JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD
A telegram from The Hague to the Orient, bearing date of July 1, 1907,
announced the arrival of three Koreans at the place of Peace Conference,
and the publication over their signatures, in a French paper called _The
Peace Conference Times_, of an open letter addressed to the delegates
of all the Powers. In their letter these men claimed to have been
authorized by the Emperor, in a document bearing his seal, to take part
in the Conference as the delegates of Korea. In this connection they
repeated the time-worn falsehoods as to the conditions under which the
Treaty of November, 1905, was signed, and as to the present treatment
accorded by the Japanese to the ruler and people of Korea. In view of
these alleged facts they made in behalf of their country an appeal for
pity and for relief to all the foreign delegates. As was inevitable
from the beginning, the efforts of this deputation at The Hague came
to naught; and after the death of one of their number they departed to
carry on their mission of appeal, first in England and afterward in the
United States. So thoroughly discredited, however, had the word of such
Koreans and of their “foreign friends” already become in the hearing
of all acquainted with the facts, that the mission met with as little
real success in these other foreign countries as at The Hague. So far as
its original purpose was concerned, it ended in failure—miserable and
complete. But in Korea itself the results were by no means transient or
trivial.
The news of the appearance of the so-called Korean delegates at the
World’s Peace Conference was received in Seoul on July 3d. It will be
remembered (see p. 83 _f._) that—to quote from the _Seoul Press_ of
the next day—“when Mr. H. B. Hulbert left for Europe under peculiar
circumstances, there were rumors that he was charged by the Emperor of
Korea with some political mission to The Hague.” This paper then goes
on to say that it did not attach much importance to the rumor at the
time, being unable to reconcile such an enterprise with the reputation
for shrewdness of the chief foreign commissioner, and also “with the
expressions of good will and friendship which the Emperor of Korea has
repeated to Japan and her Representative over and over again.” But there
were even more important reasons why the rumor should seem antecedently
incredible. No one of the present Cabinet, or of the previously existing
Cabinet, appeared to have any knowledge of so serious an affair of State;
no one of either of these bodies had even been consulted by His Majesty
about the possibility of such an undertaking. “Even the best informed
did not dream that a step so palpably useless and treacherous would be
taken.” The conclusion followed that, if the rumor proved true, the act
was ascribable to the Emperor alone, as “instigated no doubt by the
coterie of irresponsible native counsellors and their obscure foreign
coadjutors whose mischievous advice has already so often led His Majesty
astray.” Such a movement was rendered all the more untimely, not to say
unnecessary, because under the new Ministry and the wise and kindly
leadership of the Residency-General, all the foreign and domestic affairs
of the country were now proceeding in the most orderly and satisfactory
manner. Whatever ground for protest and appeal against the treatment of
Korea by the Japanese Government may have existed in the past, everything
in the situation of the spring and early summer of 1907 called for
hopeful and active co-operation on the part of all forces interested in
the welfare of the land. The stirring of the elements always ready for
riot, sedition, arson, and bloodshed, was, under the circumstances, both
a folly and a crime.
On the morning of the same day on which the news of the affair at The
Hague reached Seoul, the Emperor sent the Minister of the Imperial
Household to Marquis Ito with a message disavowing all responsibility
for the delegation and for the protest addressed by it to the Peace
Conference. This was precisely what the delegation had already informed
all Europe His Korean Majesty would certainly do. But then there was
their word against the Emperor’s word; and they claimed that the document
in their possession bore the Imperial seal. There was, moreover, for
the very few who knew the circumstances under which the alleged foreign
member of the delegation left Seoul, the previous private confession of
His Majesty made—to be sure—only after repeated private denials. The
situation was, therefore, so far as the testimony of Koreans went, rather
complex. His Majesty was now publicly denying what he had formerly, in
private, both affirmed and denied; his delegates were publicly affirming
what he was publicly denying, but had previously, in private, both
denied and affirmed. To the Minister of the Imperial Household Marquis
Ito replied that, in view of all the circumstances which had come to his
knowledge—not the least significant of which was the public declaration
of the Imperial sanction, made by the delegation and supported by its
offer to submit its credentials to the inspection of the Conference—the
force of His Majesty’s disavowal was weakened. At any rate, the situation
had now become so grave that the only course the Resident-General could
pursue was to submit the whole matter to his own Government and await its
decision.[100]
The news from The Hague at once provoked a lively discussion on
the part of the Japanese press and the political parties as to the
proper treatment of Korea and her Emperor for this breach of treaty
faith. Meetings were held by the leaders of the principal parties to
determine the policy which should, in their judgment, be followed by
the Government; and several of the more prominent statesmen allowed
themselves to be interviewed for publication of their views upon this
important national affair. Count Okuma was reported as having suggested
that His Majesty of Korea, in case he had authorized a scheme so
lacking in common sense, could not be in his right mind, and might, not
improperly, be placed under restraint. Count Inouye, whose successful
management of Korean affairs at the close of the Chino-Japan war entitled
his judgment to public confidence, thought that if the Emperor could be
induced, or compelled, to come to Japan and see for himself what Japan
had done by way of recent developments, and what Japan wished to do for
Korea, he would voluntarily cease from his unfriendly and treacherous
policy.[101] Of the political bodies, the Constitutionalists, or party
now in control of the Government, took the entire matter most quietly,
and expressed itself as entirely ready to leave the whole situation
in the hands of the Resident-General, as advised or instructed by the
Tokyo authorities. Prime Minister Saionji, to whose cool judgment and
quiet temper the nation is greatly indebted at all times for allaying
tendencies to undue excitement, assured the _Daido_ delegates, on July
12th, that the policy toward Korea had already been established and that
there was really no need of making “much fuss” over the matter. The
Progressives, or strongest anti-Government party, took the most vehement
position of urgency for prompt action and for punitive measures. Some of
its papers went so far as again to call in question the entire policy
of Marquis Ito, with its plan for securing a peaceful development of
Korea under a Japanese Protectorate; but only a few called for immediate
forcible annexation.
