THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Manila Bay--The naval battle of Cavite--General
Aguinaldo--Progress of the Tagals--The Tagal Republic--Who
were the aggressors?--Requisites for a settlement--Scenes
of drunkenness--The estates of the religious orders to be
restored--Slow progress of the campaign--Colonel Funston's
gallant exploits--Colonel Stotsenburg's heroic death--General
Antonio Luna's gallant rally of his troops at Macabebe--Reports
manipulated--Imaginary hills and jungles--Want of co-operation
between army and navy--Advice of Sir Andrew Clarke--Naval officers
as administrators--Mr. Whitelaw Reid's denunciations--Senator
Hoar's opinion--Mr. McKinley's speech at Pittsburgh--The false
prophets of the Philippines--Tagal opinion of American Rule--Senor
Mabini's manifesto--Don Macario Adriatico's letter--Foreman's
prophecy--The administration misled--Racial antipathy--The curse
of the Redskins--The recall of General Otis--McArthur calls
for reinforcements--Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of
war--State of the islands--Aguinaldo on the Taft Commission.
Manila Bay.
The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a
half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal
channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock
called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore,
farther reduces that channel.
The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and
Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the
channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.
The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El
Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water
in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.
In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.
With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a
squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the
hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.
And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of
submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence
by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only
nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These
were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious
that they were useless.
On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of
torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such
craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the
time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats
in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisers Isla de Cuba and Isla
de Luzon were fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the
channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he
did not detach them on this service.
There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American
Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed
in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.
But Admiral Dewey's exploit does not need any such enhancing, it
speaks for itself.
To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially
of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against
an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful. As a
matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers
built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. The Castilla and
Reina Cristina were wooden vessels, standing very high out of the
water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small,
some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in
battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.
But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American
Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that
they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would
have supposed it possible that the Spanish Squadron could have been
completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.
It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon
Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not
only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation
that enabled them to score so decided a success.
The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they
had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country's
need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as
the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had
terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the
remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.
We must infer that Admiral Dewey's victory and its consequences
were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no
preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned
of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled
a force strong enough to take and hold the city, three weary months
elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay
cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.
General Aguinaldo.
On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the
insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with
the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of
seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview
with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces,
a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.
He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was
already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against
the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his
followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.
I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and
Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject
has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of
his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at
Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who had participated
in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the
knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But
whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it
not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish
forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland
out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their
resistance for years.
The Tagal Republic.
The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of
1896-7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary
organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the
improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published
by Aguinaldo.
They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending
over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They
established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened
the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public
worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination
of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this
time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they
claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.
Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled
through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks,
reported [9] to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration
had been established, and was in full working order.
Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the army
co-operating with the American forces by the written request of General
Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very
least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American
Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as
soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general
commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for
the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff
found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt,
and the estrangement was gradually increased.
I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899,
each swears that it was the other. The cui bono test cuts both ways,
for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful
votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the
Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may
have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would
fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both
parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case,
the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an
armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that "fighting must go on."
Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had
been adopted, had the local government established been recognized,
had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native
Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into
the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have
been made on the lines of a Protectorate.
I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives
already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely
thrown away.
The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state
of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the
American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were
vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder,
and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.
Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:--
First.--A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America,
fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.
Second.--A strict discipline amongst the American forces.
Third.--The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must
be secured.
General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition,
he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an
insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying
himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed
parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all,
and only dealt in vague generalities which the Tagals could not be
expected to accept.
As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally
acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and
other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have
no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear
about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline,
and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable
drink for a tropical climate.
Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a
drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign
sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking
saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and
debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When
John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the
great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, "to enforce
the high religious purposes of Philip II.," not foresee that his
words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men
struggling to be free "for their welfare, not our gain," nor that this
army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,
[10] would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly
temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely
a parallel.
Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that
these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve
rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over
by such as these.
More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection
should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty
thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It
was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The
Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were
the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable
possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?
This seems to have been General Otis' intention. I think he might
have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.
The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession
cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies
to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish
subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property
and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound
by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied
by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice
given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess.,
Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating
these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: "We have no law which will allow
us to arbitrarily do so."
As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda,
who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to
Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis,
and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.
Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars'
vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would
in due time take possession and exploit them.
One can understand the Tagals' grief and desperation; all their blood
and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!
I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that
commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.
In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness
and adaptability one would have expected from them. For my part, I
expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected
from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling
the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to
have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater
degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack
or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their
advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible
hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors,
acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmission
of accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of
victories gained by the American troops.
It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without
rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and
soldiers.
