sabotage organisations in existence,
or where the enemy knows that sabotage organisations were only
counterfeited by tricks of the security police, which had meanwhile
been disclosed.
* * * _I consider it essential that the necessary orders should also be
given from there, in order that the lesser units_ of the Armed Forces
may not--as has often been the case recently--interpret them wrongly
and turn the Commando troops over to the Security Police instead of
slaughtering them in combat as they retreat. It is only a question of
handing them over to the Security Police when members of Commandos of
this kind are not captured in battle by the Armed Forces but by other
means, e.g., by being handed over by the native police.
If a few isolated Commando troops _are spared at first for
interrogation purposes_, I consider it necessary for the _Security
Police authorities to take part in_ the interrogation. The further
treatment of members of Commandos, who are finally to be treated as
killed in action [Gefallene], is, however, even in these cases, the
responsibility of the Armed Forces.
I request that the measures taken from there be reported to me.
By Order
Signed: Mueller
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1279-PS
MOST SECRET
_WFSt/Qu (Admin. 1)_
No. 007893/44 Most Secret
[The number is changed, in pencil, to 009074/44]
One copy has been destroyed
[remainder of pencil note illegible] 27/7
22.7.1944
2 Copies
2nd Copy
_Subject_: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions"
captured with partisan groups.
Minutes of a meeting
1. The Fuehrer has decided that members of Anglo-American and
Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan
fighting in the South-East, are to be treated in the same way as those
taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.
2. Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl., following queries made by
the RSHA--Military Section--has put forward for decision the question
of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups
are to be treated.
The following are the resulting opinions:
a. _C-in-C, South-East_
The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the
SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.
b. _Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of war general_ in
conjunction with _Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff Alien
Armies in the West_ and Armed Forces Ops. Staff/Op. (Army).
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces
Ops. Staff/Op (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.
c. _Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War
Section_ in conjunction with _Armed Forces Reserve_ (_WR_) and _Armed
Forces Ops Staff/Org I_.
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces
Ops Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43, which disregards
differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of
commando operations. (then they are handed over to the Security Service
[SD]).
d. _RSHA/Section IV_
Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war under the directives
mentioned in b and c, but a more definite ruling is required to decide
whether and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the
Security Service [SD].
e. _RSHA/Military Section_
Considers that the Commando Order _cannot_ be applied to partisan
fighting in the south East, that to do so would be dangerous in that it
might imperil those taking part in our own operation (Brandenburg).
No opinion on the question of foreign missions.
f. _Ag. Ausl._
Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members
of missions were taking part in a commando-operation.
g. _Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op._ (_Army_)
Treatment as the members of partisan groups themselves, i.e., as
prisoners of war if they are in uniform and are captured or surrender
in open battle, or executed if they are in civilian clothes or are
captured in a sabotage- or commando-operation.
[The whole of g is crossed out.]
3. _Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops. Staff_
According to the orders issued to date, even for example, the British
captured in the "Rosselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners
of war. This is especially evident in the Op. (Army)-Order dated
18.8.43.
[This last sentence is put in parenthesis, underlined, Op (Army)
crossed out and a large query inserted in the margin.]
The Commando Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its
extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the
missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the
orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission
acting with the partisan groups in the South-East is to be called a
commando-operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision
seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to
the wording of the Commando-Order or to the previous definition of
a commando operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual
form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter
measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all
members of partisan groups, even in the South-East are fundamentally
guerrillas. Indeed they are treated as prisoners of war for reasons of
expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters
and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the members of
foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore no necessity
to treat them, in every case, in the same way as the members of
partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far more appropriate
to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian military missions
as commando-operations and to treat their members accordingly.
The appended Order is therefore proposed.
W [Initialed by Warlimont]
* * * * *
MOST SECRET
_WFSt/Qu_ (_Admin._ 1) 27.7.1944
No. 009074/44 Most Secret
2 Copies
1st Copy
_Subject_: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions"
captured with partisan groups.
K [initialled in pencil by Keitel]
Minutes of a meeting
1. The Fuehrer has decided that members of Anglo-American and
Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan
fighting in the South East, are to be treated in the same way as those
taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.
2. Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl. following queries made
by the RSHA--Military section--, has put forward for decision the
question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the
partisan groups, are to be treated.
The following are the resulting opinions:
a. _C-in-C, South East._
The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the
SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.
b. _Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of War General_ in
conjunction with _Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Alien
Armies in the West_:
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order _Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces_/Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army) No. 03408/43
Secret, dated 18.8.43.
c. _Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War
Section_ in conjunction with _Armed Forces Reserve_ (_WR_):
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces
Ops. Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43 which disregards
differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of
commando-operations (then they are handed over to the Security Service
[SD]).
d. _RSHA/Section IV_
Fundamentally as prisoners of war under the directives mentioned in b
and c, but a more definite ruling is required to decide whether, and in
what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service
[SD].
e. _RSHA/Military Section_:
Considers that the Commando-Order _cannot be applied_ to partisan
fighting in the South East that to do so would be dangerous in that it
might imperil those taking part in our own operations (Brandenburg).
No opinion on the question of Foreign Missions.
f. _Ag. Ausl._
Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members
of missions were taking part in a commando-operation.
3. _Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops Staff_
According to the Orders issued to date, even, for example, the British
captured in the "Ruesselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners
of war.
The Commando-Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its
extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the
missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the
orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission
acting with the partisan groups in the South East is to be called
a commando operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision
seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to
the wording of the commando-order or to the previous definition of
a commando-operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual
form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter
measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all
members of partisan groups, even in the South East, are fundamentally
guerillas. Indeed, they are treated _as_ prisoners of war, for reasons
of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of
deserters and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the
members of foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore
no necessity to treat them in every case, in the same way as the
members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far
more appropriate to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian
military missions as commando-operations and to treat their members
accordingly.
The appended Order is therefore proposed.
Sgd: Warlimont
_Distribution_:
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces via the Deputy Chief
of the Armed Forces Ops Staff.
1st Copy
Qu. (Draft) 2nd Copy
[The second copy of the above dated 27.7.1944 marked "Draft" is also
contained in 1279-PS it is initialled at the end by Warlimont and has
an illegible pencil note at the top. In the second copy the first words
of 2 and 3 are underlined in pencil. The type-script of both copies is
identical.]
* * * * *
MOST SECRET
Draft
_Supreme Command of the Armed Forces_
No. 007893/4 Most Secret/Armed Forces Ops. Staff/QU (Admin. 1)
[The number is changed to 009074/44]
Fuehrer Headquarters 22.7.1944
--Copies, --Copy
_Subject_: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions"
captured with partisan groups.
The Special Orders for the treatment of captured members of partisan
groups do not apply to members of foreign so-called "military mission"
(Anglo-American or Soviet-Russian) captured in the fight against
partisan groups in the areas under the command of the C-in-C South East
and South West. They are therefore to be treated, not as prisoners of
war, but in accordance with the Fuehrer's Order on the extermination of
terrorist and sabotage troops, dated 18.10.1942 (OKW/WFSt No. 003830/42
Most Secret).
This order is not to be distributed beyond the divisional or
equal-ranking staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces. Any
papers distributed to Army Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs, of
the Armed Forces are to be recalled, when read, and destroyed.
[This last sentence is changed to "This order is not to be distributed
beyond General Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs of other branches
of the Armed Forces and is to be destroyed when read."]
Keitel
_Distribution_:
C-in-C South East Copy 1
C-in-C South West Copy 2
Army General Staff Copy 3
OKM/Naval War Staff Copy 4
OKL/Air Force Ops. Staff Copy 5
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
Police--Headquarters Staff of the Reichsfuehrer
SS--for the attention of SS
Brigadefuehrer and Major-General of the
Waffen SS Rohde, also for RSHA Copy 6
OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. Copy 7
/Chief of P.W. section Copy 8
/Armed Forces Reserves (WR) Copy 9
/WFSt/W Pr Copy 10
/Op (Army-Air Force-Navy) Copy 11
/Org Copy 12
/War Diary Copy 13
/Qu (Draft) Copy 14
Reserve Copy 15-25
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1285-PS
"The German Police"
[Extracts from handbook "Die Deutsche Polizei" 1943]
B. Use of weapons on command
1. Every policeman is compelled to make use of his weapon if a superior
officer, in compliance with his duty, orders him to do so.
2. In such a case, the superior officer alone bears the responsibility.
Use of weapons on the part of the police in the case of fugitive PWs
3. Fugitive Russian prisoners of war shall be fired upon without
previous challenge.
4. Under no circumstances will warning shots be fired.
* * * * *
_To a_: According to paragraph 1 of the law mentioned * * * the
following become as of 1 April 1937 immediate Reichs officials
[unmittelbare Reichsbeamte]:
1. Officials occupying TO positions [Planstellen] in the agency
"Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reichs Ministry of
the Interior".
2. The officials of the Security Police [Secret State Police--Gestapo],
and Criminal Police, however not the Police administrative officials
working with the state police administrations for the criminal police.
3. The officials of the Protective Police [Schutzpolizei] and the
Gendarmerie [Landjaegerei] and the police medical and police veterinary
officials, police vocational school teachers and technical officials
working with these organizations.
The personal salaries and welfare expenses of these officials and the
operational expenses of the whole state police will be borne from 1
April 1937 on by the Reich, the same for the salaries, etc. of all
employees and workers working at police agencies, who likewise on 1
April 1937 enter the Reichs service (paragraph 1(2) and paragraph 2).
Hence from the fiscal year 1937 on there will be made up a Reichs
budget for the police.
_To b_: For all police officials uniform official titles are introduced
through the law cited * * * along with equal pay; only a few exceptions
(retaining of some former official designations for the present
incumbents) are permitted in the implementative regulations (transition
lists).
_To c_: Through the German police official law [24 June 1937, RGBl
I, 653] the same legal situation is created for all process servers
without differentiation. Hence in Germany there is no longer a
Prussian or a Bavarian process server, but now only a German process
server, who is everywhere subject to the same legal regulations, wears
the same uniform, and has the same official designation of rank.
The laws cited [relating to police officials] are valid since 1 October
1938 also for the former Austrian federal executive police, which
including the police administrative officials by the decree of 27
October 1938 (RGBl. I, p. 1633) is at the same time taken over into the
Reichs budget and thereby brought into the Reichs service.
More detailed regulations on this matter are to be found in the
implementative regulations of 15 May 1939 [RGBl. I, p. 945]. According
to these the valid functional police law in the former state of Austria
is not affected.
_To d_: According to paragraph 1 of the law [28 March 1940, RGBl.
I, p. 613] the police administrative officials of upper middle and
simple civil service rank are transferred onto the Reichs budget. The
officials of the higher police administrative service of a federal
state can with the consent of the latter be transferred onto the Reichs
budget.
* * * * *
[Pp. 81-82]
III. Security Police [Sicherheitspolizei]
At the head of the Security Police is the chief of the security police
and of the Security Service [SD]. Provisionally the Reichsfuehrer SS
and Chief of the German Police in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior
has taken over leadership personally. He unites in his person the
direction of the security police and of the "Security Service of the
Reichsfuehrer SS".
The security police is composed of the secret state police (including
frontier police) and criminal police which in the central instance
together with the central offices of the security service are united in
the Chief Office for Reichs Security [RSHA].
Thereby the governmental security police and the party's SS
intelligence activity complement each other in the unified central
agency both organizationally and in leadership.
With the Chief Office for Reichs Security rest the elaboration of all
organizational, personnel, economic, and technical affairs of the
security police and security service; besides this however, the central
agencies of the state police and criminal executives and the central
direction of the security service information nets are also included.
In the field of functional legislation the Chief Office for Reichs
Security, insofar as its interests are touched upon, either controls
the framing of the law or has a part therein.
The chief office for Reich security is composed at present of 7
offices, to these several special institutes are attached.
The following serve to train the members of the security police and the
security service:
1. The leaders' school of the security police in Berlin-Charlottenburg.
2. The elementary school of the security police in
Fuerstenberg/Mecklenburg.
The establishment of special sport and technical schools is planned.
The criminal-technical institute [KTI] is available for all chemical
and physical experiments and research to the whole security police.
The chief of the security police and of the security service is
president of the international criminal-police commission. Through this
personal union an especially close exchange of findings and methods of
the German criminal police with other nations which are also connected
with the IKpK is assured.
IV. Higher SS and Police Leaders
Higher SS and police leaders are installed for the area of every
military district [Wehrkreis] as well as in the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia, in the General Government, in Norway, the Netherlands and
in parts of the occupied area of the Soviet Union, who are in their
areas the representatives of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the
German police in regard to all duties for which the Reichsfuehrer SS
and Chief of German Police is responsible.
Inspectors of the order and security police are subordinate to the
higher SS and police leaders.
[P. 83]
Inspectors (Commanders) of the Security Police and Security Service
Inspectors of the Security Police and Security Service--without
prejudice to their subordination to the higher SS and police
leaders--are installed in the field of responsibility of the security
police in corresponding manner for the exercise of inspectoral
authority.
Outside of territory strictly a part of the Reich, commanders of the
security police and security service are appointed whose duty it is to
lead the security police forces employed there.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1292-PS
Fuehrer Headquarters, 4th Jan. 1944
To Rk. 13402 c Double
Ref.: Allocation of Labor 1944
1. A conference took place with the Fuehrer to-day which was attended
by:
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel,
The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal
Keitel,
General Field Marshal Milch,
The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary
Backe,
The Minister of the Interior, Reich Fuehrer of the SS, Himmler,
and myself.
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy
had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the
Conference, but the Fuehrer did not wish their attendance).
The Fuehrer declared in his introductory remarks:
I want a clear picture:
(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of German War
Economy?
(a) For the maintenance of present output?
(b) To increase its output?
(2) How many workers can be obtained from Occupied Countries, or how
many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means (increased
output)?
For one thing, it is this matter of making up for losses by death,
infirmity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so forth, and
further it is a matter of procuring additional workers.
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared
that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers, he would have
to add at least 2-1/2 but probably 3 million new workers in 1944.
Otherwise production would fall off. Reichminister _Speer_ declared
that he needs an _additional_ 1.3 million laborers. However, this
would depend on whether it will be possible to increase production of
iron ore. Should this not be possible, he would need no additional
workers. Procurement of additional workers from Occupied Territory
would, however, be subject to the condition that these workers will
not be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already
working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of
these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance,
who are already working in France in industries mentioned above,
must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the
Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuehrer agreed with
the opinions of Reichminister Speer and emphasized that the measures
taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor should order
no circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from
Armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied territories,
because such a shift of workers would only cause disturbance of
production in occupied countries.
The Fuehrer further called attention to the fact that at least 250,000
laborers will be required for preparations against air attacks in the
field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna alone 2000-2500 are
required immediately. The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor
must add at least 4 million workers to the manpower pool, considering
that he requires 2-1/2 million workers for maintenance of the present
level, that Reich Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers,
and that the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against
air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.
The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that
he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain these workers.
Until now, he has always kept his promise as to the number of workers
to be furnished. With the best of intentions, however, he is unable to
make a definite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his powers
to furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed
depends primarily on what _German_ enforcement agents will be made
available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement
agents.
The Reichfuehrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his
disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel
project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder. The
Reichfuehrer SS made immediately available 2000 to 2500 men from
concentration camps for air raid preparations in Vienna.
Generally all participants in the conference agreed that it will be
possible to treat additional manpower even at home by activation and
intensification of available labor, especially the Prisoners of War,
provided they are given awards in form of additional food, clothing,
and so forth. State Secretary Backe will examine to which extent help
can be given with additional food. Field Marshal _Milch_ remarked that
especially in agriculture, many women, who are really able to work,
evade it because they receive family-allotments from their husbands
who were inducted into the Armed Forces, and the wages for work done
would be deducted from their family allotment. In their primitive way
of thinking they therefore believe that they would have to work for
nothing. Therefore on one hand, wages should not be deducted from the
family allotment; on the other hand, it should be ruled that women who
refuse work would, in consequence, receive no family allotment, or only
a reduced family allotment.
The Fuehrer did not comment, declaring that he did not wish to go into
details any longer.
Results of the Conference:
(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure at least
4 million new workers from occupied territories.
(2) These workers may not be taken from armament and auxiliary
industries in actual production in the occupied territories.
(3) It is to be examined by what means the output of workers now on
hand can be increased and intensified, especially that of Prisoners of
War.
(4) The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor shall get in touch
with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs before taking any action.
Signed: Dr. Lammers
II. Reichleiter Bormann has received a copy of paragraph I.
III. To the State Secretary for cognizance.
IV. Original to Mr. C. Please return. (Arrival at Fuehrer Headquarters,
6 January 1944.)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Financing of the armament
The following explanations take as their premise the fact that the
execution of the armament program is by its speed and extent _the_
mission of German policy, that everything else therefore must be
subordinated to this purpose, unless the neglect of other questions
would endanger the main goal. Even after 16 March 1935, the difficulty
continues to exist, that one cannot attempt the influencing of the
German people by propaganda for support of the armament, without
endangering internationally our position. The financing of the armament
program, already almost impossible, is being made especially difficult
by that.
Further, another prerequisite must be presented. The printing press
can only be used for the financing of armament to the extent which the
maintenance of money value allows. Each inflation increases the prices
of foreign raw materials, and increases the prices within the country;
thus it is a snake, which bites its tail. The fact that our armament
had to be camouflaged completely until 16 March 1935, and for the
biggest part even afterwards, has led to that, that the printing press
has already been made use of at the start of the armament program;
whereas it would have been natural to put it at the final point of the
financing. Of the 3775 millions in the portfolio of the Reichsbank plus
866 millions set aside in bills of exchange==total of 4641 millions,
the bills of exchange to finance armament represent 2374 millions
(status of 30 April 1935). The Reichsbank has invested most of the
German mark sums, available to its administration and belonging to
foreigners, in armament bills of exchange. Thus our armament was partly
financed with the property of our political opponents. Also used for
the financing of the armament program were the 500 millions RM, which
came together through the Reich loan placed at the savings banks in Jan
1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided for the
armed forces: fiscal year 1933/34 RM 750 millions, fiscal year 1934/35
RM 1100 millions, fiscal year 1935/36 RM 2500 millions.
The sum of the deficits of the budgets increase since 1928, according
to the estimate 1935/36, up to 5 to 6 billions RM. At present this
total deficit is already being financed by short-term credits from the
money market. Thus it already burdens in this amount the possibilities
of use of the public market for armament. The Reich Minister of Finance
is justified in saying in his budget explanations: "Since an annual
deficit ... is an impossibility permanently, since one cannot count
with certainty on an increased tax income, covering the deficit and
other previous debts; since on the other hand only a balanced budget
offers a secure basis for our great future task in the armament policy,
fundamentally and consciously--a budget policy must be followed, which
will solve the problem of financing of armament by organic and planned
decrease of other expenses, not only from the point of view of income,
but also of expenses, that means saving."
How urgent this demand is can further be construed from the fact that
an unending number of tasks were attacked and are in the process
of execution by state and party, all of which cannot be covered by
the budget but by subscriptions and credits, which must be raised
besides the regular taxes by business. This simultaneous existence
of various budgets, which however all serve a more or less public
purpose, present the greatest obstacle to the gaining of a clear
picture of the financing possibilities of armament. A whole series of
ministries and numerous agencies of the party have their own budget
in addition to their share of the Reich budget, and thus accordingly
income and expense possibilities, which, although they are based on
the financial sovereignty of the state, are not subordinated to the
control of the Minister of Finance and thus also not to the control of
the cabinet. Exactly as in the field of politics, the too far reaching
delegation of legislative authority to individuals in Germany has led
to the condition of many states within the state, thus the condition
of parallelism and divergence [Nebeneinander und Gegeneinander]
of numerous state and party agencies has absolutely a disastrous
effect on the financing possibility of armament. If in this field,
no concentration and no unified control is introduced finally, one
must fear the worst for the solution of the almost impossible task of
financing of armament.
Thus the following tasks result:
1. A commissioner must at first determine all sources and incomes,
which are derived from Reich, State and Party funds, as well as from
profits of public or party enterprises.
2. Then, a commission, appointed by the Fuehrer must investigate how
these funds were used up to now, and how much can be taken from these
funds in the future from their present purpose, and made available to
the financing of armament.
3. The same commission has to examine the assets of all public and
official party organizations, how the assets have been invested, and to
what extent these assets can be utilized for the financing of armament.
4. The Reichministry of Finance is to be commissioned to investigate
the possibilities of an increased tax income by the introduction of new
taxes or the increase of existing tax rates.
The financing of armament previously by the Reich Bank was a necessity
under the existing political conditions, and the political success
has proved the correctness of this action. However, now other methods
of financing of armament must be attempted under all conditions. With
that, all not absolutely necessary expenses in other fields must
be refrained from, and the entire, actually small, financial power
of Germany must be concentrated on this one goal, the financing of
armament. Whether the financial problem will succeed with this method
of approach is as yet doubtful, but without such concentration it will
fail with certainty.
Memorandum 9.III.1936 on the supply situation in the field of fuels and
its effect on the Wehrmacht.
The simultaneous throttling and blocking of foreign sources of liquid
fuel has caused an increasingly critical situation of supply of the
German market since the beginning of the year 1936.
This situation calls for a description of the serious effects on the
preparedness for action of the Wehrmacht and of the extraordinary
measures which necessitate a decision in this matter.
The supply of the Wehrmacht is based on the home production, the
reserves which can be made available in case of mobilization and the
foreign imports which still for some time must fill the present gaps of
supply.
I. _The German production._
The anticipating measures taken during the last 2 years by the Reich
Cabinet to increase the home production of fuel, will not bring about
an essential improvement of the supply situation during the current
year because of the time required for factory construction and the
uninterrupted increase of demand, but cannot bring an appreciable
relief until the year 1938. The list in enclosure 1 of the requirements
in case of mobilization and of the supply of these requirements by
production, as well as the graphs added to the other enclosures, show
the influence to be expected from the German production on the entire
supply.
The expanding German production favors mainly light fuels, especially
fuel for airplanes, and in addition, oil for airplane engines. As to
the other kinds required by the Wehrmacht in case of war, we cannot
expect any improvement for the time being; as to heating oils it may be
anticipated that the situation will deteriorate. The developments of
new processes (Uhde and Pott), the extent of which will shortly permit
an opinion, offers certain possibilities of auxiliary supply which do
not appear on the graphs, because the extent of the production possible
until 1938 cannot yet be foreseen.
The inadequacy of the supply on the basis of home production is a fact
which cannot be eliminated during the next 2-3 years, even with the
greatest efforts and in spite of the planning started for additional
expansion of production.
II. _Reserves._
To assure the requirements of the Wehrmacht it becomes necessary
to bridge the supply gaps by reserves. For the first period of
mobilization the Wehrmacht relies on the reserves of business,
especially of great importing corporations, which also in peace time
consider stored reserves for about 3 months as indispensable for smooth
distribution. The Wehrmacht ought to be enabled to count on the amount
of these reserves remaining constant.
Beyond that the Wehrmacht accumulates its own reserves in large storage
houses so that considerable national reserves will be available as
buffers in case of supply difficulties.
III. _Dependency of the overall supply on imports._
The obstacle to importing encountered to a large extent during the
last weeks, and which have been brought about by an accumulation of
economic-political events in foreign trade, endanger not only the
maintenance of industrial reserves but also the continuation of the
storage policy of the Wehrmacht. They shake the very foundations of the
motorization program of industry and consequently also of Wehrmacht
mobilization of mechanized vehicles to the extent planned for in case
of war.
In particular large gaps have been opened:
1. due to the Russian prohibition of exporting petroleum, by which the
benzol-association supplying about 20% of the German market got into
considerable difficulties.
2. due to suddenly considerably increased demands of the Rumanians,
who offer fuel only in exchange for foreign bills proper [Bardevisen]
and/or at greatly increased prices in marks. The contribution of
Rumanian imports to the supply of German requirements was 40% during
the last year. The firm Olex which contributes 11% to the German market
has already been forced, due to the obstruction of Rumanian deliveries,
to decrease its business considerably, and will face a close-down of
its market supply if relief is not procured before June 1936. Due to
this reduction of imports similar stoppages are to be expected by the
other great organizations of distribution during the same period.
IV. _Means to secure the supply._
In considering how to meet the situation the following devices are
_unbearable_ for the Wehrmacht:
1. Reduction of mechanized traffic because this would, in addition to
precarious economic and psychological effects, bring about a throttling
of German motorization, which in view of the requirements of the
Wehrmacht in case of war, would be a shock to mobility and supply of
replacements.
2. Just as undesirable is to be considered the diminishing of reserves.
The industrial reserves constitute the basis for mobilization, which
has to rely on firm figures which remain about constant. As a decrease
of reserves has already started, the further development in this
direction is to be counteracted immediately. Aid from the reserves of
the Wehrmacht cannot be granted because these modest quantities being
ultimate reserves cannot be diminished under any circumstances.
Consequently, only the following means are to be considered:
1. Conceding to the Rumanian demands of paying imports in marks on a
considerably raised price-basis.
2. Additional payments in foreign bills proper [Bardevisen] of imports
from Anglo-Saxon countries.
3. Investigation to what extent an improvement can be achieved by
accelerating or expanding the facilities for German production.
The first course has been followed by the authorization to negotiate
new contracts on the basis of the Rumanian demands. Adequate and
punctual delivery to the market, however, is not yet assured hereby.
