[Greek: Athaenaion politeia:] _De republica Atheniensium_: On the
Constitution of Athens. [One of the [Greek: Politeiai], said to have
been 158 at least, the genuineness of which is attested by the defence
which Polybius (xii.) makes of Aristotle's history of the Epizephyrian
Locrians against Timaeus, Aristotle's contemporary and critic.
Hitherto, only fragments have come down to us (cf. _Fragm_. 381-603).
The present treatise, without however its beginning and end, written
on a papyrus discovered in Egypt and now in the British Museum, was
first edited by F.G. Kenyon 1890-1891.] (See the article CONSTITUTION
OF ATHENS.)
_The Difficulty._--The genuineness of the Aristotelian works, as
Leibnitz truly said (_De Stilo Phil. Nizolii_, xxx.), is ascertained by
the conspicuous harmony of their theories, and by their uniform method
of swift subtlety. Nevertheless difficulties lurk beneath their general
unity of thought and style. In style they are not quite the same: now
they are brief and now diffuse: sometimes they are carelessly written,
sometimes so carefully as to avoid hiatus, e.g. the _Metaphysics_ A, and
parts of the _De Coelo_ and _Parva Naturalia_, which in this respect
resemble the fragment quoted by Plutarch from the early dialogue
_Eudemus_ (_Fragm_. 44). They also appear to contain displacements,
interpolations, prefaces such as that to the _Meteorologica_, and
appendices such as that to the _Sophistical Elenchi_, which may have
been added. An Aristotelian work often goes on continuously at first,
and then becomes disappointing by suddenly introducing discussions which
break the connexion or are even inconsistent with the beginning; as in
the _Posterior Analytics_, which, after developing a theory of
demonstration from necessary principles, suddenly makes the admission,
which is also the main theory of science in the _Metaphysics_, that
demonstration is about either the necessary or the contingent, from
principles either necessary or contingent, only not accidental. At times
order is followed by disorder, as in the _Politics_. Again, there are
repetitions and double versions, e.g. those of the _Physics_, vii., and
those of the _De Anima_, ii., discovered by Torstrik; or two discussions
of the same subject, e.g. of pleasure in the _Nicomachean Ethics_, vii.
and x.; or several treatises on the same subject very like one another,
viz. the _Nicomachean Ethics_, the _Eudemian Ethics_ and the _Magna
Moralia_; or, strangest of all, a consecutive treatise and other
discourses amalgamated, e.g. in the _Metaphysics_, where a systematic
theory of being running through several books ( [Beta, Gamma, Epsilon,
Zeta, Eta, Theta]) is preceded, interrupted and followed by other
discussions of the subject. Further, there are frequently several titles
of the same work or of different parts of it. Sometimes diagrams
([Greek: diagraphai] or [Greek: hypographai]) are mentioned, and
sometimes given (e.g. in _De Interp_. 13, 22 a 22; _Nicomachean Ethics_,
ii. 7; _Eudemian Ethics_, ii. 3), but sometimes only implied (e.g. in
_Hist. An._ i. 17, 497 a 32; iii. 1, 510 a 30; iv. 1, 525 a 9). The
different works are more or less connected by a system of references,
which give rise to difficulties, especially when they are
cross-references: for example, the _Analytics_ and _Topics_ quote one
another: so do the _Physics_ and the _Metaphysics_; the _De Vita_ and
_De Respiratione_ and the _De Partibus Animalium_; this latter treatise
and the _De Animalium Incessu_; the _De Interpretatione_ and the _De
Anima_. A late work may quote an earlier; but how, it may be asked, can
the earlier reciprocally quote the later?
Besides these difficulties in and between the works there are others
beyond them. On the one hand, there is the curious story given partly by
Strabo (608-609) and partly in Plutarch's _Sulla_ (c. 26), that
Aristotle's successor Theophrastus left the books of both to their joint
pupil, Neleus of Scepsis, where they were hidden in a cellar, till in
Sulla's time they were sold to Apellicon, who made new copies,
transferred after Apellicon's death by Sulla to Rome, and there edited
and published by Tyrannio and Andronicus. On the other hand, there are
the curious and puzzling catalogues of Aristotelian books, one given by
Diogenes Laertius, another by an anonymous commentator (perhaps
Hesychius of Miletus) quoted in the notes of Gilles Menage on Diogenes
Laertius, and known as "Anonymus Menagii," and a third copied by two
Arabian writers from Ptolemy, perhaps King Ptolemy Philadelphus, son of
the founder of the library at Alexandria. (See Rose, _Fragm_. pp. 1-22.)
