passage lower down, by which the troops might be landed on the other
side. But, although the banks of the ravine became less formidable as
they descended, they found no means of crossing the river, till a path
unexpectedly presented itself, on which, probably, no one before had
ever been daring enough to venture.
From the cliffs on the opposite sides of the barranca, two huge trees
shot up to an enormous height, and, inclining towards each other,
interlaced their boughs so as to form a sort of natural bridge. Across
this avenue, in mid-air, a Tlascalan conceived it would not be difficult
to pass to the opposite bank. The bold mountaineer succeeded in the
attempt, and was soon followed by several others of his countrymen,
trained to feats of agility and strength among their native hills. The
Spaniards imitated their example. It was a perilous effort for an armed
man to make his way over this aerial causeway, swayed to and fro by the
wind, where the brain might become giddy, and where a single false
movement of hand or foot would plunge him in the abyss below. Three of
the soldiers lost their hold and fell. The rest, consisting of some
twenty or thirty Spaniards and a considerable number of Tlascalans,
alighted in safety on the other bank.[371] There hastily forming, they
marched with all speed on the city. The enemy, engaged in their contest
with the Castilians on the opposite brink of the ravine, were taken by
surprise,--which, indeed, could scarcely have been exceeded if they had
seen their foe drop from the clouds on the field of battle.
They made a brave resistance, however, when fortunately the Spaniards
succeeded in repairing one of the dilapidated bridges in such a manner
as to enable both cavalry and foot to cross the river, though with much
delay. The horse, under Olid and Andres de Tápia, instantly rode up to
the succor of their countrymen. They were soon followed by Cortés at the
head of the remaining battalions, and the enemy, driven from one point
to another, were compelled to evacuate the city and to take refuge among
the mountains. The buildings in one quarter of the town were speedily
wrapped in flames. The place was abandoned to pillage, and, as it was
one of the most opulent marts in the country, it amply compensated the
victors for the toil and danger they had encountered. The trembling
caciques, returning soon after to the city, appeared before Cortés, and
deprecating his resentment by charging the blame, as usual, on the
Mexicans, threw themselves on his mercy. Satisfied with their
submission, he allowed no further violence to the inhabitants.[372]
Having thus accomplished the great object of his expedition across the
mountains, the Spanish commander turned his face northwards, to recross
the formidable barrier which divided him from the Valley. The ascent,
steep and laborious, was rendered still more difficult by fragments of
rock and loose stones, which encumbered the passes. The mountain sides
and summits were shaggy with thick forests of pine and stunted oak,
which threw a melancholy gloom over the region, still further heightened
at the present day by its being a favorite haunt of banditti.
The weather was sultry, and, as the stony soil was nearly destitute of
water, the troops suffered severely from thirst. Several of them,
indeed, fainted on the road, and a few of the Indian allies perished
from exhaustion.[373] The line of march must have taken the army across
the eastern shoulder of the mountain, called the _Cruz del Marques_, or
Cross of the Marquess, from a huge stone cross erected there to indicate
the boundary of the territories granted by the Crown to Cortés, as
Marquis of the Valley. Much, indeed, of the route lately traversed by
the troops lay across the princely domain subsequently assigned to the
Conqueror.[374]
The Spaniards were greeted from these heights with a different view from
any which they had before had of the Mexican Valley, made more
attractive in their eyes, doubtless, by contrast with the savage scenery
in which they had lately been involved. It was its most pleasant and
populous quarter; for nowhere did its cities and villages cluster
together in such numbers as round the lake of sweet water. From whatever
quarter seen, however, the enchanting region presented the same aspect
of natural beauty and cultivation, with its flourishing villas, and its
fair lake in the centre, whose dark and polished surface glistened like
a mirror, deep set in the huge frame-work of porphyry in which nature
had enclosed it.
The point of attack selected by the general was Xochimilco, or “the
field of flowers,” as its name implies, from the floating gardens which
rode at anchor, as it were, on the neighboring waters.[375] It was one
of the most potent and wealthy cities in the Valley, and a stanch vassal
of the Aztec crown. It stood, like the capital itself, partly in the
water, and was approached in that quarter by causeways of no great
length. The town was composed of houses like those of most other places
of like magnitude in the country, mostly of cottages or huts made of
clay and the light bamboo, mingled with aspiring _teocallis_, and
edifices of stone, belonging to the more opulent classes.
As the Spaniards advanced, they were met by skirmishing parties of the
enemy, who, after dismissing a light volley of arrows, rapidly retreated
before them. As they took the direction of Xochimilco, Cortés inferred
that they were prepared to resist him in considerable force. It exceeded
his expectations.
On traversing the principal causeway, he found it occupied at the
farther extremity by a numerous body of warriors, who, stationed on the
opposite side of a bridge, which had been broken, were prepared to
dispute his passage. They had constructed a temporary barrier of
palisades, which screened them from the fire of the musketry. But the
water in its neighborhood was very shallow, and the cavaliers and
infantry, plunging into it, soon made their way, swimming or wading, as
they could, in the face of a storm of missiles, to the landing near the
town. Here they closed with the enemy, and hand to hand, after a sharp
struggle, drove them back on the city; a few, however, taking the
direction of the open country, were followed up by the cavalry. The
great mass, hotly pursued by the infantry, were driven through street
and lane, without much further resistance. Cortés, with a few followers,
disengaging himself from the tumult, remained near the entrance of the
city. He had not been there long when he was assailed by a fresh body of
Indians, who suddenly poured into the place from a neighboring dike.
The general, with his usual fearlessness, threw himself into the midst,
in hopes to check their advance. But his own followers were too few to
support him, and he was overwhelmed by the crowd of combatants. His
horse lost his footing and fell; and Cortés, who received a severe blow
on the head before he could rise, was seized and dragged off in triumph
by the Indians. At this critical moment, a Tlascalan, who perceived the
general’s extremity, sprang, like one of the wild ocelots of his own
forests, into the midst of the assailants, and endeavored to tear him
from their grasp. Two of the general’s servants also speedily came to
the rescue, and Cortés, with their aid and that of the brave Tlascalan,
succeeded in regaining his feet and shaking off his enemies. To vault
into the saddle and brandish his good lance was but the work of a
moment. Others of his men quickly came up, and the clash of arms
reaching the ears of the Spaniards, who had gone in pursuit, they
returned, and, after a desperate conflict, forced the enemy from the
city. Their retreat, however, was intercepted by the cavalry, returning
from the country, and, thus hemmed in between the opposite columns, they
were cut to pieces, or saved themselves only by plunging into the
lake.[376]
This was the greatest personal danger which Cortés had yet encountered.
His life was in the power of the barbarians, and, had it not been for
their eagerness to take him prisoner, he must undoubtedly have lost it.
To the same cause may be frequently attributed the preservation of the
Spaniards in these engagements. The next day he sought, it is said, for
the Tlascalan who came so boldly to his rescue, and, as he could learn
nothing of him, he gave the credit of his preservation to his patron,
St. Peter.[377] He may well be excused for presuming the interposition
of his good Genius to shield him from the awful doom of the captive,--a
doom not likely to be mitigated in his case. That heart must have been a
bold one, indeed, which, from any motive, could voluntarily encounter
such a peril! Yet his followers did as much, and that, too, for a much
inferior reward.
The period which we are reviewing was still the age of chivalry,--that
stirring and adventurous age, of which we can form little conception in
the present day of sober, practical reality. The Spaniard, with his nice
point of honor, high romance, and proud, vainglorious vaunt, was the
true representative of that age. The Europeans generally had not yet
learned to accommodate themselves to a life of literary toil, or to the
drudgery of trade or the patient tillage of the soil. They left these
to the hooded inmate of the cloister, the humble burgher, and the
miserable serf. Arms was the only profession worthy of gentle
blood,--the only career which the high-mettled cavalier could tread with
honor. The New World, with its strange and mysterious perils, afforded a
noble theatre for the exercise of his calling; and the Spaniard entered
on it with all the enthusiasm of a paladin of romance.
Other nations entered on it also, but with different motives. The French
sent forth their missionaries to take up their dwelling among the
heathen, who, in the good work of winning souls to Paradise, were
content to wear--nay, sometimes seemed to court--the crown of martyrdom.
The Dutch, too, had their mission, but it was one of worldly lucre, and
they found a recompense for toil and suffering in their gainful traffic
with the natives. While our own Puritan fathers, with the true
Anglo-Saxon spirit, left their pleasant homes across the waters, and
pitched their tents in the howling wilderness, that they might enjoy the
sweets of civil and religious freedom. But the Spaniard came over to the
New World in the true spirit of a knight-errant, courting adventure,
however perilous, wooing danger, as it would seem, for its own sake.
With sword and lance, he was ever ready to do battle for the Faith; and,
as he raised his old war-cry of “St. Jago,” he fancied himself fighting
under the banner of the military apostle, and felt his single arm a
match for more than a hundred infidels! It was the expiring age of
chivalry; and Spain, romantic Spain was the land where its light
lingered longest above the horizon.
It was not yet dusk when Cortés and his followers re-entered the city;
and the general’s first act was to ascend a neighboring _teocalli_ and
reconnoitre the surrounding country. He there beheld a sight which might
have troubled a bolder spirit than his. The surface of the salt lake was
darkened with canoes, and the causeway, for many a mile, with Indian
squadrons, apparently on their march toward the Christian camp. In fact,
no sooner had Guatemozin been apprised of the arrival of the white men
at Xochimilco than he mustered his levies in great force to relieve the
city. They were now on their march, and, as the capital was but four
leagues distant, would arrive soon after nightfall.[378]
Cortés made active preparations for the defence of his quarters. He
stationed a corps of pikemen along the landing where the Aztecs would be
likely to disembark. He doubled the sentinels, and, with his principal
officers, made the rounds repeatedly in the course of the night. In
addition to other causes for watchfulness, the bolts of the crossbowmen
were nearly exhausted, and the archers were busily employed in preparing
and adjusting shafts to the copper heads, of which great store had been
provided for the army. There was little sleep in the camp that
night.[379]
It passed away, however, without molestation from the enemy. Though not
stormy, it was exceedingly dark. But, although the Spaniards on duty
could see nothing, they distinctly heard the sound of many oars in the
water, at no great distance from the shore. Yet those on board the
canoes made no attempt to land, distrusting, or advised, it may be, of
the preparations made for their reception. With early dawn they were
under arms, and, without waiting for the movement of the Spaniards,
poured into the city and attacked them in their own quarters.
The Spaniards, who were gathered in the area round one of the
_teocallis_, were taken at disadvantage in the town, where the narrow
lanes and streets, many of them covered with a smooth and slippery
cement, offered obvious impediments to the manœuvres of cavalry. But
Cortés hastily formed his musketeers and crossbowmen, and poured such a
lively, well-directed fire into the enemy’s ranks as threw him into
disorder and compelled him to recoil. The infantry, with their long
pikes, followed up the blow; and the horse, charging at full speed as
the retreating Aztecs emerged from the city, drove them several miles
along the main land.
At some distance, however, they were met by a strong reinforcement of
their countrymen, and, rallying, the tide of battle turned, and the
cavaliers, swept along by it, gave the rein to their steeds and rode
back at full gallop towards the town. They had not proceeded very far,
when they came upon the main body of the army, advancing rapidly to
their support. Thus strengthened, they once more returned to the charge,
and the rival hosts met together in full career, with the shock of an
earthquake. For a time, victory seemed to hang in the balance, as the
mighty press reeled to and fro under the opposite impulse, and a
confused shout rose up towards heaven, in which the war-whoop of the
savage was mingled with the battle-cry of the Christian,--a still
stranger sound on these sequestered shores. But, in the end, Castilian
valor, or rather Castilian arms and discipline, proved triumphant. The
enemy faltered, gave way, and, recoiling step by step, the retreat soon
terminated in a rout, and the Spaniards, following up the flying foe,
drove them from the field with such dreadful slaughter that they made no
further attempt to renew the battle.
The victors were now undisputed masters of the city. It was a wealthy
place, well stored with Indian fabrics, cotton, gold, feather-work, and
other articles of luxury and use, affording a rich booty to the
soldiers. While engaged in the work of plunder, a party of the enemy,
landing from their canoes, fell on some of the stragglers, laden with
merchandise, and made four of them prisoners. It created a greater
sensation among the troops than if ten times that number had fallen on
the field. Indeed, it was rare that a Spaniard allowed himself to be
taken alive. In the present instance the unfortunate men were taken by
surprise. They were hurried to the capital, and soon after sacrificed;
when their arms and legs were cut off, by the command of the ferocious
young chief of the Aztecs, and sent round to the different cities, with
the assurance that this should be the fate of the enemies of
Mexico![380]
From the prisoners taken in the late engagement, Cortés learned that the
forces already sent by Guatemozin formed but a small part of his levies;
that his policy was to send detachment after detachment, until the
Spaniards, however victorious they might come off from the contest with
each individually, would, in the end, succumb from mere exhaustion, and
thus be vanquished, as it were, by their own victories.
