+Progress of the War+
The war went on for years, but the vigor and ferocity with which
it was carried on by the able commanders of the American army have
unfortunately never been fully comprehended by the public. This was
largely due to the attempts of those in political office to minimize
the importance of the struggle and to convince the people at home that
the enemy was but a small fraction of the native population. Bearing
in mind the statement of Secretary Root, therefore, we can appreciate
the true progress of the war as shown by the war records in Washington.
Thus:
On February 10, six days after the firing of that fatal shot which
plunged the nation into war, General Lawton succeeded in dislodging
an army of 4,000 Filipinos from Caloocan, on the outskirts of Manila.
It was at this point, too, that General MacArthur came to realize the
stupendous task that lay before his army.
When I first started in against these rebels [he said] I believed
that Aguinaldo’s troops represented only a fraction.... I did not
like to believe that the whole population of Luzon ... was opposed
to us, but having come thus far, and having been brought much in
contact with both insurgents and amigos, I _have been reluctantly
compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to
Aguinaldo and the government which he leads_[1].
The island of Luzon alone at that time had a population of over three
and a half million.
Four hundred miles south of Manila lie the Visayan Islands, one of the
richest groups of the archipelago. Early in December, 1898, General
Miller in command of an expedition composed largely of fresh arrivals
from San Francisco had previously sailed for Iloilo, the largest city
of the Visayas. Arriving there and finding the Filipinos supreme in
command, he had courteously asked them to permit his troops to land.
This request had been refused. Another request had followed on January
1, 1899, accompanied by a copy of McKinley’s Benevolent Proclamation
claiming sovereignty over the archipelago. The Filipinos immediately
asked if the American commander carried instructions from Aguinaldo,
saying that they could do nothing without orders from their recognized
leader “in cases affecting their Federal Government.”
I have the honor to notify you [said the Filipino leader in these
islands hundreds of miles from Manila] that, in conjunction with
the people, the army, and the committee, we insist upon our
pretentions not to consent ... to any foreign interference _without
express orders from the central government of Luzon_ (that is, the
Government headed by Aguinaldo) ... with which we are one in ideas,
as we have been until now in sacrifices[2].
And with regard to the claim of sovereignty made by McKinley seven
weeks before the treaty was ratified, this is what the Filipinos in
Iloilo said in another dispatch to General Miller:
The _supposed_ authority of the United States began with the treaty
of Paris, on the 10th of December, 1898. The authority of the
Central Government of Malolos (the seat of Aguinaldo’s government)
is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language,
uses, customs, ideas (and) sacrifices[3].
Here were bits of real eloquence substantiated by acts coming from
Filipinos four hundred miles south of Manila. Compare these with
Secretary Root’s statements about the “sixty tribes” and “sixty
languages” and what conclusion are we forced to draw?
In the face of this stubborn resistance General Miller with his
several thousand troops had, therefore, decided not to land, but
instead picked up anchor and set sail for Manila. The President’s
benevolent proclamation in Iloilo, as well as in Luzon, had thus
completely failed.
Following the outbreak of February 4, however, Miller again returned
with his troops, and, with the assistance of the armed vessels
_Baltimore_ and _Petrel_ finally captured the city. Then followed the
occupation of Cebu, the third largest city of the archipelago.
During the month of March the so-called “Visayan Military District” was
organized and placed under the command of General Miller. This district
included the southern islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu, by far the
richest sugar lands of the archipelago. On the thirty-first of the
same month, General MacArthur entered the town of Malolos where, for
several months, Aguinaldo’s seat of government had been located. One
month later he succeeded in driving the main body of Aguinaldo’s army
from that vicinity, and the march northward began in earnest. General
Lawton in command of another army moved on a parallel line thus forming
a big wing which captured and swept everything before them. A base for
military operations was established also in San Fernando, forty miles
north of Manila[4].
During the summer months that followed the army of the American
expeditionary forces was replaced largely by fresh recruits. By
October the northern advance was again launched with greater severity
towards the great plain of Luzon where Aguinaldo was still supreme.
General Lawton with his vastly superior forces again swept everything
before him. Generals Wheaton and MacArthur also followed in almost
parallel lines, and by November 12 the main body of the Filipino army
was forced to scatter. Some managed to return south where they joined
the insurgents of that region. Aguinaldo himself succeeded in evading
the net and escaped through Wheaton’s lines. After fleeing further
northward he sought refuge in the mountains along the eastern coast[5].
