CHAPTER XXVII.

1812.

Changeableness of Bonaparte's plans and opinions--Articles for the

'Moniteur' dictated by the First Consul--The Protocol of the

Congress of Chatillon--Conversations with Davoust at Hamburg--

Promise of the Viceroyalty of Poland--Hope and disappointment of the

Poles--Influence of illusion on Bonaparte--The French in Moscow--

Disasters of the retreat--Mallet's conspiracy--Intelligence of the

affair communicated to Napoleon at Smolensko--Circumstances detailed

by Rapp--Real motives of Napoleon's return to Paris--Murat, Ney, and

Eugene--Power of the Italians to endure cold--Napoleon's exertions

to repair his losses--Defection of General York--Convocation of a

Privy Council--War resolved on--Wavering of the Pope--Useless

negotiations with Vienna--Maria Louisa appointed Regent.

It may now he asked whether Bonaparte, previous to entering upon the last

campaign, had resolved on restoring Poland to independence. The fact is

that Bonaparte, as Emperor, never entertained any positive wish to

reestablish the old Kingdom of Poland, though at a previous period he was

strongly inclined to that re-establishment, of which he felt the

necessity. He may have said that he would re-establish the Kingdom of

Poland, but I beg leave to say that that is no reason for believing that

he entertained any such design. He had said, and even sworn, that he

would never aggrandise the territory of the Empire! The changeableness

of Bonaparte's ideas, plans, and projects renders it difficult to master

them; but they may be best understood when it is considered that all

Napoleon's plans and conceptions varied with his fortunes. Thus, it is

not unlikely that he might at one time have considered the

reestablishment of Poland as essential to European policy, and afterwards

have regarded it as adverse to the development of his ambition. Who can

venture to guess what passed in his mind when dazzled by his glory at

Dresden, and whether in one of his dreams he might not have regarded the

Empire of the Jagellons as another gem in the Imperial diadem? The truth

is that Bonaparte, when General-in-Chief of the army of Egypt and First

Consul, had deeply at heart the avenging the dismemberment of Poland, and

I have often conversed with him on this most interesting subject, upon

which we entirely concurred in opinion. But times and circumstances were

changed since we walked together on the terrace of Cairo and mutually

deplored the death of young Sulkowski. Had Sulkowski lived Napoleon's

favourable intentions with respect to Poland might perhaps have been

confirmed. A fact which explains to me the coolness, I may almost say

the indifference, of Bonaparte to the resurrection of Poland is that the

commencement of the Consulate was the period at which that measure

particularly occupied his attention. How often did he converse on the

subject with me and other persons who may yet recollect his sentiments!

It was the topic on which he most loved to converse, and on which he

spoke with feeling and enthusiasm. In the 'Moniteur' of the period here

alluded to I could point out more than one article without signature or

official character which Napoleon dictated to me, and the insertion of

which in that journal, considering the energy of certain expressions,

sufficiently proves that they could have emanated from none but

Bonaparte. It was usually in the evening that he dictated to me these

articles. Then, when the affairs of the day were over, he would launch

into the future, and give free scope to his vast projects. Some of these

articles were characterised by so little moderation that the First Consul

would very often destroy them in the morning, smiling at the violent

ebullitions of the preceding night. At other times I took the liberty of

not sending them to the 'Moniteur' on the night on which they were

dictated, and though he might earnestly wish their insertion I adduced

reasons good or bad, to account for the delay. He would then read over

the article in question, and approve of my conduct; but he would

sometimes add, "It is nevertheless true that with an independent Kingdom

of Poland, and 150,000 disposable troops in the east of France, I should

always be master of Russia, Prussia, and Austria."--"General," I would

reply," I am entirely of your opinion; but wherefore awaken the

suspicions of the interested parties. Leave all to time and

circumstances."

The reader may have to learn, and not, perhaps, without some surprise,

that in the protocol of the sittings of the Congress of Chatillon

Napoleon put forward the spoliation of Poland by the three principal

powers allied against him as a claim to a more advantageous peace, and to

territorial indemnities for France. In policy he was right, but the

report of foreign cannon was already loud enough to drown the best of

arguments.