The soldiers having now sacked the city, Cortés did not care to await
further assaults from the enemy in his present quarters. On the fourth
morning after his arrival, he mustered his forces on a neighboring
plain. They came, many of them reeling under the weight of their
plunder. The general saw this with uneasiness. They were to march, he
said, through a populous country, all in arms to dispute their passage.
To secure their safety, they should move as light and unencumbered as
possible. The sight of so much spoil would sharpen the appetite of
their enemies, and draw them on, like a flock of famished eagles after
their prey. But his eloquence was lost on his men, who plainly told him
they had a right to the fruit of their victories, and that what they had
won with their swords they knew well enough how to defend with them.
Seeing them thus bent on their purpose, the general did not care to balk
their inclinations. He ordered the baggage to the centre, and placed a
few of the cavalry over it; dividing the remainder between the front and
rear, in which latter post, as that most exposed to attack, he also
stationed his arquebusiers and crossbowmen. Thus prepared, he resumed
his march, but first set fire to the combustible buildings of
Xochimilco, in retaliation for the resistance he had met there.[381] The
light of the burning city streamed high into the air, sending its
ominous glare far and wide across the waters, and telling the
inhabitants on their margin that the fatal strangers so long predicted
by their oracles had descended like a consuming flame upon their
borders.[382]
Small bodies of the enemy were seen occasionally at a distance, but they
did not venture to attack the army on its march, which, before noon,
brought them to Cojohuacan, a large town about two leagues distant from
Xochimilco. One could scarcely travel that distance in this populous
quarter of the Valley without meeting with a place of considerable size,
oftentimes the capital of what had formerly been an independent state.
The inhabitants, members of different tribes, and speaking dialects
somewhat different, belonged to the same great family of nations, who
had come from the real or imaginary region of Aztlan, in the far
Northwest. Gathered round the shores of their Alpine sea, these petty
communities continued, after their incorporation with the Aztec
monarchy, to maintain a spirit of rivalry in their intercourse with one
another, which--as with the cities on the Mediterranean in the feudal
ages--quickened their mental energies, and raised the Mexican Valley
higher in the scale of civilization than most other quarters of Anahuac.
The town at which the army had now arrived was deserted by its
inhabitants; and Cortés halted two days there to restore his troops and
give the needful attention to the wounded.[383] He made use of the time
to reconnoitre the neighboring ground, and, taking with him a strong
detachment, descended on the causeway which led from Cojohuacan to the
great avenue of Iztapalapan.[384] At the point of intersection, called
Xoloc, he found a strong barrier, or fortification, behind which a
Mexican force was intrenched. Their archery did some mischief to the
Spaniards as they came within bowshot. But the latter, marching
intrepidly forward in face of the arrowy shower, stormed the works, and,
after an obstinate struggle, drove the enemy from their position.[385]
Cortés then advanced some way on the great causeway of Iztapalapan; but
he beheld the farther extremity darkened by a numerous array of
warriors, and, as he did not care to engage in unnecessary hostilities,
especially as his ammunition was nearly exhausted, he fell back and
retreated to his own quarters.
The following day, the army continued its march, taking the road to
Tacuba, but a few miles distant. On the way it experienced much
annoyance from straggling parties of the enemy, who, furious at the
sight of the booty which the invaders were bearing away, made repeated
attacks on their flanks and rear. Cortés retaliated, as on the former
expedition, by one of their own stratagems, but with less success than
before; for, pursuing the retreating enemy too hotly, he fell with his
cavalry into an ambuscade which they had prepared for him in their turn.
He was not yet a match for their wily tactics. The Spanish cavaliers
were enveloped in a moment by their subtle foe, and separated from the
rest of the army. But, spurring on their good steeds, and charging in a
solid column together, they succeeded in breaking through the Indian
array, and in making their escape, except two individuals, who fell into
the enemy’s hands. They were the general’s own servants, who had
followed him faithfully through the whole campaign, and he was deeply
affected by their loss,--rendered the more distressing by the
consideration of the dismal fate that awaited them. When the little band
rejoined the army, which had halted, in some anxiety at their absence,
under the walls of Tacuba, the soldiers were astonished at the dejected
mien of their commander, which too visibly betrayed his emotion.[386]
The sun was still high in the heavens when they entered the ancient
capital of the Tepanecs. The first care of Cortés was to ascend the
principal _teocalli_ and survey the surrounding country. It was an
admirable point of view, commanding the capital, which lay but little
more than a league distant, and its immediate environs. Cortés was
accompanied by Alderete, the treasurer, and some other cavaliers, who
had lately joined his banner. The spectacle was still new to them; and,
as they gazed on the stately city, with its broad lake covered with
boats and barges hurrying to and fro, some laden with merchandise, or
fruits and vegetables, for the markets of Tenochtitlan, others crowded
with warriors, they could not withhold their admiration at the life and
activity of the scene, declaring that nothing but the hand of Providence
could have led their countrymen safe through the heart of this powerful
empire.[387]
In the midst of the admiring circle, the brow of Cortés alone was
observed to be overcast, and a sigh, which now and then stole audibly
from his bosom, showed the gloomy working of his thoughts.[388] “Take
comfort,” said one of the cavaliers, approaching his commander, and
wishing to console him, in his rough way, for his recent loss; “you must
not lay these things so much to heart; it is, after all, but the fortune
of war.” The general’s answer showed the nature of his meditations. “You
are my witness,” said he, “how often I have endeavored to persuade
yonder capital peacefully to submit. It fills me with grief when I think
of the toil and the dangers my brave followers have yet to encounter
before we can call it ours. But the time is come when we must put our
hands to the work.”[389]
There can be no doubt that Cortés, with every other man in his army,
felt he was engaged on a holy crusade, and that, independently of
personal considerations, he could not serve Heaven better than by
planting the Cross on the blood-stained towers of the heathen
metropolis. But it was natural that he should feel some compunction as
he gazed on the goodly scene, and thought of the coming tempest, and how
soon the opening blossoms of civilization which there met his eye must
wither under the rude breath of War. It was a striking spectacle, that
of the great Conqueror thus brooding in silence over the desolation he
was about to bring on the land! It seems to have made a deep impression
on his soldiers, little accustomed to such proofs of his sensibility;
and it forms the burden of some of those _romances_, or national
ballads, with which the Castilian minstrel, in the olden time, delighted
to commemorate the favorite heroes of his country, and which, coming
mid-way between oral tradition and chronicle, have been found as
imperishable a record as chronicle itself.[390]
Tacuba was the point which Cortés had reached on his former expedition
round the northern side of the Valley. He had now, therefore, made the
entire circuit of the great lake; had reconnoitred the several
approaches to the capital, and inspected with his own eyes the
dispositions made on the opposite quarters for its defence. He had no
occasion to prolong his stay in Tacuba, the vicinity of which to Mexico
must soon bring on him its whole warlike population.
Early on the following morning he resumed his march, taking the route
pursued in the former expedition north of the small lakes. He met with
less annoyance from the enemy than on the preceding days; a circumstance
owing in some degree, perhaps, to the state of the weather, which was
exceedingly tempestuous. The soldiers, with their garments heavy with
moisture, ploughed their way with difficulty through miry roads flooded
by the torrents. On one occasion, as their military chronicler informs
us, the officers neglected to go the rounds of the camp at night, and
the sentinels to mount guard, trusting to the violence of the storm for
their protection. Yet the fate of Narvaez might have taught them not to
put their faith in the elements.
At Acolman, in the Acolhuan territory, they were met by Sandoval, with
the friendly cacique of Tezcuco, and several cavaliers, among whom were
some recently arrived from the Islands. They cordially greeted their
countrymen, and communicated the tidings that the canal was completed,
and that the brigantines, rigged and equipped, were ready to be launched
on the bosom of the lake. There seemed to be no reason, therefore, for
longer postponing operations against Mexico.--With this welcome
intelligence, Cortés and his victorious legions made their entry for the
last time into the Acolhuan capital, having consumed just three weeks in
completing the circuit of the Valley.
CHAPTER IV
CONSPIRACY IN THE ARMY--BRIGANTINES LAUNCHED--MUSTER OF
FORCES--EXECUTION OF XICOTENCATL--MARCH OF THE ARMY--BEGINNING OF
THE SIEGE
1521
At the very time when Cortés was occupied with reconnoitring the Valley,
preparatory to his siege of the capital, a busy faction in Castile was
laboring to subvert his authority and defeat his plans of conquest
altogether. The fame of his brilliant exploits had spread not only
through the Isles, but to Spain and many parts of Europe, where a
general admiration was felt for the invincible energy of the man who
with his single arm, as it were, could so long maintain a contest with
the powerful Indian empire. The absence of the Spanish monarch from his
dominions, and the troubles of the country, can alone explain the supine
indifference shown by the government to the prosecution of this great
enterprise. To the same causes it may be ascribed that no action was had
in regard to the suits of Velasquez and Narvaez, backed as they were by
so potent an advocate as Bishop Fonseca, president of the Council of the
Indies. The reins of government had fallen into
[Illustration: ADRIAN OF UTRECHT (POPE ADRIAN VI.)
_Goupil & Cº. Paris_]
the hands of Adrian of Utrecht, Charles’s preceptor, and afterwards
Pope,--a man of learning, and not without sagacity, but slow and timid
in his policy, and altogether incapable of that decisive action which
suited the bold genius of his predecessor, Cardinal Ximenes.
In the spring of 1521, however, a number of ordinances passed the
Council of the Indies, which threatened an important innovation in the
affairs of New Spain. It was decreed that the Royal Audience of
Hispaniola should abandon the proceedings already instituted against
Narvaez for his treatment of the commissioner Ayllon; that that
unfortunate commander should be released from his confinement at Vera
Cruz; and that an arbitrator should be sent to Mexico with authority to
investigate the affairs and conduct of Cortés, and to render ample
justice to the governor of Cuba. There were not wanting persons at court
who looked with dissatisfaction on these proceedings, as an unworthy
requital of the services of Cortés, and who thought the present moment,
at any rate, not the most suitable for taking measures which might
discourage the general and perhaps render him desperate. But the
arrogant temper of the bishop of Burgos overruled all objections; and
the ordinances, having been approved by the Regency, were signed by that
body, April 11, 1521. A person named Tápia, one of the functionaries of
the Audience at St. Domingo, was selected as the new commissioner to be
despatched to Vera Cruz. Fortunately, circumstances occurred which
postponed the execution of the design for the present, and permitted
Cortés to go forward unmolested in his career of conquest.[391]
But, while thus allowed to remain, for the present at least, in
possession of authority, he was assailed by a danger nearer home, which
menaced not only his authority, but his life. This was a conspiracy in
the army, of a more dark and dangerous character than any hitherto
formed there. It was set on foot by a common soldier, named Antonio
Villafaña, a native of Old Castile, of whom nothing is known but his
share in this transaction. He was one of the troop of Narvaez,--that
leaven of disaffection, which had remained with the army, swelling with
discontent on every light occasion, and ready at all times to rise into
mutiny. They had voluntarily continued in the service after the
secession of their comrades at Tlascala; but it was from the same
mercenary hopes with which they had originally embarked in the
expedition,--and in these they were destined still to be disappointed.
They had little of the true spirit of adventure which distinguished the
old companions of Cortés; and they found the barren laurels of victory
but a sorry recompense for all their toils and sufferings.
With these men were joined others, who had causes of personal disgust
with the general; and others, again, who looked with distrust on the
result of the war. The gloomy fate of their countrymen who had fallen
into the enemy’s hands filled them with dismay. They felt themselves the
victims of a chimerical spirit in their leader, who, with such
inadequate means, was urging to extremity so ferocious and formidable a
foe; and they shrank with something like apprehension from thus pursuing
the enemy into his own haunts, where he would gather tenfold energy from
despair.
These men would have willingly abandoned the enterprise and returned to
Cuba; but how could they do it? Cortés had control over the whole route
from the city to the sea-coast; and not a vessel could leave its port
without his warrant. Even if he were put out of the way, there were
others, his principal officers, ready to step into his place and avenge
the death of their commander. It was necessary to embrace these, also,
in the scheme of destruction; and it was proposed, therefore, together
with Cortés, to assassinate Sandoval, Olid, Alvarado, and two or three
others most devoted to his interests. The conspirators would then raise
the cry of liberty, and doubted not that they should be joined by the
greater part of the army, or enough, at least, to enable them to work
their own pleasure. They proposed to offer the command, on Cortés’
death, to Francisco Verdugo, a brother-in-law of Velasquez. He was an
honorable cavalier, and not privy to their design. But they had little
doubt that he would acquiesce in the command thus in a manner forced
upon him, and this would secure them the protection of the governor of
Cuba, who, indeed, from his own hatred of Cortés, would be disposed to
look with a lenient eye on their proceedings.
