_The Defences of Canada._
In February and March, 1865, I spoke in the House of Commons on the
general question of the defences of Canada; and, also, on the special
vote (carried by a majority of 235) of 50,000_l_. for the
fortifications of Quebec. The first of these speeches was delivered on
the 13th March, 1865; the second on the 23rd March. On the second
occasion I was followed by Lord Palmerston; and I commend his speech,
pithy and decisive as it was, to the statesmen who have to deal with
our Imperial relations with Canada, and with her Canadian Pacific
Railway.
"Hansard" reports that,--
"Mr. WATKIN said that having, like the right hon. gentleman the member
for Calne, visited Canada not once but frequently, he felt unable to
corroborate the description given of Quebec; nor could he agree as to
what had been said of other places. The fortifications of Quebec were
not those of the days of Wolfe; they had been systematically enlarged
and strengthened. Quebec, naturally a position of enormous strength,
was now most efficiently fortified, and so far from the nature of the
surrounding country exposing it to attack, that country presented
features enabling the speedy and easy construction of additional works
rendering the fortress impregnable. In fact, it might easily be made
the strongest work upon the continent. Nor was it fair to say, as the
gallant member opposite had declared, that the guns were all antiquated
and the gun-carriages rotten. It was true that many of the guns were
old, but newer ordnance had been supplied; there were abundant stores
of shot, shell, and rockets, and a considerable number of Armstrong
guns had been received at the citadel very recently. Canada could be
made capable of defence, without difficulty, though, of course, not
without cost. No one would contend that the defence of Canada, if an
Imperial duty, was simply an Imperial liability. Every one would admit
that the colony should contribute, both in times of peace and of war,
its fair share of the burden. Independence and defence were co-existent
ideas, and Canada, desiring to be free of foreign control, should, and
he hoped would, be ready to defray her just and honest share of the
burden. He took this as admitted on all hands and on both sides of the
Atlantic. His objection, then, to the proposal of the Government was
that it was not worthy of that emergency which alone could justify the
policy of the fortification of a frontier. But the question really
before the House was not one of the extent of territory to defend, but
plainly this--Was this House, was the country, ready to abandon--to
alienate for ever from the British Crown--the vast expanse of territory
lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans? There was no half-way
house between 'cutting the painter,' as one or two hon. gentlemen near
him now and then suggested, in conversation only, as regarded Canada,
and severing all connection, now and for ever, with Prince Edward's
Island, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada, on the
east; British Columbia, one of the most thriving and hopeful of the
British possessions, on the west; and that vast intermediate country
known as the 'Hudson's Bay Territory,' which they were told contained
within itself fertile land enough to sustain 50,000,000 of people--and
holding on to the Queen's possessions. Hon. gentlemen near him should
remember their geography a little, and they would cease to speak of
Canada as more than a section of that northern continent over which the
Queen of Great Britain ruled, and which comprised an area larger than
that of the Federal and Confederate States put together. Now what was
that great property? He could not describe it better than in the
language of the United States. If the House would refer to the report
on the Reciprocity Treaty laid before the House of Representatives at
Washington in 1862 by Mr. Ward, they would find a glowing description
of the vast extent, the wonderful means of internal navigation, the
richness of mineral resources, the bracing healthiness of climate, and
the immense extent of fertile soil which British North America
contained. The report said:--'The great and practical value of the
British North American Provinces and possessions is seldom appreciated.
Stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, they contain an
area of at least 3,478,380 square miles--more than is owned by the
United States, and not much less than the whole of Europe, with its
family of nations.' And, again, it said--'The climate and soil of these
Provinces and possessions, seemingly less indulgent than those of
tropical regions, are precisely those by which the skill, energy, and
virtues of the human race are best developed. Nature there demands
thought and labour from man as conditions of his existence, and yields
abundant rewards to a wise industry.' Indeed, the warmth of language
used irresistibly suggested the idea that the people of the United
States, with whom the love of territory was a passion, were disposed to
cast a covetous eye upon these possessions of old England. Now, knowing
something of America, he must express his belief that there was no very
imminent danger of war with the United States. The issues of peace and
war, however, depended upon the attitude of that House and of the
country. Weakness never promoted peace, and an uncertain and half-
hearted attitude was provocative of war. This country had, he believed,
the desire to preserve its power and influence on the American
continent. It was for the good of mankind that the rule of the British
Crown and the influence of the wisely-regulated liberty of Britain and
of the British Constitution should continue. The way to prevent war was
not to talk of severing the connection with Canada or of withdrawing
our troops from Canada for fear they should be caught in a net, but to
announce boldly but calmly, in language worthy of the traditions of
that House, that these vast American possessions are integral parts of
the great British Empire, and come weal, come woe, would be defended to
the last. If that language were held there would be no war in America.
The only danger arose from impressions produced by speeches in that
House and elsewhere, leading to the belief that we were indifferent to
our duties or our interests on the American Continent; for we had
duties as well as interests. Those who thus spoke--humanitarians by
profession--could support the continuance of a war which, in his humble
opinion, disgraced the civilization of our time; and, while professing
to be Liberals, they were ready to thrust out from our Imperial home of
liberty the populations of some of our most important possessions to
satisfy some imaginary economical theory of saving. They spoke of the
Empire as if it were this mere island, and they seemed enchanted with
the idea of narrowing our boundaries everywhere. That was not a
question of simple arithmetic, it was a question of empire; not a
question of a single budget, but a question of the future destiny of
our race. These gentlemen seemed to prefer to live in a small country.
For his part, he hoped he should all his life live in a great one. No
country could be stationary without becoming stagnant, or restrict its
natural progress without inviting its decay. It was so in all human
affairs; it was so even in ordinary business. Every man of business
knew that if his enterprise ceased to grow bigger, it soon began to
dwindle down; and so a country must grow greater or else must slide
away to weakness, until at last it would be despised. Now the
Government proposed to spend 50,000_l_. at Quebec;
50,000_l_., he repeated, was really nothing if it were necessary
to carry out the fortification policy at all. He had two objections to
make. One was, that Quebec was not the vulnerable point; that point was
Montreal. Montreal was the key to Canada. Once holding that key, the
enemy would cut Canada in two--would separate Upper and Lower Canada
from each other. Yet the Government proposed to leave all that to the
unaided resources of Canada--to do nothing, in fact, where, if action
were necessary at all, that action was pressing and imperative. He
should deplore to see this country commencing and carrying on a
competition of expenditure on fortifications with the United States.
The results must be, as he warned the House, excessive votes of money,
of which this one was only the small beginning, and an entire change in
the nature of those relations which had so happily subsisted between
the United States and the British North American possessions. Let the
House remember the case of France. England and France had for years
been running a race of competition of this kind. If France raised a new
regiment, or added a new ship of war, or built an ironclad, or erected
a fortress, we must do the same. And thus it had been that the forces
still remained on a measure of some sort of equality, notwithstanding a
vast outlay, which had crippled the resources of both countries, and
here at home had delayed fiscal reform and retarded, nay even
prevented, the most obvious measures for the elevation and education of
our people. Were we to play the same game over again with the States?
Now, as regards the great lakes and water ways of America, possessing a
coast line of above 3,000 miles, we had since 1817 neutralized these
waters as regards armaments. Under that truly blessed arrangement, the
sound of a hostile shot, or even of a shot fired for practice, had
never been heard now for nearly half a century. Here was a precedent of
happy history and worthy of all gratitude and of all imitation. Now, if
they were to fortify, let it be done adequately, whatever the cost.