After the ill-timed and useless union of the Hanse Towns to France I

returned to Hamburg in the spring of 1811 to convey my family to France.

I then had some conversation with Davoust. On one occasion I said to him

that if his hopes were realised, and my sad predictions respecting the

war with Russia overthrown, I hoped to see the restoration of the Kingdom

of Poland. Davoust replied that that event was probable, since he had

Napoleon's promise of the Viceroyalty of that Kingdom, and as several of

his comrades had been promised starosties. Davoust made no secret of

this, and it was generally known throughout Hamburg and the north of

Germany.

But notwithstanding what Davoust said respecting. Napoleon's intentions

I considered that these promises had been conditional rather than

positive.

On Napoleon's arrival in Poland the Diet of Warsaw, assured, as there

seemed reason to be, of the Emperor's sentiments, declared the Kingdom

free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were

pronounced to be null; and certainly the Diet had a right so to act, for

it calculated upon his support. But the address of the Diet to Napoleon,

in which these principles were declared, was ill received. His answer

was full of doubt and indecision, the motive of which could not be

blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia he had just

guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon

therefore declared that he could take no part in any movement or

resolution which might disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish

provinces forming a part of her Empire. To act otherwise, he said, would

be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw her

into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian

provinces, Napoleon declared he would see what he could do, should

Providence favour the good cause. These vague and obscure expressions

did not define what he intended to do for the Poles in the event of

success crowning his vast enterprises. They excited the distrust of the

Poles, and had no other result. On this subject, however, an observation

occurs which is of some force as an apology for Napoleon. Poland was

successively divided between three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia,

with each of which Napoleon had been at war, but never with all three at

once. He had therefore never been able to take advantage of his

victories to re-establish Poland without injuring the interests of

neutral powers or of his allies. Hence it may be concluded not only that

he never had the positive will which would have triumphed over all

obstacles, but also that there never was a possibility of realising those

dreams and projects of revenge in which he had indulged on the banks of

the Nile, as it were to console the departed spirit of Sulkowski.

Bonaparte's character presents many unaccountable incongruities.

Although the most positive man that perhaps ever existed, yet there never

was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In many

circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same

thing. He never indulged in greater illusions than at the beginning of

the campaign of Moscow. Even before the approach of the disasters which

accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, all sensible

persons concurred in the opinion that the Emperor ought to have passed

the winter of 1812-13 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises in

the spring. But his natural impatience impelled him forward as it were

unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an invisible

demon stronger than even his own strong will. This demon was ambition.

He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently understood its

power, and how much is sometimes gained by delay. Yet Caesar's

Commentaries, which were his favourite study, ought to have shown him

that Caesar did not conquer Gaul in one campaign. Another illusion by

which Napoleon was misled during the campaign of Moscow, and perhaps past

experience rendered it very excusable, was the belief that the Emperor

Alexander would propose peace when he saw him at the head of his army on

the Russian territory. The prolonged stay of Bonaparte at Moscow can

indeed be accounted for in no other way than by supposing that he

expected the Russian Cabinet would change its opinion and consent to

treat for peace. However, whatever might have been the reason, after his

long and useless stay in Moscow Napoleon left that city with the design

of taking up his winter quarters in Poland; but Fate now frowned upon

Napoleon, and in that dreadful retreat the elements seemed leagued with

the Russians to destroy the most formidable army ever commanded by one

chief. To find a catastrophe in history comparable to that of the

Beresina we must go back to the destruction of the legions of Varus.