But the extraordinary thing is that, without exactly agreeing among
themselves, the catalogues give titles which do not agree well with the
Aristotelian works as we have them. A title in some cases suits a given
work or a part of it; but in other cases there are no titles for works
which exist, or titles for works which do not exist.
These difficulties are complicated by various hypotheses concerning the
composition of the Aristotelian works. Zeller supposes that, though
Aristotle may have made preparations for his philosophical system
beforehand, still the properly didactic treatises composing it almost
all belong to the last period of his life, i.e. from 335-334 to 322; and
from the references of one work to another Zeller has further suggested
a chronological order of composition during this period of twelve years,
beginning with the treatises on Logic and Physics, and ending with that
on Metaphysics. There is a further hypothesis that the Aristotelian
works were not originally treatises, but notes of lectures either for or
by his pupils. This easily passes into the further and still more
sceptical hypothesis that the works, as we have them, under Aristotle's
name, are rather the works of the Peripatetic school, from Aristotle,
Theophrastus and Eudemus downwards. "We cannot assert with certainty,"
says R. Shute in his _History of the Aristotelian Writings_ (p. 176),
"that we have even got throughout a treatise in the exact words of
Aristotle, though we may be pretty clear that we have a fair
representation of his thought. The unity of style observable may belong
quite as much to the school and the method as to the individual." This
sceptical conclusion, the contrary of that drawn by Leibnitz from the
harmony of thought and style pervading the works, shows us that the
Homeric question has been followed by the Aristotelian question.
_The Solution._--Such hypotheses attend to Aristotle's philosophy to the
neglect of his life. He was really, as we have seen, a prolific writer
from the time when he was a young man under Plato's guidance at Athens;
beginning with dialogues in the manner of his master, but afterwards
preferring to write didactic works during the prime of his own life
between thirty-eight and fifty (347-335-334), and with the further
advantage of leisure at Atarneus and Mitylene, in Macedonia and at home
in Stagira. When at fifty he returned to Athens, as head of the
Peripatetic school, he no doubt wrote much of his extant philosophy
during the twelve remaining years of his life (335-322). But he was then
a busy teacher, was growing old, and suffered from a disease in the
stomach for a considerable time before it proved fatal at the age of
sixty-three. It is therefore improbable that he could between fifty and
sixty-three have written almost the whole of the many books on many
subjects constituting that grand philosophical system which is one of
the most wonderful works of man. It is far more probable that he was
previously composing them at his leisure and in the vigour of manhood,
precisely as his contemporary Demosthenes composed all his great
speeches except the _De Corona_ before he was fifty.
Turning to Aristotle's own works, we immediately light upon a surprise:
Aristotle began his extant scientific works during Plato's lifetime. By
a curious coincidence, in two different works he mentions two different
events as contemporary with the time of writing, one in 357 and the
other in 356. In the _Politics_ ([Epsilon] 10, 1312 b 10), he mentions
as now ([Greek: nun]) Dion's expedition to Sicily which occurred in 357.
In the _Meteorologica_ (iii. 1, 371 a 30), he mentions as now ([Greek:
nun]) the burning of the temple at Ephesus, which occurred in 356. To
save his hypothesis of late composition, Zeller resorts to the vagueness
of the word "now" ([Greek: nun]). But Aristotle is graphically
describing isolated events, and could hardly speak of events of 357 and
356 as happening "now" in or near 335. Moreover, these two works contain
further proofs that they were both begun earlier than this date. The
_Politics_ ([Beta] 10) mentions as having happened lately ([Greek:
neosti]) the expedition of Phalaecus to Crete, which occurred towards
the end of the Sacred War in 346. The _Meteorologica_ ([Gamma] 7)
mentions the comet of 341. It is true that the _Politics_ also mentions
much later events, e.g. the assassination of Philip which took place in
336 ([Epsilon] 10, 1311 b 1-3). Indeed, the whole truth about this great
work is that it remained unfinished at Aristotle's death. But what of
that? The logical conclusion is that Aristotle began writing it as early
as 357, and continued writing it in 346, in 336, and so on till he died.
