BRICKS OF STRAW
THE CAMP, ORANGE RIVER,
_September 26th, 1899_.
Soldiers and sand--clouds of sand whirring and eddying through the
air, drifting through closed windows, piling in swift-mounting heaps
against barred doors. That is the camp here, stretching upon both
sides of the railway line in orderly rows, flanked upon either
extremity by a ragged outspan of waggons, empty to-day but soon
creating work for numerous fatigue parties when the orders come to
push forward the supplies. At present it is only a small cluster of
tents, many more tents than men--this to confuse the friendly Boers
who, visiting the railway station refreshment bar for the purposes of
espionage, stop to drink in an effort to gauge the strength of the
camp by counting the ranks of dirty white tents which flap and quiver
in the breezes. Such an impossible little camp, but so impressed with
the true spirit.
Colonel Kincaid, R.E., commands at Orange River, and his force
comprises a few companies of the Loyal Lancashire Regiment, a troop or
two of the Cape Police District II., sections of the Field Company of
Engineers, a composite field battery and a few stores--but a general
numerical insufficiency of men and munitions. Major Jackson, with
Major Coleridge, commands the companies of the Loyal Lancashires that
were detailed with him from Kimberley, where his regiment lies, for
duty at this camp. Surgeon-Major O'Shanahan takes care of the field
hospital which has been attached to the camp, and Captain Mills, R.A.,
controls the artillery. It is a happy family, this British camp in
which the necessity for hard work is understood and the members of
whose circle willingly endure the difficulties and privations of their
situation. From the ends of the earth they have come together to be
dumped down upon the Orange River flats, where for many days they will
remain an important unit in the scheme of preparation, but one which
stands alone and aside from the general hurry and scurry of our
belated movements. There is a bridge across the Orange River at this
point, and it is the duty of protecting it and guaranteeing it from
the attentions of the Boers, guarding its approaches by cunningly
contrived gun emplacements and enveloping its definite security in a
network of defensive measures, which is, for the time, the sole
objective of the various officers and detachments that compose Colonel
Kincaid's command.
The conformation of the country abutting upon Orange River presents
those composite peculiarities of construction which contribute more
generally to the setting of the high veldt. Orange River is broken by
hills and river-beds, dry courses with rock-strewn banks, patches of
sand, sparsely grassed and destitute of bushes. The land to the west
rolls smoothly to the watershed of the river, breaking into bush and
short rises about the banks of the stream. The water clatters among
stones and rocks to the north-west, leaving to the south-west and due
west the same barren open sand flats. Upon the east there is a slight
contrast to the evenness of the pastureless country which meets the
sunset; but the fall of the land due south, south-east, south-west, is
unchanging, the compass shifting due east and north-east before the
abrupt and rugged lines of the country are exposed. Then, and then
only, does the face of the country reveal its uncouth and
uncomfortable character. East, whence the waters stream beneath the
railway bridge, the watershed is herring-backed, concealing, beneath
rough folds of rising ground, stretches of bush veldt and stony
patches. High ridges debouch at right angles to the stream, with
uncertain contours and abrupt declivities; detached kopjes rise from
upon the face of the country, claiming classification with the ages
around them, but standing aloof with forbidding mien--a formidable
menace to the chance of successful storming. Parallel hills and ridges
distinguish the hinterland of this watershed so far inland as the
areas of the Orange Free State, while the broken and dangerous
character of the country east-north-east, continuing until the
watershed of the Modder River, still further prolongates these
disturbing features. The valley of the river, within a mile from the
stretch of flats which rolls away from the bases of the hills,
converges until the sides lie within a few hundred yards of each
other. There the stream rushes and roars with some force, until the
wider reaches of the plain give to the pent-up waters a greater space
of revolt. From the mouth of the valley the river wanders with easy
indifference across a broader course to the west; gathering its volume
from the seasons, and leaving in the hot weather a margin of shining
stones upon both sides of the river bed. The hills are in pleasant
contrast to the even tenour of the veldt, and the cool waters of the
river invite repose. Small game lurk within the cover of the scrub,
mountain duck haunt the mountain cataract; cattle roam across the
land, snatching mouthfuls of dry herbage, while just now the sides of
the hills throw back the echo of the military occupation, the noises
of the camp, the calls of the horses upon the picket lines, the heavy
thudding of the picks, the shrill rasping of the shovels in the places
where the men are throwing up the necessary field works.
Everywhere is the spectacle of orderly bustle. The summits of the
hills are crowned with earthworks, brown lines of trenches traverse
the valley, block houses command the entrances of the bridge. These
are the signs of the times, encompassed in an unremitting rapidity of
execution. Colonel Kincaid rides from point to point, throwing advice
here, praise there, and expressing general satisfaction over the
labours of his men, as the scheme of defences runs to its conclusion.
