Most Jews, as Trypho testifies in Justin's Dialogue, 49, conceived the

Messiah as a man. We may indeed go a step further and say that no Jew at

bottom imagined him otherwise; for even those who attached ideas of

pre-existence to him, and gave the Messiah a supernatural background,

never advanced to speculations about assumption of the flesh,

incarnation, two natures and the like. They only transferred in specific

manner to the Messiah the old idea of pre-terrestrial existence with

God, universally current among the Jews. Before the creation of the

world the Messiah was hidden with God, and, when the time is fulfilled,

he makes his appearance. This is neither an incarnation nor a

humiliation, but he appears on earth as he exists before God, viz., as a

mighty and just king, equipped with all gifts. The writings in which

this thought appears most clearly are the Apocalypse of Enoch (Book of

Similitudes, Chap. 46-49) and the Apocalypse of Esra (Chap. 12-14).

Support to this idea, if anything more of the kind had been required,

was lent by passages like Daniel VII. 13 f. and Micah, V. 1. Nowhere do

we find in Jewish writings a conception which advances beyond the notion

that the Messiah is the man who is with God in heaven; and who will make

his appearance at his own time. We are merely entitled to say that, as

the same idea was not applied to all persons with the same certainty, it

was almost unavoidable that men's minds should have been led to

designate the Messiah as the man from heaven. This thought was adopted

by Paul (see below), but I know of no _Jewish_ writing which gave clear

expression to it.

Jesus Christ designated himself as the Messiah, and the first of his

disciples who recognised him as such were native Jews. The Jewish

conceptions of the Messiah consequently passed over into the Christian

community. But they received an impulse to important modifications from

the living impression conveyed by the person and destiny of Jesus. Three

facts were here of pre-eminent importance. First, Jesus appeared in

lowliness, and even suffered death. Secondly, he was believed to be

exalted through the resurrection to the right hand of God, and his

return in glory was awaited with certainty. Thirdly, the strength of a

new life and of an indissoluble union with God was felt issuing from

him, and therefore his people were connected with him in the closest

way.

In some old Christian writings found in the New Testament and emanating

from the pen of native Jews, there are no speculations at all about the

pre-temporal existence of Jesus as the Messiah, or they are found

expressed in a manner which simply embodies the old Jewish theory and is

merely distinguished from it by the emphasis laid on the exaltation of

Jesus after death through the resurrection. 1. Pet. I. 18 ff. is a

classic passage: [Greek: elutrôthête timiô haimati hôs amnou amômou kai

aspilou Christou, proegnôsmenou men pro katabolês kosmou, phanerôthentos

de ep' eschatou tôn chronôn di' humas tous di autou pistous eis theon

ton egeiranta autou ek nekrôn kai doxan autô donta, hôste tên pistin

humôn kai elpida einai eis theon]. Here we find a conception of the

pre-existence of Christ which is not yet affected by cosmological or

psychological speculation, which does not overstep the boundaries of a

purely religious contemplation, and which arose from the Old Testament

way of thinking, and the living impression derived from the person of

Jesus. He is "foreknown (by God) before the creation of the world", not

as a spiritual being without a body, but as a Lamb without blemish and

without spot; in other words, his whole personality together with the

work which it was to carry out, was within God's eternal knowledge. He

"was manifested in these last days for our sake", that is, he is now

visibly what he already was before God. What is meant here is not an

incarnation, but a _revelatio_. Finally, he appeared in order that our

faith and hope should now be firmly directed to the living God, _that_

God who raised him from the dead and gave him honour. In the last clause

expression is given to the specifically Christian thought, that the

Messiah Jesus was _exalted_ after crucifixion and death: from this,

however, no further conclusions are drawn.

But it was impossible that men should everywhere rest satisfied with

these utterances, for the age was a theological one. Hence the paradox

of the suffering Messiah, the certainty of his glorification through the

resurrection, the conviction of his specific relationship to God, and

the belief in the real union of his Church with him did not seem

adequately expressed by the simple formulæ [Greek: proegnôsmenos,

phanerôtheis]. In reference to all these points, we see even in the

oldest Christian writings, the appearance of formulæ which fix more

precisely the nature of his pre-existence, or in other words his

heavenly existence. With regard to the first and second points there

arose the view of humiliation and exaltation, such as we find in Paul

and in numerous writings after him. In connection with the third point

the concept "Son of God" was thrust into the foreground, and gave rise

to the idea of the image of God (2 Cor. IV. 4; Col. I. 15; Heb. I. 2;

Phil. II. 6). The fourth point gave occasion to the formation of theses,

such as we find in Rom. VIII. 29: [Greek: prôtotokos en pollois

adelphois], Col. I. 18: [Greek: prôtotokos ek tôn nekrôn] (Rev. I. 5),

Eph. II. 6 [Greek: sunêgeiren kai sunekathisen en tois epouraniois hêmas

en Christô Iêsou], I. 4: [Greek: ho theos exelexato hêmas en Christô pro

katabolês kosmou], I. 22: [Greek: ho theos edôken ton Christon kephalên

huper panta tê ekklêsia hêtis estin to sôma autou] etc. This purely

religious view of the Church, according to which all that is predicated

of Christ is also applied to his followers, continued a considerable

time. Hermas declares that the Church is older than the world, and that

the world was created for its sake (see above, p. 103), and the author

of the so-called 2nd Epistle of Clement declares (Chap. 14) [Greek: ...

esometha ek tês ekklêsias tês prôtês tês pneumatikês, tês pro hêliou kai

selênês hektismenês ... ouk oiomai de humas agnoein, hoti ekklêsia zôsa

sôma esti Christou. legei gar hêgraphê. Epoiêsen ho theos ton anthrôpon

arsen kai thêlu. to arsen estin ho Christos to thêlu hê ekklêsia.] Thus

Christ and his Church are inseparably connected. The latter is to be

conceived as pre-existent quite as much as the former; the Church was

also created before the sun and the moon, for the world was created for

its sake. This conception of the Church illustrates a final group of

utterances about the pre-existent Christ, the origin of which might

easily be misinterpreted unless we bear in mind their reference to the

Church. In so far as he is [Greek: proegnôsmenos pro katabolês kosmou],

he is the [Greek: archê tês ktiseôs tou theou] (Rev. III. 14), the

[Greek: prôtotokos pasês ktiseôs] etc. According to the current

conception of the time, these expressions mean exactly the same as the

simple [Greek: proegnôsmenos pro katabolês kosmou], as is proved by the

parallel formulæ referring to the Church. Nay, even the further advance

to the idea that the world was created by him (Cor. Col. Eph. Heb.) need

not yet necessarily be a [Greek: metabasis eis allo genos]; for the

beginning of things [Greek: archê] and their purpose form the real force

to which their origin is due (principle [Greek: archê]). Hermas indeed

calls the Church older than the world simply because "the world was

created for its sake."

All these further theories which we have quoted up to this time need in

no sense alter the original conception, so long as they appear in an

isolated form and do not form the basis of fresh speculations. They may

be regarded as the working out of the original conception attaching to

Jesus Christ, [Greek: proegnôsmenos pro katabolês kosmou, phanerôtheis

k.t.l.]; and do not really modify this religious view of the matter.

Above all, we find in them as yet no certain transition to the Greek

view which splits up his personality into a heavenly and an earthly

portion; it still continues to be the complete Christ to whom all the

utterances apply. But, beyond doubt, they already reveal the strong

impulse to conceive the Christ that had appeared as a divine being. He

had not been a transitory phenomenon, but has ascended into heaven and

still continues to live. This post-existence of his gave to the ideas of

his pre-existence a support and a concrete complexion which the earlier

Jewish theories lacked.

We find the transition to a new conception in the writings of Paul. But

it is important to begin by determining the relationship between his

Christology and the views we have been hitherto considering. In the

Apostle's clearest trains of thought everything that he has to say of

Christ hinges on his death and resurrection. For this we need no proofs,

but see, more especially Rom. I. 3 f.: [Greek: peri tou huiou autou, tou

genomenou ek spermatos Daueid kata sarka, tou horisthentos huiou theou

en dunamei kata pneuma agiôsunês ek anastaseôs nekrôn, Iêsou Christou

tou kuriou hêmôn]. What Christ became and his significance for us now

are due to his death on the cross and his resurrection. He condemned sin

in the flesh and was obedient unto death. Therefore he now shares in the

[Greek: doxa] of God. The exposition in 1 Cor. XV. 45, also ([Greek: ho

eschatos Adam eis pneuma Zôopoioun, all' ou prôton to pneumatikon alla

to psuchikon, epeita to pneumatikon. ho prôtos anthrôpos ek gês choikos

ho deuteros anthrôpos ex ouranou]) is still capable of being understood,

as to its fundamental features, in a sense which agrees with the

conception of the Messiah, as [Greek: kat' exochên,] the man from heaven

who was hidden with God. There can be no doubt, however, that this

conception as already shewn by the formulæ in the passage just quoted,

formed to Paul the starting-point of a speculation, in which the

original theory assumed a completely new shape. The decisive factors in

this transformation were the Apostle's doctrine of "spirit and flesh",

and the corresponding conviction that the Christ who is not be known

"after the flesh", is a spirit, namely, the mighty spiritual being

[Greek: pneuma zôopoioun], who has condemned sin in the flesh, and

thereby enabled man to walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit.

According to one of the Apostle's ways of regarding the matter, Christ,

after the accomplishment of his work, became the [Greek: pneuma

zôopoioun] through the resurrection. But the belief that Jesus always

stood before God as the heavenly man, suggested to Paul the other view,

that Christ was always a "spirit", that he was sent down by God, that

the flesh is consequently something inadequate and indeed hostile to

him, that he nevertheless assumed it in order to extirpate the sin

dwelling in the flesh, that he therefore humbled himself by appearing,

and that this humiliation was the deed he performed.