Similarly, he began the _Meteorologica_ as early as 356 and was still
writing it in 341. Both books were commenced some years before Plato's
death: both were works of many years: both were destined to form parts
of the Aristotelian system of philosophy. It follows that Aristotle,
from early manhood, not only wrote dialogues and didactic works,
surviving only in fragments, but also began some of the philosophical
works which are still parts of his extant writings. He continued these
and no doubt began others during the prime of his life. Having thus
slowly matured his separate writings, he was the better able to combine
them more and more into a system, in his last years. No doubt, however,
he went on writing and rewriting well into the last period of his life;
for example, the recently discovered [Greek: Athaenaion politeia]
mentions on the one hand (c. 54) the archonship of Cephisophon
(329-328), on the other hand (c. 46) triremes and quadriremes but
without quinqueremes, which first appeared at Athens in 325-324; and as
it mentions nothing later it probably received its final touches between
320 and 324. But it may have been begun long before, and received
additions and changes. However early Aristotle began a book, so long as
he kept the manuscript, he could always change it. Finally he died
without completing some of his works, such as the _Politics_, and
notably that work of his whole philosophic career and foundation of his
whole philosophy--the _Metaphysics_--which, projected in his early
criticism of Plato's philosophy of universal forms, gradually developed
into his positive philosophy of individual substances, but remained
unfinished after all.
On the whole, then, Aristotle was writing his extant works very
gradually for some thirty-five years (357-322), like Herodotus (iv. 30)
contemplated additions, continued writing them more or less together,
not so much successively as simultaneously, and had not finished writing
at his death.
There is a curious characteristic connected with this gradual
composition. An Aristotelian treatise frequently has the appearance of
being a collection of smaller discourses ([Greek: logoi]), as, e.g.,
K.L. Michelet has remarked.
This is obvious enough in the _Metaphysics_: it has two openings (Books
[Alpha] and [alpha]); then comes a nearly consecutive theory of being
([Beta], [Gamma], [Epsilon], [Zeta], [Eta], [Theta]), but interrupted by
a philosophical lexicon [Delta]; afterwards follows a theory of unity
([Iota]); then a summary of previous books and of doctrines from the
_Physics_ ([Kappa]); next a new beginning about being, and, what is
wanted to complete the system, a theory of God in relation to the world
([Lambda]); finally a criticism of mathematical metaphysics ([Mu],
[Nu]), in which the argument against Plato ([Alpha] 9) is repeated
almost word for word ([Mu] 4-5). The _Metaphysics_ is clearly a
compilation formed from essays or discourses; and it illustrates another
characteristic of Aristotle's gradual method of composition. It refers
back to passages "in the first discourses" ([Greek: en tois protois
logois]) --an expression not uncommon in Aristotelian writings.
Sometimes the reference is to the beginning of the whole treatise; e.g.
_Met_. [Beta] 2, 997 b 3-5, referring back to [Alpha] 6 and 9 about
Platonic forms. Sometimes, on the other hand, the reference only goes
back to a previous part of a given topic, e.g. _Met_. [Theta] 1, 1045 b
27-32, referring back to [Zeta] 1, or at the earliest to [Gamma] 2. On
either alternative, however, "the first discourses" mentioned may have
originally been a separate discourse; for Book [Gamma] begins quite
fresh with the definition of the science of being, long afterwards
called "Metaphysics," and Book [Zeta] begins Aristotle's fundamental
doctrine of substance.
Another indication of a treatise having arisen out of separate
discourses is its consisting of different parts imperfectly connected.
Thus the _Nicomachean Ethics_ begins by identifying the good with
happiness ([Greek: eudaimonia]), and happiness with virtuous action. But
when it comes to the moral virtues (Book iii. 6), a new motive of the
"honourable" ([Greek: tou kalou eneka]) is suddenly introduced without
preparation, where one would expect the original motive of happiness.
