This ebook, based on a book first published in 1925, was created in
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_The_ +Conquest+ _of the_ +Philippines+
_by the_ +United States+
1898-1925
_by_
+Moorfield Storey+
Former President American Bar Association
_and_
+Marcial P. Lichauco+
Harvard Law School
“_Personally I think it is a fine and high thing for a nation to have
done such a deed (our work in the Philippines) with such a purpose.
But we cannot taint it with bad faith. If we act so that the natives
understand us to have made a definite promise, then we should live
up to that promise. The Philippines, from a military standpoint,
are a source of weakness to us. The present administration has
promised explicitly to let them go, and by its action has rendered it
difficult to hold them against any serious foreign foe. These being
the circumstances, the islands should at an early moment be given
their independence without any guaranty whatever by us and without our
retaining any foothold in them._”
_THEODORE ROOSEVELT._
G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS
NEW YORK LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1926
Copyright, 1926
by
Moorfield Storey
and
Marcial P. Lichauco
[Colophon]
Made in the United States of America
PREFACE
This book has been prepared in order to lay before the people of the
United States the facts relating to the conquest of the Philippines.
The government of the United States rests upon the self-evident truths
that “all men are created equal,” that is, with equal political rights,
and that “governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed,” or, in the words of Abraham Lincoln,—“No man is good enough
to govern another without that other’s consent. I say this is the
leading principle—the sheet anchor of American republicanism.”
As if anticipating what would be said in justification of the policy
in the Philippines, the same great American said: “These arguments
that are made that the inferior race are to be treated with as much
allowance as they are capable of enjoying, that as much is to be done
for them as their condition will allow,—what are these arguments?
They are the arguments that kings have made for the enslaving of the
people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments
of kingcraft were always of this class: they always bestrode the
necks of the people—not because they wanted to do it, but because
the people were better off for being ridden.... Turn it every way
you will,—whether it come from the mouth of a king as an excuse for
enslaving the people of his country, _or from the mouth of men of one
race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race_,—it is the same
old serpent.”
In 1898 every good American believed in the principles thus announced
and in recognition of this belief President McKinley in his message to
Congress urging the declaration of war against Spain used these words:
“I speak not of forcible annexation for that under our code of morals
is criminal aggression.”
To emphasize this principle and to remove all doubt as to the purpose
of the United States the Senate on April 20 passed the so-called Teller
Resolution declaring that “the people of Cuba are and of right ought to
be free and independent,” and that “the United States hereby disclaims
any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island (of Cuba) except for the pacification thereof,
and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the
government and control of the Island to its people.”
How happens it that with these convictions and these high purposes the
United States proceeded to conquer the Philippine Islands and to hold
them for more than twenty-five years against the will of their people?
President McKinley assured his fellow-countrymen that “our priceless
principles undergo no change under a tropical sun.” How happened it
that they did change?
It is the purpose of this volume to answer these questions and to show
how the American people were led by false statements and systematic
suppression of truth to believe that the Islands came into their
possession “unsought by the fortune of war,” and that, in consequence,
they became responsible for the government of the Filipinos in the
effort to fit them for independence, and that they have since been
governed wholly for their own benefit and not for America’s, while as a
matter of fact their conquest and retention were due to the influence
of a comparatively few men who, caring nothing for American principles
or the interests either of the Filipinos or their own countrymen, have
sought to make money for themselves at the expense of both.
It will become apparent that this policy has not been approved by the
people of the United States nor their representatives in Congress
with full knowledge of the facts, but has been devised and carried
through by the Executive in the exercise of usurped powers. Today the
same influences are at work seeking to prevent the fulfillment of the
promise made in the Jones Bill and to make permanent the retention of
the Philippine Islands because a few Americans wish to make money. It
has even been urged that the United States should deny the Filipinos
independence because some of the Islands are well-adapted to the
cultivation of India rubber, and the question is whether America’s
“priceless principles” and solemn promise shall be abandoned in order
to make rubber cheaper.
The people of the United States must indeed be blind if with the
history of Ireland before them, they believe that the Filipino nation
will continue to submit and regard with placid indifference this
cynical repudiation of our national promises and national principles.
The weapons which labor now uses against its fellow-countrymen at home
are quite as effective abroad and will be used.