On the whole, and considering the great and repeated provocations offered
to Japan by the Korean Emperor and his Government, the Japanese nation
kept its temper in a truly admirable way. While agreeing that some means
must at last be found to stop the interference of His Majesty of Korea
with all attempts to reform internal affairs, and the better in the
future to control foreign intrigues, the general opinion favored strongly
an increased confidence in the character and policy of the existing
Residency-General. The situation in Japan itself was faithfully described
as follows in the _Japan Times_, in its issue of July 14th:
The Hague Deputation question continues to attract serious
attention. The whole Press is practically unanimous in urging
the adoption of such measures as would effectively prevent
the recurrence of similar incidents. The matter has also been
taken up by nearly all the important political parties, and
the attitude adopted by them is tantamount to an endorsement
of the view so unanimously expressed through the newspaper
organs. Very little attempt has been made, however, to point
out in a concrete form the line of action to be taken. It is
evident that, although a small section of the Press unfavorably
criticizes Marquis Ito’s leniency in dealing with the Emperor,
the important organs of opinion have so much confidence in
His Excellency’s ability to cope with the situation with his
characteristic wisdom and efficiency, that they do not think
it necessary to trouble him with suggestions at to matters of
procedure and detail.
The Tokyo Government acted with promptness and decision in dealing with
this latest phase of the everlasting Korean problem. On July 16th it was
publicly announced that the Government had determined to “go along with
the opinion of the people,” and adopt “a strong line of action toward
Korea.” Viscount Hayashi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was forthwith
appointed to convey in person the views of the Government to His
Excellency Marquis Ito, and was commissioned with the disposal of Korean
affairs after consultation with the Marquis on the spot. Hayashi bore
with him several somewhat different plans, among which decision was to be
reached after his arrival at Seoul; but all of them contemplated leaving
the details very largely to the Resident-General. It is pertinent to say,
_with authority_, in this connection, that none of these plans included,
much less suggested or required, the abdication of the Emperor; although,
as we have already seen, Marquis Ito had become quite conclusively
convinced that the reform of Korean affairs could never be accomplished
with the co-operation of the present ruler of the land, or, indeed,
otherwise than in spite of his utmost opposition.
Meantime there was a great stir taking place among the members of the
different political factions in Seoul. The Emperor himself, now that
his own foolish treachery had been brought to light, was daily becoming
more alarmed. The Court intriguers of necessity shared in this growing
alarm. Before the departure of Viscount Hayashi, the Imperial Government
of Japan had received a telegram from Mr. Motono, Minister in St.
Petersburg, which stated that the new Russo-Japanese Convention would
recognize Japan’s rights in Korea even more completely than the Peace of
Portsmouth had done. The fact, now made evident to the Korean officials,
that the backs of all the nations were turned toward the verbal and
practical falsehoods of their Emperor and of his intriguing foreign
friends, and that the judgment of all those wise in respect of Korean
history and Korean characteristics saw no hope for their country except
through the aid of Japan, tended as a matter of course to deepen this
alarm. And when the determination of the Japanese Government to send one
of its Cabinet Ministers to Korea, in order at once and finally to put an
end to Korea’s power, in treachery, intrigue, and assassination, to work
her own woe and to jeopard the peace of the Far East, was made known, the
consternation in Seoul officialdom reached its height.
The only persons among the Koreans who could be relied upon in any
measure to save the country from well-merited punishment for this
last act of insane treachery on the part of the Emperor and his Court
were the newly appointed Korean Cabinet. It was a great piece of good
fortune for Korea that this Cabinet had previously been appointed and
pledged to fidelity to the interests of the whole country rather than
to connivance at His Majesty’s intriguing ways. On the whole, in this
extreme emergency, the Korean Government behaved wisely, patriotically,
and in a way to secure the crown and the people against the worst results
of the Emperor’s policy. They began their efforts, indeed, in the vain
attempt to discover the plans of the Japanese Government through the
Resident-General and to get His Excellency’s advice upon the best course
of action on their part in order to meet these plans. But Marquis Ito
refrained alike from indicating the steps which would probably be taken
by Japan and also from advising as to the steps which it was best for
Korea to take.
The Korean Ministers were by this time holding daily conferences of
several hours in length. The result of these conferences was the
conclusion on their part that the abdication of the Emperor offered the
only escape from the direful condition in which he had himself placed
his country. As early, therefore, as an audience on the 6th of July,
they began collectively and individually to urge upon His Majesty the
advisability of this step. There is no doubt that they gave this advice
the more heartily because, apart from the present dilemma, they were
profoundly convinced that he was a bad and dangerous ruler, and that
comparatively little could be done for the improvement of Korean affairs
as long as he sat upon the throne of Korea. The occasion was opportune,
then, for terminating such weak misrule and perversion of Imperial power.
