HIS TRUE RELATIONS WITH McCLELLAN.
The character of no statesman in all the history of the world has been
more generally or more completely misunderstood than that of Abraham
Lincoln. Many writers describe him as a mere creature of circumstances
floating like a piece of driftwood on the current of events; and about
the only attribute of statesmanship they concede to him is a sort of
instinctive divination of the popular feeling at a given period, and on
a given subject. They do not thus dwarf Mr. Lincoln in set phrase or
formal propositions, but that is the logic and effect of their
narratives. Some of these writers go even further, and represent him as
an almost unconscious instrument in the hands of the Almighty,--about as
irresponsible as the cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night which
went before the Israelites through the wilderness.
The truth is, that Mr. Lincoln was at once the ablest and the most
adroit politician of modern times. In all the history of the world I can
recall no example of a great leader, having to do with a people in any
degree free, who himself shaped and guided events to the same extent,
unless it was Julius Caesar. Mr. Lincoln was not the creature of
circumstances. He _made_ circumstances to suit the necessities of his
own situation. He was less influenced by the inferior minds around him
than was Washington, Jefferson, or Jackson. His policy was invariably
formed by his own judgment, and it seldom took even the slightest color
from the opinions of others, however decided. In this originality and
independence of understanding he resembled somewhat the great William of
Orange.
Mr. Lincoln was supposed at the outset of his Administration to have
placed himself, as it were, under the tutelage of William H. Seward; and
later he was generally believed to have abjectly endured the almost
insulting domination of Edwin M. Stanton. But I say without the
slightest fear of contradiction, that neither Mr. Seward nor Mr.
Stanton, great men as they both were, ever succeeded either in leading
or misleading Mr. Lincoln in a single instance. The Administration was
not a week old when Mr. Seward had found his level, and the larger
purposes, dangerous and revolutionary, with which Mr. Stanton entered
the War Department, were baffled and defeated before he had time to
fashion the instruments of usurpation. Consciously or unconsciously, Mr.
Seward and Mr. Stanton, like others, wrought out the will of the great
man who had called them to his side to be appropriately used in
furtherance of plans far greater and more comprehensive than they
themselves had conceived.
I shall not linger here to present instances of this subordination of
high officials and party leaders to Mr. Lincoln; they may be gleaned
without number from the published histories of the times. I shall
content myself with recounting some of his relations with the
illustrious, and at that time powerful, Democratic captain, George B.
McClellan.
General McClellan was as bitterly disliked by the politicians of the
country as he was cordially loved by the troops under his command.
Whatever may be said by the enemies of this unsuccessful general, it
must be remembered that he took command of the Army of the Potomac when
it was composed of a mass of undisciplined and poorly armed men. Yet
after fighting some of the hardest battles of the war, he left it, in
less than eighteen months, a splendid military organization, well
prepared for the accomplishment of the great achievements afterward
attained by General Grant. At the time McClellan took command of that
army, the South was powerful in all the elements of successful warfare.
It had much changed when General Grant took command. Long strain had
greatly weakened and exhausted the forces and resources of the South.
There had come a change from the former buoyant bravery of hope to the
desperate bravery of doubtful success; and it may well be questioned
whether any commander could have crushed the rebellion in the time
during which General McClellan was at the head of the army. That he
lacked aggressiveness must be admitted by his most ardent admirers. His
greatness as a defensive general precluded this quality.[7]
[7] Page 199, last line, after the word "quality."
While reading over some of the appealing telegrams sent to the War
Department by General McClellan, Lincoln said, "It seems to me that
McClellan has been wandering around and has got lost. He's been
hollering for help ever since he went south--wants somebody to come to
his deliverance and get him out of the place he's got into. He reminds
me of the story of a man out in Illinois, who, in company with a number
of friends, visited the state penitentiary. They wandered all through
the institution and saw everything, but just about the time to depart,
this man became separated from his friends and couldn't find his way
out. At last he came across a convict who was looking out from between
the bars of his cell door; he hastily asked: 'Say! How do you get out of
this place?'"
At one time when things seemed at a standstill, and no aggressive
movements could be induced by the anxious Washington authorities, Mr.
