I do hope your "fifty submarines" is true. I shan't think much of you
if you can't get official confirmation from Cousin Arthur: but if he
is impenetrably discreet, you might at least get him to explain--or
pass it on to me if you know already--what conceivable harm it could
do if we published the bare numbers of submarines "accounted for"
without any particulars of when, where, or how.
As for this campaign it is the old story of the Empire repeating
itself. When it began they only meant to secure the oil-pipe and
protect British interests at Basra. But they found to their great
surprise that you can't stay comfortably on the lower waters of a
great river with an enemy above you any more than you could live in a
flat with the lodger above continually threatening your life. A river
like the Tigris or Euphrates is a unit, and the power which occupies
its mouth will inevitably be drawn to its source unless it meets the
boundaries of a strong and civilised state on the way. Turkey will be
neither after the war.
What has happened so far?
[Sidenote: Dec.-Jan.]
We occupied the Shattal-Arab as far as Kurnah. We sat still. The
Turks, based on Nasiriyah attacked us and nearly recaptured Basra.
[Sidenote: April]
We beat them at Shaiba, and for safety's sake had to push them from
their base.
[Sidenote: May]
Then the double advance to Amarah and Nasiriyah.
[Sidenote: July]
We pushed the Turks out, and they promptly reformed at Kut and
prepared to threaten us again. So we pushed forward again and beat
them at Kut.
[Sidenote: September]
Now they have reformed at a point, only twenty miles from ----, their
present base. We shall go for them there no doubt, and push them back
once more. But what does it all lead to? Imagine peace restored. What
will Turkey be like? She will be bankrupt, chaotic, totally incapable
of keeping order among these murderous Bedouins. The country would be
a second Persia under her. Persia is intolerable enough for the
Europeans who trade there at present: but the plight of this country
might easily be worse. We are bound to control the bit from Basra to
the sea to protect existing interests. The whole future of that
area--as of all Mesopotamia--depends on a scientific scheme of
drainage and irrigation. At present half the country is marsh and half
desert. Why? Because under Turkish rule the river is never dredged,
the banks are never repaired, stray Arabs can cut haphazard canals and
leave them to form marshes, and so on. Now an irrigation and drainage
scheme is vitally necessary, but (1) it involves a large outlay; (2)
to be effective it must start a long way up-stream; (3) there must be
security for the good government _not only_ of the area included in
the scheme, but of the whole course of the river above it. These
Asiatic rivers are tricky things: they run for hundreds of miles
through alluvial plains which are as flat as your hand. Here at
Amarah, 200 miles from the mouth of the Tigris, we are only 28ft.
above sea-level. Consequently the river's course is very easily
altered. Look at Stanford's map of this region and see how the
Euphrates has lost itself between Nasiriyah and Basra--"old channel,"
"new channel," creeks, marshes, lakes, flood-areas and so on; the
place is a nightmare. That kind of thing is liable to happen anywhere
if the river is neglected. So that our schemes for Lower Mesopotamia
might be spoilt by the indolence of those in possession higher up the
river: let alone the security of the trade-routes which would be at
the mercy of wild Arabs if Turkey collapses.
All this inclines me more and more to believe that we shall be forced,
sooner or later, to occupy the whole Mesopotamian plain as far as
Mosul or to whatever point is the southern limit of Russian control.
At first I favoured a "neutral zone" from Mosul to Kut, and I
shouldn't be surprised if that plan still finds favour at home. But
frankly I see no prospect of a strong enough Government to make the
neutral zone workable; on the contrary everything points to the
absorption of the Persian neutral zone by either us or Russia,
probably us.
I am still a Captain, but no longer a Coy. Commander. A large draft
from India has arrived, 11 officers and 319 men from 1/4th and 2/4th,
invalids returned. I am now second in command of a Coy. of respectable
size.
* * * * *