This view is found in 2 Cor. VIII. 9: [Greek: Iêsous Christos di' humas

eptôcheusen plousios ôn]; in Rom. VIII. 3: [Greek: ho theos ton heautou

huion pempsas en homoiômati sarkos hamartias kai peri hamartias

katekrine tên hamartian en tê sarki]; and in Phil. II. 5 f.: [Greek:

Christos Iêsous en morphê theou huparchôn ... heauton ekenôsen morphên

doulon labôn, en homoiômati anthrôpôn genomenos, kai schêmati heuretheis

hôs anthrôpos etapeinôsen heauton k.t.l.] In both forms of thought Paul

presupposes a real exaltation of Christ. Christ receives after the

resurrection more than he ever possessed ([Greek: to onoma to huper pan

onoma]). In this view Paul retains a historical interpretation of

Christ, even in the conception of the [Greek: pneuma Christos]. But

whilst many passages seem to imply that the work of Christ began with

suffering and death, Paul shews in the verses cited, that he already

conceives the appearance of Christ on earth as his moral act, as a

humiliation, purposely brought about by God and Christ himself, which

reaches its culminating point in the death on the cross. Christ, the

divine spiritual being, is sent by the Father from heaven to earth, and

of his own free will he obediently takes this mission upon himself. He

appears in the [Greek: homoiôma sarkos amartias], dies the death of the

cross, and then, raised by the Father, ascends again into heaven in

order henceforth to act as the [Greek: kurios zôntôn] and [Greek:

nekrôn] and to become to his own people the principle of a new life in

the spirit.

Whatever we may think about the admissibility and justification of this

view, to whatever source we may trace its origin and however strongly we

may emphasise its divergencies from the contemporaneous Hellenic ideas,

it is certain that it approaches very closely to the latter; for the

distinction of spirit and flesh is here introduced into the concept of

pre-existence, and this combination is not found in the Jewish notions

of the Messiah.

Paul was the first who limited the idea of pre-existence by referring it

solely to the spiritual part of Jesus Christ, but at the same time gave

life to it by making the pre-existing Christ (the spirit) a being who,

even during his pre-existence, stands independently side by side with

God.

He was also the first to designate Christ's [Greek: sarx] as "assumpta",

and to recognise its assumption as in itself a humiliation. To him the

appearance of Christ was no mere [Greek: phanerousthai], but a [Greek:

kenousthai, tapeinousthai] and [Greek: ptôcheuein].

These outstanding features of the Pauline Christology must have been

intelligible to the Greeks, but, whilst embracing these, they put

everything else in the system aside. [Greek: Christos ho kurios ho sôsas

hêmas, hôn men to prôton pneuma, egeneto sarx kai houtôs hêmas

ekalesen], says 2 Clem. (9. 5), and that is also the Christology of 1

Clement, Barnabas and many other Greeks. From the sum total of

Judæo-Christian speculations they only borrowed, in addition, the one

which has been already mentioned: the Messiah as [Greek: proegnôsmenos

pro katabolês kosmou] is for that very reason also [Greek: hê archê tês

ktiseôs tou theou], that is the beginning, purpose and principle of the

creation. The Greeks, as the result of their cosmological interest,

embraced this thought as a fundamental proposition. The complete Greek

Christology then is expressed as follows: [Greek: Christos, ho sôsas

hêmas, hôn men to prôton pneuma kai pasês ktiseôs archê, egeneto sarx

kai houtôs hêmas ekalesen]. _That is the fundamental theological and

philosophical creed on which the whole Trinitarian and Christological

speculations of the Church of the succeeding centuries are built, and it

is thus the root of the orthodox system of dogmatics_; for the notion

that Christ was the [Greek: archê pasês ktiseôs] necessarily led in some

measure to the conception of Christ as the Logos. For the Logos had long

been regarded by cultured men as the beginning and principle of the

creation.[452]

With this transition the theories concerning Christ are removed from

Jewish and Old Testament soil, and also that of religion (in the strict

sense of the word), and transplanted to the Greek one. Even in his

pre-existent state Christ is an independent power existing side by side

with God. The pre-existence does not refer to his whole appearance, but

only to a part of his essence; it does not primarily serve to glorify

the wisdom and power of the God who guides history, but only glorifies

Christ, and thereby threatens the monarchy of God.[453] The appearance

of Christ is now an "assumption of flesh", and immediately the intricate

questions about the connection of the heavenly and spiritual being with

the flesh simultaneously arise and are at first settled by the theories

of a naive docetism. But the flesh, that is the human nature created by

God, appears depreciated, because it was reckoned as something

unsuitable for Christ, and foreign to him as a spiritual being. Thus the

Christian religion was mixed up with the refined asceticism of a

perishing civilization, and a foreign substructure given to its system

of morality, so earnest in its simplicity.[454] But the most

questionable result was the following. Since the predicate "Logos",

which at first, and for a long time, coincided with the idea of the

reason ruling in the cosmos, was considered as the highest that could be

given to Christ, the holy and divine element, namely, the power of a new

life, a power to be viewed and laid hold of in Christ, was transformed

into a cosmic force and thereby secularised.

In the present work I have endeavoured to explain fully how the doctrine

of the Church developed from these premises into the doctrine of the

Trinity and of the two natures. I have also shewn that the imperfect

beginnings of Church doctrine, especially as they appear in the Logos

theory derived from cosmology, were subjected to wholesome

corrections--by the Monarchians, by Athanasius, and by the influence of

biblical passages which pointed in another direction. Finally, the Logos

doctrine received a form in which the idea was deprived of nearly all

cosmical content. Nor could the Hellenic contrast of "spirit" and

"flesh" become completely developed in Christianity, because the belief

in the bodily resurrection of Christ, and in the admission of the flesh

into heaven, opposed to the principle of dualism a barrier which Paul as

yet neither knew nor felt to be necessary. The conviction as to the

resurrection of the flesh proved the hard rock which shattered the

energetic attempts to give a completely Hellenic complexion to the

Christian religion.

The history of the development of the ideas of pre-existence is at the

same time the criticism of them, so that we need not have recourse to

our present theory of knowledge which no longer allows such

speculations. The problem of determining the significance of Christ

through a speculation concerning his natures, and of associating with

these the concrete features of the historical Christ, was originated by

Hellenism. But even the New Testament writers, who appear in this

respect to be influenced in some way by Hellenism, did not really

speculate concerning the different natures, but, taking Christ's

spiritual nature for granted, determined his religious significance by

his moral qualities--Paul by the moral act of humiliation and obedience

unto death, John by the complete dependence of Christ upon God and hence

also by his obedience, as well as the unity of the love of Father and

Son. There is only one idea of pre-existence which no empiric

contemplation of history and no reason can uproot. This is identical

with the most ancient idea found in the Old Testament, as well as that

prevalent among the early Christians, and consists in the religious

thought that God the Lord directs history. In its application to Jesus

Christ, it is contained in the words we read in 1 Pet. I. 20: [Greek:

proegnôsmenos men pro katabolês kosmou, phanerôtheis de di' humas tous

di' autou pistous eis theon ton egeiranta auton ek nekrôn kai doxan

autôi donta, hôste tên pistin humôn kai elpida einai eis theon].

[Footnote 452: These hints will have shewn that Paul's theory occupies a

middle position between the Jewish and Greek ideas of pre-existence. In

the canon, however, we have another group of writings which likewise

gives evidence of a middle position with regard to the matter, I mean

the Johannine writings. If we only possessed the prologue to the Gospel

of John with its "[Greek: en archê ên ho logos]," the "[Greek: panta di'

autou egeneto]" and the "[Greek: ho logos sarx egeneto]" we could indeed

point to nothing but Hellenic ideas. But the Gospel itself, as is well

known, contains very much that must have astonished a Greek, and is

opposed to the philosophical idea of the Logos. This occurs even in the

thought, "[Greek: ho logos sarx egeneto]," which in itself is foreign to

the Logos conception. Just fancy a proposition like the one in VI. 44,

[Greek: oudeis dunatai elthein pros me, ean mê ho patêr ho pempsas me

elkusê auton], or in V. 17. 21, engrafted on Philo's system, and

consider the revolution it would have caused there. No doubt the

prologue to some extent contains the themes set forth in the

presentation that follows, but they are worded in such a way that one

cannot help thinking the author wished to prepare Greek readers for the

paradox he had to communicate to them, by adapting his prologue to their

mode of thought. Under the altered conditions of thought which now

prevail, the prologue appears to us the mysterious part, and the

narrative that follows seems the portion that is relatively more

intelligible. But to the original readers, if they were educated Greeks,

the prologue must have been the part most easily understood. As nowadays

a section on the nature of the Christian religion is usually prefixed to

a treatise on dogmatics, in order to prepare and introduce the reader,

so also the Johannine prologue seems to be intended as an introduction

of this kind. It brings in conceptions which were familiar to the

Greeks, in fact it enters into these more deeply than is justified by

the presentation which follows; for the notion of the incarnate Logos is

by no means the dominant one here. Though faint echoes of this idea may

possibly be met with here and there in the Gospel--I confess I do not

notice them--the predominating thought is essentially the conception of

Christ as the Son of God, who obediently executes what the Father has

shewn and appointed him. The works which he does are allotted to him,

and he performs them in the strength of the Father. The whole of

Christ's farewell discourses and the intercessory prayer evince no

Hellenic influence and no cosmological speculation whatever, but shew

the inner life of a man who knows himself to be one with God to a

greater extent than any before him, and who feels the leading of men to

God to be the task he had received and accomplished. In this

consciousness he speaks of the glory he had with the Father before the

world was (XVII. 4 f.; [Greek: egô se edoxasa epi tês gês, to ergon

teleiôsas ho dedôkas moi hina poiêsô; kai nun doxason me su, pater, para

seautô tê doxê hê eichon pro tou ton kosmon einai, para soi]). With this

we must compare verses like III. 13: [Greek: oudeis anabebêken eis ton

ouranon ei mê ho ek tou ouranou katabas, ho huios tou anthrôpou], and

III. 31: [Greek: ho anôthen erchomenos epanô pantôn estin. ho ôn ek tês

gês ek tês gês estin kai ek tês gês lalei ho ek tou ouranou erchomenos

epanô pantôn estin] (see also I. 30: VI. 33, 38, 41 f. 50 f. 58, 62:

VIII. 14, 58; XVII. 24). But though the pre-existence is strongly

expressed in these passages, a separation of [Greek: pneuma (logos)] and

[Greek: sarx] in Christ is nowhere assumed in the Gospel except in the

prologue. It is always Christ's whole personality to which every sublime

attribute is ascribed. The same one who "can do nothing of himself", is

also the one who was once glorious and will yet be glorified. This idea,

however, can still be referred to the [Greek: proegnosmenos pro

katabolês kosmon], although it gives a peculiar [Greek: doxa] with God

to him who was foreknown of God, and the oldest conception is yet to be

traced in many expressions, as, for example, I. 31: [Greek: kagô ouk

êdein auton, all' hina phanerôthæ tô Israêl dia touto êlthon], V. 19:

[Greek: ou duvatai ho uios poiein aph' eautou ouden an mê ti blepê ton

patera poiountai], V. 36: VIII. 38: [Greek: ha egô heôraka para tô patri

lalô], VIII. 40: [Greek: tên alêtheian humin lelalêka hên êkousa para

tou theou], XII. 49: XV. 15: [Greek: panta ha êxousa para tou patros mou

egnôrisa humin.]]