Viscount Hayashi arrived at Seoul on the evening of July 18th. In the
afternoon of the same day Marquis Ito visited the Palace at the request
of the Korean Emperor. He found that His Majesty had no suggestions to
make as to the solution of the grave problem before the two governments:
His Majesty continued, however, to disavow the Hague delegation and to
suggest the severe punishment of its members.[102] The more important
reason for the request for this interview appeared when the Emperor
stated that his Cabinet were urging him to abdicate and suggested that
he supposed they were prompted to do so by Marquis Ito. This the Marquis
emphatically denied: so far as the Resident-General was concerned, the
Korean Cabinet were in all respects acting on their own initiative. His
Excellency was himself still awaiting the decision of his own Government
at Tokyo; and until that was announced he had nothing to say as to what
Japan was likely to do. Moreover, since he was not a subject of the
Emperor of Korea he should refrain from advising His Majesty in any way
about the matter of his abdication.[103]
Meantime the Korean Cabinet continued to press upon the Emperor the
necessity of his abdication in the interests of the country at large.
On Wednesday, July 17th, they proceeded in a body to the Palace, where
His Majesty is said to have kept them waiting for their audience with
him for nearly three hours. At this audience, however, they again
explained the nature of the present crisis, and again besought him to
save his country by sacrificing the crown for himself. After a prolonged
interview they are said to have left the Emperor much enraged and still
refusing. But on the next day the Cabinet Ministers repaired again to
the Palace at a quarter to five in the afternoon. Before this meeting
could be over the train bearing the Viscount Hayashi would roll into
the South-Gate Station. The whole affair was culminating; the national
crisis was imminent. For more than three hours the Ministers pressed for
their Sovereign’s abdication, with a most bold and insistent attitude.
It was after eleven o’clock that evening when the Emperor began to
show signs of giving way, and ordered summons to be issued to assemble
the Elder Statesmen. These men soon arrived at the Palace and held a
secret conference among themselves, during which they, too, arrived at
the decision that there was really no alternative for the Emperor; he
should yield to the advice of his Ministers; and the throne was at once
memorialized to this effect. At three o’clock on the morning of the
nineteenth the Emperor agreed to retire in favor of the Crown Prince, and
a decree announcing this fact was published in the _Official Gazette_ at
a later hour the same morning.
From about ten o’clock on Thursday night the people began to assemble
in front of the Palace. By one o’clock in the morning of Friday the
crowd had become dense and began to show threatening signs of a riotous
character; but they dispersed by degrees without serious incidents, until
at dawn scarcely one hundred men were remaining in the neighborhood.
Rumors of the Emperor’s abdication were spread abroad after sunrise;
and again the crowd of excited people increased in front of the main
gate of the Palace and in the streets adjoining. A hand-bill, circulated
from the same source of so much pernicious misinformation—namely, the
native edition of the Korean _Daily News_—which asserted that the Emperor
had been deposed and was going to be carried off to Japan by Viscount
Hayashi, added greatly to the popular excitement. The Korean police,
under Police Adviser Maruyama, however, had the matter well in hand;
and having been earnestly advised by the Resident-General to avoid all
unnecessary harshness, they succeeded in dispersing the people with only
a few trifling encounters. In the work of restoring order and preventing
riot and bloodshed, the police were doubtless greatly assisted by a
timely downpour of rain. For of all people under the sun it is probable
that a Korean crowd of men, with their expensive and cherished crinoline
hats and their lustrous white raiment, most object to getting thoroughly
wet. Patriotism of the intensest heat can scarcely bear this natural
process of cooling.
At 7.15 P. M. on July 19th the Korean Minister of Justice called on the
Resident-General and delivered to him the following message from His
Majesty:
In abdicating my throne I acted in obedience to the dictate
of my conviction; my action was not the result of any outside
advice or pressure.
During the past ten years I have had an intention to cause
the Crown Prince to conduct the affairs of State, but, no
opportunity presenting itself, my intention has to this day
remained unrealized. Believing, however, that such opportunity
has now arrived, I have abdicated in favor of the Crown Prince.
In taking this step I have followed a natural order of things,
and its consummation is a matter of congratulation for the sake
of my dynasty and country. Yet I am grieved to have to observe
that some of my ignorant subjects, laboring under a mistaken
conception of my motives and in access of wanton indignation,
may be betrayed into acts of violence. In reliance, therefore,
upon the Resident-General, I entrust him with the power of
preventing or suppressing such acts of violence.
This appeal to the Residency-General to preserve order in Seoul was made
in view of events which had occurred earlier in the afternoon of the same
day. About a quarter to four a Japanese military officer on horseback
was stopped by the mob while passing in front of the main gate of the
Palace; and when the Japanese policemen in the Korean service came to his
rescue and attempted to open a path for him through the crowd, both they
and the officer were more or less seriously wounded by stones. The mob,
on being dispersed, retreated in the neighborhood of Chong-no. Here a
party of Korean soldiers, who had deserted from the barracks since the
previous night, joined the crowds under the command of an officer. Soon
after five o’clock these soldiers, without either provocation or warning,
fired a succession of volleys upon a party of police officers, killing
and wounding more than a score; whereupon the fury of the mob broke out
anew, and several more were killed and wounded on both sides. The total
number of police officers who lost their lives in this way was ten, and
some thirty or more others were more or less severely wounded.[104] After
this dastardly action the Korean soldiers ran away.