The conspirators even went so far as to appoint the subordinate
officers, an _alguacil mayor_ in place of Sandoval, a
quartermaster-general to succeed Olid, and some others.[392] The time
fixed for the execution of the plot was soon after the return of Cortés
from his expedition. A parcel, pretended to have come by a fresh arrival
from Castile, was to be presented to him while at table, and, when he
was engaged in breaking open the letters, the conspirators were to fall
on him and his officers and despatch them with their poniards. Such was
the iniquitous scheme devised for the destruction of Cortés and the
expedition. But a conspiracy, to be successful, especially when numbers
are concerned, should allow but little time to elapse between its
conception and its execution.
On the day previous to that appointed for the perpetration of the deed,
one of the party, feeling a natural compunction at the commission of the
crime, went to the general’s quarters and solicited a private interview
with him. He threw himself at his commander’s feet, and revealed all the
particulars relating to the conspiracy, adding that in Villafaña’s
possession a paper would be found, containing the names of his
accomplices. Cortés, thunderstruck at the disclosure, lost not a moment
in profiting by it. He sent for Alvarado, Sandoval, and one or two other
officers marked out by the conspirator, and, after communicating the
affair to them, went at once with them to Villafaña’s quarters,
attended by four alguacils.
They found him in conference with three or four friends, who were
instantly taken from the apartment and placed in custody. Villafaña,
confounded at this sudden apparition of his commander, had barely time
to snatch a paper, containing the signatures of the confederates, from
his bosom, and attempt to swallow it. But Cortés arrested his arm, and
seized the paper. As he glanced his eye rapidly over the fatal list, he
was much moved at finding there the names of more than one who had some
claim to consideration in the army. He tore the scroll in pieces, and
ordered Villafaña to be taken into custody. He was immediately tried by
a military court hastily got together, at which the general himself
presided. There seems to have been no doubt of the man’s guilt. He was
condemned to death, and, after allowing him time for confession and
absolution, the sentence was executed by hanging him from the window of
his own quarters.[393]
Those ignorant of the affair were astonished at the spectacle; and the
remaining conspirators were filled with consternation when they saw that
their plot was detected, and anticipated a similar fate for themselves.
But they were mistaken. Cortés pursued the matter no further. A little
reflection convinced him that to do so would involve him in the most
disagreeable, and even dangerous, perplexities. And, however much the
parties implicated in so foul a deed might deserve death, he could ill
afford the loss even of the guilty, with his present limited numbers. He
resolved, therefore, to content himself with the punishment of the
ringleader.
He called his troops together, and briefly explained to them the nature
of the crime for which Villafaña had suffered. He had made no
confession, he said, and the guilty secret had perished with him. He
then expressed his sorrow that any should have been found in their ranks
capable of so base an act, and stated his own unconsciousness of having
wronged any individual among them; but, if he had done so, he invited
them frankly to declare it, as he was most anxious to afford them all
the redress in his power.[394] But there was no one of his audience,
whatever might be his grievances, who cared to enter his complaint at
such a moment; least of all were the conspirators willing to do so, for
they were too happy at having, as they fancied, escaped detection, to
stand forward now in the ranks of the malecontents. The affair passed
off, therefore, without further consequences.
The conduct of Cortés in this delicate conjuncture shows great coolness,
and knowledge of human nature. Had he suffered his detection, or even
his suspicion, of the guilty parties to take air, it would have placed
him in hostile relations with them for the rest of his life. It was a
disclosure of this kind, in the early part of Louis the Eleventh’s
reign, to which many of the troubles of his later years were
attributed.[395] The mask once torn away, there is no longer occasion to
consult even appearances. The door seems to be closed against reform.
The alienation, which might have been changed by circumstances or
conciliated by kindness, settles into a deep and deadly rancor. And
Cortés would have been surrounded by enemies in his own camp more
implacable than those in the camp of the Aztecs.
As it was, the guilty soldiers had suffered too serious apprehensions to
place their lives hastily in a similar jeopardy. They strove, on the
contrary, by demonstrations of loyalty, and the assiduous discharge of
their duties, to turn away suspicion from themselves. Cortes, on his
part, was careful to preserve his natural demeanor, equally removed from
distrust and--what was perhaps more difficult--that studied courtesy
which intimates, quite as plainly, suspicion of the party who is the
object of it. To do this required no little address. Yet he did not
forget the past. He had, it is true, destroyed the scroll containing the
list of the conspirators. But the man that has once learned the names of
those who have conspired against his life has no need of a written
record to keep them fresh in his memory. Cortés kept his eye on all
their movements, and took care to place them in no situation,
afterwards, where they could do him injury.[396]
This attempt on the life of their commander excited a strong sensation
in the army, with whom his many dazzling qualities and brilliant
military talents had made him a general favorite. They were anxious to
testify their reprobation of so foul a deed, coming from their own body,
and they felt the necessity of taking some effectual measures for
watching over the safety of one with whom their own destinies, as well
as the fate of the enterprise, were so intimately connected. It was
arranged, therefore, that he should be provided with a guard of
soldiers, who were placed under the direction of a trusty cavalier named
Antonio de Quiñones. They constituted the general’s body-guard during
the rest of the campaign, watching over him day and night, and
protecting him from domestic treason no less than from the sword of the
enemy.
As was stated at the close of the last chapter, the Spaniards, on their
return to quarters, found the construction of the brigantines completed,
and that they were fully rigged, equipped, and ready for service. The
canal, also, after having occupied eight thousand men for nearly two
months, was finished.
It was a work of great labor; for it extended half a league in length,
was twelve feet wide, and as many deep. The sides were strengthened by
palisades of wood, or solid masonry. At intervals, dams and locks were
constructed, and part of the opening was through the hard rock. By this
avenue the brigantines might now be safely introduced on the lake.[397]
Cortés was resolved that so auspicious an event should be celebrated
with due solemnity. On the 28th of April, the troops were drawn up under
arms, and the whole population of Tezcuco assembled to witness the
ceremony. Mass was performed, and every man in the army, together with
the general, confessed and received the sacrament. Prayers were offered
up by Father Olmedo, and a benediction invoked on the little navy, the
first--worthy of the name--ever launched on American waters.[398] The
signal was given by the firing of a cannon, when the vessels, dropping
down the canal, one after another, reached the lake in good order; and,
as they emerged on its ample bosom, with music sounding, and the royal
ensign of Castile proudly floating from their masts, a shout of
admiration arose from the countless multitudes of spectators, which
mingled with the roar of artillery and musketry from the vessels and the
shore![399] It was a novel spectacle to the simple natives; and they
gazed with wonder on the gallant ships, which, fluttering like sea-birds
on their snowy pinions, bounded lightly over the waters, as if rejoicing
in their element. It touched the stern hearts of the Conquerors with a
glow of rapture, and, as they felt that Heaven had blessed their
undertaking, they broke forth, by general accord, into the noble anthem
of the _Te Deum_. But there was no one of that vast multitude for whom
the sight had deeper interest than their commander. For he looked on it
as the work, in a manner, of his own hands; and his bosom swelled with
exultation, as he felt he was now possessed of a power strong enough to
command the lake, and to shake the haughty towers of Tenochtitlan.[400]
The general’s next step was to muster his forces in the great square of
the capital. He found they amounted to eighty-seven horse, and eight
hundred and eighteen foot, of which one hundred and eighteen were
arquebusiers and crossbowmen. He had three large field-pieces of iron,
and fifteen lighter guns or falconets of brass.[401] The heavier cannon
had been transported from Vera Cruz to Tezcuco, a little while before,
by the faithful Tlascalans. He was well supplied with shot and balls,
with about ten hundred-weight of powder, and fifty thousand
copper-headed arrows, made after a pattern furnished by him to the
natives.[402] The number and appointments of the army much exceeded what
they had been at any time since the flight from Mexico, and showed the
good effects of the late arrivals from the Islands. Indeed, taking the
fleet into the account, Cortés had never before been in so good a
condition for carrying on his operations. Three hundred of the men were
sent to man the vessels, thirteen, or rather twelve, in number, one of
the smallest having been found, on trial, too dull a sailer to be of
service. Half of the crews were required to navigate the ships. There
was some difficulty in finding hands for this, as the men were averse to
the employment. Cortés selected those who came from Palos, Moguer, and
other maritime towns, and, notwithstanding their frequent claims of
exemption, as hidalgos, from this menial occupation, he pressed them
into the service.[403] Each vessel mounted a piece of heavy ordnance,
and was placed under an officer of respectability, to whom Cortés gave a
general code of instructions for the government of the little navy, of
which he proposed to take the command in person.
He had already sent to his Indian confederates, announcing his purpose
of immediately laying siege to Mexico, and called on them to furnish
their promised levies within the space of ten days at furthest. The
Tlascalans he ordered to join him in Tezcuco; the others were to
assemble at Chalco, a more convenient place of rendezvous for the
operations in the southern quarter of the Valley. The Tlascalans arrived
within the time prescribed, led by the younger Xicotencatl, supported by
Chichemecatl, the same doughty warrior who had convoyed the brigantines
to Tezcuco. They came fifty thousand strong, according to Cortés,[404]
making a brilliant show with their military finery, and marching proudly
forward under the great national banner, emblazoned with a spread eagle,
the arms of the republic.[405] With as blithe and manly a step as if
they were going to the battle-ground, they defiled through the gates of
the capital, making its walls ring with the friendly shouts of “Castile
and Tlascala.”
The observations which Cortes had made in his late tour of
reconnoissance had determined him to begin the siege by distributing his
forces into three separate camps, which he proposed to establish at the
extremities of the principal causeways. By this arrangement the troops
would be enabled to move in concert on the capital, and be in the best
position to intercept its supplies from the surrounding country. The
first of these points was Tacuba, commanding the fatal causeway of the
_noche triste_. This was assigned to Pedro de Alvarado, with a force
consisting, according to Cortés’ own statement, of thirty horse, one
hundred and sixty-eight Spanish infantry, and five-and-twenty thousand
Tlascalans. Cristóval de Olid had command of the second army, of much
the same magnitude, which was to take up its position at Cojohuacan, the
city, it will be remembered, overlooking the short causeway connected
with that of Iztapalapan. Gonzalo de Sandoval had charge of the third
division, of equal strength with each of the two preceding, but which
was to draw its Indian levies from the forces assembled at Chalco. This
officer was to march on Iztapalapan and complete the destruction of that
city, begun by Cortés soon after his entrance into the Valley. It was
too formidable a post to remain in the rear of the army. The general
intended to support the attack with his brigantines, after which the
subsequent movements of Sandoval would be determined by
circumstances.[406]
Having announced his intended dispositions to his officers, the Spanish
commander called his troops together, and made one of those brief and
stirring harangues with which he was wont on great occasions to kindle
the hearts of his soldiery. “I have taken the last step,” he said; “I
have brought you to the goal for which you have so long panted. A few
days will place you before the gates of Mexico,--the capital from which
you were driven with so much ignominy. But we now go forward under the
smiles of Providence. Does any one doubt it? Let him but compare our
present condition with that in which we found ourselves not twelve
months since, when, broken and dispirited, we sought shelter within the
walls of Tlascala; nay, with that in which we were but a few months
since, when we took up our quarters in Tezcuco.[407] Since that time our
strength has been nearly doubled. We are fighting the battles of the
Faith, fighting for our honor, for riches, for revenge. I have brought
you face to face with your foe. It is for you to do the rest.”[408]
The address of the bold chief was answered by the thundering
acclamations of his followers, who declared that every man would do his
duty under such a leader; and they only asked to be led against the
enemy.[409] Cortés then caused the regulations for the army, published
at Tlascala, to be read again to the troops, with the assurance that
they should be enforced to the letter.
It was arranged that the Indian forces should precede the Spanish by a
day’s march, and should halt for their confederates on the borders of
the Tezcucan territory. A circumstance occurred soon after their
departure which gave bad augury for the future. A quarrel had arisen in
the camp at Tezcuco between a Spanish soldier and a Tlascalan chief, in
which the latter was badly hurt. He was sent back to Tlascala, and the
matter was hushed up, that it might not reach the ears of the general,
who, it was known, would not pass it over lightly. Xicotencatl was a
near relative of the injured party, and on the first day’s halt he took
the opportunity to leave the army, with a number of his followers, and
set off for Tlascala. Other causes are assigned for his desertion.[410]
It is certain that from the first he had looked on the expedition with
an evil eye, and had predicted that no good would come of it. He came
into it with reluctance, as, indeed, he detested the Spaniards in his
heart.