Re. 2. Foreign bills [Devisen] for the minimum of the indispensable
import requirements can probably be obtained only by reduction of
import of other necessities. The narrow limits of the presently assured
raw materials for armament do not allow for a decrease of such imports
which are indispensable for the Wehrmacht. In particular we cannot do
without the necessary quantities of metals required by the Wehrmacht
for current procurements.
Re. 3. As a result of investigations made, essential changes cannot be
expected at a date within sight.
V. _Uniform management of the petroleum industry._
During the last few months the Wehrmacht has repeatedly emphasized
the unavoidable call for a uniform and planned steering of the entire
German petroleum industry. The present dangerous situation of the
German fuel industry puts this necessity again into the spotlight. The
lack of stern guidance in the present moment must lead to severest
damages to the public and the defense of the country. The duty of a
management according to plans of the petroleum industry must be in the
first line to avert the permanent threat to mechanized traffic and
the preparedness of the Wehrmacht for action lying in the extensive
dependency on forces outside of the German sphere of control.
* * * * *
_Enclosure 1_ to "memorandum on the supply situation in the field of
fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht" of 9 March 36.
-----------------------------+--------------------+----------------------
| |Supply of requirements
|Mob. requirements | by production
-----------------------------+---------+----------+------------+---------
| 1936 | 1938 | 1936 | 1938
| t/Jahr | t/Jahr | % | %
| | | |
Light fuels for car | | | |
engines | 900 000 | 1 530 000| 43 | 60.5
| | | |
Light fuels for airplane | | | |
engines | 460 000 | 600 000| 39 | 61.5
| | | |
(illegible), Fuel oil | 650 000 | 1 280 000| 11.6 | 22
| | | |
Heating oil | 800 000 | 1 200 000| 30.6 | 22
| | | |
Lubricating oil for car | | | |
engines | 80 000 | 150 000| 22.5 | 23
| | | |
Lubricating oil for airplane | | | |
engines | 35 000 | 55 000| - | 22
-----------------------------+---------+----------+------------+---------
IIa Needed raw materials 4/28/1936 with consideration of the program
for the supply of ammunition, amounting to 200 million marks [Mil. RM.]
(for the months of April 1936 to March 1937=12 months)
_Supply needed, submitted to R.Wi.Min._ (letter of 1/1336.)
Copper 5400 t/month (without plate VIII)
lead 2300 t/month (without plate VIII)
zinc 3100 t/month (without plate VIII)
_Supply needed, considering the 200 Mill-plan._
Copper 5850 t/month (without plate VIII)
lead 3350 t/month (without plate VIII)
zinc 4020 t/month (without plate VIII)
Therefore the _additional_ need amounts to
Copper 450 t/month
lead 1050 t/month
zinc 920 t/month
_Raw materials needed by parts of the Armed Forces_
(for the months of April 1936 to March 1937)
copper 4830 670 175 175 5850
lead 2750 280 300 20 3350
zinc 2420 160 260 1180 4020
* * * * *
SECRET
_Raw materials needed by the armed forces during the years 1935 and
1936_
---------------------------------------+-----------+-------------
_Raw materials_ |_need 1936_| _t/month 1935_
---------------------------------------+-----------+-------------
_Iron and steel_ | |
| |
Iron ore Fe | 130,000 | 80,000
| |
Manganese ore Mn | 7,000 | 4,000
| |
Chromium 0,5 C | 220 | 88
| |
0,5 C | 160 | 86
| |
Wolfram | 80 | 15
| |
Molybdenum | 40 | 8
| |
Vanadium | 3 | 1
| |
Tantalum | 2 | 0.5
| |
Silicon | 400 | 250
| |
_Non-iron metals_ | |
| |
Copper | 7,500(1)| 4,670
| |
Lead | 6,500(2)| 3,520
| |
Nickel | 275 | 174
| |
Tin | 150 | 89
| |
Zinc | 3,100(3)| 1,830
| |
Aluminum | 2,720 | 1,900
| |
Antimone | 55 | 25
| |
Cadmium | 10 | 0.62
| |
Mercury | 20 | 12
| |
Cobalt | 10 | 3
| |
_Leather goods (economy)_ | |
| |
skins and pelts | 1 300 | 1 400
| |
natural tanning matter | 800 | 860
| |
_Wood_ | |
| |
special foreign timber | 170 | 150
| |
_Grain, fodder and further | |
agricultural products_ | |
| |
linseed | 1 500 | 1 900
| |
_Coal and Salt_ | |
| |
oil coke and Pitch coke--of these 1500 | |
t/month to produce the aluminum | |
needed by the armed forces. | 1 700 | 1 300
| |
_Various goods_ | |
| |
diamonds, amounting to a value of | RM. 15 000| 11 000RM
| /month |
| |
cane | 200 | 160
| |
mica | 18 | 15
| |
magnesite | 1 200 | 1 000
| |
_Rubber and asbestos_ | |
| |
rubber | 280 | 150
| |
asbestos [spinasbest] | 100 | 70
| |
_Fat for industrial purposes_ | |
| |
glycerine | 165 | 120
| |
_Petroleum oils_ | |
| |
gas for plane engines | 7 000 | 4 000
| |
light fuel f. motor vehicles | 3 000 | 1 500
| |
lubrication oil f. plane engines | 700 | 200
| |
lubrication oil f. motor vehicles | 500 | 150
| |
gas-oil, (diesel) | 7 500 | 1 200
| |
heating oil | 15 000 | 6 000
---------------------------------------+-----------+-------------
Note: 1. for cables 2100 t/months; starting on 1 Apr. 36 possibly only
6000 t/month, including 2100 t/ for cables;
Note: 2. for cables 4200 t/months; starting 1 Apr. 36 7800 t/months
which means 5500 t/month for cables;
Note: 3. from this amount: sheet-zinc in the limits of the quota of
the association of zinc-rolling-mills 340 t/month; starting 1 Apr. 36
possibly only 2700 t/month including sheet-zinc.
Situation re fuel
---------------------+----------------------+-----------------------+
| Fuel for motorized | Fuel for airplanes |
| vehicles | |
|----------+-----------+----------+------------+
| Peace 36 | Case of | Peace 36 | Case of |
| | mobil. 38 | | mobil. 38 |
---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------+
Total need of | | |
armed forces | | |
and economy | | |
t/year | 2,000,000 1,650,000 | 80,000 600,000 |
| | |
Production in entire | | |
Reich-territory | | |
t/year | 900,000 | 80,000 |
| | |
Missing quantity | | |
t/year | 1,100,000 750,000 | - 520,000 |
| | |
New planning | 700,000 | 300,000 |
---------------------+----------------------+-----------------------+
+----------------------+ ----------------------+
| Gas-Oil | |
| Diesel | Heating fuel |
|---------+------------+----------+------------+
|Peace 36 | Case of | Peace 36 | Case of |
| | mobil. 38 | | mobil. 38 |
---------------------+---------+------------+----------+------------+
Total need of | | |
armed forces | | |
and economy | | |
t/year |800,000 1,300,000 | 500,000 1,200,000 |
| | |
Production in entire | | |
Reich-territory | | |
t/year | 280,000 | 270,000 |
| | |
Missing quantity | | |
t/year |520,000 1,020,000 | 230,000 930,000 |
| | |
New planning | 200,000 | ? |
---------------------+----------------------+-----------------------+
---------------------+----------------------+---------------------
| Oil for motor | Oil for airplane
| vehicles | engines
|----------+-----------+----------+----------
| Peace 36 | Case of | Peace 36 | Case of
| | mobil. 38 | | mobil. 38
--------------------+----------+-----------+----------+----------
Total need of | |
armed forces | |
and economy | |
t/year | 75,000 150,000 | 5,000 55,000
| |
Production in entire | |
Reich-territory | |
t/year | 20,000 | -
| |
Missing quantity | |
t/year | 55,000 130,000 | 5,000 55,000
| |
New planning | 20,000 | 15,000
---------------------+----------------------+---------------------
Copy
Berlin, 15 May 1936
Prime minister General Goering
Raw material and Foreign exchange staff
Top Secret
To the Reichminister of war Generaldfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Enclosed, a record of the conference of the council of ministers of 12
May 1936 in the afternoon is forwarded.
By order
/s/ Loeb
Lt. Col. in the General Staff
* * * * *
Top Secret
_Record of the council of ministers on 12 May 1936 1700 hours_
Chairman: Prime minister General Goering.
Reichminister of War Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg.
Reichsbank President and acting Reich and Prussian minister for
Economy Dr. Schacht
Reichminister of Finance Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
Prussian minister of Finance Prof. Dr. Popitz as the recording
secretary Lt. Col. in the General Staff Loeb
_Minister Schacht_: shows the development up to now when two years ago,
the decision for rearmament was made, it was decided to carry out the
financing mainly outside the means of the Reichministry of Finance.
This meant the commitment of the last reserve from the very beginning.
A decision which did not seem without hazards. The memorandum of 3 May
1936 says the same thing.
In the course of the last two years, the program was increased more and
more in its extent and speed. Thus the requirements to the Reichsbank
were increased steadily.
It would be necessary to create, as basis for financing, a steady,
prosperous economy, and therefore renounce the execution of other,
partially irrational ideas and aims of the party. The psychological
prerequisite was not disturbed by the party as such, but by many
individual groups of the party, again and again; personal attacks
against Dr. Schacht and thus against the economy followed. Dr. Schacht
has emphasized again and again, that one must follow a cultural and
legal policy, which will leave economy alone. However one must not
describe it as greedy and selfish from the beginning.
Also money theories of the most variable kind have been published
repeatedly, thus causing anxiety for the economy; to counteract this
was practically impossible, as the propaganda machine of the party did
not permit this.
Despite all this, Dr. Schacht continued to work, because he stands
with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he fully recognizes
the basic idea of national socialism and because at the end, the
disturbances, compared to the great task, can be considered irrelevant.
Previously, approximately 11 billion marks besides the budget have been
raised for rearmament and re-employment without shaking the rates of
exchange and currency; the rate of interest could be lowered.
The Fuehrer has repeatedly emphasized in personal talks and cabinet
meetings, that the speed of rearmament must be kept up until the spring
of 1936. This was agreed to and carried out.
_Prime Minister Goering_: has never heard about this time limitation.
_Minister Schacht_: The main question for the further execution of
the program is, how much money can be gotten out of business. Some 2
billion can be consolidated annually by long term loans, 8 to 9 billion
cannot be asked for; the possibility of making available depends on the
development of the money market. Full concentration of the money market
through the Reichsbank is necessary.
If the Reichsbank should have to issue more notes than could be born by
the currency, one must reach back to other factors.
Dr. Schacht will never be part to an inflation; the Fuehrer also has
decided in this sense. The danger of such a development is imminent. If
a road is to be taken, which contains this danger, Dr. Schacht would
like to drop out on time, so that he does not disturb the new course.
Dr. Schacht considers it impossible, that prices can be fixed by the
state, if the same money policy is continued.
_Prime Minister Goering_: What is the basis of currency with the
Reichsbank?
_Minister Schacht_: This question has nothing to do with the gold
standard. It is a question of something imponderable, to recognize the
time of which must be left up to fine sensitivity. If by a surplus of
money, the danger of devaluation of the mark exists, the state can and
must take action from the financial side by taxes, etc. Considering
the material factor, it must be determined, that we are dependent for
numerous goods on foreign countries. Even small percentages as a whole
have considerable effect. In many cases, the necessity for import
is caused by trade political relations; therefore the raw-material
situation may not only be viewed and attacked from the production
within Germany. The foreign relations must be decreased all of a
sudden. For instance the negotiations with Standard and Shell were
carried out on this basis.
_Prime Minister Goering_: When substitutes [ersatzstoffe] are
sufficient in quantity, we shall no longer need the import, which
presents us such difficulties.
_Minister Schacht_: In a series of cases, to be able to carry out the
import, work from within Germany was utilized for compensation, for
instance tankers for oil import corporations.
However it is especially required that nothing be said about intentions
and measures of this field in public, so as not to aggravate the
importers.
_Prime Minister Goering_: If the Fuehrer has expressed himself in this
direction, he did it to counteract the increasing pessimism in the
country in respect to this field.
_Minister Schacht_: In any case, all anxiety must be prevented.
Foreign exporters have already shown less readiness to deliver against
certificate of foreign exchange, since they apparently have no
confidence in the cashing of these certificates.
_Prime Minister Goering_: Our raw material situation is generally known
to the world. The article published in the papers on 28 April 1936 did
not contain anything secret. Actually the confidence abroad should
have been increased by this publication, because generally the opinion
was held abroad that Dr. Schacht was protected by the Prime Minister
against the party.
_Minister Schacht_: The situation at present is thus:
Some 64 million marks are already claimed by reimbursement.
We must buy especially crude rubber and textiles; we have practically
no crude rubber. Cellulose wool is not an adequate substitute,
especially not for export goods.
The necessity for the closing down of manufacturing plants will soon
result from this accordingly.
It must be decided whether the available gold should be all spent at
the present speed or whether it should already be slowed down.
Swedish ores are still available for about 3 months. The export to
Sweden becomes more difficult, and thus the import possibilities
decrease.
_Prime Minister Goering_: is of the opinion that our export to Sweden
continues, so that one can further count on import.
_Minister Schacht_: The raw material supply of Germany amounted at the
beginning of the war to a value of about 7 to 8 billions; now it is
less than 1 billion.
_Prime Minister Goering_: has heard repeatedly, that export business
was refused by the Reichminister for Economy. In the future, the
departments will be caused by him to re-examine such occurrences;
perhaps then it will work differently than until now.
_Minister Schacht_: Increase of our export appears improbable in the
near future. Further obligations arise through the Foreign Office, the
Reichsbank, Post Office, Party and other agencies; soon the consular
service cannot be paid any more.
The time will come, when we will have no longer any reserves of either
raw materials or foreign exchange at our disposal.
_Prime Minister Goering_: If we have war to-morrow, we must help
ourselves by substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If
that is the case, then we must be ready to create the prerequisites
for that in peace. The account just described could have also been
presented, in his opinion, in the meeting this morning.
_Minister Schacht_: Publication is recommended for only the smallest
circle.
_Prime Minister Goering_: It is necessary to inform the people required
for the execution.
_Minister Schacht_: In his opinion only the ministers, not the
state secretaries. In addition, each department must be called in
individually.
_Prime Minister Goering_: The psychological prerequisites for the
correct approach to the work must be created everywhere. The actual
work is done by the state-secretaries and the experts. In the future
one must go much more into detail; confidence in the persons employed
in this is absolute necessity.
_Prime Minister Goering_: summarizes the explanation by Minister
Schacht: In short, demands on the Reichsbank can no longer be covered;
only 64 million marks are still available.
_Minister Schacht_: declares that besides these 64 million Reichsmarks
in the private banks, there are another 72 million gold with the
Reichsbank.
_Prime Minister Goering_: continues with the summary: The shortage of
raw material is known in its extent. A considerable increase is no
longer possible, in the opinion of Minister Schacht.
_Minister Schacht_: The production of raw materials within Germany
finds its limitation there, when an increase of prices of export goods
is created by it.
_Prime Minister Goering_: One can separate requirements within Germany
and export. Even the smallest details are important. The following
appears necessary.
1. Increase of export despite all difficulties.
2. The raw material coverage within Germany.
3. The possibly necessary resettlement of workers and food-fundamentals
for the execution of all measures.
These problems all affect each other, so that the participation of all
departments is necessary.
Appropriate example: Position of the farmer, who does not utilize the
available possibility of intensifying of fertilizing, because the
capital lost is not bearable for him in case of bad harvests. In such a
case, the risk lying with the weather must be partially taken from the
farmer by a special organization.
The Reichministry of Finance must also be consulted greatly in
reference to the regular budget. Re-awakening of thriftiness in all
fields belongs to this program.
_Minister Popitz_: The final conclusions made by Dr. Schacht are
clear and convincing, under the condition that the bases for these
conclusions are correct. That must be examined. It must be determined
again, whether the principles, according to which the present raw
material and foreign currency policy has been carried out with such a
big success, are unalterable and correct.
The time when perhaps an inflation is feared is unclear; actually it is
already here, even if it has a bearable extent.
An increase of export cannot be expected with the present system.
However it is to be examined, whether there is not a better system.
The basis of the present economic policy is deflationary. However it
appears impossible to integrate the deflation into an actually existing
inflation. It must be discussed, whether forced economy of export is to
be continued.
It is to be examined further, whether the money for rearmament can be
drawn out from the remaining economy. In no case may the condition
arise, that the Reichminister for Finance and the Reichminister for
Economy push the responsibility for the providing of funds to each
other.
The difference between 2 billion Reichsmarks, which the Reichsbank
believes to be able to raise on a long term basis, and the 8 to 9
billion Reichsmarks required for armament, cannot be covered by taxes.
Therefore the following suggestion:
1. The raw material question, which can be solved comparatively simply,
must be attended to at once by a special committee.
2. Illuminate critically the export question, so to say, in a
scientific manner.
_Minister von Krosigk_: Economy of foreign exchange in detail is
necessary. In that, small things also play a part. Equal saving is
necessary in spending money within Germany. In contrast to Minister
Popitz, he is of the opinion that expenses for armament must be taken
over more and more by the regular budget. Expenses above this budget
are to be covered
a. by long term consolidation of annually some 2 billion marks.
b. by short term bills of exchange and similarly.
The financing has succeeded up to now by these two means.
However the danger exists, the short-term bills of exchange can no
longer be negotiated, so that flooding of the Reichsbank with MEFO
bills would have an increased printing of banknotes as consequence.
_Minister Popitz_: In this case, printing of bank notes is only
necessary if the money is absolutely necessary for payment of wages
among other unavoidable things.
_Minister von Krosigk_: The decisive question for that is, whether
inflation would actually happen by printing of banknotes to this
extent. He does not believe so. The increase of prices observed so far
was not caused by monetary reasons, but can be derived from increase
of prices for raw materials and agricultural products. Thus one cannot
speak of an inflation.
_Prime Minister Goering_: does not believe that an inflation would
happen from the monetary angle.
Measures which in a state with a parliamentary government would
probably bring about inflation, do not have to have the same results in
a totalitarian state.
Important for this is the application of an appropriate propaganda,
so that the co-operation of the propaganda ministry, promised by the
Fuehrer, is of great importance.
_Minister Schacht_: gives a summary of the holdings of bills of
exchange in the Reichsbank at present:
4,353,000,000.--RM bills of exchange
3,731,000,000.--RM of which are in MEFO bills of exchange
2,200,000.--MEFO bills of exchange are deposited in clearing accounts.
More than 5 billions in bills of exchange are deposited thus, that
they can be presented immediately in case of disturbances of the money
market, caused by any measure. Therefore any disturbance must be
prevented under all conditions.
_Prime Minister Goering_: agrees to be the "shield" for the measure of
financial nature, so that no disturbances would happen.
The regular budget is to take over the current upkeep of the armed
forces, but not the costs of the reconstruction.
_Minister Popitz_: It is to be examined whether the regular budget
cannot be relieved from interests and amortization quotas of advance
drawings. Even the observing of the international bank law cannot
prevent the using of these recognized necessary measures in this
direction.
If the economy is started by increased export, naturally the
circulation of money will increase and with that the possibility of
further financing.
If the money, which had to be put into circulation, is only used for
payment of wages, no inflation can take place.
_Prime Minister Goering_: orders:
1. Determination as rapidly as possible of the basis of payment.
2. Beginning of the execution work in the realm of raw material
production within Germany.
3. Examination of the question of the export system.
In the next conference, contemplated for Friday afternoon, the
examination of the export system is to take place.
First under his chairmanship (Goering's) the ministers Dr. Schacht,
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk and Prof. Dr. Popitz will consult each other.
Then, immediately thereafter, the suggestions voiced there are to be
discussed by a board of experts. The following were named for this
board:
By Minister Schacht:
Reichsbank Director Brinkman
Reichsbank Director Blessing
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Sarnow
By Minister von Blomberg:
Dr. Trendelenburg
By Minister Popitz:
Dr. Springorum
Dr. Sogemeier
Further
Reg. Burgermeister Kroogmann
Prof. Wayemann
and others, who will be appointed by the Prime Minister.
_Prime Minister Goering_: states that he can expect and demand
discipline from the party, so that the protection of the individual
auditor, called, is guaranteed.
Close of the conference; 1910.
Summary of the raw material situation 2 May
----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Iron ores | Aluminum |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
Total requirement for | peace | case of | peace | case of |
the armed forces | 1936 |mobil. 1938| 1936 |mobil. 1938|
and the industry | | | | |
(estimated) | | | | |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
| 9.5 | 11 | 105,000 | 160,000 |
| million | million | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
Production entire | | |
Reich industry | 1.8 million | 96,000 |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
Deficit | 7.7 | 9.2 | 9,000 | 64,000 |
| million | million | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
Excess | -- | -- | -- | -- |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
Tentative plans for | 1.2 million | -- |
expansion of own | proposal Keppler | |
production | | |
----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
----------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------+
| Crude Rubber | Cellulose wool |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------+-----------+
Total requirement for | peace | case of | peace | case of |
the armed forces | 1936 |mobil. 1938| 1936 |mobil. 1938|
and the industry | | | | |
(estimated) | | | | |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------+-----------+
| 75,000 | 85,000 | 12,000- |depending |
| | | 70,000 |on import |
| | | |of natural |
| | | |fiber |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------+-----------+
Production entire | | |
Reich industry | 1000 | 12,000-70,000 |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------------------+
Deficit | 74,000 | 84,000 |any increase in |
| | |production would be |
| | |taken up by the |
| | |market |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------------------+
Excess | -- | -- | |
----------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------------------+
Tentative plans for | 2400 | first increase until |
expansion of own | | end of 1936 70,000 t |
production | | |
----------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------+
Berlin, 30 May 1936
Behrenstrasse 68-70
Telephone A 2 0048
Prime Minister General Goering
Raw Material and Foreign Exchange Staff
Journal No. * * * /36
[initial] BG th 2/6
[initial]
Rubber Stamp Top Secret
To the Reichminister of War Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Berlin
Enclosed, a report of the conference of the council of ministers of 27
May 1936, is forwarded.
By Order
Loeb
Lt. Col. in the General Staff
1 Inclosure:
* * * * *
Top Secret
Copy of meeting of Minister on 27 May 36, at 1130 o'clock.
Chairman: Ministerpraesident Generaloberst Goering
Reichskriegsminister Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Reischsbankpraesident und kommissarischer Reichs- und Preussischer
Wirtschaftsminister Dr. Schacht
Reichsfinanzminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
Preussischer Finanzminister Prof. Dr. Popitz
Recording Secretary: Lt. Col in the General Staff Loeb
_Prime Minister Goering_: The two sessions of the board of experts held
so far have brought forth interesting discussions. Naturally, opinions
frequently disagree. The experts are invited to state their concepts in
writing.
Today, discussion concerning the question of substitute-material. What
objections are made to the production of war-raw materials within the
Reich?
_Minister Schacht_: Principly there is nothing to object; a solution of
the raw material problem by self-producing is absolutely necessary and
agreed with, theoretically.
Difficulties are encountered with regard to:
1. serious monetary strain because of investments. Providing money by
taxing capital is impossible. Circulation of money can not be increased
beyond a certain amount. Previous measures executed correctly and
without danger to monetary value. Further increase seems precarious;
matter of confidence. This point of view alone, however, not
determining; possible that funds could be drawn from industrial profits.
2. special scruples, regarding the cases where prices for substitute
[Ersatz] material are far beyond world-market prices, and therefore the
products cannot compete (for example: tires made from Buna). Adjustment
would further increase the excise tax on exports. Inflation cannot be
chosen, as this would immediately upset the state's budget.
It must be attempted to produce those raw materials within Germany
which are economically favorable; _for other raw materials ready
reserves for the case of mobilization_ [_Mobfall_]. Especially clear
is the situation of flax; the complete covering of the requirement is
possible; however not with hemp.
_Certain raw materials for war must be stocked._
These viewpoints are recognized and followed by the Reich ministry
for Economy. The execution is mainly dependent on the question of
funds. Therefore, necessity to save in all fields, to make saved funds
available for investment.
_Prime Minister Goering_: All measures are to be considered from the
standpoint of an assured waging of war.
Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in peace in
certain amounts.
It is to be attempted to use cheap imported raw materials for export
purposes, expensive raw materials from within Germany. In cases where
the price differences are small, probably creation of a settlement is
preferred.
_Minister Schacht_: This settlement can be carried out either by
compulsory mixing or by a price settlement by the state of the
expensive raw materials.
_In any case, price supervision must be introduced again._
_Minister Popitz_: Placing of the burden of increased prices on the
consumer is possible when the difference is only small.
The other possible method is sales monopoly or wholesale monopoly of
certain goods.
_Minister Schacht_: It is recommendable not to influence individual,
large fields, for instance textiles, by prices; but to concentrate
funds for the monetary subsidation of other fields of raw materials.
_Minister von Krosigk_: The question cannot generally be judged
theoretically, but only practically with the use of individual examples.
_Prime Minister Goering_: At first, the specially urgent petroleum
question is to be treated.
General agreement to that.
_Minister von Krosigk_: Present experience is that the beginning of new
methods of sale or price guarantee by the Reich results thus, that soon
new and cheaper production methods are found. This recommends a not too
sudden expansion of production.
_Prime Minister Goering_: Waiting for new methods is no longer
appropriate. Plan of the Reich forestry office for the utilization of
wood is ready. Import of timber must be cut down in any case; strongest
demands on German forests to be preferred at present and can be
advocated.
It is to be decided, whether at the beginning, a risk bonus over 6%
profit is to be granted.
_Minister Schacht_: turns against higher profits than 6%. Guarantee of
interest-bearing is to be preferred, and must be sufficient.
