It seems odd to get just now your letter answering my arguments
_against_ the advance to Baghdad. They were twofold (1) Military, that
we should not have the force to hold it and our communications would
be too vulnerable. These objections have been largely met (_a_) by
large reinforcements, which will nearly double our forces when they
are all up, (_b_) by the monitors--the second is here now; they solve
the communication problem. I think now it will take a fresh Army Corps
from Constantinople to dislodge us: and I now hear that the
difficulties of _its_ communications would be very great. (2)
Politically. I thought the occupation of Baghdad would cause trouble
(_a_) with Russia, (_b_) with Indian soldiers, (_c_) with Moslems
generally. Here again (_a_) P. tells me Russia is giving us a free
hand, (_b_) trouble did occur with some Indian Regiments, but it took
the mild form of a strike, and the disaffected units have been
dispersed by Coys. over the lines of communication. (_c_) As regards
Moslems in India, I think I was wrong. The bold course, even to
bluffing, generally pays with Orientals. We have incurred their
resentment by fighting Turkey and on the whole we had better regain
their respect by beating her. Of course we shall respect their
religious feelings and prejudices in every practicable way.
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