That cost would, he repeated, be great and also uncertain. Now he would
venture to make a suggestion to the Government. It was to try
negociation. Place before the minds of American statesmen the
neutralization of the lakes and ask if the frontiers could not be
neutralized also. Was it not possible that if Her Majesty's Government
took Brother Jonathan in a quiet mood, he might be disposed to save his
own pocket and thereby to save ours, and unite with us to set a bright
example to surrounding nations? The people of the United States had
their faults and we had ours; but they were distinguished by their
common sense. No people had more of it. This suggestion would, he
thought, come home to it; for they would argue, if we lay out millions
so will the British, and, after all, it is merely adding burdens to
both and not really strength or dignity to either. Let the Government
try. If they failed the trial would have shown them to be just and in
the right. If they succeeded how happy would it be for us. Reference
had been made by the right hon. gentleman to the fortifications at New
York, Boston, and Portland; but no one had mentioned a very strong work
within forty miles of Montreal itself. He had seen that work. It was
called 'Fort Montgomery,' and there was a railway all the way from it
to Montreal. It was now very strong. He believed it had embrasures for
some 200 guns. All the time this war had been going on, this work had
been going on also. Now this looked like menace. Our Government had
been informed about it, but he failed to find that they had made any
representation to Washington. Surely they might have said, and would
have been justified in saying to a friendly nation--'If you must have
200 guns 40 miles from Montreal, we must have 250 at Montreal; and
whatever you do, we must imitate--therefore, why should either of us
lay out our money?' But Government had done nothing; and now, before
attempting any negociation, they asked the House to agree to make
fortifications. He had humbly offered a suggestion to the Government.
Let them take one of two decided courses. Let them deal firmly and
wisely with the question. Let them state, in no spirit of offence, to
the United States that, as Canada was part of the British Empire, we
would defend it at all cost; or let them endeavour to induce the
Government of Washington to distinguish itself for ever by adopting the
alternative--the neutralization of the lakes and the avoidance of
hostile fortifications on both sides of the frontier."
The second speech is reported as follows:
"Mr. WATKIN, member for Stockport, said, that he felt concerned to hear
the United States so often spoken of in the debate as 'the enemy;' and
if he thought that the vote before the committee would in any manner
increase international irritation, he should regret his vote in favour
of the proposition of the Government. As it was, he felt that he could
not quite agree with the policy the vote indicated. That policy was one
of armament against an enemy. The proposition, in his opinion, went
either too far or not far enough. It did not go far enough to inspire
undoubted confidence and to deter attack by providing for absolute
defence; and still it went far enough to raise suspicion and to excite
or to aggravate a frontier feeling. But he thought that our actual
relations with the United States were guiding considerations in
reference to the policy of this vote. Government ought, therefore, to
tell the House how far they could repeat the peaceful assurances of a
former debate. Did the despatches by the mail just arrived tend towards
peace or misunderstanding? Was it true, on one side, that formal notice
had a few days ago been given to our Government by the United States to
terminate the Reciprocity Treaty? and was it true that that notice had
been entirely unaccompanied by any overture or suggestion for a re-
discussion of the question? On the other and more friendly side, was it
true that the vexatious passport system had been abrogated? and, above
all, was it also true that the Government of Washington had expressed
to Her Majesty's Government their intention to revoke the notice to
terminate the arrangement of 1817, and to place gunboats on the great
American lakes? If this was true, and if it should also appear that the
notice to put an end to the Reciprocity Treaty had either not yet been
given or had been accompanied by some friendly declaration of a desire
to negociate anew, the House must receive the intelligence with
satisfaction; but should it, unfortunately, be the fact that non-
intercourse regulations were maintained, that the lakes were to be
covered by armaments, and that international trade was to be interfered
with, then he thought the House would consider the question as one
affecting a hostile neighbour, whose unfriendly designs had to be met
by preparation. He hoped, therefore, that the right hon. gentleman
would give the House all the information at his command. Had he been in
possession of all the facts, he should have been disposed to move as an
amendment that it was inexpedient to consider a vote of money for the
construction of fortifications adjoining the United States frontier
until negociations had been undertaken and had failed, with a view to
the suspension of such works under treaty obligation. He was strongly
in favour of negociation. There was an example and precedent in the
arrangement of 1817 for the neutralization of the lakes. That peaceful
compact had endured for fifty years, and had alike saved the expense
and obviated the dangers attending rival navies on the great internal
waters of America. It was self-evident that we must either fortify
efficiently or let it alone. The United States could not fail to see
that if they laid out large sums on permanent works of defence, we must
do the same; while if we voted money, they must follow us. And thus
while both countries made themselves poorer in the process, neither
became much stronger, because a sort of equilibrium of forces would
after all be maintained. The Government at Washington surely had no
present desire to enter upon a race of expenditure for military works
on both sides of the frontier. If they had, the sooner we knew it the
better, for then the House would only have one course, however they
might deplore it, to pursue. But here was a case where the common sense
of the American people could, he thought, be appealed to not in vain.