Notwithstanding the general dismay which prevailed in Paris that capital

continued tranquil, when by a singular chance, on the very day on which

Napoleon evacuated the burning city of Moscow, Mallet attempted his

extraordinary enterprise. This General, who had always professed

Republican principles, and was a man of bold decided character, after

having been imprisoned for some time, obtained the permission of

Government to live in Paris in a hospital house situated near the

Barriere de Trove. Of Mallet's, conspiracy it is not necessary to say

much after the excellent account given of it in the Memoirs of the Due de

Rovigo. Mallet's plan was to make it be believed that Bonaparte had been

killed at Moscow, and that a new Government was established under the

authority of the Senate. But what could Mallet do? Absolutely nothing:

and had his Government continued three days he would have experienced a

more favourable chance than that which he ought reasonably to have

expected than asserted that the Emperor was dead, but an estafette from

Russia would reveal the truth, resuscitate Napoleon, and overwhelm with

confusion Mallet and his proclamation. His enterprise was that of a

madman. The French were too weary of troubles to throw themselves into

the arms of, Mallet or his associate Lahorie, who had figured so

disgracefully on the trial of Moreau., Yet, in spite of the evident

impossibility of success, it must be confessed that considerable

ingenuity and address marked the commencement of the conspiracy. On the

22d of October Mallet escaped from the hospital house and went to Colonel

Soulier, who commanded the tenth cohort of the National Guard, whose

barracks were situated exactly behind the hospital house. Mallet was

loaded with a parcel of forged orders which he had himself prepared. He

introduced himself to Soulier under the name of General La Motte, and

said that he came from General Mallet.

Colonel Soulier on hearing of the Emperor's death was affected to tears.

He immediately ordered the adjutant to assemble the cohort and obey the

orders of General La Motte, to whom he expressed his regret for being

himself too ill to leave his bed. It was then two o'clock in the

morning, and the forged documents respecting the Emperor's death slid the

new form of Government were read to the troops by lamplight. Mallet then

hastily set off with 1200 men to La Force, and liberated the Sieurs Gudal

and Laholze, who were confined there. Mallet informed them of the

Emperor's death and of the change of Government; gave them some orders,

in obedience to which the Minister and Prefect of Police were arrested in

their hotel.

I was then at Courbevoie, and I went to Paris on that very morning to

breakfast, as I frequently did, with the Minister of Police. My surprise

may be imagined when

--[General Mallet gave out that the Emperor was killed under the

walls of Moscow on the 8th of October; be could not take any other

day without incurring the risk of being contradicted by the arrival

of the regular courier. The Emperor being dead, he concluded that

the Senate ought to be invested with the supreme authority, and he

therefore resolved to address himself in the name of that body to

the nation and the army. In a proclamation to the soldiers he

deplored the death of the Emperor; in another, after announcing the

abolition of the Imperial system and the Restoration of the

Republic, he indicated the manner in which the Government was to be

reconstructed, described the branches into which public authority

was to be divided, and named the Directors. Attached to the

different documents there appeared the signatures of several

Senators whose names he recollected but with whom he had ceased to

have any intercourse for a great number of years. . These

signatures were all written by Mallet, and he drew up a decree in

the name of the Senate, and signed by the same Senators, appointing

himself Governor of Paris, and commander of the troops of the first

military division. He also drew up other decrees in the same form

which purported to promote to higher ranks all the military officers

he intended to make instruments in the execution of his enterprise.

He ordered one regiment to close all the barriers of Paris, and

allow no person to pass through them. This was done: so that in all

the neighbouring towns from which assistance, in case of need, might

have been obtained, nothing was known of the transactions in Paris.

He sent the other regiments to occupy the Bank, the Treasury, and

different Ministerial offices. At the Treasury some resistance was

made. The minister of that Department was on the spot, and he

employed the guard of his household in maintaining his authority.

But in the whole of the two regiments of the Qnard not a single,

objection was started to the execution of Mallet's orders (Memoirs

of the Duc de Rivogo, tome vi. p. 20.)]--

I learned from the porter that the Due de Rovigo had been arrested and

carried to the prison of La Force. I went into the house and was

informed, to my great astonishment, that the ephemeral Minister was being

measured for his official suit, an act which so completely denoted the

character of the conspirator that it gave me an insight into the

business.

