CHAPTER VII

THE SKIRMISH AT FIVE MILE BANK

THE CAMP, MAFEKING,

_October 14th, 1899_.

Early this morning a mounted patrol under Captain Lord Charles

Bentinck reported the Boers in strong position to the north of the

town, and engaging them at once a general fight ensued.

Colonel Baden-Powell, upon receiving this information, instructed

Captain Fitzclarence, D Squadron Protectorate Regiment, which is

commanded by Colonel Hore, to cover the right flank of the armoured

train, which had already moved out to support the patrol of A

squadron, and which, under the direction of Captain Williams, British

South Africa Police, drove the Boer artillery from two positions.

It may be said that this movement began the more serious and certainly

the more determined portion of the engagement. Captain Fitzclarence

was accompanied by seventy men. Upon the termination of the fight he

had twelve wounded, two dead, and two others wounded so seriously that

they since died. The firing-line at no time contained more than two

troops, who, in extended order, and having seized the little cover

which was available, hotly contested the position against four hundred

Boers. Upon the arrival of the squadron under Captain Fitzclarence the

Boers again began to fall back, and withdrawing their right flank from

its propinquity to the armoured train, they projected their entire

force well beyond the right flank of Captain Fitzclarence. The two

forces both in extended order, the one falling back upon the lines of

a position which had been carefully selected and which was admirably

adapted to their methods of fighting, the other pursuing, then

prepared to settle matters between themselves. Had Captain

Fitzclarence but realised it, and had this young officer not been so

intrepid, he would have recognised in this Boer movement the ruse by

which they hoped to entice the "Red necks" within range of a position

from which they could be more effectually surrounded. The motive in

their movement to the rear was to secure the ample protection which

was offered to them by the low ridge covered with timber, scrub, large

masses of rock, and cut up by many little sluits, which extended along

the line of their retreat. When once the Boers had gained this ridge

they faced about, though it must not be imagined their retirement was

in any way a mad gallop. They fell back in as good order as our

squadron advanced, but so soon as they had lined up upon the ridge it

could be seen how very greatly the Boer detachment out-numbered the

men opposed to them. Moreover, in a little their artillery again spoke

for itself, impressing the situation with still greater gravity. When

the Boer guns opened fire Captain Fitzclarence very wisely availed

himself of the shelter of three native huts, for the better protection

of the horses and any wounded that might come on. Leaving his horses

here, he advanced with his men in extended order, until he had secured

a line of front immediately adjacent to the Boers. Indeed, our

firing-line was at first only four hundred yards from the ridge; but,

after a short experience of such close quarters, it was found to be

wiser to take up a position some four hundred yards further off. The

action of Captain Fitzclarence in endeavouring to meet the Boer

commando was one of those inopportune acts of gallantry where loss,

should the fight be successful, is overlooked. Technically speaking,

of course, the strategy was all at fault, and it soon was seen how

very serious the situation of Squadron D had become. By good luck I had

joined this squadron in its move to the front, and it was very

interesting to observe how a force, whose composite qualities were

quite unknown, showed itself to be worthy of the utmost respect, and a

corps upon which every reliance could be placed. Our men did not seem

to mind the formidable odds against which they contended. The only

disconcerting thing at the outset of the action being the position of

the artillery on the Boer side, but for some reason the Boers ceased

their shell fire very shortly after the action had begun. This again

is another of those extraordinary blunders which creep into most

fighting. The Boers might have wiped Squadron D out of existence by

playing their nine-pounders upon our position. As it was, the Boer

commandant withdrew his artillery from the fight and relied solely

upon his rifles. From the little ridge, which, when our own

firing-line had fallen back, was barely five hundred yards distant,

there came a shower of Mauser and Martini bullets. The direction from

which the fire came at first suggested that the Boers were undecided

as to the area of the position which they would occupy, since shortly

after the action began the enemy's line of fire expanded until it

extended beyond our front. For the moment the firing-line developed,

continuing to expand until it became evident that the fire of their

either flank was here most effectually enveloping the rear of our

position, and endangering our line of retreat as well as those who had

been sent to the improvised hospital in the native huts. But it was

impossible to avoid such a contingency with the numbers against which

we had to contend. Indeed, there was no point from which this

enveloping movement could be escaped, since the men with Captain

Fitzclarence were already unduly extended. The rifle fire was very

heavy.

