THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE TAKEN FROM SIR PERCY
LAKE'S DESPATCH TO THE WAR OFFICE, PUBLISHED
OCTOBER, 1916.
_It will be noticed that it differs from the private accounts in one or
two particulars._
_1st phase--January 19--23._
After the battle of Wadi River General Aylmer's leading troops had
followed the retreating Turks to the Umm-el-Hannah position, and
entrenched themselves at the mouth of the defile, so as to shut the
enemy in and limit his power of taking the offensive.
The weather at this period was extraordinarily unfavourable. Heavy
rains caused the river to come down in flood and overflow its banks,
and converted the ground on either bank into a veritable bog.
Our bridge across the Wadi was washed away several times, while the
boisterous winds greatly interfered with the construction of a bridge
across the Tigris, here some 400 yards in width.
It was essential to establish Artillery on the right bank of the
Tigris, so as to support, by enfilading fire, the attack of our
Infantry against the Hannah position.
Guns and troops were ferried across, with difficulty, owing to the
high wind and heavy squalls of rain, but by the 19th all troops
allotted to the right bank had crossed over and were established in
the positions from which they were required to co-operate with the
main force on the left bank.
Meanwhile, the leading Infantry Brigades on the left bank had pushed
nearer the enemy. January 20th was devoted to a systematic bombardment
of his position, and during the night the Infantry pushed forward
their advanced line to within 200 yards of the enemy's trenches.
On the morning of the 21st, under cover of an intensive Artillery
bombardment, our Infantry moved to the attack. On our right the troops
got to within 100 yards of the enemy's line, but were unable to
advance further. Our left column, consisting of the Black Watch, 6th
Jats, and 41st Dogras, penetrated the front line with a rush,
capturing trenches, which they held for about an hour and a half.
Supports were sent forward, but, losing direction and coming under
heavy fire, failed to reach them. Thus, left unsupported, our
previously successful troops, when Turkish counter-attacks developed,
were overwhelmed by numbers and forced to retire.
Heavy rain now began to fall and continued throughout the day.
Telephone communication broke down, and communication by orderly
became slow and uncertain.
After further artillery bombardment the attack was renewed at 1 p.m.,
but by this time the heavy rain had converted the ground into a sea of
mud, rendering rapid movement impossible. The enemy's fire was heavy
and effective, inflicting severe losses, and though every effort was
made, the assault failed.
Our troops maintained their position until dark and then slowly
withdrew to the main trenches which had been previously occupied, some
1,300 yards from those of the enemy.
As far as possible all the wounded were brought in during the
withdrawal, but their sufferings and hardships were acute under the
existing climatic conditions, when vehicles and stretcher-bearers
could scarcely move in the deep mud.
To renew the attack on the 22nd was not practicable. The losses on the
21st had been heavy, the ground was still a quagmire and the troops
exhausted. A six hours' armistice was arranged in order to bury the
dead and remove the wounded to shelter.
I cannot sufficiently express my admiration for the courage and dogged
determination of the force engaged. For days they bivouacked in
driving rain on soaked and sodden ground. Three times they were called
upon to advance over a perfectly flat country, deep in mud, and
absolutely devoid of cover, against well-constructed and well-planned
trenches, manned by a brave and stubborn enemy approximately their
equal in numbers. They showed a spirit of endurance and self-sacrifice
of which their country may well be proud.
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