Then at the end of the moral virtues justice is treated at inordinate
length, and in a different manner from the others, which are regarded as
means between two vices, whereas justice appears as a mean only because
it is of the middle between too much and too little. Later, the
discussion on friendship (Books viii.-ix.) is again inordinate in
length, and it stands alone. Lastly, pleasure, after having been first
defined (Book vii.) as an activity, is treated over again (Book x.) as
an end beyond activity, with a warning against confusing activity and
pleasure. The probability is that the _Nicomachean Ethics_ is a
collection of separate discourses worked up into a tolerably systematic
treatise; and the interesting point is that these discourses correspond
to separate titles in the list of Diogenes Laertius ([Greek: peri kalou,
peri dikaion, peri philias, peri haedonaes, and peri haedonon]). The
same list also refers to tentative notes ([Greek: upomnaemata
epicheiraematika]), and the commentators speak of ethical notes ([Greek:
aethika upomnaemata]). Indeed, they sometimes divide Aristotle's works
into notes ([Greek: upomnaematika]) and compilations ([Greek:
syntagmatika]). How can it be doubted that in the gradual composition of
his works Aristotle began with notes ([Greek: upomnaematika]) and
discourses ([Greek: logoi]), and proceeded to treatises ([Greek:
pragmateiai])? He would even be drawn into this process by his writing
materials, which were papyrus rolls of some magnitude; he would tend to
write discourses on separate rolls, and then fasten them together in a
bundle into a treatise.
If then Aristotle was for some thirty-five years gradually and
simultaneously composing manuscript discourses into treatises and
treatises into a system, he was pursuing a process which solves
beforehand the very difficulties which have since been found in his
writings. He could very easily write in different styles at different
times, now avoiding hiatus and now not, sometimes writing diffusely and
sometimes briefly, partly polishing and partly leaving in the rough,
according to the subject, his own state of health or humour, his age,
and the degree to which he had developed a given topic; and all this
even in the same manuscript as well as in different manuscripts, so that
a difference of style between different parts of a work or between
different works, explicable by one being earlier than another, does not
prove either to be not genuine. As he might write, so might he think
differently in his long career. To put one extreme case, about the soul
he could think at first in the _Eudemus_ like Plato that it is
imprisoned in the body, and long afterwards in the _De Anima_ like
himself that it is the immateriate essence of the material bodily
organism. Again, he might be inconsistent; now, for example, calling a
universal a substance in deference to Plato, and now denying that a
universal can be a substance in consequence of his own doctrine that
every substance is an individual; and so as to contradict himself in the
same treatise, though not in the same breath or at the same moment of
thinking. Again, in developing his discourses into larger treatises he
might fall into dislocations; although it must be remembered that these
are often inventions of critics who do not understand the argument, as
when they make out that the treatment of reciprocal justice in the
_Ethics_ (v. 5-6) needs rearrangement through their not noticing that,
according to Aristotle, reciprocal justice, being the fairness of a
commercial bargain, is not part of absolute or political justice, but is
part of analogical or economical justice. Or he might make repetitions,
as in the same book, where he twice applies the principle, that so far
as the agent does the patient suffers, first to the corrective justice
of the law court (_Eth_. v. 4) in order to prove that in a wrong the
injurer gains as much as the injured loses, and immediately afterwards
to the reciprocal justice of commerce (_ib_. 5) in order to prove that
in a bargain a house must be exchanged for as many shoes as equal it in
value. Or he might himself, without double versions, repeat the same
argument with a different shade of meaning; as when in the _Nic. Ethics_
(vii. 4) he first argues that incontinence about such natural pleasures
as that of gain is only modified incontinence, a sign (as _causa
cognoscendi_) of which is that it is not so bad as incontinence about
carnal pleasures, and then argues that, because (as _causa essendi_) it
is only modified incontinence, therefore it is not so bad. Or he might
return again and again to the same point with a difference: there is a
good instance in his conclusion that the speculative life is the highest
happiness; which he first infers because it is the life of man's highest
and divine faculty, intelligence (1176 b-1178 a 8), then after an
interval infers a second time because our speculative life is an
imitation of that of God (1178 b 7-32), and finally after another
interval infers a third time, because it will make man most dear to God
(1179 a 22-32). Or, extending himself as it were still more, he might
write two drafts, or double versions of his own, on the same subject;
_e.g. Physics_, vii. and _De Anima_, ii. Or he might, going still