[Footnote 453: This is indeed counterbalanced in the fourth Gospel by

the thought of the complete community of love between the Father and the

Son, and the pre-existence and descent of the latter here also tend to

the glory of God. In the sentence "God so loved the world" etc., that

which Paul describes in Phil. II. becomes at the same time an act of

God, in fact the act of God. The sentence "God is love" sums up again

all individual speculations, and raises them into a new and most exalted

sphere.]

[Footnote 454: If it had been possible for speculation to maintain the

level of the Fourth Gospel, nothing of that would have happened; but

where were there theologians capable of this?]

APPENDIX II.

_Liturgy and the Origin of Dogma._

The reader has perhaps wondered why I have made so little reference to

Liturgy in my description of the origin of dogma. For according to the

most modern ideas about the history of religion and the origin of

theology, the development of both may be traced in the ritual. Without

any desire to criticise these notions, I think I am justified in

asserting that this is another instance of the exceptional nature of

Christianity. For a considerable period it possessed no ritual at all,

and the process of development in this direction had been going on, or

been completed, a long time before ritual came to furnish material for

dogmatic discussion.

The worship in Christian Churches grew out of that in the synagogues,

whereas there is no trace of its being influenced by the Jewish Temple

service (Duchesne, Origines du Culte Chrétien, p. 45 ff.). Its oldest

constituents are accordingly prayer, reading of the scriptures,

application of scripture texts, and sacred song. In addition to these we

have, as specifically Christian elements, the celebration of the Lord's

Supper, and the utterances of persons inspired by the Spirit. The latter

manifestations, however, ceased in the course of the second century, and

to some extent as early as its first half. The religious services in

which a ritual became developed were prayer, the Lord's Supper and

sacred song. The Didache had already prescribed stated formulæ for

prayer. The ritual of the Lord's Supper was determined in its main

features by the memory of its institution. The sphere of sacred song

remained the most unfettered, though here also, even at an early

period--no later in fact than the end of the first and beginning of the

second century--a fixed and a variable element were distinguished; for

responsory hymns, as is testified by the Epistle of Pliny and the still

earlier Book of Revelation, require to follow a definite arrangement.

But the whole, though perhaps already fixed during the course of the

second century, still bore the stamp of spirituality and freedom. It was

really worship in spirit and in truth, and this and no other was the

light in which the Apologists, for instance, regarded it. Ritualism did

not begin to be a power in the Church till the end of the second

century; though it had been cultivated by the "Gnostics" long before,

and traces of it are found at an earlier period in some of the older

Fathers, such as Ignatius.

Among the liturgical fragments still preserved to us from the first

three centuries two strata may be distinguished. Apart from the

responsory hymns in the Book of Revelation, which can hardly represent

fixed liturgical pieces, the only portions of the older stratum in our

possession are the Lord's Prayer, originating with Jesus himself and

used as a liturgy, together with the sacramental prayers of the Didache.

These prayers exhibit a style unlike any of the liturgical formulæ of

later times; the prayer is exclusively addressed to God, it returns

thanks for knowledge and life; it speaks of Jesus the [Greek: pais

theou] (Son of God) as the mediator; the intercession refers exclusively

to the Church, and the supplication is for the gathering together of the

Church, the hastening of the coming of the kingdom and the destruction

of the world. No direct mention is made of the death and resurrection of

Christ. These prayers are the peculiar property of the Christian Church.

It cannot, however, be said that they exercised any important influence

on the history of dogma. The thoughts contained in them perished in

their specific shape; the measure of permanent importance they attained

in a more general form, was not preserved to them through these prayers.

The second stratum of liturgical pieces dates back to the great prayer

with which the first Epistle of Clement ends, for in many respects this

prayer, though some expressions in it remind us of the older type

([Greek: dia tou êgapêmenou paidos sou Iêsoun Christou], "through thy

beloved son Jesus Christ "), already exhibits the characteristics of the

later liturgy, as is shewn, for example, by a comparison of the

liturgical prayer in the Constitutions of the Apostles (see Lightfoot's

edition and my own). But this piece shews at the same time that the

liturgical prayers, and consequently the liturgy also, sprang from those

in the synagogue, for the similarity is striking. Here we find a

connection resembling that which exists between the Jewish "Two Ways"

and the Christian instruction of catechumens. If this observation is

correct, it clearly explains the cautious use of historical and dogmatic

material in the oldest liturgies--a precaution not to their

disadvantage. As in the prayers of the synagogue, so also in Christian

Churches, all sorts of matters were not submitted to God or laid bare

before Him, but the prayers serve as a religious ceremony, that is, as

adoration, petition and intercession. [Greek: Su ei ho theos monos kai

Iêsous Christos ho pais sou kai hêmeis laos sou kai probata tês nomês

sou], (thou art God alone and Jesus Christ is thy son, and we are thy

people and the sheep of thy pasture). In this confession, an expressive

Christian modification of that of the synagogue, the whole liturgical

ceremony is epitomised. So far as we can assume and conjecture from the

scanty remains of Ante-Nicene liturgy, the character of the ceremony was

not essentially altered in this respect. Nothing containing a specific

dogma or theological speculation was admitted. The number of sacred

ceremonies, already considerable in the second century (how did they

arise?), was still further increased in the third; but the accompanying

words, so far as we know, expressed nothing but adoration, gratitude,

supplication, and intercession. The relations expressed in the liturgy

became more comprehensive, copious and detailed; but its fundamental

character was not changed. The history of dogma in the first three

centuries is not reflected in their liturgy.

APPENDIX III.

NEOPLATONISM.

_The historical significance and position of Neoplatonism._

The political history of the ancient world ends with the Empire of

Diocletian and Constantine, which has not only Roman and Greek, but also

Oriental features. The history of ancient philosophy ends with the

universal philosophy of Neoplatonism, which assimilated the elements of

most of the previous systems, and embodied the result of the history of

religion and civilisation in East and West. But as the Roman Byzantine

Empire is at one and the same time a product of the final effort and the

exhaustion of the ancient world, so also Neoplatonism is, on one side,

the completion of ancient philosophy, and, on another, its abolition.

Never before in the Greek and Roman theory of the world did the

conviction of the dignity of man and his elevation above nature, attain

so certain an expression as in Neoplatonism; and never before in the

history of civilisation did its highest exponents, notwithstanding all

their progress in inner observation, so much undervalue the sovereign

significance of real science and pure knowledge as the later

Neoplatonists did. Judged from the stand-point of pure science, of

empirical knowledge of the world, the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle

marks a momentous turning-point, the post-Aristotelian a retrogression,

the Neoplatonic a complete declension. But judging from the stand-point

of religion and morality, it must be admitted that the ethical temper

which Neoplatonism sought to beget and confirm, was the highest and

purest which the culture of the ancient world produced. This necessarily

took place at the expense of science: for on the soil of polytheistic

natural religions, the knowledge of nature must either fetter and

finally abolish religion, or be fettered and abolished by religion.

Religion and ethic, however, proved the stronger powers. Placed between

these and the knowledge of nature, philosophy, after a period of

fluctuation, finally follows the stronger force. Since the ethical

itself, in the sphere of natural religions, is unhesitatingly conceived

as a higher kind of "nature", conflict with the empirical knowledge of

the world is unavoidable. The higher "physics", for that is what

religious ethics is here, must displace the lower or be itself

displaced. Philosophy must renounce its scientific aspect, in order that

man's claim to a supernatural value of his person and life may be

legitimised.

It is an evidence of the vigour of man's moral endowments that the only

epoch of culture which we are able to survey in its beginnings, its

progress, and its close, ended not with materialism, but with the most

decided idealism. It is true that in its way this idealism also denotes

a bankruptcy; as the contempt for reason and science, and these are

contemned when relegated to the second place, finally leads to

barbarism, because it results in the crassest superstition, and is

exposed to all manner of imposture. And, as a matter of fact, barbarism

succeeded the flourishing period of Neoplatonism. Philosophers

themselves no doubt found their mental food in the knowledge which they

thought themselves able to surpass; but the masses grew up in

superstition, and the Christian Church, which entered on the inheritance

of Neoplatonism, was compelled to reckon with that and come to terms

with it. Just when the bankruptcy of the ancient civilisation and its

lapse into barbarism could not have failed to reveal themselves, a

kindly destiny placed on the stage of history barbarian nations, for

whom the work of a thousand years had as yet no existence. Thus the fact

is concealed, which, however, does not escape the eye of one who looks

below the surface, that the inner history of the ancient world must

necessarily have degenerated into barbarism of its own accord, because

it ended with the renunciation of this world. There is no desire either

to enjoy it, to master it, or to know it as it really is. A new world is

disclosed for which everything is given up, and men are ready to

sacrifice insight and understanding, in order to possess this world with

certainty; and, in the light which radiates from the world to come, that

which in this world appears absurd becomes wisdom, and wisdom becomes

folly.