_Minister von Krosigk_: discusses the advantages of the amortization
program.
_Minister von Popitz_: In contracts many times rapid cancellation is
contemplated.
_Minister Schacht_: At the beginning more consideration is recommended,
later stronger concentration, with profit sharing by the Reich.
_Minister Popitz_: requests that the cancellation periods be
re-examined by a special committee.
_Prime Minister Goering_: The summary is to be prepared for the next
committee meeting about:
1. Inventory of German Raw Material possibilities.
2. Form of the present decrease.
3. Mobilization requirement.
4. How shall raw materials be handled? Especially clarifications
whether production within Germany is to start already in peace or
whether the stocking or reserves is more important.
Subject of petroleum also can be considered concluded, therefore is to
be handled immediately.
In the next council of Ministers, discussion of the agricultural
question, then Minister Darré and State secretary Backe present.
_Minister von Blomberg_: In the fuel industry it is to be decided
whether conversion to solid fuels should already be carried out
in peace, or whether, as in France, it is to be prepared for the
mobilization case. If possible and recommendable, increased use of tar
coke [Schwelkok], no diesel oil for railroads.
_Prime Minister Goering_: Economy also absolutely necessary and to be
insisted on in other fields of raw materials.
_Minister von Blomberg_: Examine as an example substitution of
heavy metal by light metal (for instance cans of aluminum): general
increase of the use of glass, especially for aerial bombs, maybe
also for grenades; use of plastics for wide fields, even as far as
transmissions. Certain hopes can be set on China. Therefore prevent
political estrangement. Careful advances in the approaching of Japan
necessary, at present the recognition of Manchukuo would be disastrous
for Mr. Klein's current plans in China.
_Prime Minister Goering_: Common front of China with Japan against
Soviet Russia can probably be produced.
[in green pencil] I did _not_ express myself so specifically BL/
_Minister von Blomberg_: Japan is doubtful as a factor of military
power.
_Prime Minister Goering_: Furthermore, the danger of Japan's turnabout
always exists.
Results of the China affair cannot be viewed clearly because of the
unclear inner political situation.
_Minister Schacht_: always has supported the attempts of Mr. Klein,
because he especially hopes for food, raw materials from China.
_Minister von Blomberg_: recommends further collaboration with the
Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft, with whom the Reichministry of War had
very good experiences. At its head is the scientific authority; other
imminent changes for solution proposed by the party unbearable.
_Minister Popitz_: Nomination of Geheimrat Bosch is possible for this
post, when his resignation from the IG is possible.
_Minister Schacht_: General complaints about the deterioration of
German science; this is also harmful for export, since the missing
replacement limits the execution of German engineering missions abroad
and thus German orders from abroad.
_Minister Popitz_: Seconds these complaints. Actions by the party which
remove the most important people is unbearable. Explanation by examples.
In the liberal arts, the consequences are not being felt immediately,
all the more so in the natural sciences. If service etc., should be
limited to the first two semesters of study, then full time and freedom
for scientific activity.
_Prime Minister Goering_: In Prussia then, difficulties are partially
removed. Influence of the liaison staff not always fortunate. Role of
Professor Wagner.
Puts to discussion a taking over of a Spanish tin source, which is
being offered from the Swedish side.
_Minister Schacht_: Basically in agreement, particularly when in a
partnership enterprise German achievements will result by deliveries of
machines.
_Prime Minister Goering_: asks Minister Schacht to conduct negotiations
in this spirit during his visit in Belgrade relative to Jugoslavia in
the near future.
_Minister Schacht_: The copper mining in Jugoslavia must take place by
excluding the French, who sell copper for foreign exchange only.
_Prime Minister Goering_: During the next ministerial session,
the investigation of the problems in the agricultural sector has
to be conducted in such a way that direct statements of Minister
Schacht/Minister Darré should be made about the single problematic
issues.
End of the session 13 o'clock.
Fuel-supply situation (1st draft of a plan for solution) 27 May 1936
--------------------------------+------------------+----------------------+
|Light vehicle fuel| Airplane fuel |
+--------+---------+----------+-----------+
| Peace | case of| Peace | case of |
| 36 | mobil. | 36 | mobil. |
| | 38 | | 38 |
--------------------------------+--------+---------+----------+-----------+
Total requirement Armed | | |
Forces and Industry tons/years|2,000,000 1,650,00| 80,000 600,000 |
| | |
Production in the entire | | |
Reich industry tons/years | 1,300,000 | |
| | |
Deficit from requirements | | |
of mobilization tons/years | 950,000 | |
| | |
To be covered by conversion | | |
(substitute fuel) | | |
| | |
Necessary new plans 950,000 | | |
| | |
Proposal for a solution | 3 Fischer plants of 320,000 tons |
| each by the end of 1937 |
| |
| |
Costs | 380 million RM |
--------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
+----------------------+
| Gas oil |
|----------+-----------+
| Peace | case of |
| 36 | mobil. |
| | 38 |
---------------------------------+----------+-----------+
Total requirement Armed | |
Forces and Industry tons/years | 800,000 1,300,000 |
| |
Production in the entire | |
Reich industry tons/years | 220,000 |
| |
Deficit from requirements | |
of mobilization tons/years | 1,080,000 |
| |
To be covered by conversion | |
(substitute fuel) | 200,000 |
| |
Necessary new plans 950,000 | 880,000 |
| |
Proposal for a solution |4 IG-Pott plants of |
|220,000 tons/year each|
| by end of 1937 |
| |
Costs | 400 million RM |
---------------------------------+----------------------+
---------------------------------+----------------------+
| Heating oil |
|----------+-----------+
| Peace | case of |
| 36 | mobil. |
| | 38 |
---------------------------------+----------+-----------+
Total requirement Armed | |
Forces and Industry tons/years |500,000 1,200,000 |
| |
Production in the entire | 270,000 |
Reich industry tons/years | |
| |
Deficit from requirements | 930,000 |
of mobilization tons/years | |
| |
To be covered by conversion | |
(substitute fuel) | |
| |
Necessary new plans 950,000 | 930,000 |
|3 Fischer whole-Pott |
Proposal for a solution |or distilling plants |
|of 310,000 tons/year |
|each |
| |
Costs | 370 million RM |
---------------------------------+----------------------+
Copy of draft
Top Secret
31 August 1936
The War Minister and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2001/36
Top Secret WH
4 copies--
1st copy--draft
2nd copy--Reich Air Ministry
3rd copy--Reich Ministry for Finances
4th copy--President of the Reichsbank
1. To the Reich Minister of Air and the Supreme Commander of the Air
Forces General Goering
Berlin W 8
Dear General Goering!
The negotiations conducted until now in the commission for foreign
exchange and raw materials which is under your leadership, have
already shown the necessity of dealing also with the financing of the
armed forces there also. I believe the time has now arrived that the
commission should take up the treatment of this problem.
As a preparation of such a discussion I suggest the following:
I. _Overstepping of the 1936 budget._
It has been proven, particularly from the decree issued 7 March 1936,
that the sum of about 10 billions of RM which was provided for the
Wehrmacht for 1936 is not sufficient.
1. Additional expenses in the _army_ are needed in first place for
a. the remilitarizing of the Rhineland
b. the fortification of the Rhineland
c. the setting up of all the 36 divisions already by 1 Oct 1936
d. the speeding-up of motorization, particularly the establishment of 4
fully motorized Infantry divisions.
e. the necessity of markedly increasing the reserve ammunition because
of the increased number of divisions.
f. industrial preparations in a great variety of fields.
2. In the _navy_ the required faster increase of personnel, the
building of a 4th entry to Wilhelmshaven and the refortification of
Helgoland cause additional expenses.
3. _Air Force_
a. According to an order of the Fuehrer, the setting up of all air
force units has to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable
expenditures have to be made in 1936 which at the time when the
budget for 1936 was made, were planned for later years only. Special
additional expenses are caused by the creation of sufficient ground
force personnel.
b. In the air force the first introduction of new types has to take
place in 1937. Therefore the required industrial preparations have to
begin in 1936.
It follows that an additional sum of at least 3.6 billions of RM will
be needed by the Wehrmacht for 1936.
Of this about 1 billion RM is allotted to Army and Navy together. In
the case of the Army and Navy, the execution of the orders and, in
consequence, the dead-lines for the payments of the deliveries lagged
quite considerably behind the placing of the orders. Therefore it can
be assumed that these 1 billion RM will not be needed _in cash_ before
1 Apr 1937. However, the orders for these 1 billion RM have been placed
and in the fiscal year 1937 these 1 billion RM will also be needed in
cash.
In the air force the additional expenditures amount to 2600 millions
RM. Here the execution of the orders from the budget funds of 1936
as well as of the orders for the additional requirements is in full
progress. The 2600 millions RM for the air force have to be made
available in the fiscal year 1936.
As yet it cannot be ultimately settled whether the introduction of the
two years' service will lead to further additional expenses.
II. _Requirements for 1937_
The preparatory works for the budget of 1937 have not been concluded.
At present the requirements for 1937 are estimated to be for:
1. the army 6.5 billions RM
2. the navy 1.2 billions RM
3. the air force 6.0 billions RM
----------------
Total 13.7 billions RM
Besides these 13.7 billions RM about 500 millions RM will be needed for
the Reich defense requirements of the civilian departments.
III. _Permanent requirements_
According to a recently conducted survey, the component of the armed
forces will have the following permanent requirement after the rearming
is completed:
1. Army 3.6 billions RM
2. Navy 0.73 billions RM
3. Air Force 2.507 billions RM
------------------
Total 6.837 billions RM
At present it is hardly possible to make an accurate estimate of the
permanent requirements. In the case of the Army it is very likely that
the amount for the permanent requirement will be considerably raised.
Later I will submit further material, particularly a statement about
the requirements for the years until the completion of the rearming, as
soon as the necessary inquiries are concluded.
I submitted copies of this letter to the Reich Minister for Finance,
and to the President of the Reichsbank.
Heil Hitler!
Yours,
[unsigned]
2. To the Reich Minister for Finances _Berlin W 8_
3. To the President of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht _Berlin SW 111_
Copy (of 1) for your kind information
4. WV
_Chief WA Chief WH_
signed P
_Remark_:
1. Major v. Wolff has given the letter addressed to General Goering to
Lt. Col. Bodenschatz on 31 Aug.
2. I have personally handed the letters 2 and 3 to the President of the
Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, and to the Reich Minister of Finance, Count
Schwerin von Krosigk, on Aug 31.
signed P
Copy authenticated Hollender Ministerial Councillor
30 Sept 36.
* * * * *
Note
[initialed] B [Blomberg?]
[initialed] K 2/9 [Keitel]
President Schacht called me to him today at 1300 and requested me to
forward the following to the Minister of War:
Schacht returned from the Fuehrer with the greatest anxiety, since he
could not agree to the economic program planned by the Fuehrer.
The Fuehrer wants to speak at the party convention [Parteitag] about
economic policy, and wants to emphasize there that we now want to
get free with all our energy from foreign countries by production in
Germany.
Schacht requests urgently that the Reichminister of War warn the
Fuehrer from this step.
If the Fuehrer emphasizes in front of the masses in Nurnberg, he will
receive a great amount of applause from the audience, but with it he
will bring failure to the entire commercial policy. There is only one
thing in our needy position: _the promotion of export_. _Every threat
against foreign countries_ however, will show contrary results.
We have reverses in the field of fuels until the middle of next
year, there will not be large amounts in the field of rubber. The
Renn-process in the field of ores is having great difficulties.
If we now shout out our decision abroad to make ourselves economically
independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer
survive the necessary transitory period.
Also, it must always be pointed out that German materials are at
present much too expensive to be used for export, and export alone
makes further armament possible.
If the food-basis of the people is not to be endangered, the Fuehrer
must refrain from his plan.
President Schacht concluded that he again requests urgently to listen
to this warning, and that he forwards it to the minister of war, as he
will not participate in to-morrow's conference.
Thomas 2/9 [in blue pencil]
[Translator's note: the following is written in pencil in the
original:]
_THOMAS in his memorandum:_
The missing million in cash must be saved, since there is no more
possibility to obtain it by increase of export.
English armament-ore! Our own procurement is a _must_.
_4 Year Plan without_ antagonizing foreign countries.
Card file?
Speed of armament? Yes--
Extent of armament not sufficient. Backing by foreign exchange and raw
materials is absolutely necessary.
* * * * *
Top Secret [rubber stamp]
1st copy 5 Sept 1936
Wi II
File No 66 b 9910 II z-a
_Minutes on a Conference in the Reichministry for Economy on 3 Sept
1936_
} Reichministry
Chairman: Ministerialdirektor Sarnow } for Economy
Present: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Landwehr } and the competent
Ministerialdirigent Dr. Spitta } experts of
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Michals } the Reichministry
} for Economy
} and the supervisory
} agencies
Major Czimatis
Commander Griebel } Reichministry
Regierungsbaurat Wissman } of War, W.A.
Intendanturrat Nierhoff Reichministry of War, V.A.
Lt.Col. Ploch } Reichministry for Air and
Col. Witting } Supreme Commander of the
Dipl.ing. Bresser } Air Force
Gen.Direktor Schirner, }
combined alum. plants }
Dr. Westrick, combined } Only during the conference
alum. plants } on aluminum
Dir. Byer, Alum. Sales }
Corp. }
_Subject_:
I. Possibilities of allotment of foreign exchange to the armed forces
and economy.
II. Aluminum supply.
I. After extensive study of the connected disadvantages, the
Reichministry for economy has dropped the principle that one could
desist from exporting all products with more than 40% foreign raw
materials. Therefore an additional need for foreign exchange results
for the upkeep of the export of 2 million marks with the supervisory
board for base metals. Furthermore the allotment of cash foreign
exchange to the supervisory board for bast fibres must be increased
from 10 million marks to 17 million marks.
Intendanturrat Nierhoff made reports on the need of the Armed Forces of
textiles and leather in the year 1937, which has increased considerably
from the requirements of the year 1936 (see inclosure). To fulfill
these Armed Forces requirements, cash foreign exchange is necessary in
the following amounts:
------------------------------+-------------------------------------
| Additional Armed Forces requirements
Group of goods | of cash foreign exchange in millions
| of marks
------------------------------+-------------------------------------
1. Wool | 24
shredded wool [Reisswolle] | 3
mohair wool | 0.75
|
2. silk | 0.55
|
3. bast fibres | 0.25
|
4. cotton | 4
|
5. leather | 22.5
| -----
Total | 55.00
------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Accordingly, the following overall picture results:
Amount of cash foreign exchange necessary previously for the upkeep
of economy and for the covering of requirements of the Armed Forces.
_146.8 million marks_
Amount of cash foreign necessary for the upkeep of export. _248 million
marks_
Additional requirement of cash foreign exchange necessary for the Armed
Forces. _146.8 million marks_
Available amount of cash foreign exchange _140 million marks_.
II. Aluminum
Report on the requirements of aluminum for the Armed Forces are
contained in the summary given to the Reichministry for Economy on 29
Aug.
Major Czimatis explained that the Reichministry of War did not renounce
the limitations of the allotments of aluminum to the general industry,
as it was said in the letter of the Reichministry for Economy of 21 Aug
1936, but that the demands for full delivery to the Armed forces for
the programatic rearmament, especially for the Air Force, will be kept
up.
The Reichministry for Economy considers the full delivery to industry
urgently necessary also in the interest of the Armed Forces, since by
a "strangulation" installations important to the Armed Forces (power
issues) would also be affected immediately, and one could therefore
count on an increased requirement of copper and thus of foreign
exchange.
The administration of aluminum by the supervisory board for base metals
is being absolutely refused by the Reichministry for Economy.
Generaldirektor Schirner reports that the negotiations for the import
of 1000 tons of aluminum from Switzerland against delivery of German
clay and pitch-coke are favorable. Also, the payment of processing
wages is to be done with clay. However, the import of these 1000 tons
is distributed over 6 to 7 months.
1000 tons more can be obtained in a comparatively short time from the
Aluminum Ltd. from Canada. The negotiations for this are still in
process.
Schirner reported that the stocks of aluminum in the plants is so high
that he, in case the Reichministry for Air should agree to a temporary
decrease of the stocks, could guarantee full delivery for both the
Armed Forces and Industry until the opening of the new plants in Toging
and Bitterfeld.
Lt. Col. Ploch consents that the stocks be decreased temporarily.
The Reichministry for Economy orders that the supervisory board for
base metals first determine by revision the exact size of the stocks of
aluminum for the Duren Metal works and the combined Light Metal works
[Vereinigten leicht Metall Werke].
However, if difficulties should arise in the delivery to the Armed
Forces with aluminum, then the Reichministry for Economy is ready to
take up negotiations again.
MW [initials in pencil]
* * * * *
Inclosure
Textile and Leather Requirements of the Armed Forces
------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------
| | |Required
| | |additional
|Requirement|Requirement|cash foreign
Raw materials |in the year|in the year|exchange
|1936 in |1937 in |requirements
|tons |tons |in millions
| | |of marks
------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------
Sheared wool | 7 200| 18 152| 24
| | |
Wool scrap [Reisswolle] | 1 040| 4 900| 3
| | |
Combings | 11| 42| -
| | |
Mohair wool | -| 260| 0.75
| | |
Wool from tanned hides | | |
[Gerberwolle] | 761| 1 236| -
| | |
Silk | 23| 72| 0.5
| | |
Cocoons[4] | 72| 72| -
| | |
Silk yarns[4] | 48| 48| -
| | |
Cotton of which quality cotton | 8 600| 16 200|
Portiers and shelter halves (Egypt) | |about 4 000| 4
| | |
Cotton scraps | 560| 835| -
| | |
Artificial silk | 310| 670| -
| | |
Cellulose wool | 1 080| 3 130| -
| | |
Cleaned flax [Schwingflachs] | 3 600| 4 800| -
| | |
Flax scrap | 7 070| 10 500| -
| | |
Jute | 2 100| 2 100| -
| | |
Soft hemp and hard fibers | 1 100| 1 635| 0.25[5]
of which hard fiber | | about 200 |
| | |
Sleek leather | 11 000| 24 000|
| | |
Skins for uppers | 7 100| 13 900|
| | |
Tanned leather | | 4 100| ----
| | |
Leather for soles | | 9 500| 22.5[6]
| | |
| | | Total 55.00
------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-------------
[Footnote 4: figures by Reichministry for air]
[Footnote 5: for 400 tons soft hemp and 200 tons Manila and Sisal]
[Footnote 6: for 22 500 tons hides corresponding to 11 200 tons
leather]
It must be considered in the calculation of the foreign exchange
requirements for the upkeep of the export of woolen goods, that the
wool industry cannot stand more than a 10% decrease of the present
amount, if it is to retain its export capability. Instead of Australian
wool, one must reach back to about 50% of the available South-African
wool for exports. The wool available through the limitations of value
of the clearing agreement is entirely used for export. The calculated
amount of foreign exchange and the most urgent requirement within
Germany of 12 million marks only applies under the condition that there
are until the end of September still 2 million marks in cash foreign
exchange available.
One can count for the requirement of the Armed Forces on an amount of
10,000 tons raw wool, based on existing agreement. 24 million marks in
cash foreign exchange are required for the additional amount of 8,152
tons with the price basis of 3,000-marks per ton.
Intendanturrat Nierhoff explained: that a decrease of the demands
for quality for the Armed Forces is no longer bearable. Already 20%
cellulose wool is being earmarked for uniform cloths, and a mixing of
30% scrap wool for over-coats.
The amount of foreign exchange of 4 million marks for quality cotton is
therefore necessary, because one cannot count any more on the hitherto
existing compensating transactions--especially with Egypt after
circular 237.
The amount of foreign exchange estimated for export of 17 million marks
for the supervisory board for bast fibres is distributed as follows:
10 million marks for jute
6 million marks for Sisal
1 million marks for Manila
The production of hides in Germany is reported as 140,000 tons per
year. Even with the basis that the consumption of leather within
Germany is decreased to a minimum, the 22,500 ton hides, corresponding
to 11,200 tons leather for the Armed Forces, can only be procured with
cash foreign exchange (22.5 million marks).
The raw hide requirement has been determined individually with
consideration for the time required to tan the individual types of
leather.
* * * * *
[in pencil] Top Secret!
Conference at General Field Marshal Goering's at 1000, 14 Oct. 38, in
the Reich Air Ministry
[in pencil] attention H.G.
General Field Marshal Goering opened the session by declaring that
he intended to give directives about the work for the next months.
Everybody knows from the press what the world situation looks like
and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him to carry out
a gigantic program compared to which previous achievements are
insignificant. There are difficulties in the way which he will overcome
with utmost energy and ruthlessness.
The amount of foreign exchange has completely dwindled on account of
the preparation for the Czech enterprise, and this makes it necessary
that it should be strongly increased immediately. Furthermore, the
foreign credits have been greatly over-drawn and thus the strongest
export activity--stronger than up to now--is in the foreground. For the
next weeks an increased export was first priority in order to improve
the foreign exchange situation. The Reich Ministry for Economy _should
make_ a plan about raising the export activity by pushing aside the
current difficulties which prevent export.
These gains made through the export are to be used for increased
armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the export activity.
He received the order from the Fuehrer to increase the armament to
an abnormal extent, the air force having first priority. Within the
shortest time the air force is to be increased five fold, also the navy
should get armed more rapidly and the army should procure large amounts
of offensive weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery
pieces and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go;
especially fuel, powder and explosives are moved into the foreground.
It should be coupled with the accelerated construction of highways,
canals, and particularly of the railroads.
To this comes the Four Years' Plan which is to be reorganized according
to 2 points of view.
In the Four Years' Plan in 1st place all the constructions which are
in the service of armament are to be promoted and in 2nd place all the
installations are to be created which really spare foreign exchange.
The substitutes produced by the Four Years' Plan are to be brought
rapidly into circulation. The Reich Ministry for Economy and the other
agencies should make suggestions by the beginning of November for
rapidly increasing the introduction of the substitutes. The import of
materials for which we have substitutes has to be drastically curtailed.
General Field Marshal Goering enlarged then upon the main problem of
the session: how can these requirements be fulfilled.
He is faced with unheard difficulties. The treasury is empty, the
industrial capacity is crammed with orders for many years. In spite
of these difficulties he is going to change the situation under all
circumstances. Memoranda were of no help, he desires only positive
proposals. If necessary, he is going to convert the economy with brutal
methods in order to achieve his aim. The time has come when private
enterprise can show whether it has a right for continued existence. If
it fails, he is going over to state enterprise without any regard. He
is going to make barbaric use of his plenipotentiary power which was
given to him by the Fuehrer.
All the wishes and plans of the state, party and other agencies which
are not entirely in this line have to be rejected without pity. Also
the ideological problems cannot be solved now, there will be time for
them later. He urgently cautions against making promises to the workers
which can not be kept by him. The wishes of the labor front recede
entirely into the background. Industry has to be fully converted. An
immediate investigation of all productive plants is to be initiated
in order to determine whether they can be converted for armament and
export or whether they are to be closed down. The problem of the
machine industry has the first consideration in this respect. There is
no place for printing and laundry machines and other machines of that
kind, they all have to produce machine tools. In the field of machine
tools the priorities of the orders are to be investigated, and wherever
possible, increase in productive capacity is to be introduced. It
follows without saying that work has to be conducted in 3 shifts.
It remains now to decide who is going to carry out this task; the
state of the self-administrative industry. He requested a proposal
from General Director Zangen for the methods to realize these plans.
He warns all agencies, particularly the labor front, price controller,
etc., from interfering with these proposals in any way. He is going to
proceed ruthlessly against every interference on the part of the Labor
Front. The Labor Front would not receive raw materials and workers for
its tasks any more. Similarly all other party requirements have to be
set aside without consideration. Foreign workers can continue being
employed except in the particularly secret sections of the enterprise.
At the present time the plants should not be burdened with unnecessary
demands, such as athletic fields, casinos or similar desires of the
Labor Front. Measures proposed by the Labor Front have to be submitted
to him for approval.
Raw materials and power are to be subjected to accurate management.
Similarly the distribution of men has to be organized in an entirely
different way than it has been done until now. The retraining did not
function; all agencies failed. The recommitment of the youth into the
industry will be organized by him on a very large scale. Large state
apprenticeships are to be created; besides, the plants will be obliged
to hire a certain number of apprentices. A retraining of hundreds of
thousands of people will have to take place. Much more work will have
to be performed by women than until now. Above all, the young women
have to be employed much more. Work periods of eight hours do not exist
any more; wherever necessary, overtime is to be performed, double and
triple shifts are a matter of course. Where the workers will protest,
as in Austria, for example, General Field Marshal Goering will proceed
with forced labor; he will create camps for forced labor. The Labor
Front should not carry false social ideas among the workers. It is a
fact that one generation has driven the cart into the mud through the
mutiny of the workers and by being guilty of not having shot these
workers on the spot. Therefore, we had to put the thing in order again.
Much is to be done at once in the field of transportation. The Ministry
for Transportation should submit a request about the construction of
rolling stock and about other requirements. The branch-canal near the
Hermann Goering Works is particularly important. It cannot continue
that the Armed Forces interfere with the car park. If that will
continue, he will make a decision, because it is impossible that the
people should starve on account of it.
In the agriculture it is of importance to employ foreign workers.
Similarly the problem of the agricultural machine has to be promoted.
Of particular importance is the erection of store-houses.
The Sudeten land has to be exploited with all the means. General
Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation
of Slovakia. Czechia and Slovakia would become German dominions.
Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be
speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia,
notably by State Secretary Keppler.
