CHAPTER II.

THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONS OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.

23. The distinguishable parts of this system are the central axis, the

cranial nerves, and the spinal nerves, with the chain of ganglia and

nerves composing the Sympathetic. Let us briefly set down what is known

of their special offices.

Men very early discovered that the nerves were in some way ministrant

to Sensation and Movement; a divided nerve always being accompanied

by insensibility and immobility in the limb. Galen, observing that

paralysis of movement sometimes occurred without insensibility,

suggested that there were two kinds of nerve; but no one was able to

furnish satisfactory evidence in support of this suggestion until early

in the present century, when the experiments of Charles Bell, perfected

by those of Majendie and Müller, placed the suggestion beyond dispute.

[Illustration: Fig. 12.--_Transverse sections of spinal cord (dorsal

region)._]

24. Fig. 12 is a _diagram_ (not a drawing of the actual aspect, which

would be hardly intelligible to readers unversed in such matters)

representing two transverse sections of the spinal cord just where the

nerve-roots issue. The gray substance is somewhat in the form of a

rude H, in the dorsal region, and of the expanded wings of a butterfly

in the lumbar enlargements (Figs. 4–6); the extremities of this gray

substance are the _anterior and posterior horns_. We have already said

that from the anterior horns of each half issue the roots of the motor

nerves, which pass to the muscles. From the posterior horns issue the

sensory nerves, which, soon after leaving the cord, enter the ganglia

before joining the motor nerves, and then pass to the skin, in the

same sheath with their companions, separating again as they reach the

muscles and surfaces where they are to be distributed. When this mixed

nerve is cut through, or tied, all sensation and movement disappear

from the parts innervated. But if only one of the roots be cut through,

above the ganglion, there will then be only a loss of movement or a

loss of sensation. Thus suppose the section be made at _a_, _b_, A:

we have then divided a sensory nerve, and no pinching or pricking of

the part innervated by that nerve will be felt; but movement will take

place if the under nerve be irritated, or if a sensation _elsewhere_ be

excited. Now reverse the experiment, as at B, _c_, _d_. Then, pricking

of the skin will be felt, but no movement will respond. The nerve which

enters the cord at the upper (posterior) part is therefore a sensory

nerve; that which enters at the under (anterior) part is motor. The

direction is in each case indicated by the arrow. The central end _b_,

if irritated, will produce sensation; whereas the peripheral end _a_

produces neither sensation nor movement. The central end _d_ produces

neither sensation nor movement; the peripheral end _c_ produces

movement.

25. Two facts are proved by these experiments. First, that the

co-operation of the centre is necessary for Sensation, but not for

Movement. Although normally all the muscles of the trunk are moved only

when their centre has been excited, yet any irritation applied directly

to the muscle nerve, even when separated from its centre, produces a

movement. And to this we may add that a slighter stimulus will move the

muscle by direct irritation of the nerve, than by indirect irritation

through the centre; a slighter stimulus also will suffice when applied

to the nerve than when applied to the muscle itself.

26. The second fact proved is known as _Bell’s Law_, that the sensory

and motor channels are respectively the posterior and anterior nerves.

The fact is indisputable, but its theoretic interpretation can no

longer be accepted in its original form. Bell supposed the two nerves

to be different in kind, endowed with different specific energies, the

one sensitive, the other motor. The majority of writers still express

themselves as if they adopted this view. We shall, however, presently

see reason for replacing it by the more consistent interpretation

which assigns one and the same property to both nerves, marking their

distinction by the terms afferent and efferent; the one set being

anatomically so disposed that it conveys stimuli from the surfaces to

the centre, and the other set conveying stimuli from the centre to the

muscles, glands, and other cells.[89]

27. Bell’s discovery was rapidly generalized. The principle of

localization was extended to all nerves, and of course to the posterior

and anterior columns of the spinal cord, which indeed were assumed to

be continuations of the nerves. Bell, who was greater as an anatomist

than as a philosopher, always maintained that anatomical deduction was

superior to experiment. But this was to misunderstand the reach of

deduction, which is only valid to the extent of its premises.[90] In

the present case, the premises assumed that the posterior columns were

continuations of the posterior roots, and carried impressions to the

brain, the anterior columns carrying back from the brain the “mandates

of the will.” Experiment has, however, decisively shown that it is

_not_ through the posterior columns that sensory impressions travel to

the brain, but through the central gray substance.

