A TALE OF BAD LEADERSHIP AND BAD FAITH
It became a habit of the Irish Party, in its more decadent days, to
spout out long litanies of its achievements and to claim credit, as a
sort of hereditament no doubt, for the reforms won under the
leadership of Parnell. It was, when one comes to analyse it, a sorry
method of appealing for public confidence--a sort of apology for
present failures on the score of past successes. It was as if they
said: "We may not be doing very well now, but think of what we did and
trust us." And the time actually arrived when "Trust us" was the
leading watchword of Mr Redmond and his Party. How little they
deserved that trust in regard to some important concerns I will
proceed to explain. I have shown how they dished Devolution and drove
Mr Wyndham from office when he was feeling his way towards the
concession of Home Rule--or equivalent proposals under another name;
and how they thus destroyed in their generation the last hope of a
settlement by Consent of the Irish Question--although a settlement
along these lines was what Gladstone most desired. Writing to Mr
Balfour, so long ago as 20th December 1885, he thus expressed himself:
"On reflection I think what I said to you in our conversation at Eaton
may have amounted to the conveyance of a hope that the Government
would take a strong and early decision on the Irish Question. This
being so, I wish, under the very peculiar circumstances of the case,
to go a step further and say that I think it will be a public calamity
if this great subject should fall into the lines of Party conflict. I
feel sure that the question can only be dealt with by a Government,
and I desire especially on grounds of public policy that it should be
dealt with by the present Government. If, therefore, they bring in a
proposal after settling the whole question of the future government of
Ireland my desire will be, reserving, of course, necessary freedom, to
treat it in the same spirit in which I have endeavoured to proceed in
respect to Afghanistan and with respect to the Balkan Peninsula."
To this statesmanlike offer Mr Balfour immediately replied:
"I have had as yet no opportunity of showing your letter to Lord
Salisbury or of consulting him as to its contents, but I am sure he
will receive without any surprise the statement of your earnest hope
that the Irish Question should not fall into the lines of Party
conflict. If the ingenuity of any Ministry is sufficient to devise
some adequate and lasting remedy for the chronic ills of Ireland, I am
certain it will be the wish of the leaders of the Opposition, to
whatever side they may belong, to treat the question as a national and
not as a Party one."
And not less clear or emphatic were the views of Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, spoken on 23rd December 1885, as to the
feasibility of settling the Irish problem by Consent:
"On one point I may state my views with tolerable clearness. In my
opinion the best plan of dealing with the Irish Question would be for
the leaders of the two great parties to confer together for the
purpose of ascertaining whether some _modus vivendi_ could not be
arrived at by which the matter would be raised out of the area of
party strife."
It will thus be seen that at a very early stage indeed of the
discussions on Home Rule, distinguished statesmen were agreed that the
ideal way of settling the Irish Question was by an arrangement or
understanding between the two great British parties--otherwise by
those methods of Conference, Conciliation and Consent which Mr William
O'Brien and Lord Dunraven were so violently and irrationally assailed
by Mr Dillon and his supporters for advocating. The great land pact
was arranged by those methods of common agreement between all parties
in Parliament--it could never have been reached otherwise. And, as
these pages will conclusively show, the "factionism" of Mr O'Brien and
those associated with him consisted in pressing a settlement by
Conference methods consistently on the notice of the leaders of all
parties. But Mr Wyndham was treated by the Dillonite section as "a
prisoner in a condemned cell"--to use their own elegant
metaphor--because he showed a disposition to secure a settlement of
the Irish difficulty on a non-party basis. He was ruthlessly exiled
from office by methods which confer no credit on their authors, and
the Unionist Party retired at the close of the year 1905 with nothing
accomplished on the Home Rule issue.
When the Liberals came back to power with an irresistible majority
Ireland rang from end to end with glad promises of a great, a glorious
and a golden future. The Liberals had the reins of government in their
hands, and the tears were going to be wiped from the face of dark
Rosaleen. Never again was she to know the bitterness of sorrow or that
hope of freedom so long deferred which maketh the heart sick. Mr T.P.
O'Connor wrote to his American news agency that Home Rule was coming
at a "not far distant date." It was a fair hope, but the men who
gambled on it did not take the House of Lords sufficiently into their
calculations. And they forgot also that Home Rule was not a concrete
and definite issue before the country at the General Election. The
Liberal Party in 1906 had no Home Rule mandate. Its leaders were
avowedly in favour of what was known as "the step-by-step" programme.
This policy was less than Lord Dunraven's scheme of Devolution, but
because it was the Liberal plan it came in for no stern denunciations
from either Mr Dillon or Mr T.P. O'Connor. Even so staunch a Home
Ruler as Mr John Morley insisted that Mr Redmond's Home Rule Amendment
to the Address should contain this important addendum: "subject to the
supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament." The men who shouted in
Ireland: "No compromise," who were clamant in their demand that there"
should be no hauling down of the flag," and who asked the country to
go "back to the old methods" (though they made it clear they were not
going to lead them if they did), showed no disinclination to have
their own private negotiations with the Liberal leaders on a much
narrower programme.