As to the unprovoked character of this deplorable incident the testimony
of eye-witnesses is quite conclusive. Dr. George Heber Jones, who was on
the spot soon after the first sound of firing, says: “In fact all through
the excitement I was impressed with the moderation and self-control shown
by the public officers in dealing with the crowds which had been surging
about them since Thursday night. Their conduct was admirable.” After
narrating the experiences of himself and his companion as they came upon
the dead and wounded lying in the streets and alleys of the district, the
wrecked police-boxes and the officers covered with blood, this witness
goes on to say: “The Pyeng-yang soldiers in the barracks just north of
Chong-no, becoming restive, in the afternoon broke into the magazine of
their barracks and supplied themselves with ammunition. One company of
them then broke out, and under command—it is said, of a captain who was
mounted—suddenly appeared at Chong-no and without warning began firing
on the policemen who were trying to preserve order in the crowds....
A mania of destruction took possession of the people for a time, and
there are reports of assaults on Japanese civilians in various parts of
the city; and from what I personally witnessed there is little doubt of
this, that the scenes of violence which occurred in 1884 were repeated
yesterday.”[105]
As a result of the Emperor’s request following upon this outbreak of
serious disorder, the city of Seoul was put in charge of Japanese police
and gendarmes. A strong body of Japanese troops was posted outside the
Palace, and four machine guns were placed in front of the Taihan or
Main Gate. A battalion of infantry was summoned from Pyeng-yang, and a
squadron of the artillery regiment at Yong-san. The riotous outbreaks
were now mainly directed against those Korean officials who had brought
about the abdication of the Emperor. Over one thousand rioters assembled
near the Kwang-song Gate and, after a short debate, proceeded to assault
and set on fire the residence of the Prime Minister, Mr. Yi Wan-yong. In
spite of the efforts of the Japanese troops and gendarmes, as well as
of the fire brigades, a large portion of the residence was destroyed.
Part of a Korean battalion also assaulted the prison at Chong-no, where
the headquarters of the Japanese police had been established, but were
driven away. At 6 P. M. of Tuesday, July 23d, a huge crowd assembled and
“passed resolutions” that at sunset the headquarters of the Il Chin-hoi,
or party most prominent in its demand for reforms, should be set on fire,
and after this several other buildings were marked for destruction. These
attempts were, however, frustrated; but the villas of Mr. Yi Kun-tak and
Mr. Yi Chi-yung, the former Ministers of War and of Home Affairs, outside
the small East Gate, were burned. Finally, these demonstrations of
rowdyism came to a point of cessation, and the usual order of Seoul was
restored. During the period of rioting the Korean crowd was, as usual,
tolerably impartial in the distribution of its favors; in addition to
Japanese and Koreans, a few Chinese and other foreigners were assaulted
or shot at.
All these events made it entirely obvious, even to the most prejudiced
observer, that the Korean Government was still as incapable of securing
and preserving order in times of popular excitement as it has ever been.
It could not guarantee the safety of its own officials or of foreigners
of any nationality, without outside assistance. Unless the controlling
influence of the Japanese authorities had been exercised, there cannot be
the slightest doubt that a frightful reign of anarchy and bloodshed would
have ensued upon the abdication of the Emperor; and no one acquainted
with the Korean mob, when once let loose, will venture to predict how
many, and whom, it might have involved. Thus far these authorities had
done nothing beyond lending an indispensable support and assistance
to the Korean Government. They were acting wholly in its interests as
centralized in the newly declared Emperor and in the Cabinet Ministers.
One other thing, however, was also made equally obvious. The Korean army
could not be trusted; its continuance as at present constituted was an
intolerable menace to both governments, as well as to the interests of
the people at large. It was intrinsically worthless for the legitimate
purposes of an army, and dangerous in the extreme as a force to provoke
and to intensify all manner of lawlessness. If it had not been for the
mutinous action of these undisciplined troops, who became centres of all
the forces of sedition, arson, and murder, there would probably have been
little or no bloodshed connected with the events of July, 1907.
It should not be forgotten that the Korean Ministers were influenced by
patriotic motives in unanimously and urgently demanding the abdication
of the Emperor.[106] It immediately became evident, however, that His
Majesty did not intend really to abdicate, but that he was continuing his
old tricks of intrigue, double-dealing, and instigating assassination.
There was well-founded suspicion—to quote a statement based on
trustworthy information—that “the unfortunate incident of Friday last
and the mutinous spirit prevailing among the Korean troops were the
result of an understanding between the ex-Emperor and his abettors and
supporters in Seoul.” There was even proof of a conspiracy to have the
Korean troops rise in a body, kill the entire Korean Cabinet, and rescue
from their dominating influence his “oppressed” Majesty. Whatever may
be the full measure of truth as to these and other secret intrigues and
plots for sedition and murder, certain actions were publicly avowed that
were unmistakably in open defiance of the new Emperor and his Ministers,
as well as complete proof that by abdication His Majesty meant something
quite different from what the word was properly held to signify. [This
Korean word was indeed capable of two interpretations; it was, however,
the term customarily employed to signify the relinquishment of Imperial
control and responsibility, while at the same time “saving the face” of
the person abdicating and often increasing his real influence for evil.]
