'TIS WEARY WAITING
MAFEKING, _March 31st, 1900_.
We have lived for so many months now under the conditions which govern
a town during siege that we almost accept existing circumstances as
normal. We have ceased to wonder at the shortness of our rations,
content to recognise that we might grumble from sunrise to sunset and
gain nothing by it. We are no longer surprised at the enemy; they seem
to take the siege as a joke, but it is a comedy which has a tragic
lining. We have astounding spirit; there is no question of the gravity
of our situation; there is no doubt that if we were to relax our
vigilance for a moment, if we were to withdraw an outpost, diminish
the establishment of some trench, the Boers would be in upon us before
the garrison had realised that any such alteration in the defences had
taken place. Nevertheless, there is really an admirable exhibition of
almost uncomplaining acquiescence in the hardships which have fallen
to our daily lot. Here and there there is grumbling, but the man who
grumbles to-day rejoices to-morrow, since no siege can be endured with
fortitude and determination if one dwells unduly long upon the
difficulties and trials which beset us. Lately we had an exhibition,
and many people in the garrison have consumed the past three weeks in
a feverish and untiring activity to complete their exhibits. Ladies
accomplished something rather fine in lacework, the men turned their
attention to constructing models of the town's defences, and one and
all entered into this little break in the monotony of the siege with
the cheering intention of getting as much out of the event as was
possible. Prizes varying from L5 to a sovereign were offered, and
indirectly, each endeavoured to foster the spirit of the town. It had
a beneficial effect, this artificial method of killing time, and it
realised some L50 for the hospital. There have been other things
besides the exhibition to stimulate the spirits of the garrison.
Native runners brought us the news of the fall of Bloemfontein, a
feature in the campaign which adds fresh laurels to the reputation of
Lord Roberts. His continued successes have been an _elixir vitae_, and,
indeed, so freely have we imbibed of this new medicine, that there
have been many who have found themselves possessed of a fresh
strength. There is, however, one thing which does not give any
satisfaction whatsoever to the little band of men who have held this
outpost of the Empire during so many weary months, and this is
embodied in the absence of any very definite signs of a speedy relief.
Lord Roberts has told us to hold out until the middle of May, but it
is a weary wait, and we could well see the van of the column crossing
the rise. Within the past few days the town has been swept by rumours
about the propinquity of the southern column; we have understood
Colonel Plumer has been within fifty miles of Mafeking for some weeks.
The rumours anent the southern relief place this column at any point
within two hundred miles of Mafeking; some days it has reached Taungs,
upon others it has not left Kimberley, again it is a week's march
north of Vryburg, and in the meantime we receive telegrams from London
congratulating us upon our successful and happy release. Where do
these rumours come from? How comes it that London should be in
ignorance of our condition?
We, who have followed with so much interest the fortunes of the
campaign, sharing in the success of others with all sincerity and
feeling reverses like personal insults, are disinclined to deny the
existence of a relief column; but perhaps it is not altogether
understood that, while we have food lasting till the middle of May, it
is not impossible to feel famished upon our present rations at the end
of March. Of food in the abstract there is an abundance, but the
condition and quality of the ration is such that it cannot be reduced
any further without immediately affecting the health of the garrison
and proving a very serious obstacle to the successful execution of any
work which may be detailed to the command. Experiments have been tried
for the purpose of discovering whether it were possible to exist, and
to work, upon an allowance of 8 oz. of meat and 4 oz. of bread, and,
while it was proved that the garrison might exist upon such short
commons, it would be very injudicious to issue this allowance, since
it caused a serious deterioration in the stamina of the men; it has,
therefore, been condemned. The bread is impossible, and, although
every effort be made to improve it, it still resembles a penwiper more
than a portion of bread. It is made from the common oats which one
gives to horses. These oats are crushed, but, sift them as you please,
treat them by every process which the ingenuity of the entire
garrison can devise, they positively bristle all over with
sharp-pointed pieces of the husks. Recently we have been promised Boer
meal, but it would appear, according to Captain Ryan, that the Boer
meal is to be held in reserve as long as possible. For the moment we
rather hanker after that reserve, and we do not take much of the
composite forage which is served us as bread. However, if we are
eating the rations of horses, the unfortunate people of Kimberley ate
the horses, and so, it would seem, our lot might be much worse. Horses
have not become our daily ration yet, although they form the basis of
a curious soup which is made and served out to the natives. The smell
of that soup turns many weary pedestrians from their usual paths,
although the spectacle of the starving natives swarming round the
soup-kitchen is one of the sights of the siege.