In the second part of his discussion General Field Marshal Goering took
up the Jewish problem. The Jewish problem had to be tackled now with
all methods, because they have to get out of the economy. However,
the wild bustle of commissars as it developed in Austria has to be
prevented under all circumstances. These wild actions have to cease
and the settling of the Jewish problem should not be regarded as a
system of providing for inefficient party members. Thereupon Ministry
Councillor Fischboeck was allowed to speak. He revealed that in the
beginning there were 25,000 commissars in Austria. Today there are
still 3,500 who are useless almost without exception. In Austria the
party is of the opinion that Aryanization is a duty of the party and
that it is connected with the recompensation of the old party members.
In Austria there is still a total of 2 billions of Jewish property.
The large enterprises are being bought up by the Control Bank; it is
difficult to oust the Jews from the small industrial enterprises.
General Field Marshal Goering took a strong stand against the opinion
that the Aryanization is the duty of the party. It is the duty of
the State alone. However, he could not release foreign exchange for
shipping away the Jews. In an emergency situation ghettos should be
erected in the individual large cities.
State Councillor Schmeer cautioned against more lenient methods in the
fight against the Jews; Jewish labor units should be established, then
the people would emigrate of their own accord. State Councillor Neumann
warned and expressed the opinion that one should use more precaution in
this matter, particularly in Austria.
Thereupon the meeting was quite surprisingly closed by General Field
Marshal Goering without recording the minutes of the meeting or making
decisions.
HG.
* * * * *
Material for the Conference with Goering on 25 Nov 1938 (General
Keitel, Brig. Gen. Thomas)
27 Oct 1938
W.Wi Id.
For the consideration of the assignment of tasks to people, state
and the Armed Forces, judging of the requirements of raw materials,
especially steel, appears necessary.
This is shown as follows, as far as it can be judged from here. The
inclosed summary shows that one must count, according to the Fuehrer's
directives, on a steel requirement for armament production, which
amounts to 1.08 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on, that is, it
must be increased by about 48% of the present contingent. Added to
this requirement are the increased demands of the Four Years' Plan,
the demands of export and the amount necessary for the upkeep of the
production machine of German economy in the amount of 1.83 million tons
monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on; thus this results in a total requirement
of 2.9 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on, against which there is
only a monthly production of at present 1.8 million tons monthly.
Furthermore, it must be pointed out, that with the increased use of
steel, an increased use of the already scarce non-ferrous metals is
necessarily coupled; the latter also are closely associated with the
procurement of foreign exchange.
The increased rearmament of the armed forces must further affect deeply
the supply requirements of the armed forces, especially munitions and
fuels. Therefore, it must be expected that the future requirements of
the armed forces will exceed the present plans (accelerated program for
powder and explosives, fuel program), which will have an increase of
the steel requirements not yet planned as result.
* * * * *
Secret
Summary of the Iron and Steel Requirements of the Armed Forces and
Industry tons per month
---------------------+------------+------------+------------+--------------
| | | |in contrast to
| Contingent | Contingent |Requirement |the contingent
|of the IVth | of the 1st | from 1 Jan | of 1st
|quarter 1938|quarter 1939| 1939 on | quarter 1939
---------------------+------------+------------+------------+--------------
| | | |
I. Armed Forces | 584,333 | 573,133 | 1,088,300 | --515,167
| | | |
II. War economical | | | |
organization of | | | |
German industry | 306,600 | 306,600 | 613,500 | --306,900
| | | |
III. Export in case | | | |
it is possible to | | | |
reach the stage of | | | |
beginning of 1938 | 380,000 | 380,000 | 550,000 | --170,000
| | | |
IV. Upkeep of the | | | |
production machine | | | |
of the German | 582,800 | 582,800 | 582,800 | ----
industry | | | |
| | | |
V. Other requirements| 83,500 | 83,500 | 83,500 | ----
| | | |
Total | 1,937,233 | 1,926,033 | 2,918,100 | --992,067
---------------------+------------+------------+------------+--------------
Summary on the Iron and Steel Requirement of the Armed Forces (tons per
months)
---------------------+------------+------------+------------+--------------
| | | |in contrast to
| Contingent | Contingent |Requirement |the contingent
|of the IVth |of the 1st |from 1 Jan |of 1st
|quarter 1938|quarter 1939| 1939 on |quarter 1939
---------------------+------------+------------+------------+--------------
Army | 300 367 | 266 000 | 525 000 | --259 000
(For fortifications) | (86 667) | (85 000) | (165 000) | (--80 000)
| | | |
Navy | 78 000 | 74 000 | 140 500 | --66 500
(For "Gruenewiese") | (- - -) | ( - ) | (35 000) | (--35 000)
| | | |
Air Force | 166 400 | 191 133 | 247 300 | --56 187
(For fortifications) | (13 333) | (15 000) | (15 000) | ( - )
| | | |
Reich communication | | | |
measures | 39 566 | 42 000 | 175 500 | --133 500
[RV-Massnahmen] | | | |
| | | |
(For increased | | | |
extension of the | | | |
Reich railroad) | | | |
| (- - -) | ( - ) | 130 000 | (--130 000)
| | | |
Armed Forces | | | |
Total | 584 333 | 573 133 | 1 088 300 | --515 167
-------------------+------------+------------+------------+--------------
Chief OKW
_58a 40 38 top secret_
1157/38 top secret
7 Dec 1938
Top Secret
7 copies
7th copy
[in pencil]
To the State Secretary Neumann
Received copy without receipt K. 12 Dec 38
Documents for the conference at Field Marshal Goering's on 13
Dec 1938 with Supreme Commanders General Keitel,
Neumann, Koerner, Gen. Thomas.
To
the Supreme Commander of the Army }
the Supreme Commander of the Navy }
the Reichs Marshal of the Air Force and } one copy each
Supreme Commander of the Air Force }
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces authorized me to
inform the Supreme Commander of the following:
The strained financial situation of the Reich makes it necessary that
for the rest of the current fiscal year 38/39 the expenses of the Armed
Forces, which in the last months under the strain of extraordinary
circumstances have undergone a very considerable increase, should be
lowered again to a level which would be tolerable for some time.
It will be at the discretion of the Supreme Commander to decide what
measures should be taken for this purpose according to the priorities
in the armament program. According to the Fuehrer's request.
ARMY
The equipping with arms will have first priority, the providing of
ammunition and the building of fortifications for the army will be
considered in second place only.
NAVY
The building of ships, of ports and docks will have first priority over
all other requirements, also over that of providing ammunition.
AIR FORCE
The equipping with arms will have first priority, the providing of
ammunition will have to be considered in second place only.
If necessary, the initiation of new enterprises will have to be
delayed, the execution of current enterprises and orders will have to
be distributed over a longer period of time. The allotted quota of raw
materials which will be decreased starting 1 Jan 39, will also compel
us to a certain extent to do this. It has to be achieved that
in the _Army_
in the _Navy_
in the _Air Force_
during the period from 1 November 1938 to 31 March 1939 (end of the
fiscal year) not more than
(_Army_): 3.7 billion RM (used until now 4.9)
(_Navy_): 650 million RM
(_Air Force_): 2.5 billion RM
should be expended in the form of cash and delivery treasury scrips.
It is not yet definitely established how much can be allotted for the
next fiscal year 1939/40 in the form of cash and delivery scrips. At
present, the branches of the Armed Forces cannot expect greater quotas
than the following:
5.2 billion RM for the Army
1.4 billion RM for the Navy
4.9 billion RM for the Air Force
signed: Keitel
* * * * *
W H
_58 a 40 38 g K_
1157/38 g K
Top Secret
Copy
for information
[illegible signature]
to
the Chief of the Air Force
the Chief of the W Stb
Chief of the War Industry Staff Adjutant
1 March 1939
Draft
To the adjutant's office of General Field Marshal Goering.
On behalf of Brig. Gen. Thomas I request an appointment for a
conference for the general before the departure of the General Field
Marshal on following urgent subjects:
1. The branches of the Armed Forces--particularly the Navy--submitted
requests for additional amounts of non-ferrous metals and of steel.
General Thomas requests instructions what attitude he should take in
regard to this question during the absence of the General Field Marshal.
2. The General Field Marshal has to make decisions in 2 matters
concerning foreign policy.
[signature illegible]
Captain.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1316-PS
Working Committee Oldenburg
B.Nr. 15/41 g.Kdos. 21.3.41
_2 copies_
1st. copy.
TOP SECRET
_Note for Files._
Regarding the discussion held on the 21.3.41. at 11 o'clock with the
head of the department.
Top Secret
Present: General Thomas, Colonel Huenermann, Lt. Col. Luther,
Major v. Gusevius.
From the Quartermaster General: Major v. Altenstadt, Min. Dir. Sarnow.
_Major v. a._ develops the idea of the Quartermaster General regarding
the employment of his organization. The Fuehrer had laid down that he
would appoint his three commissioners in about four weeks time. Only
then would he lay down the directives for their activities.
The Quartermaster General thinks it necessary to create a modest
economic organization in the operational area as well, so as to be
able to supply the needs of the fighting forces. This organization
would later be replaced by the office of the industrial armaments
organization. This was to a certain extent a measure of self-help by
the Quartermaster General. He would also employ field-commands, which
would be manned by individual officials. As soon as the operational
area has moved on, the handing over of large areas has been planned. At
this time the Quartermaster General's organizations will be withdrawn
and their tasks will be taken over by the industrial armaments
organization.
Regarding the present organization of the areas he mentioned the
following:
_Operational Area_: Army area
Rear area of the Army
_Political Area_: in which the Wehrmacht commanders
operate.
In the rear area of the army, the Reichsleader of the SS is first of
all responsible for the entire control, except for the economic field.
The Wehrmacht commanders are made responsible for the exploitation of
the country's industry. According to the general interpretation, this
only means a utilization "for purposes of the Wehrmacht". Quartermaster
General makes the following proposal:
The department IV-Wi at Army Commands will be enlarged, so that they
are able to direct industry in the operational area. For this purpose
the V.O. are to be strengthened by suitable personnel who can be
employed in the spheres of banking, customs and finance.
OKW/industrial armaments department will put its demands to
Quartermaster General. Quartermaster General will pass these demands in
the form of an order to the V.O. at Army Commands. The IV Wi will of
course receive the technical instructions from Industrial Armaments
through the official channels, just as Industrial Armaments is also
providing the organization in the form of IV Wi.
The proposal meets with general approval.
With regard to basic directives the representative of the Quartermaster
General mentions:
Each army is followed by a security division. For reasons of expediency
the industrial armaments commands in the beginning will be attached
to these security divisions. As soon as operations have made further
progress, the industrial armaments commands will come under the
Wehrmacht commanders.
The Quartermaster General thinks it expedient, that the industrial
armament Staff should be near to or actually with the Quartermaster
General whilst operations are in progress. Only thus can it be
guaranteed that the Industrial Armament Staff is kept informed of the
progress of the operations as a whole, and of the intentions of the
leadership. As soon as operations cease, the Industrial Armaments Staff
will join the Industrial Armaments Department, as the inspectorates
(with the Reich Commissioners) will then be operating as their economic
department. The main activity of the Industrial Armaments Staff will
then be properly in Berlin.
The Quartermaster General does not intend to create a Quartermaster
General organization for the East. He will attach a General Staff
Officer as representative to each Army Group. The Quartermaster General
intends to go forward in person.
_Min. Dir. Sarnow_ mentions that there is in existence an agricultural
atlas of Russia which contains the latest information about all tractor
stations. This atlas is in the possession of Secretary of State Backe.
Acquaintance with this atlas is of the greatest importance for the V.O.
and the industrial armaments commands. General Thomas orders that this
atlas be obtained. On the basis of this publication the Quartermaster
General is to receive information on how to supply the fighting forces
with circulars containing detailed instructions regarding the armaments
department to provide the Quartermaster General with the contributions
required for compiling these circulars for the fighting forces. The
Quartermaster General's representative mentions that it is intended to
attach suitable individuals for the securing of these tractor stations
to the armoured divisions.
In these circulars the primary demand made on the fighting forces will
be:
a. Securing of all supplies found.
b. Safeguarding of all tractors and fuel in stock.
_Quartermaster General_ states that Admiral Canaris has drawn up
a list of reliable people with detailed knowledge of the locality
and industry, who are to be employed immediately on entry. For the
occupation of East-Galicia, special oil-detachments are to be provided,
where possible from the present West-Galicia, to take over supervision
of the oil installations in the district of Lemberg immediately.
_The Chief of the department_ sums up:
1. The most urgent task is the strengthening of IV Wi. The staff of the
industrial armaments command takes over the responsibility for this.
2. In the rear of the army area it is the intention to appoint a
commanding general in the area of each Army Command, under whose
command the security divisions will also be placed. Here in the
industrial armaments commands are to be introduced and attached to
the security divisions. As soon as this rear army area passes into
the political area, the armament commands, or the industrial armament
inspectorates, will come under the command of the Wehrmacht Commander.
3. The Reich Commissioners take over political administration in the
so-called political area.
4. The inspectorates and industrial armaments commands furthest to
the rear (western) must be the first to be employed, i.e., must be in
front. They are the first to reach their final areas.
_Distribution_:
_1st. copy_
_2nd. copy_
Staff of the Industrial Armaments Department
Working Committee Oldenburg.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1317-PS
Rue Ic
Berlin, March 1, 1941
[stamp] TOP SECRET
5 copies, 1st copy
_Re_: _Oldenburg_
Memorandum
_Conference at Office Chief, General of the Infantry Thomas on
February 28, 1941_
_Present_: General of the Infantry Thomas
Colonel Becht
Lt. Col. Luther
Lt. Col. Matzky
Major von Gusevius
Major von Payr
Major Huch
Captain Emmerich
Captain Dr. Hamann
The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for
the Reich Marshal.
Essential Points:
1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal.
_Purpose_: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan.
2. The organization must include everything concerning war economy,
excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission
of State Secretary Backe.
3. Clear statement that _the organization is to be independent of the
military or civil administration_. Close cooperation, but instructions
direct from the central office in Berlin.
4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:
a. Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines,
in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the
removal of important goods.
b. Administration of the occupied industrial districts and
exploitation of economically complimentary districts.
5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term _war economy_
inspection is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection.
6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be
generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous.
_The main mission of the organization_ will consist of _seizing raw
materials_ and _taking over all important concerns_. For the latter
mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed
suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the
beginning can only be performed by the aid of their experiences (for
example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).
After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed
to make an initial draft of such an organization within one week.
Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is
essential. An Officer must still be appointed for Wi. and Ro, with whom
the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give
each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding
Russia.
Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half
of next week. Also, the 4 officers who are ordered to draw up the
individual armament inspections are to report to the Office Chief at
the end of next week.
(signed) Hamann
_Distribution_:
Staff 1st Copy
Rue 2nd Copy
Lt. Col. Luther 3rd Copy
Planning 4th Copy
Supply 5th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1337-PS
_Decree setting up Secret Cabinet Council 4 February 1938_
Reichsgesetzblatt, 1938, Part I, page 112.
For my guidance in the conduct of Foreign Policy, I am creating a
Secret Cabinet Council.
I nominate as President of the Secret Cabinet Council:
Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath.
I appoint as members of the Secret Cabinet;
The Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
The President of Prussia, Minister for Air and the Air Force, Field
Marshal Herman Goering,
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Rudolf Hess,
The Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Goebbels,
The Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellory, Dr. Hans Heinrich
Lammers,
The Supreme Commander of the Army, Col. Gen. Walther v Brauchitsch,
The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Admiral Dr. L.C. Erich Raeder,
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, General of the Artillery,
Wilhelm Keitel,
The Reichsminister and Head of the Reichschancellery will conduct the
current business of the Secret Cabinet Council.
Berlin, 4th February 1938.
Fuehrer and Reichchancellor,
ADOLF HITLER.
Reichsminister and Head of Reichschancellery
Dr. LAMMERS.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1347-PS
The Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 72.
18 September 1942.
To the State Governments [Landesregierungen] (State Nutrition offices)
the Prussian Provincial Presidents (provincial nutrition offices) with
the exception of the Eastern territories not incorporated into Upper
Silesia.
For information of the district presidents [Regierungspraesidenten]
and respective authorities
Re: food supply for Jews.
* * * * *
2. Rations.
Jews will no longer receive the following foods, beginning with the
42nd distribution period (19 October 1942): meat, meat products, eggs,
wheat products (cake, white bread, wheat rolls, wheat flour, etc)
whole milk, fresh skimmed milk, as well as such foods are distributed
not on food ration cards issued uniformly throughout the Reich but on
local supply certificates or by special announcement of the nutrition
offices on extra coupons of the food cards. Jewish children and young
people over 10 years of age will receive the bread ration of the normal
consumer. Jewish children and young people over 6 years of age will
receive the fat ration of the normal consumer, no honey substitute and
no cocoa powder, and they will not receive the supplement of marmalade
accorded the age classes of 6 to 14 years. Jewish children up to 6
years receive 1/2 liter of fresh skimmed milk daily.
Accordingly no meat, egg or milk cards and no local supply certificates
shall be issued to Jews. Jewish children and young people over 10 years
of age will receive the bread cards and those over 6 years of age the
fat cards of the normal consumer. The bread cards issued to Jews will
entitle them to rye flour products only. Jewish children under 6 years
of age shall be issued the supply certificate for fresh skimmed milk.
"Good for 1/2 liter daily" shall be noted on it.
Jews cannot be self-providers in the sense of any decrees.
3. Regulation for sick persons, etc.
The regulations for sick and infirm persons, expectant and nursing
mothers and women in childbed do not apply to Jews.
The regulations of this decree apply also to Jewish inmates of
hospitals.
4. Special allotments.
Jews are excluded from special allotments.
5. Exchange of food cards for travel and restaurant coupons.
The exchange of food cards for travel and restaurant coupons may be
allowed to Jews only in urgent exceptional cases.
6. Ration-free food.
For the purchase of non-rationed food the Jews are not subject to
restrictions as long as these products are available to the Aryan
population in sufficient quantities. Ration-free foods which are
distributed only from time to time and in limited quantities, such as
vegetable and herring salad, fish paste, etc., are not to be given to
Jews. The nutrition offices are authorized to permit Jews to purchase
turnips, plain kind of cabbage etc.
7. Marking of ration cards.
Ration cards issued to Jews shall be printed over diagonally (i.e.
over all individual coupons) with the repeated over-print "Jew". A
color in contrast to the basic color of the cards shall be chosen for
this. Cards and coupons overprinted "Jew" do not entitle the bearer to
special allotments. Cancellation of these coupons before issue of the
cards is therefore not necessary.
8. Special shopping time for Jews.
In order to avoid inconveniences in the supply of the Aryan population,
it is recommended that the nutrition authorities establish special
shopping times for Jews.
9. Food gift parcels for Jews.
The nutrition offices have to charge in full against the rations of the
received all gift food parcels from abroad addressed to Jews. Should it
be products which are rationed but not regularly distributed (such as
coffee, cocoa, tea, etc.) the entire shipment or in case of a delayed
report on the receipt of the package, the still unused part--will be
made available to big consumers, such as hospitals and will be charged
against their rations.
In the decree of 29 April 1941, of which a copy is enclosed, the Reich
Minister of Finance instructed the Customs Offices to report weekly to
the competent nutrition offices all gift packages, regardless of the
quantity of the incoming merchandise, when it is known or can suspect
that the receiver is a Jew. In case the report of the Customs Office
to the nutrition office is delayed until the food received in the gift
package is consumed, it can still be charged against their rations.
Insofar as the State Police Offices are informed of these food parcels
from abroad addressed to Jews, they will secure the packages and put
them at the disposal of the nutrition offices [Ernaehrungs-Aemter].
For the Secretary of State Reicke
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1352-PS
COPY
The Leader of the Central Landoffice for the Reichfuehrer SS
Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationalism
Berlin NW7, May 29, 1940
Friedrichstrasse 110-112
Tel. 42 38 62
_Az. K Al_
Subject: Report on the confiscations in the Bielitz District of May
22, 1940
Ref: Your letter of May 22, 1940, Br./Schl. to the Silesian Land Office
_Kattowitz_ Bernhardstrasse 49
I have repeatedly pointed out to you that the Land Office is to concern
itself exclusively with the tasks outlined in the Service Directive
of Feb. 1, 1940. In accordance with this, the Land Office, in the
case under discussion, is also to restrict itself to the seizure and
proposal for confiscation of Polish or Jewish private agriculture
enterprises that are needed in consequence of the construction of
the concentration camp. I forbid you any participation in measures
going beyond this and their preparation, such as, more or less, the
evacuation, management or reoccupation of the enterprises concerned
as well as the accommodation elsewhere of the Polish farm owners. In
the same way, the Land Office is to do nothing further regarding the
Bielitz district villages named in the report than to undertake the
seizure of the Polish and Jewish agriculture enterprises and to propose
their confiscation to the State Police. Arrangements which according to
the Land Office report have been found too sweeping are in every case
to be revoked immediately, in consideration of their invalidity I again
point out that as against the other Land Offices, the Silesian Land
Office has the poorest results to show in connection with seizures.
Signed: W Baron von Holzschuher,
SS Group Leader
Certified a true copy
Signed: signature
Administrative Leader. (L.S.)
* * * * *
Ku/Ni
Kattowitz, May 22, 1940
SECRET
_Report on Details of the confiscation in the Bielitz country_
Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp being built at
Auschwitz spoke at Staff Leader Mueller's and we requested support for
the carrying out of his assignments. He said that it was absolutely
necessary to confiscate the agriculture enterprises within a certain
area around the concentration camp, since not only the fields but also
the farm houses of these border directly on the concentration camp. A
local inspection held on the 21st of this month revealed the following:
There is no room for doubt that the agriculture enterprises bordering
on the concentration camp must be confiscated at once. Further than
this, the camp commandant requests that further plots of farm land be
placed at his disposal, so that he can keep the prisoners busy. This
too can be done without further delay since enough land can be made
available for the purpose. The owners of the plots are all Poles.
The following agreements have been reached by me with the Camp
Commandant and the proper measures prepared. The Director of the Branch
agency in Bielitz will immediately determine the names of the Polish
farmers and will also divide the land to be confiscated into zones.
Zone 1. Enterprises whose plots border directly on the camp.
Zone 2. Agricultural plots with enterprises which are placed at the
disposal of the camp for the employment of the prisoners, namely for
about 2000 prisoners for the time being.
Zone 3. As in zone 2, with the only difference, that the number of
prisoners has increased considerably. Zones 4 and 5 follow them. In the
last case it must be determined to what extent it is possible to put
that kind of terrain at the disposal of the camp. The result for Zone I
must be known within a few days, in order to enable the Land office in
Kattowitz to start the confiscation procedures. It will be necessary to
state the size of the families whose enterprises have been confiscated,
even giving age and sex.
I had the following discussion with the head of the labor-office in
Bielitz.
The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the old Reich.
The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated enterprises,
together with their entire families, to the Reich is possible without
any further consideration. It is only necessary for the labor office to
receive the lists of the persons in time, in order to enable it to take
the necessary steps (collection of transportation, distribution over
the various regions in need of such labor). Furniture cannot be taken
along under any circumstances in the course of the confiscation, the
only things left to the Poles, were, anyway, only the most vital items,
like bedding, ample food, clothes and other such things.
If the confiscation takes place the Poles will be billeted by the labor
office in barracks, put at its disposal by the camp commandant, until
their deportation. The deportation of the Poles of further zones will
follow along the same lines.
This matter has already been discussed in its outlines with the
agricultural management (Ruppert). A farmer will be appointed by
the Association of Agricultural Management, who will supervise the
agricultural labor of the prisoners at the agricultural enterprises and
who, naturally, will carry the sole responsibility for the agricultural
measures, which he alone determines.
As soon as the preparatory measures are finished, a meeting will
be called on the spot, next week, with the participation of the
agricultural management, in order to clear up and determine completely
everything that might be necessary. The chief of the Branch Agency
Bielitz has been ordered to report on Thursday the 23rd of this month
to this office, in order to receive the necessary instructions.
Moreover, I have reached the following agreement with the camp
commandant: As there are a number of villages in the district of
Bielitz, which contain racial-German [Volksdeutsche] farmers, the
existing Poles must be sheltered in those villages in the very
near future as quickly as possible, in order to realize a quick
consolidation of German folkdom [Volkstume]. The Poles of the
confiscated enterprises are taken by the concentration camps then, but
not as prisoners [Haeftlinge], rather until the Labor Office Bielitz
has turned them over to the Reich as farm laborers.
The following villages are to be considered for the time being: Alzen,
Ernstdorf, Batzdorf, Lomnitz.
I have already spoken with the mayor of Alzen, and he will collect all
the Poles who possess agricultural property by Saturday, 25th of this
month, and submit the list to the Branch Agency Bielitz. The Chief of
the Branch Agency Bielitz is requested to get that list personally.
The confiscation of those Polish enterprises in Alzen will also
be carried out within the next few days. The Commandant of the
Concentration camp will furnish SS-men and a truck for the execution of
the action. Should it not yet be possible to take the Poles from Alzen
to Auschwitz, they should be transferred to the empty castle at Zator.
The liberated Polish property is to be given to the needy racial-German
farmers for their use. The Chief of the Branch Agency must therefore
on Saturday determine, in cooperation with the local authorities, the
Germans who can be taken into consideration for that purpose.
The list of the Poles to be turned over to the Reich for agricultural
labor is to be handed over to the labor office Bielitz, as quickly as
possible. Care is to be taken that the size of the family, etc, is
also indicated. The Poles in the other German villages of the district
Bielitz, are to be determined in the same manner, in cooperation with
the various mayors, in order to enable the office here to prepare
the confiscation as quickly as possible. The execution of these
measures naturally takes place simultaneously with those at Auschwitz.