From the ridge of the Boer position our complete formation and the

situation of each unit could be seen. It merely required a little

sharpshooting, keen sight, and sufficient energy to cause a disaster.

Our men lay upon the ground seeking cover where they could find it,

but they had neither the trees, nor the low-lying shrubs, nor the

rocks, nor the sluits which had lent themselves to the Boers' shelter.

They simply lay, a determined body of men, individually keen for

distinction, and individually keen to put the Boers out of existence.

The firing became hot and so rapid that in a very short time the heavy

drain upon our ammunition was beginning to have effect. This again

establishes the position of D Squadron. There were no supplies, nor

was there any artillery support until too late. There was no

ambulance, and no effective preparation for retirement. The horses

behind the huts, the men in the front, were each in a position from

which it certainly seemed that escape was impossible. The Boers, upon

the contrary, had a train of supplies and an excellent line of cover

for retreat.

The first Boer shell killed two horses and reduced to ruins a hut from

the group which had given some protection to the wounded. The second

shell fell wide, exploding, with no effect, into a sand heap. Between

the intervals of shelling, the fire from the Boer Maxims whistled

across the open spaces between the two firing-lines with a discord

which was altogether out of harmony with the calmness and coolness of

our men who, so soon as they had settled down to the serious business

of the engagement, did not seem at all to mind the firing.

Two cousins, Corporal Walshe and Corporal Parland, Irishmen, were shot

dead very soon after the engagement opened, but the absence of

ambulance arrangements prevented those who were wounded in the

advanced position from falling back to the rear. With a quiet and

unsuspected courage they just stopped where they were shot until they

could muster sufficient strength to drag themselves to the rear. Each

wounded form became, as it crawled along, the objective of the Boer

rifle fire, and no few of those who had been hit in action were hit

again as they made their way to the field hospital. Here Major

Anderson, with whom I remained from the moment of my arrival until we

retired--who told me afterwards that it was a mere chance which caused

him to accompany the squadron to the field, since in the confusion and

din no one had thought to give him his orders--was busily dressing the

men as they came in. The total area of the improvised dressing station

was perhaps half a dozen yards; into that crowded six or seven horses,

seven or eight wounded men, the Surgeon-Major, his orderly, and all

those others who made their way through the firing-line from time to

time. There seemed to be indescribable confusion in this little spot.

The wounded men lay between horses' legs, rested upon one another,

crouched against the walls of the huts, each recognising that the

situation was one of gravity, and endeavouring to assist so far as he

was able; those who were not too severely wounded helped to undress

those who had been less fortunately hit, and to each as he fell back

from the firing-line to have his wounds dressed, there was thrown a

merry jest from his comrades. The nature of the wounds created no

little interest among the men, since it was the first time that any

one had seen the effect, upon human beings, of the Mauser bullets. One

man as he came back was advised not to sit down; another man, with

extraordinary coolness in seeing the nature of his wounds, which were

seven, exclaimed with a quaint blasphemy, that it still might be

possible for him to enjoy the functions of a married man. But if this

were the scene at the hospital base, the scene at our firing-line and

at that upon the Boer side was very different. We possibly occupied a

line of front some eighty yards in extent, and as the Boers saw that

the hospital hut was becoming the centre of our position, so they

extended their lines until a direct cross fire from the extremities of

the two flanks were added to the direct fire from the centre; each

man, therefore, was under a converging fire from three distinct

points, and had it not been that the Boers' aim was not so good as

their range our losses would have been much more serious than has

happily proved to be the case. We could see the Boers sitting in the

branches of the trees; we could see them crouching beneath bushes; we

could detect them, from the fire of their rifles, in the shelter of

the rocks and in the depths of the sluits. It soon became the first

serious consideration with our men to try to hit them as they sat in

the branches of the trees, and it was because Private Wormald caught

sight of a piece of a paper as it dropped from a tree that he was able

to shoot the Dutchman who was known to have shot the two cousins. It

was almost a unique method of warfare. Anon and again our fellows

enjoyed a little Boer potting among the foliage of the trees. Here and

there a body was seen to fall heavily from a branch, or to spring up

and fall heavily into a bush; that was as much as we could gauge of

the effect of our own handiwork. Those who were behind the stones were

possibly as safe as those who were in the sluits, but through the lack

of any effective support our shooting, good as it may have been, was

not sufficiently strong for us to maintain our position. If D Squadron

were to save itself from an unfortunate disaster it seemed that it

would have to fall back. The wounded men had come in so rapidly from

the front, and ammunition had been so heavily expended, that many of

those situated upon the extreme flanks of our position were completely

without ammunition. In one case five men had no ammunition left, and

one volunteered to go to the rear to obtain some from those who had

been wounded, and were consequently out of action. He successfully

accomplished this errand, sustaining, however, such wounds as must

prove fatal.