Such is Neoplatonism. The pre-Socratic philosophers, declared by the

followers of Socrates to be childish, had freed themselves from

theology, that is, the mythology of the poets, and constructed a

philosophy from the observation of nature, without troubling themselves

about ethics and religion. In the systems of Plato and Aristotle physics

and ethics were to attain to their rights, though the latter no doubt

already occupied the first place; theology, that is popular religion,

continues to be thrust aside. The post-Aristotelian philosophers of all

parties were already beginning to withdraw from the objective world.

Stoicism indeed seems to fall back into the materialism that I prevailed

before Plato and Aristotle; but the ethical dualism which dominated the

mood of the Stoic philosophers, did not in the long run tolerate the

materialistic physics; it sought and found help in the metaphysical

dualism of the Platonists, and at the same time reconciled itself to the

popular religion by means of allegorism, that is, it formed a new

theology. But it did not result in permanent philosophic creations. A

one-sided development of Platonism produced the various forms of

scepticism which sought to abolish confidence in empirical knowledge.

Neoplatonism, which came last, learned from all schools. In the first

place, it belongs to the series of post-Aristotelian systems and, as the

philosophy of the subjective, it is the logical completion of them. In

the second place, it rests on scepticism; for it also, though not at the

very beginning, gave up both confidence and pure interest in empirical

knowledge. Thirdly, it can boast of the name and authority of Plato; for

in metaphysics it consciously went back to him and expressly opposed the

metaphysics of the Stoics. Yet on this very point it also learned

something from the Stoics; for the Neoplatonic conception of the action

of God on the world, and of the nature and origin of matter, can only be

explained by reference to the dynamic pantheism of the Stoics. In other

respects, especially in psychology, it is diametrically opposed to the

Stoa, though superior. Fourthly, the study of Aristotle also had an

influence on Neoplatonism. That is shewn not only in the philosophic

methods of the Neoplatonists, but also, though in a subordinate way, in

their metaphysics. Fifthly, the ethic of the Stoics was adopted by

Neoplatonism, but this ethic necessarily gave way to a still higher view

of the conditions of the spirit. Sixthly and finally, Christianity also,

which Neoplatonism opposed in every form (especially in that of the

Gnostic philosophy of religion), seems not to have been entirely without

influence. On this point we have as yet no details, and these can only

be ascertained by a thorough examination of the polemic of Plotinus

against the Gnostics.

Hence, with the exception of Epicureanism, which Neoplatonism dreaded as

its mortal enemy, every important system of former times was drawn upon

by the new philosophy. But we should not on that account call

Neoplatonism an eclectic system in the usual sense of the word. For in

the first place, it had one pervading and all predominating interest,

the religious; and in the second place, it introduced into philosophy a

new supreme principle, the super-rational, or the super-essential. This

principle should not be identified with the "Ideas" of Plato or the

"Form" of Aristotle. For as Zeller rightly says: "In Plato and Aristotle

the distinction of the sensuous and the intelligible is the strongest

expression for belief in the truth of thought; it is only sensuous

perception and sensuous existence whose relative falsehood they

presuppose; but of a higher stage of spiritual life lying beyond idea

and thought, there is no mention. In Neoplatonism, on the other hand, it

is just this super-rational element which is regarded as the final goal

of all effort, and the highest ground of all existence; the knowledge

gained by thought is only an intermediate stage between sensuous

perception and the super-rational intuition; the intelligible forms are

not that which is highest and last, but only the media by which the

influences of the formless original essence are communicated to the

world. This view therefore presupposes not merely doubt of the reality

of sensuous existence and sensuous notions, but absolute doubt,

aspiration beyond all reality. The highest intelligible is not that

which constitutes the real content of thought, but only that which is

presupposed and earnestly desired by man as the unknowable ground of his

thought." Neoplatonism recognised that a religious ethic can be built

neither on sense-perception nor on knowledge gained by the

understanding, and that it cannot be justified by these; it therefore

broke both with intellectual ethics and with utilitarian morality. But

for that very reason, having as it were parted with perception and

understanding in relation to the ascertaining of the highest truth, it

was compelled to seek for a new world and a new function in the human

spirit, in order to ascertain the existence of what it desired, and to

comprehend and describe that of which it had ascertained the existence.

But man cannot transcend his psychological endowment. An iron ring

incloses him. He who does not allow his thought to be determined by

experience falls a prey to fancy, that is, thought, which cannot be

suppressed, assumes a mythological aspect: superstition takes the place

of reason, dull gazing at something incomprehensible is regarded as the

highest goal of the spirit's efforts, and every conscious activity of

the spirit is subordinated to visionary conditions artificially brought

about. But that every conceit may not be allowed to assert itself, the

gradual exploration of every region of knowledge according to every

method of acquiring it, is demanded as a preliminary--the Neoplatonists

did not make matters easy for themselves,--and a new and mighty

principle is set up which is to bridle fancy, viz., _the authority of a

sure tradition_. This authority must be superhuman, otherwise it would

not come under consideration; it must therefore be divine. On divine

disclosures, that is revelations, must rest both the highest

super-rational region of knowledge and the possibility of knowledge

itself. In a word, the philosophy which Neoplatonism represents, whose

final interest is the religious, and whose highest object is the

super-rational, must be a _philosophy of revelation_.

In the case of Plotinus himself and his immediate disciples, this does

not yet appear plainly. They still shew confidence in the objective

presuppositions of their philosophy, and have, especially in psychology,

done great work and created something new. But this confidence vanishes

in the later Neoplatonists. Porphyry, before he became a disciple of

Plotinus, wrote a book [Greek: peri tês eklogiôn philosophia]; as a

philosopher he no longer required the "[Greek: logia]." But the later

representatives of the system sought for their philosophy revelations of

the Godhead. They found them in the religious traditions and cults of

all nations. Neoplatonism learned from the Stoics to rise above the

political limits of nations and states, and to widen the Hellenic

consciousness to a universally human one. The spirit of God has breathed

throughout the whole history of the nations, and the traces of divine

revelation are to be found everywhere. The older a religious tradition

or cultus is, the more worthy of honour, the more rich in thoughts of

God it is. Therefore the old Oriental religions are of special value to

the Neoplatonists. The allegorical method of interpreting myths, which

was practised by the Stoics in particular, was accepted by Neoplatonism

also. But the myths, spiritually explained, have for this system an

entirely different value from what they had for the Stoic philosophers.

The latter adjusted themselves to the myths by the aid of allegorical

explanation; the later Neoplatonists, on the other hand, (after a

selection in which the immoral myths were sacrificed, see, e.g. Julian)

regarded them as _the proper material and sure foundation of

philosophy_. Neoplatonism claims to be not only the absolute

_philosophy_, completing all systems, but, at the same time, the

absolute _religion_, confirming and explaining all earlier religions. A

rehabilitation of all ancient religions is aimed at (see the philosophic

teachers of Julian and compare his great religious experiment); each was

to continue in its traditional form, but, at the same time, each was to

communicate the religious temper and the religious knowledge which

Neoplatonism had attained, and each cultus is to lead to the high

morality which it behoves man to maintain. In Neoplatonism the

psychological fact of the longing of man for something higher, is

exalted to the all-predominating principle which explains the world.

Therefore the religions, though they are to be purified and

spiritualised, become the foundation of philosophy. The Neoplatonic

philosophy therefore presupposes the religious syncretism of the third

century, and cannot be understood without it. The great forces which

were half unconsciously at work in this syncretism, were reflectively

grasped by Neoplatonism. It is the final fruit of the developments

resulting from the political, national and religious syncretism which

arose from the undertakings of Alexander the Great, and the Romans.

Neoplatonism is consequently a stage in the history of religion; nay,

its significance in the history of the world lies in the fact that it is

so. In the history of science and enlightenment it has a position of

significance only in so far as it was the necessary transition stage

through which humanity had to pass, in order to free itself from the

religion of nature and the depreciation of the spiritual life, which

oppose an insurmountable barrier to the highest advance of human

knowledge. But as Neoplatonism in its philosophical aspect means the

abolition of ancient philosophy, which, however, it desired to complete,

so also in its religious aspect it means the abolition of the ancient

religions which it aimed at restoring. For in requiring these religions

to mediate a definite religious knowledge, and to lead to the highest

moral disposition, it burdened them with tasks to which they were not

equal, and under which they could not but break down. And in requiring

them to loosen, if not completely destroy, the bond which was their only

stay, namely, the political bond, it took from them the foundation on

which they were built. But could it not place them on a greater and

firmer foundation? Was not the Roman Empire in existence, and could the

new religion not become dependent on this in the same way as the earlier

religions had been dependent on the lesser states and nations? It might

be thought so, but it was no longer possible. No doubt the political

history of the nations round the Mediterranean, in their development

into the universal Roman monarchy, was parallel to the spiritual history

of these nations in their development into monotheism and a universal

system of morals; but the spiritual development in the end far

outstripped the political: even the Stoics attained to a height which

the political development could only partially reach. Neoplatonism did

indeed attempt to gain a connection with the Byzantine Roman Empire: one

noble monarch, Julian, actually perished as a result of this endeavour:

but even before this the profounder Neoplatonists discerned that their

lofty religious philosophy would not bear contact with the despotic

Empire, because it would not bear any contact with the "world" (plan of

the founding of Platonopolis). Political affairs are at bottom as much a

matter of indifference to Neoplatonism as material things in general.

The idealism of the new philosophy was too high to admit of its being

naturalised in the despiritualised, tyrannical and barren creation of

the Byzantine Empire, and this Empire itself needed unscrupulous and

despotic police officials, not noble philosophers. Important and

instructive, therefore, as the experiments are, which were made from

time to time by the state and by individual philosophers, to unite the

monarchy of the world with Neoplatonism, they could not but be

ineffectual.

But, and this is the last question which one is justified in raising

here, why did not Neoplatonism create an independent religious

community? Since it had already changed the ancient religions so

fundamentally, in its purpose to restore them, since it had attempted to

fill the old naive cults with profound philosophic ideas, and to make

them exponents of a high morality, why did it not take the further step

and create a religious fellowship of its own? Why did it not complete

and confirm the union of gods by the founding of a church which was

destined to embrace the whole of humanity, and in which, beside the one

ineffable Godhead, the gods of all nations could have been worshipped?