further, in his long literary career write two or more treatises on the
same subject, different and even more or less inconsistent with each
other, as we shall find in the sequel. Finally, having a great number of
discourses and treatises, containing all those small blemishes, around
him in his library, and determined to collect, consolidate and connect
them into a philosophical system, he would naturally be often taking
them down from their places to consult and compare one with another, and
as naturally enter in them references one to the other, and
cross-references between one another. Thus he would enter in the
_Metaphysics_ a reference to the _Physics_, and in the _Physics_ a
reference to the _Metaphysics_, precisely because both were manuscripts
in his library. For the same purpose of connexion he would be tempted to
add a preface to a book like the _Meteorologica_. In order to refer back
to the _Physics_, the _De Coelo_, and the _De Generatione_, this work
begins by stating that the first causes of all nature and all natural
motion, the stars ordered according to celestial motion and the bodily
elements with their transmutations, and generation and corruption have
all been discussed; and by adding that there remains to complete this
investigation, what previous investigators called meteorology. To
suppose this preface, presupposing many sciences, to have been written
in 356, when the _Meteorologica_ had been already commenced, would be
absurd; but equally absurd would it be to reject that date on account of
the preface, which even a modern author often writes long after his
book. Nor is it at all absurd to suppose that, long after he began the
_Meteorologica_, Aristotle himself added the preface in the process of
gathering his general treatises on natural science into a system. So he
might afterwards add the preface to the _De Interpretatione_, in order
to connect it with the _De Anima_, though written afterwards, in order
to connect his treatises on mind and on its expression. So also he might
add the appendix to the _Sophistical Elenchi_, long after he had written
that book, and perhaps, to judge from its being a general claim to have
discovered the syllogism, when the founder of logic had more or less
realized that he had written a number of connected treatises on
reasoning.
_The Question of Publication._--There is still another point which would
facilitate Aristotle's gradual composition of discourses into treatises
and treatises into a system; there was no occasion for him to publish
his manuscripts beyond his school. Printing has accustomed us to
publication, and misled us into applying to ancient times the modern
method of bringing out one book after another at definite dates by the
same author. But Greek authors contemplated works rather than books.
Some of the greatest authors were not even writers: Homer, Aesop,
Thales, Socrates. Some who were writers were driven to publish by the
occasion; and after the orders of government, which were occasionally
published to be obeyed, occasional poems, such as the poems of Solon,
the odes of Pindar and the plays of the dramatists, which all had a
political significance, were probably the first writings to be published
or, rather, recited and acted, from written copies. With them came
philosophical poems, such as those of Xenophanes and Empedocles; the
epical history of Herodotus; the dramatic philosophy of Plato. On a
larger scale speeches written by orators to be delivered by litigants
were published and encouraged publication; and, as the Attic orators
were his contemporaries, publication had become pretty common in the
time of Aristotle, who speaks of many bundles ([Greek: desmas]) of
judicial speeches by Isocrates being hawked about by the booksellers
(_Fragm_. 140).
No doubt then Aristotle's library contained published copies of the
works of other authors, as well as the autographs of his own. It does
not follow that his own works went beyond his library and his school.
Publication to the world is designed for readers, who at all times have
demanded popular literature rather than serious philosophy such as that
of Aristotle. Accordingly it becomes a difficult question, how far
Aristotle's works were published in his lifetime. In answering it we
must be careful to exclude any evidence which refers to Aristotle as a
man, not as a writer, or refers to him as a writer but does not prove
publication while he was alive.
Beginning then with his early writings, which are now lost, the
dialogues _On Poetry_ and the _Eudemus_ were probably the published
discourses to which Aristotle himself refers (_Poetics_, 15; _De Anima_,
i. 4); and the dialogue _Protrepticus_ was known to the Cynic Crates,
pupil of Diogenes and master of Zeno (_Fragm_. 50), but not necessarily
in Aristotle's lifetime, as Crates was still alive in 307. Again,
Aristotle's early rhetorical instructions and perhaps writings, as well
as his opinion that a collection of proverbs is not worth while, must
have been known outside Aristotle's rhetorical school to the orator
Cephisodorus, pupil of Isocrates and master of Demosthenes, for him to
be able to write in his _Replies to Aristotle_ ([Greek: en tais pros
Aristotelaen antigraphais]) an admired defence of Isocrates (Dionys. H.