Not in the interest of the Filipinos only, therefore, but far more in
the interest of the United States, should the control of the Philippine
Islands be abandoned. Well did Lincoln say, “Those who deny freedom
to others deserve it not themselves, and under a just God cannot long
retain it,” and well did Whittier say the same thing in the lines:
That laws of changeless justice bind
Oppressor with oppressed;
And close as sin and suffering joined,
We march to fate abreast.
+Moorfield Storey+,
+Marcial P. Lichauco+.
+Lincoln, Massachusetts+
October 20, 1925
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I.—+The Cuban Insurrection+ 3
II.—+The Philippine Situation Before the American Conquest+ 20
III.—+The Beginning of the Conquest+ 33
IV.—+Filipino-American Relations Prior to August, 1898+ 44
V.—+Conquest by Treaty+ 66
VI.—+Conquest by Force of Arms+ 88
VII.—+Progress of the War+ 101
VIII.—+Conduct of the War+ 126
IX.—+The Campaign of 1900+ 156
X.—+The Taft Policy Analyzed+ 181
XI.—+The Taft Policy in Practice+ 209
XII.—+The Attitude of President Coolidge+ 229
XIII.—+An Appeal to Reason+ 255
The Conquest of the Philippines by
the United States
1898-1925
CHAPTER I
+The Cuban Insurrection+
It has been customary to attribute the outbreak of the Spanish American
war to the deplorable situation existing in the island of Cuba, for the
cruel methods by which Spain sought to suppress the local insurrection
had indeed excited the sympathy of Americans who wished to end the
horrible conditions that existed there. But the desire for intervention
in 1898 was by no means the first manifestation of interest on the
part of the United States. On the contrary, many years ago America and
Spain had been on the verge of war over this tempting possession, and
it was only the influence of conservatives in both countries that had
prevented a more frequent recurrence of such strained relations. To
understand the intervention of 1898, therefore, it is necessary to
look back and recall the attitude of American statesmen in former years
upon the Cuban problem.
We first find that fully a century before the war of 1898 Cuba had
already been an object of concern to the United States. Jefferson
had coveted it, declaring that its possession by Great Britain would
imperil the future of the Republic, and John Quincy Adams had contended
that the laws of political gravitation would inevitably draw the
island to the Union. In 1825 Henry Clay declared that America would
not permit the occupation of Cuba by any other power than Spain, while
Daniel Webster as Secretary of State subsequently went to the extent of
assuring Spain that the entire naval and military forces of the United
States would aid her in maintaining her possession of Cuba[1].
At that early period it was the fear that Cuba might fall into the
hands of France or England which caused such concern in the United
States. A change in this attitude occurred in the middle of the
nineteenth century and must be considered with more care. American
historians have aptly described this period as one during which the
young Republic began to feel more keenly her growing power, and the
relations which she maintained with foreign nations were characterized
by the spirit of expansion which a few years before had brought about
the annexation of Texas, the Oregon controversy, and the Mexican war[2].
This was also the period when American diplomacy took a vigorous
attitude in the Far East. In 1853 the Japanese government was forced
to open her doors to American commerce and the world. In the following
year, Mr. Marcy, the American Secretary of State, went so far as to
attempt the annexation of Hawaii, while troubles with Mexico and Great
Britain were pushed to a successful termination.
These difficulties, however, were trifling compared with the problems
of expansion in the South. The annexation of Cuba in particular had
been desired ardently by the southern states. “If we hold Cuba,” wrote
one enthusiastic supporter of this movement, “we would hold the destiny
of the richest commerce that has ever dazzled the cupidity of man. And
with that commerce we can control the power of the world”[3].
The Washington government did not ignore such pressure. It, therefore,
directed the American representative at Madrid to sound the Spanish
government on this matter, but the latter soon made it clear that
“sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer
seeing it sunk in the ocean”[4]. Despite such a determined opposition
on the part of Spain the desire to annex Cuba gave rise to frequent
filibustering efforts. Finally in 1852, as if to put an end to this
uncertain situation, England proposed a tri-partite agreement by which
Great Britain, France and the United States should mutually renounce
any purpose or design of annexing Cuba. To this proposition, however,
America declined to bind herself on the ground that her peculiar
interest in the island did not warrant it[5].