Out across the plain, upon Reservoir Hill, the sappers are
constructing an entrenched position under the direction of Captain
Mills, R.A., and especially designed to protect the water supply.
Roads have been cut across the rear face of the hill, a breastwork of
stones and earth encircles the Reservoir, and gun emplacements flank
either extremity. It is a pretty work, carefully conceived, skilfully
constructed, commanding the portion of the camp, and sweeping the
approaches to the bridge. From the top of Reservoir Hill, no great
eminence, the surrounding country is easily inspected, and the more
one scans and studies the peculiarities of its formation, the more
one becomes impressed with the fact that it presents the gravest
obstacles to the British principles of military operations. A
well-equipped and mobile force will hold the hills for eternity--but
God help the troops who are launched against these awful kopjes which
create the strength of such positions. The officers commanding these
detached units along this border have received instructions to prepare
extensive lines of fortifications round their bases, and at De Aar, as
at Orange River and elsewhere, these commands have been complied with,
until now the positions need only the service of some good artillery
to be made impregnable. When cables be at the disposal of a possible
enemy, it is as well to be reticent upon the cardinal weaknesses
within our lines, but already there are signs of the extreme haste
with which the troops have been despatched to the front. No unit would
appear to be complete, despite the months of warning in which there
has been ample opportunity to prepare. Everything is rushed through at
the last, and although urgent orders be issued to make ready against
attack, no artillery is available for the purpose. Everything is
obscured in idle talk or deferred by empty promise, and the
authorities appear to be continuing a policy which gives to the Boers
some justification of their hopes of success. The Imperial
authorities, in relying so much upon the moral effect of their
artillery, appear to forget that the better it is, the more important
the results it achieves; the more important the position to be
defended, the better it should be. The Boers lose nothing by
possessing modern weapons of defence. But with a wing only of the
King's Own Light Infantry to occupy De Aar, and four companies of the
Loyal Lancashires to hold Orange River, the need of strong artillery
support is manifest. It has been laid down that the proportion of guns
to men is as near as possible three guns to one thousand men, but this
proportion must depend upon the nature of the service upon which the
force is to be employed, the topography of the theatre of war and the
quality of the troops. A force intended more for the occupation of
strong positions, must have a larger proportion of guns than an army
intended for offensive operations in the field. De Aar, as one base of
operations toward the lines of least resistance to the western,
southern, and south-eastern approaches to the Orange Free State, is
even more important than our position at Orange River, which is
intended, in the event of any campaign, to protect the railway bridge
and the lines of communication with the north. But at De Aar the lines
of railway, which converge upon it, link Pretoria and Bloemfontein to
Cape Town, connect the north with the south, join Cape Town with the
south and south-east by a stretch of line almost parallel with the
southern border of the Orange Free State. Yet, so dilatory have been
the efforts of headquarters to obtain the necessary artillery, that,
having reduced South Africa to a condition of war, they split up
between De Aar, Orange River, and other defenceless, but important,
strategic positions along the western border, improvised field
batteries drawn from any garrison lumber room which came handy.
The artillery at present upon this border is, as a consequence, the
seven-pound muzzle-loader which was obsolete when the passing
generation of officers were at the "shop." The inadequacy of the
artillery is a matter of the gravest concern, since, even if the
troops at these places be sufficient to police the disaffected areas,
and to hold in check the local disposition to rebel, in face of the
weapons of precision with which the Boer forces be armed, it would be
impossible, should they move forward, for the British artillery to
maintain any position which was incumbent upon the possession of good
artillery. So well is this realised by our Intelligence Department,
that elaborate precautions are taken by that Bureau, as well as all
commanding officers, to prevent the enemy from discovering that, in
its main part, the strength of the batteries in opposition has been
drawn from derelicts in the garrison stores. These improvised field
batteries might be of service in maintaining the line of communication
if any advance of British troops be made, but as an actual factor in
any defensive or offensive movements which the forces may undertake,
their restricted utility escapes all serious consideration, and puts
our present artillery almost at once out of action. The physical
configuration of the country urgently calls for the immediate despatch
of modern weapons, similar to those which the Sirdar used in his
Soudan campaign. In addition to this an exchange, piece by piece,
between these seven-pounder muzzle-loading monstrosities and the
converted twelve-pounders, breech-loaders and high-velocity quick
firers, might be seasonably effected. Five-inch howitzers, too, should
also be sent forward. But the lack of reliable artillery is
scandalous, and the sooner that guns, of a calibre which is in a true
proportion to the importance of the positions which they will command,
arrive upon the scene, the less uncertain will be the results of any
actual contact between our forces in their present deplorable
condition and those of the African Republics with whom we are so soon
to be at war.