A discussion with the district-leader, the district head-farmers
of the association of agricultural management for Eastern Germany
[Kreislandwirt der Ostdeutschen landbewirtschaftungs-Gesellschaft] must
of course, take place, before those measures are carried out.
signed: KUSCHE
* * * * *
Ku/Ni
CONFIDENTIAL
_Report Re_: Achievement of confiscations of Polish agricultural
enterprises with the purpose to transfer the Poles to the Old Reich
and to employ them as agricultural workers.
In the Old Reich again and again the complaint can be heard that a
shortage of agricultural workers exists, and that it cannot be remedied
by any means though Polish farm-workers have been placed at disposal.
The employment offices have informed farmers and owners of estates who
are looking for workers that it was difficult to get any workers at all
from Poland, that the recruiting in the Government-General and also in
the Eastern territory was initiated and the Poles who had applied were
placed.
A few days ago, the Country Farmers Leader from Neutitschein called
on our Office and told us that in his district many lands were still
not yet tilled because there is a lack of any workers. The Reich Food
Estate has decreed that everyone can procure himself Polish workers in
the Eastern territory or in the Government General.
This appears preposterous if one knows that the office of the Higher
SS and Police leader as deputy of the Reich commissar for the
strengthening of German nationality, Land Office Silesia, cannot
perform the confiscations of small and even very small agricultural
enterprises for the reason that we do not know where to put the former
Polish owners. Until now the work regarding the confiscation of Polish
small farms has been limited to racial-German villages. I have already
reported on this matter for the county of Blachownia as well as for
the county of Bielitz-Biala, in connection with the institution of a
concentration camp in Auschwitz.
I have made an arrangement with the Chief of an employment agency
to transfer at once for employment into the Old Reich such Poles as
agricultural workers who are designated by us.
It is possible without difficulty to accomplish the confiscation
of small agricultural enterprises in the villages in which larger
agricultural enterprises have been already confiscated and are under
the management of the East German Corporation for Agricultural
Development. For it is by no means difficult for the larger
agricultural estate to manage a few hundred acres, of course consistent
with its own character without any particular additional expenses. It
is a matter of course that above all Polish arable lands adjacent to
the land of the estate should be confiscated and added to the estate
for exploitation. Agricultural-technical or other difficulties by no
means can occur. _The former owners of Polish farms together with
their families will be transferred to the Old Reich by the employment
agencies for employment as farm-workers._
In this way many hundred Polish agricultural workers can be placed
at the disposal of agriculture in the Old Reich in the shortest and
simplest manner. This way the most pressing shortage is removed that
is now in a very disagreeable manner felt especially in the root-crop
districts.
Besides, the settlers who are still working in the confiscated and
formerly settled enterprises and who are superfluous are to be removed
into the Old Reich, for until now they were only a burden for the
respective enterprise if they are too numerous. In this way, Polish
agricultural workers can be made free for the Old Reich.
The confiscations of small enterprises already achieved together with
the following transfer of the farmer owners as agricultural workers
to the larger estates already in operation have not only brought
experience but have proved unequivocably that no difficulties are to be
expected. The measures themselves are only a matter of organization,
and the success of the measures as proposed by me is based on the good
will of cooperation of the other authorities with the office of the
Reich Fuehrer-SS as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of German
folkdom. Means of transportation to the railroad can be provided
1. by the enterprises of the East-German Corporation of Agricultural
Development
2. by the SS NCO school in Lublinitz and the Concentration Camp of
Auschwitz.
These two latter places will also detail the necessary SS-men for
the day of the confiscation etc. In case that a place of assembly is
necessary for the Polish land-workers who are to be transported into
the Reich, for there too sufficient rooms and lodgings can be provided
(Kaminiek, Zator Castle, barracks in Auschwitz).
I have already reported on the accomplishment of confiscations in
Bielitz county and initiated the necessary measures.
For the purpose of accomplishing further measures proposed by me which
envision particularly the supplying of the farms in the Reich with
Polish agricultural workers, ask that I be given your consent and the
necessary full authority.
(signed) Kusche
5/22/40.
* * * * *
Kattowitz, 16 May 1940.
Ku/Ni.
CONFIDENTIAL
Report on the accomplishment of confiscations of agricultural
enterprises in Blachownia County.
With the scope of responsibility of the Higher SS--and Police leaders
as the deputy of the Reichs Commissar for the strengthening of German
nationality, Land officer Silesia, a survey was made in Blachownia
County since the beginning of April as to how far confiscations of
agricultural enterprises in Polish ownership could be accomplished.
Before the outbreak of the war the present county of Blachownia was
a part of Czestachowa County (before 1941 this territory belonged
to Russian Poland). Only recently, it was decided to incorporate the
present county area of Blachownia County into the district of Oppeln.
Blachownia is a rather big market-place which in Polish times was even
called a Spa.
As the necessary preparations can be considered closed in the following
a short survey on the general conditions shall be given as far as they
are at present of interest and importance.
At first, contact was made by the Chief of the local agency of the Land
Office in Lublinitz, with the local authorities of the Party, the State
such as the East German Corporation for Agricultural Development and
the Secret State Police, and after a thorough exposition of the aims
of the Land Office, excellent state of agreement was reached. Before
this the Land Office of Kattowitz had discussions in the same direction
regarding the Blachownia County with the higher authorities of the
Party and the State District Governor [Regierungspresident], Provincial
Governor [Oberpresident], Gauleitung.
The chief of the local agency at Lublinitz had found out that a number
of villages exist in Blachownia County the inhabitants of which belong
for the greatest part to the German nationality and that particularly
in recent years the Polish nationality strongly penetrated into these
small ethnic German islands.
Blachownia County comprises about 133,000 inhabitants. Of these, 2,000
can be considered without further ado as ethnic Germans. The number of
Jews is estimated at 6,000. 260 villages are combined in 15 greater
communities. In 3 of such greater communities to which also the German
villages belong, racial German mayors are in office.
1. The greater community Lipie: Mayor Mueller, comprising the
racial-German villages of Haukow, Lindow, Natalin and Rosalin,
2. The greater community Scharny-Las: Mayor Lorenz, comprising the
racial-German villages of Schwarzwald,
3. The greater community Wrozosowa: Mayor Neugebauer, comprising the
racial-German village of Alt-Hutau.
The rest of the communities are Polish throughout and have still an
almost pure Polish administration.
To 1. In greater Lipie 20 of the 23 villages are destroyed up to
80%. The ethnic-German families are living in the most primitive
conditions, closely compressed into the few dwelling-houses still
remaining or into other poorly prepared shelters consisting of
destroyed houses even in holes in the ground. The German villages
mentioned were founded about 80 years ago by Germans who came mostly
from Middle-Silesia (Strehlen, district of Breslau). By hard work they
have cleared the woods and created farms.
To 2. The Germans of this village immigrated about 100 years ago from
the region of Frankfort on Main and have built up by their own work
their economic basis of life.
To 3. In Alt-Hutau, it is a question above all, of Sudeten
German-weavers, who immigrated in 1812 from Maehrisch-Truebau. Because
of shortage of raw materials for several months the looms have been
idle, so that, on account of the cessation of this so necessary
opportunity for additional income, the economic situation of these
ethnic-Germans is endangered.
In course of time, of course, the Poles also have intruded into these
German settlements with the purpose at first to weaken Germanism in
its economic existence and finally to drive it out. The agricultural
enterprises of the racial-Germans have sizes from 1-1/2 to 5 hectares.
In all probability the enterprises have become so small due to
partitioning and above all to economic pressure from the former Polish
masters.
By the quick advance of the German troops a terrible massacre of the
ethnic Germans by the Poles of the Polish soldiery has been prevented.
Before the outbreak of the war, the Poles in these German settlements
behaved very aggressively against the German nationality and everything
was made ready for its destruction during the disorders of war. Even
if at the present moment the Poles have become a little more quiet
it appears that it concerns only outward appearances. Therefore, it
is absolutely necessary to bring about a strengthening of the German
nationality in the small far advanced German linguistic islands. These
ethnic-Germans make the best impressions. For whole decades they have
not abandoned their German national culture despite terror and so on,
but have confessed firmly and resolutely. Thus for example, the present
Mayor Mueller of Natalin has given to German children during the Polish
times lessons in reading and writing on Saturday and Sunday because a
school for the German minority did not exist. The ethnic-Germans and
above all the youth know the German language not only orally but even
by the written word.
In order to break down the Polish nationality most quickly in the
German villages, the Polish agricultural enterprises were confiscated.
Therewith it has to be remarked further that also Polish enterprises
were destroyed by warfare and the Poles too are partly in a situation
which gives grounds for fear in so far that theft of German property
and other encroachments on the part of the Poles may occur. The
confiscation was done in accordance with the directives of Reich
Fuehrer-SS as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of German
nationality, on 9 May in the villages of Natalin and Rosalin. As the
Polish enterprises were from 2 to about 8 hectares in size and the
arable land and the farm-buildings are dispersed within the area. The
County agronomist [Kreislandwirt] of the East-German Agricultural
Development Corporation thought that a centralized management of
the confiscated farms by appointment of a manager was impractical.
He resolved therefore to give the arable land, livestock and other
property to the trusteeship of needy racial-Germans. The agronomist
who was present at the performance of the confiscation accomplished
this at once on the spot. However he thought it necessary to take the
former Polish owners as farm-workers to an estate in Blachownia County
which is also managed by the East-German Agricultural Development
Corporation, in order to enable the racial-Germans installed to run
the Polish enterprises without friction. Today in fact farm-workers
are lacking here, for the former workers were Jews and are useless for
such work and moreover, they would endanger an orderly management.
However, if the Poles would remain on their former farms the danger
of the worst sort of sabotage to the agricultural property now at the
disposal of the German Reich would exist. The Poles are paid for their
work. The execution of the confiscation as well as the transfer of
the Polish farm-workers to the estate of the East-German Corporation
for Agriculture Management was accomplished quite quietly and without
friction.
In the same way as it was done until now the break-up of Polish
Nationality will be shortly accomplished in the other racial-German
villages as well.
Because of the extremely good cooperation with the authorities,
the party offices and the East German Corporation for Agricultural
Development, and above all with the Secret State Police the
confiscations etc. will be accomplished absolutely without friction in
the future, as well especially as preparations of greatest minuteness
will secure the success from the outset.
Before the end of June the soil in the ethnic-German villages of
Blachownia County will be taken entirely from Polish hands and be
confiscated for the German Reich at the disposal of Reich Fuehrer-SS as
Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of German Nationality.
(signed) Kusche
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1366-PS
[Secret Decree of Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Lammers of 29 August 1943, RK. 99 MD]
BUDGET OF THE REICH PROTECTOR FOR THE YEAR 1944
Introduction
* * *
The Fuehrer has modified the position, duties and authorities of the
Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia upon the appointment of the
new Reich Protector. The Reich Protector is the representative of the
Fuehrer in his capacity as Chief of State ... It is his function to
confirm the members of the government of the Protectorate, to appoint,
dismiss and retire the German civil servants. He exercises the power to
grant pardons and to quash legal proceedings except in cases before the
Military and SS Police Courts.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1375-PS
Castle Krakow
25 Jan. 1940
Minister President Field Marshal Goering Deputy for the Four-Year Plan
The Commissioner General for the General-gouvernement Poland
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
_S B 1/40_
I To the Director of the Service Agency for the Four-Year Plan Major
General Buehrmann or representative in _Krakow_ Lenartovicza 13
For the execution of the task of systematically placing the economic
strength of the General-gouvernement, within the framework of the
Four-Year Plan, in the service of the German defense industry, I give
the following
_Directives_
1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the defense
industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to carry on a
long-term economic policy in the General gouvernement. Rather, it is
necessary so to steer the economy of the General gouvernement that it
will, in the shortest possible time, accomplish results representing
the maximum that can be gotten out of the economic strength of the
General gouvernement for the immediate strengthening of our capacity
for defense.
2. In particular the following performances are expected of the total
economy of the General gouvernement:
a. Intensification of agricultural production esp. in the larger farms
(above 100 ha.) and a planned distribution of the food-stuffs to be
requisitioned in order to fill the requirements of the troops, units,
and service agencies as well as of the native population, which are not
yet fully covered by the present production.
b. Fullest exploitation of the forests, in temporary disregard of
forest conservation principles, so as to deliver to the Reich approx.
1 million fm sawmill lumber, 1. 2 million fm of mine timbers and up to
0.4 million rm of fiber wood.
c. Stepping-up of the raw material production in the industrial
sector, in particular: in the extraction of iron ores and pyrites in
order to cover the local needs of the smelting plants operated in the
General gouvernement; in petroleum extraction; in order to cover the
militarily most important requirements of the General gouvernement
and to export the greatest possible quantities to the Reich; in the
chemical industry (nitrogen, phosphate) to provide for the fertilizer
requirements of agriculture in so far as they can be covered in the
General gouvernement;
d. Exploitation, if necessary also partial expansion, of the industrial
capacity existing in the General gouvernement, in order to execute as
rapidly as possible the Wehrmacht orders to be placed by the Reich in
the General gouvernement while maintaining production of those products
which are absolutely vital for the running of the economic machinery in
the General gouvernement even if the strictest standards are applied;
e. Maintenance of the productive capacity of those plants to which
Wehrmacht orders have not yet been assigned but which are chosen as
replacement plants for militarily vital factories which have been or
will be evacuated in the Reich;
f. Stripping and scrapping of those plants which have neither been made
into armament plants nor declared to be replacement plants, as well as
of destroyed buildings;
g. Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and female
agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich--among them at least
7500 000 [sic] agricultural workers of which at least 50% must be
women--in order to guarantee agricultural production in the Reich and
as a replacement for industrial workers lacking in the Reich.
3. In order to attain the expected performances, provision is to be
made:
a. that the organizational measures for increasing agricultural
production and for the building up of the live stock, extraordinarily
depleted by the war, are implemented by the insurance of the seed
and fertilizer supply--if necessary by imports from the Reich--; by
sufficient supplies of agricultural machinery from local production in
the General gouvernement; by a planned development of the water economy
which should be simultaneously designed for the requirements of the
waterways and of the power supply;
b. that all uneconomic consumption of wood be avoided and that the
shipment of the quantities to be delivered to the Reich is insured;
c. that within the framework of the stepping-up of the industrial raw
material production the following are guaranteed: financing through
the most extensive possible utilization of the credit system existing
in the General gouvernement; procurement of the necessary mining and
drilling equipment, the supplying of the workers with the food and
articles of clothing absolutely essential for the maintenance of their
full efficiency; the shipment, especially of mineral oil, to the Reich;
d. that in engaging the industrial capacity of the General gouvernement
with armament orders from the Reich the following be coordinated:
nature and volume of the orders
location and capacity of the plants
raw material requirements and coverage the latter as far as possible
out of raw material stocks existing in the General gouvernement--
requirements and provisioning of workers means of transport for
delivery of materials and dispatch of finished products;
pre-financing of wages in the General gouvernement and transfer of the
proceeds from the Reich;
e. that exact investigations be made in order to determine the plants
which are either required for filling the armament orders or continue
to work for the supplying of the General gouvernement with absolutely
vital goods, or are being maintained as replacement plants, or are
to be stripped and scrapped; and that the putting into operation or
continued operation of the plants be uniformly regulated and made
subject to permit;
f. that in order to insure the necessary supply of Polish workers in
the Reich the labor offices harmonize the recruiting with the labor
requirements in the General gouvernement; that the shipment will take
place early enough to be completed in the course of April; that the
transfer of savings of these workers be regulated who came to the Reich
merely as migratory workers.
4. For the uniform orientation of the total economy of the General
gouvernement towards the tasks now to be accomplished the following
additional measures are to be taken:
a. In the food supply of the population it must under all circumstances
be seen to it that the persons working in plants vital to life and
armaments will maintain their efficiency while the rest of the
population will have to remain restricted to a minimum ration as long
as the food shortage lasts.
b. Any production which, on the basis of raw materials important for
armament, is directed towards objects which in the framework of the
present plan are not vital, is to be ruthlessly discontinued in so far
as it will not be possible to switch it over to sufficiently abundant
Ersatz materials and other materials (e.g. by producing wooden shoes
while simultaneously prohibiting the production of leather shoes and
boots for the native population). For the rest, all raw material saving
decrees prohibitions of production and shipment and orders valid in the
Reich are to be carried through in the Generalgouvernement at least to
the same degree as is done in the Reich.
c. The shipment of raw materials to the Reich is to be limited to
those amounts not absolutely needed in the Generalgouvernement to
guarantee militarily vital production. The right of disposing of the
stocks of raw materials, half-finished and finished goods in the
Generalgouvernement is reserved to your service agency. For the better
regulation of supply small amounts of valuable raw materials will be
brought into collection depots from scrapped plants and from smaller
depots.
d. The supplying of militarily vital plants with coal and the filling
of the most urgent coal requirements of the population are to be
guaranteed by agreements with the proper Reich agencies.
e. The collection of leather and old material [Erfassung] and the
gathering of scrap are to be pushed forward according to plan. In view
of the especial conditions in the Generalgouvernement, Jewish dealers
who can be freed for this purpose from forced service etc., may also be
engaged.
f. A transport plan will be drawn up in agreement with the
transportation authorities with the object of bringing transport
desires into line with transport possibilities and to arrive at
priority scale which will then be made the basis of all further
planning.
g. Price and wage regulations, currency protection and credit policy
will be harmonized in closest accord between the agencies concerned
with the object of creating stable conditions as an indispensable
prerequisite for any economic planning.
h. In order to gain a conception of the presumable shape of the payment
transactions between the Reich and the General-gouvernement, a payment
balance sheet is to be drawn up as soon as it is possible to see to
what extent armament orders from the Reich can be filled in the General
gouvernement.
5. I reserve the right to issue further basic instructions.
Copy of the present is being sent to the subordinate service agencies
as well as to the Commander in Chief East, the Chief of the Armament
Inspectorate Upper-East, the Military Commander in Krakow and the Bank
Director of the Emission Bank in Poland with the request that the
service agency for the Four-Year Plan be supported in every possible
way in the execution of its tasks.
(signed) Dr. Frank
Certified
(signed) Ministerialkanzleiobersekretaer als Kanzleivorsteher
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1376-PS
1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 778
20 May 1940 Nr 87
Decree of the Fuehrer of 18 May 1940 on the Execution of Power by the
Government in the Lowlands
In order to secure public order and public life in the Dutch
territories taken under the protection of German troops, I decree:
Paragraph 1
The occupied Dutch territories will be subordinated to the "Reichs
Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch territories." His seat will be The
Hague. The Reichs Commissioner is protector of the interests of the
Reich and will represent the supreme power of the government within the
civil sphere. He will be directly subordinated to me and will receive
directives and orders from me.
Paragraph 2
The General military commander in the Netherlands will exercise
military sovereign rights, his demands within the civilian sphere will
be carried out by the Reichs Commissioner. He has the right to order
the measures which are necessary for the execution of his military
mission and for military security. The same right belongs to the
supreme commanders of the branches of the armed forces.
Paragraph 3
The Reich Commissioner may use German Police forces to carry out his
orders. The German Police forces are at the disposal of the German
military commander insofar as the military necessities require this and
if the missions of the Reichs Commissioner permit it.
Paragraph 4
For the execution of his orders and the functioning of the
administration the Reichs Commissioner may make use of the Dutch
authorities.
Paragraph 5
1. The law which was formerly valid remains in force, in as much as it
is compatible with the occupation.
2. The Reichs Commissioner may enforce law by decree. The ordinances
will be proclaimed in the "Ordinance for the occupied Dutch
territories."
Paragraph 6
I appoint Reichs Minister Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart to be Reich
Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories.
Paragraph 7
Regulations for the execution and completion of this decree will be
issued according to my directives for the civilian sphere by the Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory and for the military sphere
by the Chief of the supreme command of the armed forces.
Paragraph 8
This decree will be enforced as soon as and insofar as I shall cancel
the order given to the Supreme Commander of the Army for the exercise
of the complete power.
Fuehrer's Hqs. 18 May 1940
The Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler
The President of the Cabinet Counsel for the defense of the Reich,
Goering, Field Marshal
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop
The Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1377-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 111
5th February 1938
Decree concerning the leadership of the Armed Forces--
4th February 1938
From now on I take over directly the command of the whole Armed Forces.
The Armed Forces Office with its functions as Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces, hitherto within the Reichs War Ministry, will come
directly under my command and as my military staff.
At the head of the staff of the supreme command of the Armed Forces
is the former Chief of the Armed Forces department as "Chief of the
supreme command of the Armed Forces". He is equal in rank to a Reichs
Minister.
At the same time, the supreme command takes the responsibility for the
affairs of the Reichs Ministry of War, and by my order the chief of the
supreme command of the Armed Forces exercises the authority formerly
belonging to the Reichs Minister.
It is the supreme command of the Armed Forces' duty to carry out in
peace time, in accordance with my instructions, the preparation of the
defense system of the Reich.
Berlin, 4 February 1938.
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery
DR. LAMMERS
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
KEITEL
* * * * *
REICHSGESETZBLATT, 5th February 1938
Decree concerning the setting up of a secret cabinet council of 4th
February 1938.
To advise me in conducting the foreign policy I am setting up a secret
cabinet council.
As president of the secret cabinet council, I nominate: Reichsminister
Freiherr-Von Neurath
As members of the secret cabinet council, I nominate:
Reichsminister of the Exterior Joachim von Ribbentrop
Prussian Prime Minister, Reichsminister of the Air, Supreme Commander
of the Air Forces, General Field Marshal Hermann Goering
The Fuehrer's Deputy, Reichsminister Rudolf Hess
Reichsminister for the enlightenment of the people and of propaganda,
Dr. Joseph Goebbels
Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery Dr. Hans-Heinrich
Lammers
The Supreme Commander of the Army, General Walter von Brauchitsch
The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Grand Admiral Dr. (honorary) Erich
Raeder
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Wilhelm
Keitel
The current affairs of the secret cabinet council are handled by the
Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery.
Berlin, 4 February 1938.
of the Reichs Chancellery
ADOLF HITLER
The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory
DR. LAMMERS
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1381-PS
The Representative of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories with the Headquarters of Army Group North
December 1942
SECRET
[Rubber Stamp]
_Political and Economic Problems of the Military and Civil
Administration of the Occupied Eastern Territories._
_Introduction_: The author of this report as representative of
the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories with the
Headquarters of Army Group North had the possibility to become
acquainted with all questions of administration and economy in the
Eastern area. An information trip also brought him to the
Army Area B (Donetz)
Army Area Don
Army Area Crimea
Army Area A (Caucasus)
into the General Commissariat Dniepropstrovsk
into several District Commissariats.
Conferences took place with all commanders of these army areas, the
chiefs of staff, the chiefs of the departments VII, the chiefs and
experts of the economic inspectorates and numerous economic teams and
with field and local commanders.
In the field of civil administration, conversations were held with the
competent experts as well.
_Result: Necessity for our Present Eastern Policy._
_Reasons_: 1. The military results of the fighting of this year in the
Eastern area is the fact that the fighting power of the Bolshevist army
has not been broken yet. One must count on a prolonged duration of the
war.
2. The size of the occupied territory results in a noticeable lack
of security troops as well as fighting troops. The necessity of the
military commitment of the Slav becomes apparent more and more, whether
it be for the combatting of partisans and in the police service, or
whether it is for use at the front even as will be necessitated by
future developments.
3. The war economic importance of the Occupied Eastern Territories
increases with the duration of the war. The last inhabitant of the
country, able to work, must be utilized in agriculture or in war
economic factories. His existence must be assured. Losses of a large
number mean damage for the front which cannot be repaired.
4. As in all great wars of all times, one must also reckon with
military reverses in the East. In retaining our present Eastern policy,
we stand before the danger that one day the dissatisfaction of the
population will find an outlet in a general uprising, whereby the
supply for the front would be endangered most seriously.
5. It is the opinion of all military commanders as well as of the
leaders of the civil administrative areas, to whom the reporter
was able to talk, that the present Eastern policy must undergo a
fundamental change in its basic points.
The following are the most important problems:
I. _The Food Problem_
The food rations granted to the Russian rural population do not
constitute the assurance of their existence, but only a vegetating for
a limited duration. One can never expect the necessary _cooperation_
for the Armed Forces from a population who does not know whether it
will still be alive tomorrow, who thus must expect death by starvation
and who lived in the Bolshevist period--with the exception of the year
1933, with its bad harvest--better than today. The military dangers
described at the beginning increase with the deterioration of the food
basis; the tendency to support the partisans increases; the desire
to experience again the former Bolshevist conditions comes to the
foreground even in those who refute the system ideologically.
The rations allotted at present, which in practice are for the most
part not issued complete, are as follows:
(Appendix A 3a)
_City and Country_: The following food situation prevails: The rural
populations, although it has to hand over more today than in Bolshevist
times, still goes rarely hungry. No matter whether it was in the time
of the Mongol rule, or in Tsarist or Bolshevist times, they were
always exploited, and they know methods of secreting food items, which
guarantee them food despite of all controls. Today they are even able
to deliver at least the most necessary things to the urban population
through the black market. The German administration will never be able
to develop a system which will enable a 100% seizure of products on
Russian territory. The territory is too large for this, and the number
of the appointed agricultural leaders is too small.