This attitude continued until 1854 when an extraordinary incident
temporarily put an end to it. It happened that in that year the
Secretary of State directed three of the American ministers in Europe
to prepare some statement of the policy of the United States in regard
to Cuba. The three American officials designated were the ministers to
Spain, France, and England,—Soulé, Mason and Buchanan, respectively.
They met at Ostend in the summer of 1854, and there drafted a manifesto
to the effect that:
1. Spain ought to sell Cuba to the United States.
2. That Cuba was necessary for the safety of slavery in the
southern states of the Union.
3. And that if Spain refused to sell Cuba and the internal peace of
the Union was threatened, then “by every law, human and divine,
we (U. S.) shall be justified in wresting it (Cuba) from Spain
if we possess the power.”
This clearly meant forcible annexation justified by the doctrine
that “might makes right.” In transmitting the document to Washington
the American minister Soulé further added that the time was most
appropriate in which to declare war on Spain, inasmuch as England and
France were involved in the Crimean war and hence would be unable to
interfere with the conquest[6].
When the contents of this manifesto were made known in the United
States, however, the plan was severely condemned by the northern
states and the Republican party, the avowed enemies of slavery. The
administration soon became convinced that forcible annexation in this
matter would not receive the support of the entire nation and the
proposition was, therefore, dropped.
The Republican platform of 1860 contained this statement,
That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the
Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Federal
Constitution “that all men are created equal; that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure
these rights, governments are instituted among men deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed,” is essential to the
preservation of our Republican institutions.
After the Civil War, however, the United States again narrowly escaped
hostilities with Spain. It should be remembered that during the Civil
War Spain had recognized the Southern Confederacy and this did much
to augment the feeling of animosity towards the decaying empire. Many
thought that Spain should be punished for having showed friendly
interest towards the rebels. The opportunity to do so came in 1869.
In that year Cuba was seething with revolt. Although the progress of
the insurgents was slight, they found many sympathizers in the United
States, chief among whom was General Rawlins, the Secretary of War,
who persuaded General Grant to sign a proclamation recognizing the
belligerency of the insurgents. This proclamation was then handed
to Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State, with orders to seal and issue
it. Mr. Fish, however, knew better than to do this, for he realized
that conditions at the time did not warrant such drastic action.
He therefore put the paper away quietly and with the subsequent
restoration of order in Cuba it was forgotten. President Grant never
spoke of the matter again except to thank his able Secretary for
having pigeonholed the proclamation[7]. The agitation for some action
in behalf of the rebellious Cubans, which had made itself felt in the
press as well as in the halls of Congress, was later finally ended by
a definite announcement of the President that the Administration would
maintain an attitude of non-intervention[8].
The years that followed, however, again brought frequent attempts
by private Americans interested in Cuban commerce to secure a more
aggressive attitude at Washington. They resorted to filibustering in
order to draw the nation into war, and only the mature judgment of the
Secretary of State prevented ill-advised intervention[9].
It must also be remembered that during this period the grievances of
the Cubans against the home government were numerous and well-founded.
The native planters found themselves placed at a disadvantage in their
dealings with their best customers, the United States, which consumed
62 per cent of their sugar crop. This was owing to the duties placed
by the Spanish officials upon all American grains entering Cuba, a
measure which naturally provoked similar restrictions on Cuban products
entering American ports. Further grounds for complaint were found
in the fact that the creoles of the island were allowed no share in
their government, no chance to protest officially against treating
Cuba like a “milch cow which Spain seemed to wish to exhaust.” Add to
this the corrupt and complicated administration saddled upon the Cuban
producers; the disgraceful fortunes accumulated by Captains General;
and a budget augmented to cover numerous expenses of Spain entirely
disconnected with Cuba, and it is easy to understand why Cuba’s
proverbial loyalty which had withstood a heavy strain for many years
now began to fail.
It is only surprising that the final bid for freedom was so
long delayed. It came at length in 1895, but as in the earlier
insurrections, it was as clear that the Cuban “patriots” could not take
Havana as that the royal forces could not pacify the entire island.