His partner in the command instantly sent information of the affair to
the Spanish general, still encamped at Tezcuco. Cortés, who saw at once
the mischievous consequences of this defection at such a time, detached
a party of Tlascalans and Tezcucan Indians after the fugitive, with
instructions to prevail on him, if possible, to return to his duty. They
overtook him on the road, and remonstrated with him on his conduct,
contrasting it with that of his countrymen generally, and of his own
father in particular, the steady friend of the white men. “So much the
worse,” replied the chieftain: “if they had taken my counsel, they would
never have become the dupes of the perfidious strangers.”[411] Finding
their remonstrances received only with anger or contemptuous taunts, the
emissaries returned without accomplishing their object.
Cortés did not hesitate on the course he was to pursue. “Xicotencatl,”
he said, “had always been the enemy of the Spaniards, first in the
field, and since in the council-chamber; openly, or in secret, still the
same,--their implacable enemy. There was no use in parleying with the
false-hearted Indian.” He instantly despatched a small body of horse
with an alguacil to arrest the chief wherever he might be found, even
though it were in the streets of Tlascala, and to bring him back to
Tezcuco. At the same time, he sent information of Xicotencatl’s
proceedings to the Tlascalan senate, adding that desertion among the
Spaniards was punished with death.
The emissaries of Cortés punctually fulfilled his orders. They arrested
the fugitive chief,--whether in Tlascala or in its neighborhood is
uncertain,--and brought him a prisoner to Tezcuco, where a high gallows,
erected in the great square, was prepared for his reception. He was
instantly led to the place of execution; his sentence and the cause for
which he suffered were publicly proclaimed, and the unfortunate cacique
expiated his offence by the vile death of a malefactor. His ample
property, consisting of lands, slaves, and some gold, was all
confiscated to the Castilian crown.[412]
Thus perished Xicotencatl, in the flower of his age,--as dauntless a
warrior as ever led an Indian army to battle. He was the first chief
who successfully resisted the arms of the invaders; and, had the natives
of Anahuac, generally, been animated with a spirit like his, Cortés
would probably never have set foot in the capital of Montezuma. He was
gifted with a clearer insight into the future than his countrymen; for
he saw that the European was an enemy far more to be dreaded than the
Aztec. Yet, when he consented to fight under the banner of the white
men, he had no right to desert it, and he incurred the penalty
prescribed by the code of savage as well as of civilized nations. It is
said, indeed, that the Tlascalan senate aided in apprehending him,
having previously answered Cortés that his crime was punishable with
death by their own laws.[413] It was a bold act, however, thus to
execute him in the midst of his people. For he was a powerful chief,
heir to one of the four seigniories of the republic. His chivalrous
qualities made him popular, especially with the younger part of his
countrymen; and his garments were torn into shreds at his death and
distributed as sacred relics among them. Still, no resistance was
offered to the execution of the sentence, and no commotion followed it.
He was the only Tlascalan who ever swerved from his loyalty to the
Spaniards.
According to the plan of operations settled by Cortés, Sandoval, with
his division, was to take a southern direction, while Alvarado and Olid
would make the northern circuit of the lakes. These two cavaliers,
after getting possession of Tacuba, were to advance to Chapoltepec and
demolish the great aqueduct there, which supplied Mexico with water. On
the tenth of May they commenced their march; but at Acolman, where they
halted for the night, a dispute arose between the soldiers of the two
divisions, respecting their quarters. From words they came to blows, and
a defiance was even exchanged between the leaders, who entered into the
angry feelings of their followers.[414] Intelligence of this was soon
communicated to Cortés, who sent at once to the fiery chiefs, imploring
them, by their regard for him and the common cause, to lay aside their
differences, which must end in their own ruin and that of the
expedition. His remonstrance prevailed, at least, so far as to establish
a show of reconciliation between the parties. But Olid was not a man to
forget, or easily to forgive; and Alvarado, though frank and liberal,
had an impatient temper much more easily excited than appeased. They
were never afterwards friends.[415]
The Spaniards met with no opposition on their march. The principal towns
were all abandoned by the inhabitants, who had gone to strengthen the
garrison of Mexico, or taken refuge with their families among the
mountains. Tacuba was in like manner deserted, and the troops once more
established themselves in their old quarters in the lordly city of the
Tepanecs.[416]
Their first undertaking was to cut off the pipes that conducted the
water from the royal streams of Chapoltepec to feed the numerous tanks
and fountains which sparkled in the court-yards of the capital. The
aqueduct, partly constructed of brickwork and partly of stone and
mortar, was raised on a strong though narrow dike, which transported it
across an arm of the lake; and the whole work was one of the most
pleasing monuments of Mexican civilization. The Indians, well aware of
its importance, had stationed a large body of troops for its protection.
A battle followed, in which both sides suffered considerably, but the
Spaniards were victorious. A part of the aqueduct was demolished, and
during the siege no water found its way again to the capital through
this channel.
On the following day the combined forces descended on the fatal
causeway, to make themselves masters, if possible, of the nearest
bridge. They found the dike covered with a swarm of warriors, as
numerous as on the night of their disaster, while the surface of the
lake was dark with the multitude of canoes. The intrepid Christians
strove to advance under a perfect hurricane of missiles from the water
and the land, but they made slow progress. Barricades thrown across the
causeway embarrassed the cavalry and rendered it nearly useless. The
sides of the Indian boats were fortified with bulwarks, which shielded
the crews from the arquebuses and cross-bows; and, when the warriors on
the dike were hard pushed by the pikemen, they threw themselves
fearlessly into the water, as if it were their native element, and,
reappearing along the sides of the dike, shot off their arrows and
javelins with fatal execution. After a long and obstinate struggle, the
Christians were compelled to fall back on their own quarters with
disgrace, and--including the allies--with nearly as much damage as they
had inflicted on the enemy. Olid, disgusted with the result of the
engagement, inveighed against his companion as having involved them in
it by his wanton temerity, and drew off his forces the next morning to
his own station at Cojohuacan.
The camps, separated by only two leagues, maintained an easy
communication with each other. They found abundant employment in
foraging the neighboring country for provisions, and in repelling the
active sallies of the enemy; on whom they took their revenge by cutting
off his supplies. But their own position was precarious, and they looked
with impatience for the arrival of the brigantines under Cortés. It was
in the latter part of May that Olid took up his quarters at Cojohuacan;
and from that time may be dated the commencement of the siege of
Mexico.[417]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] “Y mucho os ruego, pues á todos os es notorio todo esto, que assí
como hasta aquí á mí me habeis tenido, y obedecido por Señor vuestro,
de aquí adelante tengais, y obedescais á este Gran Rey, pues él es
vuestro natural Señor, y en su lugar tengais á este su Capitan: y todos
los Tributos, y Servicios, que fasta aquí á mí me haciades, los haced,
y dad á él, porque yo assimismo tengo de contribuir, y servir con todo
lo que me mandaré.” Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 97.
[2] “Lo qual todo les dijo llorando, con las mayores lágrimas, y
suspiros, que un hombre podia manifestar; é assimismo todos aquellos
Señores, que le estaban oiendo, lloraban tanto, que en gran rato no le
pudiéron responder.” Ibid., loc. cit.
[3] Solís regards this ceremony as supplying what was before
defective in the title of the Spaniards to the country. The remarks
are curious, even from a professed casuist: “Y siendo una como
insinuacion misteriosa del título que se debió despues al derecho
de las armas, sobre justa provocacion, como lo verémos en su lugar:
circunstancia particular, que concurrió en la conquista de Méjico para
mayor justificacion de aquel dominio, sobre las demas consideraciones
generales que no solo hiciéron lícita la guerra en otras partes, sino
legítima y razonable siempre que se puso en términos de medio necesario
para la introduccion del Evangelio.” Conquista, lib. 4, cap. 3.
[4] Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 101.--Solís,
Conquista, loc. cit.--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 9, cap.
4.--Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., MS., cap. 87.--Oviedo considers the
grief of Montezuma as sufficient proof that his homage, far from being
voluntary, was extorted by necessity. The historian appears to have
seen the drift of events more clearly than some of the actors in them.
“Y en la verdad si como Cortés lo dice, ó escrivió, passó en efecto,
mui gran cosa me parece la conciencia y liberalidad de Montezuma en
esta su restitucion é obediencia al Rey de Castilla, por la simple
ó cautelosa informacion de Cortés, que le podia hacer para ello;
Mas aquellas lágrimas con que dice, que Montezuma hizo su oracion,
é amonestamiento, despojándose de su señorío, é las de aquellos con
que les respondiéron aceptando lo que les mandaba, y exortaba, y á mi
parecer su llanto queria decir, ó enseñar otra cosa de lo que él, y
ellos dixéron; porque las obediencias que se suelen dar á los Príncipes
con riza, é con cámaras; é diversidad de Música, é leticia, enseñales
de placer, se suele hacer; é no con lucto ni lágrimas, é sollozos, ni
estando preso quien obedece; porque como dice Marco Varron: Lo que por
fuerza se da no es servicio sino robo.” Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib.
33, cap. 9.
[5] Gomara, Crónica, cap. 92.--Clavigero, Stor. del Messico, tom. ii.
p. 256.
[6] “Pareceria que ellos comenzaban á servir, y Vuestra Alteza tendria
mas concepto de las voluntades, que á su servicio mostraban.” Rel. Seg.
de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 98.
[7] Peter Martyr, distrusting some extravagance in this statement of
Cortés, found it fully confirmed by the testimony of others. “Referunt
non credenda. Credenda tamen, quando vir talis ad Cæsarem et nostri
collegii Indici senatores audeat exscribere. Addes insuper se multa
prætermittere, ne tanta recensendo sit molestus. _Idem affirmant qui ad
nos inde regrediuntur._” De Orbe Novo, dec. 5, cap. 3.
[8] “Las quales, demas de su valor, eran tales, y tan maravillosas, que
consideradas por su novedad, y estrañeza, no tenian precio, ni es de
creer, que alguno de todos los Príncipes del Mundo de quien se tiene
noticia, las pudiesse tener tales, y de tal calidad.” Rel. Seg. de
Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 99.--See, also, Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind.,
MS., lib. 33, cap. 9.--Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 104.
[9] “Dezilde en vuestros anales y cartas: Esto os embia vuestro buen
vassallo Monteçuma.” Bernal Diaz, ubi supra.
[10]
“Fluctibus auri
Expleri calor ille nequit.”
CLAUDIAN, In Ruf., lib. 1.
[11] “Y quando aquello le oyó Cortés, y todos nosotros, estuvímos
espantados de la gran bondad, y liberalidad del gran Monteçuma, y con
mucho acato le quitámos todos las gorras de armas, y le dixímos, que se
lo teniamos en merced, y con palabras de mucho amor,” etc. Bernal Diaz,
ubi supra.
[12] Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 99.--This estimate of
the royal fifth is confirmed (with the exception of the four hundred
ounces) by the affidavits of a number of witnesses cited on behalf of
Cortés to show the amount of the treasure. Among these witnesses we
find some of the most respectable names in the army, as Olid, Ordaz,
Avila, the priests Olmedo and Diaz,--the last, it may be added, not too
friendly to the general. The instrument, which is without date, is in
the collection of Vargas Ponçe. Probanza fecha á pedimento de Juan de
Lexalde, MS.
[13] “Eran tres montones _de oro_, y pesado huvo en ellos sobre _seis
cientos mil pesos_, como adelante diré, sin la plata, é otras muchas
riquezas.” Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 104.
[14] The quantity of silver taken from the American mines has exceeded
that of gold in the ratio of forty-six to one. (Humboldt, Essai
politique, tom. iii. p. 401.) The value of the latter metal, says
Clemencin, which on the discovery of the New World was only eleven
times greater than that of the former, has now come to be sixteen
times. (Memorias de la Real Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 20.) This
does not vary materially from Smith’s estimate made after the middle of
the last century. (Wealth of Nations, book 1, chap. 11.) The difference
would have been much more considerable, but for the greater demand for
silver for objects of ornament and use.
[15] Dr. Robertson, preferring the authority, it seems, of Diaz, speaks
of the value of the treasure as 600,000 _pesos_. (History of America,
vol. ii. pp. 296, 298.) The value of the _peso_ is an ounce of silver,
or dollar, which, making allowance for the depreciation of silver,
represented, in the time of Cortés, nearly four times its value at the
present day. But that of the _peso de oro_ was nearly three times that
sum, or eleven dollars sixty-seven cents. (See _ante_, Book II. chap.