Why not? The answer to this question is at the same time the reply to

another, viz., why did the Christian church supplant Neoplatonism?

Neoplatonism lacked three elements to give it the significance of a new

and permanent religious system. Augustine in his confessions (Bk. VII.

18-21) has excellently described these three elements. First and above

all, it lacked a religious founder; secondly, it was unable to give any

answer to the question, how one could permanently maintain the mood of

blessedness and peace: thirdly, it lacked the means of winning those who

could not speculate. The "people" could not learn the philosophic

exercises which it recommended as the condition of attaining the

enjoyment of the highest good; and the way on which even the "people"

can attain to the highest good was hidden from it. Hence these "wise and

prudent" remained a school. When Julian attempted to interest the common

uncultured man in the doctrines and worship of this school, his reward

was mockery and scorn.

Not as philosophy and not as a new religion did Neoplatonism become a

decisive factor in history, but, if I may say so, as a frame of

mind.[455] The feeling that there is an eternal highest good which lies

beyond all outer experience and is not even the intelligible, this

feeling, with which was united the conviction of the entire

worthlessness of everything earthly, was produced and fostered by

Neoplatonism. But it was unable to describe the contents of that highest

being and highest good, and therefore it was here compelled to give

itself entirely up to fancy and aesthetic feeling. Therefore it was

forced to trace out "mysterious ways to that which is within", which,

however, led nowhere. It transformed thought into a dream of feeling; it

immersed itself in the sea of emotions; it viewed the old fabled world

of the nations as the reflection of a higher reality, and transformed

reality into poetry; but in spite of all these efforts it was only able,

to use the words of Augustine, to see from afar the land which it

desired. It broke this world into fragments; but nothing remained to it,

save a ray from a world beyond, which was only an indescribable

"something."

And yet the significance of Neoplatonism in the history of our moral

culture has been, and still is, immeasurable. Not only because it

refined and strengthened man's life of feeling and sensation, not only

because it, more than anything else, wove the delicate veil which even

to-day, whether we be religious or irreligious, we ever and again cast

over the offensive impression of the brutal reality, but, above all,

because it begat the consciousness that the blessedness which alone can

satisfy man, is to be found somewhere else than in the sphere of

knowledge. That man does not live by bread alone, is a truth that was

known before Neoplatonism; but it proclaimed the profounder truth, which

the earlier philosophy had failed to recognise, that man does not live

by knowledge alone. Neoplatonism not only had a propadeutic significance

in the past, but continues to be, even now, the source of all the moods

which deny the world and strive after an ideal, but have not power to

raise themselves above æsthetic feeling, and see no means of getting a

clear notion of the impulse of their own heart and the land of their

desire.

* * * * *

_Historical Origin of Neoplatonism._

The forerunners of Neoplatonism were, on the one hand, those Stoics who

recognise the Platonic distinction of the sensible and supersensible

world, and on the other, the so-called Neopythagoreans and religious

philosophers, such as Posidonius, Plutarch of Chæronea, and especially

Numenius of Apamea.[456] Nevertheless, these cannot be regarded as the

actual Fathers of Neoplatonism; for the philosophic method was still

very imperfect in comparison with the Neoplatonic, their principles were

uncertain, and the authority of Plato was not yet regarded as placed on

an unapproachable height. The Jewish and Christian philosophers of the

first and second centuries stand very much nearer the later Neoplatonism

than Numenius. We would probably see this more clearly if we knew the

development of Christianity in Alexandria in the second century. But,

unfortunately, we have only very meagre fragments to tell us of this.

First and above all, we must mention Philo. This philosopher, who

interpreted the Old Testament religion in terms of Hellenism, had, in

accordance with his idea of revelation, already maintained that the

Divine Original Essence is supra-rational, that only ecstasy leads to

Him, and that the materials for religious and moral knowledge are

contained in the oracles of the Deity. The religious ethic of Philo, a

combination of Stoic, Platonic, Neopythagorean and Old Testament gnomic

wisdom, already bears the marks which we recognise in Neoplatonism. The

acknowledgment that God was exalted above all thought, was a sort of

tribute which Greek philosophy was compelled to pay to the national

religion of Israel, in return for the supremacy which was here granted

to the former. The claim of positive religion to be something more than

an intellectual conception of the universal reason, was thereby

justified. Even religious syncretism is already found in Philo; but it

is something essentially different from the later Neoplatonic, since

Philo regarded the Jewish cult as the only valuable one, and traced back

all elements of truth in the Greeks and Romans to borrowings from the

books of Moses.

The earliest Christian philosophers, especially Justin and Athenagoras,

likewise prepared the way for the speculations of the later

Neoplatonists by their attempts, on the one hand, to connect

Christianity with Stoicism and Platonism, and on the other, to exhibit

it as supra-Platonic. The method by which Justin, in the introduction to

the Dialogue with Trypho, attempts to establish the Christian knowledge

of God, that is, the knowledge of the truth, on Platonism, Scepticism

and "Revelation", strikingly reminds us of the later methods of the

Neoplatonists. Still more is one reminded of Neoplatonism by the

speculations of the Alexandrian Christian Gnostics, especially of

Valentinus and the followers of Basilides. The doctrines of the

Basilidians(?) communicated by Hippolytus (Philosoph. VII. c. 20 sq.),

read like fragments from the didactic writings of the Neoplatonists:

[Greek: Epei ouden ên ouch hulê, ouk ousia, ouk anousion, ouch haploun,

ou suntheton, ouk anoêton, ouk anaisthêton, ouk anthrôpos ... ouk ôn

theos anoêtôs, anaisthêtôs aboulôs aproairetôs, apathôs, anepithumêtios

kosmon êthelêse poiêsai ... Houtôs ouk ôn theos epoiêse kosmon ouk onta

ex ouk ontôn, katabalomenos kai hupostêsas sperma ti en echon pasan en

heautô tês tou kosmou panspermian.] Like the Neoplatonists, these

Basilidians did not teach an emanation from the Godhead, but a dynamic

mode of action of the Supreme Being. The same can be asserted of

Valentinus who also places an unnamable being above all, and views

matter not as a second principle, but as a derived product. The

dependence of Basilides and Valentinus on Zeno and Plato is, besides,

undoubted. But the method of these Gnostics in constructing their mental

picture of the world and its history, was still an uncertain one. Crude

primitive myths are here received, and naively realistic elements

alternate with bold attempts at spiritualising. While therefore,

philosophically considered, the Gnostic systems are very unlike the

finished Neoplatonic ones, it is certain that they contained almost all

the elements of the religious view of the world, which we find in

Neoplatonism.

But were the earliest Neoplatonists really acquainted with the

speculations of men like Philo, Justin, Valentinus and Basilides? were

they familiar with the Oriental religions, especially with the Jewish

and the Christian? and, if we must answer these questions in the

affirmative, did they really learn from these sources?

Unfortunately, we cannot at present give certain, and still less

detailed answers to these questions. But, as Neoplatonism originated in

Alexandria, as Oriental cults confronted every one there, as the Jewish

philosophy was prominent in the literary market of Alexandria, and that

was the very place where scientific Christianity had its headquarters,

there can, generally speaking, be no doubt that the earliest

Neoplatonists had some acquaintance with Judaism and Christianity. In

addition to that, we have the certain fact that the earliest

Neoplatonists had discussions with (Roman) Gnostics (see Carl Schmidt,

Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache, pp. 603-665), and that

Porphyry entered into elaborate controversy with Christianity. In

comparison with the Neoplatonic philosophy, the system of Philo and the

Gnostics appears in many respects an anticipation, which had a certain

influence on the former, the precise nature of which has still to be

ascertained. But the anticipation is not wonderful, for the religious

and philosophic temper which was only gradually produced on Greek soil,

existed from the first in such philosophers as took their stand on the

ground of a revealed religion of redemption. Iamblichus and his

followers first answer completely to the Christian Gnostic schools of

the second century; that is to say, Greek philosophy, in its immanent

development, did not attain till the fourth century the position which

some Greek philosophers, who had accepted Christianity, had already

reached in the second. The influence of Christianity--both Gnostic and

Catholic--on Neoplatonism was perhaps very little at any time, though

individual Neoplatonists since the time of Amelius employed Christian

sayings as oracles, and testified their high esteem for Christ.

_Sketch of the History and Doctrines of Neoplatonism._

Ammonius Saccas (died about 245), who is said to have been born a

Christian, but to have lapsed into heathenism, is regarded as the

founder of the Neoplatonic school in Alexandria. As he has left no

writings, no judgment can be formed as to his teaching. His disciples

inherited from him the prominence which they gave to Plato and the

attempts to prove the harmony between the latter and Aristotle. His most

important disciples were; Origen the Christian, a second heathen Origen,

Longinus, Herennius, and, above all, Plotinus. The latter was born in

the year 205, at Lycopolis in Egypt, laboured from 224 in Rome, and

found numerous adherents and admirers, among others the Emperor Galienus

and his consort, and died in lower Italy about 270. His writings were

arranged by his disciple, Porphyry, and edited in six Enneads.

The Enneads of Plotinus are the fundamental documents of Neoplatonism.

The teaching of this philosopher is mystical, and, like all mysticism,

it falls into two main portions. The first and theoretic part shews the

high origin of the soul, and how it has departed from this its origin.

The second and practical part points out the way by which the soul can

again be raised to the Eternal and the Highest. As the soul with its

longings aspires beyond all sensible things and even beyond the world of

ideas, the Highest must be something above reason. The system therefore

has three parts. I. The Original Essence. II. The world of ideas and the

soul. III. The world of phenomena. We may also, in conformity with the

thought of Plotinus, divide the system thus: A. The supersensible world

(1. The Original Essence; 2. the world of ideas; 3. the soul). B. The

world of phenomena. The Original Essence is the One in contrast to the

many; it is the Infinite and Unlimited in contrast to the finite; it is

the source of all being, therefore the absolute causality and the only

truly existing; but it is also the Good, in so far as everything finite

is to find its aim in it and to flow back to it. Yet moral attributes

cannot be ascribed to this Original Essence, for these would limit it.

