THE DEFEAT OF THE CONCILIATION BILL
"Keep on ploughing when you've missed crops,
Keep on dancing when the fiddle stops,
Keep on faithful till the curtain drops,
And you'll get there in the morning."
(_With acknowledgments to the Trent Otter._)
Suffragists had entered upon the Session of 1912 with two strings to
their bow. The first was a definite promise from the Prime Minister
of a week, or more if necessary, of parliamentary time for the Second
Reading and all the necessary subsequent stages of the Conciliation
Bill.
The second string was embodied in the series of promises given by Mr.
Asquith to the suffrage deputation described in the last chapter.
These promises we had been assured by Mr. Lloyd George were of the
very utmost value; to cast doubt upon them was "an imputation of deep
dishonour" which he vehemently repudiated. Sir Edward Grey shared
Mr. Lloyd George's opinion, and assured us that we now had "a real
opportunity" of victory.
Our first struggle was over the Second Reading of the Conciliation
Bill, and it was not long before we discovered that the dice were being
loaded against us. We had, however, in our favour the big majorities
for the Bill in 1910 and 1911, the promises and past support of M.P.'s
of all the parties, numbering more than half the House of Commons. This
position seemed too strong to be abandoned, and we therefore encouraged
our friends in the House to ballot for a day for the Second Reading.
The 28th of March was secured. The text and title of the Bill were
exactly the same as had been read a second time the previous year by a
majority of 167.
As the day for the Second Reading approached we became aware that
all kinds of new influences hostile to us were in operation. These
were for the most part in the nature of Lobby gossip, and, not being
publicly made, could not be publicly refuted. One, however, had been
made public—viz., Mr. MacCallum Scott's appeal to Liberals, published
in the _Standard_, as mentioned in the last chapter, not to allow their
leader, Mr. Asquith, to be subjected to "the humiliation" of having
to fulfil the promises he had given to suffragists in the previous
November. This method of detaching Liberal M.P.'s from the support
of the Bill was very freely used. It was said that if this Bill were
carried it would break up the Ministry, and in particular it was widely
rumoured that the Prime Minister and other antisuffrage members of
the Government would resign. These rumours were never contradicted.
Mr. Lloyd George's name was also freely used in this connection.
Had he not openly expressed his dislike of the Bill? He had spoken
against it in 1910; and in his speech at Bath in November, 1911, he
had boasted that it had been "torpedoed" by the promise of a wider
measure. The Irish Nationalists were peculiarly susceptible to the line
of argument that the success of women's suffrage would mean the break
up of the Government. The Home Rule Bill had been passed in all its
stages twice by the House of Commons in two successive Sessions, but it
required, under the Parliament Act, to be passed three times in three
successive Sessions before it could be placed on the Statute Book,
notwithstanding its rejection by the House of Lords. The continued
violence of the militants—smashing windows, slashing the canvas of
valuable pictures, burning the contents of letter-boxes, letting off
explosives in empty churches, etc.—caused intense irritation and
resentment among the general public, and afforded an excuse to those
M.P.'s who had promised their support to our movement to break their
word. On March 28th thirteen members of the Labour Party were absent
in their constituencies in consequence of the labour unrest connected
with the coal strike. The result of this combination of unfavourable
conditions resulted in the defeat of the Bill by a majority of 14.
Our Labour supporters could have saved the Bill had they been present
in their full strength. It was a heavy disappointment, and the utmost
was of course made of it by the antisuffragists, including, first and
foremost, Mr. Asquith.
Analyzing the causes of our defeat, we found that, whereas in 1911
thirty-one followers of Mr. John Redmond had supported the Bill,
including Mr. William Redmond, Professor Kettle, Mr. Stephen Gwynn,
and other men in a leading position in their party, in 1912 not a
single one voted for it. The only Irish Nationalists who continued
their support to the Bill were three O'Brienites, Mr. William O'Brien
himself, Mr. Timothy Healy, and Mr. Gilhooley. Twenty-two Liberals,
twelve Nationalists, and eight Conservatives, who had hitherto
supported the Bill, now voted against it. A far larger number withdrew
their support, but did not give a hostile vote.
What perturbed us more than anything else was the knowledge that
the same underhand and unscrupulous methods which had been used to
defeat the Conciliation Bill would also in all probability be used
to defeat the women's suffrage amendments to the Government Reform
Bill. We appealed, quite unsuccessfully, to our leading friends in the
Government to check these hostile influences.
One outstanding instance of the methods employed against us must here
be described. Some years before, Dr. Louisa Martindale, a lady of the
highest character and professional standing, belonging to a family
universally respected in their place of residence in the South of
England, had written a book called "Beneath the Surface." It was, in
a far briefer form, on the lines of Mr. A. Flexner's well-known book
on the History of Prostitution in Europe. It was in part historical
and in part a warning to men and women of the physical risks connected
with promiscuous sexual intercourse, and its dangers to the race as
well as to the individual. The literature department of the N.U.W.S.S.
stocked this volume, and placed its title in the list of books and
pamphlets they were prepared to supply. Then suddenly there appeared
in the list of questions to be addressed by M.P.'s to members of the
Government one by the Marquis of Tullibardine (now the Duke of Atholl),
to ask the Home Secretary if he intended to prosecute the N.U.W.S.S.
for circulating an "obscene book," meaning the one by Dr. Martindale.