Instead of fortifying, let us neutralize the frontier--let us agree to
do away with the expenditure. [Mr. BRIGHT: On both sides the frontier?]
Yes, on both sides. If the American people were appealed to as the hon.
member for Rochdale appealed to the Emperor of the French in favour of
the French treaty, he believed that similar earnestness and tact could
bring about an arrangement. The Government at Washington would thereby
set an example to all countries having long frontier lines, and a
precedent would be established of inestimable value to the world. What
could be more deplorable than to substitute for neutrality and the
operation of the Reciprocity Treaty an armed frontier and practical
non-intercourse? He had before stated, from much personal observation
on the spot, that border feeling and jealousy had hardly an existence
as between the people of our possessions, and of the United States; but
so soon as rival fortresses, frowned at each other on both sides of the
line, and an armed truce were, so to speak, established, all the
feelings and prejudices of separate nationality would grow up in
abundance. The free exchanges of industry would, perhaps, be at the
same time arrested, and war itself might not be impossible. The
Reciprocity Treaty practically made the people of the United States and
of the British North American possessions, each living under a totally
different form of government, one for all purposes of trade and
intercourse. Why should they be separated? But unfortunately our
Government did not appreciate the value of, or they did not appear
disposed to undertake, negociations. Instead of endeavouring to come to
some friendly understanding first, they came down to the House and
asked for a vote of money, enough to change the aspect of discussion
with the United States, but not enough to effectually protect from
danger. They would spend money first, he supposed, and then negotiate;
they would allow some great evil to happen, and remonstrate afterwards.
The difficulties in Canada might have been avoided by previous
precaution. The threatened notice to put an end to the treaty, which
grew out of those difficulties, might have been avoided by a renewal of
the engagement two years ago. But the Government had done nothing. They
had been--how many months?--without a Minister at Washington at the
most critical period of our relations with the United States. Now it
was proposed to send out a gentleman of many attainments, but who
certainly was not of the first order of diplomatists. Was he gone? [Mr.
BRIGHT: They say he goes to-morrow.] His hon. friend the member for
Birmingham said he was to leave to-morrow. Hitherto all the interests
of this country had been left in the hands of Mr. Burnley, who, if only
from his position, was not able to meet on equal terms the able men of
whom Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet was composed. Ever since the 17th December a
vexatious system of passports and consular regulations as to
merchandize had been in force. These regulations were probably in force
now. They had seriously impeded trade, produced uncertainty and alarm,
and great losses to individuals. They had also created great
exasperation; yet during all this time we had no ambassador at
Washington. Since he entered the House, a letter, by the mail just in,
had been placed in his hands, and he would, with the permission of the
House, read an extract from it. The writer, under date Portland, March
11th, says:--'Some eighteen passengers, per "Belgian," arrived here
without passports for Canada. The United States Government, by order of
General Dix, has detained them, and sent a squad of soldiers to guard
them on board the "Belgian." At this time of writing they are still in
custody, one of them being a clergyman. Only fancy, United States
soldiers taking charge of an English ship and English subjects! This is
carrying the matter with a high hand.' Now, he did not believe that the
Government of the United States had purposely and of malice
aforethought committed this outrage, nor did he speak of it to increase
irritation; but did it not show how wrong the Government had been in
leaving the interests of this country so long without representation?