Captain Fitzclarence maintained his splendid isolation as long as

possible, and just as every one was wondering why, in the name of

Heaven, no artillery had been sent to support the squadron in a

position it was never intended to occupy, a gun detachment was seen

to gallop into action on the extreme right flank. Between our men and

the gun perhaps a mile stretched, and when we could see that they were

preparing to fire, each for a brief moment stopped to congratulate his

fellow upon the succour at hand. In this they didn't think of

themselves, but they hoped that with the aid of the gun they might

still be able to maintain their position and give the enemy a hiding.

Suddenly a cloud of smoke hung over the gun and a shell shrieked

through the air. We rapidly speculated upon the amount of damage it

would make, when, with noisy force, it burst among us. We thought at

first that the shell had fallen short, and we hoped the next would

reach the enemy, but when Lieutenant Murchison, who was in charge of

the gun, dismissed his second shell, and it was so well directed as to

fall upon one of the three huts behind which we were sheltering, the

luckless position of D Squadron received unmerited but instantaneous

aggravation and aggrievement, since it was turning the tables with a

vengeance upon the enemy when the guns coming to our support set,

forthwith, to shell us. The menace which our own artillery had thus

unconsciously become to one portion of our wounded men about these

huts had to be immediately removed, and I was one of two who were

permitted to carry intelligence of his mistake to the officer in

charge of the seven-pounder. In galloping across to the position of

the gun, the third shell thrown in this direction burst just past my

horse's head, the force of its wind almost lifting me from the saddle.

The moment was of interest, and I only realised my escape when, upon

returning, I found the base of the shell and my helmet lying quite

close to each other. When a new direction had been given to the guns,

and their fire brought to bear upon the position which the Boers

occupied, the rifle fire from the front of the ridge gradually

slackened, while, under cover of the very excellent work which this

gun was executing, our men fell back upon the hospital. Here an order

had just arrived instructing Fitzclarence to send back his wounded to

the armoured train, those uninjured covering the movement. While the

squadron was engaged in completing this order, no shots were fired

from the position of the Boers, and we concluded that they also were

engaged in withdrawing at discretion. Captain Fitzclarence, Lieutenant

Swinburne, and myself were the last to leave the line of action,

tailing off ourselves in the same open order that the remainder of the

squadron had been ordered to preserve. As we retired Captain

Fitzclarence put three wounded horses out of their misery, leaving

their bodies for the vultures that were already wheeling in circles in

the realms of space above us. These were the last shots fired in this

action, although through mistake, the Boers had fired upon the

ambulance train, mistaking it for a new instrument of destruction.

Subsequently we heard that the Boers buried their dead at

Ramathlabama, and we also have heard that all the houses in that place

have been seized as accommodation for the 107 Boers who were wounded

in the fight. These numbers may probably be exaggerated, but there is

no cause to doubt that their loss was much greater than ours, since

the proportion of their men to ours was greater than twelve to one.

Saturday thus initiated the Boer war along this frontier, and after

the morning's excitement the rest of the day passed without incident.

Colonel Baden-Powell, Colonel Hore, and Colonel Walford, the one as

the colonel in command, the others as the commanding officers of the

Protectorate Regiment and the British South Africa Police,

congratulated their men upon the stand which they had made in the

morning, and the courage which they had displayed. Brevet-Major Lord

Edward Cecil, C.S.O., described Captain Fitzclarence's movement as

brilliant. It is a question whether this movement was not, at least,

characterised by an equal amount of foolhardiness. However, the

officer himself showed such coolness in this his baptism of fire as to

deserve much congratulation upon his individual gallantry.

The Siege of Mafeking (1900) · 第 7 / 37 章