28. The spinal cord with its central gray substance is at each point

a centre of reflexion. Connected as it is with different organs, we

artificially consider it as a chain of different centres, and try to

detect the functional relations of its parts. The inquiry is important,

but we must bear in mind the cardinal principle that diversity of

Function depends on the organs innervated, and not on a diversity of

Property in the nervous tissue. Although all nerves have a common

structure and common property, yet we distinguish them as sensory and

motor; and the sensory we subdivide into those of Special Sensation

and those of Systemic Sensation. The motor we divide into muscular,

vasomotor, and glandular. The hypothesis of specific energies must be

relinquished (§ 63).

In like manner all centres have a common structure and a common

property, with a great diversity of functional relations. Here also the

hypothesis of specific energies has been generally adopted, owing to

a mistaken conception of the biological principle just mentioned. The

cerebral hemispheres are credited with the properties of sensation,

thought, and volition; the cerebellum with the property of muscular

co-ordination; the spinal cord with the property of reflexion.

29. No attempt to assign the true functional relations of the centres

will be made at the present stage of our exposition. We must learn more

of the processes in Sensation, Thought, and Volition, before we can

unravel the complex physiological web on which they depend. But here,

provisionally, may be set down what observation and experiment have

disclosed respecting the part played by certain centres. We know, for

example, that when the cerebral hemispheres are carefully removed from

a reptile or a bird, all the essentially _vital_ functions go on pretty

much as before, but a great disturbance in some of the _psychical_

functions is observed. The brainless bird eats, drinks, sleeps, moves

its limbs separately and in combination, manifests sensibility to

light, sound, and touch, performs such instinctive actions as preening

its feathers, or thrusting the head under the wing while roosting.

Throw it into the air and it will fly. In its flight it will avoid

obstacles, and will alight upon a ledge, or your shoulder. But it will

not fly unless thrown into the air; it will not escape through the

open door or window; it will avoid objects, but will show no fear of

them,--alighting on your head, for example, without hesitation. It is

sensitive to light, and may in a certain sense be said to _see_; but

it fails to _perceive_ what is _seen_. It will eat and drink, if food

and water be administered, but it will starve near a heap of grain and

never peck it, not even if the beak be thrust into the heap. A grain,

or strip of meat, may be thrust inside the beak; there it will remain

unswallowed, unless it touches the back of the mouth, then swallowing

at once follows the stimulus. The bird _with_ its brain will fly away

if you turn the finger, or stick, on which it is perching; _without_

its brain, it makes no attempt to fly, but flutters its wings, and

balances itself. If you open the mouth of a cat, or rabbit, and drop

in some bitter fluid, the animal closes its mouth firmly, and resists

your efforts to repeat the act; without its brain, the animal shows the

same disgust at the taste, but never resists the preliminaries of the

repetition.

30. These, and analogous facts, have been noted by various

experimenters. They are very far from proving what is usually

concluded; but they prove the important negative position that the

cerebrum is not the centre of innervation for any of the organs on

which the observed actions depend. Thus, the cerebrum is not necessary

to sight: _ergo_ it does not innervate the eye. It is not necessary to

hearing: _ergo_ it does not innervate the ear.[91] It is not necessary

to breathing, swallowing, flying, etc.: _ergo_ it does not innervate

the organs of these functions.

What then is lost? We have only to remember that the cerebrum is

continuous with the thalami and corpora striata, and, through its

crura, with the medulla oblongata and medulla spinalis, to foresee

that its removal must more or less affect the whole neural axis,

and consequently disturb the actions of the whole organism; this

disturbance will often have the appearances which would be due to the

removal of a central apparatus, so that we shall be apt to attribute

the cessation of a function to the loss of its organ, when in fact the

cessation is due simply to an arrest of the organ by irritation. Thus

the cessation of consciousness, or of any particular movements, when

the cerebrum is removed, is no decisive proof that the cerebrum is the

organ of consciousness, or of the movement in question. This point will

be duly considered hereafter. What we have now to consider is the facts

observed after removal of the cerebrum.

First, we observe a loss of that power of combining present states

with past states, present feelings with feelings formerly excited in

conjunction with them, the power which enables the animal to adjust

its actions to certain sensations _now unfelt_ but which _will be_

felt in consequence of the adjustment. Secondly, we observe a loss of

Spontaneity: the bird, naturally mobile and alert, now sits moveless

for hours in a sort of stupor, occasionally preening its feathers, but

rarely quitting its resting-place. All the most conspicuous phenomena

which we assign to Intelligence and Will seem absent. The sensations

are altered and diminished. Many Instincts have disappeared, but some

remain. The sexual feeling is preserved, although the bird has lost

all power of directing its actions so as to gratify the desire. But

these effects are only observed when the whole of both hemispheres have

been removed. If a small portion remain the bird retains most of its

faculties, though with less energy. In frogs and fishes there is little

discernible effect observed when a large portion of the cerebrum is

removed.