Having accomplished his task, General Lawton turned south in order
to break the line of communication between the northern and southern
armies of the Filipinos. He succeeded in this mission also but
sacrificed his life in a battle just twelve miles from Manila.
The new year 1900 marked the beginning of a fresh series of campaigns.
General Bates began by launching an aggressive drive in the province of
Cavite, southwest of Manila. In the following month, February, General
Bell sailed to the southern islands to capture the provinces of North
and South Camarines and West Albay where the Filipino forces had been
swelled by a number of those defeated in the north. Similar expeditions
were sent to the Visayan islands and garrisons established everywhere.
A total of four hundred different army posts was the final outcome of
this campaign[6].
In June of this same year, General MacArthur, believing that the
backbone of the Philippine army had been broken, recommended a
proclamation of amnesty. This was issued by the President on the
twenty-first, but it soon became evident that although unable to fight
in the open as an army, the Filipinos were determined to continue the
uneven struggle by guerrilla warfare.
With Aguinaldo in full retreat, the amazing thing is that he was not
overpowered sooner. The following account of the defeat of one of his
loyal forces, as reported by American eye witnesses, may give the
reason why.
It was a great fight that was fought away up on the trail of lonely
Tirad Pass on that Saturday morning of December 2. It brought glory
to Major Marsh’s battalion of the Thirty-Third volunteer infantry
who were the victors. It brought no discredit to the little band
of sixty Filipinos who fought and died there. Sixty was the number
that, at Aguinaldo’s orders had come down into the pass that
morning to arrest the onward march of the Americans. Seven were all
that went back over the pass that night to tell Aguinaldo that
they had tried and failed. Fifty-three of them were either killed
or wounded. And among them, the last to retreat, we found the body
of young General Gregorio del Pilar.
We had seen him cheering his men in the fight. One of our companies
crouched up close under the side of the cliff where he had built
his first intrenchment, heard his voice continually during the
fight urging his men to greater effort, scolding them, praising
them, cursing, appealing one moment to their love of their native
land and the next instant threatening to kill them himself if they
did not stand firm. Driven from the first intrenchment he fell
slowly back to the second in full sight of our sharpshooters and
under a heavy fire. Not until every man around him in the second
intrenchment was down did he turn his white horse and ride slowly
up the winding trail. Then we who were below saw an American squirm
his way out to the top of a high flat rock, and take deliberate aim
at the figure on the white horse. We held our breath, not knowing
whether to pray that the sharpshooter would shoot straight or
miss. Then came the spiteful crack of the Krag rifle and the man
on horseback rolled to the ground, and when the troops charging up
the mountain side reached him, the boy general of the Filipinos was
dead.
We went up on the mountain side. After H company had driven the
insurgents out of their second position and killed Pilar, the
other companies had rushed straight up the trail, and never
stopped until they were far up above the clouds and there was no
longer an insurgent in sight. As we went up the trail we passed
dead Filipino soldiers. We counted ten in all. Some had been shot
several times. We found bloody trails that led to places on the
edge of the cliffs, where wounded men had either jumped or fallen
off. We passed the second intrenchment high up on the trail. It
was built of heavy rocks well banked with earth. Just past this a
few hundred yards we saw a solitary figure lying on the road. The
body was almost stripped of clothing, and there were no marks of
rank on the blood-soaked coat. But the face of the dead man had a
look I had never noticed on the face of other dead men in insurgent
uniform on the field of battle, in the wake of an American firing
line. The features were clear cut and the forehead high and
shapely. I decided the man must have been an insurgent officer. A
soldier came running down the trail.
“That’s old Pilar,” he said, “we got the old rascal. I guess he’s
sorry he ever went up against the Thirty-Third.”
“There ain’t no doubt about its being Pilar,” rattled on the
young soldier. “We got his diary and letters and all his papers,
and Sullivan of our company’s got his pants, and Snider’s got
his shoes, but he can’t wear them because they’re too small,
and a sergeant in G. Company got one of his silver spurs, and a
lieutenant got the other, and somebody swiped the cuff buttons
before I got here or I would have swiped them, and all I got was a
stud button and his collar with blood on it.”