Without aid from America it was very unlikely that the insurgents
would have realized their aim within any reasonable time. The future
could only promise a continuation of petty guerilla warfare which
naturally afforded no prospect of settlement or peace. In the meantime
the economic interests, not only of Cuba but also of the world,
and especially of the United States, were sure to suffer. Let not
the disinterested American be entirely deceived. Bitter as was the
indignation in the public mind at the Spanish atrocities, it must be
apparent that this irritation was greatly increased by the pecuniary
interests which America had and hoped to have in the struggling island
beside her. As Professor Keller of Yale put it, it was
because the interests of the United States were so extensive
that irritation in this country waxed greater, and gradually
metamorphosed itself into the form of a crusade against
misgovernment and oppression.
When General Weyler began his notorious reconcentration camps in 1896,
intervention was again averted by the narrowest of margins. Congress
on April 6 passed a resolution recognizing the belligerency of the
insurgents but President Cleveland ignored it, choosing to protest
through diplomatic correspondence. When President McKinley assumed
office these protests were renewed through the same channels but it
soon became evident that nothing tangible could be accomplished by
diplomacy.
Two later incidents also no doubt hastened the aggressive attitude of
the United States. One was the indiscretion of the Spanish minister
at Washington in writing a letter to a personal friend in which he
described the American President as a soft-handed politician, “and
a bidder for the admiration of the crowd.” Somehow, this letter was
“surreptitiously if not criminally obtained” and later published,
and it naturally created a profound feeling of indignation[10]. It
required more than the mere recall of the Spanish minister to cover
this diplomatic blunder.
The second incident was the blowing up of the battleship _Maine_ as it
lay in the harbor of Havana. No definite cause has yet been discovered
for this mysterious explosion which destroyed two hundred and fifty
American lives, but at the time an investigation made by officers of
the United States, in which the Spaniards were not allowed to take
part, reported that the destruction was caused by a mine. War spirit
could no longer be restrained. “When the _Maine_ was blown up in Havana
Harbor,” said Roosevelt, “war became inevitable”[11]. Add to this the
fact that public sentiment had been stirred up by a sensational press
which, in the words of the historian Rhodes had “manipulated the real
news, spread false reports, putting all before their readers with scare
headlines”[12], and we cannot wonder at the war fever which swept the
continent. “Every Congressman,” said Boutelle of Maine, “had two or
three newspapers in his district, most of them printed in red ink,
shouting for blood”[13].
In perfect accord with the attitude of the nation, therefore, President
McKinley, whose conduct in this matter had been flawless, sent a
message to Congress recommending intervention in behalf of Cuba and
humanity. “Our people,” he said, “have beheld a once prosperous
community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually
paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid
waste, its mills in ruins and its people perishing by tens of thousands
from hunger and destitution.” Thus did the President lay bare to that
august body the situation of the Cubans, a situation which he said,
“shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies” of the
American people.
A more than ready Congress thereupon passed the Resolution introduced
by Senator Teller of Colorado declaring among other things that “the
people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent,” and that “the Government of the United States does hereby
demand that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority
and government of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba
and Cuban waters.” This virtually meant war, but the Congress also took
particular care to stipulate
that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over
said island, except for the pacification thereof, and _asserts its
determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and
control of the island to its people_[14].
It is doubtful if an actual war had ever been begun with a purpose more
lofty and humane or with a clearer declaration of that purpose.
The outcome of the war every one knows. Spain was driven from the
island and the United States was left to fulfill her promise of giving
the Cubans the government and control of their island. But now, in the
face of this sacred pledge to recognize the independence of Cuba, a
campaign for the retention of that island went on quietly and patiently.
There has been no lack of counselors [said Senator Hoar] to whisper
in the ear of the President and Senate and House the dishonorable
counsel that we should hold Cuba, without regard to our pledges
or our principles, and that the resolution of the Senator from
Colorado was a great mistake.
This movement for the retention of Cuba, however, did not prosper and
happily for the sanctity of America’s word, steps were immediately
taken for the establishment of a government which could be handed down
intact to the Cubans. This was begun early in 1899 and by July, 1900, a
constitutional convention was called to frame and adopt a constitution
for the people of Cuba, and, “as a part thereof, to provide for and
agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to
exist between that government and the Government of Cuba.”
What these relations were to be was a question which naturally arose in
Washington, and Congress speedily decided the matter by the so-called
“Platt Amendment” defining America’s relations with Cuba. This act,
passing under a most unpretentious designation, may be said to be one
of the most important documents in the history of the nation. Let us
see why.