6, note 18.) Robertson makes his own estimate, so much reduced below
that of his original, an argument for doubting the existence, in any
great quantity, of either gold or silver in the country. In accounting
for the scarcity of the former metal in this argument, he falls into an
error in stating that gold was not one of the standards by which the
value of other commodities in Mexico was estimated. Comp. _ante_, vol.
i. p. 161.
[16] Many of them, indeed, could boast little or nothing in their
coffers. Maximilian of Germany, and the more prudent Ferdinand of
Spain, left scarcely enough to defray their funeral expenses. Even as
late as the beginning of the next century we find Henry IV. of France
embracing his minister, Sully, with rapture when he informed him that,
by dint of great economy, he had 36,000,000 livres--about 1,500,000
pounds sterling--in his treasury. See Mémoires du Duc de Sully, tom.
iii. liv. 27.
[17] “Por ser tan poco, muchos soldados huuo que no lo quisiéron
recebir.” Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 105.
[18] “Palabras muy melifluas; ... razones mui bien dichas, que las
sabia bien proponer.” Bernal Diaz, ubi supra.
[19] Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 105, 106.--Gomara,
Crónica, cap. 93.--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 8, cap. 5.
[20] “Ex jureconsulto Cortesius theologus effectus,” says Martyr, in
his pithy manner. De Orbe Novo, dec. 5, cap. 4.
[21] According to Ixtlilxochitl, Montezuma got as far on the road to
conversion as the _Credo_ and the _Ave Maria_, both of which he could
repeat, but his baptism was postponed, and he died before receiving
it. That he ever consented to receive it is highly improbable. I quote
the historian’s words, in which he further notices the general’s
unsuccessful labors among the Indians: “Cortés comenzó á-dar órden de
la conversion de los Naturales, deciéndoles, que pues eran vasallos
del Rey de España que se tornasen Cristianos como él lo era, y así se
comenzáron á Bautizar algunos aunque fuéron muy pocos, y Motecuhzoma
aunque pidió el Bautismo, y sabia algunas de las oraciones como eran el
Ave María, y el Credo, se dilató por la Pasqua siguiente, que era la de
Resurreccion, y fué tan desdichado que nunca alcanzó tanto bien, y los
Nuestros con la dilacion y aprieto en que se viéron, se descuidáron, de
que pesó á todos mucho muriese sin Bautismo.” Hist. Chich., MS., cap.
87.
[22] “O Malinche, y como nos quereis echar á perder á toda esta
ciudad, porque estarán mui enojados nuestros Dioses contra nosotros,
y aun vuestras vidas no sé en que pararán.” Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la
Conquista, cap. 107.
[23] This transaction is told with more discrepancy than usual by the
different writers. Cortés assures the emperor that he occupied the
temple, and turned out the false gods by force, in spite of the menaces
of the Mexicans. (Rel. Seg., ap. Lorenzana, p. 106.) The improbability
of this Quixotic feat startles Oviedo, who nevertheless reports it.
(Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 10.) It looks, indeed, very much
as if the general was somewhat too eager to set off his militant zeal
to advantage in the eyes of his master. The statements of Diaz, and of
other chroniclers, conformably to that in the text, seem far the most
probable. Comp. Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, ubi supra,--Herrera, Hist.
general, dec. 2, lib. 8, cap. 6,--Argensola, Anales, lib. 1, cap. 88.{*}
{*} [According to Andrés de Tapia, an eyewitness whose account was not
accessible to Prescott, Cortés did use violence in occupying the temple
and turning out the false gods. Two chapels, those of Huitzilopochtli
and Tezcatlipopoca, were set apart for the use of the Christians. The
fact that the image of the first god was found in this chapel during
the later siege is easily accounted for. It had been restored to its
old position when the invaders were forced to leave the city.--M.]
[24] “Para mí yo tengo por marabilla, é grande, la mucha paciencia de
Montezuma, y de los Indios principales, que assí viéron tratar sus
Templos, é Idolos: Mas su disimulacion adelante se mostró ser otra cosa
viendo, que vna Gente Extrangera, é de tan poco número, les prendió
su Señor é porque formas los hacia tributarios, é se castigaban é
quemaban los principales, é se aniquilaban y disipaban sus templos,
é hasta en aquellos y sus antecesores estaban. Recia cosa me parece
soportarla con tanta quietud; pero adelante, como lo dirá la Historia,
mostró el tiempo lo que en el pecho estaba oculto en todos los Indios
generalmente.” Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 10.
[25] According to Herrera, it was the Devil himself who communicated
this to Montezuma, and he reports the substance of the dialogue between
the parties. (Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 9, cap. 6.) Indeed, the
apparition of Satan in his own bodily presence, on this occasion,
is stoutly maintained by most historians of the time. Oviedo, a
man of enlarged ideas on most subjects, speaks with a little more
qualification on this: “Porque la Misa y Evangelio, que predicaban y
decian los christianos, le [al Diablo] daban gran tormento; y débese
pensar, si verdad es, que esas gentes tienen tanta conversacion y
comunicacion con nuestro adversario, _como se tiene por cierto en estas
Indias_, que no le podia á nuestro enemigo placer con los misterios y
sacramentos de la sagrada religion christiana.” Hist. de las Ind., MS.,
lib. 33, cap. 47.
[26] “E Cortés proveió de maestros é personas que entendiesen en la
labor de los Navíos, é dixo despues á los Españoles desta manera:
Señores y hermanos, este Señor Montezuma quiere que nos vamos de la
tierra, y conviene que se hagan Navíos. Id con estos Indios é córtese
la madera; é entretanto Dios nos proveherá de gente é socorro; por
tanto, poned tal dilacion que parezca que haceis algo y se haga con
ella lo quo nos conviene; é siempre me escrivid é avisad que tales
estáis en la Montaña, é que no sientan los Indios nuestra disimulacion.
E así se puso por obra.” (Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap.
47.) So, also, Gomara. (Crónica, cap. 95.) Diaz denies any such secret
orders, alleging that Martin Lopez, the principal builder, assured him
they made all the expedition possible in getting three ships on the
stocks. Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 108.
[27] “I may say without vaunting,” observes our stout-hearted old
chronicler, Bernal Diaz, “that I was so accustomed to this way of
life, that since the conquest of the country I have never been able
to lie down undressed, or in a bed; yet I sleep as sound as if I were
on the softest down. Even when I make the rounds of my _encomienda_,
I never take a bed with me, unless, indeed, I go in the company of
other cavaliers, who might impute this to parsimony. But even then
I throw myself on it with my clothes on. Another thing I must add,
that I cannot sleep long in the night without getting up to look at
the heavens and the stars, and stay awhile in the open air, and this
without a bonnet or covering of any sort on my head. And, thanks to
God, I have received no harm from it. I mention these things, that
the world may understand of what stuff we, the true Conquerors, were
made, and how well drilled we were to arms and watching.” Hist. de la
Conquista, cap. 108.
[28] In the collection of MSS. made by Don Vargas Ponce, former
President of the Academy of History, is a Memorial of this same Benito
Martin to the emperor, setting forth the services of Velasquez and
the ingratitude and revolt of Cortés and his followers. The paper is
without date; written after the arrival of the envoys, probably at the
close of 1519 or the beginning of the following year.
[29] Sandoval, indeed, gives a singular reason,--that of being near the
coast, so as to enable Chièvres and the other Flemish blood-suckers to
escape suddenly, if need were, with their ill-gotten treasures, from
the country. Hist. de Cárlos Quinto, tom. i. p. 203, ed. Pamplona, 1634.
[30] See the letter of Peter Martyr to his noble friend and pupil, the
Marquis de Mondejar, written two months after the arrival of the vessel
from Vera Cruz. Opus Epist., ep. 650.
[31] Zuñiga, Anales eclesiásticos y seculares de Sevilla (Madrid,
1677), fol. 414.--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 5, cap. 14; lib.
9, cap. 17, et alibi.
[32] Velasquez, it appears, had sent home an account of the doings of
Cortés and of the vessel which touched with the treasures at Cuba, as
early as October, 1519. Carta de Velasquez al Lic. Figueroa, MS., Nov.
17, 1519.
[33] “With loud music from clarions and flutes, and with great
demonstration of joy, they weighed anchor and unfurled their sails
to the wind, leaving unhappy Spain oppressed with sorrows and
misfortunes.” Sandoval, Hist. de Cárlos Quinto, tom. i. p. 219.
[34] The instrument was dated at Barcelona, Nov. 13, 1518. Cortés left
St. Jago the 18th of the same month. Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2,
lib. 3, cap. 11.
[35] Gomara (Crónica, cap. 96) and Robertson (History of America,
vol. ii. p. 304, 466) consider that the new dignity of _adelantado_
stimulated the governor to this enterprise. By a letter of his own
writing in the Muñoz collection, it appears he had begun operations
some months previous to his receiving notice of his appointment. Carta
de Velasquez al Señor de Xêvres, Isla Fernandina, MS., Octubre 12, 1519.
[36] Carta de Velasquez al Lic. Figueroa, MS., Nov. 17, 1519.
[37] The person of Narvaez is thus whimsically described by Diaz: “He
was tall, stout-limbed, with a large head and red beard, an agreeable
presence, a voice deep and sonorous, as if it rose from a cavern. He
was a good horseman and valiant.” Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 205.
[38] The danger of such a result is particularly urged in a memorandum
of the licentiate Ayllon. Carta al Emperador Guaniguanico, Marzo 4,
1520, MS.
[39] Processo y Pesquiza hecha por la Real Audiencia de la Española,
Santo Domingo, Diciembre 24, 1519, MS.
[40] Parecer del Lic. Ayllon al Adelantado Diego Velasquez, Isla
Fernandina, 1520, MS.
[41] Relacion del Lic. Ayllon, Santo Domingo, 30 de Agosto, 1520,
MS.--Processo y Pesquiza por la Real Audiencia, MS.--According to Diaz,
the ordnance amounted to twenty cannon. Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 109.
[42] The great fleet under Ovando, 1501, in which Cortés had intended
to embark for the New World. Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 1, lib. 4,
cap. 11.
[43] “De allí seguímos el viage por toda la costa de la Isla de
Yucatan.” Relacion del Lic. Ayllon, MS.
[44] “La cual tierra sabe é ha visto este testigo, que el dicho
Hernando Cortés tiene pacífica, é le sirven é obedecen todos los
Indios; é que cree este testigo que lo hacen por cabsa que el dicho
Hernando Cortés tiene preso á un Cacique que dicen Montesuma, que es
Señor de lo mas de la tierra, á lo que este testigo alcanza, al cual
los Indios obedecen, é facen lo que les manda, é los Cristianos andan
por toda esta tierra seguros, é un solo Cristiano la ha atravesado
toda sin temor.” Processo y Pesquiza hecha por la Real Audiencia de la
Española, MS.
[45] Relacion del Lic. Ayllon, MS.--Demanda de Zavallos en nombre de
Narvaez, MS.
[46] This report is to be found among the MSS. of Vargas Ponçe, in the
archives of the Royal Academy of History. It embraces a hundred and
ten folio pages, and is entitled “El Processo y Pesquiza hecha por la
Real Audiencia de la Española é tierra nuevamente descubierta. Para el
Consejo de su Majestad.”
[47] “E iban espantados de que veian tātas ciudades y pueblos grandes,
que les traian de comer, y vnos los dexavan, y otros los tomavan, y
andar por su camino. Dizē que iban pensando si era en cantamiento,
ó sueño.” Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 111.--Demanda de
Zavallos, MS.
[48] “Ya auia tres dias que lo sabia el Monteçuma, y Cortés no sabia
cosa ninguna.” Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 110.
[49] Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.--Rel. Seg. de
Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, pp. 117-120.
[50] “Our commander said so many kind things to them,” says Diaz, “and
_anointed their fingers_ so plentifully with gold, that, though they
came like roaring lions, they went home perfectly tame!” Hist. de la
Conquista, cap. 111.
[51] Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 112.
[52] Ibid., cap. 111.--Oviedo says that Montezuma called a council
of his nobles, in which it was decided to let the troops of Narvaez
into the capital, and then to crush them at one blow, with those
of Cortés! (Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33. cap. 47.) Considering
the awe in which the latter alone were held by the Mexicans, a more
improbable tale could not be devised. But nothing is too improbable for
history,--though, according to Boileau’s Maxim, it may be for fiction.
[53] In the Mexican edition of the letters of Cortés, it is called
five hundred men. (Rel. Seg., ap. Lorenzana, p. 122.) But this was
more than his whole Spanish force. In Ramusio’s version of the same
letter, printed as early as 1565, the number is stated as in the text.
(Navigationi et Viaggi, fol. 244.) In an instrument without date,
containing the affidavits of certain witnesses as to the management of
the royal fifth by Cortés, it is said there were one hundred and fifty
soldiers left in the capital under Alvarado. (Probanza fecha en la
nueva España del mar océano á pedimento de Juan Ochoa de Lexalde, en
nombre de Hernando Cortés, MS.) The account in the Mexican edition is
unquestionably an error.