Mr T.P. O'Connor, in his _Life of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman,
M.P._, tells us exactly what happened, in the following words:--
"The Irish Nationalists had already become restive, for, while not
openly repudiating Home Rule as an ultimate solution, several of the
friends and adherents of Lord Rosebery among the leaders of the
Liberal Party had proclaimed that they would not only not support, but
would resist any attempt to introduce a Home Rule measure in a
Parliament that was about to be elected. It was under these
circumstances that I had an interview of any length with
Campbell-Bannerman for the last time. He invited a friend and me to
breakfast with him.... This exchange of views was brief, for there was
complete agreement as to both policy and tactics.... It was shortly
after this that he made his historic speech in Stirling. That was the
speech in which he laid down the policy that while Ireland might not
expect to get at once a measure of complete Home Rule, any measure
brought in should be consistent with and leading up to a larger
policy. Such a declaration was all that the Irish Nationalist Party
could have expected at that moment and it enabled them to give their
full support at the elections to the Liberal Party."
This is a very notable statement, because it shows that the
Nationalists, who poured out their vials of vituperation upon Lord
Dunraven and the Irish Reform Association, were now eager to accept an
infinitely lesser instalment of Home Rule from their own Liberal
friends. And it also demonstrates that for a very meagre modicum of
the Irish birth-right they were willing to sacrifice the position of
Parliamentary independence, which was one of the greatest assets of
the Party, and to enter into a formal alliance with the Liberals on a
mere contingent declaration that "any measure brought in" should be
"consistent with and leading up to a larger policy." Note, there was
no guarantee, no positive statement, that a measure would be brought
in, yet Mr T.P. O'Connor tells us that this declaration was "all that
the Irish Nationalist Party could have expected," and that it enabled
them "to give their full support at the elections to the Liberal
Party." I wonder what Parnell, had he been alive, would have thought
of this offer of the Liberals and whether he would in return for it
make such an easy surrender of a nation's claims. And I wonder also
whether a paltrier bargain was ever made in the whole history of
political alliances. It does not require any special gift of vision to
divine who was "the friend" who went with Mr O'Connor to Sir H.
Campbell-Bannerman's breakfast-party and who was in "complete
agreement as to both policy and tactics." They were good Liberals both
of them, and for my own part I would find no fault with them for this,
if only they had been better Nationalists.
Mr Redmond publicly ratified the new policy--or rather, treaty, as it
now practically was--of Home Rule by instalments in a speech at
Motherwell, in which he announced his readiness to accept any
concession "which would shorten and smoothen the road to Home Rule."
But it is significant that although Mr Dillon was in complete
agreement with the Liberals "as to both policy and tactics," yet he
devoted, with a rather supercilious levity, his speeches in Ireland to
a demand for "Boer Home Rule as a minimum." This was the way in which
the country was scandalously hoodwinked as to the real relations which
existed between the Liberals and Nationalists.
Mr O'Brien had at this time gone abroad and left the stage completely
to Mr Dillon and his friends, having, however, made it clear that he
was in favour of the Council Bill and suggested certain improvements,
which the Government agreed to. His temporary withdrawal from the
scene was dictated solely by the desire to give the utmost freedom of
action to the Irish Party, seeing that they were acting in conformity
with the best national interests in the special circumstances of the
moment. He was also aware that Mr Birrell, who had now accepted office
as Chief Secretary, was particularly acceptable to the Nationalist
leaders and that they were in constant communication with him on
details of the Bill, the safety of which seemed to be assured. Indeed,
when it was introduced into Parliament, Mr Redmond spoke in
appreciation of it, reserved in statement, no doubt, as befitting a
leader who had yet to see the measure in print, but there is not a
shadow of doubt that Messrs Redmond, Dillon and O'Connor were
practically pledged to the support of the principle of the Bill before
ever it was submitted to Parliament.
When, however, they summoned a National Convention to consider the
Bill, to which they were committed by every principle of honour which
could bind self-respecting men, to the amazement of everybody not
behind the scenes, the very men who had crossed over from Westminster
to recommend the acceptance of the measure were the first to move its
rejection. A more unworthy and degrading performance it is not
possible to imagine. It was an arrant piece of cowardice on the part
of "the leaders," who failed to lead and who shamefully broke faith
with Mr Birrell and their Liberal allies. True, the Irish Council Bill
was not a very great or strikingly generous measure. It had serious
defects, but these might be remedied in Committee, and it had this
merit, at least, that it did carry out the Liberal promise of being
"consistent with and leading up to a larger policy." Its purpose,
broadly stated, was to consolidate Irish administration under the
control of an Irish Council, which would be elected on the popular
franchise. It contained no provision for a Statutory Legislative body.