At midnight on Saturday, July 20th, the ex-Emperor summoned to the Palace
and personally appointed Pak Yong-hio to be “Minister of the Imperial
Household.”[107] Upon this Mr. Pak had the impudence to call upon Marquis
Ito on the following Sunday morning and announce his appointment. It
is probable that he did not meet with a very cordial reception, or
succeed well in impressing His Excellency with the dignity and value
of his new office. Not satisfied with this practical retraction of his
own deposition of Imperial functions, when the Cabinet submitted to
the Throne for Imperial signature a draft of an edict calling upon the
people to keep peace and order, the ex-Emperor prohibited his son, now
the reigning Emperor, from signing it and insisted that the edict should
be issued in his own name. In view of all this manœuvering, the Cabinet
Ministers spent another whole night closeted with the ex-Emperor: they
emerged from this new contention with a renewed and perfectly positive
declaration of abdication. At the same time the new Emperor issued over
his own name an edict in which his subjects were warned against all
disloyalty to him, and were exhorted to turn their energies, in reliance
upon his guidance, to the advancement of civilization and of the national
interests.
Nothing could, of course, be done toward settlement of the problem of
future relations between the Governments of Korea and Japan until public
order was restored. But speculation was eager and varied as to what
would then take place: for neither had the Marquis Ito disclosed his
views upon this subject, nor had the instructions of Minister Hayashi
been made known to the public. The telegrams which came into Seoul
from all quarters showed that the civilized world, both diplomatic and
business, expected the out-and-out annexation of Korea by Japan, and the
consequent dethronement of the Imperial house. The Koreans themselves
expected little less; in addition to this they feared the immediate and
open humiliation of having the ex-Emperor carried off to the enemies’
country. Indeed, it was this severe calamity which the Korean Cabinet
hoped to mitigate by procuring His Majesty’s abdication. In the same
hope the most numerous of the several Korean societies of an alleged
patriotic character—the _Il Chin-hoi_, or “All-for-Progress Society”—sent
in a petition, or “pathetic memorial,” to the Residency-General. After
acknowledging “the policy of mildness and conciliation” which had won for
His Excellency the hearts of the Korean people, the memorial proceeds in
substance as follows: “The offence which the Emperor has committed in
connection with the Hague question is great as a mountain; His Majesty
has been very deficient in having a proper sense of what he owes to
Japan. But what fault is there in the people who know nothing about the
affair? Or what culpability in the land and soil of Korea? They are in no
way related to the dynasty of Korea. When we think over these things we
cannot stop the flow of tears in a thousand drops. Your Excellency, we
pray you to have mercy on the mountains and seas of Korea and to place in
a position of safety the 20,000,000 souls, the 3,000,000 homesteads, and
the nation of 500 years,” [The customary expedient of Korean rhetoric is
to be noted in doubling the number of the population of the peninsula.]
It has been said of the Japanese that they treat no one else so
generously as their defeated and prostrate enemy. However this may be, it
is matter of historical truth that after some particularly aggravating
offence from Korea, what Western nations generally would regard as
an excess of chivalric and totally unappreciated kindness has quite
uniformly characterized the treatment accorded to this country by the
Japanese Government. The Bismarckian policy of “making your enemy cough
up all you can when you have him by the throat” has never been the policy
of Japan in dealing with the peninsula. And yet, at last, it should have
been perfectly evident to every true friend of both countries that the
Korean Government—traditionally corrupt, cruel, and regardless of the
Korean nation—must no longer be allowed to stand between this nation and
the plans for bringing it into an improved internal condition and into
safer relations with foreign Powers. That formal annexation was never
contemplated by the Tokyo Government became evident when, on the evening
of July 21st, a congratulatory telegram was received by the new Emperor
from His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan. To this telegram a reply
was sent on the next day, which read, in effect, as follows: “By the
order of my Imperial father I have ascended the throne at this difficult
crisis, and being conscious of my unworthiness, I am filled with
apprehensions. I beg Your Majesty to accept my profound thanks for Your
Majesty’s courteous telegram of congratulations. I warmly reciprocate
Your Majesty’s wishes for still more intimate relationship between the
two countries and between our Imperial Houses.”
After a number of consultations between Minister Hayashi and the
Residency-General, and between the Japanese representatives and the
Korean Cabinet (who, in their turn, consulted among themselves and with
the new Emperor), at noon of Wednesday, July 24th, Marquis Ito handed
over to the Korean Government a document conveying Japan’s proposals as
the basis of a new Japanese-Korean agreement. After the Korean Ministers
had again conferred with one another, the Premier and the Minister of
War, at four o’clock P. M. of the same day, had a brief audience with
their Emperor. Other conferences continued through the whole of this
memorable night—with the result that at a later audience Mr. Yi Wan-yong,
the Premier, was invested by His Majesty with authority to sign the new
Convention. It is understood that on this occasion, as on that former
equally memorable night in November of 1905, Marquis Ito used the
authority given him to modify some of the details, so as to make them
seem less harsh while preserving the substance of the contract, in order
to “save the face” of the Korean Government. When this Convention was
published in the _Official Gazette_, the Korean politicians of the Palace
“gang” were congratulating themselves on having escaped so easily from
the risk of a punitive expedition to which their Emperor, by their own
assistance, had subjected them; the Korean Cabinet were congratulating
themselves on the deliverance of their country from the peril of
annexation; while the majority of the Korean people, even in Seoul,
seemed quite indifferent to what had happened.