At the time of the intervention in Cuba the United States was only too
eager to absolutely pledge herself to establish the independence for
which the unhappy Cubans had been fighting. This unqualified promise
was given readily and sincerely. No doubt it was made to remove
the apprehension of conservative Americans as well as Cubans. But
conditions had changed in 1901. Then the possession of Porto Rico, of
Guam and the Philippines was more than certain. Certainly there was
more to be said in favor of retaining Cuba than for annexing those
far-flung possessions in the Pacific. But to annex Cuba was virtually
impossible,—a definite pledge to recognize her independence made
in the hectic days of ’98 barred the way. And so under Roosevelt’s
administration America kept her word and withdrew from Cuba. But
she kept her word with a very important qualification in the Platt
Amendment, which virtually meant no Cuban independence after all.
Already commercial advantage was overcoming conscience and principle.
The United States had promised to quit Cuba when “pacification was
accomplished.” Here was an elastic condition which could be interpreted
narrowly. She could under that phrase have stayed on the island
indefinitely troubled only by the never-ending contest between good
faith and pecuniary interest. Instead America chose to protect herself
by means of the Platt Amendment which briefly provided that (1) Cuba
should not enter into any agreement with foreign powers which might
tend to impair her independence; (2) that no debt should be contracted
which could not be paid out of the island’s current revenues; (3) that
the United States might intervene to preserve Cuban independence,
enforce the treaty obligations imposed by the treaty of Paris, and
insure a government able to protect property and life; (4) that all
acts performed by the American government during its brief occupation
were to be validated; (5) that Cuba was to sell or lease to the United
States sites for two naval stations; (6) and that by way of further
assurance that these provisions were to be followed strictly _Cuba
should embody them all in a treaty_ with the United States.
The strictness and exactness of these provisions will more clearly
appear on a careful reading of the amendment itself, paragraphs (1)
and (3) in particular being the most exact. These provisions meant
that the United States virtually retained complete control of Cuba’s
foreign relations. The right was also reserved to her whereby she might
intervene in the island government in order to correct any conditions
which _in her judgment_ were considered unsatisfactory. The two naval
bases which she reserved for herself on opposite sides of the island
were the best evidence of her power to exercise such absolute control.
Of course, Cuban statesmen were not blind to the exact purpose of the
amendment. They protested that the provisions virtually destroyed the
independence which had been promised and which America now said she was
granting. But they were informed that the acceptance of the amendment
must be unqualified and so with bad grace they were finally forced to
yield[15].
Judged superficially, however, the Cuban venture might well appear to
have been an act of altruism on the part of the United States. After
all, the Cubans got more than they could ever have got from Spain,
although their liberator did really profit from the enterprise as well.
Before leaving the story of the Cuban occupation, however, it is well
to give a parting thought to the arguments which induced nation-wide
sentiment to favor intervention. When America intervened Spain held
the island by an indisputable title. She controlled its cities, its
ports, and its coast, and maintained in them an organized government.
It is true that some of the Cubans had been for years in unsuccessful
revolt, but they had no organized government which had any claim to
be recognized as such. Yet when America declared war upon Spain she
avowedly declared that Cuba was, and of right, ought to be free and
independent. Why? Only because in the judgment of the people of the
United States, Spain’s title had been forfeited by her cruel method of
dealing with the Cubans. With this thought constantly in mind we can
approach the story of the Philippine adventure.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER I
[1] _The American Nation—A History_, vol. xxv. Latane, _America
as a World Power_, p. 4.
[2] _The American Nation, etc._, vol. xviii. _Parties and
Slavery_, by T. C. Clarke, p. 75.
[3] Clark, _ibid._, p. 81.
[4] House Exec. Doc., 32d Cong., 1st Sess., 121, p. 58.
[5] Sen. Exec. Doc., 32d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, p. 74, 76; 2d
Sess., No. 63.
[6] Clarke, _Parties and Slavery_, p. 87.
[7] Dunning, _Reconstruction—Political and Economic_, p. 172.
[8] _Ibid._, p. 172.
[9] See the _Virginius_ case, for example.
[10] Day, _Foreign Relations_, p. 680 and p. 1007.
[11] Roosevelt, _Autobiography_, p. 232.
[12] Rhodes, _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 55.
[13] _Boston Herald_, October 23, 1898.
[14] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, liv.
[15] Powers, _America Among the Nations_, p. 116.