It has no attributes at all; it is a being without magnitude, without

life, without thought; nay, one should not, properly speaking, even call

it an existence; it is something above existence, above goodness, and at

the same time the operative force without any substratum. As operative

force the Original Essence is continually begetting something else,

without itself being changed or moved or diminished. This creation is

not a physical process, but an emanation of force; and because that

which is produced has any existence only in so far as the originally

Existent works in it, it may be said that Neoplatonism is dynamical

Pantheism. Everything that has being is directly or indirectly a

production of the "One." In this "One" everything so far as it has

being, is Divine, and God is all in all. But that which is derived is

not like the Original Essence itself. On the contrary, the law of

decreasing perfection prevails in the derived. The latter is indeed an

image and reflection of the Original Essence, but the wider the circle

of creations extends the less their share in the Original Essence. Hence

the totality of being forms a gradation of concentric circles which

finally lose themselves almost completely in non-being, in so far as in

the last circle the force of the Original Essence is a vanishing one.

Each lower stage of being is connected with the Original Essence only by

means of the higher stages; that which is inferior receives a share in

the Original Essence only through the medium of these. But everything

derived has one feature, viz., a longing for the higher; it turns itself

to this so far as its nature allows it.

The first emanation of the Original Essence is the [Greek: Nous]; it is

a complete image of the Original Essence and archetype of all existing

things; it is being and thought at the same time, World of ideas and

Idea. As image the [Greek: Nous] is equal to the Original Essence, as

derived it is completely different from it. What Plotinus understands by

[Greek: Nous] is the highest sphere which the human spirit can reach

([Greek: kosmos noêtos]) and at the same time pure thought itself.

The soul which, according to Plotinus, is an immaterial substance like

the [Greek: Nous],[457] is an image and product of the immovable [Greek:

Nous]. It is related to the [Greek: Nous] as the latter is to the

Original Essence. It stands between the [Greek: Nous] and the world of

phenomena. The [Greek: Nous] penetrates and enlightens it, but it itself

already touches the world of phenomena. The [Greek: Nous] is undivided,

the soul can also preserve its unity and abide in the [Greek: Nous]; but

it has at the same time the power to unite itself with the material

world and thereby to be divided. Hence it occupies a middle position. In

virtue of its nature and destiny it belongs, as the single soul (soul of

the world), to the supersensible world; but it embraces at the same time

the many individual souls; these may allow themselves to be ruled by the

[Greek: Nous], or they may turn to the sensible and be lost in the

finite.

The soul, an active essence, begets the corporeal or the world of

phenomena. This should allow itself to be so ruled by the soul that the

manifold of which it consists may abide in fullest harmony. Plotinus is

not a dualist like the majority of Christian Gnostics. He praises the

beauty and glory of the world. When in it the idea really has dominion

over matter, the soul over the body, the world is beautiful and good. It

is the image of the upper world, though a shadowy one, and the

gradations of better or worse in it are necessary to the harmony of the

whole. But, in point of fact, the unity and harmony in the world of

phenomena disappear in strife and opposition. The result is a conflict,

a growth and decay, a seeming existence. The original cause of this lies

in the fact that a substratum, viz., matter, lies at the basis of

bodies. Matter is the foundation of each ([Greek: to bathos hekastou hê

hulê]); it is the obscure, the indefinite, that which is without

qualities, the [Greek: mê on]. As devoid of form and idea it is the

evil, as capable of form the intermediate.

The human souls that are sunk in the material have been ensnared by the

sensuous, and have allowed themselves to be ruled by desire. They now

seek to detach themselves entirely from true being, and striving after

independence fall into an unreal existence. Conversion therefore is

needed, and this is possible, for freedom is not lost.

Now here begins the practical philosophy. The soul must rise again to

the highest on the same path by which it descended: it must first of all

return to itself. This takes place through virtue which aspires to

assimilation with God and leads to Him. In the ethics of Plotinus all

earlier philosophic systems of virtue are united and arranged in

graduated order. Civic virtues stand lowest, then follow the purifying,

and finally the deifying virtues. Civic virtues only adorn the life, but

do not elevate the soul as the purifying virtues do; they free the soul

from the sensuous and lead it back to itself and thereby to the [Greek:

Nous]. Man becomes again a spiritual and permanent being, and frees

himself from every sin, through asceticism. But he is to reach still

higher; he is not only to be without sin, but he is to be "God." That

takes place through the contemplation of the Original Essence, the One,

that is through ecstatic elevation to Him. This is not mediated by

thought, for thought reaches only to the [Greek: Nous], and is itself

only a movement. Thought is only a preliminary stage towards union with

God. The soul can only see and touch the Original Essence in a condition

of complete passivity and rest. Hence, in order to attain to this

highest, the soul must subject itself to a spiritual "Exercise." It must

begin with the contemplation of material things, their diversity and

harmony, then retire into itself and sink itself in its own essence, and

thence mount up to the [Greek: Nous], to the world of ideas; but, as it

still does not find the One and Highest Essence there, as the call

always comes to it from there: "We have not made ourselves" (Augustine

in the sublime description of Christian, that is, Neoplatonic

exercises), it must, as it were, lose sight of itself in a state of

intense concentration, in mute contemplation and complete forgetfulness

of all things. It can then see God, the source of life, the principle of

being, the first cause of all good, the root of the soul. In that moment

it enjoys the highest and indescribable blessedness; it is itself, as it

were, swallowed up by the deity and bathed in the light of eternity.

Plotinus, as Porphyry relates, attained to this ecstatic union with God

four times during the six years he was with him. To Plotinus this

religious philosophy was sufficient; he did not require the popular

religion and worship. But yet he sought their support. The Deity is

indeed in the last resort only the Original Essence, but it manifests

itself in a fulness of emanations and phenomena. The [Greek: Nous] is,

as it were, the second God; the [Greek: logoi], which are included in

it, are gods; the stars are gods, etc. A strict monotheism appeared to

Plotinus a poor thing. The myths of the popular religion were

interpreted by him in a particular sense, and he could justify even

magic, soothsaying and prayer. He brought forward reasons for the

worship of images, which the Christian worshippers of images

subsequently adopted. Yet, in comparison with the later Neoplatonists,

he was free from gross superstition and wild fanaticism. He cannot, in

the remotest sense, be reckoned among the "deceivers who were themselves

deceived," and the restoration of the ancient worships of the Gods was

not his chief aim.

Among his disciples the most important were Amelius and Porphyry.

Amelius changed the doctrine of Plotinus in some points, and even made

use of the prologue of the Gospel of John. Porphyry has the merit of

having systematized and spread the teaching of his master, Plotinus. He

was born at Tyre, in the year 233; whether he was for some time a

Christian is uncertain; from 263-268 he was a pupil of Plotinus at Rome;

before that he wrote the work [Greek: peri tês ek logiôn philosophias],

which shews that he wished to base philosophy on revelation; he lived a

few years in Sicily (about 270) where he wrote his "fifteen books

against the Christians"; he then returned to Rome where he laboured as a

teacher, edited the works of Plotinus, wrote himself a series of

treatises, married, in his old age, the Roman Lady Marcella, and died

about the year 303. Porphyry was not an original, productive thinker,

but a diligent and thorough investigator, characterized by great

learning, by the gift of an acute faculty for philological and

historical criticism, and by an earnest desire to spread the true

philosophy of life, to refute false doctrines, especially those of the

Christians, to ennoble man and draw him to that which is good. That a

mind so free and noble surrendered itself entirely to the philosophy of

Plotinus and to polytheistic mysticism, is a proof that the spirit of

the age works almost irresistibly, and that religious mysticism was the

highest possession of the time. The teaching of Porphyry is

distinguished from that of Plotinus by the fact that it is still more

practical and religious. The aim of philosophy, according to Porphyry,

is the salvation of the soul. The origin and the guilt of evil lie not

in the body, but in the desires of the soul. The strictest asceticism

(abstinence from cohabitation, flesh and wine) is therefore required in

addition to the knowledge of God. During the course of his life Porphyry

warned men more and more decidedly against crude popular beliefs and

immoral cults. "The ordinary notions of the Deity are of such a kind

that it is more godless to share them than to neglect the images of the

gods." But freely as he criticised the popular religions, he did not

wish to give them up. He contended for a pure worship of the many gods,

and recognised the right of every old national religion, and the

religious duties of their professors. His work against the Christians is

not directed against Christ, or what he regarded as the teaching of

Christ, but against the Christians of his day and against the sacred

books which, according to Porphyry, were written by impostors and

ignorant people. In his acute criticism of the genesis or what was

regarded as Christianity in his day, he spoke bitter and earnest truths,

and therefore acquired the name of the fiercest and most formidable of

all the enemies of Christians. His work was destroyed (condemned by an

edict of Theodosius II. and Valentinian, of the year 448), and even the

writings in reply (by Methodius, Eusebius, Apollinaris, Philostorgius,

etc.,) have not been preserved. Yet we possess fragments in Lactantius,

Augustine, Macarius Magnes and others, which attest how thoroughly

Porphyry studied the Christian writings and how great his faculty was

for true historical criticism.

Porphyry marks the transition to the Neoplatonism which subordinated

itself entirely to the polytheistic cults, and which strove, above all,

to defend the old Greek and Oriental religions against the formidable

assaults of Christianity. Iamblichus, the disciple of Porphyry (died

330), transformed Neoplatonism "from a philosophic theorem into a

theological doctrine." The doctrines peculiar to Iamblichus can no

longer be deduced from scientific, but only from practical motives. In

order to justify superstition and the ancient cults, philosophy in

Iamblichus becomes a theurgic, mysteriosophy, spiritualism. Now appears

that series of "Philosophers", in whose case one is frequently unable to

decide whether they are deceivers or deceived, "decepti deceptores," as

Augustine says. A mysterious mysticism of numbers plays a great rôle.

