In 1876--thirty-two years after the discontinuance of efforts on the
part of Great Britain and Venezuela to fix by agreement a line which
should divide their possessions--Venezuela was confronted, upon the
renewal of negotiations for that purpose, by the following conditions:
The claim by her, of a divisional line, founded upon her conception of
strict right, which her powerful opponent had insisted could not in any
way be plausibly supported, and which therefore she would in no event
accept.
An indefiniteness in the limits claimed by Great Britain--so great
that, of two boundary-lines indicated or suggested by her, one had
been plainly declared to be “merely a preliminary measure open to
future discussion between the Governments of Great Britain and
Venezuela,” while the other was distinctly claimed to be based not on
any acknowledgment of the republic’s rights, but simply upon generous
concessions and a “desire to avoid all cause of serious controversies
between the two countries.”
A controversy growing out of this situation impossible of friendly
settlement except by such arrangement and accommodation as would
satisfy Great Britain, or by a submission of the dispute to arbitration.
A constant danger of such an extension of British settlements in the
disputed territory as would necessarily complicate the situation
and furnish a convenient pretext for the refusal of any concession
respecting the lands containing such settlements.
A continual profession on the part of Great Britain of her present
readiness to make benevolent concessions and of her willingness to
co-operate in a speedy adjustment, while at the same time neither
reducing her pretensions, nor attempting in a conspicuous manner to
hasten negotiations to a conclusion.
A tremendous disparity in power and strength between Venezuela and
her adversary, which gave her no hope of defending her territory or
preventing its annexation to the possessions of Great Britain in case
the extremity of force or war was reached.
The renewed negotiations began with a communication dated November
14, 1876, addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela
to Lord Derby, then Great Britain’s principal Secretary of State. In
this communication the efforts made between the years 1841 and 1844 to
establish by agreement a divisional line between the two countries,
and their interruption, were referred to, and the earnest desire was
expressed that negotiations for that purpose might at once be resumed.
The minister suggested no other line than the Essequibo River, but in
conclusion declared that the President of Venezuela was led to “hope
that the solution of this question, already for so many years delayed,
will be a work of very speedy and cordial agreement.”
On the same day that this note was written to Lord Derby, one was
also written by the same Venezuelan official to Mr. Fish, then our
Secretary of State. After speaking of the United States as “the most
powerful and the oldest of the Republics of the new continent, and
called on to lend to others its powerful moral support in disputes
with European nations,” the minister directs attention to the boundary
controversy between Venezuela and Great Britain and the great necessity
of bringing it to a speedy termination. He concludes as follows: “But
whatever may be the result of the new steps of the Government, it has
desired that the American Government might at once take cognizance
of them, convinced, as it is, that it will give the subject its kind
consideration and take an interest in having due justice done to
Venezuela.” A memorandum was inclosed with the note, setting forth the
claims of Venezuela touching the boundary location.
This appears to be the first communication addressed to our Government
on the subject of a controversy in which we afterward became very
seriously concerned.
A short time after the date of these communications, a Venezuelan envoy
to Great Britain was appointed; and, on the thirteenth day of February,
1877, he addressed to Lord Derby a note in which, after asserting the
right of Venezuela to insist upon the boundary previously claimed by
her, he declared the willingness of his government “to settle this
long-pending question in the most amicable manner,” and suggested
either the acceptance of a boundary-line such as would result from
a presentation by both parties of Spanish and Dutch titles, maps,
documents, and proofs existing before the advent in South America of
either Venezuela or British Guiana, or the adoption of “a conventional
line fixed by mutual accord between the Governments of Venezuela and
Great Britain after a careful and friendly consideration of the case,
keeping in view the documents presented by both sides, solely with the
object of reconciling their mutual interests, and to fix a boundary as
equitable as possible.” The suggestion is made that the adoption of
a divisional line is important “to prevent the occurrence of serious
differences in the future, particularly as Guiana is attracting the
general attention of the world on account of the immense riches which
are daily being discovered there.”