However, should one of the periodical bad harvests occur in Southern
Russia within the next years, as last in the year 1933, then the
present lack of reserves would result in a catastrophe in the Eastern
territory, the effects of which would be unpredictable for the food
situation in the rest of Europe.
The food question in the Eastern territory today is an _urban
problem_. As already explained in the beginning, we must free
ourselves completely from the attitude which we maintained at the
time, that there were too many people in the territory, and that their
extermination would mean a blessing to Germans! The German Armed
Forces in the East live on the work performance of the cities there.
Complaints about the lack of workers after the execution of the Sauckel
action are common.
If we continue to maintain our present attitude, it will be the combat
soldier who will pay with his blood for this mistake.
Generally there is no famine yet in the cities at present. The reporter
was even able to establish in a city like Kharkov, which had been
embattled to the finish, that the food situation is better than in the
past year. This condition can be traced back to the fact that the
urban population, which for the most part has been living in cities of
industrial areas for only one or two generations, has relatives in the
country by whom it is supplied with food items in exchange for consumer
goods.
_Nutrition--Nomadic Movement--Utilization of Labor._
He who flies over or rides through the occupied Eastern area today will
notice crowds of people moving along the roads; there are hundreds of
thousands of them, and according to the estimate of experts, their
number often may reach a million. These crowds are on the move, either
to look for food, or vice versa, to bring food to the cities in order
to sell it.
The exchange of food items/consumer goods, which thereby is reached
between city and country, is vital in the cities in view of the food
supply which is insufficiently controlled by the German administration.
Suggestions to suppress this self-support of the urban population
radically are unbearable, because this would result in starvation of
the urban population, causing decreased work performance and finally a
revolutionary attitude.
_Loss of Working Power_
On the other hand, however, a tremendous amount of valuable working
power is being lost for a certain time to the utilization of labor
through the nomadic movement.
The conclusion therefore is: _First_ securing of livelihood for the
important war economically urban population and their relatives, and
_only then_ suppression of this self-support. But not vice versa.
Because of reasons of the utilization of labor therefore, all
preparatory measures must be taken without delay in order to guarantee
sufficient supplies for the urban population of the occupied Eastern
territory which is important to the war economy.
_The Family Problem_
This must also include members of the family, because the male Slav
worker like the female Slav worker will starve or practically give
up the food to which they are entitled or even the cooked food which
is being furnished in the factory mess halls, in order to save their
children, parents, or other relatives from starvation.
The claim, that there are not sufficient food items on hand for this
subsistence is countered by the fact that by way of the nomadic
movement into the rural areas and the black market in the cities, food
is supplied which until now has prevented specific signs of starvation
on a larger scale.
_The Occupied Eastern Area no Surplus Territory._
Despite this the realization that contrary to propagandistic claims
the Ukraine as well as the areas of the Caucasus and the remaining
Eastern area _are not yet surplus areas at present_, from which Germany
and the rest of Europe could already be fed tomorrow. The truth is
that the additional subsistence of Western Europe today can only
result in the risk that the Eastern territory will become refractory
tomorrow as a result of its present delivery quota, which has been
increased considerably in comparison to the Bolshevist period and that
simultaneously part of the urban population, which is indispensable for
the war economic tasks will approach a slow ebbing of strength, if not
even death of starvation.
_Ukraine Industrial Area without Agricultural Surplus_
The large number of publications, which are being distributed at
present in Germany about the Eastern territory, are copies of obsolete
or uncontrolled figures from Tsarist or Bolshevist times, which lack
any knowledge of fact. As every expert will have to realize, the truth
in the Ukraine is that a situation has been created by the Bolshevist
industrialization and by the accumulation of giant urban populations in
the Don- and Donetz areas, which consumed the agricultural surpluses,
which were at hand during the Tsarist period for the overwhelming part
in their own territory.
_Exchange Trade A Regulator_
A part of the food of the cities is being procured through the black
market, which for the most part is barter trade. First of all it is
a regulating factor. In the Bolshevist era the urban population was
better supplied with consumer goods because of relatively higher
wages at the expense of the Sochos- and Kolchos peasants. Today these
consumer goods are wandering to the country as barter goods for food.
_Dangers of the Black Market Prohibition._
The black market has been completely outlawed in individual area as in
the Army Area North [XVIII.AOK], in Pleskau and, as the commander of
Army Area Don has informed the reporter, in Transnistria, which had
been ceded by Rumania.
All these prohibitions had a completely negative result. The goods
disappeared from the markets, trading was continued in uncontrollable
backyards, and the urban population lacked the most important food
items. With a readmission of the markets, these dangerous symptoms
vanished.
_Black Market Prices_
Following are some examples of black market prices in the occupied
Eastern territories:
_In Areas of the Caucasus_
1 Egg RM 1.--
1 lb. Butter RM 15.-- - 20.--
1 ltr milk RM 2.60 - 3.40
100 gr. tea RM 20.-- - 40.--
1 apple RM 1.--
1 chicken RM 9.-- - 10.--
1 lb. meat RM 5.--
1 winter overcoat RM 600.--
1 pr. shoes RM 200.-- - 300.--
_In the city of Kharkov_:
1 ltr milk RM 3.-- - 4.--
1 kg tea RM 1000.--
1 piece wartime soap RM 7.-- - 8.--
1 ltr Vodka RM 70.--
1 cigarette RM -.30
1 pr shoes RM 400.-- - 500.--
In regard to all these prices, however, it must not be forgotten that
the majority of the scales being executed by means of barter.
_The Armed Forces And Increases in Prices_
Besides the lack of consumer goods, the German soldier is also
responsible for the outrageous prices, because by uncontrollable
means he is obtaining funds from home besides his pay, which in
army of a million men add up to an imposing sum. Every expert of
the conditions knows that the doughboy will today pay any price,
because the additional food items are more import to him than
money. The suggestion, made to the reporter by various economic
inspectorates, that the soldier in future should receive no
_Reichskreditkassenscheine_, but shall receive a type of _substitute
money_ for purchasing in post exchange [Marketendereien], can only
then be carried out, if the post exchanges can offer to the soldier
additional food items, which he would otherwise obtain in the black
market.
The opportunity for the combat soldier to acquire additional food items
or to purchase them for the homefront must not be hampered, it must not
be forgotten, that this combat soldier decides the war.
_The Combat Soldiers as the Bearer of Useful Barter._
It is therefore regrettable, that town commanders often punish the
soldier severely, who exchanges tobacco goods or minor items of
consumer goods which he receives from home, for food items with the
local population. It has to be considered that the consumer goods in
question are in most cases rubbish of the German household, items
which can be foregone by the homefront, but which such as needles,
twine, pocket knives, nails, combs, etc., are necessary in the eastern
territory and bring good will. The combat soldier, who carried out this
barter, procures additional food for the front and/or to the homefront,
and at the same time supplies to the East the most necessary consumer
goods, which cannot be supplied in general today by German authorities.
For these reasons, the market activity in Russian towns must be
retained despite all mentioned disadvantages.
_Price Ceiling in the Black Market._
In order not to let the prices rise beyond all limits it is recommended
to have a certain control, a price ceiling which equals the present
average price; however an experiment which was executed in various
towns, is not recommended for imitation, whereby merchandise which was
not sold on the market by evening, is confiscated and sold at the local
average price.
_Establishment of a Central Food Administration._
Despite all this, market dealing can not be a solution. The food supply
must be assured by the German administration. Two ways constitute the
solution.
1. Further expansion of the factory kitchens
2. Mass introduction of community kitchens.
This system was built up during the Bolshevist period in a form, which
an unbiased reporter must describe as exemplary. For instance, there
was in the town of Simferropol, in the Crimea, during the Bolshevist
period a food trust which supplied 23 mess halls and 15 factory
kitchens, by which 50,000 of the town's 140,000 inhabitants were fed.
Breakfast, lunch and supper were served and could be eaten right there
and then, or were taken home. The appearance of the population and its
physical condition at the time of conquest of the territory proved
that the food was sufficient. A system of feeding to the population
was carried out here, which is also going into effect in Germany in
numerous labor camps, and factory canteens, etc., but in its present
stage does not yet approach the Bolshevist system.
_The Example Simferopol_
A Kriegsveraltungsrat, who came from the Arbeitsfront took over these
institutions in the town of Simferopol to a certain extent and operated
them according to the necessities and conditions of the present. This
organization appears to be so successful that its general introduction
into the towns of the occupied East must be thought over in manner and
extent.
At first, this system is marked that only a _single_ German
administrative official can be in charge of the entire system without
any further German help.
A Main Food Administration was established for the whole Crimea.
The native town administrations supplied the collaborators of this
organization, which, in Simferopol alone, runs today 12 mess halls
and 49 factory kitchens, in which you can eat lunch or take it to
your home. Those working for the German Armed Forces and also some of
their relatives, a total of approximately 30,000 persons of the 70,000
inhabitants of the town, are fed. There is mostly soup, vegetables,
sometimes fish and meat from deceased animals.
However the distribution of the allocated bread coupons frequently
runs up against difficulties, since the bread supply is especially
difficult in the Crimea. On the other hand an information service of
the Food Administration itself is excellently organized; it consists of
native residents, who immediately report, if spoiled, but still edible
food from army stores, in the case of small truck farm vegetables
etc. can be procured. Furthermore each deceased horse or cow within
the territory of the town or its vicinity is reported immediately and
examined for suitability.
A special control section of the Food Administration inspects the mess
halls, doctors make spot checks of the quality of the food offered.
In this case also, native help is used. Further sections of the Main
Food Administration are the mill sections, which is in charge of the
processing of grain. The section for the issuing of bread and food
coupons, the bread baking and trading section etc. A procurement
section which has to secure the release coupons from the competent
German authorities and must look further for food, and call for it with
its own vehicles, is in charge of the procurement of merchandise. All
big consumers, such as hospitals, schools etc., have to submit monthly
reports of supply requirements. Procurement takes place according to a
common plan, so that the German agricultural leadership is not hampered
by numerous individual requests.
This example must be imitated in its magnitude. In the field of food,
the organizing capabilities of the Eastern population must be used,
thus relieving simultaneously the German administrative apparatus.
The example Simferopol proves that we have to use the Slav in the huge
Eastern territories for the organization of food, since he is always in
the position to discover possibilities of procurement which we cannot
do because of insufficient help. Self administration, which goes as far
as possible, in the field of food for the urban population is necessary.
_No Schematic All-inclusive Ruling of Fundamental Directives._
On account of the gigantic delivery quota of corn, meat, poultry, eggs,
oil, to the German Reich, it is obviously not possible in the near
future to guarantee to the urban population in the East a 100% supply
of food. In addition, as already explained, there is still a great deal
of food in the hands of the farmers and of some urban residents which
is beyond our control. Thus schematic ruling would therefore lead to
the result that the Russian towns would receive food which could be
spared in an emergency at the expense of the German and/or the Western
European territories. Thus the final conclusion can only be this that
at the moment, a general systematic ruling which guarantees the minimum
subsistence level of the entire population cannot be carried out in
the occupied Eastern territories. On the other hand, the responsible
leaders of the occupied territories must immediately receive the
authority through directives from competent authority, that they can
take immediate measures there, where serious dangers arise in the food
situation of those natives employed in the war economy with freedom of
decision and responsibility to exceed the presently authorized rations,
which secure the minimum subsistence level and prevent the described
dangers (loss of Man Power, Anti-German, and Pro-Bolshevist attitude).
This system, which gives to the responsible administrative employee
freedom of action and which has primarily been developed and tried by
the English administration, based on hundred years of experience must
be introduced more and more in the German work in the Eastern area.
Basic decisions from central authorities, which can be of unforeseen
consequence, should only be decided upon then, if the measures have
proved themselves by experiments in a partial sector of the area.
II. The Position Agricultural
The food political situation which may become important during the
coming year, even for the Reich and the whole of Europe, is opposite
to the demand to procure sufficient food for people working in town in
essential industry.
The following spot checks of the various Eastern territories give an
approximate picture of the situation:
_Caucasus_
Economic Inspectorates established generally a surplus of farm products
for the Reich can not be expected from the Caucasian area. At best,
some cattle, sunflower seeds, wool and cowhides could be delivered.
As far as grain is concerned, it must be expected that there will not
be enough in many cases for the supply of the local population until
the next harvest. For example, details from the District Voroschilovsk
(Stavropol): the territory covers approximately 540,000 hectars, 60,000
hectars of which are steppe.
The total area, growing wheat was 70,000 hectars, 10,000 hectars of
which were destroyed by the Bolshevists. Of the total area growing
oats, approximately 50% of 8000 hectars are destroyed and full of
weeds. Of 17,000 hectars of barley, 4,000 hectars are destroyed. 8,000
hectar of meadow could not be mowed. The total cultivated area amounts
to only 50-60% to that of 1940. Reason: lack of fuel and labor.
In the District Patigorsk, the conditions are still less favorable.
The example of the development of the Sovchos Semlianskaia near
Voroschilovsk is also informative. According to this, there were the
following during the Bolshevist time at this Sovchos:
104 horses presently 41
104 cows presently 60
32,000 sheep presently 8,899
5,561 double hundredweights of barley and fodder are required to
keep the present livestock, 650 double hundredweights are available.
Reason: 180 hectars of 750 hectars of wheat were destroyed by the
Bolshevists. 360 of 475 hectars of barley are lost, since it could not
be cut in time because of lack of gasoline, tractors, scythes, and
man power; 20 hectars of oats are completely lost. 5 of 18 tractors
are still on hand. 5,000 of the 8,899 sheep mentioned above must be
surrendered to the Armed Forces in the near future.
_Crimea_
The result of the harvest is 191,969 tons of grain. 109,620 tons are
needed for seed grain, 55,739 tons for fodder and 129,503 for food.
Accordingly, there is a deficit 81,126 tons of grain in the Crimea.
Added to this is a poor harvest of potatoes.
_Territory Kharkov_
In the territory of Kharkov (Army B) the delivery of cattle to the
front has been so large, that only young cattle is still on hand.
Thousands of hectars of the best soil could not be cultivated because
there were no draft animals.
_Ukraine_
The total result of the harvest is worse than last year. In detail, the
delivery quota calls for: 600 ltr. milk from each dairy cow at a price
of 7 Pfg. per liter (during the Bolshevist period it was 90 ltr. at
price of 15 Kopeken). Every liter delivered voluntarily exceeding this
was paid with 3 Rbl. Because of the high delivery quota of more than
3 million tons of grain from the whole Ukraine it looks as follows in
some of the districts of the country.
Rural District Wynica: The harvest gave winter wheat:
82 982 double hundredweights
------
55 900 double hundredweights must be surrendered
25 906 double hundredweights are required for feed grain.
This leaves 11,176 double hundredweights for feeding the population,
which are by no means sufficient.
In the General Commissariat Shitomir about 28% of the livestock has to
be consigned. Normally it would be 18%.
_General Commissariat Dniepropetrovsk._
The presumed consignment of grain amounts to a total of 490,000 tons of
the total crop of 820,000 tons. Thereby the population receives only 65
kg. per capita of which 30 kg. already were distributed.
26% of the total arable land is used for winter grains. Of that, 30%
are good, 30% are spotted, and _40% did not come up at all_.
The difficulties of cultivation are very great because of the shortage
of tractors, fuel, and labor. Thus for 100 hectars 23-25 laborers are
regularly required, but today only 13-14 are available. There are only
4-6 horses to 100 hectars. But the cow teams requires a greater number
of laborers.
The consignment of live stock amounts to 50% of the stock. There are
numerous cases where the farmer has to deliver his dairy cow, his only
real property from the Bolshevik period.
III. The Agrarian Reform
The agrarian reform up to now has been carried out in a different
manner in the various occupied territories. While the "Kalchos" were
divided and the land given to the farmers for cultivation in the north
and the center, not much was changed in the Bolshevistic conditions as
such in the South, especially the Ukraine. The creation of agricultural
cooperatives up to volume of 10% of the total agricultural area can not
be considered as a basic change of the system.
It must be admitted that in the south with its strongly industrialized
giant estates a slower pace is advisable in the division of the estate.
The danger of a decrease in production in cases of a quick division
would be present.
_Conception of the Cossacks-Atamane._
In addition, another fact has to be taken into consideration, which is
that old "Atamanen" have found in the Cossack areas for instance that
only old Cossacks were capable of managing an individual farm. The
young generation is partially so used to industrial agriculture that
before all a certain re-education is necessary.
Also in carrying out of the new agricultural reform a general solution,
as already mentioned, must not be striven for from the beginning;
rather the return to individual farming must be carried out with
consideration of economic and political points of view resulting from
the particular situation in a particular region of the tremendous
Eastern Area.
_Special Arrangements in the Agrarian Reform._
The efficient German administrative expert must have the possibility
of experimentation and his successes and his failures must become the
basis for final decision of the central office.
The discussion, which the reporter was able to have with the
specialists concerned in the entire eastern areas, resulted in the
following proposed solution:
The Russian farmer is without exception land hungry and an opponent of
the "Kalchos system." He desires private property of land, even though
of limited extent. In contrast to the worker and intellectual he is the
most honest opponent of the Bolshevik system. If tomorrow he is denied
his property, then we shall lose the east economic and political power
with which we could build up the Eastern Area.
_Land Distribution According to Merit._
The demand to immediately allot to all farmers, land as private
property, is in spite of these political points of view, of course
unfeasible for the present.
First of all those farmers respectively their families, who themselves
or whose sons have earned special merit in war economy in the fight
against partisans, or today or tomorrow at the front, must receive
self-sufficient individual farms.
Although later the distribution of land must be carried out in a
generous manner without the qualifying clauses used today.
The greatest part of the agricultural region in the East must, because
of the political reasons mentioned, as time goes on, become the
property of farmer families in order to create a stratum of satisfied
farmers as sure counter-weight against possible revolutionary ambitions
of labor and intelligentsia in this manner.
_State Farms and Farmer's Land_
Besides these farmers' lands, a great number of state farms should
be created by the taking over of the Sovchosen and/or the creation
of new estates whose production would have to deliver the excess of
agricultural products necessary for Europe.
IV. The Slav as Worker
_Necessity of Realistic Policy_
As initially pictured, every member of the rural population less
means a weakening of the labor power as well as fighting power of the
Reich. All occurrences of the recent past prove that there is no room
for ideologies at this time. Where this demand is not heeded because
of ideological reasons, for the sake of future problems, where the
law of the best utilization of man-power is violated, the objection
of the soldiers as well as that of responsible civil servants arises
with justification. Thus we hear again and again from leading Germans
in the East, the regret expressed that we learn too little from the
English, who--under the cover of long term policy--act on the basis of
the needs of the hour, while we antagonize people in the East and cause
the greatest difficulties in reconstruction only in order to proclaim
distant aims, whose accomplishment is in no way certain, but which come
about on its own accord after a victory.
He who just like the reporter, has gone through English schooling
and knows the English manner of treating foreign peoples, can only
confirm that the greatest mistake of our entire Eastern policy is to
be found in this field. First of all we have to win the war. Having
won it, we can shape the area as we see fit. Every proclamation of an
aim that repulses those who are of the most use for us in the Eastern
area today, which makes them resent the German leadership, is, from
a soldier's point of view, a mistake which has to be continually
rectified by the commitment of German blood.
Thus the Project Sauckel as earned out in the Eastern area has caused
unrest and dissatisfaction which is the equivalent of a lost battle,
though without doubt it was the final means to cover the requirements
for workers of the German economy.
_Dangerous Excesses._
But the executing agencies have committed errors which should have been
avoided: De-lousing of Russian girls by men, taking of nude photographs
in forced positions, locking female doctors in cars in order to make
them available to the transport leaders, transporting of shackled girls
in shirts through Russian localities to the railroad, etc.... (The
complete material has been channeled through the proper army regions to
the OKH.)
_Important Imponderables._
It is of course correct to consider these things without
sentimentality. In spite of that the results of such errors must not be
overlooked. Before everything, the treatment of the Eastern workers in
the Reich is decisive. According to all previous reports the results in
household and in agriculture are good; in industry bad. The fact that
male and female workers housed in camps have no leave, that exercise of
religion etc., in contrast to conditions in the Russian territories, is
prohibited, leads the population of the occupied Eastern territories to
the conclusion that the Slav is treated and utilized as a slave. The
result is that when today a commission for the hiring of labor for the
Reich appears in a region, everybody, as far as possible, flees into
the woods.
Our propaganda, which attempts to influence the East by an expenditure
of millions of Marks and irreplaceable paper, and also by the
employment of valuable manpower, which is lost to the Armed Forces,
must evaporate into thin air under these circumstances.
_Attitude of the Eastern Peoples Important._
The Slav will formulate his opinion and attitude on the basis of his
experiences in the Reich. Here comes the decision, whether millions of
Slavs will reconstruct under German domination and leadership willingly
or whether they, filled with hate, will seek every opportunity to
destroy this domination, since their conditions make a worthwhile
existence impossible.
The attitude, still present today occasionally in some places, to treat
the Slav as a slave, whereby beatings are the best means of education,
must be corrected by immediate orientation, and that the maltreatment
concerned must be stopped at once by the severest threat of punishment.
Despite all terror during the Bolshevist period, the social aid
measures for the Russian worker and his family were considerably
better than is assumed in Germany--as has been proven in the meantime
by unbiased investigations. In addition a purposeful meaning of his
work in the realm of the community is given to him by unrelenting and
refined propaganda. One must have much understanding for this, and it
is by no means easy to win this people for us. Whoever represents the
opinion that the attitude of this people is unimportant, sins against
the German armed power in the face of the war economic and also future
military indespensability of the Eastern peoples and calls for the
danger that most valuable, forever irreplaceable German blood must be
sacrificed in addition.
_Methods of the Utilization of Labor._
The utilization of labor of the Slavic workers can be carried out best
in similarity to the Bolshevist example, as various experiments which
the reporter could observe, prove.
_The Successes in Dniepropetrovsk._
Model successes have been achieved by _Commissioner General Selzner
in Dniepropetrovsk_. The Russian worker, who practically has been
primarily an armament worker for years, works according to the
_group piecework system_. Not the individual performance, but that
of the group was decisive. This system, the advantages of which are
apparent, must be retained and introduced generally. Furthermore,
the punitive system for contract violators or workers who violate
the work discipline is ideal. At first, a reprimand is given or a
monetary fine imposed. In case of repeated violations, additional duty
[Dienstverpflichtung] with exact orientation about further punitive
measures is another disciplinary procedure.
_Educational Work Camps._
The severest punishment is confinement in a educational work camp. The
maximum length of punishment here is 6 months. Such camps are in all
District Commissariats, sometimes installed as mobile camps and made
available to the Organization TODT. In the camps, all _beatings_ and
all corporal punishment are _forbidden_ altogether, out of principle.
_Coordination of Utilization of Labor and Food._
The work is carried out in groups, as in the group piecework. In case
of full work performance, the convicts receive Armed Forces rations,
diluted three times. If the group of ten men produce in their work
performance only 50% of the quota, their food is diluted six times,
and they receive 50% less bread. The results are marvelous. The amount
of punishment decreases constantly, work performance increases, the
morale of the workers is good, considering the circumstances.
_Bonus System._
The Bonus system proves itself in case of the Eastern workers,
industrial workers as well as farmers. Thus in the District
Dniepropetrovsk, especially good results were achieved in the delivery
of sunflowers, when 1 kg oil was made available to the farmer for every
100 kg of seeds delivered.
An especially attractive bonus is the _distribution of tobacco_. In
several districts, the tobacco, allocated to certain armament and/or
war economic plants, is distributed equally up to 90% to the workers,
whereas the remaining 10% * * *
V. Salary, Money, Market--Price Problem
The salaries which are being paid at the present time in the Eastern
area are so low, in comparison to the general market prices, that they
are of absolutely no value: Actually, in the entire section, there
exists _no salary problem at all, but merely a food problem_. It is
impossible to raise the salaries in order to thereby make it possible
for the workers to purchase the most essential consumer goods. There
is enough money. The reporter experienced repeatedly that for example,
porters, unskilled laborers, etc., were in possession of such amounts
of money as no German General possessed. A raise of salaries would only
constitute a swelling of the circulation of a medium of exchange and a
further price increase.
_Comparison with the Japanese Experience in China._
In the entire Eastern Area, prices are being paid today for food
and consumer goods which are actually inflationary. The reporter,
who before the war, in 1939 had the assignment to conduct the same
investigations on the Chinese-Japanese battle front, today in the
Eastern area can only determine that the German administration is
repeating the same mistakes which Japan had previously exercised in the
occupied Chinese territory.
_Combining the Reichs-kreditmark with the Ruble._
The greatest financial mistake which we could have made was to combine
the Reichsmark, respectively the Reichskreditmark with the Ruble,
similarly as Japan had done with its leveling, in connection with the
Chinese dollar, until after severe set-back, it was at last recognized
that this had been the greatest mistake which could have been made at
all by the Japanese financial policy.
The Reichskreditmark, which, not only in the Eastern, but also in
other occupied territories, is the medium of exchange which the combat
soldier accepts as standard salary, is today actually of inflationary
value. Her fate depends on the Ruble, which is entirely beyond our
control. Today there is no German office which could determine in
which amounts the Ruble is circulating, which amounts, thru robbing of
the inhabitants, have come into additional circulation at the Finance
Offices and which amounts are brought in by the Bolshevists through the
Front, into the occupied territory.
We therefore made the same mistake with the same repercussion. Just
as Japan, after several years of the Chinese-Japanese war, decided to
withdraw from the former use of enemy currency, we too shall have to
take that step. The quicker this happens, the better it will be.