[54] Carta de la Villa de Vera Cruz á el Emperador, MS. This
letter without date was probably written in 1520.--See, also, for
the preceding pages, Probanza fecha á pedimento de Juan Ochoa,
MS.,--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 9, cap. 1, 21; lib. 10, cap.
1,--Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, pp. 119, 120,--Bernal Diaz,
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 112-115,--Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS.,
lib. 33, cap. 47.
[55] So says Oviedo,--and with truth: “Si aquel capitan Juan Velasquez
de Leon no estubiera mal con su pariente Diego Velasquez, é se pasara
con los 150 Hombres, que havia llevado á Guaçacalco, á la parte de
Pánfilo de Narvaez su cuñado, acabado oviera Cortés su oficio.” Hist.
de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 12.
[56] Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, pp. 123, 124.--Bernal Diaz,
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 115-117.--Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS.,
lib. 33, cap. 12.
[57] But, although irresistible against cavalry, the long pike of the
German proved no match for the short sword and buckler of the Spaniard,
in the great battle of Ravenna, fought a few years before this, 1512.
Machiavelli makes some excellent reflections on the comparative merit
of these arms. Arte della Guerra, lib. 2, ap. Opere, tom. iv. p. 67.
[58] Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 118.--“Tambien quiero
dezir la gran necessidad que teniamos de armas, que por vn peto, ó
capacete, ó casco, ó babera de hierro, dieramos aquella noche quāto nos
pidiera por ello, y todo quāto auiamos ganado.” Cap. 122.
[59] “Yo les respondí, que no via provision de Vuestra Alteza, por
donde le debiesse entregar la Tierra; é que si alguna trahia, que
la presentasse ante mí, y ante el Cabildo de la Vera Cruz, segun
órden, y costumbre de España, y que yo estaba presto de la obedecer,
y cumplir; y que hasta tanto, por ningun interese, ni partido haria
lo que él decia; ántes yo, y los que conmigo estaban, moririamos en
defensa de la Tierra, pues la habiamos ganado, y tenido por Vuestra
Magestad pacífica, y segura, y por no ser Traydores y desleales á
nuestro Rey.... Considerando, que morir en servicio de mi Rey, y por
defender, y amparar sus Tierras, y no las dejar usurpar, á mí, y á los
de mi Compañía se nos seguia farta gloria.” Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap.
Lorenzana, pp. 125-127.
[60] Such are the natural reflections of Oviedo, speculating on the
matter some years later. “E tambien que me parece donaire, ó no
bastante la escusa que Cortés da para fundar é justificar su negocio,
ques es decir, que el Narvaez presentase las provisiones que llevaba de
S. M. Como si el dicho Cortés oviera ido á aquella tierra por mandado
de S. M. ó con mas, ni tanta autoridad como llebaba Narvaez; pues que
es claro é notorio, que el Adelantado Diego Velasquez, que embió á
Cortés, era parte, segun derecho, para le embiar á remover, y el Cortés
obligado á le obedecer. No quiero decir mas en esto por no ser odioso á
ninguna de las partes.” Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 12.
[61] More than one example of this _ruse_ is mentioned by Mariana in
Spanish history, though the precise passages have escaped my memory.
[62] Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 119.
[63] “E assimismo mandaba, y mandé por el dicho Mandamiento á todas
las Personas, que con el dicho Narvaez estaban, que no tubiessen,
ni obedeciessen al dicho Narvaez por tal Capitan, ni Justicia;
ántes, dentro de cierto término, que en el dicho Mandamiento señalé,
pareciessen ante mí, para que yo les dijesse, lo que debian hacer
en servicio de Vuestra Alteza: con protestacion, que lo contrario
haciendo, procederia contra ellos, como contra Traydores, y aleves, y
malos Vasallos, que se rebelaban contra su Rey, y quieren usurpar sus
Tierras, y Señoríos.” Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 127.
[64] “Y aun llouia de rato en rato, y entonces salia la Luna, que
quādo allí llegámos hazia muy escuro, y llouia, y tambien la escuridad
ayudó.” Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 122.
[65] The attorney of Narvaez, in his complaint before the crown,
expatiates on the diabolical enormity of these instructions. “El dho
Fernando Corttés como traidor aleboso, sin apercibir al dho mi partte,
con un diabólico pensamᵗᵒ é infernal osadía, en contemtto é menosprecio
de V. M. ó de sus provisiones R.ˢ, no mirando ni asattando la lealtad
qᵉ debia á V. M., el dho Corttés dió un Mandamientto al dho Gonzalo
de Sandobal para que prendiese al dho Pánfilo de Narvaez, é si se
defendiese qᵉ lo mattase.” Demanda de Zavallos en nombre de Narvaez, MS.
[66] Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib 33, cap. 12, 47.--Bernal Diaz,
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 122.--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib.
10, cap. 1.
[67] “Que hazeis, que estais mui descuidado? pensais que Malinche, y
los Teules que trae cōsigo, que son assí como vosotros? Pues yo os
digo, que quādo no os cataredes, será aquí, y os matará.” Bernal Diaz,
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 121.
[68] Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 128.--Oviedo, Hist. de las
Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10,
cap. 2, 3.
[69] “Ya que se acercaban al Aposento de Narvaez, Cortés, que andaba
reconociendo, i ordenando á todas partes, dixo á la Tropa de Sandoval:
Señores, arrímaos á las dos aceras de la Calle, para que las balas del
Artillería pasen por medio, sin hacer daño.” Herrera, Hist. general,
dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 3.
[70] Demanda de Zavallos en nombre de Narvaez, MS.--Oviedo, Hist. de
las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.
[71] “Como hazia tan escuro auia muchos cocayos (ansí los llaman en
Cuba) que relumbrauan de noche, é los de Narvaez creyéron que era
muchas de las escopetas.” Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 122.
[72] Narvaez, or rather his attorney, swells the amount of slain on
his own side much higher. But it was his cue to magnify the mischief
sustained by his employer. The collation of this account with those of
Cortés and his followers affords the best means of approximation to the
truth. “E allí le mattáron quince hombres qᵉ muriéron de las feridas
qᵉ les diéron é les quemáron seis hombres del dho Incendio qᵉ despues
pareciéron las cabezas de ellos quemadas, é pusiéron á sacomano todo
quantto ttenian los que benian con el dho mi partte como si fueran
Moros y al dho mi partte robáron é saqueáron todos sus vienes, oro, é
Platta é Joyas.” Demanda de Zavallos en nombre de Narvaez, MS.
[73] “Entre ellos venia Andres de Duero, y Agustin Bermudez, y muchos
amigos de nuestro Capitā, y assí como veniā, ivan á besar las manos á
Cortés, [~q] estaua sentado en vna silla de caderas, con vna ropa larga
de color como narājada, cō sus armas debaxo, acōpañado de nosotros.
Pues ver la gracia con que les hablaua, y abraçaua, y las palabras de
tātos cumplimiētos que les dezia, era cosa de ver que alegre estaua: y
tenia mucha razon de verse en aquel pūto tan señor, y pujāte: y assí
como le besauā la mano, se fuérō cada vno á su posada.” Bernal Diaz,
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 122.
[74] Ibid., loc. cit.--“Dixose que como Narvaez vido á Cortés estando
así preso le dixo: Señor Cortés, tened en mucho la ventura que habeis
tenido, é lo mucho que habeis hecho en tener mi persona, ó en tomar mi
persona. E que Cortés le respondió, é dixo: Lo menos que yo he hecho en
esta tierra donde estais, es haberos prendido: é luego le hizo poner á
buen recaudo é le tubo mucho tiempo preso.” Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind.,
MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.
[75] Oviedo says that military men discussed whether Velasquez de Leon
should have obeyed the commands of Cortés rather than those of his
kinsman, the governor of Cuba. They decided in favor of the former,
on the ground of his holding his commission immediately from him.
“Visto he platicar sobre esto á caballeros é personas militares sobre
si este Juan Velasquez de Leon hizo lo que debia, en acudir ó no á
Diego Velasquez, ó al Pánfilo en su nombre; E combienen los veteranos
mílites, é á mi parecer determinan bien la question, en que si Juan
Velasquez tubo conducta de capitan para que con aquella Gente que él le
dió ó toviese en aquella tierra como capitan particular le acudiese á
él ó á quien le mandase. Juan Velasquez faltó á lo que era obligado en
no pasar á Pánfilo de Narvaez siendo requerido de Diego Velasquez, mas
si le hizo capitan Hernando Cortés, é le dió él la Gente, á él havia de
acudir, como acudió, excepto si viera carta, á mandamiento expreso del
Rey en contrario.” Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 12.
[76] This ascendency the thoughtful Oviedo refers to his dazzling and
liberal manners, so strongly contrasted with those of the governor of
Cuba. “En lo demas valerosa persona ha seido, é para mucho; y este
deseo de mandar juntamente con que fué mui bien partido é gratificador
de los que le viniéron, fué mucha causa juntamente con ser mal quisto
Diego Velasquez, para que Cortés se saliese con lo que emprendió, é se
quedase en el oficio, é governacion.” Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33,
cap. 12.
[77] It was in a conversation with Oviedo himself, at Toledo, in 1525,
in which Narvaez descanted with much bitterness, as was natural, on
his rival’s conduct. The gossip, which has never appeared in print,
may have some interest for the Spanish reader. “Que el año de 1525,
estando Cesar en la cibdad de Toledo, ví allí al dicho Narvaez, é
publicamente decia, que Cortés era vn traidor: E que dándole S. M.
licencia se lo haria conocer de su persona á la suya, é que era hombre
sin verdad, é otras muchas é feas palabras llamándole alevoso é tirano,
é ingrato á su Señor, é á quien le havia embiado á la Nueva España,
que era el Adelantado Diego Velasquez á su propia costa, é se le havia
alzado con la tierra, é con la Gente é Hacienda, é otras muchas cosas
que mal sonaban. Y en la manera de su prision la contaba mui al reves
de lo que está dicho. Lo que yo noto de esto es, que con todo lo que
oí á Narvaez, (como yo se lo dixe) no puedo hallarle desculpa para
su descuido, porque ninguna necesidad tenia de andar con Cortés en
pláticas, sino estar en vela mejor que la que hizo. E á esto decia él
que le havian vendido aquellos de quien se fiaba, que Cortés le havia
sobornado.” Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 12.
[78] Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 6.--Oviedo, Hist. de
las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.--Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista,
cap. 123.
[79] Diaz, who had often listened to it, thus notices his eloquence:
“Comenzó vn parlamento por tan lindo estilo, y plática, tābiē dichas
cierto otras palabras mas sabrosas, y llenas de ofertas, [~q] yo aquí
no sabré escriuir.” Ibid., cap. 122.
[80] Captain Diaz had secured for his share of the spoil of the
Philistines, as he tells us, a very good horse with all his
accoutrements, a brace of swords, three daggers, and a buckler,--a very
beautiful outfit for the campaign. The general’s orders were, naturally
enough, not at all to his taste. Ibid., cap. 124.
[81] Narvaez alleges that Cortés plundered him of property to the value
of 100,000 castellanos of gold! (Demanda de Zavallos en nombre de
Narvaez, MS.) If so, the pillage of the leader may have supplied the
means of liberality to the privates.
[82] Demanda de Zavallos en nombre de Narvaez, MS.--Bernal Diaz, Hist.
de la Conquista, cap. 124.--Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33,
cap. 47.--Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 130.--Camargo, Hist.
de Tlascala, MS.--The visit of Narvaez left melancholy traces among the
natives, that made it long remembered. A negro in his suite brought
with him the smallpox. The disease spread rapidly in that quarter of
the country, and great numbers of the Indian population soon fell
victims to it. Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 6.
[83] “Se perdia la mejor, y mas Noble Ciudad de todo lo nuevamente
descubierto del Mundo; y ella perdida, se perdia todo lo que estaba
ganado, por ser la Cabeza de todo, y á quien todos obedecian.” Rel.
Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 131.
[84] Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 131.--Oviedo, Hist. de las
Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 13, 14.--Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista,
cap. 124, 125.--Peter Martyr, De Orbe Novo, dec. 5, cap. 5.--Camargo,
Hist. de Tlascala, MS.
[85] Gomara, Crónica, cap. 103.--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib.
10, cap. 7.--Bernal Diaz raises the amount to 1300 foot and 96 horse.
(Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 125.) Cortes diminishes it to less than
half that number. (Rel. Seg., ubi supra.) The estimate cited in the
text from the two preceding authorities corresponds nearly enough with
that already given from official documents of the forces of Cortés and
Narvaez before the junction.
