III

Where then are we?

Clearly we have not really produced any new species in any correct sense

of the word. If we have produced new forms that breed true and that are

seemingly just as deserving of the rank of distinct species as many now

listed in scientific books, it only shows that our lists are sadly at

fault, and that they are not all species that are called species. These

experiments merely indicate that _the parent form possesses more

potential characters than it can give expression to in a single

individual form_, some of them being necessarily latent or hidden, and

that when these latent ones show themselves they must do so at the

expense of others which become latent or hidden in their turn. This

_vital elasticity_, as it may be termed, or the vital rebound under

definite conditions, is indeed a prime characteristic of the species

just as it is of the individual; but like that of the individual the

vital elasticity of the species is strictly bounded by comparatively

narrow limits beyond which we have never seen a single type pass under

either natural or artificial conditions. Mutations can be made according

to Mendel's Law; but when we have made them once _we can always be sure

of producing the_ _very same mutants again in the very same way_, as

surely as we produce a definite chemical compound; and when we have made

it _we can always resolve it at will back into its original form_, just

as we can a chemical compound. And so, where is the evolution? or how do

these facts throw any light on the problem of the origin of species, any

more than chemical compounds throw light on the origin of the elements?

Obviously in biology as in chemistry we are only working in a circle,

merely marking time.

And the bearing of these facts on the other problem of the transmission

of acquired characters is quite obvious. Mendelism provides no place for

any such transmission. Mendel's Law is sometimes called the law of

_alternative inheritance_, thus embodying in its name the thought that

offspring may show the characters possessed by one parent or by the

other, but that it cannot develop any characters whatever which were not

manifest or latent in the ancestry. Changes in the environment during

the embryonic stage, it is true, seem sometimes to be registered in the

growing form; but it has never yet been proved that these induced

changes can ever amount to a unit character or genetic factor that will

maintain itself and segregate as a distinct factor after hybridization.

Ancestry alone furnishes the material for the factor, and no amount of

induced change can get itself registered in the organism so as to come

into this charmed circle of ancestral characters which alone seem to be

passed on to posterity.

A quotation from Bateson ought to set this point at rest:

"The essence of the Mendelian principle is very easily expressed. It is,

first, that in great measure the properties of organisms are due to the

presence of distinct, detachable elements [factors], separately

transmitted in heredity; and secondly, that _the parent cannot pass on

to offspring an element, and consequently the corresponding property,

which it does not itself possess_."[28]

[Footnote 28: _Scientific American_ Sup., January 3, 1914.]

Heredity we now see is a method of analysis, and the facts brought to

light by Mendelism help us very much toward an understanding of living

matter. Especially does it help us to understand the complexity

underlying the facts of heredity, which until now have seemed so strange

and capricious. As Professor Punnett of Cambridge remarks:

"Constitutional differences of a radical nature may be concealed beneath

an apparent identity of external form. Purple sweet peas from the same

pod, indistinguishable in appearance and of identical ancestry, may yet

be fundamentally different in their constitution. From one may come

purples, reds, and whites; from another only purples and reds; from

another purples and whites alone; whilst a fourth will breed true to

purple. Any method of investigation which fails to take account of the

radical differences of constitution which may underlie external

similarity, must necessarily be doomed to failure. Conversely, we

realize to-day that individuals identical in constitution may yet have

an entirely different ancestral history. From the cross between two

fowls with rose and pea combs, each of irreproachable pedigree for

generations, come single combs in the second generation, _and these

singles are precisely similar in their behavior to singles bred from

strains of unblemished ancestry_. In the ancestry of the one is to be

found no single over a long series of years; in the ancestry of the

other nothing but singles occurred. The creature of given constitution

may often be built up in many ways, but once formed it will behave like

others of the same constitution."[29]

[Footnote 29: Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. XVIII, p. 119.]

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