CHAPTER XI

CANNON KOPJE

MAFEKING, _October 31st, 1899_.

Cannon Kopje is in itself a hideous cluster of stones, perched upon a

rocky ridge, which commands the town, a mile across the veldt. It is

impossible to conceive any more positive death-trap than that which

was contained in this kopje, and whatever may have been the

determining element in its original construction, it is infinitely to

be regretted that the possibilities of its being under shell fire were

never very seriously contemplated. It was thrown up during the Warren

expedition, and much as these things go, was neither removed nor

replaced until Monday's bombardment established its complete

uselessness under shell fire, and the folly of which Colonel

Baden-Powell was guilty in leaving it unprotected. It is too late to

say much now, but we have paid a heavy price for our neglect and

carelessness. We found it here when we came; we put men into it, we

are maintaining men there, and it is essential to the safety of our

town that we should still hold it. Since the action an effort has been

made to improve it; a splinter-proof shelter has been thrown across

the trench, and traverses have been thrown out, but the work of the

past few days has perhaps prepared the kopje for further shelling at

the enemy's convenience. As a _piece de resistance_ in the defence of

Mafeking, Cannon Kopje is the most strategically important position

near Mafeking, and we may reckon that, at the moment when these

wretched shepherds who are besieging us, secure this fort, to Mafeking

itself there remains but a few hours.

Colonel Walford had under his command at the fort forty-four men with

a Maxim detachment from the Protectorate Regiment. The fairest

estimate of the men against him would place the Boer forces at no less

than eight hundred with four guns. Sunday night, the look-out from

Cannon Kopje saw a body of Boers making their way to a point somewhat

nearer the town than had hitherto been their custom, and our

expectations having been aroused by this movement we were inclined to

believe that the enemy might attack upon the following morning. Our

anticipations were further grounded upon the fact that the Boers to

the south-west of the town, had by no means despised the claims of

Cannon Kopje upon their attentions, and to every three shells which

their guns had thrown into the town during the days which the siege

had lasted, one, in a proportion of one in three, had been fired at

Cannon Kopje. It has gradually come to be considered, therefore, that

Cannon Kopje was a point against which the Boers would, sooner or

later, direct an attack, since its capture was necessary to the

successful execution of any general movement against the town.

[Illustration: Cannon Kopje.]

The detachment of Police, who formed the garrison at Cannon Kopje,

upon this day performed a most brilliant service for the town by

their determined and gallant stand. Perhaps in war more than in

anything else, chance is a greater arbiter than we like to consider,

and if it had not been for the chance attack against Cannon Kopje,

which resulted in the defeat of the Boer forces, it is not improbable

that Mafeking itself would have been invaded by the enemy. The

subjugation of this point, in reality the turning point in the siege,

was, however, of vital concern to Commandant Cronje, since it had been

his intention to bombard the south-east portion of the town, and to

carry it with a large force which he had assembled during the night in

the adjacent valley of the Molopo River. When day had dawned, the

look-out from Cannon Kopje had already reported to Colonel Walford

that there was unusual activity in the Boer camp; at the moment this

was stirring news, and indeed the fatigues for the night had been

barely dismissed when an experimental shell from the Boer artillery to

test the range, opened the action. During the night, and about the

close of Sunday, the enemy's artillery had taken up their position,

and as the grey of dawn ushered in the fatal day, a large force of

Boers moved out from their laager and occupied any point by which they

might command the area of the fort. It seemed to me, as I witnessed

their disposition, that at least a third of the forces before Mafeking

had been concentrated upon Cannon Kopje, and if so great a tragedy had

not attended the action, we could have afforded to laugh at the

efforts of an enemy so hopelessly incompetent as the Boer force has

proved itself to be. Against a mere gun emplacement and forty-four

men, shell fire from four guns was directed, and the services of eight

hundred men utilised. In the extreme west there was "Big Ben" and a

seven-pounder; in the extreme east there was a twelve-pounder. Within

a circle from these two points, and within effective range, a

seven-pounder and quick-firing Maxim-Nordenfeldt had been stationed.