[86] “Las sierras altas de Tetzcuco á que le mostrasen desde la mas
alta cumbre de aquellas montañas y sierras de Tetzcuco, que son las
sierras de Tlallocan altísimas y humbrosas, en las cuales he estado y
visto, y puedo decir que son bastante para descubrir el un emisferio
y otro, porque son los mayores puertos y mas altos de esta Nueva
España, de árboles y montes de grandísima altura, de cedras, cipreses y
pinares.” Camargo, Hist. de Tlascala, MS.
[87] The historian partly explains the reason: “En la misma Ciudad de
Tezcuco habia algunos apasionados de los deudos y amigos de los que
matáron Pedro de Alvarado y sus compañeros en México.” Ixtlilxochitl,
Hist. Chich., MS., cap. 88.
[88] “En todo el camino nunca me salió á recibir ninguna Persona de el
dicho Muteczuma, como ántes lo solian facer; y toda la Tierra estaba
alborotada, y casi despoblada: de que concebí mala sospecha, creyendo
que los Españoles que en la dicha Ciudad habian quedado, eran muertos.”
Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 132.
[89] “Y como asomó á la vista de la Ciudad de México, parecióle que
estaba toda yerma, y que no parecia persona por todos los caminos, ni
casas, ni plazas, ni nadie le salió á recibir, ni de los suyos, ni de
los enemigos; y fué esto señal de indignación y enemistad por lo que
habia pasado.” Sahagun, Hist. de Nueva-España, MS., lib. 12, cap. 19.
[90] “Pontes ligneos qui tractim lapideos intersecant, sublatos, ac
vias aggeribus munitas reperit.” P. Martyr, De Orbe Novo, dec. 5, cap.
5.
[91] Probanza á pedimento de Juan de Lexalde, MS.--Rel. Seg. de Cortés,
ap. Lorenzana, p. 133.--“Esto causó gran admiracion en todos los que
venian, pero no dejáron de marchar, hasta entrar donde estaban los
Españoles acorralados. Venian todos muy cansados y muy fatigados y
con mucho deseo de llegar á donde estaban sus hermanos; los de dentro
cuando los viéron, recibiéron singular consolacion y esfuerzo y
recibiéronlos con la artillería que tenian, saludándolos, y dándolos el
parabien de su venida.” Sahagun, Hist. de Nueva-España, MS., lib. 12,
cap. 22.
[92] “E así los Indios, todos Señores, mas de 600 desnudos é con muchas
joyas de oro é hermosos penachos, é muchas piedras preciosas, é como
mas aderezados é gentiles hombres se pudiéron é supiéron aderezar, é
sin arma alguna defensiva ni ofensiva bailaban é cantaban é hacian
su areito é fiesta segun su costumbre.” (Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind.,
MS., lib. 33, cap. 54.) Some writers carry the number as high as
eight hundred or even one thousand. Las Casas, with a more modest
exaggeration than usual, swells it only to two thousand. Brevíssima
Relatione, p. 48.
[93] “Sin duelo ni piedad Christiana los acuchilló, i mató.” Gomara,
Crónica, cap. 104.
[94] “Fué tan grande el derramamiento de Sangre, que corrian arroyos de
ella por el Patio, como agua cuando mucho llueve.” Sahagun, Hist. de
Nueva-España, MS., lib. 12, cap. 20.
[95] [In the process instituted against Alvarado this massacre forms
one of the most important charges. He is there accused of having killed
four hundred of the principal nobles and a great number of the common
people, of whom more than three thousand, it is stated, were assembled
to celebrate the festival in honor of their war-god. “Ynbio al patyo
donde todos baylaban y syn cabsa ni razon alguna dieron sobrellos y
mataron todos los mas de los señores que estavan presos con el dicho
Motenzuma y mataron cuatro cientos señores e prencipales que con el
estavan e mataron mucho numero de yndios que estavan baylando en mas
cantydad de tres mill personas.” (Procesos de Residencia, instruidos
contra Pedro de Alvarado y Nuño de Guzman, p. 53.) The public are under
great obligations to the licentiate Don Ignacio Rayon for bringing into
light this important document, which for more than three centuries had
lain hid in the General Archives of Mexico. We have hardly less reason
to thank him for placing the manuscript in the hands of so competent
a scholar as Don José Fernando Ramirez, to enrich it with the stores
of his critical erudition. The publication of the process did not take
place till some years after that of my own history of the Conquest
of Mexico. But, as it contains a minute specification of the various
charges against Alvarado, and his own defence, it furnishes me with the
means of correcting any errors into which I have fallen in reference to
that commander, while it corroborates, I may add, the general tenor of
the statements I have derived from contemporary chroniclers.]
[96] “Y de aquí á que se acabe el mundo, ó ellos del todo se acaben,
no dexarán de lamentar, y cantar en sus areytos, y bayles, como en
romances, que acá dezimos, aquella calamidad, y perdida de la sucession
de toda su nobleza, de que se preciauan de tantos años atras.” Las
Casas, Brevíssima Relatione, p. 49.
[97] See Alvarado’s reply to queries of Cortés, as reported by Diaz
(Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 125), with some additional particulars in
Torquemada (Monarch. Ind., lib. 4, cap. 66), Solís (Conquista, lib. 4,
cap. 12), and Herrera (Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 8) who all
seem content to endorse Alvarado’s version of the matter. I find no
other authority, of any weight, in the same charitable vein.
[98] Oviedo mentions a conversation which he had some years after
this tragedy with a noble Spaniard, Don Thoan Cano, who came over in
the train of Narvaez and was present at all the subsequent operations
of the army. He married a daughter of Montezuma, and settled in
Mexico after the Conquest. Oviedo describes him as a man of sense and
integrity. In answer to the historian’s queries respecting the cause
of the rising, he said that Alvarado had wantonly perpetrated the
massacre from pure avarice; and the Aztecs, enraged at such unprovoked
and unmerited cruelty, rose, as they well might, to avenge it. (Hist.
de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 54.) See the original dialogue in
Appendix, Part 2, No. 11.
[99] “Verdaderamente dió en ellos por metelles temor.” Hist. de la
Conquista, cap. 125.
[100] Such, indeed, is the statement of Ixtlilxochitl, derived, as
he says, from the native Tezcucan annalists. According to them, the
Tlascalans, urged by their hatred of the Aztecs and their thirst for
plunder, persuaded Alvarado, nothing loth, that the nobles meditated
a rising on the occasion of these festivities. The testimony is
important, and I give it in the author’s words: “Fué que ciertos
Tlascaltecas (segun las Historias de Tescuco que son las que Io sigo y
la carta que otras veces he referido) por embidia lo uno acordándose
que en semejante fiesta los Mexicanos solian sacrificar gran suma de
cautivos de los de la Nacion Tlascalteca, y lo otro que era la mejor
ocasion que ellos podian tener para poder hinchir las manos de despojos
y hartar su codicia, y vengarse de sus Enemigos (porque hasta entonces
no habian tenido lugar, ni Cortés se les diera, ni admitiera sus
dichos, porque siempre hacia las cosas con mucho acuerdo) fuéron con
esta invencion al capitan Pedro de Albarado, que estaba en lugar de
Cortés, el qual no fué menester mucho para darles crédito porque tan
buenos filos, y pensamientos tenia como ellos, y mas viendo que allí en
aquella fiesta habian acudido todos los Señores y Cabezas del Imperio y
que muertos no tenian mucho trabajo en sojuzgarles.” Hist. Chich., MS.,
cap. 88.
[101] Alvarado intimates, in the defence of his conduct which forms
part of the process, one source of the rumors respecting the rising of
the Aztecs, by saying that the existence of such a scheme was matter
of public notoriety among the Tlascalans. He adds that he obtained
more precise intelligence from two or three Indians, one a Tezcucan,
another a slave whom he had rescued from the sacrifice to which he
had been doomed by the Aztecs; that these latter, under cover of the
festivities, had planned an insurrection against the Spaniards, in
which he and his countrymen were all to be exterminated. At the same
time they determined to tear down the image of the Virgin which had
been raised in the temple, and in its place to substitute that of
their war-god, Huitzilopochtli. Montezuma was accused of being privy
to this conspiracy. Thus instructed, Alvarado, as he asserts, got his
men in readiness to resist the enemy, who, after a short encounter,
was repulsed with slaughter, while one Spaniard was slain, and he
himself, with several others, severely wounded (Proceso, pp. 66, 67).
But although a long array of witnesses, most of them probably his
ancient friends and comrades, are introduced to endorse his statement,
one who reflects on the submissive spirit hitherto shown, not only by
Montezuma, but his subjects, in their dealings with the Spaniards,
and contrasts it with the fierce and unscrupulous temper displayed
by Alvarado, will have little doubt on whose head the guilt of the
massacre must rest; and as little seems to have been felt by most of
the writers of the time who have spoken of the affair.
[102] Martyr well recapitulates these grievances, showing that they
seemed such in the eyes of the Spaniards themselves,--of those, at
least, whose judgment was not warped by a share in the transactions.
“Emori statuerunt malle, quam diutius ferre tales hospites qui
regem suum sub tutoris vitæ specie detineant, civitatem occupent,
antiquos hostes Tascaltecanos et alios præterea in contumeliam ante
illorum oculos ipsorum impensa conseruent; ... qui demum simulachra
deorum confregerint, et ritus veteres ac ceremonias antiquas illis
abstulerint.” De Orbe Novo, dec. 5, cap. 5.
[103] Camargo, Hist. de Tlascala, MS.--Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS.,
lib. 33, cap. 13, 47.--Gomara, Crónica, cap. 105.
[104] He left in garrison, on his departure from Mexico, 140 Spaniards
and about 6500 Tlascalans, including a few Cempoallan warriors.
Supposing five hundred of these--a liberal allowance--to have perished
in battle and otherwise, it would still leave a number which, with the
reinforcement now brought, would raise the amount to that stated in the
text.
[105] “Seeing how all went contrary to his expectations and that we
still received no supplies, he grew extremely sad, and showed himself
in his bearing towards the Spaniards fretful and haughty.” Bernal Diaz,
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 126.
[106] The scene is reported by Diaz, who was present. (Hist. de la
Conquista, cap. 126.) See, also, the Chronicle of Gomara, the chaplain
of Cortés. (Cap. 106.) It is further confirmed by Don Thoan Cano, an
eye-witness, in his conversation with Oviedo. See Appendix, Part 2, No.
11.
[107] Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 8.
[108] “El qual Mensajero bolvió dende á media hora todo descalabrado,
y herido, dando voces, que todos los Indios de la Ciudad venian de
Guerra y que tenian todas las Puentes alzadas; é junto tras él da sobre
nosotros tanta multitud de Gente por todas partes que ni las calles ni
Azoteas se parecian con Gente; la qual venia con los mayores alaridos,
y grita mas espantable, que en el Mundo se puede pensar.” Rel. Seg. de
Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 134.--Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib.
33, cap. 13.
[109] “Eran tantas las Piedras, que nos echaban con Hondas dentro
en la Fortaleza, que no parecia sino que el Cielo las llovia; é las
Flechas, y Tiraderas eran tantas, que todas las paredes y Patios
estaban llenos, que casi no podiamos andar con ellas.” (Rel. Seg. de
Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 134.) No wonder that they should have found
some difficulty in wading through the arrows, if Herrera’s account be
correct, that _forty cart-loads_ of them were gathered up and burnt by
the besieged every day! Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 9.
[110] “Luego sin tardanza se juntáron los Mexicanos, en gran copia,
puestos á punto de Guerra, que no parecia, sino que habian salido
debajo de tierra todos juntos, y comenzáron luego á dar grita y pelear,
y los Españoles les comenzáron á responder de dentro con toda la
artillería que de nuebo habian traido, y con toda la gente que de nuevo
habia venido, y los Españoles hiciéron gran destrozo en los Indios,
con la artillería, arcabuzes, y ballestas y todo el otro artificio de
pelear.” (Sahagun, Hist. de Nueva-España, MS., lib. 12, cap. 22.) The
good father waxes eloquent in his description of the battle-scene.
[111] The enemy presented so easy a mark, says Gomara, that the gunners
loaded and fired with hardly the trouble of pointing their pieces. “Tan
recio, que los artilleros sin asestar jugaban con los tiros.” Crónica,
cap. 106.
[112] “Hondas, que eran la mas fuerte arma de pelea que los Mejicanos
tenian.” Camargo, Hist. de Tlascala, MS.
[113] “En la Fortaleza daban tan recio combate, que por muchas partes
nos pusiéron fuego, y por la una se quemó mucha parte de ella, sin
la poder remediar, hasta que la atajámos, cortando las paredes, y
derrocando un pedazo que mató el fuego. E si no fuera por la mucha
Guarda, que allí puse de Escopeteros, y Ballesteros, y otros tiros de
pólvora, nos entraran á escala vista, sin los poder resistir.” Rel.
Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 134.
[114] Ibid., ubi supra.--Gomara, Crónica, cap. 106.--Oviedo, Hist. de
las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 13.--Sahagun, Hist. de Nueva-España, MS.,
lib. 12, cap. 22.--Gonzalo de las Casas, Defensa, MS., Parte 1, cap.
26.--Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 126.
[115] Carta del Exército, MS.
[116] “Están todas en el agua, y de casa á casa vna puente leuadiza,
passalla á nado, era cosa muy peligrosa; porque desde las açuteas
tirauan tanta piedra, y cantos, que era cosa perdida ponernos en ello.
Y demas desto, en algunas casas que les poniamos fuego, tardaua vna
casa en se quemar vn dia entero, y no se podia pegar fuego de vna casa
á otra; lo vno, por estar apartadas la vna de otra el agua en medio; y
lo otro, por ser de açuteas.” Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap.
126.
[117] “The Mexicans fought with such ferocity,” says Diaz, “that, if
we had had the assistance on that day of ten thousand Hectors, and
as many Orlandos, we should have made no impression on them. There
were several of our troops,” he adds, “who had served in the Italian
wars, but neither there nor in the battles with the Turk had they
ever seen anything like the desperation shown by these Indians.”
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 126. See, also, for the last pages, Rel.
Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 135,--Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones,
MS.,--Probanza á pedimento de Juan de Lexalde, MS.,--Oviedo, Hist. de
las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 13,--Gomara, Crónica, cap. 196.
[118] Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 9.--Torquemada,
Monarch. Ind., lib. 4, cap. 69.
[119] Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 126.--Oviedo, Hist. de
las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 13.--Gomara, Crónica, cap. 107.
[120] Cortés sent Marina to ascertain from Montezuma the name of the
gallant chief, who could be easily seen from the walls animating and
directing his countrymen. The emperor informed him that it was his
brother Cuitlahua, the presumptive heir to his crown, and the same
chief whom the Spanish commander had released a few days previous.
Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 10.
[121] “¿Que quiere de mí ya Malinche, que yo no deseo viuir ni oille?
pues en tal estado por su causa mi ventura me ha traido.” Bernal Diaz,
Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 126.
[122] Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, ubi supra.--Ixtlilxochitl,
Hist. Chich., MS., cap. 88.
[123] Acosta reports a tradition that Guatemozin, Montezuma’s nephew,
who himself afterwards succeeded to the throne, was the man that shot
the first arrow. Lib. 7, cap. 26.
[124] I have reported this tragical event, and the circumstances
attending it, as they are given, in more or less detail, but
substantially in the same way, by the most accredited writers of
that and the following age,--several of them eye-witnesses. (See
Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 126.--Oviedo, Hist. de las
Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.--Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana,
p. 136.--Camargo, Hist. de Tlascala, MS.--Ixtlilxochitl, Hist.
Chich., MS., cap. 88.--Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10,
cap. 10.--Torquemada, Monarch. Ind., lib. 4, cap. 70.--Acosta, ubi
supra.--Martyr, De Orbe Novo, dec. 5, cap. 5.) It is also confirmed
by Cortés in the instrument granting to Montezuma’s favorite daughter
certain estates by way of dowry. (See Appendix, No. 12.) Don Thoan
Cano, indeed, who married this princess, assured Oviedo that the
Mexicans respected the person of the monarch so long as they saw him,
and were not aware, when they discharged their missiles, that he
was present, being hid from sight by the shields of the Spaniards.
(See Appendix, No. 11.) This improbable statement is repeated by
the Chaplain Gomara. (Crónica, cap. 107.) It is rejected by Oviedo,
however, who says that Alvarado, himself present at the scene, in a
conversation with him afterwards, explicitly confirmed the narrative
given in the text. (Hist. de las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 47.) The
Mexicans gave a very different account of the transaction. According
to them, Montezuma, together with the lords of Tezcuco and Tlatelolco,
then detained as prisoners in the fortress by the Spaniards, were all
strangled by means of the _garrote_, and their dead bodies thrown over
the walls to their countrymen. I quote the original of Father Sahagun,
who gathered the story from the Aztecs themselves:
“De esta manera se determináron los Españoles á morir ó vencer
varonilmente; y así habláron á todos los amigos Indios, y todos ellos
estuviéron firmes en esta determinacion: y lo primero que hiciéron fué
que diéron garrote á todos los Señores que tenian presos, y los echáron
muertos fuera del fuerte: y antes que esto hiciesen les dijéron muchas
cosas, y les hiciéron saber su determinación, y que de ellos habia
de comenzar esta obra, y luego todos los demas habian de ser muertos
á sus manos, dijéronles, no es posible que vuestros Idolos os libren
de nuestras manos. Y desque les hubiéron dado garrote, y viéron que
estaban muertos, mandáronlos echar por las azoteas, fuera de la casa,
en un lugar que se llama Tortuga de Piedra, porque allí estaba una
piedra labrada á manera de Tortuga. Y desque supiéron y viéron los de á
fuera, que aquellos Señores tan principales habian sido muertos por las
manos de los Españoles, luego tomáron los cuerpos, y les hiciéron sus
exequias, al modo de su Idolatría, y quemáron sus cuerpos, y tomáron
sus cenizas, y las pusiéron en lugares apropiadas á sus dignidades y
valor.” Hist. de Nueva-España, MS., lib. 12, cap. 23.
It is hardly necessary to comment on the absurdity of this monstrous
imputation, which, however, has found favor with some later writers.
Independently of all other considerations, the Spaniards would have
been slow to compass the Indian monarch’s death, since, as the Tezcucan
Ixtlilxochitl truly observes, it was the most fatal blow which could
befall them, by dissolving the last tie which held them to the
Mexicans. Hist. Chich., MS., ubi supra.
[125] “Salí fuera de la Fortaleza, aunque manco de la mano izquierda de
una herida que el primer dia me habian dado: y liada la rodela en el
brazo fu ẏ á la Torre con algunos Españoles, que me siguiéron.” Rel.
Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 138.
[126] See vol. ii. pp. 320-323.--I have ventured to repeat the
description of the temple here, as it is important that the reader, who
may perhaps not turn to the preceding pages, should have a distinct
image of it in his own mind before beginning the account of the combat.
[127] Many of the Aztecs, according to Sahagun, seeing the fate of such
of their comrades as fell into the hands of the Spaniards on the narrow
terraces below, voluntarily threw themselves headlong from the lofty
summit and were dashed in pieces on the pavement. “Y los de arriba
viendo á los de abajo muertos, y á los de arriba que los iban matando
los que habian subido, comenzáron á arrojarse del cu abajo, desde lo
alto, los cuales todos morian despeñados, quebrados brazos y piernas, y
hechos pedazos, porque el cu era muy alto; y otros los mesmos Españoles
los arrojaban de lo alto del cu, y así todos cuantos allá habian
subido de los Mexicanos, muriéron mala muerte.” Sahagun, Hist. de
Nueva-España, MS., lib. 12, cap. 22.
[128] Among others, see Herrera, Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap.
9,--Torquemada, Monarch. Ind., lib. 4, cap. 69,--and Solís, very
circumstantially, as usual, Conquista, lib. 4, cap. 16.--The first of
these authors had access to some contemporary sources, the chronicle
of the old soldier, Ojeda, for example, not now to be met with. It is
strange that so valiant an exploit should not have been communicated by
Cortés himself, who cannot be accused of diffidence in such matters.
[129] Captain Diaz, a little loth sometimes, is emphatic in his
encomiums on the valor shown by his commander on this occasion. “Here
Cortés showed himself a very man, such as he always was. Oh, what a
fighting, what a strenuous battle, did we have! It was a memorable
thing to see us flowing with blood and full of wounds, and more than
forty soldiers slain.” (Hist. de la Conquista, cap. 126.) The pens of
the old chroniclers keep pace with their swords in the display of this
brilliant exploit:--“colla penna e colla spada,” equally fortunate.
See Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 138.--Gomara, Crónica, cap.
106.--Sahagun, Hist. de Nueva-España, MS., lib. 12, cap. 22.--Herrera,
Hist. general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 9.--Oviedo, Hist. de las Ind.,
MS., lib. 33, cap. 13.--Torquemada, Monarch. Ind., lib. 4, cap. 69.
[130] Archbishop Lorenzana is of opinion that this image of the Virgin
is the same now seen in the church of _Nuestra Señora de los Remedios_!
(Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 138, nota.) In what way the
Virgin survived the sack of the city and was brought to light again,
he does not inform us. But the more difficult to explain, the more
undoubted the miracle.
[131] No achievement in the war struck more awe into the Mexicans than
this storming of the great temple, in which the white men seemed to bid
defiance equally to the powers of God and man. Hieroglyphical paintings
minutely commemorating it were to be frequently found among the natives
after the Conquest. The sensitive Captain Diaz intimates that those
which he saw made full as much account of the wounds and losses of the
Christians as the facts would warrant. (Hist. de la Conquista, ubi
supra.) It was the only way in which the conquered could take their
revenge.
[132] “Sequenti nocte, nostri erumpentes in vna viarum arci vicina,
domos combussêre tercentum: in altera plerasque e quibus arci molestia
fiebat. Ita nunc trucidando, nunc diruendo, et interdum vulnera
recipiendo, in pontibus et in viis, diebus noctibusque multis laboratum
est utrinque.” (Martyr, De Orbe Novo, dec. 5, cap. 6.) In the number
of actions and their general result, namely, the victories, barren
victories, of the Christians, all writers are agreed. But as to time,
place, circumstance, or order, no two hold together. How shall the
historian of the present day make a harmonious tissue out of these
motley and many-colored threads?
[133] It is the name by which she is still celebrated in the popular
minstrelsy of Mexico. Was the famous Tlascalan mountain, _sierra de_
_Malinche_,--anciently “Mattalcueye,”--named in compliment to the
Indian damsel? At all events, it was an honor well merited from her
adopted countrymen.
[134] According to Cortés, they boasted, in somewhat loftier strain,
they could spare twenty-five thousand for one: “á morir veinte y
cinco mil de ellos, y uno de los nuestros.” Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap.
Lorenzana, p. 139.
[135] “Que todas las calzadas de las entradas de la ciudad eran
deshechas, como de hecho passaba.” Ibid., loc. cit.--Oviedo, Hist. de
las Ind., MS., lib. 33, cap. 13.
[136] “Pues tambien quiero dezir las maldiciones que los de Narvaez
echauan á Cortés, y las palabras que dezian, que renegauan dél, y de la
tierra, y aun de Diego Velasquez, que acá les embió, que bien pacíficos
estauan en sus casas en la Isla de Cuba, y estavan embelesados, y sin
sentido.” Bernal Diaz, Hist. de la Conquista, ubi supra.
[137] Notwithstanding this, in the petition or letter from Vera Cruz,
addressed by the army to the Emperor Charles V., after the Conquest,
the importunity of the soldiers is expressly stated as the principal
motive that finally induced their general to abandon the city. Carta
del Exército, MS.
[138] “The scarcity was such that the ration of the Indians was a small
cake, and that of the Spaniards fifty grains of maize.” Herrera, Hist.
general, dec. 2, lib. 10, cap. 9.
[139] Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p. 135.--Gomara, Crónica,
cap. 106.--Dr. Bird, in his picturesque romance of “Calavar,” has made
good use of these _mantas_, better, indeed, than can be permitted to
the historian. He claims the privilege of the romancer; though it must
be owned he does not abuse this privilege, for he has studied with
great care the costume, manners, and military usages of the natives.
He has done for them what Cooper has done for the wild tribes of the
North,--touched their rude features with the bright coloring of a
poetic fancy. He has been equally fortunate in his delineation of the
picturesque scenery of the land. If he has been less so in attempting
to revive the antique dialogue of the Spanish cavalier, we must not
be surprised. Nothing is more difficult than the skilful execution of
a modern antique. It requires all the genius and learning of Scott to
execute it so that the connoisseur shall not detect the counterfeit.
[140] Carta del Exército, MS.--Rel. Seg. de Cortés, ap. Lorenzana, p.
140.--Gomara, Crónica, cap. 109.
[141] Clavigero is mistaken in calling this the street of Iztapalapan.
(Stor. del Messico, tom. iii. p. 120.) It was not the street by which
the Spaniards entered, but by which they finally left the city, and
is correctly indicated by Lorenzana as that of Tlacopan,--or, rather,
Tacuba, into which the Spaniards corrupted the name. See vol. ii. p.
322, note.
[142] It is Oviedo who finds a parallel for his hero in the Roman
warrior; the same, to quote the spirit-stirring legend of Macaulay,