_De Isoc_. 18). But this early dialectic and rhetoric, being popular,
would tend to be published. History comes nearer to philosophy; and
Aristotle's _Constitutions_ were known to his enemy Timaeus, who
attacked him for disparaging the descent of the Locrians of Italy,
according to Polybius (xii.), who defended Aristotle. But as Timaeus
brought his history down to 264 B.C. (Polyb. i. 5), and therefore might
have got his information after Aristotle's death, we cannot be sure that
any of the _Constitutions_ were published in the author's lifetime. We
are equally at a loss to prove that Aristotle published his philosophy.
He had, like all the great, many enemies, personal and philosophical;
but in his lifetime they attacked the man, not his philosophy. In the
Megarian school, first Eubulides quarrelled with him and calumniated him
(Diog. Laert. ii. 109) in his lifetime; but the attack was on his life,
not on his writings: afterwards Stilpo wrote a dialogue ([Greek:
Aristotelaes]), which may have been a criticism of the Aristotelian
philosophy from the Megarian point of view; but he outlived Aristotle
thirty years. In the absence of any confirmation, "the current
philosophemata" ([Greek: ta egkuklia philosophaemata]), mentioned in the
_De Coela_ (i. 9, 279 a 30), are sometimes supposed to be Aristotle's
published philosophy, to which he is referring his readers. But the
example there given, that the divine is unchangeable, is precisely such
a religious commonplace as might easily be a current philosopheme of
Aristotle's day, not of Aristotle; and this interpretation suits the
parallel passage in the _Nic. Ethics_ (i. 5, 1096 a 3) where opinions
about the happiness of political life are said to have been sufficiently
treated "even in current discussions" ([Greek: kai en tois egkukliois]).
There is therefore no contemporary proof that Aristotle published any
part of his mature philosophical system in his lifetime. It is true that
a book of Andronicus, as reported by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5), contained a
correspondence between Alexander and Aristotle in which the pupil
complained that his master had published his "acroatic discourses"
([Greek: tous akroatikous ton logon]). But ancient letters are
proverbially forgeries, and in the three hundred years which elapsed
between the supposed correspondence and the time of Andronicus there was
plenty of time for the forgery of these letters. But even if the
correspondence is genuine, "acroatic discourses" must be taken to mean
what Alexander would mean by them in the time of Aristotle, and not what
they had come to mean by the time of Andronicus. Alexander meant those
discourses which Aristotle, when he was his tutor, intended for the ears
of himself and his fellow-pupils; such as the early political works on
_Monarchy_ and on _Colonies_, and the early rhetorical works, the
_Theodectea_, the _Collection of Arts_, and possibly the _Rhetoric to
Alexander_, in the preface to which the writer actually says to
Alexander: "You wrote to me that nobody else should receive this book."
These few early works may have been published, and contrary to the
wishes of Alexander, without affecting Aristotle's later system. But
even so, Alexander's complaint would not justify writers three centuries
later in taking Alexander to have referred to mature scientific
writings, which were not addressed, and not much known, to him, the
conqueror of Asia; although by the times of Andronicus and Aulus
Gellius, Aristotle's scientific writings were all called acroatic, or
acroamatic, or sometimes esoteric, in distinction from exoteric--a
distinction altogether unknown to Aristotle, and therefore to Alexander.
In the absence of any contemporary evidence, we cannot believe that
Aristotle in his lifetime published any, much less all, of his
scientific books. The conclusion then is that Aristotle on the one hand
to some extent published his early dialectical and rhetorical writings,
because they were popular, though now they are lost, but on the other
hand did not publish any of the extant historical and philosophical
works which belong to his mature system, because they were best adapted
to his philosophical pupils in the Peripatetic school. The object of the
philosopher was not the applause of the public but the truth of things.
Now this conclusion has an important bearing on the composition of
Aristotle's writings and on the difficulties which have been found in
them. If he had like a modern author brought out each of his extant
philosophical works on a definite day of publication, he would not have
been able to change them without a second edition, which in the case of
serious writings so little in demand would not be worth while. But as he
did not publish them, but kept the unpublished manuscripts together in
his library and used them in his school, he was able to do with them as
he pleased down to the very end of his life, and so gradually to
consolidate his many works into one system.