So this was the end of Gregorio del Pilar. Only twenty-two years
old he managed to make himself a leader of men when he was hardly
more than a boy, and at last had laid down his life for his
convictions. Major Marsh had the diary. In it he had written under
the date of December 2, the day he was killed:
“The General has given me the pick of all the men that can be
spared and ordered me to defend the pass. I realize what a terrible
task is given me. And yet I feel that this is the most glorious
moment of my life. What I do is done for my beloved country. No
sacrifice can be too great.”
A private sitting by the fire was exhibiting a handkerchief. “It’s
old Pilar’s. It’s got ‘Dolores Hoses’ on the corner. I guess that
was his girl. Well, it’s all over with Gregorio.”
“Anyhow,” said Private Sullivan, “I got his pants. He won’t need
them any more.”
The man who had the general’s shoes strode proudly past, refusing
with scorn a Mexican dollar and a pair of shoes taken from one of
the private insurgent soldiers. A private sitting on a rock was
examining a golden locket containing a curl of a woman’s hair. “Got
the locket off his neck,” said the soldier....
As the main column started on its march for the summit of the
mountain a turn in the trail brought us again in sight of the
insurgent general far down below us. There had been no time to bury
him. Not even a blanket or a poncho had been thrown over him.
A crow sat on the dead man’s feet. Another perched on his head. The
fog settled down upon us. We could see the body no longer.
“We carved not a line and we raised not a stone, But we left him
alone in his glory.”
And when Private Sullivan went by in his trousers, and Snider with
his shoes, and the other man who had the cuff buttons, and the
sergeant who had the spur, and the lieutenant who had the other
spur, and the man that had the handkerchief, and another that had
his shoulder straps, it suddenly occurred to me that his glory was
about all we had left him[7].
In fairness to the sober thought of the Americans, however, it should
be stated that the body of the Filipino general was later rescued from
those who were despoiling it and buried with full military honors. Over
his humble grave the American soldiers erected a stone bearing this
convincing testimony:
GENERAL GREGORIO DEL PILAR
KILLED
AT THE BATTLE OF TIRAD PASS
DECEMBER 2, 1899
COMMANDING AGUINALDO’S REAR GUARD
AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN
It was no doubt just such instances of bravery and personal sacrifices
that finally led General Lawton to say:
“Taking into account the disadvantages they have to fight against
in arms, equipment and military discipline,—without artillery,
short of ammunition, powder inferior, shells reloaded until they
are defective, inferior in every particular of equipment and
supplies,—they are the bravest men I have ever seen.
What we want is to stop this accursed war.... These men are
indomitable. At Bacoor bridge they waited until the Americans had
brought their cannon to within thirty-five yards of their trenches.
_Such men have the right to be heard. All they want is a little
justice”_[8].
This brief but colorful record of the first stages of the conquest,
and the disastrous defeats of Aguinaldo’s army are seldom questioned.
But it has often been asked why, seeing that victory over American
arms was virtually impossible, the Filipinos should have persisted
in sacrificing their lives and their fortunes by carrying on such
an unequal struggle. The answer was properly given at that time by
Apolinario Mabini, the intellectual leader of the revolution, the
Alexander Hamilton of that epoch. He thus expressed the sentiments of
his countrymen:
The Filipinos realize that they cannot expect any victory over the
American forces; they are fighting to show the American people that
they are sufficiently intelligent to know their rights despite any
pretense to hide these rights with able sophistry....
The Filipinos maintain their fight against the American troops,
not because of an especial hatred, but in order to show to the
American people that, far from being indifferent as to their
political situation they know how to sacrifice themselves for a
government which assures them their individual liberty and which
governs them in conformity with the wishes and the needs of the
people. They have been unable to avoid that fight, owing to the
fact that they have been unable to obtain from the American
government any kind of formal and clear promise regarding the
establishment of such a kind of government[9].
In order to show that the Filipinos were not by nature of a warring
disposition and that they were anxious to have peace and understanding,
Mabini continued thus:
The present condition and state of war deprives the people of
the chance to manifest freely their aspirations; therefore the
Filipinos desire most ardently that the Congress of the United
States provide for some means to listen to them before adopting
a resolution that would mean a definite decision regarding their
future....
I confidently hope that when the Americans and Filipinos have come
to know each other better, not only will the present conflict
come to an end but also future ones will be avoided. The opinion
prevailing among the impartial part of the American nation appears
to tend toward adhering to its old traditions and the spirit of
justice and humanity, which constitute at the present time the
sole hope of all upright Filipinos[10].