That which is absurd and mechanical is surrounded with the halo of the

sacramental; myths are proved by pious fancies and pietistic

considerations with a spiritual sound; miracles, even the most foolish,

are believed in and are performed. The philosopher becomes the priest of

magic, and philosophy an instrument of magic. At the same time, the

number of Divine Beings is infinitely increased by the further action of

unlimited speculation. But this fantastic addition which Iamblichus

makes to the inhabitants of Olympus, is the very fact which proves that

Greek philosophy has here returned to mythology, and that the religion

of nature was still a power. And yet no one can deny that, in the fourth

century, even the noblest and choicest minds were found among the

Neoplatonists. So great was the declension, that this Neoplatonic

philosophy was still the protecting roof for many influential and

earnest thinkers, although swindlers and hypocrites also concealed

themselves under this roof. In relation to some points of doctrine, at

any rate, the dogmatic of Iamblichus marks an advance. Thus, the

emphasis he lays on the idea that evil has its seat in the will, is an

important fact; and in general the significance he assigns to the will

is perhaps the most important advance in psychology, and one which could

not fail to have great influence on dogmatic also (Augustine). It

likewise deserves to be noted that Iamblichus disputed Plotinus'

doctrine of the divinity of the human soul.

The numerous disciples of Iamblichus (Aedesius, Chrysantius, Eusebius,

Priscus, Sopater, Sallust and especially Maximus, the most celebrated)

did little to further speculation; they occupied themselves partly with

commenting on the writings of the earlier philosophers (particularly

Themistius), partly as missionaries of their mysticism. The interests

and aims of these philosophers are best shewn in the treatise "De

mysteriis Ægyptiorum." Their hopes were strengthened when their disciple

Julian, a man enthusiastic and noble, but lacking in intellectual

originality, ascended the imperial throne, 361 to 363. This emperor's

romantic policy of restoration, as he himself must have seen, had,

however, no result, and his early death destroyed ever hope of

supplanting Christianity.

But the victory of the Church, in the age of Valentinian and Theodosius,

unquestionably purified Neoplatonism. The struggle for dominion had led

philosophers to grasp at and unite themselves with everything that was

hostile to Christianity. But now Neoplatonism was driven out of the

great arena of history. The Church and its dogmatic, which inherited its

estate, received along with the latter superstition, polytheism, magic,

myths and the apparatus of religious magic. The more firmly all this

established itself in the Church and succeeded there, though not without

finding resistance, the freer Neoplatonism becomes. It does not by any

means give up its religious attitude or its theory of knowledge, but it

applies itself with fresh zeal to scientific investigations and

especially to the study of the earlier philosophers. Though Plato

remains the divine philosopher, yet it may be noticed how, from about

400, the writings of Aristotle were increasingly read and prized.

Neoplatonic schools continue to flourish in the chief cities of the

empire up to the beginning of the fifth century, and in this period they

are at the same time the places where the theologians of the Church are

formed. The noble Hypatia, to whom Synesius, her enthusiastic disciple,

who was afterwards a bishop, raised a splendid monument, taught in

Alexandria. But from the beginning of the fifth century ecclesiastical

fanaticism ceased to tolerate heathenism. The murder of Hypatia put an

end to philosophy in Alexandria, though the Alexandrian school

maintained itself in a feeble form till the middle of the sixth century.

But in one city of the East, removed from the great highways of the

world, which had become a provincial city and possessed memories which

the Church of the fifth century felt itself too weak to destroy, viz.,

in Athens, a Neoplatonic school continued to flourish. There, among the

monuments of a past time, Hellenism found its last asylum. The school of

Athens returned to a more strict philosophic method and to learned

studies. But as it clung to religious philosophy and undertook to reduce

the whole Greek tradition, viewed in the light of Plotinus' theory, to a

comprehensive and strictly articulated system, a philosophy arose here

which may be called scholastic. For every philosophy is scholastic which

considers fantastic and mythological material as a _noli me tangere_,

and treats it in logical categories and distinctions by means of a

complete set of formulæ. But to these Neoplatonists the writings of

Plato, certain divine oracles, the Orphic poems, and much else which

were dated back to the dim and distant past, were documents of standard

authority, and inspired divine writings. They took from them the

material of philosophy, which they then treated with all the instruments

of dialectic.

The most prominent teachers at Athens were Plutarch (died 433), his

disciple Syrian (who, as an exegete of Plato and Aristotle, is said to

have done important work, and who deserves notice also, because he very

vigorously emphasised the freedom of the will), but, above all, Proclus

(411-485). Proclus is the great scholastic of Neoplatonism. It was he

"who fashioned the whole traditional material into a powerful system

with religious warmth and formal clearness, filling up the gaps and

reconciling the contradictions by distinctions and speculations,"

"Proclus," says Zeller, "was the first who, by the strict logic of his

system, formally completed the Neoplatonic philosophy and gave it, with

due regard to all the changes it had undergone since the second century,

that form in which it passed over to the Christian and Mohammedan middle

ages." Forty-four years after the death of Proclus the school of Athens

was closed by Justinian (in the year 529); but in the labours of Proclus

it had completed its work, and could now really retire from the scene.

It had nothing new to say; it was ripe for death, and an honourable end

was prepared for it. The words of Proclus, the legacy of Hellenism to

the Church and to the middle ages, attained an immeasurable importance

in the thousand years which followed. They were not only one of the

bridges by which the philosophy of the middle ages returned to Plato and

Aristotle, but they determined the scientific method of the next thirty

generations, and they partly produced, partly strengthened and brought

to maturity the mediæval Christian mysticism in East and West.

The disciples of Proclus, Marinus, Asclepiodotus, Ammonius, Zenodotus,

Isidorus, Hegias, Damascius, are not regarded as prominent. Damascius

was the last head of the school at Athens. He, Simplicius, the masterly

commentator on Aristotle, and five other Neoplatonists, migrated to

Persia after Justinian had issued the edict closing the school. They

lived in the illusion that Persia, the land of the East, was the seat of

wisdom, righteousness and piety. After a few years they returned with

blasted hopes to the Byzantine kingdom.

At the beginning of the sixth century Neoplatonism died out as an

independent philosophy in the East; but almost at the same time, and

this is no accident, it conquered new regions in the dogmatic of the

Church through the spread of the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius; it

began to fertilize Christian mysticism, and filled the worship with a

new charm.

In the West, where, from the second century, we meet with few attempts

at philosophic speculation, and where the necessary conditions for

mystical contemplation were wanting, Neoplatonism only gained a few

adherents here and there. We know that the rhetorician, Marius

Victorinus, (about 350) translated the writings of Plotinus. This

translation exercised decisive influence on the mental history of

Augustine, who borrowed from Neoplatonism the best it had, its

psychology, introduced it into the dogmatic of the Church, and developed

it still further. It may be said that Neoplatonism influenced the West

at first only through the medium or under the cloak of ecclesiastical

theology. Even Boethius--we can now regard this as certain--was a

Catholic Christian. But in his mode of thought he was certainly a

Neoplatonist. His violent death in the year 525, marks the end of

independent philosophic effort in the West. This last Roman philosopher

stood indeed almost completely alone in his century, and the philosophy

for which he lived was neither original, nor firmly grounded and

methodically carried out.

_Neoplatonism and Ecclesiastical Dogmatic._

The question as to the influence which Neoplatonism had on the history

of the development of Christianity, is not easy to answer; it is hardly

possible to get a clear view of the relation between them. Above all,

the answers will diverge according as we take a wider or a narrower view

of so-called "Neoplatonism." If we view Neoplatonism as the highest and

only appropriate expression for the religious hopes and moods which

moved the nations of Græco-Roman Empire from the second to the fifth

centuries, the ecclesiastical dogmatic which was developed in the same

period, may appear as a younger sister of Neoplatonism which was

fostered by the elder one, but which fought and finally conquered her.

The Neoplatonists themselves described the ecclesiastical theologians as

intruders who appropriated Greek philosophy, but mixed it with foreign

fables. Hence Porphyry said of Origen (in Euseb., H. E. VI. 19): "The

outer life of Origen was that of a Christian and opposed to the law;

but, in regard to his views of things and of the Deity, he thought like

the Greeks, inasmuch as he introduced their ideas into the myths of

other peoples." This judgment of Porphyry is at any rate more just and

appropriate than that of the Church theologians about Greek philosophy,

that it had stolen all its really valuable doctrines from the ancient

sacred writings of the Christians. It is, above all, important that the

affinity of the two sides was noted. So far, then, as both

ecclesiastical dogmatic and Neoplatonism start from the feeling of the

need of redemption, so far as both desire to free the soul from the

sensuous, so far as they recognise the inability of man to attain to

blessedness and a certain knowledge of the truth without divine help and

without a revelation, they are fundamentally related. It must no doubt

be admitted that Christianity itself was already profoundly affected by

the influence of Hellenism when it began to outline a theology; but this

influence must be traced back less to philosophy than to the collective

culture, and to all the conditions under which the spiritual life was

enacted. When Neoplatonism arose ecclesiastical Christianity already

possessed the fundamental features of its theology, that is, it had

developed these, not by accident, contemporaneously and independent of

Neoplatonism. Only by identifying itself with the whole history of Greek

philosophy, or claiming to be the restoration of pure Platonism, was

Neoplatonism able to maintain that it had been robbed by the church

theology of Alexandria. But that was an illusion. Ecclesiastical

theology appears, though our sources here are unfortunately very meagre,

to have learned but little from Neoplatonism even in the third century,

partly because the latter itself had not yet developed into the form in

which the dogmatic of the church could assume its doctrines, partly

because ecclesiastical theology had first to succeed in its own region,

to fight for its own position and to conquer older notions intolerable

to it. Origen was quite as independent a thinker as Plotinus; but both

drew from the same tradition. On the other hand, the influence of

Neoplatonism on the Oriental theologians was very great from the fourth

century. The more the Church expressed its peculiar ideas in doctrines

which, though worked out by means of philosophy, were yet unacceptable

to Neoplatonism (the christological doctrines), the more readily did

theologians in all other questions resign themselves to the influence of

the latter system. The doctrines of the incarnation, of the resurrection

of the body, and of the creation of the word, in time formed the

boundary lines between the dogmatic of the Church and Neoplatonism; in

all else ecclesiastical theologians and Neoplatonists approximated so

closely that many among them were completely at one. Nay, there were

Christian men, such as Synesius, for example, who in certain

circumstances were not found fault with for giving a speculative

interpretation of the specifically Christian doctrines. If in any

writing the doctrines just named are not referred to, it is often

doubtful whether it was composed by a Christian or a Neoplatonist. Above

all, the ethical rules, the precepts of the right life, that is,

asceticism, were always similar. Here Neoplatonism in the end celebrated

its greatest triumph. It introduced into the church its entire

mysticism, its mystic exercises, and even the magical ceremonies, as

expounded by Iamblichus. The writings of the pseudo-Dionysius contain a

Gnosis in which, by means of the doctrines of Iamblichus and doctrines

like those of Proclus, the dogmatic of the church is changed into a

scholastic mysticism with directions for practical life and worship. As

the writings of this pseudo-Dionysius were regarded as those of

Dionysius the disciple of the Apostle, the scholastic mysticism which

they taught was regarded as apostolic, almost as a divine science. The

importance which these writings obtained first in the East, then from

the ninth or the twelfth century also in the West, cannot be too highly

estimated. It is impossible to explain them here. This much only may be

said, that the mystical and pietistic devotion of to-day, even in the

Protestant Church, draws its nourishment from writings whose connection

with those of the pseudo-Areopagitic can still be traced through its

various intermediate stages.