The Home Secretary, Mr. R. McKenna, could give no positive answer; he
must take time to make enquiries; the question must be repeated. A few
days later it was repeated; again the Home Secretary delayed his reply;
he found it necessary to consult the Law Officers. The Under Secretary
for the Home Department answered these questions more than once, but
at last owned that the Law Officers advised that a prosecution would
not be successful. As no one in his senses could possibly think that
this little book was obscene, it would have been simpler to reply
that the prosecution would be unsuccessful on this account; but this
straightforward course was avoided. It became evident to us that the
object of the whole business was to bring up the question in the
House of Commons as often as possible with a view of prejudicing the
public against the suffrage and the suffragists, and to produce the
impression that we were people who delighted in the circulation of
vile literature. This went on for about a fortnight, when I happened
to have the opportunity of a conversation, on an entirely different
subject, with a highly placed officer of the Government, a member of
the House of Lords. While I was talking to him on the subject on which
I had come to see him, it occurred to me to speak to him also about
the little plot to discredit the suffrage movement in which the Home
Secretary was playing the leading rôle. "Is it with your knowledge
and consent, Lord ——," I asked, "that your colleague, Mr. McKenna, is
keeping before the public as long as he possibly can the interesting
fact that he is unable to make up his mind whether or not to prosecute
me and the N.U.W.S.S., of which I am President, for circulating obscene
literature? Three questions have already been asked on this subject in
the House of Commons within the last eleven days, and it is impossible
to say how many more times the point will be discussed in the House
and reported in every paper in Great Britain."[3] I also told him
something of Dr. Louisa Martindale, her high character and first-rate
professional position, and also (rather maliciously on my part) that
her family were very active and highly esteemed Liberals in Sussex, and
that gratuitous insults to them would be keenly resented, and might
possibly even have a political reaction. He appeared startled, and, as
far as I could gather, had had no previous knowledge of what had been
going on. He said very little, and promised me nothing. But from that
date the attack upon Dr. Martindale, her book, and the N.U.W.S.S.,
entirely ceased. The incident did not increase our esteem for the
antisuffrage party in the House of Commons. A few months later I had
proof, if proof were needed, that the Government did not seriously
believe me to be a person capable of circulating obscene literature,
for I was invited by the Government to become a member of the Royal
Commission on Venereal Disease, a position which could certainly not
have been offered if the Government had shared Mr. McKenna's doubts as
to my character. I was not able to accept the invitation because my
suffrage work entirely absorbed me, and I saw no prospect of its claims
becoming less urgent in the near future.
The Session of 1912 dragged its interminable length along. It lasted
for thirteen months, from January, 1912, to January, 1913, both
inclusive. The Government were slow in producing their Reform Bill.
In May, however, it was brought forward, and it did not come up for
Second Reading until July 12th, 1912. In the Second Reading debate Mr.
Asquith, Prime Minister and Leader of the House, expressed himself as
follows:
"This Bill does not propose to confer the franchise on women; whatever
extensions of the franchise it makes are to male persons only.
Speaking for myself, I cannot help remembering that the House at
an earlier stage of the Session rejected with, I think, sufficient
emphasis the proposal to confer the franchise on women; and, so far as
I am concerned, I dismiss at this moment as altogether improbable the
hypothesis that the House of Commons is likely to stultify itself by
reversing in the same Session the considered judgment at which it has
arrived."
That is to say, the rejection of the Conciliation Bill by a majority of
14 in the previous March was to be taken as "the considered judgment of
the House of Commons," whereas its passage in May, 1911, by a majority
of 167 counted for nothing at all. What the passage just quoted did
stand for was the continued and bitter hostility of the Prime Minister
to women's suffrage in any form, and as a renewal of his S.O.S. call
to his followers to come to his deliverance. The fortunes of all the
little politicians "in the make" are absolutely in the hands of the
Prime Minister—more so at that moment than perhaps at any other period
of our history. To please the Prime Minister and serve his purposes
indicated the road which led to success and preferment, and he made it
absolutely plain what was the best possible way to please him in this
matter of women's enfranchisement.
This was truly a time when we had "to go on dancing when the fiddle
stopped," and we did not decline the task. We held two immense meetings
in the Albert Hall, the combined collections at which totalled nearly
£13,000, and also organized an even more than usually vigorous
campaign throughout the country in support of the inclusion of women
in the Government Reform Bill; there were twenty-one by-elections
during the year, in all of which the N.U.W.S.S. took an active part,
making suffrage a very live issue in the country, and we also lost no
opportunity of raising the question in the House on other Bills which
came before it.
But the change from a majority of 167 in 1911 to a minority of 14
in 1912 gave a fatal shock to what had hitherto been our election
policy—namely, the support at all contested elections of the candidate
(irrespective of party) whom we deemed from his answers to our
questions, his personal record, and other indications, to be "the
best friend of women's suffrage." When the Conciliation Bill was
defeated in March, 1912, 42 of these "best friends" had voted against
the Bill, and 91 had abstained from supporting it. To lean on such
"friends" as these was to lean on a broken reed. We did not abandon
the essential principle of our election policy, but we gave a new and
improved interpretation of the meaning to be attributed to the words
"best friend"; and as a result of a special council held for the
purpose in May, 1912, it was decided that a friend of suffrage who had
the support of his party upon our question was a better friend than
one who belonged to a party which was either hostile or neutral. The
immense powers of party in our politics made it practically certain
that this was the only safe line to take. There were, it is true, a
handful of men, in both the Liberal and Conservative ranks, who had
shown themselves such strong and convinced suffragists as to be capable
of disregarding the party whip when it was used against us. These we
defined as "tried friends"—tried not only on the platform, but in the
fiery ordeal of the House of Commons, and these we excepted from the
new definition we had agreed to make of the words "the best friend of
women's suffrage."