In the spring of 1901 finally occurred the most important incident of
the war. This was the dramatic ruse which culminated in the capture of
Aguinaldo. It will be remembered that ever since the beginning of the
campaign the leadership of Aguinaldo was undisputed. The capture of
that great leader, therefore, meant everlasting glory to the American
soldier brave enough to perform such an exploit.
The opportunity to attempt such a deed came when an officer of
General Funston’s district in central Luzon intercepted a messenger
from Aguinaldo bearing dispatches to one of his generals in that
locality. The message directed the Filipino General Lacuna to send some
reinforcements to Aguinaldo’s camp. Here was the golden opportunity.
Why not impersonate the reinforcements called for? The plan was
submitted to General MacArthur and adopted by him.
The American commander thereupon secured a company of Macabebe Filipino
scouts for the purpose. These Macabebe scouts had been loyal to the
Spanish military régime and when the Americans came they sided with
the invader. They came from a small district in Pampanga province, the
population of which at that time was a little over 25,000. In every
respect they were pure blooded Filipinos, as later events proved, and
the American commanders took advantage of this to deceive the wily
Aguinaldo.
On March 6th the U. S. _Vicksburg_ slipped quietly out of Manila Bay
bearing the members of the enterprise. Outside the American commanders
of whom there were four, no one had been told of the nature of the
expedition. Once they were aboard, however, the Macabebes were told to
discard their American uniforms and made to dress in such fashion as to
most resemble a tired and haggard insurgent command. It was necessary
to land over a hundred miles from Aguinaldo’s camp, as the smoke from
the vessel might have attracted the attention of some peasant or
insurgent lookout who would sound the alarm. General Funston’s account
of the precautions taken in this expedition offers the most convincing
proof that outside of a few natives, such as the Macabebes who had
accepted American sovereignty, the rest of the native population as
late as 1901 were hostile to the United States and loyal to Aguinaldo.
The party landed at night with all the ship’s lights screened, and the
_Vicksburg_ sailed away immediately agreeing to meet them at a nearer
point eleven days later. Thence started the march through a hostile
territory. The friendly Macabebes had been carefully drilled in the
part they were to play, and the stories they were to tell in the
villages that they passed. The story was to the effect that on their
march cross country to join Aguinaldo they had encountered a small
party of Americans drawing maps of the outlying country. A skirmish
followed and after killing and wounding some of them they had succeeded
in capturing the five Americans whom they were now bearing to Aguinaldo
as prisoners of war.
As the party marched through the villages they were, therefore,
received with pride and honor, the natives never suspecting that
they were feeding and guiding the enemy, a convincing proof that all
Filipinos look alike and do not differ from one another in appearance
any more than a Massachusetts man does from a New Yorker. General
Funston in his account of this enterprise later took particular pains
to say that the village officials and insurrectionists whom they
encountered were very humane and courteous to himself and the other
four American “prisoners”[11].
When within eight miles of Aguinaldo’s camp, quite exhausted from
the long march, the leader of the Macabebe troop, a certain Hilario
Tal Placido, sent a note in advance to Aguinaldo saying that he had
halted his command at the beach for a short rest as they were exhausted
from their long march and very much in need of food. The message also
requested that some be sent to them. The food came, and Aguinaldo’s
capturers were elated to find that the leader did not suspect the fate
that awaited him.
Then came one of the emergencies which American wit had to encounter.
Just as the final march was about to begin word came from Aguinaldo
that the American prisoners should be left behind in charge of some of
his guards. This was no doubt a precaution to prevent the Americans
from knowing the exact location of the insurgent camp. After a hurried
whispered conversation Funston directed the Macabebes under the command
of Placido to go ahead and leave them behind, but to later send a
forged order from Aguinaldo directing that the “prisoners” be sent up
to the camp after all. This ruse was successfully accomplished also and
Placido finally reached Aguinaldo’s presence, the American “prisoners”
lagging a short distance behind and out of sight. Aguinaldo’s neatly
uniformed guard of fifty men presented arms as Placido entered the
insurgent leader’s office and while the Macabebes were nonchalantly
forming a cordon around the guard, Placido entertained the President
with his story of the march across the country. Then when he saw that
the moment had come he went to the window and by a prearranged signal
ordered the Macabebes to open fire. So unexpected was the attack that
it succeeded in overpowering the guards.