Mallet repaired to General Hulin, who had the command of Paris. He

informed him that he had been directed by the Minister of Police to

arrest him and seal his papers. Hulin asked to see the order, and then

entered his cabinet, where Mallet followed him, and just as Hulin was

turning round to speak to him he fired a pistol in his face. Hulin fell:

the ball entered his cheek, but the wound was not mortal. The most

singular circumstance connected with the whole affair is, that the

captain whom Mallet had directed to follow him, and who accompanied him

to Hulin's, saw nothing extraordinary in all this, and did nothing to

stop it. Mallet next proceeded, very composedly, to Adjutant-General

Doucet's. It happened that one of the inspectors of the police was

there. He recognised General Mallet as being a man under his

supervision. He told him that he had no right to quit the hospital house

without leave, and ordered him to be arrested. Mallet, seeing that all

was over, was in the act of drawing a pistol from his pocket, but being

observed was seized and disarmed. Thus terminated this extraordinary

conspiracy, for which fourteen lives paid the forfeit; but, with the

exception of Mallet, Guidal, and Lahorie, all the others concerned in it

were either machines or dupes.

This affair produced but little effect in Paris, for the enterprise and

its result were make known simultaneously. But it was thought droll

enough that the Minister and Prefect of Police should be imprisoned by

the men who only the day before were their prisoners. Next day I went to

see Savary, who had not yet recovered from the stupefaction caused by his

extraordinary adventure. He was aware that his imprisonment; though it

lasted only half an hour, was a subject of merriment to the Parisians.

The Emperor, as I have already mentioned, left Moscow on the day when

Mallet made his bold attempt, that is to say, the 19th of October.

He was at Smolensko when he heard the news. Rapp, who had been wounded

before the entrance into Moscow, but who was sufficiently recovered to

return home, was with Napoleon when the latter received the despatches

containing an account of what had happened in Paris. He informed me that

Napoleon was much agitated on perusing them, and that he launched into

abuse of the inefficiency of the police. Rapp added that he did not

confine himself to complaints against the agents of his authority. "Is,

then, my power so insecure," said he, "that it may be put in peril by a

single individual, and a prisoner? It would appear that my crown is not

fixed very firmly on my head if in my own capital the bold stroke of

three adventurers can shake it. Rapp, misfortune never comes alone; this

is the complement of what is passing here. I cannot be everywhere; but I

must go back to Paris; my presence there is indispensable to reanimate

public opinion. I must have men and money. Great successes and great

victories will repair all. I must set off." Such were the motives which

induced the Emperor to leave his army. It is not without indignation

that I have heard his precipitate departure attributed to personal

cowardice. He was a stranger to such feelings, and was never more happy

than on the field of battle. I can readily conceive that he was much

alarmed on hearing of Mallet's enterprise. The remarks which he made to

Rapp were those which he knew would be made by the public, and he well

knew that the affair was calculated to banish those illusions of power

and stability with which he endeavoured to surround his government.

On leaving Moscow Napoleon consigned the wrecks of his army to the care

of his most distinguished generals to Murat who had so ably commanded the

cavalry, but who abandoned the army to return to Naples; and to Ney, the

hero, rather than the Prince of the Moskowa, whose name will be immortal

in the annals of glory, as his death will be eternal in the annals of

party revenge. Amidst the general disorder Eugene, more than any other

chief, maintained a sort of discipline among the Italians; and it was

remarked that the troops of the south engaged in the fatal campaign of

Moscow had endured the rigour of the cold better than those troops who

were natives of less genial climates.

Napoleon's return from Moscow was not like his returns from the campaigns

of Vienna and Tilsit when he came back crowned with laurels, and bringing

peace as the reward of his triumphs. It was remarked that Napoleon's

first great disaster followed the first enterprise he undertook after his

marriage with Maria Louisa. This tended to confirm the popular belief

that the presence of Josephine was favourable to his fortune; and

superstitious as he sometimes was, I will not venture to affirm that he

himself did not adopt this ides. He now threw off even the semblance of

legality in the measures of his government: he assumed arbitrary power,

under the impression that the critical circumstances in which he was

placed would excuse everything. But, however inexplicable were the means

to which the Emperor resorted to procure resources, it is but just to

acknowledge that they were the consequence of his system of government,

and that he evinced inconceivable activity in repairing his losses so as

to place himself in a situation to resist his enemies, and restore the

triumph of the French standard.