Let us here note that this renewal by Venezuela of her efforts to
settle her boundary-line was accompanied by two new features. These,
though in themselves entirely independent, became so related to each
other, and in their subsequent combination and development they so
imperiously affected our Government, that their coincident appearance
at this particular stage of the controversy may well strike us as
significant. One of these features was the abandonment by Venezuela of
her insistence upon a line representing her extreme claims, and which
England would not in any contingency accept, thus clearing the field
for possible arbitration; and the other was her earnest appeal to us
for our friendly aid. Neither should we fail to notice the new and
important reference of the Venezuelan envoy to the immense riches being
discovered in the disputed territory. Gold beneath soil in controversy
does not always hasten the adjustment of uncertain or disputed
boundary-lines.
On the twenty-fourth day of March, 1877, Lord Derby informed the
Venezuelan envoy that the governor of British Guiana was shortly
expected in London, and that he was anxious to await his arrival before
taking any steps in the boundary discussion.
After waiting for more than two years for a further answer from the
English Government, the Venezuelan representative in London, on the
19th of May, 1879, addressed a note on the subject to Lord Salisbury,
who, in the meantime, had succeeded Lord Derby. In this note reference
was made to the communication sent to Lord Derby in 1877, to the desire
expressed by him to await the arrival of the governor of British
Guiana before making reply, and to the fact that the communication
mentioned still remained unanswered; and on behalf of Venezuela her
representative repeated the alternative proposition made by him in
February, 1877, in these words: “The boundary treaty may be based
either on the acceptance of the line of strict right as shown by the
records, documents, and other authoritative proofs which each party may
exhibit, or on the acceptance at once by both Governments of a frontier
of accommodation which shall satisfy the respective interests of the
two countries”; and he concluded his note as follows:
If Her Britannic Majesty’s Government should prefer the
frontier of accommodation or convenience, then it would be
desirable that it should vouchsafe to make a proposition of an
arrangement, on the understanding that, in order to obviate
future difficulties and to give Great Britain the fullest
proof of the consideration and friendship which Venezuela
professes for her, my Government would not hesitate to accept
a demarcation that should satisfy as far as possible the
interests of the Republic.
At all events, my Lord, something will have to be done to
prevent this question from pending any longer.
Thirty-eight years ago my Government wrote urging Her Majesty’s
Government to have the Boundary Treaty concluded, and now
this affair is in the same position as in 1841, without any
settlement; meanwhile Guiana has become of more importance than
it was then, by reason of the large deposits of gold which have
been and still are met with in that region.
Now, at the date of this communication England’s most extreme claims
were indicated either by the Schomburgk line or by the line which
Lord Aberdeen suggested in 1844 as a concession. These were indeed the
only lines which Great Britain had thus far presented. When in such
circumstances, and with these lines distinctly in mind, the envoy of
Venezuela offered to abandon for his country her most extreme claims,
and asked that Great Britain should “vouchsafe to make a proposition
of an arrangement” upon the basis of a “frontier of accommodation or
convenience,” what answer had he a right to expect? Most assuredly he
had a right to expect that if Great Britain should prefer to proceed
upon the theory of “accommodation or convenience,” she would respond by
offering such a reduction of the claims she had already made as would
indicate a degree of concession or “accommodation” on her part that
should entitle her to expect similar concession from Venezuela.
What was the answer actually made? After a delay of nearly eight
months, on the tenth day of January, 1880, Lord Salisbury replied that
her Majesty’s Government were of the opinion that to argue the matter
on the ground of strict right would involve so many intricate questions
that it would be very unlikely to lead to a satisfactory solution of
the question, and they would therefore prefer the alternative “of
endeavoring to come to an agreement as to the acceptance by the two
Governments of a frontier of accommodation which shall satisfy the
respective interests of the two countries.”