Who can forget Colonel Funston's gallant exploit in crossing the Rio
Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry
and enfilading the Tagals' position? Or his leading part of same
regiment in a charge upon an enemy's earthwork near Santo Tomas,
where he was wounded?
What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg's leading of the
Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quingua, where he was killed? And
since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late
General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance
from Macabebe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to
the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify
the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills
were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around
Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from
Manila to Tarlac. [11] This country supports a dense population, and
almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The
only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to
May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can
traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The
only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and
having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect
material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.
The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land
and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the
way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his
ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila
Bay whilst arms [12] and ammunition were landed at the outposts or
on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that
troops were landed at Dagupan, the northern terminus of the railway,
though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to
attack the enemy front and rear.
The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such
was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided
that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to
have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899,
without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an
escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga
before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took
possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder
them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they
took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is
denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy
the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned
in charge of junior naval officers.
Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the
utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige
they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great
popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious
responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the
co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure
this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and
prolonged the war.
Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the
Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the
affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a
letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book,
p. 628.
He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be
desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more
value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands
and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.
Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political
and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the
first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to
say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of
the United States navy, active and retired, can be found many men of
wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to
administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised,
as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious
Orders, i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans,
and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving
compensation for their property.
Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: "Enlist native
sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents,
supervised by carefully selected American residents."
As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it
possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and
blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection,
and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain,
it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong
claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification
of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to
possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted,
it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man
who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The
craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United
States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect
generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.
This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings;
we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought
that to allow Dewey to add to his victor's laurel wreath the palm of
the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise
him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.
A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed
from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was
received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval
and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was
marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived,
Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made
a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for
neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.
He said: "If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to
bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest
time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than
the one we have already pursued." It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw
Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the
enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and
treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and
declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.
I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United
States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly
the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the
beginning.
But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They
seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.
1. They took General Merritt's opinion that the Tagals would submit,
and accepted Mr. Foreman's assurance of Tagal plasticity and
accommodating nature.
2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the
accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement
to which they were not parties.
3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like
a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.
4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the
possession of estates already taken from them.
5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to
return and exercise their profession.
To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not
even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be
ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for
Sibutu and Cagayan Sulu Islands, left out by mistake. If any man has a
right to say, "Save me from my friends," that man is William McKinley.
As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid's
irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I
prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of
three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: "Mr. President, these are
three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found
in our own history of our own revolutionary time we should be proud
to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which
Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity."
In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader's
attention: "Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of
the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as
to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have
been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that
mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion
of the United States."
Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The
Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On
August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania
Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He
said: "The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated
our kindness with cruelty, our mercy [13] with Mausers.... They
assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until
the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged
and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by
purchase, or Texas, or Alaska." Here we get down to the bed rock,
and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war
of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy
either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have
to wait till November to see what they think about it.
But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered
minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be
a great outcry in America.
Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were
misled by the information given them by those they relied on.
The False Prophets of the Philippines.
Here is an extract from General Merritt's evidence taken from the
Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62,
part I, p. 367:
Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably
remote?
General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as
these people think the United States is going to take possession
there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards
are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.
Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with
Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents
--how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?
General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following
would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not
know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters
go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.
The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this
country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit
to it?
General Merritt: Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to
administer the government of this island--to secure the
administration of our government there?
General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.
I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits
of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom,
by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in
Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.
That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On
p. 4582 of the 'Congressional Record,' I find that Senor Mabini, in
a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that
"race hatred is much more cruel and pitiless among the Anglo-Saxons"
(he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, "Annexation,
in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation
whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation which
hates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could
never separate ourselves except by war." The outbreaks against the
negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans,
Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Senor Mabini's
remarks.
Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller,
writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: "It could easily be
conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least of
all of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests
as a heavy load."
In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts,
and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust,
and the Hemp Trust, they would soon find themselves reduced to the
condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.
They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably
befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to
a large American army.
But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the
Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what
the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).
Mr. Foreman (answering Mr. Day): "The Tagals are of a very
plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to
accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion
which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into
any new system adopted.
"The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more
uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse
to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals,
but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little
more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched,
and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon."
Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable
that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily
overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.
Yet in June, 1900, we read, "The recall of General Otis is taken
to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end,
and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule."
General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first
thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral
Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent,
also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men
and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to
hold down the Philippines.
However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial
antipathy between the United States' soldiers, white or black,
and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of
disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers
become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in
America's new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders
the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are
kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.
To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows:
There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting
is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops
are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic
plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken
over the administration of the islands from September 1st.
The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is
in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected
to suit the presidential campaign in America.
Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the
Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does
not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the
personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which
it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will
not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens
condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It
would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.
Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General
Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually
ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st,
General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces
of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila,
as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.