_The Karbovanetz Experiment._
The introduction of the Karbovanetz in the Ukraine, put through as an
attempted solution, must be recognized as such, although it, as local
experts of the Reichscommissariat themselves confirm, was a useless
attempt. It is so because a partial solution is senseless in the huge
Eastern Area and the Karbovanetz is meaningless as long as the other
immense territories retain the Ruble.
The attempt was also doomed to failure because currency problems can
only be solved together with the consumer goods problem. One can
determine and control mediums of exchange; nothing is changed in the
price fixing, as long as not even a half way satisfactory consumers
goods offer opposes the continuous flow of mediums of exchange to the
working country--and city inhabitants.
The currency political experiment, taken as a whole, must therefore be
considered as a failure in the Ukraine. It has only brought unrest to
the people. Above all, the fact that large banknotes are not redeemable
in Karbovanetz, has resulted in the transport of money into the other
sections, where the notes are changed into small coins.
_Central Solution of Currency Problem_.
This case proves particularly well that such efforts towards solution
should be conducted only centrally, never locally. This example is
further proof that, as all the General officers of the Army sector
and Army groups had informed the reporter the greatest danger in the
Eastern area was the lack of a central leadership in the Civilian
Administration.
VI. Care of the sick--Self Aid Service
With a view to the aim, that is to say, the maintenance of the
able-bodied person, the most important beside the sustenance, is the
care of the sick and the safeguarding of those people who through
lengthy illness have become unfit for work.
In some Army sectors, in the meanwhile, precautions for the care of the
sick have been taken, and it is true, not only in the interest of the
country inhabitants working for the German Armed Forces, but above all,
in recognition of the Russian Psyche, for their families as well. The
measures, carried out in this sense in the various Army sectors, must
be taken over in general.
The lack of medicinal items, in the entire Eastern Area, is
particularly catastrophic. The number of hospitals, doctors and medical
personnel is fairly adequate, despite the abductions during the retreat
of the Bolshevists. In order to uphold the standard of the people, for
the purpose of war economic and military utilization, you must however
work primarily for the accumulation of medicines for the entire Eastern
territory.
_Exemplary Solution in the Northern and Central Army Sector_
Of particular importance is the so-called _Self Aid Service_, which
represents a special measure of the first order for the entire Russian
area and which expects to lift the social calibre of the peasantry in
the Northern and Central Army Sector. It is necessary to spread this
organization to all other occupied territories.
As the reporter was able to determine, on the basis of intensive
investigations, particularly in this field, measures were taken during
the Bolshevistic period, which on the average, correspond to the German
conditions. The partially carried out and proposed emergency measures
for further accomplishments correspond of course in no way to the
former Bolshevistic and other accomplishments as customary in Germany
today. They have in fact the exclusive aim to keep the most important
portions of the Eastern Nations alive and capable of working for the
German Armed Forces and the sustenance of the German people.
VII. The School System
The viewpoint represented up to now by numerous German offices in the
Eastern area, that the Slavic person should be kept in a condition
which could not be primitive enough, cannot practically be carried out.
All Military posts, all Civilian Administrative offices, with which the
reporter spoke on this problem took the viewpoint that the front, like
the German war economy, was in need of a worker's replacement, which
could not be supplied by 3rd or 4th grade primary schools.
_No Breeding of Superfluous Intelligentsia._
Without exception, the viewpoint is taken, of course, that it would
be wrong to heed a Russian intelligentsia, which without possibility
of commitment, dissatisfied and without work, tomorrow would have to
become the bearer of National, Revolutionary and Panslavic ideas. It
is here important to keep a proper plan in mind. To point here to
India, to England's faulty policy, is premature. The reporter had the
opportunity to study the English colonial policy in India. It is true
that the English, out of consideration for later working possibilities,
make it possible for every Hindu to study at any desired school or
college. In this manner, a Hindu proletarian intelligentsia was
created. However--on the other side of every propaganda--one must admit
today that, as the result of this English policy, today, in the darkest
home of the Empire, one cannot speak of serious uprisings in India and
that the Indian economy is working one hundred percent for the British
war.
_The British Experiences._
It is, however, not decisive as was sometimes believed, if a young
native inhabitant in a subordinate section has a college education
or is illiterate, but decisive is the fact whether this person is
satisfied with the extensive utilization of labor and thereby actually
is the best collaborator of the ruling people, or if he, regardless of
what educational class he belongs to, dreams only of the downfall of
this ruling class. The fact that England, as the third people after the
Greek and Roman Empire has succeeded on the basis of a century-long
experience of her colonial statesmen to gain supporters for herself
among the best of the conquered peoples is the basis of the rule of the
British Isle.
_The German Language in the East_.
If we are prohibiting today the learning of the German language in the
occupied Eastern territories, then this is considered only a sign of
weakness, not that of strength. Military detachments told the reporter
that they were in many instances asked by the natives why their
children were not allowed to study the German language. The Russians
concluded from this that the Germans intended to leave the Eastern
territory in the shortest possible period of time. Throughout the
existence of world history, the conquered have learned the languages of
the ruling peoples. This law of nature cannot be changed.
Today it is actually so, that--contrary to the order of the Ministry
for the East-German is being learned and taught everywhere. Especially
exemplary is the settlement at Selzner in the General Commissariat
Dniepropetrovsk, where in the professional schools all professional and
technical expressions are taught to the apprentices right away in the
German language.
_Replacement [Nachwuchs] of Specialists_.
Aside from the general school education the question of _specialist
training_ for industrial use plays the decisive part at present.
Here also the way and manner is exemplary in which the solution is
being executed in the General Commissariat Dniepropetrovsk with an
inclination toward Bolshevist examples.
This concerns handicraft schools with attached retraining shops, which
are connected with practical work in the factory.
The youths between the ages of 14-16 years, who have left school,
attend a training course in industrial preparatory school, which lasts
two months, after having taken a capability examination with the
employment office. Then follows practical work in a factory; duration
6 month. This is followed by another training course of 2 month. After
every attendance of a semester the youth advances into the next higher
wage class. Altogether 12-16 months of training are given.
The system turns out useful specialists within the shortest period
of time, even though they are not painstaking craftsmen. The
continuation of this method is to be urgently recommended in view of
the mobilization of labor, and if possible it should be executed by a
_central order for the remaining occupied Eastern territories_.
In Dniepropetrovsk itself especially good participants of the training
courses are finally taken over after the Germans example into an
apprenticeship of three years' length, where their final training takes
place under German supervision.
_Retraining in Critical Professions._
With the same system the unskilled workers who were left behind by the
Bolshevists are being retrained in the critical professions: metal
craftsmen, construction craftsmen, carpenters, and stone cutters.
Further schools for car mechanics, tractor drivers, etc., have been
established and schools for other professions are being planned.
_Medical and Legal Replacement Necessary_.
Besides this special training for industrial use a thorough training of
the young generation also in the medical, veterinary, and legal fields
is necessary. Because we need the Slav as a peasant and worker and
tomorrow as a fighting soldier, in order to maintain ourselves against
the whole world, it is necessary that especially in the medical field
the required education for the maintenance of the population, whose
life and work is necessary for our front. The impetus is the greater,
because already today the time has arrived, when Ukrainian and/or
Russian doctors are working in the Reich itself as assistant doctors in
German hospitals because of the lack of doctors and thereby represent
to the leading doctors a more valuable help than the inexperienced
young German generation.
_The Rising Generation of Farmers._
Just as important is the rising generation of farmers. In reality, in
the East, the Specialist Officers [Sonderfuehrer] who cultivated at
home 10 Mozgen, does not manage half a dozen communal farms [Sovchose]
and state farms [Kolchose] with a total of a hundred thousand hectars,
but the problems of such agricultural installations are mastered by
the Bolshevist agronomist subordinate to the former, who has received
a preliminary training during the Bolshevist period in order to manage
huge industrialized agricultural installations.
_Basic Meaning of the School Problem._
However, the question of schools, apart from all practical aspects
of the rising generation of workers is urgent for us, also for
propagandistic considerations. All efforts of the reporter to determine
which apart from the practical social measures of Bolshevism, of
the number of Moscow's ideological propaganda slogans has developed
actually the strongest public appeal, yield the following unmistakable
picture:
The entire population of the Soviet Union, even as far back as the
most remote village--despite all terrors--had the conviction that
each and every one carries the marshal's baton in his knapsack. Every
farmer's son, every worker's child actually had every opportunity for
advancement in the countless schools of the Soviets. There was no
village in which one or more farmer families could not state proudly
that their daughter or their son is an engineer or a doctor or chief
agronomist or Commander of the Red Army, etc. _There was an unusually
broad middle strata of Soviet intelligentsia_, whose highest aspiration
was the continuation of education, the breaking into the scientific
world.
As a sole sample taken at random the Sovchos Semlianskaia near
Voreschilovsk is mentioned. The following comprise the administration
of this State property; a director with a monthly salary of 1000
Rubles, his deputy 600 Rubles, another agronomist for special
assignments with 600 Rubles, two agronomists for sheep with 450
Rubles each, the chief animal agronomist with 850 Rubles, two animal
specialists with 450 Rubles each, the veterinary with 750 Rubles, two
assistants with 450 Rubles each, the chief shepherd with 350 Rubles,
the bookkeeper with 750 Rubles, his deputy with 500 Rubles, three more
bookkeepers with 350 Rubles each.
Such a staff of "these of the intelligentsia" [Intelligenzlern]
administred 20,000 hectars with 605 workers, including the members of
the family.
The crass transition from the Bolshevist propaganda of the "ascent"
[Aufstieg] into the intelligentsia to our method of closing all schools
is perhaps the very measure which is the most dangerous for our
domination in the East.
_Theater and Film_
In the same connection the theater and film question is important.
The incident in Kiev is well known, where, after the presentation of
a revue under German stage-direction with nude girls, etc., although
subdued but completely unmistakable protest reactions by the native
inhabitants were the result. The Russian and the people of the East
area influenced by him, still considered the theater as an educational
institution. They expect either education or a political tendency
in the sense of training. In the serious theater, every activity of
amusement appears to them as a sacrilege and consequently our revues
and soldier shows as a barbaric action against culture.
It is similar with the motion pictures. After the appearance of the
first German entertainment films, for a long time the native public
vainly racked its brains over their tendency. All German offices,
all interpreters, all native inhabitants who were linguists were
overwhelmed with pertinent questions. Apparently the peasants agreed on
the solution that all German films, which, as is known, take place in
an atmosphere of luxury essentially have a marked tendency to glorify
capitalism and its outward forms.
Accordingly, it is vital to exercise the greatest caution and tact in
the selection of films for the Eastern area. It is best to exhibit
cultural films, which are received with the greatest elucidation.
VIII. The Judicial Problem
_Collegiate Courts or Single Judges_
In various army areas, as well as in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine,
a legal code have been created for the arbitration of civil court
disagreements. As for details, the opinions differ. In the Army Area
North and in Army Area Center, collegiate courts have been set up. In
the Ukraine, the point of view is taken that the single judges are
better, because the Slav has the tendency to evade the responsibility.
There were endless proceedings in the collegiate court without the
possibility of arriving at a clear-cut judgment, but the single judge
is forced to pronounce a sentence on his own responsibility. This
shortens the proceedings and is more favorable in its consequences.
_Trained Jurists_
The experience and conclusion that only trained jurists are fit for
this judicial office is general and unmistakable. This conclusion
is general. It was explained especially clearly in the General
Commissariat, Dniepropetrowsk by the highest judge, who is continually
traveling in the country and is professionally best equipped to judge
the situation. This example also proves that the 3 year elementary
school [Grundschule] in the Eastern area is unfeasible.
In the necessary clarification of the legal code the inheritance law
(testaments) and marital law in particular are very urgent.
IX. Unified Leadership.
The complaint of all military offices as well as numerous civil
administration offices is that today the Ministry for the East is not
uniformly decisive in the Eastern area, but that a half dozen other
offices act independently. In the appendix a chart of the structure of
Army Group A is included which shows how many and what offices work on
their own responsibility, outside of the proper military administration
in its sphere.
Of course, this independence of individual offices gives them an
extraordinary striking power, but in the long run this division of
authority cannot be kept up. Even if the mentioned offices retain their
general independence in the future, it must by all means, be achieved
that the commander of the army areas are given the authority to
delegate to all these offices the tasks designated for the individual
commitments after previous consultation. Every military and civil
leader with final responsibility in the Eastern area is weakened in
his authority and thus also in view to the achieving of his aims
by the fact that there are today, a half dozen officers which act
independently in his sphere without having to subordinate their own
interests to the overall interest of the particular sector. This
division of jurisdiction is the same over-bureaucratization which we
justly criticize in our enemies and which the Fuehrer has often enough
branded as the cause of the weakening of our effort.
It will have to come that the highest leadership issues directives
which are decisive for the civil as well as military administrative
districts, whereby a basic law, according to an English model, has to
be considered always: first of all experiments are made, and only then,
after examination of the experiences, will the final decisive orders be
given by the central office. This knowledge of leadership from century
old experience, as possessed by the British Empire must finally be
taken over by the proper central administrative authorities in Berlin.
X. Administrative Experiment Areas.
The Army Area, respectively Army Group A (Caucasus) have organized
experimental areas of the administrative type, and namely one in the
territory of the Cuban-Cossacks around Unmanskaia, which includes six
regions with a population of about 150,000 each, the other one in the
area of the Karatschaier.
The two closed settlement groups of the Karatschaier are led by a
committee of the eldest, each consisting of 8 of the noblest persons of
the tribe, who are directly subordinated to the local commander in an
advisory capacity.
The cooperative [Kolchos] land is divided up, and given to the farmers
as their property. The old farmland from the Bolshevist period is
tax-free, taxes are levied for the new.
In the experimental area of the Cuban-Cossacks, the role of the local
commander is changed. Six regions are concentrated under one field
commandant. The District Ataman is subordinated to the field commandant
in an advisory capacity.
Furthermore, a special economic liaison staff has been created which is
directly subordinated to the economic inspectorate Caucasus. The county
Agricultural Supervisor [Kreislandwirt] must turn to him. The regional
agronomist is also subordinate directly to the liaison staff.
The attempts to carry out a certain amount of self administration
deserve the highest attention in the framework of the reconstruction
policy in the East. We must learn from experiments. Whatever proves
itself here must be exercised again tomorrow in the best suited areas,
perhaps in the Ukraine, then again in parts of districts.
XI. Realist-Political Leadership of the Peoples in the Eastern Area.
An ideological goal must be given to the peoples of the Eastern area,
where already today and tomorrow even more the last inhabitant is used
for essential agricultural or war economic task, above that where his
use in military combat, whether it is against partisan or directly on
the front has already begun. As long as no such goal is in front of
the eyes of the Slav, we must expect that all forces, organized in the
meantime, will turn against the German leadership in case of a military
reverse, with which a far sighted policy always must count upon.
Never in world history was there such a condition, whereby a large
people respectively several large peoples gave their entire working
power and their blood in military commitments without knowing what
results they can achieve by this for themselves, their children and
their children's children. The fact that we do not recognize this
thesis of experience of history will cost us tomorrow the blood of
hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. There is no General of the
German Armed Forces today who has any understanding that we believe to
be able to dominate the Slavs without consideration of this fact.
_Self Administration_
This impression of the Eastern peoples that their work and military
utilization in the German service is meaningful, can only be achieved
by giving them self administration in a national-political respect
as a goal. Secret slogans can actually never be kept secret, that is
known. Today, the conviction is at large all through the Eastern area
that Germany has the intention to put the Slav on the same level as the
Negro; that the Slav must be biologically exterminated at the first
possible moment, that at best he would be all to seek his livelihood
beyond the Ural mountains.
This knowledge constitutes the greatest danger for the German leader
who wants to organize the Russian area. Already the fact that the
marked conviction in the Eastern area is generally known and widespread
today, means a weakening of the war economic and soldierly potential
of the Slav, such as no partisan propaganda could achieve to such an
extent.
_Primacy of War Necessities_
All of these projects exist beyond any ideological attitude. The
military and war economic necessities are the only guides. If we
forsake them, then the German soldier at the front will have to pay for
our political errors in disposition with his blood.
We must build, by taking only those measures, beyond all ideology,
which may be suitable after a victorious peace, which are useful in
furthering the working and soldierly commitment of the Slav in our
interest and thereby conserve German working power and German blood,
and bring German victory closer.
* * * * *
Appendix A Daily Food Rations in the Occupied Eastern Territories. (in
grams)
-------------------------+--------+-------+------+----------+----------
| | | | Prepared |
Consumer Class | Bread | Meat | Fat | Foods | Potatoes
-------------------------+--------+-------+------+----------+----------
_In the Towns of Army | | | | |
Area A (Caucasus)_ | | | | |
| | | | |
Normal Consumer | 215 | -- | -- | -- | --
| | | | |
Worker for the German | | | | |
Armed Forces | 345 | 28.5 | 10 | -- | --
| | | | |
Very Heavy Worker for | | | | |
the German Armed | | | | |
Forces | 428 | 43 | 14.3 | -- | --
In some villages potatoes and vegetables are missing altogether.
-------------------------+--------+-------+------+----------+----------
_In the Ukraine_ (without| | | | |
legal claim) | | | | |
| | | | |
Unemployed | 215 | 14.3 | -- | -- | 286
| | | | |
Families of those working| | | | |
for German interests | 215 | 14.3 | -- | 71,5 | 286
| | | | |
Workers for the German | | | | |
Armed Forces | 286 | 28.6 | -- | 71,5 | 355
| | | | |
Very Heavy Workers for | | | | |
the German Armed | | | | |
Forces | 355 | 42.8 | -- | 355(?) | 355
These rations were issued hardly anywhere until now; especially the first
two groups mentioned have not received these rations in most cases.
-------------------------+--------+-------+------+----------+----------
_In the Towns of the | | | | |
Crimea_ | -- | -- | -- | -- | --
| | | | |
Workers for the German | | | | |
Armed Forces | 300 | -- | -- | 71,3 | --
| | | | |
Families | 200 | -- | -- | -- | --
| | | | |
Children under 14 | 100 | -- | -- | -- | --
| | | | |
According to the importance of the factory, 3-5 grams of sunflower oil is
distributed daily.
Appendix A--Continued
----------------------------+-------+------+------+----------+---------
| | | | Prepared |
Consumer Class | Bread | Meat | Fat | Foods | Potatoes
----------------------------+-------+------+------+----------+---------
_In the Towns of the General| | | | |
Commissariat | | | | |
Dniepropetrovsk_ | -- | -- | -- | | --
| | | | |
| | | (Oil)| |
| | | | |
Normal Worker | 250 | -- | 6 | 50 | --
| | | | |
Heavy Worker for the | | | | |
German Armed Forces | 300 | -- | 6 | 50 | --
| | | | |
Very Heavy Workers for | | | | |
the German Armed | | | | |
Forces | 400 | -- | 15 | 50 | --
| | | | |
Miners | 700 | -- | 20 | 100 | --
| | | | |
Women and Children | 250 | -- | -- | -- | --
----------------------------+-------+------+------+----------+---------
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1383-PS
Excerpt from Transcription of a Stenographic Report of Discussion of
the Current Military Situation--dated 12 December 1942--[Pages 65 and
66.]
Jodl: The Military Commander of France reports: The number of those
French workers who were deported into the Reich since 1 June has now
passed 220,000. There are, in round figures, 110,000 specialists in
Berlin. An agreement has been successfully concluded with the French
Government about cession of an oil refinery with a capacity of 1/2
million tons. More than that, the French Government has agreed to
furnish other installations if need be.
(Reading)
There is nothing else to report from France. The sending away of the
121st and 304th was good. One already more than 50 trains, the other
about 46 trains.
Down there in the Balkans a clean-up campaign is under way in Jajce.
Where the opponent has retreated, he is being pushed. Those mountains
here are quiet. At * * * across the demarcation line, have thrown back
the enemy. Here he has attacked very hard, left 37 dead. People are
continuously being arrested in Belgrade. One can say that every day
between 15 and 30 Mihailovic followers are being shot.
Up here where the Italians have started to withdraw, the pressure has
already become somewhat livelier. Here are concentrations,--here is
where once in a while the railways are being destroyed, and also in
this area where the pressure of the enemy against this contemplated
Italian line is increasing.
Down here another clearing action by the Italians is now in swing.
In Finland everything is quiet, also after these fake attacks day
before yesterday.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1384-PS
Conference of the Fuehrer with General Field Marshal Keitel
and General Zeitzler on 8 June 1943 at the Berghof--
Extract from stenographic notes.
[Page 6] The Fuehrer: * * * I can only say: we will never build up a
Russian army, that is a phantom of the first order. Before we will
do so, it will be much simpler if I get the Russians as workers in
Germany; that is much more decisive. I don't need a Russian army which
I have to strengthen with German corset stays through and through. It
serves my purpose if I get Russian workers instead. Then I can release
the Germans and reeducate the Russians. For us the most successful
thing lies in the production of the Russian workers who are employed
in Germany; of course, we have to feed them in a different way if we
thrust a maximum amount of work upon them.
* * * * *
[Page 12] He said: Here, I lose 500,000 Jews. I must take them away,
because the Jews are the element of revolt. But in my area, actually,
the Jews were the only tradesmen. Now they want to set up high schools
and grammar schools, thereby building here, a national Ukrainian
state, that should in the future, fight against Russia. I am not even
in a position to have the worker, who must work here, have his boots
repaired. I can't do that because the tradesmen are no longer here. The
Jews are all gone. What is more important, that I train the Ukrainians
how to mend boots, or that I send them high schools so that they can
build up the Ukrainian state?
* * * * *
[Page 25] Keitel: Now about the employment of people from deserters
camps.
Fuehrer: I am of the opinion that they should be transferred to Germany
and used there. They are prisoners of war. If I only could transfer 30,
40 or 50,000 men to the commissioner for coal production! But then they
will have to be treated really in a decent way.
Zeitzler: I have set as my goal that they should become decent workers
in Germany. We can't do much with deserters at the front. I can commit
a few of them as volunteers for replacements. But the majority should
go to Germany as workers in order to release Germans.
Fuehrer: I can only say: if we do not straighten out our coal affairs,
the moment will arrive when I shall not be able to produce either
ammunition or explosives anymore, nor will we be able to build
submarines. This will happen in 100 other fields too. It is idiotic.
But the moment will arrive. It is already tragic when the Italians come
and ask us why do we not deliver this or that. I have to deliver it. We
cannot, because we haven't got enough coal. That is sloppy, of course.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1386-PS
1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, 378
Law concerning the granting of amnesty of 23 April 1936
The Reich government has decided to enact the following law, which is
announced hereby.
Par. 1
1. Amnesty is granted for punishable acts which the perpetrator has
committed in his eagerness to fight for the National Socialist ideal.
Excluded are intentional offences through which death of a human being
has resulted; excluded also are acts, the motives and nature of which
show base intentions of the perpetrator.
2. Sentences which through the punishable acts described in Par. 1, are
recognized to be legal and are not yet carried out when this law goes
into effect, will be remitted. Pending prosecution will be put off if
the act has been committed before 20 April 1936; new prosecutions will
not be established.
Par. 2
Amnesty is also granted for other punishable acts, under the provisions
of the following regulations:
1. When this law goes into effect, sentences recognized as valid, but
not yet carried out, will be remitted, if they consist of not more than
one month imprisonment and/or a fine (the latter may be changed into
one month imprisonment). If on account of several separate actions, a
total fine is imposed, amnesty is only valid if the fine does not go
over the limit described in section 1; when this law goes into effect,
the same rule applies when several legal convictions are combined into
one.
2. Pending prosecutions for offences, committed before 20 April 1936,
will be put off if no higher punishment or combined punishment, of
one month and a fine, can be expected. New prosecutions will not be
established.
Par. 3
1. In addition to #1 and #2, when this law goes into effect, fines and
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months either separately or both together
recognized to be valid but not yet carried out, or which are still
imposed for acts committed before 20 April 1936, will be remitted
conditionally if they apply to:
1. Punishable acts against the law concerning treacherous attacks
against the State and Party and for the protection of the party
uniforms of 20 Dec. 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 1269) with
exception of offences against section 3 and section 5, chapter 1--as
well as punishable acts against section 134 a and b and section 130 of
the penal code.
2. Insults against the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor and other leading
personalities of the state or the NSDAP, as well as other insults or
physical injuries resulting from political arguments (sections 223,
223a of the penal code), and punishable remarks of dissatisfaction
according to section 360 No. 11 of the penal code.
2. The same applies to punishable acts against section 330a of the
penal code dealing with punishable acts as described in section 1 No. 1
and 2.
3. The fine will be remitted under the condition that the perpetrator
does not commit a crime or a deliberate offence for a period of 3 years
following the granting of the conditional amnesty.
Par. 4
The Reichsminister of Justice will issue the necessary regulations for
the execution of this law.
Par. 5
The law goes into effect on the day following the publication. Berlin
23 April 1936
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1388-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 479
Law concerning confiscation of Property subversive to People and State
of 14 July 1933
The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby
promulgated:
The provisions of the Law confiscating Communist Property of 26 May
1933 (RGBl I, 293) are applicable to assets and interests of the
Social Democratic Party of Germany and their welfare and affiliated
organizations and also to assets and interests which are used or
destined to promote Marxist or other activities found by the Reich
Minister of the Interior to be subversive to people and state.
Berlin, 14 July 1933
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1388-A-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 479
Law Against the New Establishment of Parties July 14, 1933
The German Government has enacted the following law, which is herewith
promulgated:
Art. 1
The National Socialist German Worker's Party [Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei] constitutes the only political party in
Germany.