31. Now take away from this mutilated bird its cerebellum: all the

functions continue as before except that _some_ combined movements can

no longer be effected; flight is impossible; walking is a mere stagger.

Remove only the lateral lobes, and though flight is still possible

great _incoherence_ of the wings is observed, whereas walking is not

much affected. If only the cerebellum be removed, the cerebrum being

intact, the phenomena are very different. All the perceptions and

almost all the emotions, all the spontaneity and vivacity are retained;

but the sexual instinct, which was manifested when the cerebrum was

removed, is now quite gone. What we call Intelligence seems unaffected.

The bird hears, and understands the meaning of the sounds, sees and

perceives, sees and fears, sees and adjusts its movements with a mental

vision of unseen consequences.[92]

32. Are we from these facts to conclude that the cerebrum is the “organ

of the mind”; that it is “the seat” of sensation, thought, emotion,

volition; and that the cerebellum is the “seat” of the sexual instinct,

and muscular co-ordination? Such conclusions have found acceptance,

even from physiologists who would have been startled had any one

ventured to affirm that the medulla oblongata was the “organ” of

Respiration, because Respiration ceases when this centre is destroyed.

I shall have to combat this notion at various stages of my exposition.

Here let me simply say that it is irreconcilable with any clear

conception of organ and function; and is plainly irreconcilable with

any survey of psychical phenomena in animals in whom the cerebrum does

not exist, and in animals from whom it has been removed.

What the facts indisputably prove is that the cerebrum has an important

part in the mechanism by which the most complex psychical combinations

are effected, and that the cerebellum has an important part in the

mechanism by which the most complex muscular combinations are

effected. The supreme importance of the cerebrum may be inferred from

its dominating all the other centres, and from its preponderance in

size. In man it stands to all the other cranial centres together in

the relation of 11 to 3. It is about five times as heavy as the spinal

cord--that is to say from 1,100 to 1,400 grammes, compared with 27 to

30 grammes. The quantity of blood circulating through it is immense.

Haller estimated the cranial circulation as one fifth of the whole

circulation. If, therefore, the Nervous Centres are agents in the

production of Sensation and Intelligence, by far the largest share must

be allotted to the cranial centres, and of these the largest to the

Cerebrum.

33. It is, however, one thing to recognize the Cerebrum as having

an important part in the production of psychical phenomena, another

thing to localize all the phenomena in it as their organ and seat--a

localization which soon becomes even more absurd, when of all the

cerebral structure the multipolar cells alone are admitted as the

active agents!

As was said just now, we recognize in the Medulla Oblongata the nervous

centre of Respiration, but we do not suppose that Respiration has its

_seat_ there, nor that this centre is absolutely indispensable for

the essential part of the process. We respire by our skin, as well as

by our lungs; many animals respire who have nothing like a medulla

oblongata; as many animals feel, and manifest will, who have nothing

like a cerebrum. The destruction of centres is of course a disturbance

of the mechanisms which they regulate. But even the observed results

of a destruction require very close examination, and are liable to

erroneous interpretations. The disappearance of a function following

the destruction, or disease of a particular part, is not to be accepted

as a proof that this part is the organ of the lost function; because

precisely the same phenomena may often be observed following the

destruction of a totally different part.[93] But one result may always

be relied on, and that is the _persistence_ of a function after removal

of a particular part. Thus there is a certain spot of the cerebral

convolutions from which movements of the limbs are excited when the

electrodes are applied to it; removal of the substance is immediately

followed by paralysis of the limbs. Are we to conclude that this spot

is the organ of the function? It is true that the function is called

into action by a stimulus applied to this spot: true that the function

suddenly vanishes when the substance of this spot is destroyed.

Nevertheless, what seems a loss of function is only a disturbance. In

two or three days the paralysis begins to disappear, and at the end

of a week the limbs are moved nearly in the normal manner. And the

same is true when the spot in question is destroyed on both sides. The

recovery of the function shows that the absent part was not its organ.

There is a paradoxical experiment recorded by M. Paul Bert which may be

cited here. He removed the right cerebral hemisphere from a chameleon,

and found that the limbs on the left side were paralyzed; but on his

then removing the left cerebral hemisphere the limbs of the left side

recovered their activity. A similar result was obtained by Lussana and

Lemoigne by extirpation of the thalami. When we find combined movements

persisting after the cerebellum has been destroyed, we may be sure that

the cerebellum is not the organ by which such combinations take place;

and when we find sensation and volition manifested after the cerebrum

has been removed, we may be sure that the cerebrum is not the organ for

these sensations and volitions.