He then gives a most startling statement of the English Government’s
claim, by specifying boundaries which overlap the Schomburgk line
and every other line that had been thought of or dreamed of before,
declaring that such claim is justified “by virtue of ancient treaties
with the aboriginal tribes and of subsequent cessions from Holland.” He
sets against this claim, or “on the other hand,” as he says, the fact
that the President of Venezuela, in a message dated February 20, 1877,
“put forward a claim on the part of Venezuela to the river Essequibo
as the boundary to which the Republic was entitled”--thereby giving
prejudicial importance to a claim of boundary made by the President
of Venezuela three years before, notwithstanding his Lordship was
answering a communication in which Venezuela’s present diplomatic
representative distinctly proposed “a frontier of accommodation.” His
declaration, therefore, that the boundary which was thus put forward by
the President of Venezuela would involve “the surrender of a province
now inhabited by forty thousand British subjects,” seems quite
irrelevant, because such a boundary was not then under consideration;
and in passing it may occur to us that the great delay in settling the
boundaries between the two countries had given abundant opportunity for
such inhabitation as Lord Salisbury suggests. His Lordship having thus
built up a contention in which he puts on one side a line which for the
sake of pacific accommodation Venezuela no longer proposes to insist
upon, and on the other a line for Great Britain so grotesquely extreme
as to appear fanciful, soberly observes:
The difference, therefore, between these two claims is
so great that it is clear that, in order to arrive at a
satisfactory arrangement, each party must be prepared to
make considerable concessions to the other; and although the
claim of Venezuela to the Essequibo River boundary could not
under any circumstances be entertained, I beg leave to assure
you that Her Majesty’s Government are anxious to meet the
Venezuelan Government in a spirit of conciliation, and would
be willing, in the event of a renewal of negotiations for a
general settlement of boundaries, to waive a portion of what
they consider to be their strict right, if Venezuela is really
disposed to make corresponding concessions on her part.
And ignoring entirely the humbly respectful request of the Venezuelan
minister that Great Britain would “vouchsafe to make a proposition
of an arrangement,” his Lordship thus concludes his communication:
“Her Majesty’s Government will therefore be glad to receive, and will
undertake to consider in the most friendly spirit, any proposal that
the Venezuelan Government may think fit to make for the establishment
of a boundary satisfactory to both nations.”
This is diplomacy--of a certain sort. It is a deep and mysterious
science; and we probably cannot do better than to confess our inability
to understand its intricacies and sinuosities; but at this point we can
hardly keep out of mind the methods of the shrewd, sharp trader who
demands exorbitant terms, and at the same time invites negotiation,
looking for a result abundantly profitable in the large range for
dicker which he has created.
An answer was made to Lord Salisbury’s note on the twelfth day of
April, 1880, in which the Venezuelan envoy stated in direct terms
that he had received specific instructions from his government for
the arrangement of the difficulty, by abandoning the ground of strict
right and “concurring in the adoption for both countries of a frontier
mutually convenient, and reconciling in the best possible manner their
respective interests--each party having to make concessions to the
other for the purpose of attaining such an important result.”
It will be remembered that in 1844, when this boundary question was
under discussion, Lord Aberdeen proposed a line beginning in the mouth
of the Moroco River, being a point on the coast south and east of the
mouth of the Orinoco, thus giving to Venezuela the control of that
river, but running inland in such a manner as to include, in the whole,
little if any less area than that included in the Schomburgk line;
and it will also be recalled that this line was not then acceptable
to Venezuela. It appears, however, that the delays and incidents of
thirty-six years had impressed upon the government of the republic
the serious disadvantages of her situation in contention with Great
Britain; for we find in this reply of the Venezuelan envoy the inquiry
“whether Her Britannic Majesty’s Government is disposed now, as it
was in 1844, to accept the mouth of the river Moroco as the frontier
at the coast.” To this Lord Salisbury promptly responded that the
attorney-general for the colony of British Guiana was shortly expected
in England, and that her Majesty’s Government would prefer to postpone
the boundary discussion until his arrival.
This was followed by a silence of five months, with no word or sign
from England’s Foreign Office; and in the meantime Earl Granville had
succeeded Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
After waiting thus long, the representative of Venezuela, on the 23d
of September, 1880, reminded Lord Granville that in the preceding
April his immediate predecessor had informed him that the arrival of
the attorney-general of British Guiana was awaited before deciding the
question of boundaries between the two Guianas; and as he had not,
after the lapse of five months, been honored with a communication on
the subject, he was bound to suppose that the attorney-general had not
accomplished his voyage, in which case it was useless longer to wait
for him. He further reminded his Lordship that on the 24th of March,
1877, Lord Derby, then in charge of British foreign affairs, also
desired to postpone the consideration of the question until the arrival
in London of the governor of British Guiana, who was then expected, but
who apparently never came. He then proceeds as follows:
Consequently it is best not to go on waiting either for the
Governor or for the Attorney-General of the Colony, but
to decide these questions ourselves, considering that my
Government is now engaged in preparing the official map of the
Republic and wishes of course to mark out the boundaries on the
East.