The big gun took no part at all in this attack upon the kopje, but at

every moment that the enemy's shell fire lapsed, the Boer marksmen

opened with their Mauser rifles. Their rifle fire stretched from the

extremities of either flank and enfiladed the interior trenches of the

kopje. Nothing perhaps in the history of their operations along this

frontier, was so calculated to prove successful as the Boer attack

upon Cannon Kopje. They had the guns, the men, and they held all

commanding points, while they themselves were snugly ensconced behind

cover almost impervious to shell fire. With these advantages it would

seem morally impossible that forty-four men could withstand the

unceasing stream of shells, the mist of bullets, which comprised the

zone of fire of which the kopje was the centre. Had these men wavered,

such a thing is easy to explain; had they fallen back upon the town,

their movement would have been in order. But by preference they

stopped at their posts, the mark for every Boer rifle, the objective

of the enemy's shell fire, until so great had been our execution upon

the enemy that the Boers themselves proclaimed an armistice under the

protection of the Red Cross flag. When this was decreed one-fourth of

the detachment in the kopje were out of action, and eight of these

were killed. But the lamentable list of fatalities had been piled up

only at great cost to the enemy, since around the circle of the fort,

and not four hundred yards away, we could see the Boer ambulances

picking up their dead and wounded. It has been stated that they lost

one hundred men, and that a further fifty were seriously wounded, but

this is preposterous; while if we err at all towards our foe it is in

the computation of the losses which we claim to have inflicted upon

them. It is almost impossible to kill a Dutchman on the field, since

they are as pertinacious and industrious as beetles in seeking cover.

We saw two waggon loads pass from their firing-line to their laager,

but I am inclined to doubt if we killed and wounded forty of the

enemy. To have scored that number in the face of the most remarkable

fusilade of bullet and shell which was directed against the fort is a

wonderful feat, since it should not be forgotten that to every shot

which we fired, there were at least four hundred barrels emptied at

our marksmen in return. Such was the unfortunate construction of

Cannon Kopje, however, and the gross neglect with which it has been

treated to prepare for the present war, that it was not possible for

our men to use their loopholes, and as it was most necessary to hold

the fort each man who fired stood to his feet, and exposed himself

above the breastwork to the full force of the Boer rifles. The enemy

had carried out their movement so well, that under cover of their

guns, and the great annoyance of their enfilading fire, they had made

it almost impossible for the defenders of the fort to pay much

attention to their advance. They compelled men to take cover, since if

anything were seen to move behind the parapet of the fort, the Boers

swept the area of the position with most cruel and deadly volleys. But

cover was sought only at intervals, and when the hail of shells became

too tempestuous, since the brave little garrison were impressed with a

courage which scorned the fire which was turned upon them. When they

manned the defences and maintained a sturdy front the Boers were

nonplussed. They had expected to carry the position whereas they were

losing men more rapidly than they were killing them. We fired by six,

we fired independently, and whenever it was possible, the Maxim swept

the front of the enemy, but, relatively speaking, nothing could

prevail against the Boer numbers. It was easy enough to hold them in

check, since the first well-directed volley made them fall back some

few yards, but the heavy shell fire would sooner or later have told

its tale. It had already claimed the majority of those who were hit,

since if the shells did not burst and strike some one of those who

were lying near, they splintered upon the stones which composed the

defences of the fort and these splintered in their turn, coming into

contact with any one who was crouching behind them for shelter. Cannon

Kopje in itself was a terrible lesson; but it was also a magnificent

example of gallant conduct in the field. Captain the Hon. D. Marsham

who was killed, and Captain Charles Alexander Kerr Pechell, who died

in the course of the morning from wounds received, were individually

setting as fine an object lesson to their men as could be conceived,

yet it must not be imagined that the standard of their bravery was

much finer or much greater than that of their comrades. Colonel

Walford and Colonel Baden-Powell have each expressed their high

appreciation of the conduct of the men who survived the attack, and

although, as befits their rank, the example of the officers was

admirable, it was no better in reality than the action of the men over

whom they were commanding. Captain Marsham was struck by a rifle

bullet in turning to render some assistance to a wounded comrade. As

he attempted to do this a second bullet passed through his chest, and

a moment later he was dead, just as a third bullet passed through his

shoulder. It was as fine a death as any soldier could perhaps have

chosen, and it had the crowning mercy of being instantaneous.

Captain Pechell was busying himself in directing the rifle fire from

the fort, and thereby directly drew the attention of the enemy. He,

with a detachment of six men, ranged up from time to time, and picked

off the enemy with well-aimed volleys. They had taken up their

position behind the eastern wing of the kopje, engaging a body of the

enemy whose flank fire enfiladed our position. The first shell which

came at these six men fell short, and the second and the third

bursting in the same place, scattered the outer covering of the

breastwork. Pechell ordered his men to retire from the direct line of

shell fire, when just as they were shifting their position a shell

struck the stone parapet, and burst among them. Private Burrows was

killed at once, just as he had been admiring the shooting of a

comrade. Sergeant-Major Upton and Captain Pechell received some

terrible injuries; poor Pechell died of injury extending from the

thigh to the shoulder. No one regrets, so much as his comrades,

Captain Pechell's gallant act, since had he not been endowed with most

magnificent courage he would have preserved discretion in the method

by which he exposed himself to the enemy, and by the death of these

two officers, Captain Marsham and Captain Pechell, her Majesty loses

two officers of exceptional promise and soldierly qualifications.