What, in fact, was the use of an embassy at all if our ambassador was
not at his post? The Embassy at Washington was now the most important
of our diplomatic establishments abroad. We ought to place there the
ablest man we could find, regardless of all party or personal
considerations. The people of the United States knew our own estimate
of our own officials well, and they took it as a slight if we did not
send to Washington a man of the first rank as a diplomatist. He would
appeal to the noble lord at the head of the Government to consider the
suggestion he had ventured to make, and not to allow the country to
embark, without any attempt at negociation, in an expenditure of which
this was but the first beginning if the policy of it should be forced
upon the House. Our fellow-subjects in Canada ought to be assured that,
if an unjust war broke out, this country would stand by them at all
hazards; but that assurance was quite consistent with the attempt
which, he hoped, would be made after all, to neutralize the frontier
and the lakes and to re-establish the Reciprocity Treaty. The House
would, he felt assured, do nothing to raise up bitter feelings between
the British Provinces and the United States, nor to alienate still
further two peoples of common origin, who, for the sake of civilization
itself, ought, as far as possible, to be one and united in the
interests of commerce and of peace."
"Lord PALMERSTON: Sir, this is not a Canadian question, it is not a
local question, it is an Imperial question. It is a question which
affects the position and character, the honour, the interests, and the
duties of this great country; and I hold it to be of the utmost
importance to the character of the nation in a case like this, and when
the great majority of the House seem to be of the same opinion, that it
should not go forth to the world that there has been a difference of
opinion on this motion; but that it should be seen to have been
accepted by a unanimous House of Commons. Sir, there are one or two
points with regard to which I think it right to express my dissent from
some doctrines which have been laid down. Many gentlemen have argued
this question as if there was a general impression and belief that war
with the United States was imminent, and that this proposal of ours was
for the purpose of meeting a sudden danger which we apprehended to be
hanging over us. Now, I think there is no danger of war with America.
Nothing that has recently passed indicates any hostile disposition on
the part of the United States towards us; and, therefore, I do not base
this motion on the ground that we expect war to take place between this
country and America. But is it necessary that when you propose to put a
country in a state of defence you should show that war with some
powerful neighbour is imminent and likely soon to take place? Why, the
whole practice of mankind is founded on an entirely different
assumption. Every country which is able to do so fortifies its frontier
if its neighbour is a powerful state, which might, if it thought fit,
attack it. But it is said that you cannot defend Canada. Now, I utterly
deny that proposition. I think that is assuming a conclusion which no
man is entitled to assume. Does the example even of the war now going
on tend to justify that conclusion? The territory of the Confederates
is vast and extensive; have they attempted to defend every portion of
that territory? They have fortified certain important points, and those
important points, although the rest of the country may have been
overrun, have resisted attack--some of them even to this day and others
for three or four years of the contest. Look at Richmond; is Richmond
taken? Has not Richmond been attacked for a great length of time? And
what are its defences? Why, chiefly earthworks, with a force behind
them; and, though that force is inferior in numbers to the force which
threatens it, it has hitherto remained in Confederate hands. The mere
occupation of territory by an army that traverses through it without
reducing its fortresses is no conquest. The conquest is limited to the
ground that the invading army occupies, and when that army passes to
another part of the country its conquest passes away with it. But all
countries fortify particular points, and when those points are secure
they trust that the general bulk of the territory is safe from any
permanent occupation or conquest by any enemy who may attack it. It is
urged that Canada has an extended frontier; but are no other States
similarly placed in that respect? What country has the largest
frontier? What is the extent of our own frontier? Why, the whole coast
of the United Kingdom; and we might as well say that it would be
necessary for the security of this country that we should line our
whole coast with defensive works because we may be attacked at any
point of that great and extensive frontier. I maintain, therefore, that
there is nothing that has passed--nothing that is now passing--between
the Government of the United States and our Government which justifies