Immediately upon the conclusion of the new Convention Marquis Ito
summoned to his residence the principal Residency-General officials
and acquainted them with its terms. He also informed them that he
should himself adhere constantly and firmly to the policy of carrying
out its stipulations; and he exhorted them to bear in mind what he had
just said and to spare no pains to discharge their own duties with
moderation and efficiency. The officials, in their turn, congratulated
the Resident-General upon his brilliant success, and promised their
co-operation in the new plans now before them.
The Agreement of July 24, 1907, definitively places the enactment
of all laws and ordinances, the administration of all important
Korean Government affairs, and all official appointments which
relate to internal administration, under the control of the Japanese
Resident-General. Its preamble renews the assertion which has governed
the policy of Marquis Ito throughout—namely, that the motive is to be
found in “the early attainment of the prosperity and strength of Korea,”
and the “speedy promotion of the welfare of the Korean people.” Moreover,
it pledges the Korean Government to keep judicial affairs distinct from
administrative affairs. With regard to the appointment and dismissal of
officials of the higher rank, whether native or foreign, it is specified
that the consent of the Resident-General must be secured; and also that
his recommendations for the appointment of Japanese to official positions
shall be followed. Taken in connection with the Convention of November,
1905, therefore, the present condition of Korea is undoubtedly that of a
country completely dependent upon Japan for both internal government and
also for commercial and diplomatic relations with all foreign countries.
For the present the autonomy of Korea, except so far as it is preserved
in certain customs and laws which even the source of control would be
forced to regard, and in the nominal preservation of the Korean crown and
its Cabinet Ministers, is suspended. The native government can suggest,
propose, and assimilate suggestions and proposals; but they can neither
initiate nor control in important affairs without the consent of the
representative of Japan. On the other hand, the plans and proposals of
the Japanese Resident-General must be accepted and carried out under his
supervision and ultimate control.[108]
The clause in the new Convention which gave most offence to the official
classes and to the Yang-bans generally in Korea was that which opened
the door, per force as it were, to the appointment of Japanese to all
kinds of official positions in the peninsula. Although it has been the
declared policy of the present Resident-General to retain the Korean
Cabinet Ministers, the agreement plainly makes it easily possible for
the Japanese Government to treat desirable appointments in Korea as
freely in the interests of its own countrymen as is possible for the
British Government in British India. The pledge, however, to maintain the
Imperial House in the nominal possession of the crown, and in the show of
authority and dignity which go with this possession, appears still to be
binding upon Japan. From this time onward, the Resident-General becomes
the uncrowned king of Korea.
In spite of this, and of all the other features of these reformed
relations which might seem offensive and humiliating to Korean
officialdom, it is altogether likely that no considerable disturbance
would anywhere have taken place, had it not been for the action of the
same disorderly and rebellious factors which occasioned the bloodshed
and confusion of Friday, July 19th.[109] These were the Korean troops
belonging to the barracks at Seoul. Let it be distinctly understood that
these troops were not disciplined soldiers; much less were they sincere
though misguided patriots. They were largely untrained rowdies, who cared
chiefly for the pay, prestige, and idle life which their employment as
so-called palace guards gave to them. At the time of the conclusion
of the Convention an understanding probably existed between the
Resident-General and the Korean Ministry, who were themselves threatened
with assassination and the defeat of all their work by these same armed
and unscrupulous fellows, that the Korean army should be disbanded.
Late on Wednesday night, July 31st, an Imperial rescript was issued
which ordered the disbandment of the Korean Army. The reason assigned
was the necessity of economizing all superfluous expenses and applying
the funds thus saved to material improvement. The existing army was
called “mercenaries”[110] and said to be “unfit for purposes of national
defense.” The intention was announced to remodel the entire military
system and, for the present time, to attend chiefly to the training of
officers for a national army in the future. A small select force was to
be retained as guardians of the Imperial House, and a gratuity in money
was to be bestowed upon every one of the disbanded troops, according
to rank. All the reasons here given for this action were quite in
accordance with the facts; but the most important of all was, of course,
concealed—namely, that the existing army was the most serious of all
menaces to good order and to peace. It was sure to be the tool, for
purposes of assassination, of the reactionary party.
Early the following morning—Thursday, July 31st—the superior officers
were summoned to the residence of General Hasegawa, where General Yi,
the Korean Minister of War, read to them the rescript of disbandment.
After conference it was decided that the non-commissioned officers
and men of all the battalions in Seoul should be marched without arms
to the parade ground inside the East Gate of the city and there be
dismissed after receiving their gratuities from the Emperor. They were
to be present for this purpose by ten o’clock of the same morning. Soon
after eight o’clock, as the Japanese instructor of the Korean Army was
engaged, in its barracks, in drawing up the first battalion of the
First Korean Regiment, a great noise of weeping and groaning was heard,
and the fact was made known that its commander had committed suicide.