The casualties of this action alone were eight killed and three

wounded, four being killed upon the spot, four dying of their wounds

within twelve hours of the action. Captain Marsham, Sergeant-Major

Curnihan, Private Burrows, and Private Martin were killed in the fort;

Captain Pechell, Sergeant-Major Upton, Private Nicholas and Private

Lloyd died of wounds; Sergeant-Major Butler, Corporal Cooke and

Private Newton were wounded.

That night the garrison paid its farewell duties to those gallant men

who were killed at Cannon Kopje. Their interment took place at six

o'clock, and as we followed in the wake of the _cortege_ we felt the

shock which brought home to each of us the bitter fact that we should

henceforth know them no more. The attack of the Boers upon Cannon

Kopje had been so sudden, so utterly unexpected, and the manner in

which these men of the British South Africa Police had met their

death, had been so valorous that the sympathies of the entire town had

been most keenly aroused and overcome by the appalling swiftness of

the tragedy; there was no one who did not feel that in some way he was

himself a mourner even though the men who had been killed were quite

indifferent to him. Doubtless before the siege terminates we shall

become accustomed to our situation, and realise that after all it is

but the natural issue to a condition of belligerency that no one can

quite tell what sorrow the day will bring forth. But at present these

tragedies come upon us with a vivid freshness which is almost

unnerving and which stimulate disquietening fancies in the minds even

of the most callous.

The cemetery here is in close proximity to the Boer lines, and lies to

the north of the town. It is a small enclosure banked by white rough

stones, and set amid green trees, where gentle fragrance imparts a

balminess to the breeze. It is as quiet and peaceful, by force of

contrast to the dried-up veldt around, as some oasis in the desert.

There is a winding path from the hospital to the cemetery; a road

which at the present moment is flanked in two places by the forts of

the Railway Division, and kept well defined by the footsteps of those

who bear their burdens to the tomb. Since the siege began we have lost

twenty-five, and with one engagement following rapidly upon another,

nightfall usually ushers in a scene in which a small body of men may

be seen gathered round an open grave, waiting irresolutely to take

some share in the rites of the burial service. We paced slowly and

solemnly along this veldt track, depressed not so much by the fate

which had befallen them, as by the hideous realism with which the

appalling uncertainty of war had been brought home to us. In the

darkness of the evening we could see across the veldt the fires of the

enemy's position, and as the _cortege_ wound its way from the hospital

we marched to the boom of the Boer artillery, while passing bullets

sang the notes of our evening hymn above our heads, and dropped about

us in the sand. Along the eastern front of the town as it lay behind

us, an occasional blaze of light in the sky told us where the shells

of the enemy were bursting, and to many came the thought that perhaps

even of those who had remained to do their duty in the trenches, there

were some who, less fortunate than others, might have already kept

their last vigils. In time we reached the grave side, then as we

gathered round the open spaces which had been so quickly prepared,

those who felt their loss the keenest, those who had been comrades and

close friends of the killed, paid their last homage to their memory

by placing some little trinket, some slight token of personal

friendship and affection, upon the winding sheet. At this juncture,

when war is all around us, when every able-bodied man is standing to

his arms, it is not possible to provide the dead with anything better

than a simple sheet. The men who fall in these days are interred in

their blood-stained uniforms, since there be no time in which to dress

their bodies. Those upon whom the funeral service was about to be read

lay in two waggons, silent shrouded witnesses to the fleeting vanity

which attends all heroes. Around the entrance to the cemetery the

officers of the staff, the commanding officers of the outposts,

representatives of every corps and every troop had foregathered,

following closely upon the heels of those who, bearing the grim

burdens upon their shoulders epitomised in their action the horrors of

war. It seemed as we stood there waiting, listening to the solemn

words of the service, punctuated now and then as they were, by the

screams of shells, by the angry snap of the Mauser, and the droning of

the Martini bullets, that these men who were now dead had achieved the

full honour of their calling. Indeed, many were there who would have

given gladly their own lives in exchange for that of their friend,

while there was not one who did not feel that the manner in which

their end had come to them was impressed with all that was most noble.

For a moment after the service had concluded, we stood listening to

the strains of the Last Call. As its solemn notes died away, and we

retraced our steps to the various trenches and earthworks which, for

the moment, gave us shelter, we little imagined that within a few

hours, those of us who were correspondents would follow the body of

one from amongst ourselves once more upon this road. The following

night Lieutenant Murchison, who was in charge of the guns, wilfully

shot with his revolver Mr. E. G. Parslow, war correspondent of the

London _Daily Chronicle_. The horror of such a crime still hangs over

us, and is not in any way diminished by the fact that an officer who

had already distinguished himself by his career, should now be

awaiting the verdict of a Field Court Martial upon the gravest charge

in the criminal calendar. Poor Parslow had endeared himself to

everybody by the genial sympathy which he extended to those who were

themselves in trouble. He had won the admiration of many by the

calmness with which he conducted himself under the heaviest fire.

The Siege of Mafeking (1900) · 第 11 / 37 章