any man in saying that the relations between the two countries are
likely, as far as present circumstances go, to assume a character of
hostility leading to war. But, then, the hon. member for Birmingham
says that any danger which might threaten Canada and our North American
Provinces must arise from political disputes between England and the
United States. And, therefore, the hon. gentleman says the Canadians
will find that their best security is, not in fortifications or in
British support, but in separating themselves from Great Britain. Now,
in the first place, that happens not to be the wish or inclination of
the Canadians. The Canadians are most anxious to maintain the
connection with this country. They are proud of that connection; they
think it for their interest; they are willing to make every exertion
that their population and resources enable them to achieve, and, in
conjunction with the efforts of this country, to preserve that
connection, and prevent themselves from being absorbed by a
neighbouring power. Is it not, therefore, alike the duty and interest
of this country, for the sake of that reputation which is the power and
strength of a nation, when we find the Canadas and our other Provinces
desirous of maintaining the connection, to do that which we may have
the means of doing in assisting them to maintain that connection and
remain united with Great Britain? But, sir, is it true that the only
danger which a smaller colonial state runs from a more powerful and
larger neighbour arises from quarrels that may exist between the Mother
Country and the foreign state? I say that is a total fallacy. Suppose
these provinces separated from this country--suppose them erected into
a monarchy, a republic, or any other form, of Government, are there not
motives that might lead a stronger neighbour to pick a quarrel with
that smaller state with a view to its annexation? Is there nothing like
territorial ambition pervading the policy of great military states? The
example of the world should teach us that as far as the danger of
invasion and annexation is concerned, that danger would be increased to
Canada by a separation from Great Britain, and when she is deprived of
the protection that the military power and resources of this country
may afford. If these American Provinces should desire to separate, we
should not adopt the maxim that fell unconsciously from the hon. member
for Birmingham, who maintained that the North was right in suppressing
the rebellion of the South; we will not adopt his maxim, and think that
we have a right to suppress the rebellion of the North American
Provinces. We should take a different line, no doubt, and if these
Provinces felt themselves strong enough to stand upon their own ground,
and if they should desire no longer to maintain their connection with
us, we should say, 'God speed you and give you the means to maintain
yourselves as a nation!' That has not happened; but, on the contrary,
they much dislike the notion of annexation to their neighbours and
cling to their connection with this country. And I say that it will be
disgraceful to this country--it would lower us in the eyes of the
world--it would weaken our power and leave consequences injurious to
our position in the world if, while they desire to maintain their
connection with us, we did not do what we could to assist them in
maintaining their position. I think that the Government are perfectly
right in proposing this vote to the House. We are of opinion that all
those examples which my right hon. friend behind me (Mr. Lowe) has
adduced are not applicable. We all know that in winter the snow is so
deep in Canada that if an army should march it could only be in one
beaten track, and that it would be impossible to carry on siege
operations in winter. We know that warlike operations must be limited
to the summer months, and we think that we can, by the fortifications
now proposed--some to be made by the Canadians and some by this
country--put Canada into such a state of defence that, with the
exertions of her own population, and assisted by the military force of
this country, she will be able to defend herself from attack. My right
hon. friend the member for Calne argued in a manner somewhat
inconsistent with himself, for what did he say? He says that you cannot
defend Canada because the United States can bring a military force into
the field much superior to that which you can oppose to them. Yet the
right hon. gentleman says we ought to defend Canada. You ought not to
relinquish the connection, he says, but you should defend Canada
elsewhere. Where? Why, as you are not able to cope with the United
States in Canada, where you have a large army, and where you can join
your forces to those of the Canadians, you should send an expedition
and attack the people of the United States in their own homes and in
the centre of their own resources, where they can bring a larger force
to repel our invasion. If we are unable to defend Canada, we shall not
have much better prospects of success if we land an army to attack New
York or any other important city."