This was the signal for the springing up of a great excitement, during
which the troops broke their ranks and threatened the Japanese officer
with a murderous attack. The mutiny spread at once to another battalion
occupying adjoining barracks. The mutineers then proceeded to break open
the magazines and, arming themselves, they rushed out of the barracks.
They thereupon posted sentinels around the barracks where the majority of
the forces still remained, who began to fire aimless shots from within
upon the passers-by. Meantime some of the troops ran away.
From this centre the mutiny spread, the mutineers rushing out from
the barracks to fire upon the Japanese officers who were conducting
to the parade ground the other Korean battalions; but soon after the
appointed time of ten o’clock all the Korean forces had reported there,
with the exception of the two mutinous battalions. The reduction of the
mutinous soldiers was no easy matter, for the main force was entrenched
behind stone walls near the centre of the city, and the Japanese forces
attacking them were much embarrassed by being fired upon by those of
the number who had rushed out from the barracks. But the use of several
machine guns—two of which, after being planted on the wall of the Great
South Gate, were trained so as to cover the advance of the Japanese
infantry—and a hand-to-hand fight with bayonets and hand-grenades at the
barracks soon reduced the mutinous Korean soldiers. By 10.50 A. M. the
barracks were completely in the hands of the Japanese. The casualties as
estimated in the official report of General Hasegawa were, on the side
of the Japanese, 3 killed, and 2 officers and 20 men wounded; on the
side of the Koreans, 11 officers and 57 men killed, and 100 officers and
men wounded. Korean officers and men, to the number of 516, were taken
prisoners. The best possible care was given to the wounded, both Koreans
and Japanese, in the government and missionary hospitals—Marquis Ito, and
his suite, and the prominent Japanese ladies belonging to the Red Cross
Society and Patriotic Associations, visiting them in the hospitals and
making generous contributions to their assistance and comfort.
In one respect, however, the Japanese military authorities made a mistake
which their hostile critics were not slow to seize upon and exaggerate to
the discredit of their management generally. It appears that the services
of some thirty civilians were volunteered and accepted to assist the
police and soldiers in searching for the fugitive mutineers. Much bad
blood had been stirred up between the two nationalities by the previous
unprovoked attack and murder of the Japanese police at the hands of
mutinous Korean soldiers. In the spirit of vengeance, therefore, there
was no doubt considerable return of excesses on the part of irresponsible
individuals among the Japanese civilian volunteers. Otherwise, the
very trying situation in which these revolts of the Korean military
forces placed the Japanese Government in Seoul was apparently met with
commendable moderation and skill.
One of the most noteworthy features of this entire disturbance was the
complete aloofness of the people of Seoul from any hostile demonstration
toward the Japanese. Within forty-eight hours of this battle between
their own disbanded troops and the foreign military, the city resumed its
normal appearance; the people went about their accustomed occupations;
the full tide of business began to flow as usual. Such behavior as this,
under anything resembling similar conditions, has seldom or never before
characterized the populace of Seoul. It must be interpreted as a hopeful
sign for the future good order and prosperity of the city.
The disbandment of the Korean provincial garrisons for the most part
proceeded quietly. But the disbanded soldiers in considerable numbers
allied themselves with other elements of riot and unrest, and local
disturbances of a more or less serious character continued to break out
and demand suppression by the police and the military, here and there
in various parts of the peninsula. This state of things continued for
weeks and, in a diminishing degree, for months following the Convention
of July, 1907. But the detailed account of these transactions does not
concern our narrative. Under the circumstances they may be considered
as temporary but unavoidable incidents in the practical solution of
this complex and difficult historical problem of the relations to be
established between Japan and Korea. Among the mutinous and riotous
outbreaks that at Kang-wha Island—the scene in the past of so many
acute conflicts between Korea and foreign nations—was typical and
also, perhaps, one of the most important. When the Japanese captain
in command of a detachment of Japanese troops, and accompanied by the
Korean commander of the native battalion at Suwon, arrived to disband
the Korean garrison and to distribute the gratuities, they were met by
a shower of bullets poured upon them while landing on the island. The
Korean mutineers retreated to the city of Kang-wha, where they were
joined by some 300 rioters. Under cover of the city walls they offered a
somewhat stubborn resistance to the attacking forces, but were finally
dislodged and fled in various directions. It was afterward learned that
the Korean troops, in defiance of their own officers, had broken open
the military magazine, murdered the magistrate of the island and several
policemen, and had then forced some hundreds of the citizens, by threats
of death, to join with them in fighting the Japanese. When the real
fighting began, they ran away.
The procedure at Kang-wha, we repeat, was typical. It is a specimen of
the Korean ancestral way of resisting every form of government. The
method of these “patriotic” uprisings was everywhere similar. Several
score or hundreds of Koreans, stirred and led by the disbanded soldiers,
came together, killed the Japanese—old men, women, and children—as well
as the police officials, shot some of their own countrymen, chiefly
those suspected of not being sufficiently violent in their anti-Japanese
sentiments, burned and plundered indiscriminately; and then when the
Japanese military or police approached in any formidable numbers they
ran away and hid themselves. In view of these disturbed conditions and
the alleged connection of some of their converts with these uprisings,
the missionaries were anew placed in a difficult and delicate situation.