It was to confine itself to the purely administrative side of
Government. The various Irish administrative departments were to be
regrouped, with a Minister (to be called Chairman) at the head of
each, who would be responsible to the elected representatives of the
people. The Council was to be provided with the full Imperial costs
(the dearest in the world) of the departments they were to administer,
and they were to receive in addition an additional yearly subsidy of
£600,000 to spend, with any savings they might effect on the
administrative side on the development of Irish resources. Finally,
this limited incursion into the field of administrative
self-government was to last only for five years. Appeals to ignorant
prejudice were long made by misquoting the title of the Irish Council
Bill as "The Irish _Councils_ Bill"--quite falsely, for one of
its main recommendations was that the Bill created _one_ national
assembly for all Ireland, including the Six Counties which the Party
subsequently ceded to Carson. Do not these proposals justify the
comment of Mr O'Brien on them?--"If the experiment had been proved to
work with the harmony of classes and the broad-mindedness of
patriotism, of which the Land Conference had set the example, the end
of the quinquennial period would have found all Ireland and all
England ready with a heart and a half for 'the larger policy.' There
would even have been advantages which no thoughtful Irish Nationalist
will ignore, in accustoming our people to habits of self-government by
a probationary period of smaller powers and of substantial premiums
upon self-restraint."
Unfortunately, in addition to having no legislative functions, Mr
Birrell's Bill contained one other proposal which damned it from the
outset with a very powerful body of Irish thought and influence--it
proposed to transfer the control of education to a Committee
preponderatingly composed of laymen. When dropping the Bill later Sir
H. Campbell-Bannerman declared: "We took what steps we could to
ascertain Irish feelings and we had good reason to believe that the
Bill would receive the most favourable reception." One would like to
know how far the leaders of the Irish Party who were taken into the
confidence of the Government regarding the provisions of the Bill
concurred in this clause. To anyone acquainted with clerical feeling
in Ireland, whether Catholic or Protestant, it should be known that
such a proposal would be utterly inadmissible. But apparently the
Government were not warned, although it is a matter of history that
the Irish Party entertained Mr Birrell to a banquet in London the
night before they went over to Ireland for the National Convention,
and it is equally well known, on the admissions of Mr Redmond, Mr
O'Connor and others, that they crossed with the express determination
to support the Irish Council Bill and in the full expectation that
they would carry it.
But they had not reckoned on Mr Devlin and on the younger priests, who
had now begun to assert themselves vigorously in politics. Mr Devlin,
in addition to being Secretary of the United Irish League, had also
obtained a position of dominating control in the Ancient Order of
Hibernians (Board of Erin section), a secret and sectarian
organisation of which I will have much to say anon. For some
inscrutable reason Mr Devlin set himself at the head of his delegates
to intrigue with the young and ardent priesthood against the Bill. Mr
Redmond, Mr T.P. O'Connor and their friends got to hear of the tempest
that was brewing when they reached Dublin. Mr Dillon, unfortunately,
was suffering from a grievous domestic bereavement at the time, and
was naturally unable to attend the Convention. The others, instead of
standing to their guns like men and courageously facing the opposition
which unexpectedly confronted them, and which was largely founded on
misunderstandings, basely ran away from all their honourable
obligations--from what they owed in good faith to the Liberal Party,
as a duty to their country, and as a matter of self-respect to their
own good name--and instead of standing by the Bill, defending it and
explaining whatever was not quite clear in its proposals, forestalled
all criticism by putting up Mr Redmond to move its rejection. A more
humiliating attitude, a more callous betrayal, a more sorry
performance the whole history of political baseness and political
ineptitude cannot produce. The feeling that swept through Ireland on
the morrow of this Convention was one of disgust and shame, yet the
people were so firmly shackled in the bonds of the Party that they
still sullenly submitted to their chains. And the worst of this bitter
business is that the shameful thing need never have occurred. If Mr
Redmond had boldly advocated the adoption of the measure instead of
moving its rejection in a state of cowardly panic, there is
incontestable evidence he would have carried the overwhelming majority
of the Convention with him.
The truth is that the members of his Party had no love for the Bill.
Sensible of their own imperfections, as many of them were, and well
aware that, whilst considered good enough by their constituents for
service at Westminster, it was quite possible they would not come up
to the standard which national duty at home would set up, they were
naturally not very enthusiastic about any measure which would threaten
their vested interests. It may appear an extraordinary statement to
make to those who do not know their Ireland very well that the members
of the Party were not the best that could be got, the best that would
be got, under other conditions to serve in a representative capacity.
But it is nevertheless true that the conditions of service at
Westminster were not such as to tempt or induce the best men to leave
their professions or their interests for seven or eight months of the
year, whereas it was and is to be hoped that when the time comes the
cream of Irish intellect, ability and character will seek the
honourable duty of building up Irish destinies in Ireland. In justice
to those who did serve at Westminster let it be, however, said that it
invariably entailed loss and sacrifice even to the very least of them,
and to very many, indeed, it meant ruined careers and broken lives.
This apart. The Irish Council Bill was lost because of bad leadership
and bad faith, and the Irish Party continued to travel stumblingly
along its pathway of disaster and disgrace.