34. And this we do find. Physiologists, indeed, for the most part,

deny it; or rather, while they admit the observed facts, they refuse

to admit the only consistent interpretation, biassed as they are by

the traditional conception of the brain. After having for many years

persistently denied Sensibility to any centre except the cerebrum, they

are now generally agreed in including the medulla oblongata within the

privileged region; but they still exclude the medulla spinalis.

35. If all the cranial centres as far as the medulla oblongata are

removed from young rabbits, dogs, or cats, there are unmistakable

evidences of Sensibility in their _cries_ when their tails are pinched,

their _moving jaws_ (as in mastication) when bitters are placed in

their mouths, and their _raised paws rubbing their noses_, when

irritating vapors are applied. It is said indeed that the cries are no

signs of _pain_; and this is probable; but they are assuredly signs of

Sensibility.

35. The frog thus mutilated has lost indeed all its special senses,

except Touch, but it still breathes, struggles when grasped, thrusts

aside the pincers which irritate it, or wipes away acid dropped on its

skin. If the eye be lightly touched, the eyelid closes; if the touch

be repeated three or four times, the foreleg is raised to push the

irritant away; if still repeated, the head is turned aside; but however

prolonged the irritation, the frog neither hops, nor crawls away, as he

does when the cerebellum remains. Place the brainless frog on his back,

and if the medulla oblongata remains he will at once regain the normal

position; but if that part is absent he will lie helpless on his back.

The power of preserving equilibrium in difficult positions--which

of course implies a nice co-ordination of muscles--resides in the

so-called _optic lobes_ of the frog (what in mammals are called the

_corpora quadrigemina_).

37. With the destruction of each part of the central mass there will

necessarily be some disturbance of the mechanism; but difficult as

may be the task of detecting by experiment what is the normal action

of any one part, there ought to be no hesitation in recognizing the

persistence of functions after certain parts are destroyed. The

spinal cord is anatomically known to be the centre from which the

limbs, trunk, and genito-urinary organs are innervated. So long as

the mechanism of the actions involving such organs is intact, no

removal of other parts will prevent this mechanism from exhibiting its

normal action. There may indeed arise, and there has arisen, the doubt

whether Sensibility is involved in the action of any nerve centre below

the medulla oblongata. But this doubt is founded on the traditional

hypothesis respecting the seat of Sensation, and is flagrantly at

variance with the logical conclusions of Anatomy and Experiment.

38. Anatomy shows that the structure of the spinal cord is in all

essential characters the same as that of the medulla oblongata; and

indeed that the whole central axis has one continuous tissue, somewhat

variously arranged, and in relation with various organs.

Abundant Experiment has shown that the spinal cord, apart from the

encephalon, is capable of acting as a sensorial and volitional centre.

The striking facts advanced by Pflüger, Auerbach, and myself, have

not been impugned;[94] but their interpretation has been generally

rejected. We showed that a brainless frog responded to stimulation in

actions which bore so close a resemblance to actions admitted to be

sensorial and volitional--showed the frog _adapting_ itself to new

conditions, and _acquiring_ dexterity in executing actions which at

first were impossible or difficult, _devising_ combinations to effect

a purpose which never by any possibility could have formed part of its

habits--manifesting, in a word, such signs of Sensibility, that no one

witnessing the experiments could hesitate as to the interpretation, had

he not been biassed by the traditions of the schools.

39. Our opponents argued that in spite of all appearances there

were profound differences between the actions of the normal and the

brainless animal, and that the latter were due simply to Reflex Action.

I also insist on profound differences; but underlying these there

are fundamental identities. As to the Reflex Action, two points will

hereafter be brought forward: 1°, that _all_ central action is reflex,

the cerebral no less than the spinal; 2°, that the hypothesis of Reflex

Action being purely _mechanical_, and distinguished from Voluntary

Action in not involving Sensibility, is an hypothesis which must be

relinquished.

40. Postponing, however, all discussion of these points, let me here

say that the doctrine maintained in these pages is that the whole

cerebro-spinal axis is a centre of Reflexion, its various segments

taking part in the performance of different kinds of combined action.

It has one common property, Sensibility; and different parts of it

minister to different functions--the optic centre being different from

the auditory, the cerebral from the spinal; and so on. To make this

intelligible, however, we must first learn what is known respecting the

properties of nerve-tissue.

The Physical Basis of Mind Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind. · 第 2 / 12 章