Almost immediately after giving the order Placido, who was a very stout
individual, turned and grabbed Aguinaldo, who weighed one hundred and
fifteen pounds, threw him down and sat on him until General Funston
and the rest of the Americans arrived. After a short rest the party
hurriedly covered the remaining eight miles to a certain point in the
coast where the _Vicksburg_ had agreed to meet them. The rest of the
trip by water was uneventful and in due course of time they reached
Manila.
Aguinaldo was taken to the Palace to confront General MacArthur without
a soul in Manila knowing about the successful ruse. The Filipino leader
was most graciously treated and housed by General MacArthur. He was
treated more like a guest than a prisoner of war, although, of course,
he was watched night and day by a commissioned officer. It was most
important that the leader be kept alive for his influence in quelling
the revolution was sorely needed.
During the three weeks’ confinement of the great leader, therefore,
everything was done to convince him that further resistance was
impossible. Everything that the Americans had done and the attitude
they were taking was carefully explained to him, so that he might
realize the inflexibility of America’s purpose to remain in the islands
for “the good of the Filipino,” whether they liked it or not. The
programme explained to him was wittily described by an Englishwoman
when she said that it was a plan
to have lots of American school teachers at once set to work to
teach the Filipino English and at the same time keep plenty of
American soldiers around to knock him on the head should he get a
notion that he is ready for self-government before the Americans
think he is[12].
A quaint scheme indeed and “one characteristic of the dauntlessness of
American energy”[13].
And so Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable. On April 19 he took his oath
of allegiance and at the same time issued a proclamation recommending
the abandonment of further resistance. Among other things he said:
The time has come, however, when they (the Filipinos) find their
advance along this path (the path of their aspiration for freedom)
impeded by an irresistible force.... Enough of blood, enough
of tears and desolation.... By acknowledging and accepting the
Sovereignty of the United States, I believe I am serving thee, my
beloved country. May happiness be thine[14].
The capture of Aguinaldo, in the estimation of General MacArthur was
“the most momentous single event of the year,” inasmuch as he “was the
incarnation of the insurrection”[15]. When the news of his dramatic
capture was first received in Washington, Funston was immediately
raised to the rank of Brigadier-General, a convincing testimony that
the Washington authorities knew Aguinaldo’s importance.
Although the surrender of the Filipino leader was a severe loss to the
Filipinos, however, the war went on in full if not with increasing
ferocity. Filipino forces were active in the southern islands of
Mindoro, Samar, Cebu and Bohol. This condition was deemed sufficient
to justify the establishment of the notorious reconcentration camps,
the hideous cruelty of which had precipitated the Cuban war[16]. For
the island of Samar, the Filipinos had to contend with General “Hell
Roaring Jake Smith,” so called because of his methods of conducting
“civilized warfare”[17]. We shall make General Smith’s acquaintance
later on.
The province of Batangas, not over sixty miles south of Manila was also
seething with rebellion. The official reports from the army files tell
us graphically what measures were taken to force the native population
to submit to American arms. General Bell was in charge of this
district. His Circular Order No. 22, to be found in Senate Document
331, 1902, p. 1628, read as follows:
To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of
war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious
way of accomplishing this _than by keeping the minds of the people
in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such
conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The
less said the better._ Let acts, not words, convey the intention.
If we compare this official order with President McKinley’s benevolent
proclamation instructing the military administration to win the
confidence, respect and affection of the Filipinos, the contrast
presented is extraordinary to say the least.
General Bell’s Christmas Day product is even more convincing. His
report of December 26, 1901, read as follows:
I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men who will be
used in columns of about fifty men each. I take so large a command
for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and
mountain peak for insurgents and for food, _expecting to destroy
everything I find outside of towns. All able-bodied men will be
killed or captured.... These people need a thrashing to teach them
some good common sense; and they should have it for the good of all
concerned._
No official estimate of the number of people killed by such measures
throughout the islands since the beginning of the war has ever been
made. General J. M. Bell, however, made the estimate that in Luzon
alone one-sixth of the native population had been wiped out as a
consequence of the war[18]. Luzon then had a population of over three
and a half million, and one-sixth of that number meant 600,000 men,
women and children. How many of these were killed by powder and lead?
General Bell himself gave a suggestive answer when he said as a part of
the same statement that:
The loss of life by killing alone has been very great but I think
that not one man has been slain except where his death served the
legitimate purpose of war. It has been thought necessary to adopt
what in other countries would probably be thought harsh measures.