But, doubtless, those people who send us ridiculous messages of
congratulation may think that this is, after all, but the mere detail
of the siege--the side issue which should be expected, and which
should in any case be endured with a fine toleration. That is all
right; we do not mind the bread, we do not mind the aroma of the
soup-kitchen, but we do object to preposterous messages of
congratulation telling us "the siege is over," at the very moment when
the enemy is shelling us simultaneously from five different points.
The other day they endeavoured to concentrate their fire upon the
centre of the town, and, if they did not do this altogether, they most
certainly fired into Mafeking a weight of metal that has exceeded
every other day's. We had from sunrise until dusk 79 Creusot shells,
100 lb. each; 35 steel-capped, armour-piercing, delay-action,
high-velocity Krupp, 15 lb. each; 29 9-pounder Krupp; 57 3-pounder
Maxims; and such a merry flight of 5-pounders that these shells have
become a drug in the market, and to such an extent that we would very
gladly exchange between here and London, a few such stormy petrels as
a polite and cordial memento of the day of our deliverance. It is true
that in part we are relieved, since we have chosen to take the
initiative into our own hands and expelled the enemy from a position
on the south-eastern facing of the town which they have occupied since
the beginning of hostilities. This has given us immense relief, since
it has practically placed the town beyond the effective range of the
Mauser rifle and the Boer sharpshooters.
The trench was exceedingly well made, divided by traverses, protected
with a rear bank and a strong head cover. It was a mercy that we did
not attempt to storm it, and its remarkable strength and composite
construction goes some way to explain the difficulty which we have
experienced in making much impression, either by shell fire or
storming party, upon the Boer entrenchments. We did this in a single
night, having led up to such a climax by devoting our attentions to
this particular quarter. We bombarded them by day, we sniped them by
night, and sapped them in the intervals. For a brief moment the enemy
checked us, but it was only for a moment, and our fire was so warm and
so persistent that they relinquished their attempt to prevent our
advance, leaving, however, in their trench at the moment of evacuation
a little trifle, possibly forgotten in their scramble to the rear, of
250 lbs. of nitro-glycerine. The mine was at once located, the wires
were cut, the trench was occupied, and in the morning when day
dawned, instead of there being the roar of a great explosion, there
was simply the ruddy blaze of our artillery fire from the gun
emplacements which they had constructed and which we had converted to
our own use. But we have taken care of that little mine, and
possession of the trench leaves us masters of the situation. This,
however, is the only relief that has come to Mafeking.
The Boer possesses a natural aptitude for digging ditches and throwing
up earthworks, since his instinct tells him what not to do, much as
this same intuition teaches him how to secure the natural
fortifications of a kopje, and has made him, as the war has proved, a
foeman worthy of our steel. We have despised the Boer; we have
contumaciously called him a barbarian; but, nevertheless, these nomads
of the South African veldt have given the mighty majesty of England a
lesson which will take her many years to forget. Boer tactics are
unique, but one has to witness them to believe in their feasibility.
Their horses are so trained that when the reins are thrown over their
necks they remain immovable. Their fighting is based on this fact,
combined with the dictates of common-sense and their empirical, yet
successful manner of encountering us in the Gladstonian War. Each
commando of one hundred men is their unit; these are concentrated in
scattered groups in rear of their outpost lines, and upon coming in
contact with the enemy they endeavour to encircle their adversary,
cantering in eccentric circles until they are able to dismount in a
fold of ground near some coign of vantage. They are extraordinarily
adept at making the best of their cover, and they are most patient,
waiting hours for a shot, prone upon the ground, under a scorching
sun. It would seem that they have maintained their time-honoured
system, applying to the present campaign tactics possessing great
mobility, rapid powers of concentration on vulnerable points, and as
rapid retreats therefrom if seriously threatened. This power of rapid
movement incidental to all being mounted gives them great advantage,
increasing their powers of offence and defence, and representing the
crux of their theories of war. The Boer carries on his horse one
hundred rounds of ammunition, and rations of sun-dried beef sufficient
for four days. The horses feed upon the veldt. In four days the Boer
can cover two hundred miles, and it is this ability to move from point
to point with extraordinary despatch, that makes the Boer force a body
of mounted infantrymen possessing great strategical value. It has been
impossible not to admire the tactics which the Boers have pursued in
investing Mafeking, and where they have detached a force for any
special purpose the execution of their work has been accomplished with
laudable celerity. They dismantle and re-set, at an emplacement some
miles away, their big Creusot gun--a process which seldom occupies
them longer than between dusk and dawn; sometimes we see them moving
their guns northwards, and hear from natives that they arrived at a
point some thirty miles from Mafeking by daybreak. It may be that in
respect to the mobility of their forces we have much to learn, and let
us at least profit by the lessons which are thus afforded us.