In antiquity itself Neoplatonism influenced with special directness one

Western theologian, and that the most important, viz., Augustine. By the

aid of this system Augustine was freed from Manichæism, though not

completely, as well as from scepticism. In the seventh Book of his

confessions he has acknowledged his indebtedness to the reading of

Neoplatonic writings. In the most essential doctrines, viz., those about

God, matter, the relation of God to the world, freedom and evil,

Augustine always remained dependent on Neoplatonism; but at the same

time, of all theologians in antiquity he is the one who saw most clearly

and shewed most plainly wherein Christianity and Neoplatonism are

distinguished. The best that has been written by a Father of the Church

on this subject, is contained in Chapters 9-21 of the seventh Book of

his confessions.

The question why Neoplatonism was defeated in the conflict with

Christianity, has not as yet been satisfactorily answered by historians.

Usually the question is wrongly stated. The point here is not about a

Christianity arbitrarily fashioned, but only about Catholic Christianity

and Catholic theology. This conquered Neoplatonism after it had

assimilated nearly everything it possessed. Further, we must note the

place where the victory was gained. The battle-field was the empire of

Constantine, Theodosius and Justinian. Only when we have considered

these and all other conditions, are we entitled to enquire in what

degree the specific doctrines of Christianity contributed to the

victory, and what share the organisation of the church had in it.

Undoubtedly, however, we must always give the chief prominence to the

fact that the Catholic dogmatic excluded polytheism in principle, and at

the same time found a means by which it could represent the faith of the

cultured mediated by science as identical with the faith of the

multitude resting on authority.

In the theology and philosophy of the middle ages, mysticism was the

strong opponent of rationalistic dogmatism; and, in fact, Platonism and

Neoplatonism were the sources from which in the age of the Renaissance

and in the following two centuries, empiric science developed itself in

opposition to the rationalistic dogmatism which disregarded experience.

Magic, astrology, alchemy, all of which were closely connected with

Neoplatonism, gave an effective impulse to the observation of nature

and, consequently, to natural science, and finally prevailed over formal

and barren rationalism Consequently, in the history of science,

Neoplatonism has attained a significance and performed services of which

men like Iamblichus and Proclus never ventured to dream. In point of

fact, actual history is often more wonderful and capricious than legends

and fables.

_Literature_--The best and fullest account of Neoplatonism, to which I

have been much indebted in preparing this sketch, is Zeller's, Die

Philosophie der Griechen, III. Theil, 2 Abtheilung (3 Auflage, 1881) pp.

419-865. Cf. also Hegel, Gesch. d. Philos. III. 3 ff. Ritter, IV. pp.

571-728: Ritter et Preller, Hist. phil. græc. et rom. § 531 ff. The

Histories of Philosophy by Schwegler, Brandis, Brucker, Thilo,

Strümpell, Ueberweg (the most complete survey of the literature is found

here), Erdmann, Cousin, Prantl. Lewes. Further: Vacherot, Hist, de

l'ecole d'Alexandria, 1846, 1851. Simon, Hist, de l'école d'Alexandria,

1845. Steinhart, articles "Neuplatonismus", "Plotin", "Porphyrius",

"Proklus" in Pauly, Realencyclop. des klass. Alterthums. Wagenmann,

article "Neuplatonismus" in Herzog, Realencyklopädie f. protest. Theol.

T. X. (2 Aufl.) pp. 519-529. Heinze, Lehre vom Logos, 1872, p. 298 f.

Richter, Neuplatonische Studien, 4 Hefte.

Heigl, Der Bericht des Porphyrios über Ongenes, 1835. Redepenning,

Origenes I. p. 421 f. Dehaut, Essai historique sur la vie et la doctrine

d'Ammonius Saccas, 1836. Kirchner, Die Philosophie des Plotin, 1854.

(For the biography of Plotinus, cf. Porphyry, Eunapius, Suidas; the

latter also in particular for the later Neoplatonists). Steinhart, De

dialectica Plotini ratione, 1829, and Meletemata Plotiniana, 1840.

Neander, Ueber die welthistorische Bedeutung des 9'ten Buchs in der

2'ten Enneade des Plotinos, in the Abhandl. der Berliner Akademie, 1843.

p. 299 f. Valentiner, Plotin u.s. Enneaden, in the Theol. Stud. u.

Kritiken, 1864, H. 1. On Porphyrius, see Fabricius, Bibl. gr. V. p. 725

f. Wolff, Porph. de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiæ,

1856. Müller, Fragmenta hist. gr. III. 688 f. Mai, Ep. ad Marcellam,

1816. Bernays, Theophrast. 1866. Wagenmann, Jahrbücher für Deutsche

Theol. Th. XXIII. (1878) p. 269 f. Richter, Zeitschr. f. Philos. Th.

LII. (1867) p. 30 f. Hebenstreit, de Iamblichi doctrina, 1764. Harless,

Das Buch von den ägyptischen Mysterien, 1858. Meiners, Comment. Societ.

Gotting IV. p. 50 f. On Julian, see the catalogue of the rich literature

in the Realencyklop. f. prot Theol. Th. VII. (2 Aufl.) p. 287, and

Neumann, Juliani libr. c. Christ, quæ supersunt, 1880. Hoche, Hypatia,

in "Philologus" Th. XV. (1860) p. 435 f. Bach, De Syriano philosopho,

1862. On Proclus, see the Biography of Marinus and Freudenthal in

"Hermes" Th. XVI. p. 214 f. On Boethius, cf. Nitzsch, Das System des

Boëthius, 1860. Usener, Anecdoton Holderi, 1877.

On the relation of Neoplatonism to Christianity and its significance in

the history of the world, cf. the Church Histories of Mosheim, Gieseler,

Neander, Baur; also the Histories of Dogma by Baur and Nitzsch. Also

Löffler, Der Platonismus der Kirchenväter, 1782. Huber, Die Philosophic

der Kirchenväter, 1859. Tzschirner, Fall des Heidenthums, 1829.

Burckhardt, Die Zeit Constantin's des Grossen, p. 155 f. Chastel, Hist.

de la destruction du Paganisme dans l'empire d'Orient, 1850. Beugnot,

Hist. de la destruction du Paganisme en Occident, 1835. E. V. Lasaulx,

Der Untergang des Hellenismus, 1854. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of

Alexandria 1886. Réville, La réligion à Rome sous les Sévères, 1886.

Vogt, Neuplatonismus und Christenthum, 1836. Ullmann, Einfluss des

Christenthums auf Porphyrius, in Stud, und Krit., 1832 On the relation

of Neoplatonism to Monasticism, cf. Keim, Aus dem Urchristenthum, 1178,

p. 204 f. Carl Schmidt, Gnostische Schriften in Koptischer Sprache, 1892

(Texte u. Unters. VIII. I. 2). See, further, the Monographs on Origen,

the later Alexandrians, the three Cappadocians, Theodoret, Synesius,

Marius Victorinus, Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, Scotus Erigena

and the Mediæval Mystics. Special prominence is due to: Jahn, Basilius

Plotinizans, 1838. Dorner, Augustinus, 1875. Bestmann, Qua ratione

Augustinus notiones philos. Græcæ adhibuerit, 1877. Loesche, Augustinus

Plotinizans, 1881. Volkmann, Synesios, 1869. On the after effects of

Neoplatonism on Christian Dogmatic, see Ritschl, Theologie und

Metaphysik. 2 Aufl. 1887.

[Footnote 455: Excellent remarks on the nature of Neoplatonism may be

found in Eucken, Gött. Gel. Anz., 1 März, 1884 p. 176 ff.: this sketch

was already written before I saw them. "We find the characteristic of

the Neoplatonic epoch in the effort to make the inward, which till then

had had alongside of it an independent outer world as a contrast, the

exclusive and all-determining element. The movement which makes itself

felt here, outlasts antiquity and prepares the way for the modern

period; it brings about the dissolution of that which marked the

culminating point of ancient life, that which we are wont to call

specifically classic. The life of the spirit, till then conceived as a

member of an ordered world and subject to its laws, now freely passes

beyond these bounds, and attempts to mould, and even to create, the

universe from itself. No doubt the different attempts to realise this

desire reveal, for the most part, a deep gulf between will and deed;

usually ethical and religious requirements of the naive human

consciousness must replace universally creative spiritual power, but all

the insufficient and unsatisfactory elements of this period should not

obscure the fact that, in one instance, it reached the height of a great

philosophic achievement, in the case of Plotinus."]

[Footnote 456: Plotinus, even in his lifetime, was reproached with

having borrowed most of his system from Numenius. Porphyry, in his "Vita

Plotini", defended him against this reproach.]

[Footnote 457: On this sort of Trinity, see Bigg, "The Christian

Platonists of Alexandria," p. 248 f.]