Art. 2
Whoever undertakes to maintain the organizational structure of another
political party or to form a new political party will be punished with
penal servitude up to three years or with imprisonment of from six
months to three years, if the deed is not subject to a greater penalty
according to other regulations.
Berlin, den 14 Juli, 1933.
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1389-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 769
Law creating Reich Labor Service of 26 June 1935
The Reich Government has decided to enact the following law which is
hereby made public:
Chapter I
_Labor Service of the Reich_
Article 1
1. The Reich Labor Service is a service of honor for the German people.
2. It is the duty of all young Germans of both sexes to serve their
nation within the Reich Labor Service.
3. It is the task of the Reich Labor Service to educate the German
youth in the spirit of National Socialism for the community of the
nation and the true conception of labor, particularly to inspire them
with the necessary respect for manual labor.
4. The purpose of the Reich Labor Service is the execution of work for
the common benefit.
Article 2
1. The Reich Labor Service is subordinated to the Reich Ministry of the
Interior. The Reich Labor leader rules under its jurisdiction over the
Reich Labor Service.
2. The Reich Labor leader is at the head of the Reichsleitung of
the Labor Service. He dictates its organization, decides about the
mobilization of labor and directs training and education.
Chapter II
The Labor Service Duty of the Male Youth
Article 3
1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor determines the number of the
eligible recruits for every year and decides about the length of
service.
2. The service starts at the minimum completed age of 18 and ends with
the maximum completed age of 25.
3. As a rule, the eligible recruits will be called for labor duty in
the year of completion of their 19th year.
4. Voluntary admission at an earlier age is possible.
5. Prison terms of more than 30 days will have to be made up for by the
recruits and volunteers of the Reich Labor Service, if their offense
does not make necessary their dismissal from the Reich Labor Service,
according to Article 16.
Article 4
The eligible recruits for labor will be conscripted by the
"Ersatzdienststellen of the Reich Labor Service."
Article 5
1. The following are excluded from the Reich Labor Service:
a. ex-convicts,
b. who is not in possession of the civic rights,
c. who comes under the regulations of security and correction
according to Article 42a of the penal code,
d. who has been expelled from the National Socialist Party because of
dishonorable activities,
e. who has been condemned by the court because of activities against
the State.
2. The Reich Minister of the Interior can make exceptions concerning
Part 1, letters c and e.
3. Labor Service recruits who have been declared unworthy to occupy
public offices can only be called, after the time of the loss of that
honor, determined by the verdict, has elapsed.
Article 6
1. Persons who are completely unfit for labor service will not be
conscripted for same.
2. Labor Service recruits residing abroad or intending to go abroad can
be exempted from the fulfillment of labor service for up to two years,
in exceptional cases even permanently, but in any case only as long as
they stay abroad.
Article 7
1. Not eligible for labor service are persons of non-aryan descent or
who are married to a person of non-aryan descent. The ruling of the
Reich Minister of the Interior as in Article 1, part 3 of the Reich Law
for Civil Servants, dated 8 August 1933 (RGBl I, 575), determines who
is to be considered of non-aryan descent.
2. Non-aryans who have been declared worthy for armed service
[wehrwuerdig] according to Article 15, part 2 of the Armed Service Law
[Wehrgesetz] can also be accepted for labor service. They cannot occupy
superior positions in the labor service, though.
Article 8
Eligible labor recruits can be deferred from labor service for up to 2
years, in the case of vital professional reasons up to 5 years.
Chapter III
_The Labor Service Duties of the Female Youth_
Article 9
The rules concerning the labor service of the female youth will be a
matter of special legislation.
Chapter IV
_Duties and Privileges of the Members of the Reich Labor Service_
Article 10
1. The following are members of the Reich labor service:
a. The cadre,
b. The conscripted recruits,
c. The labor service volunteers,
2. People can be hired by contract for certain functions of the
interior service.
Article 11
1. The cadre consist of the leaders and office holders according to
plan (T.O.) as well as the candidates for these offices. The regular
leaders and office holders work for the Reich Labor Service on a
professional basis.
2. The leader candidate has to sign up for at least ten years of
continuous service and must prove his aryan descent, before he can be
promoted to a regular leader [Truppfuehrer-sergeant]. He must also have
accomplished his military service.
3. Regular leaders and office holders must absolutely resign at a
certain age limit.
4. Civil servants of other administrations who are transferred to the
Reich Labor Service retain their claim concerning their financial
privileges which they acquired prior to their transfer.
5. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor nominates and dismisses the members
of the Reich Labor Service from the rank of major [Arbeitsfuehrer] and
up. The other members of the Reich Labor Service are nominated and
dismissed by the Reich Minister of the Interior on the proposal of the
Reich Labor Leader [Reichsarbeitsfuehrer]. He can confer this authority
onto the Reichsarbeitsfuehrer.
Article 12
1. A regular Fuehrer or office holder can be dismissed from the service
in any of these instances:
a. in justified cases on his own request,
b. if he does not possess any more the necessary physical and mental
capacities to carry on in his job, and if the recovery of these
capacities cannot be expected within a year, according to a certificate
of a doctor of the labor service.
c. if his superior decides that he does not possess the necessary
qualifications any more to carry on in his office.
2. Subsequent discovery of reasons for inadmissibility to the Reich
Labor Service according to Articles 5 and 7 will result in immediate
dismissal.
3. The intention of dismissal is, in the cases of part 1, letters b
and c, to be made known 3 months in advance to the members of the
cadre with more than 5 years of service and 1 month for the other
members, with the motivation of dismissal. No previous notification of
dismissals are necessary in all other cases.
Article 13
The membership of the Reich Labor Service lasts from the day of
admission or conscription [Gestellungstag] until the end of the day of
discharge.
Article 14
Membership of the Reich Labor Service does not constitute a work and
service relationship in the sense of labor rights and social security
as put down in Article 11.
Article 15
The members of the Reich Labor Service come under the penal regulations
of the Reich Labor Service.
Article 16
1. Labor service recruits and volunteers can be released before the end
of their term in the following cases:
a. on their request, if a reason for deferment, according to Article 8
came into existence after induction.
b. if they are no longer in the possession of the physical or mental
capacities necessary for the performance of the service.
2. A premature dismissal of labor service recruits and volunteers
must be ordered in the case of subsequent discovery of reasons for
inadmissibility to the Reich Labor Service according to Articles 5 or 7.
Article 17
1. Members of the Reich Labor Service who belong to the National
Socialist Party, cannot participate in the activities of the Party or
its sub-divisions.
2. In order to acquire and to exercise membership of any kind of
organization as well as in order to form any kind of organization
within or without the Reich Labor Service, the members of the Reich
Labor Service must first obtain the authorization of the Reich Labor
Service. The acquisition of membership of the National Socialist Party
does not necessitate an authorization.
Article 18
The members of the Reich Labor Service must obtain an authorization in
order to get married.
Article 19
The members of the Reich Labor Service must obtain an authorization
in order to carry on a trade, for themselves and the members of
their household, as well as in order to accept a paid, supplementary
occupation.
Article 20
1. The members of the Reich Labor Service can refuse the position of a
guardian, trustee, foster-father and supporter as well as any honorary
occupation in the service of the Reich, country, community or the party.
2. An authorization is necessary for the acceptance of such a function.
It can only be refused in vital cases.
Article 21
Members of the Reich Labor Service are entitled to free medical
treatment and care in the case of sickness and accidents, according to
special regulations.
Article 22
The salaries of the members of the Reich Labor Service are handled by
the wage regulations of the Reich Labor Service.
Article 23
1. Financial claims resulting from the participation in the Reich Labor
Service come under the regulations applicable to civil servants of the
Reich. The highest authority in the spirit of these regulations is the
Reich Labor Leader.
2. The decisions of the Reich Labor Service concerning the induction
(Articles 5, 6, 7), deferment (Article 8) and dismissal (Articles 12
and 16) are binding for the courts. The same applies to decisions about
temporary relief of duty.
Article 24
The protection of the incapacitated in performance of the service
and the personnel release after at least ten years of service and
their survivors is regulated by the Reich Labor Protection Law
[Reichsarbeitsdienstversorgungsgesetz].
Article 25
1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor or his appointed representative
office can authorize the departing members of the Reich Labor Service
to wear the Reich Labor Service uniform until further notice.
2. This privilege is ordinarily only granted after at least 10 years of
honorable service.
Chapter V
Final Instructions
Article 26
The legal and administrative regulations necessary for the execution
and completion of this law will be issued by the Reich Minister of the
Interior.
Article 27
1. This law becomes effective the day of its publication.
2. The Reich Minister of the Interior is authorized to determine at a
later date for the effectiveness of various regulations of this law.
Berlin, 26 June 1935
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1390-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 83
Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and
State of 28 February 1933
In virtue of Section 48 (2) of the German constitution, the following
is decreed as a defensive measure against Communist acts of violence,
endangering the state:
Article 1
Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the Constitution of
the German Reich are suspended until further notice. Thus, restrictions
on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion,
including freedom of the press, on the right of assembly and the right
of association, and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic,
and telephonic communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders
for confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also
permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.
Article 2
If in a state the measures necessary for the restoration of public
security and order are not taken, the Reich Government may temporarily
take over the powers of the highest state authority.
Article 3
According to orders decreed on the basis of Article 2, by the
Reich Government, the authorities of states and provinces
[Gemeindeverbaende], if concerned, have to abide thereby.
Article 4
Whoever provokes, or appeals for or incites to the disobedience of the
orders given out by the supreme state authorities or the authorities
subject to them for the execution of this decree, or the orders given
by the Reich Government according to Article 2, is punishable--insofar
as the deed is not covered by other decrees with more severe
punishments--with imprisonment of not less than one month, or with a
fine from 150 up to 15,000 Reichsmarks.
Whoever endangers human life by violating Article 1, is to be punished
by sentence to a penitentiary, under mitigating circumstances with
imprisonment of not less than six months and, when violation causes
the death of a person, with death, under mitigating circumstances with
a penitentiary sentence of not less than two years. In addition the
sentence may include confiscation of property.
Whoever provokes or incites to an act contrary to public welfare
is to be punished with a penitentiary sentence, under mitigating
circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than three months.
Article 5
The crimes which under the Criminal Code are punishable with
penitentiary for life are to be punished with death: i.e., in Sections
81 (high treason), 229 (poisoning), 306 (arson), 311 (properties), 324
(general poisoning).
Insofar as a more severe punishment has not been previously provided
for, the following are punishable with death or with life imprisonment
or with imprisonment not to exceed 15 years:
1. Anyone who undertakes to kill the Reich President or a member or
a commissioner of the Reich Government or of a state government, or
provokes to such a killing, or agrees to commit it, or accepts such an
offer, or conspires with another for such a murder;
2. Anyone who under Section 115 (2) of the Criminal Code (serious
rioting) or of Section 125 (2) of the Criminal Code (serious
disturbance of the peace) commits the act with arms or cooperates
consciously and intentionally with an armed person;
3. Anyone who commits a kidnapping under Section 239 of the Criminal
Code with the intention of making use of the kidnapped person as a
hostage in the political struggle.
Article 6
This decree enters in force on the day of its promulgation. Berlin, 28
February 1933.
The Reich President
von Hindenburg
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1391-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGES 605-607, 12 July 1934.
Statute of the Academy for German law.
Par. 1
It is the task of the Academy for German Law to further the
rejuvenation of the Law in Germany. Closely connected with the agencies
competent for legislation, it shall further the realization of the
National Socialist Program in the realm of the Law. This task shall be
carried out through well-fixed scientific methods.
The academy's task shall cover primarily:
1. The composition, the initiation, judging and preparing of drafts of
law.
2. The collaboration in rejuvenating and unifying the training in
jurisprudence and political science.
3. The editing and supporting of scientific publications.
4. The financial assistance for research and work in specific fields of
Law and Political Economy.
5. The organization of scientific meetings and the organization of
courses.
6. The cultivation of connections to similar institutions in foreign
countries.
Par. 2
For the execution of its task, the Academy may set up special
committees handling particular cases. These committees shall have as
members outstanding specialists in jurisprudence and practice of the
Law as well as experts in Economic Affairs. As a rule, a respectable
member of the Academy, shall be the chairman of Committees. The
President of the academy shall receive reports on the results of the
work done by the committees.
Par. 3
The organs of the Academy are:
1. The President,
2. The Board of Directors.
Par. 4
In addition to the responsibilities fixed by the Law, the President
shall have to carry out the following duties.
1. The internal control of the Academy particularly the fixing and
distribution of the various duties and the forming of committees and
the appointment of the chairman and members of the committees.
2. The draft of the budget of the Academy, the rendering of the account
and the administration of the property.
3. The nomination and the dismissal of members.
4. The appointment of his deputy, of the members of the Board of
Directors and of the Treasurer--all from among the members of the
Academy.
5. The changing of the statutes.
In case the President is unable to carry out his duties, they will be
carried out by his deputy.
A change of the statutes and the nomination of the President's deputy
requires the confirmation of the competent Ministers of the Reich. As
for the draft of the budget, and the rendering of the account, the
provisions contained in Art. 9 to 12 shall be applied.
Par. 5
The Board of Directors shall support and advise the President; it shall
discuss the budget and make a preliminary examination of the rendering
of the account.
Par. 6
The academy consists of:
1. ordinary,
2. extraordinary,
3. supporting,
4. corresponding members.
Par. 7
Members are nominated for a term of 4 years. The number of ordinary
members is not to exceed 300.
The ordinary members are compelled to participate in the meetings of
the Academy and, according to rules set forth by the President, to
cooperate in accomplishing the goal of the Academy.
Par. 8
The financial administration of the Academy will be handled by the
treasurer. Current administrative matters will be handled by a director
who will have a contract with the Academy.
Par. 9
It shall be up to the President to plan the budget before the
beginning of each fiscal year [Rechnungsjahr]. This draft shall show
and adjust all receipts and expenditures to be expected during the
fiscal year--separated according to purpose and valuation. Only those
expenditures are authorized which, after careful verification, are
necessary for the completion of the tasks which the Academy is to
fulfill according to Law or Statute.
Before being put into effect, the budget-plan shall be discussed by the
Board of Directors.
Par. 10
The consent of the competent Ministers of the Reich is required for the
budget plan. The Reich Minister of Justice shall receive it at a date
set forth by him but not later than one month before the beginning of
the new fiscal year.
Par. 11
The President shall have to account for all receipts and expenditures
at the end of the fiscal year. This account shall be checked by the
Board of Directors and passed on by it, with adequate comments, to the
Reich Minister of Justice.
Par. 12
As for the drafting and execution of the budget, for financial
administration and for bookkeeping as well as for the accounting,
auditing and certification of accounting, the regulations of the Reich
budget apply.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1392-PS
1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 933
Law on the Hitler Youth 1 December 1936
The future of the German Nation depends on its youth, and the German
youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties.
Therefore the Government of the Reich has prepared the following law
which is being published herewith:
Art. 1
All of the German youth in the Reich is organized within the
Hitler-Youth.
Art. 2
The German Youth besides being reared within the family and school,
shall be educated physically, intellectually, and morally in the spirit
of National Socialism to serve the people and community, through the
Hitler Youth.
Art. 3
The task of educating the German Youth through the Hitler Youth is
being entrusted to the Reichs-Leader of German Youth in the NSDAP. He
is the "Youth Leader of the German Reich". The position of his office
is that of a higher governmental Agency with its seat in Berlin, and is
directly responsible to the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich.
Art. 4
All regulations necessary for the executions and completion of this law
will be issued by the Fuehrer Chancellor of the Reich.
Berlin, 1 December 1936
The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
Adolph Hitler
The Secretary of State and Chief
of the Reichchancellery
Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1393-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1269
Law on treacherous Acts against State and Party, and for The
Protection of Party Uniforms of 20 December 1934
The Government of the Reich has decided to enact the following law,
which is published herewith:
Chapter I
Article 1
1. Unless heavier punishment is sanctioned under the authority of a law
previously established, imprisonment not to exceed two years shall be
imposed upon anybody deliberately making false or grievous statements,
fit to injure the welfare or the prestige of the government of the
Reich, the National Socialist Workers Party or its agencies. If such
statements are made or circulated in public, imprisonment for not less
than 3 months shall be imposed.
2. Anyone committing the offense insolently and carelessly shall be
punished with imprisonment not to exceed 3 months or with a fine.
3. If the offense is directed solely against the prestige of the NSDAP
or its affiliated agencies, the offender shall be prosecuted only with
the consent of the Fuehrer's deputy or of agencies authorized by him to
initiate the prosecution.
Article 2
1. Anyone who makes or circulates statements proving a malicious,
baiting or low-minded attitude towards leading personalities of the
State or the NSDAP, or towards orders issued by them or towards
institutions created by them--fit to undermine the confidence of the
people in its political leadership--shall be punished with imprisonment.
2. Statements of this kind which are not made in public shall warrant
the same punishment--provided the offender figures on his statements
being eventually circulated in public.
3. The offender shall be prosecuted only by the order of the Reich
Minister for Justice; in case the offense was committed against a
leading personality of the NSDAP, the Reich Minister for Justice shall
issue the order in agreement with the Fuehrer's Deputy.
4. The Reich Minister for Justice in agreement with the Fuehrer's
Deputy shall determine who is to be regarded as a leading personality
as specified in (1).
Article 3
1. Anyone who commits or threatens to commit a punishable act, or who
is wearing the uniform or an insignia of the NSDAP, or carries it
on his person without being a member of the NSDAP or its affiliated
agencies and therefore being entitled to do so, will be punished with
forced labor or in minor instances with imprisonment not to exceed 6
months.
2. Anyone who commits the offense with the intention to stir up unrest
or to sow fear or terror in the population, or to create difficulties
for the German Reich with a foreign power, shall be punished with
forced labor not to exceed 3 years or with forced labor for life or in
particularly grave cases with death.
3. According to this law, a German national may be punished also if he
has committed the offense in a foreign country.
Article 4
1. Anyone who for the sake of a material advantage or for political
ends poses as a member of the NSDAP or its agencies, shall be punished
with imprisonment not to exceed 1 year plus a fine or either one.
2. The offender shall be prosecuted only in agreement with the Fuehrer
or with those authorized by him.
Article 5
1. Anyone who manufactures, holds in stock, sells or otherwise brings
on the market Party uniforms, parts of Party uniforms, textiles, flags
or insignias of the NSDAP, its affiliated agencies or organizations,
without the permission of the treasurer of the Reich, shall be punished
with imprisonment not to exceed 2 years.
2. Anyone who has in his possession Party uniforms and insignias
without being a member of the NSDAP or its affiliated organizations, or
without being entitled to possess them for any other reason, shall be
punished with imprisonment not to exceed 1 year. Anyone who wears any
of the above mentioned items, shall be punished with imprisonment not
to exceed 1 month.
3. To be put on a par with Party uniforms, parts of Party uniforms and
insignia are those uniforms, parts of uniforms and insignias which can
easily be confused with them.
4. The uniforms, parts of uniforms, textiles, flags or insignias in
question shall be confiscated. In case no particular person can be
prosecuted or condemned, the confiscation shall take place all the
same--provided conditions justify it.
5. The confiscated items shall be turned over to the Reich Treasurer of
the NSDAP or to those agencies appointed by him, for future use.
6. The prosecution of the offense and the confiscation (#4, section
2) can only be undertaken in agreement with the Fuehrer's Deputy or
agencies authorized by him to handle this matter.
Article 6
According to the rules set forth in this law, anyone who has obtained
membership of the Party through false pretenses is not a member of the
NSDAP, its affiliated agencies or organizations.
Article 7
The Fuehrer's Deputy, in agreement with the Reich Minister for Justice
and of the Interior, shall issue the necessary regulations for the
execution and completion of Articles 1 to 6.
Chapter II
Article 8
1. The regulations set forth in this law, with the exception of Article
5 (1) apply accordingly to the "Reichsluftschutzbund", the "Deutschen
Luftportverband", in agreement with the Reich Minister for Air, and by
the Minister of the Interior for the Voluntary Labor Service and the
"Technische Nothilfe".
Chapter III
Article 9
Article 5 (1) will become valid on 1 February 1935. The other rules set
forth in this law will become valid one day after their publication;
the law on treacherous acts against the Government of the National
Revolution from 21 March 1933 (RGBl I, page 135) as well as article 4
of the law on the "Reichsluftfahrtverwaltung" from 15 December 1933
(RGBl I, page 1077) are obsolete.
Berlin, 20 December 1934
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister for Justice
Dr. Guertner
The Fuehrer's Deputy and Minister without portfolio
R. Hess
The Minister of the Interior
Frick
also for the Reich Minister for Air
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1394-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 723, Art. 1-3, 13 October 1933
Law to guarantee Public Peace
The Reich Government passed the following law, which is published
herewith:
Art. 1
1. With death or, as far as a more severe punishment is not provided,
with a life-term in the house of correction or with up to fifteen years
in the house of correction will be punished:
1. Whoever undertakes to kill a judge or a public prosecutor or an
official, entrusted with tasks of the political, criminal, railroad,
forest-custom-protective or security police, or a member of the
Armed Forces or of the Storm columns (inclusive Stahlhelm) or of the
Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP, a (trustee) agent of the NSDAP, or a
member of the German Air-Sport organization, out of political motives
or on account of their official activity, or whoever incites to such
a killing, whoever volunteers or accepts such an offer, or whoever
agrees on such a killing with another person;
2. Whoever undertakes to kill a magistrate or juryman on account of
his activity as magistrate or juryman, or a witness or an expert on
account of testimony given in fulfillment of his duty as witness or
expert, or whoever invites to such a killing, whoever volunteers,
accepts such an offer, or whoever agrees on such a killing with
another;
3. Whoever produces, circulates or for the purpose of circulation
holds in readiness abroad printed matter in which the facts of high
treason are substantiated (Art. 81 to 86 Criminal Code), or otherwise
commits the crime of High-treason;
4. Whoever undertakes to import printed matter, as mentioned in No. 3,
knowing of its high treasonable contents, for distribution at home, or
who distributes such printed matter, after its import; or who furthers
at home a crime of high treason, committed abroad.
2. The regulations in Art. 86a Criminal Code about confiscation and
rendering useless will be employed accordingly.
Art. 2
With house of correction up to five years will be punished whoever
undertakes to import printed matter with intention of distributing it
for purposes endangering the country, in which are substantiated the
facts:
1. of a punishable crime in accordance with the law forbidding the
(new) organization of parties of 14 July 1933 (Reich Law-Publication I,
page 479) or
2. of a punishable invitation or provocation according to Art. 110 to
112 Criminal Code or
3. of a punishable untrue report, in accordance with Art. 3 of the
Reich President's decree to prevent treacherous attacks against the
government of the national revolution of 21 March 1933 (RGBl. I, page
135).
Art. 3
For the crimes mentioned in Art. 1 and 2, the special courts,
established according to the decree of the Reich government of 1 March
1933 (RGBL I, p. 136) are competent; insofar as the competence of the
Supreme Court Reich court and the court of appeals [Oberlandesgericht]
is not proven.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1395-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1016, 1 Dec. 1933
Law to secure the unity of Party and State, 1 Dec. 1933
The Reich government has decided on the following law which is
announced herewith:
Par. 1
1. After the victory of the National Socialist revolution, the National
Socialist German Labor Party is the bearer of the concept of the German
State and is inseparable from the state.
2. It is a corporation in public law. Its organization will be
determined by the Fuehrer.
Par. 2
The deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will become
members of the Reich government in order to insure close cooperation of
the offices of the party and SA with the public authorities.
Par. 3
The members of the National Socialistic German Labor Party and the SA
(including their subordinate organizations), as the leading and driving
force of the National Socialist State will bear greater responsibility
toward Fuehrer, people and state.
2. In case they violate these duties, they will be subject to special
jurisdiction by party and state.
3. The Fuehrer may extend these regulations in order to include members
of other organizations.
Par. 4
Every action or neglect on the part of members of the SA (including
their subordinate organization) attacking or endangering the existence,
organization, activity or reputation of the National Socialistic German
Labor Party, in particular any infraction against discipline and order,
will be regarded as a violation of duty.
Par. 5
Custody and arrest may be inflicted in addition to the usual penalties.
Par. 6
The public authorities have to grant legal and administrative
assistance to the officers of the Party and the SA which are entrusted
with the execution of the jurisdiction of the Party and SA.
Par. 7
The law regarding the authority to inflict penalties on members of the
SA and SS, of the 28 April 1933 (RGBl p. 230) will be invalidated.
Art. 8
The Reich Chancellor, as Fuehrer of the National Socialistic German
Labor Party and as the supreme commander of SA will issue the
regulation necessary for the execution and augmentation of this law,
particularly with respect to the organization and procedure of the
jurisdiction of the Party and SA. He will determine the time at which
the regulations concerning this jurisdiction will be effective.
Berlin, 1 Dec. 1933
Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1396-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 293
Law concerning the confiscation of Communist property of 26 May 1933
In order to prevent for all times property in the service of communist
activities to be used subversively to the State, the Reich Government
has enacted the following law, which is hereby promulgated.
Section 1
1. The highest provincial authorities [obersten Landesbehoerden] or
offices designated by them may confiscate on behalf of the province,
assets and interests of the Communist Party of Germany and their
welfare and affiliated organizations [Hilfs- und Ersatzorganisationen]
and also assets and interests used or destined for the promotion of
communistic activities.
2. The Reich Minister of the Interior may request the highest
provincial authorities to take measures under (1).
Section 2
Section 1 is not applicable to assets which have been rented or
delivered under reservation of ownership rights, unless the lessor or
the deliverer intended to promote communistic activity by the surrender
of property.