While Aristotle did not publish his philosophical works to the world, he
freely communicated them to the Peripatetic school. They are not mere
lectures; but he used them for lectures: he allowed his pupils to read
them in his library, and probably to take copies from them. He also used
diagrams, which are sometimes incorporated in his works, but sometimes
are only mentioned, and were no doubt used for purposes of teaching. He
also availed himself of his pupils' co-operation, as we may judge from
his description in the _Ethics_ (x. 7) of the speculative philosopher
who, though he is self-sufficing, is better having co-operators ([Greek:
synergous hexon]). From an early time he had a tendency to address his
writings to his friends. For example, he addressed the _Theodectea_ to
his pupil Theodectes; and even in ancient times a doubt arose whether it
was a work of the master or the pupil. It was certainly by Aristotle,
because it contained the triple grammatical division of words into noun,
verb and conjunction, which the history of grammar recognized as his
discovery. But we may explain the share of Theodectes by supposing that
he had a hand in the work (cf. Dionys. H. _De Comp. Verb._ 2; Quintilian
i. 4. 18). Similarly in astronomy, Aristotle used the assistance of
Eudoxus and Callippus. Indeed, throughout his writings he shows a
constant wish to avail himself of what is true in the opinions of
others, whether they are philosophers, or poets or ordinary people
expressing their thoughts in sayings and proverbs. With one of his
pupils in particular, Theophrastus, who was born about 370 and therefore
was some fifteen years younger than himself, he had a long and intimate
connexion; and the work of the pupil bears so close a resemblance to
that of his master, that, even when he questions Aristotle's opinions
(as he often does), he seems to be writing in an Aristotelian
atmosphere; while he shows the same acuteness in raising difficulties,
and has caught something of the same encyclopaedic genius. Another
pupil, Eudemus of Rhodes, wrote and thought so like his master as to
induce Simplicius to call him the most genuine of Aristotle's companions
([Greek: ho gnaesiotatos ton Aristotelous hetairon]). It is probable
that this extraordinary resemblance is due to the pupils having actually
assisted their master; and this supposition enables us to surmount a
difficulty we feel in reading Aristotle's works. How otherwise, we
wonder, could one man writing alone and with so few predecessors compose
the first systematic treatises on the psychology of the mental powers
and on the logic of reasoning, the first natural history of animals, and
the first civil history of one hundred and fifty-eight constitutions, in
addition to authoritative treatises on metaphysics, biology, ethics,
politics, rhetoric and poetry; in all penetrating to the very essence of
the subject, and, what is most wonderful, describing more facts than any
other man has ever done on so many subjects?
_The Uncompleted Works._--Such then was the method of composition by
which Aristotle began in early manhood to write his philosophical works,
continued them gradually and simultaneously, combined shorter discourses
into longer treatises, compared and connected them, kept them together
in his library without publishing them, communicated them to his school,
used the co-operation of his best pupils, and finally succeeded in
combining many mature writings into one harmonious system. Nevertheless,
being a man, he did not quite succeed. He left some unfinished; such as
the _Categories_, in which the main part on categories is not finished,
while the last part, afterwards called postpredicaments, is probably not
his, the _Politics_ and the _Poetics_. He left others imperfectly
arranged, and some of the most important, the _Metaphysics_, the
_Politics_ and the logical writings. Of the imperfect arrangement of the
_Metaphysics_ we have already spoken; and we shall speak of that of his
logical writings when we come to the order of his whole system. At
present the _Politics_ will supply us with a conspicuous example of the
imperfect arrangement of some, as well as of the gradual composition of
all, of Aristotle's extant writings.
The _Politics_ was begun as early as 357, yet not finished in 322. It
betrays its origin from separate discourses. First comes a general
theory of constitutions, right and wrong (Books [Alpha], [Beta],
[Gamma]); and this part is afterwards referred to as "the first
discourses" ([Greek: hen tois protois logois]). Then follows the
treatment of oligarchy, democracy, commonwealth and tyranny, and of the
various powers of government ([Delta]), and independent investigation of
revolution, and of the means of preserving states ([Epsilon]), and a
further treatment of democracy and oligarchy, and of the different
offices of the state ([Zeta]), and finally a return to the discussion of
the right form of constitution ([Eta], [Theta]). But [Delta] and [Zeta]
are a group interrupted by [Epsilon], and [Eta] and [Theta] are another
group unconnected with the previous group and with [Epsilon], and are
also distinguished in style by avoiding hiatus. Further, the group
([Delta], [Zeta]) and the group ([Eta], [Theta]) are both unfinished.