In my despatch of the 12th of April last, I informed your
Excellency [Excellency’s predecessor?] that as a basis of a
friendly demarcation my Government was disposed to accept the
mouth of the River Moroco as the frontier on the coast. If
Her Britannic Majesty’s Government should accept this point
of departure, it would be very easy to determine the general
course of the frontier, either by means of notes or in verbal
conferences, as your Excellency might prefer.
On the twelfth day of February, 1881, Lord Granville, replying to
Venezuela’s two notes dated April 12 and September 23, 1880, informed
her representative, without explanation, that her Majesty’s Government
would not accept the mouth of the Moroco as the divisional boundary on
the coast.
A few days afterward, in an answer to this refusal, Venezuela’s
representative mentioned the extreme claims of the two countries and
the fact that it had been agreed between the parties that steps should
be taken to settle upon a frontier of accommodation; that in pursuance
thereof he had proposed as the point of departure for such a frontier
the mouth of the Moroco River, which was in agreement thus far with
the proposition made by Lord Aberdeen on behalf of Great Britain in
1844; and pertinently added: “Thus thirty-seven years ago Her Britannic
Majesty’s Government spontaneously proposed the mouth of the Moroco
River as the limit on the coast, a limit which your Excellency does
not accept now, for you are pleased to tell me so in the note which I
have the honor of answering.” He thereupon suggests another boundary,
beginning on the coast at a point one mile north of the mouth of
the Moroco River and thence extending inland in such manner as to
constitute a large concession on the part of Venezuela, but falling
very far short of meeting the claims of Great Britain. He declares,
however, that this demarcation “is the maximum of all concessions which
in this matter the Government of Venezuela can grant by way of friendly
arrangement.”
Apparently anticipating, as he well might, that the boundary he
proposed would fail of acceptance, he suggests that in such case
the two governments would have no alternative but to determine the
frontier by strict right, and that on this basis they would find it
impossible to arrive at an agreement. Therefore he declares that he has
received instructions from his government to urge upon Great Britain
the submission of the question to an arbitrator, to be chosen by both
parties, to whose award both governments should submit.
In this proposal of arbitration by Venezuela we find an approach to a
new phase of the controversy. At first, the two countries had stood
at arm’s-length, each asserting strict right of boundary, only to
be met by obstinate and unyielding resistance. Next, the field of
mutual concession and accommodation had been traversed, with no result
except damaging and dangerous delay. And now, after forty years of
delusive hope, the time seemed at hand when the feebler contestant must
contemplate ignominious submission to dictatorial exaction, or forcible
resistance, futile and distressing, unless honorable rest and justice
could be found in arbitration--the refuge which civilization has
builded among the nations of the earth for the protection of the weak
against the strong, and the citadel from which the ministries of peace
issue their decrees against the havoc and barbarism of war.
The reply of Lord Granville to the communication of the envoy of
Venezuela proposing an alternative of arbitration was delayed for seven
months; and when, in September, 1881, it was received, it contained a
rejection of the boundary offered by Venezuela and a proposal of a
new line apparently lacking almost every feature of concession; and,
singularly enough, there was not in this reply the slightest allusion
to Venezuela’s request for arbitration.
I do not find that this communication of Great Britain was ever
specifically answered, though an answer was often requested. No further
steps appear to have been taken until September 7, 1883, when Lord
Granville instructed the British minister to Venezuela to invite the
serious attention of the Venezuelan Government to the questions pending
between the two countries, with a view to their early settlement.
These questions are specified as relating to the boundary, to certain
differential duties imposed on imports from British colonies, and
to the claims of British creditors of the republic. His Lordship
declared in those instructions that as a preliminary to entering upon
negotiations it was indispensable that an answer should be given to the
pending proposal which had been made by her Majesty’s Government in
regard to the boundary.