But in spite of all Napoleon's endeavours the disasters of the campaign

of Russia were daily more and more sensibly felt. The King of Prussia

had played a part which was an acknowledgment of his weakness in joining

France, instead of openly declaring himself for the cause of Russia,

which was also his. Then took place the defection of General York, who

commanded the Prussian contingent to Napoleon's army. The King of

Prussia, though no doubt secretly satisfied with the conduct of General

York, had him tried and condemned; but shortly after that sovereign

commanded in person the troops which had turned against ours. The

defection of the Prussians produced a very ill effect, and it was easy to

perceive that other defections would follow. Napoleon, foreseeing the

fatal chances which this event was likely to draw upon him, assembled a

privy council, composed of the Ministers and some of the great officers

of his household. MM. de Talleyrand and Cambaceres, and the President of

the senate were present. Napoleon asked whether, in the complicated

difficulties of our situation, it would be more advisable to negotiate

for peace or to prepare for a new war. Cambaceres and Talleyrand gave

their opinion in favour of peace, which however, Napoleon would not hear

of after a defeat; but the Due de Feltre,--[Clarke]--knowing how to

touch the susceptible chord in the mind of Bonaparte, said that he would

consider the Emperor dishonoured if he consented to the abandonment of

the smallest village which had been united to the Empire by a 'Senatus-

consulte'. This opinion was adopted, and the war continued.

On Napoleon's return to Paris the Pope, who was still at Fontainebleau,

determined to accede to an arrangement, and to sign an act which the

Emperor conceived would terminate the differences between them. But

being influenced by some of the cardinals who had previously incurred the

Emperor's displeasure Pius VII. disavowed the new Concordat which he had

been weak enough to grant, and the Emperor, who then had more important

affairs on his hands, dismissed the Holy Father, and published the act to

which he had assented. Bonaparte had no leisure to pay attention to the

new difficulties started by Pius VII.; his thoughts were wholly directed

to the other side of the Rhine. He was unfortunate, and the powers with

whom he was most intimately allied separated from him, as he might have

expected, and Austria was not the last to imitate the example set by

Prussia. In these difficult circumstances the Emperor, who for some time

past had observed the talent and address of the Comte Louis de Narbonne,

sent him to Vienna, to supersede M. Otto; but the pacific propositions of

M. de Narbonne were not listened to. Austria would not let slip the fair

opportunity of taking revenge without endangering herself.

Napoleon now saw clearly that since Austria had abandoned him and refused

her contingent he should soon have all Europe arrayed against him. But

this did not intimidate him.

Some of the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine still remained

faithful to him; and his preparations being completed, he proposed to

resume in person the command of the army which had been so miraculously

reproduced. But before his departure Napoleon, alarmed at the

recollection of Mallet's attempt, and anxious to guard against any

similar occurrence during his absence, did not, as on former occasions,

consign the reins of the National Government to a Council of Ministers,

presided over by the Arch-Chancellor. Napoleon placed my successor with

him, M. Meneval, near the Empress Regent as Secretaire des Commandemens

(Principal Secretary), and certainly he could not have made a better

choice. He made the Empress Maria Louisa Regent, and appointed a Council

of Regency to assist her.

--[Meneval, who had held the post of Secretary to Napoleon from the

time of Bourrienne's disgrace in 1802, had been nearly killed by the

hardships of the Russian campaign, and now received an honourable

and responsible but less onerous post. He remained with the Empress

till 7th May 1815, when, finding that she would not return to her

husband, he left her to rejoin his master.]--

ETEXT EDITOR'S BOOKMARKS:

A sect cannot be destroyed by cannon-balls

Every time we go to war with them we teach them how to beat us

God in his mercy has chosen Napoleon to be his representative on earth

The wish and the reality were to him one and the same thing

Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Volume 11 · 第 8 / 8 章