Lincoln went to General McClellan's headquarters to have a talk with
him; but for some reason he was unable to get an audience with the
general. He returned to the White House much disturbed at his failure to
see the commander of the Union forces, and immediately sent for two
other general officers, to have a consultation. On their arrival, he
told them he must have some one to talk to about the situation; and as
he had failed to see General McClellan, he had sent for them to get
their views as to the possibility or probability of soon commencing
active operations with the Army of the Potomac. He said he desired an
expression of their opinion about the matter, for his was, that, if
something were not done and done soon, the bottom would fall out of the
whole thing; and he intended, if General McClellan did not want to use
the Army, to "borrow" it from him, provided he could see how it could be
made to do something; for, said he, "If McClellan can't fish, he ought
to cut bait at a time like this."
Mr. Lincoln never regarded General McClellan with personal or political
jealousy. He never feared him. He once profoundly trusted him, and to
the very last he hoped to employ his genius and his popularity in the
deliverance of their common country. His unfailing sagacity saw in him a
rising general, who should be at once Democratic and patriotic,--the
readiest possible instrument of harmonizing the North, unifying the
sentiment of the army, crushing the rebellion, and restoring the Union.
Having, then, no thought of imparting to the war any other object or
result than the restoration of the Union, pure and simple, and this
being likewise McClellan's view, the harmony and confidence that
obtained between them were plants of easy growth. The rise of discord,
the political intrigues, Democratic and Republican, which steadily aimed
to separate these noble characters, who were as steadily, of their own
impulses, tending toward each other,--these are matters of public
history. Through it all, Mr. Lincoln earnestly endeavored to support
McClellan in the field; and the diversion of men and the failure of
supplies were never in any degree due to a desire upon his part to
cripple the Democratic general. The success of this Democratic general
was the one thing necessary to enable the President to hold in check the
aggressive leaders of his own party, to restore the Union with the
fewest sacrifices, and to complete the triumph of his Administration
without dependence upon interests and factions which he seriously and
constantly dreaded.
One of the most striking instances of Mr. Lincoln's great moral courage
and self-reliance occurred just after the second battle of Bull Run. The
loss of this battle caused great consternation, not only in Washington,
but throughout the whole country. Everything was thrown into confusion.
All the Cabinet officers, except Secretary Welles and Secretary Seward
(the latter being absent at the time), signed a protest denouncing the
conduct of McClellan and demanding his immediate dismissal from the
service,--which protest, however, was not delivered to the President.
The feeling of indignation was very general throughout the country
against McClellan, and it was greatly intensified by exaggerated reports
of his supposed misconduct. Notwithstanding this deplorable state of
things, McClellan was appointed in command of the forces at Washington.
At a Cabinet meeting held three days after this battle, the members
first learned of this appointment. They were thunderstruck at the
announcement, and great regret was expressed. Mr. Stanton, with some
excitement, remarked that no such order had issued from the War
Department. The President then said with great calmness, but with some
degree of emphasis, "No, Mr. Secretary, the order was mine; and I will
be responsible for it to the country." By way of explanation, he said
something had to be done; but there did not appear to be any one to do
it, and he therefore took the responsibility on himself. He then
continued to say that McClellan had the confidence of the troops beyond
any other officer, and could, under the circumstances, more speedily and
effectively reorganize them and put them into fighting trim than any
other general. "This is what is now wanted most; and these," said the
President, "were my reasons for placing him in command."
Mr. Lincoln well knew the danger, and was apprehensive of losing
perhaps all except one of his Cabinet members by this action; but he
felt at the same time deeper apprehension of danger to the whole country
if the army were not immediately reorganized and fitted for instant
action. He knew he could replace his Cabinet from the patriotic men of
his acquaintance, but he feared he could not replace the army _in statu
quo_ unless he took the risk of losing them. He fully realized, as he
said, that nearly all the trouble had grown out of military jealousies,
and that it was time for some one to assert and exercise power. He
caused personal considerations to be sacrificed for the public good, and
in doing so he subdued his own personal feelings in the spirit of
unselfish patriotism.[8]
[8] Page 203, line 14, after the word "patriotism."
Whether the act proved his wisdom or not, the result certainly sustained
and justified his course; the proceeding at least exemplified his
firmness and determination in desperate emergencies. There is perhaps no
act recorded in our history that demanded greater courage or more heroic
treatment.