This, however, like the greater number of similar previous trials, was
not primarily due to the Japanese Protectorate, but to the Koreans
themselves—Emperor, officials, and common people. There were numerous
plausible charges made against the missionaries and their converts of
harboring Korean rioters and even of lending countenance to the rioting
under the pretence of patriotism. There can be little doubt, however,
that these charges were, almost if not quite without exception, either
misunderstandings or malicious falsehoods. The misunderstandings were, in
view of the past, not altogether unreasonable; the falsehoods were such
as are encountered by the religious teacher wherever he seems to stand
in the way of unlimited greed or unchecked violence. On the whole, as
has already been said, there can be no doubt that the missionaries and
their Korean converts exerted a notable influence in favor of quietness,
peace, and the observance of law and order. That the native Christians
were alarmed, and stood in fear both of the Japanese and of their own
countrymen, was a thing to be expected. But probably their experience
in this time of trial with the behavior of these foreign policemen and
soldiers tended to diminish the native dislike and dread of the Japanese
Protectorate.
At once the strength of the reform party among the Koreans themselves
began to make itself felt under the terms of the new Convention. On the
date of August 15th an Imperial rescript forbade boys under seventeen
years of age, and girls under fifteen, from contracting marriages. The
same day the new Emperor proclaimed the purpose, which he afterward
carried out, to cut his hair on the occasion of his formal accession
to the throne and to dress himself in military uniform from that time.
The ex-Emperor, in spite of the fact that he had formerly been glad to
see his people excited to rebellion and murder by a similar proposal
for changing the fashion of the Korean gentleman’s head-dress, and in
spite also of the fact that weeping eunuchs and ancient Court officials
besought him not to proceed to such lengths in breaking with the past,
actually did subsequently join in the new custom. And when the deed
was done, His ex-Majesty was pleased to command the objectors to do
likewise, and to say for himself that the change was really not half so
bad as he had thought it would be. Now, although these are not trivial
matters in Korea, or mere straws which show the way of the blowing
of the wind, a more important result of the new Convention was this:
after due deliberation, the Cabinet Ministers decided that the young
son of Lady Om who had already been proclaimed Crown Prince, must in
future really attend to his lessons and become educated in some manner
befitting his future expectations. Although it was doubted whether His
Imperial Highness was not still too young to go to Japan for study, he
was required to begin the study of the Japanese language in addition to
English and Chinese. Left to the influence of the eunuchs and palace
women, he was sure to be debauched and ruined. Educated, he may easily
make the best sovereign Korea has enjoyed for centuries.
At once also the Resident-General began to mature the larger plans for
carrying out his purposes toward Korea which the new Convention made
possible. For now upon the Japanese Government in Korea rested the
responsibility, not only for the satisfactory and safe management of
the country’s foreign relations, but directly and more heavily than
ever before, the readjustment, reform, and successful management of all
its internal affairs. To report to the Emperor of Japan, and to consult
with His Majesty and with the Japanese Government about the form and
successful execution of the measures made necessary or desirable by the
new Convention, Marquis Ito paid a visit to his native land. Leaving
Seoul by special train for Chemulpo on the afternoon of August 11th, His
Excellency arrived at Oiso five days later; and on the Tuesday following,
August 20th, received at Shimbashi Station in Tokyo a reception, both by
the official class and by the crowds, such as has seldom or never been
accorded to a civilian before in the history of Japan. The reception
given to him by the Emperor, who had sent an Imperial Chamberlain to
intimate his desire to consult with the Resident-General, was scarcely
less unique.
In the many public addresses which followed, at the various banquets and
receptions given to the Marquis, he took pains to make it perfectly clear
that his benevolent intentions toward the Korean people had in no respect
suffered a change. Of himself he declared that he was neither elated in
spirit over the success of the new treaty, nor depressed in spirit before
the new difficulties which must be encountered. He wished his countrymen
to remember that the Korean problem was not political, not one of the
successful exploitation of a weaker nation by a stronger, but a question
of that policy which should be for the highest interests and best
welfare of both nations. The need of the hour was the need of men—both
Japanese and Koreans—who could stand in the places of responsibility and
influence, and discharge their duties faithfully, honestly, unselfishly.
The work which he had undertaken to do in Korea was only a beginning;
and on account of advancing age he must soon let it go from his hand.
At present, however, he was in harness and must remain so. When the
time came for him to resign, he hoped sincerely that some able and wise
successor in the office—now so increasingly responsible—of Japanese
Resident-General in Korea might somewhere be found.
This historical and critical sketch of the relations between the two
nations of Japan and Korea fitly closes with the visit of Marquis—now
Prince—Ito to Tokyo in August of 1907. The results to follow from the
plans which were then matured for the administration of the offices
of the Residency-General and for the more ultimate solution of the
delicate and complex problem of bringing about a state of affairs which
shall at the same time redeem Korea and deliver Japan from the constant
menace which the peninsula has hitherto been—and not only this, but
shall bind the two nations together in a common prosperity under terms
of friendship and good-will, are destined to form important items in
the future history of the Far East. It remains only to add that no one
who could have heard the firm and feeling-full declaration made to the
writer by His Excellency when the latter was on the eve of returning to
Seoul, would question the wisdom, honesty, or benevolence of the Japanese
Resident-General in Korea. As fast and far as _he_ can have his way, this
long-time misgoverned and wretched nation will be reformed and uplifted
to an unwonted economical and political prosperity.