Finally the group ([Delta], [Zeta]), the book ([Epsilon]) and the group
([Eta], [Theta]) though unconnected with one another, are all connected
though imperfectly with "the first discourses" ([Alpha], [Beta],
[Gamma]). This complicated arrangement may be represented in the
following diagram:--
[Alpha], [Beta], [Gamma]
|
+----------------------+----------------------+
| | |
[Delta], [Epsilon] [Eta],
[Zeta] [Theta]
The simplest explanation is that Aristotle began by writing separate
discourses, four at least, on political subjects; that he continued to
write them and perhaps tried to combine them: but that in the end he
failed and left the _Politics_ unfinished and in disorder. But modern
commentators, possessed by the fallacy that Aristotle like a modern
author must from the first have comtemplated a whole treatise in a
regular order for definite publication, lose themselves in vain disputes
as to whether to go by the traditional order of books indicated by their
letters and known to have existed as early as the abstract (given in
Stobaeus, _Ecl._ ii. 7) ascribed to Didymus (1st century A.D.), or to
put the group [Eta], [Theta], as more connected with [Alpha], [Beta],
[Gamma], before the group [Delta], [Zeta], and this group before the
book [Eta]. It is agreed, says Zeller, that the traditional order
contradicts the original plan. But what right have we to say that
Aristotle had an original plan?
The incomplete state in which Aristotle left the _Metaphysics_, the
_Politics_ and his logical works, brings us to the hard question how
much he did, and how much his Peripatetic followers did to his writings
after his death. To answer it we should have to go far beyond Aristotle.
But two corollaries follow from our present investigation of his extant
writings; the first, that it was the long continuance of the Peripatetic
school which gradually caused the publication, and in some cases the
forgery, of the separate writings; and the second, that his Peripatetic
successors arranged and edited some of Aristotle's writings, and
gradually arrived by the time of Andronicus, the eleventh from
Aristotle, at an order of the whole body of writings forming the system.
Now, it is probable that the arrangement of the works which we are
considering was done by the Peripatetic successors of Aristotle. There
is nothing indeed in the _Metaphysics_ to show whether he left it in
isolated treatises or in its present disorder; and nothing in the
_Politics_. On the other hand, in the case of logic, it is certain that
he did not combine his works on the subject into one whole, but that the
Peripatetics afterwards put them together as organic, and made them the
parts of logic as an organon, as they are treated by Andronicus. Perhaps
something similar occurred to the _Metaphysics_, as Alexander imputed
its redaction to Eudemus, and the majority of ancient commentators
attributed its second opening (Book [alpha]) to Pasicles, nephew of
Eudemus. Again, it is not unlikely that the _Politics_ was arranged in
the traditional order of books by Theophrastus, and that this is the
meaning of the curious title occurring in the list of Aristotle's works
as given by Diogenes Laertius, [Greek: politikes akroaseos hos he
theophrastou a' b' g' d' e' s' z' e'], which agrees with the _Politics_
in having eight books. Although, however, we may concede that such great
works as the _Metaphysics_, the _Politics_ and the logical writings did
not receive their present form from Aristotle himself, that concession
does not deprive Aristotle of the authorship, but only of the
arrangement of those works. On the contrary, Theophrastus and Eudemus,
his immediate followers, both wrote works presupposing Aristotle's
_Metaphysics_ and his logical works, and Dicaearchus, their
contemporary, used his _Politics_ for his own _Tripoliticus_. It was
Aristotle himself then who wrote these works, whether he arranged them
or not; and if he wrote the incomplete works, then _a fortiori_ he wrote
the completed works except those which are proved spurious, and
practically consummated the Aristotelian system, which, as Leibnitz
said, by its unity of thought and style evinces its own genuineness and
individuality. We must not exaggerate the school and underrate the
individual, especially such an individual. What he mainly wanted was the
time, the leisure and the labour, which we have supposed to have been
given to the gradual composition of the extant Aristotelian writings.
Aristotle, asked where dwell the Muses, answered, "In the souls of those
who love work."