A Republican Congressman who visited the islands in 1902 confirmed
these estimates in an interview published in the Boston _Transcript_ of
March 4. Said he:
You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon; and the
secret of its pacification is, in my opinion, the secret of
pacification of the archipelago. They never rebel in northern
Luzon because there isn’t anybody there to rebel. The country was
marched over and cleaned in a most resolute manner. The good Lord
in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under
ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they
simply swept the country, and wherever or whenever they could get
hold of a Filipino they killed him. The women and children were
spared, and may now be noticed in disproportionate numbers in that
part of the island.
The army song of that period vividly typified the feeling of the
soldier towards the Filipino. Sung to the tune of “Tramp, tramp,
tramp,” the refrain was as follows:
Damn, damn, damn, the Filipino,
Pock-marked kodiac ladrone, (copper colored thief)
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag (rifle)
And return us to our own beloved home[19].
Although no very careful estimate of the total casualties has been
made, it is certain from the records, official and semi-official, that
the Filipinos killed in battle far outnumbered the American losses.
Judge Blount’s examination of the available war records showed a ratio
of sixteen Filipinos to every one American killed[20]. Commenting on
this disparity in the numbers killed the famous American historian
Latane adds that it “cannot be attributed to the superior marksmanship
of the American soldiers; it was due rather to the fact that the
Filipinos were in many cases not armed with rifles, and in some cases
perhaps, _to the ruthless slaughter of the wounded_”[21].
Considering the fact that the general belief among the American
people was that their presence in the islands was merely for the
purpose of helping the Filipino, it is indeed astounding to learn
how this conquest was being carried along in their name. But did the
administration in Washington cherish a similar purpose? We would do
well to look for light on this subject.
On page 96, Volume II, of Olcott’s _Life of McKinley_, which is the
standard biography of that President, there appears a facsimile of a
memorandum written in Mr. McKinley’s own handwriting and recording a
conversation which he had with Admiral Dewey. The piece of paper used
by the President was of the White House stationery, and it bore the
date of October 3, 1899.
“What is our duty?” was one of the President’s questions. And as
Admiral Dewey answered, McKinley wrote his memorandum, as follows:
“Keep the Island _permanently_. _Valuable in every way._”
Then followed questions regarding the number of troops and ships
needed for this permanent occupation.
And as if to assure himself of his position, the President finally
asked:
“Should we give up the Islands?”
And then follows this grim reply:
“Never—never.”
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VII
[1] Statement of MacArthur to an American war correspondent and
published in the _New York Criterion_ of June 17, 1899;
subsequently corroborated by MacArthur himself in his
testimony before the Senate in 1902. See Sen. Doc. 311, pt.
2, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1942.
[2] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 64.
[3] Sen. Doc. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, pp. 54-5.
[4] Sec. War Annual Rep., 1899, I, pt. 4, pp. 115 _et seq_.
[5] See Cong. Rec, 57th Cong., No. 331, 1st Sess., p. 1986, for
an account of this flight.
[6] Sec. War Annual Rep. 1900, I, pt. 4, p. 560.
[7] Dispatch from Richard Henry Little, special correspondent of
the _Chicago Tribune_ and published in the _Chicago Tribune_
of Feb. 4, 1900. Also reprinted in the _Lincoln Republican
Booklet_, p. 14.
[8] C. E. Russell, _The Outlook for the Philippines_, p. 94.
[9] M. Kalaw, _The Case for the Filipinos_, p. 79.
[10] Note: Mabini was later captured by the Americans in Dec.,
1899, and deported to Guam for two years.
[11] Funston’s article, “Capture of Aguinaldo,” in _Scribner’s
Magazine_, Nov., 1911.
[12] Blount, _American Occupation of the Philippines_, p. 340.
[13] _Ibid._
[14] For a full copy of this proclamation see War Dept. Report,
1901, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 100.
[15] War Dept. Rep., 1901, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 99.
[16] Sen. Doc., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 331, p. 1606.
[17] Latane, _United States as a World Power_, p. 98.
[18] Note: Gen. Bell’s estimate as it appeared in _New York Times_
of May 3, 1901; quoted in the U. S. Senate by Mr. Hoar and
never contradicted.
[19] Blount, _American Occupation of the Philippines_, p. 270.
[20] See Blount’s Estimate, p. 241.
[21] Latane, _United States as a World Power_, p. 97.