In a conversation with me shortly after this Mr. Lincoln said, "Well, I
suppose our victory at Antietam will condone my offence in reappointing
McClellan. If the battle had gone against us poor McClellan (and I too)
would be in a bad row of stumps."
Had not the tide of success and victory turned in our favor about this
time, there is little doubt that Mr. Lincoln would have been deposed and
a military dictatorship erected upon the ruins of his administration.
The victory at Antietam was, without doubt, the turning point for fame
or for downfall in the career of Mr. Lincoln.
Between Francis P. Blair and Mr. Lincoln there existed from first to
last a confidential relationship as close as that maintained by Mr.
Lincoln with any other man. To Mr. Blair he almost habitually revealed
himself upon delicate and grave subjects more fully than to any other.
When he had conceived an important but difficult plan, he was almost
certain, before giving it practical form, to try it by the touchstone of
Mr. Blair's fertile and acute mind. Mr. Blair understood Mr. Lincoln's
conception of the importance of McClellan to the President and to the
country, and, like the President himself, he realized that McClellan's
usefulness, unless destroyed by some disaster in the field, could be
abridged only by some needless misunderstanding between the two. He knew
the stubborn spirit of the Democratic party from long experience in it
and with it; and he early foresaw the tremendous influence which would
inevitably be brought to bear on McClellan to separate him from Lincoln.
It was because he foresaw this that he desired to place nearest to
General McClellan in the field some one who, having the complete
confidence of both, would form a connecting link which could not be
broken.
To this end, about the time General Pleasanton was appointed
brigadier-general, and assigned to report to General McClellan, Mr.
Blair sought a conference with him and said: "You are going to
McClellan. You will have confidential relations with him. I like him,
and I want him to succeed; but no general can succeed without proper
relations with the Administration. Say to him from me that Frank P.
Blair, Jr., can be of great service to him. I shall have access to the
Administration, and can do much to keep McClellan right. Say to him that
he ought to ask for the assignment of Blair to him, and to make him his
chief of staff. Now, Pleasanton, when you get down in Virginia, say this
to Mac, and telegraph me the result."
It was then agreed that the communication should be in cipher. If
favorable, "The weather is fair;" if otherwise, "The weather is fair,
but portends a storm." Mr. Blair's message was given to McClellan, and
General Pleasanton saw that it made an impression; but General McClellan
faltered, subject, no doubt, to some of the influences that Mr. Blair
had foreseen. After three days' deliberation, the "bad weather" was
indicated to Mr. Blair.
In the campaign for Presidential honors in 1864, General McClellan, in
his letter of acceptance, repudiated the obvious meaning of the
Democratic platform framed for his candidacy. The Convention demanded "a
cessation of hostilities with a view of an ultimate convention of
States." To this McClellan responded: "So soon as it is clear, or even
probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace on the basis
of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship ...
to secure such a peace." In this he stood precisely with Lincoln. The
sentiments of the representatives of the Democratic party in Convention
assembled seemed to be: Peace first, and Union would inevitably follow.
The sentiments of the respective chosen party standard-bearers were:
Union first, that peace might follow.
There was at no time during the campaign a reasonable doubt of the
election of Mr. Lincoln over General McClellan. Early in this campaign,
on going into Mr. Lincoln's office one night, I found him in a more
gleeful humor than usual. He was alone, and said, "I am glad you have
come in. Lamon, do you know that 'we have met the enemy, and they are
_ourn_?' I think the cabal of obstructionists 'am busted!' I feel
certain that if I live, I am going to be re-elected. Whether I deserve
to be or not, it is not for me to say; but on the score even of
remunerative chances for speculative service, I now am inspired with the
hope that our disturbed country further requires the valuable services
of your humble servant. 'Jordan has been a hard road to travel,' but I
feel now that, notwithstanding the enemies I have made and the faults I
have committed, I'll be _dumped_ on the right side of that stream. I
hope, however, that I may never have another four years of such anxiety,
tribulation, and abuse. My only ambition is and has been to put down the
rebellion and restore peace; after which I want to resign my office, go
abroad, take some rest, study foreign governments, see something of
foreign life, and in my old age die in peace with the good will of all
of God's creatures."