The representations made to the Government of Venezuela by the British
minister, in obedience to those instructions, elicited a reply, in
which a provision of the Venezuelan constitution was cited prohibiting
the alienation or cession of any part of the territory of the republic;
and it was suggested that, inasmuch as the Essequibo line seemed
abundantly supported as the true boundary of Venezuela, a concession
beyond that line by treaty would be obnoxious to this constitutional
prohibition, whereas any reduction of territory brought about by a
decree of an arbitral tribunal would obviate the difficulty. Therefore
the urgent necessity was submitted for the selection of an arbitrator,
“who, freely and unanimously chosen by the two Governments, would judge
and pronounce a sentence of a definitive character.”
The representative of her Majesty’s Government, in a response dated
February 29, 1884, commented upon the new difficulty introduced by the
statement concerning the prohibition contained in the constitution of
the republic, and expressed a fear that if arbitration was agreed to,
the same prohibition might be invoked as an excuse for not abiding by
an award unfavorable to Venezuela; and it was declared that if, on the
other hand, the arbitrator should decide in favor of the Venezuelan
Government to the full extent of their claim, “a large and important
territory which has for a long period been inhabited and occupied by
Her Majesty’s subjects and treated as a part of the Colony of British
Guiana would be severed from the Queen’s dominions.” This declaration
is immediately followed by a conclusion in these words:
For the above-mentioned reasons, therefore, the circumstances
of the case do not appear to Her Majesty’s Government to be
such as to render arbitration applicable for a solution of the
difficulty; and I have accordingly to request you, in making
this known to the Venezuelan Government, to express to them
the hope of Her Majesty’s Government that some other means may
be devised for bringing this long-standing matter to an issue
satisfactory to both powers.
Let us pause here for a moment’s examination of the surprising refusal
of Great Britain to submit this difficulty to arbitration, and the
more surprising reasons presented for its justification. The refusal
was surprising because the controversy had reached such a stage that
arbitration was evidently the only means by which it could be settled
consistently with harmonious relations between the two countries.
It was on this ground that Venezuela proposed arbitration; and
she strongly urged it on the further ground that inasmuch as the
prohibition of her constitution prevented the relinquishment, by
treaty or voluntary act, of any part of the territory which her people
and their government claimed to be indubitably Venezuelan, such a
relinquishment would present no difficulties if it was in obedience
to a decree of a tribunal to which the question of ownership had been
mutually submitted.
In giving her reasons for rejecting arbitration Great Britain says in
effect: The plan you urge for the utter and complete elimination of
this constitutional prohibition--for its expurgation and destruction so
far as it is related to the pending dispute--is objectionable, because
we fear the prohibition thus eliminated, expunged, and destroyed will
still be used as a pretext for disobedience to an award which, for the
express purpose of avoiding this constitutional restraint, you have
invited.
The remaining objection interposed by Great Britain to the arbitration
requested by Venezuela is based upon the fear that an award might be
made in favor of the Venezuelan claim, in which case “a large and
important territory which has for a long period been inhabited and
occupied by Her Majesty’s subjects and treated as a part of the Colony
of British Guiana would be severed from the Queen’s dominions.”
It first occurs to us that a contention may well be suspected of
weakness when its supporters are unwilling to subject it to the test
of impartial arbitration. Certain inquiries are also pertinent in this
connection. Who were the British subjects who had long occupied the
territory that might through arbitration be severed from the Queen’s
dominions? How many of them began this occupancy during the more than
forty years that the territory had been steadily and notoriously
disputed? Did they enter upon this territory with knowledge of the
dispute and against the warning of the government to which they owed
allegiance, or were they encouraged and invited to such entry by
agencies of that government who had full notice of the uncertainty of
the British title? In one case, being themselves in the wrong, they
were entitled to no consideration; in the other, the question of loss
and indemnification should rest between them and their government,
which had impliedly guaranteed them against disturbance. In any event,
neither case presented a reason why Great Britain should take or
possess the lands of Venezuela; nor did either case furnish an excuse
for denying to Venezuela a fair and impartial adjudication of her
disputed rights. By whom had this territory “been treated as a part
of the Colony of British Guiana”? Surely not by Venezuela. On the
contrary, she had persistently claimed it as her own, and had “treated”
it as her own as far as she could and dared. England alone had treated
it as a part of British Guiana; her immense power had enabled her to do
this; and her decrees in her own favor as against her weak adversary
undoubtedly promised greater advantages than arbitration could possibly
assure.