About two weeks before the election, Mr. Lincoln began to consider how
to make the result most decisive. He again recurred to McClellan, and
again consulted Mr. Blair. It seemed that neither of these sagacious men
could entirely free himself from the thought that in one way or another
General McClellan, with the Democratic party at his back, was somehow to
contribute a mighty blow toward the suppression of the rebellion and the
pacification of the country. With the respect which they both
entertained for General McClellan's intelligence, with the faith they
both had in his patriotism, they did not doubt that, seeing as they did
the utter impossibility of his own election to the Presidency, he would
be willing, if the way were graciously opened to him, to save his party
from the humiliation of a crushing defeat, to use his remaining power to
restore the Union without further unnecessary bloodshed, and to
tranquilize the country without more needless and heedless political
strife.
Mr. Lincoln said to Mr. Blair: "I shall be re-elected. No one can doubt
it. I do not doubt it, nor do you. It is patent to all. General
McClellan must see it as plainly as we do. Why should he not act upon
it, and help me to give peace to this distracted country? Would it not
be a glorious thing for the Union cause and the country, now that my
re-election is certain, for him to decline to run, favor my election,
and make certain a speedy termination of this bloody war? Don't you
believe that such a course upon his part would unify public partisan
sentiment, and give a decisive and fatal blow to all opposition to the
re-establishment of peace in the country? I think he is man enough and
patriot enough to do it. Do you? You have been his friend and mine. Will
you try this last appeal to General McClellan's patriotism?"
Mr. Blair heartily assented; and, as the result of their consultation,
Mr. Lincoln wrote a most remarkable autograph letter to his rival,
suggesting that he retire from the canvass and allow Mr. Lincoln's
election, then visibly impending, to be as nearly unanimous as might be.
The compensations to General McClellan and his party for the timely
relinquishment of a mere shadow were to be McClellan's immediate
elevation to be General of the Army, the appointment of his
father-in-law, Marcy, to be major-general, and the very substantial
recognition of the Democracy which would necessarily have followed these
arrangements.
This letter containing these distinct propositions was placed in Mr.
Blair's hands, and by him delivered to General McClellan.[9] It was the
attempted stroke of a master. Had it succeeded,--had the propositions
contained in the letter been accepted,--Mr. Lincoln might have lived to
prevent the follies and the crimes of reconstruction, and to bless his
country with an era of peace and good-will,--thus preventing those long
years of ferocious political contention over the results of the war
which followed its conclusion and his murder.
[9] Page 208, line 3, after the word "McClellan."
WASHINGTON, April 13, 1888.
MY DEAR MARSHAL LAMON,--I received the proof sheet of your
article enclosed in your note of the 8th. I have read it very
carefully and I find the facts as stated are correct.
Mr. F. P. Blair, Senior, told me the incident of conveying in
person President Lincoln's letter to McClellan.
I liked McClellan, but I have always believed he was politically
slaughtered in the house of his alleged friends.
Yours truly,
A. PLEASONTON.
What the great soldier might have done, if left alone to determine for
himself the proper course of action in the premises, can never be known.
The letter was submitted by General McClellan to some of his party
friends in New York, and its wise and statesmanlike propositions were
declined. On the morning of the election he resigned his commission. His
party was routed, and upon the death of Mr. Lincoln was opened the new
Iliad of partisan conflict and reconstruction woes.
Mr. Lincoln fearlessly struck out and boldly pursued, in situations the
most exacting, capital plans, of which none knew except those who might
be absolutely necessary to their execution. If he failed in the
patriotic objects which he proposed to accomplish by coalition with
McClellan, and was ultimately compelled to achieve them by less
Napoleonic and more tedious methods, the splendid conception and the
daring attempt were his alone, and prove him one of the most masterful
politicians of this or any recent age. The division of the Roman world
between the members of the Triumvirate was not comparable to this
proposal of his, because the Roman was a smaller world than the
American, and it was partitioned among three, while this was only to be
halved.
More than a quarter of a century has passed, and still the press teems
with inquiries concerning the relations between Lincoln and McClellan,
with accusation and defense by the literary partisans of each. Had the
general seen fit to respond to the magnanimous tender of the President,
their names would have been equally sacred in every American household,
and their fame would have been united, like their parties and their
country, by an act of patriotic statesmanship unparalleled in the
history of this world.